How ASEAN As An Institutional Platform Can Address The Security Problems In The Region ?

Cooperation Under The Security Dilemma1: The Case of South China Sea Disputes

Steven Yohanes Polhaupessy

Abstract The aim of this paper is to provide an analytical understanding and elaborating new perspective

regarding to the South China Sea disputes in ASEAN Context. On one hand, ASEAN as a regional institution should address a Political, Economic and Strategic dimension of South China Sea disputes in certain of security platform to maintain the regional stability in ensuring its interdependence economic growth. The People Republic of China, on the other hand, has played a major role in determining the direction of ASEAN economic growth by free trade area agreement and vast investment. Therefore, the outcomes of security platform should address the interdependence dimensions among ASEAN member states go hand in hand with People Republic of China. The writer dismantle this issue with Realism perspectives, which encompassing Robert Jervis theory of Security Dilemma.

Keywords: Uncertainty, Cooperation Under The Security Dilemma, Three Dimensions, Complex Comprehensive Security

Uncertainty

A dispute regarding the ownership of the 880.000 KM 2 South China Sea has actually been

happening since many years ago among the claimants States. During the Cold War and after the Cold

War period, claims of the ownership of South China Sea has been escalating and influencing

Southeast Asia regions. Thus, this issue became prominent regional security problems. Since the

vastly changing in international structures from bipolarity to multi-polarity, the need of security

arrangement in this region matters than before. The need of security arrangement should be

addressed not only to arrange a relations within ASEAN member states, but also with ASEAN non

member states, which in this case, People Republic of China.

Henceforth, ASEAN as a regional institution -which supposed to reduce the form of uncertainty

and alter the cost of power distributions in Realism perspective –have to bring into more

consideration in preventing the conflict escalations that intentionally trigger a war.

1This paper title adopted the original paper of Robert Jervis titled “Cooperation Under The Security Dilemma” published in World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Jan., 1978), pp. 167-214.

Because ASEAN has no certain forms of security arrangement with ASEAN non member

states –or at least an ambiguous arranged treaty –Southeast Asia region could not avoid the

vulnerability of peaceful condition which expected by the members. Due to interweaving history,

In 1974, the People Republic of China (PRC) and Vietnam has involved in a bloody skirmish

near the Woody Island in Paracel Islands. In 1988, skirmish of PRC and Vietnam was intensified

into 22 minutes short war in the South China Sea areas and caused 33 casualties of Viet Nam

naval personnel. Also in 1995, even there was an agreement within ASEAN and PRC to conduct

preventive actions toward the dispute in 1992, Mischief Reef clashed tends to ignite the intensity

of conflict into an open war. Besides, there was also another events tends to produce conflict

such as: an intimidation with the establishment of PRC military facility in disputes island, the

joint military practices between Philippines and U.S., the arrested of each claimants states

fisherman in disputes areas and there are much more clashed that could not be counted which

tends to be a conflict or war (Ras, 2001). Those examples that have been occured above made a

justification of the meaning of uncertainty in Southeast Asia regions. The uncertainty form is

consist of suspicion, fear and threat which standing in the same line during the conflicts.

Alike with the changing of volcano status from danger being vigilant and then alert to

standby again, that the South China Sea disputes concerning the ownership status of the South

China Sea is rising up and down to intensify the conflict. An uncertainty conditions of South

China Sea disputes has stimulate a suspicion, fear and misperception between the both sides.

ASEAN and PRC on the one hand wants to promote a peaceful, friendly and harmonious

environment in the South China Sea between ASEAN and PRC for the enhancement of peace,

stability, economic growth and prosperity in the region (Studies, 2002, p. 79), but on the other

hand ASEAN as institution has no authorities that can make and enforce such security

arrangements for their goodness which legally binding as international law because PRC stand

affirms for their national sovereignty and also territorial integrity. Therefore, converge of shared

understanding between ASEAN and PRC are very critical to find on this issues.

The problem nature of South China Sea has been tremendously affect in other areas, such as

differences in current security interests, disagreements in sea boundaries, and the ambiguousness

in international law. Beyond those areas which has been affected with South China Sea issue,

The clash of interest has also colouring the region dynamics with its complexity. Besides, dispute

over the South China Sea is notable for ASEAN not only in terms of stability and peaceful co-

existance, but also in terms of economic development such as vast investment and obviously the

market integration by conducting free trade with PRC itself. Therefore, the interdependence

aspects of South China Sea disputes resolution should encompassing those factors which are

very critical to the region of Southeast Asia.

