PAKISTAN – U.S. RELATIONS: KNOWN

MYTHS UNKNOWN TRUTHS

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2011

WASHINGTON, D.C.

WELCOME/MODERATOR:

George Perkovich,

Vice President for Studies,

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

SPEAKER:

Javed Jabbar,

Chairman and Chief Executive,

JJ Media (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi, Pakistan

Transcript by Federal News Service

Washington, D.C.

[00:00:20] GEORGE PERKOVICH: Good afternoon. It’s a pleasure to welcome you here. My name is George Perkovich. I’m a vice president of studies at the Carnegie Endowment, and our South Asia program is happy to welcome you and especially happy to welcome Javed Jabbar, who has become a friend, and it’s always good to see him here. Javed is the chairman and chief executive of J.J. Media Limited in Karachi, Pakistan. He’s very, very well known, not only in Pakistan, but in South Asia and globally. He’s been a participant from the very beginning, in 1992, in the longest running India-Pakistan Track II process, the Neemrana process. He’s a prolific author of columns in newspapers as well as books and, in fact, has a new book, “Pakistan: Unique Origins, Unique Destiny,” which I’ve had the pleasure of reading and can very much recommend to all of you. Javed has served in the government of Pakistan in many important posts; I would highlight a few of them. He was a minister of information and media development early in the Musharraf government in 1999 to 2000. Earlier in the ’90s, he was the minister for petroleum and natural resources in the caretaker government of President Leghari and then, earlier still, in the Benazir Bhutto government in ’88 and ’89, he was the minister of state for information and broadcasting and then the minister of state for science and technology. So you see he has a deep interest in serving Pakistan, but also insight into how it all works. And the topic today actually is one that’s been much on people’s mind(s), much in the press, much in deliberation of the two governments, is Pakistan-U.S. relations, and I’m very eager to hear to what Javed has to say about that. He will make, you know, an opening remarks (sic) and then we will sit there and have a conversation – a brief conversation, and we’ll just open it discussion with all of you. So it’s basically an informal event that we’re seeking to have and kind of a sharing of perspectives and insights. So please welcome Javed. (Applause.) (Off mic.) [00:03:05] JAVED JABBAR: George, may I borrow your – I promise to give it back to you, but – (inaudible) – (laughter) – I’m sure it’s safe. DR. PERKOVICH: You won’t get much for it if you – (off mic). MR. JABBAR: (Chuckles.) I’m carrying – not carrying one. Thank you very much – (inaudible). Thank you, George Perkovich, for your gracious hospitality and your generous introduction. It’s a pleasure to be here at the Carnegie Endowment. Six months ago George was kind enough to make the mistake of asking me to present the keynote at the Nuclear Issues Conference and, since I have no knowledge about nuclear weapons, I was delighted to accept his invitation – (laughter) – but fortunately the 800-plus participants didn’t have to suffer any knowledge of my nuclear capacity, but only about what, in my humble opinion, makes Pakistan a very special case.

And in continuum of that thought process, which was initiated at that time, I really welcome this opportunity. It’s most reassuring to see that so many esteemed persons are willing to waste their time listening to me, but I will benefit by your hopefully robust responses to anything that I have to submit. So thank you for being here. [00:04:30] We are looking at a 64-year relationship between two very different nation-states, very dissimilar in so many fundamental respects. Most of them are obvious, but I think one owes it for the record just to list them, itemize them. One – (sighs) – you have the advantage of age, 235 years old, and America still feels so young. We are barely 64, and sometimes we feel very old – but 64. And when we were born, you were already 170 years ahead of us, so much to teach us about the world. I wish you had taught us a little more. Territory-wise, my God, since 1947, the U.S. has expanded its territory. You’ve added Hawaii, you’ve added Alaska also. People say you might add another couple of other innocent states or territories elsewhere – (laughter) – but I hope not. Meanwhile Pakistan, alas, has shrunk in territory since 1947. In fact, in comparison to our not-so-small neighbor next door, which has steadily expanded its territory, Pakistan is the only country in South Asia which has lost territory. In terms of population, perhaps there is greater similarity. There is rich diversity in the U.S. though the WASP factor or dimension still predominates. Well, we have our own WASPs, which is the Punjabis, but since I’m (migrant ?) – I’m married to a Punjabi – I feel quite secure – (laughter) – in her care. And when we look at the system of government or the state structural concept, the U.S. is officially a secularist country, very good for you, but that’s not entirely true. If you still have a constitution in the state of Texas which prohibits any public officeholder from holding office unless he believes in God, is the U.S. a truly secular state? Pakistan makes no bones about it; we call ourselves the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. So there is a contrast and a similarity. [00:06:54] This system of government, you are privileged to have uninterrupted democracy and a very vigorous democracy, truly inspiring, a grass-roots democracy and a civil society democracy, which functions regardless of how dysfunctional the U.S. Congress may become at times. We in contrast have had a very, very interrupted experience with democracy, 34 years under military rule. But sometimes even our civil autocrats have been as dictatorial as military autocrats, so I don’t know whether it’s an entire loss, all of our military rule period. Especially with General Musharraf, one had the privilege of introducing the – for the first time – independence and privately owned electronic media, a law that I had originally had the privilege of drafting for a caretaker government, in the expectation that the next government, a well-elected, democratic political government would enforce that law, which it didn’t, and it took a dictatorial military ruler to bring true media freedom to Pakistan. In trade, despite our on-again, off-again relationship and the important geopolitical dimension of our relationship, alas we don’t – we don’t sum up much in terms of figures. Pakistan is still only the 57th largest trading partner of the U.S. Our trade is about 5.4 billion, fortunately in our favor, but one would want obviously exports from Pakistan to grow much more than what it has. At the moment, I think it’s about 3.5 billion from our side, and we bought about 1.9 billion from the U.S.

