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THE ELIGIBILITY OF

ETHICAL NATURALISM

by

DOUGLAS EDWARDS

Abstract: Perhaps the two main contemporary formulations of ethical natu-

ralism Synthetic Ethical Naturalism (SEN) and Analytical Descriptivism

seem to conflict with plausible views about cases where moral debate anddisagreement is possible. Both lack safeguards to avoid divergence of reference

across different communities, which can scupper the prospects for genuine

moral disagreement. I explore the prospects for supplementing both views with

Lewiss notion of eligibility, arguing that this can solve the problem for a

modified form of analytical descriptivism, and for a modified form of SEN too

(though perhaps more controversially). I close by considering the appropriate-

ness of using the notions of eligibility and joint-carving in ethics.

1. Introduction

Synthetic Ethical Naturalism (SEN), which offers a causal theory of ref-

erence for moral terms, can be shown to conflict with widely held views

about cases where moral debate and disagreement is possible. A central

problem is a lack of safeguards to avoid divergence of reference across

different communities, which, in turn, scuppers the prospects for genuine

moral disagreement and seems to imply relativism. In this article I suggest

that this is not the end of the line for ethical naturalism, provided we can

find a better semantic framework in which to cast the view. Unfortunately,

we will see that the other main competitor Jacksons (1998) AnalyticalDescriptivism falls prey to the same problem. However, I go on to

explore how more promising results can be found by supplementing both

views with David Lewiss (1983) notion of eligibility. What these supple-

ments give us is a safeguard against divergence in the reference of moral

terms across different communities. Whether this is enough to ensure

genuine disagreement is another matter, but, insofar as shared reference is

a necessary condition for genuine disagreement, some progress at least is

made. In the final section of the article I discuss the appropriateness of

using the notions of naturalness and eligibility in ethics.

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2013) 118 DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01441.x

2012 The Author

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 2012 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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2. Synthetic ethical naturalism

The version of ethical naturalism under discussion here can be minimally

defined as the idea that moral properties can be identified with natural

properties, or are at least definable in terms of natural properties. Thedriving thought is that they can be identified with properties that are fully

explicable within our scientific picture of the world, and thus that there is

nothing mysterious about properties like goodness or rightness: the moral,

just like most other subject matters, is open to naturalistic explanation.

This view thus holds that moral properties exist, and takes a cognitivist1

view of moral discourse.

SEN2 is a theory which identifies moral properties with natural proper-

ties, but which does not make analytic claims about the meanings of moral

terms being equivalent to natural terms. G. E. Moores (1903) influentialOpen Question Argument contended that moral properties cannot be

identified with natural properties, because there is clearly not an analytical

equivalence between the term good and the term for the relevant natural

property, call it X. This is because it would always make sense to ask

given that action Y is X, is action Y good?, which, Moore thought,

entailed that goodness cannot be equated with property X.3 What SEN

asks us to suppose, however, is that, whilst it may be the case that the

terms good and X are not analytically equivalent, it may still be the case

that they ultimately refer to the same property. The analogy used toexplain the idea is that of water and H20 in the post-Kripke (1980)/

Putnam (1975) environment. Whilst it might be clear that the terms water

and H20 are not analytically equivalent, most people suppose that they

both pick out the same substance: the property of being water is identical

to the property of being H20, due to the substance with the property of

being H2O being the substance that causally regulates our use of the term

water.

SEN attempts a similar move in the case of moral properties, like

goodness and rightness. SEN agrees with Moore that the terms good andX are not analytically equivalent, but this does not rule out the idea that

they ultimately refer to the same property: that the property of being good

is identical to the property of being X, with the property of being X the

property that causally regulates the use of good.

We can thus separate the main contentions of SEN so far into three

components. Firstly, moral terms behave like natural kind terms: they

have natural synthetic definitions that reveal the essence of the property

the term expresses. Secondly, moral terms rigidly designate these natural

properties. Thirdly, reference is a matter of there being certain causalrelations between peoples uses of the term and the relevant natural

properties.

PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY2

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3. A problem for SEN

We can generate a problem for SEN by thinking about the moral terms of

different communities.4 Recall that it is causal regulation which is the

defining factor in reference: terms refer to the properties that causallyregulate their use. Now suppose that the moral terms of one community,

call them T1, are causally regulated by natural property Tc, which, we

suppose, generates a broadly consequentialist moral system. Suppose also

that the moral terms of another community, call them T2, are causally

regulated by a different natural property, Td, which generates a broadly

deontological system. How then do we account for the intuitive moral

disagreements that would occur if (or when) the two communities were to

interact (suppose that their languages are sufficiently similar for them to

understand one another, or that they are able to translate one anothersdialect into their own)? Their terms refer to different properties, so are they

really disagreeing when a member of T1 says x is right, and a member of

T2 says x is not right?