Cooperation Under The Security Dilemma

Security dilemma, in realism perspective, is a paradoxical situation of states to interact with

each others. On the one hand, when there is a state simply increasing their power to ensure its

viability under the anarchy situations, other states perceived it as threat. Otherwise, the other

states react excessively with balancing behavior. On the other hand, when there is a state facing

an increasing power from the other states and they do nothing, their position toward the other

states is under the uncertainty situation whether they would be occupied or invaded with other

states.

According to ASEAN context, security dilemma is understood as Jervis pointed out, many of

the means by which a state tries to increase its security, decrease the security of others (Jervis,

1978. p. 169) or, which many of the policies that are designed to increase state’s security

automatically and inadvertently decrease the security of other (Jervis, Security Regimes, 1983, p.

174). Furthermore, Robert Jervis emphasized security dilemma as a situation where states

rationally made a decision to defend itself (Jervis, 1978).

There are Jervis scenarios to depict the security dilemma. Each of Jervis scenarios will be

used as a construction of the situation of the South China Sea disputes. From each scenarios we

could bring to the near what situation that ASEAN actually facing. Therefore, the security

dilemma would lead ASEAN to make cooperation only with its member to interact with external

parties or join an alliance with external parties.

The first scenario of Jervis security dilemma is when the states interact with offensive or

defensive behavior to other states could not be distinguished, but the offensive behavior

intentionally benefited for the states that made the offensive behavior (Jervis, 1978).

This scenario indicated to depict the PRC positions and responses toward the South China

Sea disputes. According to PRC foreign policy conception, the safeguarding national sovereignty

is the main priority of Chinese Government, in order to maintain its national independence, PRC

will neither enter into alliance with any big power of group of countries, nor establish military

bloc, join in the arm race or seek military expansion (China, 2012). Based on this issue,

therefore, clearly stated that the objectives of PRC national interest when conducting the foreign

policy is protect its national sovereignty. Moreover, PRC would make an official enforcement to

the states who threathening its sovereignty.

Several clashed that have been occured to other states such as Viet Nam or Philippines

proved the offensive behavior of PRC are benefited them. If security dilemma occurred, Jervis

argues that the aftermath of the uncertainty situation of security dilemma is the arm race between

states. PRC and some ASEAN member states who involved in this situation is going through the

arm race situation, but PRC until now undoubtedly won the arm race. PRC military

modernization since 2002 until 2011 shows that PRC has won the arm race with some ASEAN

member states due to its military expenditure (Institute, 2012) (See Table 1.1).

The PRC efforts to bring the problems being solved with diplomatic bilateral relations with

some of ASEAN member states rather with diplomatic multilateral actions with ASEAN could

be viewed as an offensive behaviour. Because the PRC’s reason to stand affirms on the status

quo and the big oppurtunities in which tends to give more benefits to them if they using a

bilateral diplomatic relations. The PRC status quo at this point could be defined as an actions to

defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Therefore, rational choice being offensive

behaviour is possible to PRC with its purpose to maintain sovereignty and territorial integrity.

If we traced by its its history, before Viet Nam joined the ASEAN in 1995. PRC was not very

happy with Viet Nam’s membership in ASEAN because Viet Nam sees its ASEAN membership

as a source to strenght in dealing with PRC over the South China Sea (ASEAN, 2002, p. 19). It is

also with others new ASEAN member which joined after Viet Nam, Such as Lao PDR (1997),

Burma (1997) and Cambodia (1999) was making PRC unhappy because their influence through

the countries will be decreased as their membership in ASEAN. Those countries are

underdeveloped rather than the rest of ASEAN members. Therefore, PRC offensive diplomatic

bilateral relations with some of ASEAN members regarding to South China Sea disputes could

be perceived not only as an offensive behavior, but also as potential disintegration of ASEAN

itself.