And then you look back at aid, which is so much a part of current discourse – aid. When you actually look at the figures, 64 years, barely about 60 billion (dollars) – $60 billion over 64 years and half of it – about half of it, military aid. And when you look in terms of the jump start, start-stop aspect of this aid relationship, in the 1990s as you know, aid had virtually dwindled to zero. And then suddenly after post – after 9/11, it goes up to 1.7 billion (dollars) and 1.3 billion (dollars); it becomes 3.1 billion (dollars) in about 8 or 10 years, too much aid coming too fast and several years without any aid, so a very erratic and sporadic process. [00:09:47] And one cannot just help looking back to the start of this relationship. Ironically on the 30th of October 1947 – (inaudible) – so there’s a nice symmetry; we are here on the 25th of October – the first representative of the government of Pakistan, one gentleman, Meerlik Ali (ph), submits a memorandum asking the U.S. government for this 2.5-month-old nation-state for a very, very modest sum of $2 billion. How modest, because by today’s standards that 2 billion (dollars) would have been 200 billion (dollars) – talk about optimism! We are a very optimistic country. Arriving in Washington, D.C., asking for $2 billion – thank God you didn’t give it because – (laughter) – you either didn’t have it or you didn’t want to give it. But the important aspect of that presentation was ironically, why do we need this aid? First and foremost for defense; secondly, for economic development – that’s the priorities that the government of Pakistan identified and which the Americans recognized because we were so inherently insecure: to begin with, the world’s most awkwardly constructed country, with two wings separated by a 1,000 miles of very unfriendly territory. And the Americans should know, if you had New York state here and you had California here and you had the Soviet Union in the middle – (laughter) – I would have liked to see how secure the United States would have evolved into as a nation-state, but thank God it didn’t happen. So, over this period, we’ve had some remarkable indicators. We become the first country in South Asia to sign a mutual defense assistance agreement that comes into force on the 15th of December 1950, the first South Asian country, and a very charming policy statement by the State Department, which (is ?) love, which has such a resonance and an irony in today’s world. The 1st of July 1951, the State Department says a policy statement on Pakistan: Quote, “As Pakistan does not suffer from the violent anti-Westernism and deep-rooted neutrality that prevents India from being a proper ally, we should seriously consider Pakistan’s offer and make Pakistan a partner for security in the Indian Ocean.” Fantastic! I mean, one just wishes – one just wishes that time had stood still and that these lovely words were still true in the year 2011, though that didn’t prevent our first prime minister in the year – in the same year complain somewhat plaintively that the U.S. was still giving too much attention to India. But let’s not carp on that. [00:12:53] Let me come now to “Four Known Myths,” the subtitle of my presentation. And in each known myth that I shall attempt to articulate, I think, is also the unknown truth, which comes with that known myth. The first is that Pakistanis hate America and Americans. Oh! Is this a gradually developed notion? Or has this come about post-9/11? That’s the – and when you see – when you see pictures, as they like to parade – the U.S. media, which I’ll come to in a moment, but let me say what is the reality? Well, whether it was from Coca-Cola to Pepsi-Cola, at 7:30 in the morning on all PIA flights in Pakistan, innocent children are being offered Pepsi-Cola; it’s being thrust down their throats. A thoroughly good American drink, huh? Carbonated to ensure that their insides do not survive. (Laughter.) So that’s how Pakistan takes off every

morning with Pepsi-Cola in our very guts. We’ve got McDonald’s, we’ve got Hardees, we’ve got Citibank, we’ve got Levi jeans, we’ve got Hollywood cinema crawling in our cinema houses. In a hundred television channels, you’ve got HBO, you’ve got STAR movies, STAR Plus – my God, America coming out of our ears, everything and America, America, everyone’s lapping up America. So where is this supposed anti-Americanism? It does not exist. [00:14:29] There is strong, sharp condemnation of U.S. government policies – and not wholesale because they’re American – about Kashmir, about Israel or Palestine or about Iraq or Afghanistan, drone attacks. But this is a fantastic capacity of the people of Pakistan, even the illiterate – supposedly illiterate, though I respect the illiterates because the damage done to our country by the educated class has no equal. The poor, illiterates have not done any damage to our country’s interest. So there is this myth of anti-Americanism. It needs to be revisited. And I was struck Ahmed Rashid’s piece on 9/11 when he said, the question should not be why do – why do Pakistanis hate America? Is it terribly true that – why do Americans hate Pakistanis? In the past 10 years has the – has the misperception grown so great that it should now be Pakistanis worrying about what Americans think about Pakistan? Because how far it is from the truth. The second known myth that the Pakistan army rules the roost, calls the shots on some, not all perhaps, vital issues – nuclear weapons, Kashmir, Afghanistan – and that story doesn’t end there, but the ISI in a de facto way rules the Pakistan army. That’s a general perception. The ISI is synonymous with all the critical decisions that are taken. [00:16:10] Well, first of all, let me say that this is only a half myth. It is half true: It has been true in the past; it is true presently as well, that the army does play a central role. And I’m not surprised, and I don’t see this changing over the next 10 to 15 to 20 years at least, without fundamental change in our relationship with India, where the onus doesn’t lie with us; we just can’t go out and make peace with India. You can’t make peace with a neighbor, which is the world’s largest importer of armaments last year. How would you like it if you’re living in an apartment building and the guy next door just keeps on arming himself and you’re supposed to turn the other way and say, you know, it has nothing to do with me. It – of course it has something to do with me; even if intends to use the arms for a third neighbor, we have to be worried. So I don’t see that changing, and I’m not surprised because on some issues there is complete unanimity. Even our weak civil political process has not been forced at gunpoint by the army to agree on the indispensability of possessing nuclear weapons. If India introduces nuclear weapons into South Asia, we cannot disregard it. We have to take notice, especially three years after we have been dismembered as a country by our beloved neighbor. So there’s no bitterness about it; it’s just hard facts of life. This country has to survive the Indian threat, and we have ensured a minimal deterrence level by acquiring nuclear weapons, which are terrible weapons, which should not have been created to begin with and which we should ever, never use or add to. So there is complete unanimity within Pakistan on basic issues and therefore, yes, the army calls the shots. But the critical thing is that where the civil political process has produced leadership of integrity and competence, the military falls in line behind that civil leadership, and the best example is Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. It’s another matter that because of his catastrophic mistake in appointing General Zia ul-Haq, General Zia ul-Haq ousted him – but he did not oust him because of any fundamental divergences on policy issues, though there is this conspiracy theory

that General Zia ul-Haq acted with tacit U.S. support because of Bhutto’s tendencies towards the left or his dedication to nuclear weapons, but I won’t go into that. [00:19:03] So if and when the civil political process produces leadership, in all my humble, limited interactions with the military leadership, I see a willingness to accept competence and strength of purpose if it is well grounded. But if leadership itself is sullied by financial corruption, by nepotism, then obviously the military, even though it has its own nonjustifiable advantages, steps in – steps into the policy vacuum. The third known myth – (sighs) – that the Pakistanis in general, but the army in particular, is playing a dual role in Afghanistan: being friends with the U.S., taking money with one hand and, with the other, supporting America’s latest discovery of the Haqqani Network. (Sighs.) There are at least seven points I’ll submit before I come to the last of my myths. First of all, we have a continuum of history – hundreds of years of history that cannot be reduced to a 10-year timespan between post-9/11 and 2011 and see this as the crucible test of how we deal with – whether it is Haqqanis or the Gilzis (ph) or the Pashtuns in general. Second is the commonality of geography. We aren’t going away anywhere from Afghanistan; you are fortunately 10,000 miles away; we are there – right stuck there. Third, on the basic level of ethnicity, the Zeldun (ph) tribe, the largest Pashtun tribe, spills over for centuries between Afghanistan and Pakistan. We can’t ignore that. There are five villages which I’ll list for you, which are divided villages, as an example of how closely bound are the territorial, ethnic, historic linkages: Kili Janyer (ph), Kili Lakman (ph), Kili Hajiabar (ph), Kili Sedhalid (ph), Kili Sheher (ph), Lal (ph) – divided villages between two – between the two countries. And let us not forget the Haqqani role in the 1980s. They are patriots for their own motherland, and while I hate the fact that American lives are being lost as much as Pakistani lives are being lost due to attacks by the Haqqanis, look at it from their point of view: They’re defending their motherland. They are patriots to the core. They don’t want any foreign troops. They don’t want Pakistani troops on Afghan soil. They won’t stand for it, leave alone 43 members of the ISAF (ph), led by the U.S. So just to refer to them saying, “attackers,” is not fair. I’m intrigued. Why is it that in the three provinces adjacent to Waziristan – Khost, Paktika, Paktia – very strong deployment of ISAF forces – are they not able to monitor what the Haqqanis are doing? How are they able to carry arms, ammunition, small – sail smoothly into Kabul and launch a 19-hour attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul undetected? (Sighs.) Bends one’s imagination. [00:22:45] A heavy presence of refugees in Pakistan, still today – 2 million by one count. How do you control the traffic within refugee camps, between refugee camps and the cross-borders? Comparative costs – and I owe it to my countrymen as much as I owe it to America to mention the figures – how many people have actually died? One country, Pakistan, has lost more lives than all the 43 countries put together.