It seems not. The difference in reference is sufficient to show that both

sides are not talking about the same thing, and the legitimacy of the dispute

between them suffers accordingly. Presumably we would at least want the

view that genuine moral dispute between these communities is possible,

but SEN seems to fail to give us this result, and, in the process, arguably

forces us into a form of moral relativism. This example, then, seems toshow that the causal theory of reference cannot be applied to moral terms

if ethical naturalism is to succeed (or, at least, if it is to avoid a fairly

radical form of moral relativism). Due to difference in reference between

different communities, moral debate between communities looks to be

impaired, which is a problematic result.

How else, then, could ethical naturalism proceed? Instead of holding

that there is a causal relationship between the natural properties and the

terms in question, we might instead say that the natural properties are

selected by their ability to fit our use of those terms. A view of this kind ispresented by Frank Jackson (1998).

4. Analytical descriptivism

According to Jackson, coming to have an understanding of our moral

concepts is a matter of mastering what he calls folk morality, which he

describes as:

. . . the network of moral opinions, intuitions, principles and concepts whose mastery is part

and parcel of having a sense of what is right and wrong, and of being able to engage in

meaningful debate about what ought to be done (Jackson, 1998, p. 130).

THE ELIGIBILITY OF ETHICAL NATURALISM 3

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Folk morality is a raft of information regarding our moral concepts,

which, as it were, locates each concept by its relation to other moral

concepts, and indeed to non-moral concepts. It is composed of a number

of intuitive thoughts about rightness and wrongness, goodness and

badness, which, when taken together, give us a more or less complete bodyof information about our moral concepts. Such a body, argues Jackson,

will contain what he calls input clauses, internal role clauses, and output

clauses. Jackson writes:

The input clauses of folk morality tell us what kinds of situations described in descriptive,

non-moral terms warrant what kinds of description in ethical terms: if an act is an intentional

killing, then normally it is wrong; pain is bad; I cut you choose is a fair procedure; and so

on. The internal role clauses of folk morality articulate the interconnections between matters

described in ethical, normative language: courageous people are more likely to do what isright than cowardly people; the best option is the right option; rights impose duties of respect;

and so on. The output clauses of folk morality take us from ethical judgments to facts about

motivation and thus behaviour: the judgement that an act is right is normally accompanied

by at least some desire to perform the act in question; the realization that an act would be

dishonest typically dissuades an agent from performing it; properties that make something

good are the properties we typically have some have some kind of pro-attitude towards, and

so on (Jackson, 1998, pp. 1301).

Jackson argues that these input, internal role, and output clauses form a

network, and, according to analytical descriptivism, the meaning of moralterms is determined by their relevant places in this network.

However, as a large part of folk morality is controversial, and what may

seem to be some of its most basic clauses are often disputed, it may turn

out that there is not one stable body of folk morality at all. Jackson

introduces the notion of mature folk morality in order to deal with this

problem. Jackson sees folk morality as evolving over time, but believes

that we can realistically posit a point where this evolution winds down,

leaving us with a stable body of moral opinion. He says:

. . . it is useful to have a term for where folk morality will end up after it has been exposed to

debate and critical reflection. . . . I will call where folk morality will end up, mature folk

morality. The idea is that mature folk morality is the best we will do by way of making good

sense of the raft of sometimes conflicting intuitions about particular cases and general

principles that make up folk morality (Jackson, 1998, p. 133).

With the advent of mature folk morality, Jackson gives a procedure to

analyse the moral terms within it, drawing upon Lewis (1970) work on

defining theoretical terms.5 Jackson gives the name M to mature folkmorality as written out in a long conjunction of its various clauses, with

each clause written out in such a way as to include explicit reference to

properties. For instance, in Jacksons example, Killing is typically wrong


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becomes Killing typically has the property of being wrong. We then

replace each moral term with a distinct variable, which gives us:

M( , , , )x x xn1 2

We then prefix each variable with an existential quantifier and introduce a

uniqueness clause to give us the modified Ramsey sentence of:

( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( , ) & )MR iff = =x y y x y x y1 1 1 1 1 2 2 M

According to analytical descriptivism (MR) is a formal statement of

mature folk morality, and gives expression to how each moral term is fixed

in the network. This is because the modified Ramsey sentence gives expres-

sion to how each moral term is fixed in the network. For example, byreplacing being right in M with xr we can construct a definition for what

it is for an action, A, to be right:

( ) ( ) ( & ( )) ( ( , ) & ))R is right iff has iff rA x A x y y x y =1 1 1 1 1 M

This states that A is right iff it has the property that plays the rightness role

specified in the right hand side of (R). Moreover, Jackson states, this

property is:

. . . a property we can be confident is a purely descriptive one, given the unrestricted, global,

a priori supervenience of the ethical on the descriptive (Jackson, 1998, p. 141).