Henceforth, the diplomatic action from PRC with enforcement to conduct a diplomatic

bilateral relations with the ASEAN claimants states rather to conduct diplomatic multilateral

relations, reflects the PRC primacy and strength. Besides, the PRC military actions is aim to

deter other states when tried to balance PRC power. The both PRC power –Diplomatic and

Military –showed the benefits if states offensively behave toward their security dilemma.

Meanwhile, at this context the PRC seems deliberately denied the presence of ASEAN as a

bridge to conduct a solution to the disputes, because ASEAN has never provide a distinc security

platform in this region and within the ASEAN member itself.

The first scenario of security dilemma, therefore, shows PRC oppurtunities of cooperation

with ASEAN are low.

Table 1

ASEAN claimants states and PRC Military Expenditure Comparison

ASEAN Claimants States Military Expenditure

States Year2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Viet Nam(not

Available)1366 1399 1459 1718 2215 2182 2397 2697 2675

Philippines 2071 2282 2127 2145 2202 2414 2391 2322 2438 2417

Brunei 318 332 262 318 357 370 381 374 391 414

Malaysia 3178 4052 3910 4183 4094 4571 4674 4413 3859 4587

Indonesia 2866 3736 3841 3336 3387 4073 3800 3971 4663 5709

Figures are in US $m. , at constant 2010 prices and exchange rates

Resources : SIPRI

People Republic of China Military Expenditure

Year Expenditure

2002 478292003 519552004 575422005 647262006 76065

2007 877302008 966632009 1166662010 1210642011 142859

Data Figures In US $ Million, at constant 2010 prices and exchange rates

Resources : SIPRI

The second scenario of Jervis security dilemma is when the states interact with offensive or

defensive behavior to other states could not be distinguished, but the defensive behavior

intentionally much benefited to the states that made the defensive behavior (Jervis, 1978).

From this point, the presence of some ASEAN member states who are not involved directly

in the disputes, namely Singapore, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia or might be Indonesia are

benefited if they behave with defensive behavior rather to be an offensive one in buttressing

some of ASEAN member states who involved to the disputes. In despite some of ASEAN

member who are not a claimants states of South China Sea disputes benefited with the PRC

relations with them, the rest of ASEAN claimants states namely Viet Nam, Malaysia, Brunei and

Philippines are threatened. Indirectly, the ASEAN also shifted into two big frictions in

responding the presence of PRC within the region. The first friction, states who directly needs

PRC presence in maintaining their national interest. And the second friction is the states who

also directly needs the PRC, but also facing a security dilemma. Otherwise, the disputes

regarding the ownership of the South China Sea disputes are intentionally disintegrate within

ASEAN member states.

The first friction, benefited by the PRC huge economics growth. The PRC now is the largest

trading areas with the access of growing of manufacturing and services in the world. Since the

ASEAN-China FTA officially run in 2010, it encompassed 1.9 billion people, had combined

GDP of US$ 6.6 Trillion and total trade amounted US$ 4.3 Trillion (Forum, 2010). Therefore, it

is easily to find that the national interest of the first friction of some of ASEAN member states

who are not involved to the disputes are benefited with PRC presence in the region. Obviously it

would affect the some member states position toward COC which ASEAN efforts now in

progress to provide. In context of the “ASEAN WAY”2 which believed on consensus from each

member states to generate a decisions.

There might be this first friction would lead into disintegrated decision. Conversely, position

for the second friction of some ASEAN member states who are involved in the diputes, therefore

are always pointed to be a threat for the peace proccess through the COC. The first friction are

always tried to restrain the offensive behaviour of the second friction, even though the second

friction impose to survive their national interest. To conclude the second scenario of security

dilemma, the second friction are always being lossed by the interest of the first friction.

States National Interest

Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity Economic DevelopmentASEANFriction 1: Non Claimants States

Indonesia Uncertain Yes Singapore No Yes Thailand No Yes

Cambodia No Yes Burma No Yes

Lao PDR No Yes

Friction 2: Claimants States

Malaysia Yes YesViet Nam Yes Yes

Philippines Yes YesBrunei Yes Yes

PRC Yes Yes

Table 1.2 ASEAN and PRC clash of Interest Map In the South China Sea

The third scenario of Jervis security dilemma is when the states interact with offensive or

defensive behavior to other states could be distinguished, but the offensive behavior benefited to

states who offensively behave than defensively behave (Jervis, 1978). 2 ASEAN Way defined with shared understanding of all ASEAN member states as stated in ASEAN Charter

Article 2, such as: respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national identity of all ASEAN Member States or, non-interference in internal affairs of ASEAN Member States. See Secretariat, A., The ASEAN Charter (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2010).