Now, why are we dying? If we got friends with the Haqqanis, why would the Haqqanis spare Pakistanis? I mean, they’re attacking Pakistanis or Pakistanis are dying without discrimination in the service of a shared cause. The last figures I have is 34,150 killed and injured – 12,800 military, 21,400 civilians. That’s one great toll taken of lives. Look at the tens of thousands of families, individual human beings affected. [00:23:56] So I come to the last one, about Pakistan wants to exclude India, its archenemy, from any role in post-2014 Afghanistan. Yes, of course we would feel uncomfortable if a country that deploys its troops on our eastern border also acquires a strong foothold there. No, we don’t make any bones about it. But we are level-headed enough to know that India will have a stake in Afghanistan. It’s had a historic relationship. And much as it may seem altruistic or false or “the lady protests too much,” we do want a secure, stable Afghanistan. It is in Pakistan’s fundamental interest to have a harmonious, stable Pakistan, friendly with India without threatening Pakistan. And I think the Indians have begun to recognize it. In my limited experience of Track II dialogue, there is a new (healthy ?) acceptance in India that they cannot ignore Pakistan’s interest there. So I conclude with two challenges – (off mic) – the challenges that face Pakistan-U.S. relations. The challenge of managing an inherent inequality of power between nation-states that are unavoidably mutually dependent on each other: How do we manage this when one is obviously so powerful and one is so weakened by internal misgovernance, corruption, what have you? The good news is that Pakistan’s strengths outnumber our weaknesses, which is yet another reason why you should buy this book – (laughter) – even though it is not available in the U.S. You’ve made a plug for it last time, George; I’m deeply touched by that. We are still trying to find a U.S. publisher gullible enough to publish it. We’ll try and put a second edition. Indians have actually managed to publish their own edition. First edition is sold out. I’ve listed our strengths, I’ve listed our weaknesses. Our strengths outweigh our weaknesses. So there’s a stable basis for U.S.-Pakistan relations built both on strengths and weaknesses. The second challenge is, how do we ensure that the gap between realities and perceptions is narrowed if not ideally eliminated – which is a pipe dream; you can’t eliminate the gap between realities and perceptions, thanks to the media, the very nature of media being subjective, being selective, being suppressive. There will always be distorted perceptions. But this choice example of distorted perceptions is this picture in The New York Times three days ago, I think. As Hillary Clinton concludes her visit to Islamabad, The New York Times gives about four columns, no less – four, five columns – to a picture of barely 20 characters – 20 people, I tell you, in a nation of 180 million people, who love consuming McDonald’s and drinking Coca-Cola, 20 guys standing around with a sign saying, Pakistani government – and the English is beautiful – Pakistani government is killer dogs – American killer dogs. (Chuckles.) I must go back and tell them about singular plural. (Laughter.) But those – you can gather 20 mad characters in any country of the world and you can burn some effigy and make it look as if this is the sentiment of the people of Pakistan. Absolutely not. [00:27:46] So it’s a tremendous challenge: How do we allow media to continue their valuable informational analytical role without distorting and damaging perceptions, both in the U.S. and in Pakistan?

Thank you very much for your patience. (Applause.) DR. PERKOVICH: I think we’re going to – (off mic). Thanks, Ed (ph). Great. Thanks – (off mic). Other than my asking a first question, let me – I mean, I’m happy to ask questions, but I – but if there are – people already have some ideas, comments, questions, let’s open it up. When I call on you, please explain who you are – not in, you know, long paragraphs, but basically your name and your affiliation. Thank you. [00:28:51] Q: Thank you very much. Raghubir Goyal, India Globe and Asia Today. Great. I hope we can read your book one day. My question is, quickly, what do you make out of when President Karzai of Afghanistan said that if there is a conflict between U.S. and Pakistan, then Afghanistan will side Pakistan, not the U.S.? And finally, what do you make Secretary Hillary Clinton’s recent visit to Pakistan? Do you – do you see a light in the dark tunnel between U.S. and Pakistan relations? Thank you. MR. JABBAR: Thank you. First of all, I think there should be absolutely no scope for any armed conflict between the U.S. and Pakistan. There is neither a rationale in this. There is neither any, even a minimal strategic objective to be achieved by Pakistan. And I hope the United States never thinks that by going into armed conflict with Pakistan, it will achieve any objective. And purely on a humanitarian basis, I think human life is too precious to be talked about in this flippant manner about the possibility of a conflict. So there will not be a conflict; that’s my conviction. And if there were, of course, the Pakistani, (the heart ?) is wronged by a very, very erratic and unpredictable head of state who keeps saying things every 72 hours in different directions. So I don’t quite know what to make of this. What he will say after another 72 hours may affect how I accept this particular statement, so I reserve my judgment. I love it; a nice, very parochial, chauvinistic part of me revels in this. But I’m also fairly realistic enough, even though I’m 6 inches off the Carnegie ground just now – (chuckles) – I still have my feet on the ground – (inaudible) – have both feet on the ground. I won’t rely on that – (inaudible). And as for Hillary Clinton’s visit, I think it has sent out some very positive signals. First of all, from an American point of view, the tactic of having every element present – the defense, intelligence, the civil, political – to dispel the Pakistanis’ notion that there is a lack of coherence and coordination within the U.S. itself on how to deal with it was a very good step. And to the best of my knowledge, the dialogue has been very useful, very productive. [00:31:22] There’s some areas left where we are not convinced by the references to the Haqqani Network. And I’m sure the Americans have varied grounds for pursuing that. But in turn, we hope that they will be respectful of our viewpoint. We simply, I’m sure, cannot afford to cut off all contact with the Haqqanis. They’ve been very upright, steadfast opponents of Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. They have fought with great tenacity, made great sacrifices. They are going to be there after the U.S. leaves.

