our forest and one and a half cubic meters of wood -legacy ... · dimitrie cantemir “a peasants...

Colloque international “Les frontières de la question foncière – At the frontier of land issues”, Montpellier, 2006 1

Our forest and one and a half cubic meters of wood

-legacy and self representation of property in Vrancea Region of Romania.

Notre forêt à nous et un mètre et demi de bois -Héritage et représentation

sociale de la propriété commune dans la Région de Vrancea en Roumanie.

Liviu Mantescu

Faculté de Sociologie et Assistance Social, Université du Bucarest

Abstract

Close to demographic dynamics, socio-economic and political context, the identity dimension of small

communities is a topic that we want to consolidate.

In this paper we illustrate the cognitive conflict between property seen as a constitutive part of local

identity and property as a source of welfare for individuals. The aim of the paper is also to make a point of

the definition of local identity. In the first part we will illustrate the micro-research that first took place in

two communities in order to verify constitutive elements for defining local identity by applying projective

tests. On the foundation of the gathered results, we designed the study for the importance of property,

CPR type, for consolidation of local identity. Using punctual empirical examples we take into account the

answers to the following questions: what processes take place in representing communities one to each

other? What is the representation of common pool resources in the studied region? What does property

mean today and what is its role in forming / preserving local identity? How do these representations

influence collective actions implied in the forest management?

As points that set off this study, we first consider the different approach to common pool resources

problem: instead of using the institutional analysis approach, which is mainly focused on advocating the

viability of CPRs confronting the tragedy of commons (see Ostrom E., 1990),

or the anthropological point of view, stressing on the embeddedness concept within social, economical

and political context (see Hann, C., 1998), this is moreover an answer coming from the sociological view,


mainly regarding identity paradigms. The methodological design, the empirical evidence and the approach

to complete a research method for small communities are the guidelines of our work.

Keywords: Social Identity, Local Identity, Common Property, Villages, Sociological Methodology Résumé

De pair avec la dynamique démographique, le contexte socio-économique et politique, la dimension

identitaire des petites communautés est un sujet que nous voulons consolider.

En cet article nous illustrons le conflit cognitif entre la propriété vue en tant que partie constitutive de

l’identité locale et la propriété comme source de bien-être pour des individus. Le but du papier est

également de faire une remarque sur la définition de l'identité locale.

Dans la première partie nous illustrerons une micro recherche qui a eu lieu dans deux communautés de la

région de Vrancea, afin de vérifier les éléments constitutifs pour définir l'identité locale en appliquant des

essais projectifs. Sur les résultats recueillis, nous concevons l'étude de l’influence de la propriété

communale, CPR, pour consolider l'identité locale. En utilisant des exemples empiriques ponctuels nous

tenons compte des réponses aux questions suivantes: quels processus ont lieu en représentant les

communautés une entre eux? Quelle est la représentation de la ressource commune dans la région étudiée?

Quelle est la signifiance aujourd'hui de la propriété et qu'est-il son rôle sous la formation/préservation de

l'identité locale? Comment ces représentations influencent-elles des actions collectives implicites dans la

gestion de forêts?

Comme points qui se distinguer de cette étude, nous considérons d'abord l'approche différente au

problème de ressources communes: au lieu d'employer l'approche de l’analyse institutionnelle, qui est

principalement concentrée sur préconiser la viabilité de CPRs, contre la perspective théorique de la

tragédie des terrains communaux (voir Ostrom E., 1990), ou le point de vue anthropologique, qui pose la

question de la propriété foncière an accentuant le concept d'enchâssement dans le contexte social,

économique et politique (voir Hann, C., 1998), ceci est d'ailleurs une réponse venant de la vue

sociologique, principalement concernant les paradigmes de l’identité. La méthodologie employée,

l'évidence empirique extensive et l'approche pour accomplir une méthode de recherche pour les petites

communautés sont les directives de notre travail.