The offensive and defensive behavior between some of ASEAN member states who involved

in disputes and PRC are distinguishable, but the intensity of security dilemma are not, even

though the security issues does its existence. The offensive behavior would give more benefits to

PRC in this context, but it would generate its behavior to a future conflict escalation or wars.

PRC behavior are always tends to make an intentional offensive behavior which also could

stimulate a war in the future situation. The Chinese military modernization buttressed with huge

economic growth would be a perfect combination to PRC in conducting offensive behavior as a

rational choice to survive in uncertainty situation which faced by ASEAN. ASEAN therefore

could not act with rational choice to be an offensive because there was friction of interest within

its cooperation. PRC on the one hand could conduct an offensive decision because of its foreign

policy are derived from the only one government. It is different with ASEAN that could not act

offensively because of its foreign policy is made by the collective national interest from different

member states. In other words, the PRC benefited with in-capabilities of ASEAN to conduct

their member states interest into a common decision in responding PRC. The offensive behavior

is indirectly formed. It is formed by the security dilemma within ASEAN member states also.

A justification of the ownership of South China Sea from PRC is clearly affirmed. The use of

force with deployment of military forces and military base in South China Sea disputes has

trigger a skirmish. PRC knows that claimants states in ASEAN context have a weakness. PRC

behavior with the use of force, henceforth could be perceived to give a detterence effect to

claimants states in order to convice them for PRC’s military power.

To conclude this scenario, even the PRC has always trying to offensively act toward some of

ASEAN member states regarding to the disputes, ASEAN act defensively with a balancing

behaviour with promote the multilateral diplomatic ties with PRC and also trying to conduct an

international law which they believed could reduce the conflict: the COC. The COC itself are the

contestation of ASEAN member states national interest just as the ASEAN wants in order to

promote a stability and peace with harmonious relationship within the region.

Three Dimensions: What Factors Will Constitute ASEAN Security Platform?

The amicably actions are needed in South China Sea dispute to assure ASEAN in providing a

security platform which reduce the uncertainty of the region. Exploring the past actions of

ASEAN, the writer found and tried to emphasize that there were several discourses which

influencing ASEAN actions toward South China Sea in order to conduct security platform. This

discourses are not able to keep pace with vastly changing with ASEAN external environmental

because of its complexity, moreover, in external relations with PRC. Conceivably, the writer

called this as three dimension and those are inter-related to each other in order to shape what is

the meaning of security for ASEAN in case of South China Sea Disputes.

The first dimension of discourses are ASEAN Norms and Principles3. The ASEAN norms of

non-interferences and principles of confidence building measures have difference points. First of

all from this dimension, ASEAN non interference and confidence building measures could be

perceived as sovereignty within the ASEAN members. And secondly, could be perceived as

determinant factor for ASEAN to provide the security platform.

The ASEAN and PRC has its own perceiption of Sovereignty. Despite the PRC

understanding its sovereignty as pursuing their national interest, ASEAN Understanding the

Sovereginty of ASEAN members are alike with understanding ASEAN norms and principles,

not intervening to other domestic matters and convincing to keep trust. Since ASEAN

established 45 years ago, ASEAN has always strenghtening for the regional identity

characteristics. The non-interference and confidence building measures are influencing ASEAN

to create particular decisions but not directly related to any particular decisions, but also be

regarded as explanations for the creation, persistence, and dissipation of ASEAN. In this context,

to attract the states in Southeast Asia region to involve in regional organization. The ASEAN

hierarchy, therefore, constituted by non interference and confidence building measures which has

been constructed for many years ago amongst its member states in order to understand what

sovereignty means for them.