So with the (part ?) that does not want destructive confrontation with the U.S. – and there are parts in the leadership (we ?) feel that may be willing to engage in dialogue. And the question of time frame, how does one agree eventually on a time frame? That’s the key issue – and the terms of the time frame. Anyway, so I think the Clinton visit was very good and it was welcomed by both sides. DR. PERKOVICH (?): Yes, sir? [00:32:28] Q: Hello. My name is Anise Taylor (ph). I’m a graduate student at GW. Could you please talk a little bit about the nature of the threat from India as it stands today and the possibility of reaching some sort of détente? Because I feel as though, if they were to pool their resources, it might be a lot more effective in reaching a resolution on the Afghan-Pakistan border. And from talking to people my age, I feel as though there is no animosity between India and Pakistan, among my generation at least. Thanks. MR. JABBAR: Thank you. First of all, this question of animosity is another myth. Because it did not concern bilateral relations between America and Pakistan, I didn’t refer to that. This also is a tremendous myth of Pakistan and India being, quote, “archenemies,” unquote. And I’m so saddened that responsible, great newspapers like The Washington Post and The New York Times or television, which is not ever as responsible as print media, they keep parroting these terms – archenemies, mortal enemies. Jane Perlez in The New York Times about five days ago – mortal enemies. What mortal enemies? It is a state-to-state relationship forced upon Pakistan. Of course, I don’t want to say that we are blameless. But the people and the states themselves enjoy a very dual relationship, partly militaristic and partly extremely peaceful. For example, trade. Now, in a country where the military is supposed to be calling all the shots like Pakistan, how come trade with India is growing steadily? Even as troops remained deployed, on the eastern front from Pakistan’s point of view, on the western front from the Indian point of view, trade has been growing. And this year, the commerce ministers, the commerce secretaries have met – many new measures around the anvil; the opening of bank branches of each country in the other country for the first time. [00:34:40] And let me say, also, about cinema, that terrible thing called Bollywood cinema. My god. All Pakistani cinema houses have been taken over by Bollywood. Poor Pakistani filmmakers like myself have to make way for Bollywood, the Bollywood monster. And we are so large-hearted, we go out and applaud Indian movies. No, you don’t sit and watch the movies of a mortal enemy every day and strengthen the mortal enemy. If you (heard ?) an enemy, then you would storm the cinema and say, remove this Indian film. (Laughter.) But you find Indian films all the time, not just in cinema houses. In cable television – (inaudible) – now has about a hundred channels. Eighty of them are showing Indian content nonstop 24 hours a day in Indian – in Pakistani homes. So this sense of animosity is purely at a policy military state-to-state level, and justifiably so until there is a rapprochement on basic issues of Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, and the water issue which causes concern.

So how do we see this going forward? I see that there is a need to introduce some kind of contact and dialogue at the military leadership level as well. Even though India has the great merit of being an uninterrupted civil-led democracy for 64 years, the Indian military, like the Pentagon in the U.S., does play a strong role in shaping India’s foreign policy, and Kashmir policy for certain. There have been occasions when the two sides were fairly close to some critical decisions, and we discovered that there was a second thought introduced by the Indian military into the Indian civil political process, which prevented at least two agreements from being signed. So – I remain hopeful, however, that the pressure on both sides in now generating a need to conduct uninterrupted dialogue and more regular dialogue – not once a year at the SAARC summit; once in three months, and not necessarily a dialogue that has to result in tangible gains. Dialogue for the sake of dialogue. Just meeting each other regularly, listening to each other and developing a sense of confidence and trust. [00:37:12] And I think it does not have anything necessarily to do with generations. Young people can also be fairly hostile and aggressive. And young people like me, for example, would like to make peace with India, having dealt with them for 19 years. I think there are human beings on the other side. And my mother happens to be buried in Hyderabad (Deccan ?), so I have a very strong relationship with India. I love many aspects of India. And even though I also love the Pakistani military, I think the military (with ?) both sides should begin to dialogue as a way of supporting the civil and political process and strengthening it. DR. PERKOVICH: Yes, the gentleman in the corner. Yeah. Q: Thank you. Question from Mohamed Wafa, Middle East Broadcast Network. I just want to go back to the – to the statement about the military. You said the military would go side by side with any government – with any civil government that is not plagued by nepotism and favoritism and corruption. [00:38:20] I ask this because many of the military in the Middle East and also the developing world, they propagate the idea of – this idea that makes them untouchable. Is the military in Pakistan – doesn’t have any corruption problems? This is one thing. The other thing is that, who is having the upper say in the Afghan issue? Because we know by experience that the military and the intelligence, they have in their upper ranks officers from tribes and denominations that historically go with the people who live in the – in the areas close to Pakistan. I think this is enough. Thank you. MR. JABBAR: Thank you. Like any large – or small, I suppose – military sector, our military too has suffered from corruption. And fortunately, apart from its own internal mechanisms of the accountant general and the auditors inside the military account service, we have a Public Accounts Committee in the national assembly which, for the first time in history, is chaired by the leader of the opposition. So there is no complicity on the part of government to suppress. And the chairman of the Public Accounts Committee has recently released data to show how large sums have remained irregularly used by the military, and has asked for an explanation. So there is a new transparency and sense of accountability on the military leadership to prove that it is taking appropriate action within its own ranks to curb corruption, especially – I’m sure it comes with defense purchases, which inevitably involve scope for misuse of authority.

On the influence of Pakistan army officers on Afghan policy because of ethnic commonalities, I would not respectfully agree with that entirely. It could equally come from Punjabi officers who are not ethnically identical to the Pashtun population but who have strongly held views. So it has nothing necessarily to do with ethnicity as a binding factor, but as – out of common concern, that they cannot – we cannot afford to have an unstable Afghanistan to the northwest. And we’ve had (this ?) terribly corrosive effect within Pakistan of an unstable Afghanistan. We’ve been paying the – the highest price paid is Pakistan, not even Afghanistan, because we’ve paid it in terms of the economy as well; for 40 years and more, something called the Afghan transit trade has made a mockery of much of our economy. For example, when Afghanistan didn’t have television, tens of thousands of television sets used to be imported via Karachi, smuggled into – or taken into Afghanistan and smuggled back into Pakistan, damaging our own TV sector. We allowed that, we allowed tea imports, blah, blah, blah. So it is – it is the interest of Pakistan to promote a stable Afghanistan. And therefore, I think even officers in the armed forces, even those with ethnic links would look at the larger picture and not willfully damage their own interests. [00:41:58] DR. PERKOVICH: Yes. And then we’ll go to the – (inaudible). Yep. Yeah, OK. Q: Thank you. I am Dr. Nisaj Cheodry (ph). My question is – (inaudible) – Mr. Jabbar that since he’s a virtually a man of tremendous insight and foresight, a very thoughtful person – and what does he think, in his assessment, are exactly the policy objectives or intentions of USA in that region, long term and short term? MR. JABBAR: Sanctions. DR. PERKOVICH: (Inaudible) – U.S. – yeah. Q: Intentions – intentions and policy objectives – what exactly U.S. is looking for. Number two is that on a scale of one to 10, when it comes to governance, good governance, where you would put Pakistan when it comes to good governance on a scale of one to 10. Thank you. [00:42:54] DR. PERKOVICH: Is one good and 10 is the best? (Laughter.) MR. JABBAR: Which is worse? Yeah, you better clarify. DR. PERKOVICH: Is 10 the best? Q: Yes, 10 is – (inaudible). MR. JABBAR: Ten is the best. Q (?): Yes. DR. PERKOVICH: You can’t say that.