Mots-clé : identité social, identité local, propriété commune, villages, méthodologie sociologique


I. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

At the beginning of the XVIIIth century Vrancea1 was named by the enlightenment Romanian writer

Dimitrie Cantemir “a Peasants’ Republic” (Cantemir: 1716)2, for its independence inside the Moldavian

State (at that time). This independence status was coming from peasants’ property, a common and

undivided property over mountains, so forests, pastures and rivers, and until the XVIIth century, also

undivided over agrarian land of villages.

The legend says that one old woman, named Vrancioaia, had seven sons and all of them put their

arms to serve Stephen the Great of Moldavia (1457-1504) in a battle against the Ottoman Empire.

Winning, Stephen settled the right, according to the legend but also to some documents, over the seven

mountains in Vrancea to each of Vrancioaia’s boys, to be for them and to their offspring for ever, as a

military reward. Afterwards, each of them founded a village that preserves his name. This is the story of

common property in Vrancea. The fact is that Vrancea is the only place in Romania where old social

forms of organizing social life through property survived close to Second World War, so that it was

possible to be scientifically studied3.This institutional form is the Obstea, the generic name for the

community, and the name for community’s property, for its goods and rights. Each village had a name that

was coming from one of Vrancioaia’s boys name, but also each village was called as being an Obstea

Nereju, for example. Their CPR, so forest, pastures etc. was also named Obstea, “on that mountain our

Obstea is” people says even today. In the old times, actually before Second World War, the common

property was managed in participatory manner, each villager, no matter man or woman, had the right “to

speak” and to vote for how to be managed the property. The most important persons of the village

assemblies were the old and wise men, the older men from community, forming a sort of board of

administration. They had also the attributions of judging small juridical or moral conflicts between

villagers and of standing as moral examples for the community. It was a participative democratic system

in which nativity was the prior condition in order to protect the property. Once you became member in

community you would have the right to access the community’s property resources with no limit. That is

1Vrancea is the western part of Vrancea County, the administrative department. In Romania, this region it is called even today “Tara Vrancei” that might be translated as Vrancea Country. In this paper when we mention Vrancea we refer to this part of Vrancea County. ( See map 1 and 2) 2Descriptio Moldaviae, a paper written for Academy from Berlin in 1716. Cantemir was also Voievod of Moldavia for one year: 1710-1711. 3 Romanian Social Institute made between 1920 and 1948 a vast research campaign in rural arias, using researchers from different disciplines such as: doctors, geographers, ethnographers, musicologists, sociologists. This academic movement led by Dimitrie Gusti was named Sociological School from Bucharest. The first study made in Vrancea by one of the multidisciplinary research teams was in 1928, at Nereju.


why strict rules against strangers’ infiltration were customary settled. People from Vrancea were

freeholders, and freedom was given by their property.

The unrestricted access for villagers to forest survives until the beginning of Second World War.

At the time when the first sociological researches were made, Obstea, as an institution that provides

identity for the inhabitants of a particular village, was in a dissolution phase (Stahl: 1958). A big number

of foreign forestry companies, especially from Austria and Italy, accessed the common properties of the

villagers by local intermediaries, persons that were called by the locals, ax handles. The rules against

strangers’ infiltration were not functioning anymore, and the old and wise men were only a keepsake in

collective memory. The connection with their common property was so strong that the whole social life

was in danger when the property rights were at stake. When the communist regime came up, the right over

property was abolished. In the 50s serious fights happened in Vrancea between villagers and communist

authorities. Many people were killed especially in the fire shouts that took place in Negrilesti. Moreover,

the rest were put in jail, unless they escaped by hiding in the mountains.4 During the communist period the

contact between villagers and their common property was not totally interrupted. Most of them worked in

the forest as wage earners; others were stealing wood from their former property with the tacit acceptance

of local authorities.