Historically, the emergence of non interference and confidence building measures are the

reflection of situation of the ASEAN establishment. The post colonialism period, the emergence

of new independence states around the world from the colonialism, the failures of several

regional institution before ASEAN and also frightened by the threat of Cold War was

overwhelming Southeast Asia region at that time. Based on those assumptions, ASEAN non

interference norms and confidence building measures principles reflects the interest of historical

3 Norms and Principles has its own definitions. Norms defined as standard of behavior in terms of right and obligation and principles could be defined as belief of fact, causation and rectitude. See Krasner, Stephen D., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

situation. Thus, ASEAN member states sovereignty has been acknowledged by them as an equal

position among others and independent government without intervention from other states. From

this point, there are no similarities of understanding the sovereignty between ASEAN and PRC.

Second point of the first dimension, ASEAN understood their norms and principles as

determinant factors to create the security platform. Related to the current situation of South

China Sea disputes do the ASEAN norms and principles should be asserted? In despite of norms

and principles does not apparent directly in any ASEAN decisions, actually those norms and

principles does its co-existence on Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN)4 which

conducted in 1971 and on Treaty Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC)5 in 1976.

Those apparent decisions mingled with norms and principles that eventually enhance the

Declaration Code of Conduct (DOC) on South China Sea disputes in 2002. ASEAN non

interference and confidence building measures should be asserted in South China Sea disputes, if

those are strengthening the security platform. But in fact, even though ASEAN has conducting

the DOC, the skirmishes still occurred and intensify the conflict. On one hand, ASEAN has

succeeded in reducing tension among its member states by implementing of non interferences

and confidence building measures, but on other hand, those were directing an impassed and

uncertainty situation which means those norms and principles are not suitable to keep pace

ASEAN with security problems with external parties, PRC.

In addition, the norms and principles of non-interference and confidence building measures

has actually abused by several member states. Ineffectiveness of ASEAN norms and principles

was abused since 1971. The new Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agremeent subtituted by the Five

Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) (Leifer, 1995, p. 138). Therefore, Malaysia and Singapore

was abusing the norms and principles which also cointained in ZOPFAN and TAC.

4 The Southeast Asia Countries made concerted efforts to secure region in context of free form or manner of interference by outside power. Titled as Declaration of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality signed in Malaysia, 27th November 1971. See ASEAN, Sekertariat N., ASEAN Selayang Pandang (Jakarta: Sekertariat Nasional Departemen Luar Negri Indonesia, 1992).

5 There are six principles of TAC that should be obeyed by ASEAN member states, it is consist of (1) “Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all nations”; (2) “The right of every states to lead its national existance free from external interference, subversion and coercion”; (3) Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; (4) settlement of differences and disputes by peaceful means”; (5) “Renunciation of the threat of use of force”; (6) “Effectiveness among the signed states” These principles reflects the ASEAN member states shared understanding about their common identity thus would enhance and buttress the confidence building measures among them. Signed in Bali, 24 th February 1976. See ASEAN, Sekertariat N., ASEAN Selayang Pandang (Jakarta: Sekertariat Nasional Departemen Luar Negri Indonesia, 1992). For more detailed discussion, see Wulan, A. R., Komunitas ASEAN 2015 Pasca Pertemuan Phnom Penh (Jakarta: Analisis CSIS, 2012).

The weakness of these norms and principles have to be questioned and scrutinized if these

norms and principles are the basis of regional security arrangement: to what extent that

confidence building measures and non interferences suitable with the Southeast Asia regions

security platform?

The Second Dimension of discourse is the presence of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) with

the presence of the great power. The ARF as inter-governmental dialogues forum implicitly

endorsed the ASEAN confidence building measures principles in real efforts (Forum, 2005).

Moreover, even the ARF declares that their duties are maintaining peaceful and harmonious

situation in the region, implicitly its contain economic protection among states involved. In ARF

concept paper reaffirmed, that the most dynamics region of economic growth in the world is also

Southeast Asia (Forum, 2005). Therefore, to prosper the states in the region is the main goals of

ARF.

The meaning of South China Sea disputes become more important with the presence of

strong states, namely United States, Japan, EU, Russia, and obviously PRC. Clearly noted that by

this attempts, ASEAN indirectly wants to bring this issues into common problems, balancing the

PRC aggressive behavior and all at once reducing PRC power and aggresive behavior with

putting some pressure to PRC which they are one who always try to enforce some countries

involved in ASEAN to solve the South China Sea disputes in bilateral relations (Collins, 2000, p.