This leads us to the final aspect of analytical descriptivism. The formula

devised above can be applied to all moral concepts, and thus we are able

to find out what it is for an action to be good, bad, fair, and so forth using

precisely the same method as (R). As Jackson notes, this does not tell us so

much what the property of rightness is, but it does give us the truth

conditions for an action to be right: A is right just in case it possesses aproperty that fills the role given in the right hand side of (R). This, then,

gives us the rightness role, but does not tell us anything about what might

realize this role.

Once we have the network of mature folk morality, we can systematise

it to provide an account of the job that, say, rightness does in our cognitive

economy. That is, we carve out the specific features that we take rightness

to have in our ordinary (or reflective) use of the term, or the specific role

that rightness has in our ordinary speech and basic conceptual reflections.

Once we have this role established, we then consider what properties arecapable of realizing this role. We can take it that realization may be a

matter of degree: some properties might do a better job of realizing the role

than others.


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On this view, then, it is the way in which terms function in our system of

thought which determines the property that they refer to. However, some

simple considerations show that this view also struggles with the problem

we noted for the causal account.6

5. The problem for analytical descriptivism

The structure of the objection follows the objection to the causal view. The

thought is, again, that we have two communities, T1 and T2. The mature

folk morality of T1 is such that a consequentialist natural property, Tc,

best realizes the role carved out by the network for rightness. The mature

folk morality of T2, however, has a slightly different character, and has adifferent, deontological natural property, Td, as the rightful referent of

right. Slight differences in the use of moral terms in the network of the

respective mature folk moralities thus means that members of T1 refer to

Tc with their use of the term right, and members of T2 refer to Td with

their use of the term right. Again, we have difference in reference, so

when a member of T1 asserts x is right, and a member of T2 asserts x is

not right, their terms refer to different properties, thus making it look as

though this is not a substantial dispute: they are merely talking past one

another.T1 and T2 have different folk moralities, hence different properties best

realize their respective rightness roles. Substantial disagreement between

them thus looks tricky, as they are still referring to different properties.

Jacksons theory, then, is not enough to guarantee sameness of reference.

The minor fluctuations in use of moral terms between T1 and T2 is

sufficient to show that they would be referring to different properties, just

as they were in the causal case. Analytical descriptivism thus cannot

provide the semantic picture the ethical naturalist needs.

A more promising route can be found, I propose, by supplementinganalytical descriptivism with Lewiss notion of eligibility. The resultant

theory accepts that realization of the rightness role plays a role in the

theory of meaning, but not that it plays the only role, and, indeed, not that

it plays the decisive role. What is also significant is the nature of the

property on the worldly end of the reference relation. In particular, what

matters is the naturalness of the property to be referred to. The more

natural the property, the more eligible it is to be considered the referent of

the term. The basic idea, then, is that, on this view, there will not be

divergence in reference: moral terms will always refer to the same proper-ties those properties that are the most eligible referents for the terms. To

explain this idea, we need to look in more detail at the notions of natu-

ralness and eligibility.


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6. Lewis on naturalness and eligibility

Lewis takes properties to be classes, and primarily classes of actual and

possible objects. Properties are taken to be abundant on this view:

Any class of things, be it ever so gerrymandered and miscellaneous and indescribable in

thought and language, and be it ever so superfluous in describing the world, is nevertheless a

property (Lewis, 1983, p. 346).

However, properties thus abundantly conceived are of little help when it

comes to some of the more traditional tasks theories of properties have

been taken to undertake, in particular, the explanation of similarities

between objects in terms of shared properties. As Lewis puts it:

Properties carve reality at the joints and everywhere else as well. If its distinctions we want,

too much structure is no better than none (Lewis, 1983, p. 346).

We need more than the abundant properties, then, if we are to be able to

use properties to say anything significant about the world. Lewis proposes

that we consider a sparse subset of the abundant properties to take on the

more heavyweight metaphysical tasks. He proposes that we have an elite

minority of special properties . . . the natural properties (Lewis, 1983,

p. 346). These properties are still classes of things, but the members ofthese classes all share something significant in common, something which

ensures the privileged status of these classes. As Lewis puts it:

Sharing of [the natural properties]7 makes for qualitative similarity, they carve at the joints,

they are intrinsic, they are highly specific, the sets of their instances are ipso facto not entirely

miscellaneous, there are just enough of them to characterise things completely and without

redundancy (Lewis, 1986, p. 60).