After 50 years of communism and usurpation of property rights, in 2001, the villagers regained their

mountains and the institution of Obstea reappears, as this study describes, more as a managerial instance

for local development. Nowadays, the common resources are managed by a committee chosen by the

people with a president, two to four councilors, and one bookkeeper. Now, Obstea has a center, a proper

building in the village, most of the times new, well equipped with office tools, internet, and equipments

for exploiting wood, trucks and even automobiles for its “members”.

Obstea has a juridical statute, being recognized as a legal institution by the Romanian State. The

committee is named The Committee of Obstea and is in charge with organizing the auctions and the

distribution of annual share of wood to villagers. Auctions are organized for private companies who want

to exploit the surplus of wood from forest parcels. People are receiving 1 to 3 cubic meters of fire wood

per year, per family, and the same quantity of wood for construction, with the right to sell it5.

In the next pages we will discuss in detail the cognitive conflict between common property as a

mark for local identity and common property as a representation of one and a half cubic meters of wood.

4 The organization in which people from Vrancea fought against communist regime was named Vlad the Impeller and it was active till the middle 60’s. 5 For accuracy we can give precise figures: the average value of an adult individual’s right is 40 euros so, with for a household including two adults it is 80 euros, per year. The average value of a household’s annual income in the investigated villages is 1500 euros per year. Concluding, the income from communal property rights values no mare than 5.33% of the total income for a middle level household.


This paper is written after 20 months of studying the commons and more than 5 months of effective

fieldwork in Vrancea Region (started in December 2003 and ended in September 2005)6. The quantitative

and qualitative evidence is combined, sociological and anthropological methods being used: the database

contains 304 questionnaires, applied in 4 villages, more than 170 interviews and 4 focus-group interviews

covering all of the 9 communities studied. The database is representative on the criteria of age, sex and

individual land tenure, for all population categories. Additionally, in Paulesti and Haulisca we have

applied, what in cognitive psychology it is called “mental maps”7, 30 of these instruments with afferent

interviews (see annex 2). The research started with a visit in these two villages on 6 December 2003.

Since than, we are trying to understand why in some villages Obstea institution performed well and in

others did not, in the same region, at distances that we may geographically ignore, in the context of the

same recent history.

II. ELEMENTS OF LOCAL IDENTITY

Paulesti and Haulisca are two villages geographically linked together, but with a different “date of birth”.

By walking on the dusty streets, observing people, their occupation, their households one can see that

there is a striking difference between these two communities. Questions are coming in your mind as soon

as you start speaking to people; as a researcher, you ask about how they consider themselves. Firstly they

will tell you the same story with Stephen the Great, a story that you are already tired of. Then, they start to

speak about their village, about how important it is. In Haulisca they show you with pride their

community’s achievements: the new church that they call cathedral, which is very beautiful indeed, their

functional roads and their beautiful houses. In Paulesti, they are not doing so, and not because they do not

have any, but because they are identifying themselves as a community through different mechanisms.

Historically speaking, Paulesti is attested 200 years before Haulisca. In all interviews that we

made this difference is kept at the level of collective memory: “we are here before them, we belong to this

place, the villagers from Paulesti are saying, the ones from Haulisca came here afterwards. They are

migrant people. They like to go from a place to another and to make fortune.” On the other side, people

from Haulisca say that the ones from Paulesti are stupid, they do not have any achievements in their

community and they are lazybones. They are seeing themselves as hard workers, as people who know how

to make good affairs. They recognize that people from Paulesti have reasons to develop an increased local

6 With the participation of a student team research from Faculty of Sociology, University of Bucharest, and with financial support from the University of Bucharest. Also we will like to thank to our professors for confidence and moral support. 7 The method was adapted by Monica Vasile after Lynch’s study (1960), and the data were processed by Cristina Craciun (2006).


identity, taking into account their older roots and administrative centrality and they develop

compensatory mechanisms to identifying themselves like: imposing local historical characters in

collective memory, affiliating the village name to one of Vrancioaia sons’ name, rejecting the imposed

alterity of people from Paulesti. We found out from interviews that the two communities identifying

themselves trough different mechanisms, historically they do have different identities, but we want to

verify these mechanisms by a stronger method.