168). Nevertheless, ASEAN also have to face the vulnerable problems if the great power

involved within the ARF, particularly the role of United States.

In accordance with the presence of great power such as United States, ASEAN ought to

aware and sensitive to take into account the interest and concerns of all ARF members,

particularly the U.S. as a great power. From this moment, the U.S. role in ARF will be

emphasized. In fact, there are several actions from U.S. in order to preserve what should they

protect in the region and the aftermath of what the U.S. has done is the intensification of threat to

the parties involved in South China Sea Disputes.

A tide harmonious diplomatic relations between U.S. with Philippines could be perceived as

a threat for PRC because the presence of U.S. military base in Philippines has an objectives to

response PRC while U.S. buttress the Philippines Sovereignty in South China Sea as claimants

states. The Burma factors in process of democratization which supported by the U.S. also

construct PRC alliance changed. The deployment of USS Freedom for 10 months in Singapore in

2013, The U.S. deployed 2.500 troops in Darwin has appearing some questions regarding its

purpose (Siegel, 2012). Or conversely, it might be tends to stimulate the new form of Cold War

if PRC suspicion of Viet Nam past experience with Russia re-emerged with a momentum of

South China Sea.

Therefore, it means ARF with the presence of the great power itself are an irony for the

ASEAN. The Uncertainty and expectations seems viewed similar. ASEAN on the one hand

could not maintain and assure its unity to response the PRC increasing power, ASEAN also on

the other hand, consist of sovereign states in which always wanted to pursue they national

interest and could not avoid the mutual trust that have been implemented as a legal basis. Since

the first dimension emphasized that the ASEAN norms of non interferences and ASEAN

principles of Confidence Building Measures are actually related with the second dimension

discourses, thus ASEAN should deeply bearing in their mind about the implementation of

ASEAN norms and principles if ASEAN wants to provide a security platform.

Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free

Zone (SEANWFZ) and Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) depicting common needs for

security within the ASEAN member states. Most of security platforms are conducted to respond

threats to ASEAN from external actor in the age of cold war. For instance, spread and balance of

power between Liberalism and Communism in this region. But now, the world constitutes with

more interdependence relations than in the age of Cold War. The fight of Liberalism and

Communism has over, the threats from PRC as a communist has altered. Furthermore, Presence

of PRC has also to ensure the presence of new economic and political power which hand in hand

to the region. Therefore, the vastly changing in regional and international environment has also

producing new threat for ASEAN, such as balance of power with “a new proxy war” between

U.S. and PRC in region. These assumptions are not without reasons. ASEAN member states,

namely Indonesia, for example, has declared the important ASEAN role as dynamic equilibrium

as the ASEAN positions toward the great power. Therefore, the ASEAN security platform

through these instrument are realistic and clear.

Historically, the establisment of ASEAN has also influenced with security calculations

interest from its member states as one of the underlying factors for ASEAN establishment. The

presence of the great powers from the security calculations has also affected the establishment of

ASEAN. In this context, Donald Crone argues that hegemony of U.S. inderectly also affecting

the establishment of ASEAN (Crone, 1993). Besides the external factor that has affecting

ASEAN establishment, the structural and identity of ASEAN member states itself also formed

ASEAN for its security calculations (Katzenstein, 1997). In simply logic, there are a similarities

of threats from the past and present situation that now ASEAN is facing ; the presence of great

power and the same member states in the past. If at the past presence of U.S. influenced the

ASEAN security calculations in conducting the security platfrom, now the presence of PRC also

influencing ASEAN security calculations in conducting the security platform, particularly in

responding the South China Sea disputes. The present situation inderectly impose ASEAN into

situation between the presence of two great power, U.S. and PRC. Thus, ASEAN should become

a prominent stabilizer because the presence of two great power also is a needed of ASEAN.

Eventually, the third dimension of discourse is Regional Code of Conduct (COC) itself . Until

now, ASEAN has never reached the consensus within its member states. The underlying cause is

because of ASEAN has never reached the consensus on regional code of conduct is ASEAN

itself viewed a security just as viewed the sovereignty (Severino, 2012). On the simple way,

actually ASEAN viewed that the security matters are indicated as domestic matters, therefore the

configuration of security matter are indicated also as a domestic matter from each member states.