MR. JABBAR: Let me start with the tough one. (Laughter.) I would place it at three and a half, three and a half to four maximum. [00:43:14] One indicator, which is not directly governance-related, but let me share that with you: I’m a member of something called the Democracy Assessment Group in Pakistan. Thirty-four of us misguided characters are asked to meet periodically and assess how is Pakistan managing its democracy. Our last assessment was in September about six weeks ago, and we gave our democracy 45 percent marks. But I think we’ve done better with democracy than we’ve done with governance because with democracy, we’ve used it, surprising for a country of our kind, and we’ve used it with great responsibility. We have devolved power. We have redistributed power away from the center to the provinces. We’ve come to an agreement on sharing of financial resources – extraordinary example of maturity. So at democracy, we’ve done better than we have done in governance. But on the first question, is it fair to ask an innocent Pakistani about U.S. intentions? You know the – what I mean, the – I thought you said sanctions because sanctions and America go synonymously with – (chuckles) – and we’ve been sanctioned so many times – fortunately, not in terms of food or the basics, but military sanctions that we are quite prepared for that. We would not – I – yeah, let me see. How do we see U.S. intentions? Despite being very critical of U.S. policies and being unhappy with U.S. policies in Palestine or Kashmir or Iraq or Afghanistan, there are – there is a large number of people in Pakistan – I think a majority – which sees U.S. intentions as being good and constructive. There is an acknowledgement of the dynamism of American society, its ability to produce such a wide range of products and services which benefit Pakistan, benefit humanity. And there’s no denying that; there’s an acknowledgement. So therefore they know they can’t afford to have hostile relations with such an incredible power. They want power but they want it with dignity and respect. So how to get that is exactly what I said: The first challenge is, how do you manage a relationship of mutual respect when the power is so inherently inequal? If we had made up for our other messes with at least being economically more productive, I think the U.S. would have been forced to treat Pakistan with greater circumspection than it has sometimes. So the onus, again, comes on us on how to improve our own internal conditions so that the U.S. recognizes that this country is making a genuine effort. But at the same time, there is a need for the U.S. to also spend much more time and effort understanding this crazy country called Pakistan. It’s a very nuanced country and it needs greater attention and care. [00:46:27] DR. PERKOVICH: Yeah. Q: Thank you very much for this timely panel. My name is Ben (ph), I’m also from the Elliott School at GW. My question is in particular pertaining to the American media. I wanted to know – you said there’s still a positive role for information and analysis. MR. JABBAR: Yeah.

Q: What kind of opinion do you have about their coverage or overhype into hyperbole of the China-Pakistan relationship, axis, whatever you want to call it? MR. JABBAR: Yes. I know it’s quite remarkable considering that, you know, we were the first country, really, to reach out to China when it was isolated, as you know. We concluded an airline agreement with China, PIA was the first commercial airline to fly into China back in 1960, ’62 phase. And inevitably, this China-Pakistan relationship really began to warm in the ’60s even though we recognized it straight away – and the effect the – the irony that Pakistan proved to be the gateway for Mr. Nixon to reach out to China through Kissinger in 1970. [00:47:38] So one would have expected a greater understanding, but I think there is – I’m not too concerned. Yes, the media portrayal of the China-Pakistan relationship and this reporting that as a result of our recent tension with the U.S., we are now looking to China to make up for this vacuum, is not justified at all. I mean, we are not so unrealistic as to think that China is going to fill some kind of a vacuum that is created if our relationship with the U.S. sours to that point. China will be of very valuable support to Pakistan, but in certain limited, clear areas which cannot be those in which the U.S. has an unbeatable or unrivaled lead, whether it is technology or whether it is even the generosity of U.S. aid – which should, of course, be larger than what it has been so far – (chuckles) – and economic aid – especially on the economic front – the capacity of the Pakistani manufacturing sector, especially, to be able to export to the U.S., not just the traditionally textiles but also IT related work, software. You know, the good news that the single most popular application downloaded by – on BlackBerry is a software concept – a software program developed by a Pakistani Lahore-based firm called Five Rivers – Pepper PK. It’s a photo suite application. So we have even got IT capacity to serve America’s software and development needs. So one hopes that, you know, the range of exports from Pakistan will be encouraged, and at the same time I’m sure we’ll be always a ready market, by the way. Even though it may be irrelevant, just let me tell you that while relationships have soured, tensions have continued, the Pakistan economy is only at 2.5 percent growth, the happiest people in Pakistan are at least seven major multinationals including a nice U.S. firm like Procter and Gamble. Have you heard of Procter and Gamble? Well, they are very happy. They are recording incredibly high profits, sales are booming. And Nestle, PNG, Shell and what have you, they’re all doing extremely well in our country because we also have something called a “parallel economy” that is not reflected in the 2.5 percent growth rate. There’s a large operative part. [00:50:15] So coming back to China, I think the China-Pakistan relationship needs to be both appreciated and reported with larger – within a larger framework than it is being presently done. DR. PERKOVICH: Now I will ask you a question, Javed, because you said something that prompted it. You said that, you know, it would be better if the U.S. was providing more aid. And I – so I want you to address the challenge that there already is more aid kind of in the reservoir that is designed to flow to Pakistan, but it’s not flowing. MR. JABBAR: Yeah. That’s true.

DR. PERKOVICH: And it’s not flowing for multiple reasons. And some of those reasons depend on who you talk to. There are people in Pakistan who have an explanation for it and then the people here have an explanation. There’s problems of corruption, there’s problems – because there are problems of corruptions, there’s problems, then, of persuading Congress that measures are taken so that there won’t be corruption and so on. [00:51:21] You’re a businessman. You do philanthropy of your own. So how would you – what are some ways in which you would think about fixing the process, in both ends, so that aid could actually flow more and then get to the people that you think in Pakistan should benefit from it? MR. JABBAR: Thank you, George. Incidentally, I am a time philanthropist. I wish I were a financial philanthropist. I just give time because time is what I have. (Chuckles.) I wish I had more money but – (chuckles). DR. PERKOVICH: But maybe the solution actually – but, yeah, right. MR. JABBAR: But time philanthropy is actually more valuable than financial philanthropy; but whatever one can do, one does. Yes, what can be done to ensure that existing levels of U.S. aid reach those who deserve it, who need it most? I see some encouraging signs, though they are very awkward and almost embarrassing for a Pakistani, because now they have these billboards up in various cities: anti-fraud hotline – USAID, as if most people in the country are rogues and criminals – (inaudible, chuckles) – who need to be to be reported upon as if big brother is watching you – you better come and report. But what they’re encouraging is whistleblowing. And this is happening for the first time, not only on billboards but also on television, where people are being encouraged to report misuse of public funds. And even the advertising is being done by USAID. I wish we didn’t need it. And sometimes USAID is used in a very inappropriate way. [00:53:04] For example, when the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is the name of the North-West Frontier Province right next to FATA where the Swat operation took place. And there suddenly ran a front-page, color advertisement asking tourists to visit Swat – which is beautiful, to –sure. But alas, the cost of the ad was paid for by USAID, which is totally a negation, in my viewpoint, of what should be done. Why should USAID have to pay for an ad? The KP government can surely afford to place front-page advertisements. So there is also this bizarre misuse and diversion of aid. What can be done? First, the raising of public awareness and the empowerment of some very promising civil society institutions that have become effective monitors of public policies. And thirdly, media’s continued vigilance. This is for the first time that we have in our country electronic media, in particular, almost on a daily basis running campaigns which go to the very locations where gross negligence or misuse is occurring of public funds. So that’s the third. The fourth would – should be really at a macro-policy levels at the federal and the four provincial government levels where the capacities of these four provincial governments to absorb the new devolve power that they have been given – unprecedented power – is actually managed in a way that makes use of existing financial resources and also doesn’t end the financial year with about 20 to 30 percent of allocated funds not yet being utilized. We even have that spectacle, and sometimes in the social sector, like education and health, where these funds are so badly needed.