We asked 19 persons from Paulesti and 11 from Haulisca, to draw their village map with

references that they consider important.8 After this, we discussed on what they have drown. We wanted to

see what reference do they perceive first, what they are not representing on the map, how are the

boundaries of the village represented, who are the neighbors.

As reference points, the maps contain most frequently the community’s institutions, in both

villages: on the first position we have the church, than the school. My house is on the last position, “my

individual property” doesn’t appear, neither the forest, which is actually not so far away. The major

differences between villages drawings resides in representing boundaries and neighbors: in Haulisca one

single map out of 11 has drown a neighbor village, Paulesti, the one that is linked with. The other 10 have

shown no neighbor villages. In Paulesti, 19 maps out of 19 have all neighbors drown, all villages that are

close to it.

The boundaries were mostly perceived in terms of neighbors although there are natural boundaries

that limit the villages. The auto isolation of one community is the response of the expansive local identity

of the other. Although people from Haulisca have a history of working abroad and they talk very much

about it, fact that might be interpreted as an openness character of its inhabitants, the fact that they are

representing almost no neighbors in their maps is a prove of an enclosed community, proud that the

villagers made it by their own power. As factual data for migration behavior we have 21 persons from

Haulisca temporarily emigrated (less than 12 months) and 39 persons from Paulesti, 2.7% and 2.8% from

the total population of each village. Things are not seriously changing when we consider a migration

period larger than 12 months: 3.7% from Haulisca are emigrated and 1.5% from Paulesti9. In fact the

difference between migratory processes in the two villages is small, but the perception over the

phenomena is different. People from Haulisca are developing compensatory mechanisms to affirm their

local identity in front of the alterity imposed by the people from Paulseti.

The mental maps method applied on local identity pattern, has proved the difference between self-

representation in the two communities. We may conclude that the elements which constitute local identity 8 We adapted the method used by Kevin Lynch for the study of cities, for drawings examples see projective maps 1 and 2 at the end of the paper 9 according to Statistical Data Base of National Institute of Statistics, Romania, 2004


are: collective memory, spatial representations over the inhabited space, the psychological characteristics

that people from one community are attributing to another, the representation over boundaries and the

representation over the property.

We extend the reference now to all villages studied to see how collective memory and property elements

function to sustain local identity.

III. COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND COMMON PROPERTY AS FACTORS IN SUSTAINING LOCAL IDENTITY

III1. Scripted proofs for property rights

Written evidences are the first that people are using to prove their rights over properties not because they

are powerful than others. The perceived prevalence of the statutory norms over the customary ones is at

stake. Back in time, the great proprietors from Middle Ages had never recognized the peasant’s rights over

the property without an act to attest it. Moreover, coming from Roman juridical system, common property

rights were not recognized, they existed only for citizens as individuals. Nevertheless, in Europe, forms of

collective property have been preserved until late in the XVIIIth century: Mir - in Russia, Markt – in

Germany. (Stahl: 1958) The fear that they could loose their property begun when the powerful landlords

asked the peasants to prove their right by a certificate, a document. However, this was the “new” Roman

fashion, and at that time, nobody could think at documents or individual property over vast areas of land.

Systematically, free peasants become deprived of their rights (Blum: 1971).

This was the case for Vrancea in 1710, when one powerful landlord from Moldavia claimed

Vrancea’s properties. In the judgment that followed and that still exists in local collective memory, all

peasants gathered as for war, and showed as proof for their property the cow leather with the gold

signature of Stephen the Great.