From PRC sides, PRC has stated its support for the DOC, but is less enthusiastic for COC

(Majid, 2012, p. 83). PRC seems strongly suggest a preferences to resolve this issues bilaterally.

Moreover, PRC continues to prefer to concentrate on the legalistic and less spesific DOC (Majid,

2012, p. 83). Therefore, even though ASEAN has reach consensus in succeding the COC, it does

not make sense that it would also be agreed and ratified by PRC.

In addition, the denial of each member states national interest is such a ‘big mistake’ for

their viability if they sacrifice the role of PRC in expanding their economy. In other words, the

Code Of Conduct (COC) just as like a shifting frictions within the ASEAN itself. Just as what

happened in Phnom Penh yesterday, for the first time that the Minister of ASEAN member states

failed to conduct common communiqué in responding the South China Sea disputes. Relations

between two ASEAN member states has deteriorated. There was also assumptions that ASEAN

shifted of two groups on the meeting. Cambodia, Lao PDR and Burma siding with PRC against

others (Majid, 2012, p. 82).

TAC ARF ASEAN PRC

The COC itself, as noted on this paper as third dimension that will constitute the regional

security platform, has actually been confused. ASEAN is in denial if the COC itself could not be

implemented.

Complex Comprehensive Security

Based on the analysis of Jervis scenarios, in this part of paper the writer would discuss the

possibilities mechanism solutions for the ASEAN security platform. Each of Jervis scenarios

depicting the analysis and would bring to the simply logic of security platform to ASEAN in

responding PRC in the South China Sea disputes. Each solutions will be provided by

encompassing the Comprehensive Security perspective.

In simple logic, a notion of comprehensive security is understood as broader understanding

of security which not only encompassing the military threats but also encompassing non-military

threats related to security problems or in David Dewitt words, comprehensive security meant

total well being (Dewitt, 1994, p. 409).

Jervis Scenario 1 & 3

Transformation

ASEAN Diplomatic Voice Norms and Principles ASEAN Norms and Principles becomes policy

The situation of cooperation mingled also with security dilemma in Jervis Scenario 1 & 3 is

depicted with the offensive behavior of PRC and how they are benefited with their behavior.

Clearly noted in realist perspective that states are always try to maximize and gain power.

Therefore, PRC itself will always try to maximize its power and influence in order to achieve its

goals. Using this propositions, the role of TAC and ARF is used to reduce the security dilemma

while maintaining the cooperation of status quo.

If we traced by its history, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation established in 1976 has its

own priority goals in order to ensure regional stability and was adopted from its member states

and also by several external states, including the great power (Wulan, 2012, p. 381). For 45 years

ASEAN could be counted as successful regional organization in context of maintaining regional

stability, despite there are still small skirmish either with ASEAN member states or with external

states but the TAC already taking its place for ASEAN as a decision making procedures (Wulan,

2012, p.382), even compared with other region in the world (Acharya, 1998, p. 199-200). But in

the case of South China Sea, as noted from earlier of this paper, the TAC is merely has emerged

an uncertainty situation and caused a dilemma for ASEAN when faced with PRC.

The mechanism solutions above (mechanism of Jervis Scenario 1 & 3), shows that TAC and

ARF has sharing common norms and principles which ASEAN within its members adopted. In

case of the South China Sea disputes, ASEAN should produce an institutionalized norms with

the presence of new institutional form. On the other words, ASEAN norms and principles driven

are the ASEAN solutions in the case of South China Sea dispute, particularly in reducing PRC

aggresiveness.

Based on this argument, an institutionalized norms and principles should be transformed to

be an institutions. The presence of new institutionalized norms and principles to an institution

becomes important and matter because the actors who involved in this issues are too wider if

ASEAN is utilizing the TAC and ARF to resolve this issues. It is too wider, thus, will also

influence other actors interest involved. From this point, ASEAN should reduce the external

actors interest influence by institutionalizing its norms and principles to an apparent institution

which only ASEAN and PRC involved within.