On Lewiss picture, then, we have the vast array of abundant properties,

and a small, elite, minority of natural properties. On Lewiss view, the

natural properties or, more carefully, the perfectly natural properties

are the properties which constitute the fundamental level of reality. At

various points Lewis suggests that these will be the properties posited by

fundamental physics, for instance:

. . . physics discovers which things and classes are the most elite of all; but others are elite

also, though to a lesser degree. The less elite are so because they are connected to the most

elite by chains of definability. Long chains, by the time we reach the moderately elite classes

of cats and pencils and puddles . . . (Lewis, 1984, p. 228).

As this quote suggests, for Lewis, naturalness is a matter of degree. The

perfectly natural properties are the properties at the most natural end of


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the scale, and the most highly abundant, disjunctive, gerrymandered prop-

erties are at the least natural, or most unnatural end of the scale. The

thought is, then, that the less natural properties are connected to the

perfectly natural properties by means of chains of definition: we can,

ultimately, trace all properties back to the perfectly natural properties bydiscerning the proper chain of definition. This also gives us a handle on the

notion of the scale of definition: the longer the chain of definition from the

perfectly natural properties, the less natural the property.

According to Lewis, then, it is the natural properties (or at least those

properties that are sufficiently far down the naturalness scale towards the

perfectly natural properties) that carve nature at its joints. If we want to

understand the world, we ought to make an inventory of these properties.

As we will see below, taking this claim seriously in ethics means that moral

properties are to be identified with properties of this kind.8

Lewis introduces the notion ofeligibility to account for naturalness in a

theory of meaning:

[a set] is eligible to be the extension of a one-place predicate iff its members are just those

things . . . that share some natural property (Lewis, 1983, p. 372).

This applies not just to isolated cases, but to theories too: An eligible

interpretation is one that assigns none but eligible extensions to the predi-

cates (1983, p. 372). As was noted above, Lewis conceives of naturalnessas a matter of degree, and, consequently, eligibility too is a matter of

degree. In short, the more natural a candidate referent is, the more eligible

it is to be considered the referent of the term in question. Correspondingly,

the more natural the candidate referents posited by a theory are, the more

eligible the theory is. To use a popular phrase, natural properties are

reference-magnets.9

It is worth pointing out that facts about language-use are not discarded

altogether when it comes to consider what the referent of a term is: if it

were naturalness alone, then reference magnetism would draw the referentof every word towards the perfectly natural properties, which would not be

a happy conclusion! What we have is the acknowledgement that there is

another important feature, concerning the naturalness of the potential

referents, which has a significant role to play, and may indeed trump other

considerations.

How might this transfer to the moral case that we have been discussing?

Eligibility concerns the naturalness of the candidate referents for a term.

Of course, this alone does not specify how we should understand what it is

that establishes the candidate referents, and this is something extra that wehave to consider. In the discussion so far we have two options for how to

do this. We have the SEN view which holds that such constraints are

causal, and that the properties that constrain the use of predicates are


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those which are causally connected to the use of those predicates. Sec-

ondly, we have the analytical descriptivist proposal which holds that can-

didates are established by their ability to realize the role specified in the

relevant mature folk morality. It will be my contention that we can solve

the disagreement problems we have been discussing if we supplement bothof these views with eligibility, but that SEN may do so in a more contro-

versial manner.

I will begin by showing how incorporating eligibility into the analytical

descriptivist account can solve the problem under discussion, before

turning to discuss whether SEN can take a similar route. I will then close

with some more general comments on the appropriateness of using con-

siderations of naturalness and joint-carving in ethics.

7. Analytical descriptivism and eligibility:

solving the problem

According to analytical descriptivism, we collect our raft of folk beliefs (or

mature folk beliefs) about morality, and systematise them to provide the

specific features of each of our moral properties. Once we have this role

established, we then consider what properties are capable of realizing this

role. We can take it that realization may be a matter of degree: some

properties might do a better job of realizing the role than others. Jackson,of course, ends the story here, effectively holding that realizing the role is

all that matters, and finding the property that best realizes the rightness

role, gives us the property that is the best property to be considered as

rightness.

However, we do not want to end the story here if we incorporate

eligibility into our account of meaning and reference. Realizing the right-

ness role is one criterion, but the naturalness of the proposed property is

another. Moreover, a significant gain in naturalness is worth sacrificing

precise realization: if our project is to find a property which carves theworld at its joints, we can sacrifice maximal realization for a significant

gain in joint-carving abilities this would serve us better in trying to

understand the world. We must, then, do more than just examine our

linguistic practice: we must examine what the world is providing for us,

and assess the naturalness of the candidate properties (we must assess both

the word and the world parts of the reference relation).