So capacity-building of the four provincial governments and the – even the federal government – the federal government is a strange anomaly. After having devolved these dozens of subjects, they have not got rid of a single official because they don’t want to create unemployment or unpopularity. And that, in my opinion, is a mistake. They must emasculate the federal government, make it lean and mean and tough and efficient, and not just have a bloated bureaucracy sitting around not doing anything productive. They should be re-trained, given gainful employment in new sectors. So it will have to take four to five, I supposed, ongoing processes. Some of them are already in place, such as the media, and increased civil society vigilance. And parliament – the last element, I would say, is the standing committees on parliament which need to become much more active in holding public policy to account. And there, I’m glad to hear that the places like the National Democratic Institute and others are supporting processes in Pakistan to improve the monitoring and performance and training of staffs attached to parliamentary committees. So given perhaps those six or seven measures, we could improve the utilization of existing aid. And I’m not saying that we should ask for substantially more aid. We should be increasing our tax to GDP ratio, which is shameful. It’s at 9.5 percent of GDP. It should be minimum 20 percent – Turkey is 23 percent and India is about 14 percent. So we have a lot of work to do ourselves. And we should not be spoiled, either, by too much aid. We should be inducting many parts of the economy that are already very productive into the official economy. [00:57:14] DR. PERKOVICH: Yes, sir? Q: Hi. My name is Ben Ligo (ph)with the Internews Network. You’ve talked a little bit about – about the press in Pakistan. I’ve touched a little bit (on ?) about the importance of the relationship between the press – the American press – on the relationship between U.S. and Pakistan. I was wondering if you could touch on the Pakistani press and how their voice has either improved or caused problems between the relationship between U.S. and Pakistan. MR. JABBAR: All right, thank you. The Pakistani print media can be seen in three basic categories: One, the English-language media, which has prestige but has very limited circulation. However, it does mean a lot to policymakers in Pakistan and it helps articulate Pakistan’s position to Washington, D.C. and the rest of the world because it’s instantly accessible. And the Pakistani English-print media are generally very balanced. They are extremely self-critical. They are extremely, in fact sometimes, hypercritical of the army, in particular, and tend to be, perhaps, imbalanced sometimes. But I think they do generally a very fair job. [00:58:37] The second segment of print media is the Urdu language media, which reaches the largest number of people. But unfortunately has a part – a part of its mindset is extremely reactionary, obscurantist and orthodox. And it caters to stereotypes of the West and tends to end up demonizing not just the West. It demonizes, for example, the concept and the word “secular.” Now, the word “secular” in our interpretation should mean that religion should not play the decisive role in state policies. But the way “secular” has been used in the Urdu-print media in Pakistan, from the word go, is that secular

means godlessness or atheism. Now, for that perception to exist amongst tens of millions of people gives you an idea of how gross the misperception is within Pakistan about what it means to be secular. [00:59:46] So I spend a fair amount of time in my appearances on television trying to tell people that the word “secular” does not mean what the Urdu media have made it mean over the last 60 years. And it is not very easy to do because it’s also been made part of the textbooks, and that has to be changed. In irony, the poet/philosopher of Pakistan, Mr. Iqbal – Allama Iqbal – famously said that all that is secular is deeply spiritual at the roots of its being. I mean, he believed in secularism, in the best sense of the term, while being a very strong Islamic thinker. The third segment of our media is the indigenous language media, which is primarily Sindhi language media, which tends to be much more balanced than Urdu media but which also tends to be very – not nationalistic, but very protective of Sindhs’ interests. But on the whole, I think they’ve done a very good job and – as has the Urdu media. What the Urdu media need is to be reached out to by American spokespersons, American institutions. Greater engagement with the Urdu media in Pakistan, both print and electronic, would make a great difference. And one excellent step has been taken by Voice of America which has bought time on Pakistan’s most popular, highly-viewed television channel called GEO. So every week we get to hear in Urdu – our language – half-hour or 45 minute report on what is happening in the United States and how does the U.S. view some basic policy issues. So that helps. But there is a need for much greater, I think, effort to be invested by the U.S. as a whole in cultivating better relations with Urdu media in Pakistan. DR. PERKOVICH: Clay. Q: I’m Clay Ramsay, Program on International Policy Attitudes. We have done polls in Pakistan in the past and I have two questions. But first, I want to just follow up about trying to explain secularism in Urdu, because we ran into this problem. And – so one question is: Do you think that the resources of the Urdu language give some good equivalents for the concept at all? My second quest ion is, it seems to me sometimes rather awkward and embarrassing that such a high proportion of public opinion polling of Pakistanis on public policy issues comes from outside the country. And I wonder if there is any prospect for either one major media outlet investing the money to do their own polling in a big way or possibly a consortium of several that would then create a little institute that could sit in a Pakistani university and have a – the sort of prestige associated with doing things properly statistically. [01:03:27] MR. JABBAR: Thank you. To respond to the second question first, there is a fair degree of – there’s a fairly frequent polling of public opinion by leading electronic media channels in Pakistan today, virtually on a weekly basis sometimes – sometimes even on a daily basis. They ask viewers to send cell phone messages to say “yes” or “no” to various questions that are posed on the screen. That’s one form of polling which is not entirely satisfactory. But that is occurring. However, on a systemic basis – on an institutional basis, independent of media – because media can cater to some other pressures or factors of prejudice – I think there is a tremendous vacuum. There is something called the Gallup Pakistan Branch and Nielsen also. But Nielsen have confined themselves largely to assessing television talk shows or television program popularity. So there is great scope for an intervention and investment.