If the ASEAN through its TAC could convince the other great power in the ARF with its

shared understanding –where also at once the ARF shares the same norms and principles also

with the ASEAN through TAC –thus also the settlement of the South China Sea ownership could

adopted this mechanism but it would need a changes to ensure the behavior of PRC. The role of

ARF in this point is not effective to resolve the South China Sea disputes and need to be

changed, it is argues that the ARF could not shift its role from confidence building measures

principles when facing an external security and focusing on the non-traditional security

(Bandoro, 2012, p.124). Moreover, the ARF is a diplomatic voice in which only a dialogue

forum which emphasized in a regional of Asia-Pasific, not the Southeast Asia.

The new institution is needed when ASEAN norms and principles are strong while the

institution is not apparent. The interest of ASEAN with the ARF is a collection of diplomatic

voice in balancing to PRC (Majid, 2012), but it is not solve the problems and if in the future

when conflict and tensions increasing, the diplomatic voice will down and reach its failure.

ASEAN is never preparing for the worst situation and too much in believing its confidence

building measures.

The transformation of ASEAN diplomatic voice with replacing the ARF with PRC in direct

institutionalized norms and principles –or in the other words with apparent institution, therefore

would encourage ASEAN and PRC to focus in providing the security platform regarding to the

South China Sea disputes. This transformation is convinced would also transforming the shared

understanding of ASEAN norms and principles as noted on Jervis Scenario 1 & 3 to make a

policy. If this scenario fullfiled, thus the security dilemma could be reduced with certain policy

which legally binding ASEAN and PRC. For example, by conducting the ASEAN - China non-

provocative defense policy of the South China Sea or the ASEAN – China non-offensive security

policy in the South China Sea.

Based on the Jervis scenario 1 & 3, the effectiveness of TAC itself is still being questioned.

Whether ASEAN should maintain its non-interference or to be more pragmatic to reduce the

security dilemma in dealing with PRC. Even the TAC and ARF with its shared norms and

principles has transformed to new institutionalized norms and principles, the TAC point of non-

interference is still the ambiguous key to engage with PRC. For instance, related with the

comprehensive security, not all ASEAN member states is involved to the South China Sea

disputes –the first friction, but they were affected by this issues when it also pressing their

economic interest converge to the problems. This interdependence pattern of relations has made

the sacred TAC points of non-interference meaningless because its scope is centralized to the

claimants states –the second friction.

Based on this proposition, the TAC itself should be altered with a more pragmatic objectives

of ASEAN member states which also shared mutual objectives with the PRC that is to the

enhancement of peace, stability, economic growth and prosperity in the region (Studies, 2002, p.

79) even there are some friction within ASEAN itself. The economic development driven is the

main objectives to substitute the TAC (see Mechanism of Jervis Scenario 2).

Mechanism of Jervis Scenario 2

ASEAN

The economic development driven is the key to engage PRC and also to raise up the

bargaining power of ASEAN in dealing with PRC while ASEAN subtitute its non-interference

norms. As depicted on Mechanism of Jervis Scenario 2, ASEAN position toward PRC is

defensive and tend to disintegrate within itself. Therefore, the only shared understanding that the

ASEAN (with its first and second friction) and PRC have is mutual interest of economic

development in the region.

Conclusions

An uncertainty of the South China Sea disputes has actually confusing ASEAN in providing

security platform. ASEAN itself is on the situation of security dilemma while at the same time

also please with PRC huge economic influence in the region. Three of Robert Jervis security

dilemma has depicts the situation that ASEAN actually faced.

Two of the Jervis scenarios shows that PRC benefited with its offensive behavior and one

shows that ASEAN benefited with its defensive behavior. Based on this propositions, therefore

ASEAN should utilize the situation to get more benefits. ASEAN should be more pragmatic to

its own norms and principles and alter it to more prosper advantages. The mechanism of Jervis 1

& 3 conclude that ASEAN should transform its norms and principles to bind PRC into an

institution in which ASEAN shared norms and principles with PRC institutionalized.

The mechanism of Jervis scenario 2 is not the solutions, but it is the part of solutions which

the mechanism of Jervis scenario 1 & 3 offered. The economic development driven is the

subtitution of TAC and ARF as the ASEAN diplomatic voice. If ASEAN could focus on the

institutionlized norms and principles into an apparent institution, therefore ASEAN security

dilemma with the PRC could be reduced while maintaining the benefits of economic cooperation

with the PRC.

Friction 1 Friction 2

PRCEconomic Development

Development ClaimantsNon-

claimants

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