Let us now examine how adding this component solves the problem that

felled analytical descriptivism as initially described, and how it gives a

clear account of sameness of reference for moral terms.Consider again the communities problem. Remember that, on this pro-

posal, we can maintain the features of Jacksons account up to a certain

point. For instance, we can accept that T1 and T2 use their moral terms


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slightly differently, and that there is a slight divergence in their respective

systems of mature folk morality. We can also suppose that, due to this

difference, different properties will best realize the roles carved out by each

communitys moral terms. As we saw earlier, if things end here, trouble is

afoot, as it looks as though we have difference in reference. But, if weincorporate eligibility, things do not end here: there is still the matter of

which of the candidate properties is more natural.

The basic idea, of course, is that reference will be drawn to the property

which is considered to be the most natural of all the available candidates,

but exactly what we say requires us to look a little more carefully at the

example. The example we are working with licenses us to suppose that the

difference in the use of moral terms between T1 and T2 is fairly small

(small enough to mask differences at first glance, for example), which

means that there is good reason to think that the role carved out by eachsystem of mature folk morality is also quite similar. If this is so, and

property Tc is the best fit for T1, and Td is the best fit for T2, then there

is good reason to think that Tc must at least be a candidate for fitting the

mature folk morality of T2, and Td is at least a candidate for fitting the

mature folk morality of T1. This is secured by the similarities of the roles

carved out in T1 and T2: they are similar enough so that any candidate

property for one will also be a candidate property for the other, but of

course, different candidates will best fit the roles carved out in each, due to

the small differences in mature folk moralities.In this scenario, both Tc and Td are candidates for realizing the right-

ness roles in both T1 and T2, with Tc best realizing the rightness role in T1,

and Td best realizing the rightness role in T2. As noted above, without any

additional constraints on reference, we are stuck with divergence in refer-

ence. However, if we are supplementing the view with eligibility, we have

the additional factor of naturalness to consider. Of course, until we have

substantive theories of the natures of Tc and Td we cannot evaluate the

naturalness of the properties in question, but we can lay down some

guidelines. If Tc is more natural than Td, then Tc is the proper referent ofright for both T1 and T2. On the other hand, if Td is the more natural

property than Tc, then Td is the proper referent of right for both T1 and

T2.10 The fact that, in both cases, the referent of right will not be the

property that best realizes one communitys rightness role is not a

problem: it is outweighed by the naturalness of the competing property.11

There is also another possibility, which is that there is a third property that

is a candidate for realization of the rightness role in both T1 and T2, but

that is neither Tc or Td, and that is more natural than both Tc and Td. In

this scenario reference of both communities use of right would be drawnto this property, and sameness of reference would still be secured.12

This, then, is one way to respond to the puzzle for the reference of moral

terms across communities, at least as we have been discussing it: what


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matters is realizing the rightness role plus the naturalness of candidate

properties. This ensures that, in the type of cases under discussion, there

will not be a divergence in reference: members of different communities

will still be referring to the same properties with their moral terms, as

reference will be drawn to the most natural candidate.13

8. SEN and eligibility

Supplementing analytical descriptivism with the notion of eligibility thus

looks to provide a safeguard against divergence of reference, and thus

responds positively to the problem of disagreement across communities.

We noted at the beginning, though, that this problem also is significant for

views like SEN, which hold that causal relations play an important role indetermining the referents of moral terms. I will now suggest that SEN

can also use the notion of eligibility here, but perhaps slightly more

controversially.

In the case of analytical descriptivism we had a method that worked well

for providing a number of candidate referents, with mature folk moralities

yielding functional roles which could be realized to varying degrees. This

idea that there is the possibility of a number of candidates was important,

as the similarity of the mature folk moralities of the communities T1 and

T2 enabled us to hold that the property that best realizedthe role of rightin T1 was also a candidate for realizing the role of right in T2 (despite not

realizing it perfectly) and vice versa. This then enabled us to assess the

naturalness of the properties best realizing the rightness role of in T1 and

T2, along with other candidates, to yield the appropriate referent for both

communities.

One way for causal theories of reference to yield multiple candidates in

this case is to notice that there is overlap in the extensions of the use of

right in T1 and the use of right in T2, for there are many actions that are

deemed to be right by both consequentialist and deontological theories.14

Thus, when we are considering which property causally regulates the uses

of right in both T1 and T2, we might well consider both Tc and Td to be

candidates for each usage, as the closeness in extension seems to make

interpreting right in T1 as referring to Td and right in T2 as referring to

Tc at least prima facie reasonable. The large overlap in extension would

mean that such interpretations would not alone saddle members of either

community with a large number of false beliefs, for example, which allows

us to conceive of both properties as being properties which their respective

uses of right track.15

There is a potential sticking point, however, which is that this criterion

just gives us candidates for the property that causally regulates the use of

a term. There is still, presumably, the further question of which property


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does in fact causally regulate the use of the term. In other words, the

procedure of looking at which properties a community could reasonably

be interpreted as referring to with right guides us towards which property

is causally regulating the use, but it is then a further question which of the

candidate properties is actually doing this causal work. The worry is thatonce this is established (as it is in the example under consideration), we will

be back to where we were above: there will be just one property that is a

candidate for actually causing the use of right in T1 (Tc), and just one

property that is a candidate for actually causing the use of right in T2

(Td).