And I would urge that it should not be attached to universities – even universities are subject to a state influence or government control because the governor of each province is the chancellor of the university as a symbol of the influence. And therefore, there is need for an independent, truly nonpartisan institution that is focused on assessing public opinion and which is indigenous and Pakistani – in association with overseas – yeah, affiliated to overseas. Certainly I would think that is necessary. [01:05:07] And the second – the first question was, does the Urdu language have the scope to offer more credible and truthful alternatives to this mis-equation of secularism with godlessness. And I think it does. For example, “insaniyat” is an Urdu word for humanism – for respecting human beings regardless of their faith. And “insaniyat” is a popular cultural concept as well. When you say insaniyat in Pakistan, it is welcomed and accepted. So whether you are a Shia Muslim or a Sunni Muslim or a fanatic, like myself, of no – no persuasion of either sect, insaniyat would ring a bell. And I think we should consciously promote phrases and concepts of this kind, starting with the primary school curriculum level, and also going into that other favorite, the religious madrasas. DR. PERKOVICH: They do polling, so can you guys – could you get into – because it strikes me, this might be interesting for you and helpful for them to think about wording and things of (the ?) polls that they do – MR. JABBAR: Yes, certainly. (Cross talk.) DR. PERKOVICH: – because they do world-class polls around the world that then get picked up a lot in the U.S. And so it – [1:06:26] MR. JABBAR: Quite right. All right, certainly – (inaudible). After this – DR. PERKOVICH: This gentleman, right here. Q: Mike Anderson (sp), retired foreign service. Much of what you said, Javed, is kind of long-term development kinds of things that need to be done largely by Pakistanis or Pakistani institutions. But it seems to me, looking at the relationship, there’s – in the past year, there’s a head-on collision between the two governments on policy issues. And I wonder if could push you a bit to be a little more specific on what can be done to get out of the current dilemma? And Ms. Clinton was just there, high-level talks. What can be done to stop the collision that’s imminent or that’s happening as we speak? And granted, what you say is long-term development things. That’s great, but it’s going to take time. But let’s talk specifically about the policy issues between the two governments at the moment. What suggestions might you offer to both sides to resolve this and get things moving in the right direction again? MR. JABBAR: Thank you. Without absolving Pakistan of its own responsibilities, I think the first has to be a cessation of verbal warfare, verbal warfare by the U.S. government.

And I know that U.S. media are very independent, but we see U.S. media being used to deliberately leak facts or semi-facts which tend to give Pakistan a very – even worse image than it already enjoys. And to see very authoritative media being willing to be used to disseminate these perceptions of Pakistan, it causes great offense. And it just is not a question of an isolated military leadership that is sitting in its ivory tower, damaging Pakistan. This is a perception that is across the whole country. There are well-meaning, liberal, modern, educated Pakistanis who want to work with America, but who are silenced – who cannot afford to speak for America – because of this assault, constant assault, on Pakistan’s credibility and its sincerity, its supposed lack of sincerity in dealing with the Taliban or the Haqqanis or whatever. [1:09:10] So the first step I would urge sincerely is, let us confine these recriminations and accusations strictly behind closed doors. And that would give the Pakistani officials, as well as the Pakistani public, a feeling that this great power does trust us enough to try to work with us, and we want it – and there’s a great backlash in Pakistan against violent extremism. There is a tremendous show of piety. People are sprouting beards, and people are wearing hijabs, and all want to wear religion on their sleeves, but that is a reaction to the assault of modernity. It is not a regression into extremism. There is a segment of people who think in those extremist terms, but they remain a minority. So this would weaken them and strengthen those who want to – who want to improve the quality of relations. That’s the first. That’s mainly a tactic, let’s say, or even a strategic effort. The second element, policy: What are the divergences? The divergences have to do, I suppose, with the time frame and the terms of disengagement with Afghanistan. What is going to be the time frame? Will it be a time frame – from our point of view, yes, there cannot be a premature withdrawal from Afghanistan. We do our best to try and convince, I think, with whatever routes of communication we have with the – whether with the Haqqanis or the Taliban – I think the message going out from Taliban is, don’t ask for immediate or short-term withdrawal. Because it’s going to lead to an implosion roughly duplicating what happened after 1988-89. So on that level, we have identical views. However, the Afghan Taliban, and the Haqqani network included, led by Mullah Omar – and incidentally, this notion of dealing separately with the Haqqanis as distinct from Mullah Omar needs to be seriously reconsidered. One does not see any willingness on the part of the Haqqanis to negotiate separately with the U.S. or with Pakistan, unless they have the blessings of Mullah Omar. And Mullah Omar may or may not be as powerful as he was 10 years ago. That is also an untested notion. But I think they would want to remain in harmony with what Mullah Omar says. [1:11:51] So the second element would be a greater process of sharing between Afghanistan, the U.S. and Pakistan. And if you wanted this conference – the conference is due now, the next Bonn Conference is due. There’s another conference due in November, a consultation. And Marc Grossman keeps coming out to Pakistan reasonably regularly. I think this process of dialogue will help identify the specifics of the time frame and the terms of withdrawal.

And I think there is a fair deal of convergence on other issues. This whole issue of whether we are actively supporting the Haqqanis also needs to be re-examined. I’ve given you some data. There are obviously at least three types of people operating against the U.S. forces. There’s one that may be gaining refuge in Northern Waziristan and occasionally slips past even U.S. forces. There is another group that is based in and around Kabul. There is no way that a 19-hour assault could have been conducted without active local networks of support from within Afghanistan and close to Kabul. And then there’s a third element, which is fairly disparate and localized and not necessarily cohesively commanded by a singular force. So with each of them, one needs a flexible strategy. [1:13:32] You cannot see them as a monolithic entity called the Afghan Taliban. I think there is scope for dealing separately with some elements of that. But the Haqqanis and Mullah Omar would, in my limited knowledge, be indivisible. And I think we facilitated – as a first step, Hillary Clinton has admitted that we did arrange a first meeting at the suggestion of Pakistan or at the request of the State Department. I don’t want to get into that. But that meeting took place. And that’s very good to build upon. So I think there’s already a lot of commonality in policy. And just determined pursuit will result in constructive collaboration. Q: What about drones? You haven’t mentioned that. MR. JABBAR: I deliberately didn’t. (Chuckles.) It’s a very bizarre situation, such repeated violations of airspace. There is a segment of Pakistan that grudgingly accepts that these wretched drones do damage and target some totally criminalistic elements who need to be caught. But at the same time, there is great concern as to what does it represent. It’s not just a question of violation of Pakistani airspace. We are creating an entirely new paradigm for international affairs over the next 20-30 years. Are we legitimizing the use of technology in a way that disregards, disrespects another country’s airspace so wholly and completely? And this issue is something that even those empathetic to the U.S. are not able to wholly accept, because it – the concepts have not yet been fully debated and there is no consensus. Should a state have this power? Because then what will prevent from using the U.S. precedent to say, we’ve also got hold of some new technology and let us try this across the line of control in Kashmir? And that could lead to terrible consequences, which we will not accept. We might accept, grudgingly, U.S. drones, because the U.S. is, fortunately, 10,000 miles away, and we have a commonality of interests. But the day an Indian drone decides to do something in Pakistan, there’s no way that Pakistan is going to react with the kind of ambivalent silence and protest that you see with U.S. drones. [1:16:16] The Pakistan reaction, both at the popular level and at the state level, is going to be much more explicit. So the U.S. needs to think this through carefully. And on the sociological level, the consequences for families whose wives, whose mothers, whose children are also killed as a result of being accidentally close remains unknown. The Taliban don’t allow people – any media – to come and photograph what happens. So lack of information itself fuels so much misinformation, or genuine apprehension that just to get one wretch, you have also killed 10 innocent people. And out of those 10 innocent people, guaranteed, one is going to say, I shall go and become a suicide bomber to seek revenge for what you have done to my father or my brother.