To illustrate the point, compare a scientific experiment, where an effect

is observed, a red colouring of a liquid, for example, and that there are a

range of different gases, a, b and c that could have caused this colouration.

Before analysing the liquid it would be reasonable to hold that a, b and care all candidates for causing the colouration. After the liquid is analysed,

it turns out that a is present in the liquid, but not b or c. At this point it no

longer seems reasonable to hold that b and c remain candidates for causing

the colouration, as only the chemical structure ofa was found in the liquid:

whilst there were many candidates for causing the colouration, there is

only one actual cause.

The worry then for the causal view in the case we are considering is that,

to avail of eligibility, there needs to be a range of candidates at this final

stage: the stage after the actual cause has been established. However,whilst we had a number of candidates prior to the establishment of the

actual cause, we do not get a range of candidates at this final stage, only

one. This seems to be of more concern for here than a parallel worry would

be for analytical descriptivism, on the grounds that actually being the

cause of the use of a term seems to be a more powerful feature to consider

than being the best realizer of a role: indeed, it seems to be part of the very

core of the initial SEN position. Moreover, built into analytical descrip-

tivism is the idea that properties may realize a particular role to more or

less of a degree, which left candidates that were less able realizers as stillcandidates (just less good ones), whereas, on the terms of SEN, it does not

seem as though a property can actually causally constrain a particular use

to some degree: it either actually causally constrains that use or it does

not.16

To respond to this worry the causal theorist who wants to adopt eligi-

bility must insist that what matters is just the range of properties that at the

initial stage are candidates for causally constraining the use of the term

right. On this view it would be these properties those identified at the

initial stage as candidates which would be assessed for naturalness, withthere being the potential for a significant gain in naturalness of one prop-

erty being able to trump another propertys actually causally constraining

a particular use. For instance, suppose that Tc actually causally constrains


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the use of right in T1, and Td actually causally constrains the use of

right in T2, but that, as noted above, due to their overlap in extension,

both were established as legitimate candidates for properties that causally

constrain the use of right in both communities. Now suppose that Tc is

significantly more natural than Td. If we are allowing naturalness totrump actual causing, then we could assign Tc as the referent of right in

both T1 and T2, which would secure sameness of reference. Conversely, if

Td were more natural, then Td would be assigned as the referent of right

in both T1 and T2. Thirdly, as above, we can also allow that a third

candidate might be the most natural candidate, thus drawing the reference

of right in T1 and T2 to that property.

As a consequence, adopting eligibility can also offer a solution to the

disagreement problem for SEN. Whether it does so in a way that departs

more significantly from the original form of SEN than the modified formof analytical descriptivism departs from the original form of analytical

descriptivism will depend on ones views about a potential difference in

significance between eligibility trumping best realization and eligibility

trumping actual causal constraints on use.

9. Carving at the moral joints

It seems, then, that using the notion of eligibility in the process of deter-mining the referents of moral terms ought to ensure sameness of reference,

and thus remove some of the obstacles to genuine disagreement that we

saw on the basic analytical descriptivist and SEN accounts. In this final

section I wish to consider a potential concern about the eligibility

approach, namely whether it is appropriate to consider Lewisian natural-

ness as a measure for moral properties.

We can offer some thoughts on the matter, though they are likely to

appeal most strongly to those who already think that some form of ethical

naturalism is plausible.17 The first is in regard to the thought that moralproperties are natural properties in the sense that they are able to be

accounted for by natural science: the definition of ethical naturalism we

began with. Holding that moral properties are reasonably natural in the

sense of Lewisian naturalness can be seen as a companion to this view,

especially when supplemented with the physicalist picture Lewis advo-

cates. Of course, it is doubtful that one would claim that moral properties

are amongst the perfectly natural properties that are the fundamental

physical properties, but ethical naturalism as we have defined it does think

that moral properties are accountable in the terms of natural science,which suggests that they will be definable in not-too-long chains of defi-

nitions from the Lewisian perfectly natural properties, thus making them

reasonably natural in the Lewisian sense. In this aspect, being reasonably


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natural in the Lewisian sense of naturalness coincides with being account-

able in the terms of natural science, thus aligning the standard claim of

ethical naturalism with a view that holds that moral properties are natural

in Lewiss sense of the term.

There is, of course, another dimension to Lewisian naturalness, which isthat natural properties mark significant, as opposed to gerrymandered,

kinds: why believe that moral properties have a significant degree of

naturalness in this sense, as opposed to being highly unnatural, abundant,

gerrymandered properties? One good reason to think that moral proper-

ties are higher up on the naturalness chain than these properties concerns

another issue mentioned earlier: joint-carving. In other words, one wants

theories to hit upon the structure of reality; to carve the world at its joints.

Presumably we want to be able to discern genuine moral kinds: we want to

clearly demarcate what is right from what is wrong, what is good fromwhat is bad, and so forth, and, in doing so, what want to get our distinc-

tions correct. If we want to form such genuine kinds, highly unnatural

properties will not do, as they will fail to provide us with the qualitative

similarity between the members of each kind that we require (they will still

be kinds, of course, just not particularly interesting ones). If we want to

ensure that our categories even our moral ones are latching onto the

more genuine features of the world, then we ought to take the naturalness

of the candidate properties very seriously indeed: the more natural the

property, the better it carves at the joints; the better it carves at the joints,the better it distinguishes right from wrong, or good from bad. In other

words, we want to be sure that all right actions share some substantial

feature in common rightness and we can only ensure this if rightness is

considered to be a fairly natural property.

Obviously, joint-carving might not be the only consideration in play

when considering moral properties, but it is an important one nonetheless.

If we want right actions to form a genuine kind which presumably ethical

naturalists would then this constraint is pretty high up on the list. So,

there are good reasons to want moral properties to come out as reasonablynatural properties, even on Lewiss conception of naturalness, and espe-

cially if we are already offering the view to ethical naturalists. This is

something that the use of eligibility proposed here can offer.

I have argued that using the notion of eligibility in ethics offers a more

promising line in the face of problems about disagreement for modified

forms of both analytical descriptivism and (perhaps more controversially)

SEN. It is also worth noting that the utility of eligibility for moral terms is

evidently not restricted to the cases discussed. What it guarantees is a

safeguard against divergence of reference across communities. Whilst itmay not guarantee that all moral disputes are substantial, and not verbal,

it does ensure, at the very least, that any failures of genuine disagreement

will not be the fault of the reference of the moral terms in question: it will


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be because of some other factor. This is true even for people who have

different moral beliefs, or who subscribe to different moral theories.

Moreover, it does this whilst maintaining that our moral terms will latch

onto the moral structure of the world as best they can.18

Northern Institute of Philosophy

University of Aberdeen

NOTES

1 Intended here to mean that sentences involving moral terms express beliefs, as opposed

to attitudes. The opposing view would be non-cognitivism, such as that of Simon Blackburn

(1998).2 Synthetic Ethical Naturalism is associated with the work of Richard Boyd (1988), and

David Brink (1986, 1989). Horgan and Timmons discuss the view in 1992a, pp. 1226. It is

also referred to as Cornell Realism in, for example, Jackson, 1998.3 For more on this argument see Kalderon, 2006.4 The case presented is of a similar structure of Horgan and Timmons (1992a, 1992b,

1992c) Moral Twin Earth thought experiment. Here I speak of different communities, and

intend to stay neutral on the issue of whether the communities need to be communities on

Earth and Twin Earth or, alternatively, two different (but perhaps isolated) communities on

Earth instead (as in Hares [1952] discussion of the missionary and the tribe). For more

discussion on the development of Horgan and Timmons formulation of the problem, and

some responses to it, see the Horgan and Timmons papers, and also Copp, 2000; Geirsson,

2005; Gert, 2006; and Sayre-McCord, 1997. van Roojen (2006) offers a response based on the

ability of speakers in a community to express knowledge using their moral terms, which also

incorporates a criterion of naturalness, albeit a different one to the version under discussion

here. I briefly discuss the differences between van Roojens conception of naturalness and

Lewiss conception in Note 8 below.5 The explanation of this procedure is taken from Jackson, 1998, pp. 1401.6 See Horgan and Timmons (2009) for their account of why analytical descriptivism fails.