So it is a self-defeating kind of long-term policy. We are breeding deep-rooted resentment, which shouldn’t happen. The last thing that the U.S. should now be doing is nurturing further hatred amongst people. So it’s an issue that needs much more careful debate and thought. DR. PERKOVICH: I want to follow up on that, and you’re – I absolutely agree about the need not only for the U.S. but for others to think through the implications of this new technology, and the principles and the laws and rules by which you would apply it. But I think people would argue in the U.S. government – I think this was one of the points Admiral Mullen was trying to make – that there’s an element of self-defense. So that if people are attacking U.S. personnel or the U.S. embassy, which is diplomatic property, and personnel that are there at the request of the Afghan government, and you trace them back someplace, you have a right to self-defense. [1:18:25] So on your Indian example, it occurred to me – I have no doubt you’re right about the reaction. But if, after another attack on India that is traced back to Pakistan – if the Indian response, instead of Mirage and Jaguar jets and ground forces – if the Indian response were UAVs, in self-defense, in response to an attack that came from LeT or somebody based there, isn’t that both – wouldn’t that be legitimate? But secondly, you know, is that not, in some way, quote, better than some of the alternative ways to act on self-defense, which have a lot more collateral damage, a lot more presence, there? So it’s – just think about it a little bit. I mean, it’s a tricky – MR. JABBAR: No, certainly. No, no, it’s certainly less a destructive option than the Jaguars and the Mirages letting themselves loose on Pakistan. But it still would be unacceptable, firstly, just purely because this whole use is based on the premise that you can be unilaterally judge, jury, and executioner – that you decide what the facts are and then you decide who is guilty, and then you decide what the punishment should be. That’s a terrible concentration of power in one entity – investigation, identification, adjudication, and implementation – my god, formidable. So this would be unacceptable to Pakistan even otherwise, quite apart from the Indian issue. So perhaps the first thing we should consider is, why cannot the U.S. collaborate with Pakistan on the use of drones? That would be a tremendous confidence-building step. And if the U.S. is apprehensive that we are going to leak the intelligence, and the targets are going to be allowed to escape, I think, really, a country that’s paying such a heavy price with its own armed forces’ officers deserves to be trusted a little more – that, and then a broader coalition, perhaps – a more participative process for decision-making in order to determine whether drones should be used or not would establish a collective principle and detract from – you know. [1:20:54] But coming back to the India question, India tends to sometimes magnify – and with due respect, fabricate – incidents which have nothing to do with Pakistan. For example, when President Clinton visited Delhi back in the year 2000, I remember there was this terrible massacre of Muslims – sorry, of non-Muslims – in Indian-occupied Kashmir.

And the timing was so odd and crude, and the massacre was so savage, it produced a tremendous reaction, obviously. And there were accusations of Pakistan being involved. But I then remember that it was eventually demonstrated that it was India’s own RAW and agents related to RAW, the militias that had been inducted by the Indian military into the opposite side, which had actually conducted the massacre. [1:21:52] So sometimes, we find the evidence of these attacks on India very lacking in credibility – for example, the attack in December 2000 on the Indian parliament. There were five characters who very conveniently carried in their pockets confectionary and biscuits made in Pakistan. Now – and then they were very conveniently found with their clothes. Now, why would anyone wanting to – why would Pakistan or ISI want the link to be traced so crudely and obviously to Pakistan? At least, they’d be asked to carry Indian biscuits in their pocket. But they were carrying Pakistani confectionary. So this makes us feel very uneasy about the reliability of the – and then last year – and I don’t want to say that Pakistanis have had no hand. Some Pakistani madmen have had a hand. But you know, in the Samjhauta Express, where 42 Pakistanis were burned alive, it has now come to light that it was the Indians who actually committed that – the Indian, Hindu extremists – while blaming the actual incident on some Pakistani provocation. So I would urge, George, in answer to that, that it’s better that there is a participative, collaborative process for the use of drones established as a global principle for the use of this kind of technology, rather than giving it unilateral freedom by one power alone or one country alone. DR. PERKOVICH: We have time for one more. Yes, ma’am? Q: (Off mic.) Margaret Rogers (sp). Hi, Margaret Rogers. I work as a USAID contractor. My question is about Osama bin Laden. I’ve heard different Pakistanis talk about this, and I’d just be interested to hear your views. How could he have been there that long without the Pakistani government or military knowing, as they have said? But also, what is your view of the impact on – him being killed there – and its impact on the army, Pakistani army? MR. JABBAR: First of all, the impact was extremely negative. It was traumatic, traumatic for the people to realize that he was there. Second, I think that it was a brilliantly audacious concept on the part of Osama bin Laden, or his helpers, to use that. I’m not – now, on the second point, I’m not yet saying whether there was official collusion or not. But the audacity is fantastic – I mean, to use this innocuous place and not have any persons guarding it, even in a society where it is quite common for even very low-level tribal sadars (ph) to have people with weapons at the gate. And that’s not looked upon with undue suspicion. [1:24:53] So if someone had been there with two guns sitting at the gate, that’s just taken as normal. So to do away with even that minimal level of protection and to have no armed persons at all in that compound, or outside the gate, has to take incredible audacity. Now, don’t make that sound, or misunderstand it as being admiring of it, but I’m just taking note of it. It’s a very audacious thing – (chuckles) – and then to be right under the noses of the military. The third element I would respond to is – by coincidence, I go there once a year, somewhat, to talk at the Pakistan Military Academy, which is the premier training institution – it is not a combat-ready city. It doesn’t have any army

units which are deployed in any kind of operational readiness capacity. It is simply a training and education-based environment. So to that extent, it is, to me, not surprising that given the level of misgovernance, which I have given three and a half overall – military governance, I would improve it to a certain higher degree. Military governance, at least in the cantonments, is better than civil governance. However, military governance can also be incompetent governance. And this has to be one of those one-in-a-billion cases of monumental incompetence concerning the most wanted man in the world. [1:26:36] Lastly, I like to think, and I am convinced, that there could not have been official collusion. The risks were far too many. There were too many. There’s too much at risk with the U.S. relationship. Even for the Pakistani military, it was too big a risk to take. And therefore, I think it is a unique case of something happening right under someone’s nose and not knowing it. But you are well aware that in many countries of the world, this has happened. It has happened in the case of former Yugoslavia, where the Serbian war criminals have been able to sit in their own little towns for 10 years without being detected. Now, it can happen. It should not have happened. And I think Pakistan has learned a great lesson from this, and the armed forces are extremely upset and embarrassed, as they should be. And I hope that never again such an incident should occur. [1:27:43] DR. PERKOVICH: Javed, let me, on behalf of everybody, thank you for a very, very insightful conversation and presentation. And I hope that when you’re in next year, you’ll come back, and wish you luck on the rest of your trip. MR. JABBAR: Great, thank you. DR. PERKOVICH: Thank you all for coming. MR. JABBAR: Thank you. (END)