The outline of the problem given here again broadly follows their line of argument.7 Lewis also uses the term sparse properties, but he takes what he calls natural prop-

erties to play the role of sparse properties in his theory. This also fits with Lewiss talk of thefeatures of natural properties throughout Lewis, 1983. The way Lewis uses natural here is

not strictly the same as the use of natural in ethical naturalism as defined earlier in Section

2, but, as I note in Section 9 below, there are important similarities. Indeed, in Section 9 I

suggest that it is plausible to think that ethical naturalism as defined earlier should not have

any problem with the thought that moral properties are natural properties in the Lewisian

sense of natural.8 Lewiss account of naturalness, whilst influential, is not the only account in town. Van

Roojen (2006), for example, offers a different account of naturalness, suggesting that natu-

ralness is, in some sense, discipline-relative. Thus, on his view, properties that are considered

ethically natural might not be considered to be physically natural, for example, but both areequally natural nonetheless. I do not have space to address the issue in great depth here, but

it is worth noting that adopting this view of naturalness would not affect the claims made

later in this article about the roles naturalness and eligibility can and cannot play in relation

to analytical descriptivism and SEN. As a brief note on my preference for Lewiss account,


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it is worth noting that there is an intuitive sense in which there is a non-discipline relative scale

of naturalness in that we commonly take moral properties to be in some sense dependent

(or supervenient) on fundamental physical properties. Whilst this should not affect the claim

of moral properties to be reasonably natural, it does suggest that they are less privileged (or

perhaps less natural) than fundamental physical properties, which is a point Lewiss concep-

tion can accommodate.9 Lewis discusses two applications of eligibility to solve two important problems in the

philosophy of language: Goodmans (1955) puzzle of induction, and the Kripkenstein

paradox (Kripke, 1982). For reasons of space, I will not discuss the problems and Lewiss

solutions to them here, but for the full story see Lewis, 1983. For more on Lewiss notion of

eligibility, see Williams, 2007.10 Of course, there is the objection that both properties may possess an equal level of

naturalness (a criticism of Lewis made by Lakoff (1987, pp. 2434)). There are two things I

wish to note about this, however. The first is that it is questionable whether it is possible that

we would get two properties that are equally natural, at least on the Lewis scale of natural-

ness, as each property occupies a particular place on the chain of definability from the

perfectly natural properties. If we suppose that this chain is single-file, then there will not be

two properties that occupy the same level on the scale, thus not two properties that are

equally natural. The only potential case of equally natural properties would be the perfectly

natural properties, and I dont think anyone would wish to suppose that moral properties are

amongst their number. Secondly, even if there were two equally natural properties in play,

this would not lead to divergence in reference, rather indeterminacy of reference. We would

not thus have the relativist proposals entailed by SEN and Jackson, but rather a view where

it was genuinely indeterminate which properties our moral terms refer to, and genuinely

indeterminate because the world provides equally natural candidates. I am inclined to think

that, were this to occur, such indeterminacy would be unavoidable on any view.11 This might be so even in cases where there is a significant difference in the role specified,

as in these cases naturalness may still be the deciding factor. See, e.g. Weatherson, 2003 on

knowledge as justified true belief.12 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility.13 Whether this is enough to guarantee genuine disagreement is a slightly different matter.

We might think that shared reference is a necessary condition of genuine disagreement, but

not necessarily a sufficient condition. In other words, there may be other factors that make it

such that genuine disagreement is not secured, even though shared reference is. As I noted at

the beginning of the article, my project here is just to secure shared reference, and not to

engage directly with the notion of genuine disagreement, which is a project suitable for aseparate inquiry. Of course, if members of both communities thought that eligibility ought to

be a factor, they could then themselves establish which property is the proper referent, and

conduct any further debates with that in mind. This would look to be progress in the way of

securing genuine disagreement (and is similar to the kind of process Sider [2009] recommends

regarding existence), but that would perhaps build too much into the example at this stage.14 This distinguishes the case from, for example, the original Twin Earth case, as, in that

case, there is no substance that is both H2O and XYZ, meaning that there is no overlap in

extension between the respective uses of water.15 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for their comments here.16 If one disagrees, though, note that, either way, the response to the worry in both cases

is the same as outlined below, with eligibility having the ability to trump actual causing or

best realization.17 There is of course a lot of room for debate about the project of ethical naturalism in

general, and I again note that the eligibility proposal is primarily offered to those already


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tempted by some form of ethical naturalism. I am not directly trying to convince those

sceptical of the project (e.g. those who think, say, that there are no moral properties!) that

moral properties should be considered to be reasonably natural.18 Earlier versions of parts of this article were presented at workshops at University

College Dublin, Trinity College Dublin, and at the 2010 Joint Session of the Mind Associa-

tion and Aristotelian Society at University College Dublin. I would like to thank audiences

at these talks for their comments, along with the Irish Research Council for the Humanities

and Social Sciences for the postdoctoral award that funded part of the work on this article.

I would also like to thank the anonymous referee for their very helpful comments. This

research was supported by a Marie Curie Intra European Fellowship within the 7th Euro-

pean Community Framework Programme.

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