We found frequently this kind of enounce: “This leather exists even today, one peasant from Paulesti told

me. I’ve heard that one old man from Nereju keeps it in great secret. My father saw it! ”

The Romanian state gave the Forest Code as the first statutory law concerning common forest

property only in 1910. Gradually, each Ob�t ea from Vrancea had to make the legal formalities to be

recognized by the state. Until 1948, each village issued its own statute in which to attest the surface of

forest and pastures, legal administrative norms and a list with villagers that have the right over the

property of the village. These signatures had, at that time, the role to make the difference between the

local villagers and those who were strangers, coming from other regions and who, in different situations,

have become inhabitants. In 2001, when Ob�t ea was reestablished, the old statute was reinforced and the

signatures were again used to determine the persons that have the right over the property, as the springs of

the elders. The villagers that were not on the list may have the right to use the common property for a fee,


about $10, the equivalent of 30 breads from the bakery. This was not the procedure in all villages, some

had ignored the strangers and in that way protected their common good and preserved their local identity.

The opportunity of common property restoration after the communist regime reinforced local identity by

bringing nativity into discussion.

In 2001, the oldest people from Vrancea villages gathered to establish the boundaries of their

property. The process was peaceful, no incidents occurred between villagers and this we believe, is an

example of strong collective memory. There are ongoing trials between different villages, but these are

what may be called canes of worms, old juridical problems before Second World War.

Collective memory level statistically correlates10 with the sense of property, meaning that persons

that preserve the collective memory of the community have a better developed sense of property.

We define sense of property as the degree in which a person sees himself as having the rights de facto at

the operational level (access and withdrawal) and at the collective choice level (management, exclusion

and alienation). 11

III2. The access

The representation of property is influenced also by the phisical access to it. Most of the Obstea have their

property at least 20 km away. Nereju, the village most populated, is actually right near their property, but

Negrilesti is about 100 km away. What is most interesting is that people do not have any physical contact

with their property, not even to pay a visit in a Sunday afternoon, riding their little horses or by their carts.

No matter if they are from Nereju or from Negrilesti, the interest level is the same. Most of the old people

haven’t been in the forest since they were young, before Second World War, and the youngest had never

been there.

In addition, we have the access concept as it was described by Ribot and Peluso (2004): „the ability to

benefit from things.” If for property the key word is right, for access is ability, and ability is more or less

power, seen as the capacity to affect practices and ideas of others. In all villages of our inquiry the power

to decide aver the communal property is held by a few social actors and in some cases, like in Nereju or

Negrilesti it is seriously monopolized by corrupted actors. Worst, the political parties, especially PSD (the

social-democrats) are developing a real Mafia of wood and property rights by covering with “parliament

immunity” its „administrative” networks. Most of the people feel that is useless to react in any way when

they see the high degree of inequality between the rich people from their village and the poor. In Nereju,

10 The correlation level is .286 at significance level of p<0,01. We emphasize that the correlation was made in a valid database containing 304 questionnaires, applied in 4 villages out of 9 that we have studied. We provide a chart representing this correlation at the end of the paper 11 All these were detailed in Schlager Edella and Ostrom Elinor 1992. Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis. Land Economics 68(3) August: 249-62.


the major (affiliated to PSD party) has a huge house and a brand-new off-road Mitsubishi.12 He also owns

the biggest forestry company in the region and de facto, he is “managing” almost all the community’s

property. People appealed to state authorities to control company’s activities, but nobody came, because of

the political involvement. This attitude of the state encouraged also smaller illegal activities, like stealing

wood from the common property. People steal with their carts tree by tree and they sell at lower prices to

the local major’s company, who is very pleased to have such “great” partners in his affairs. Sometimes,

when villagers try to claim their right to participate in decision making process and denounce the existing

corruption, the rulers use this illicit practice against them; some persons were even put in jail. One man

was found stealing wood with his cart by the forestry personal and he was imprisoned for four years. He

has seven children, all of them less than 18 years old.

These problems of physical access and ability influence the perceptions over property. In most of the cases

the perception over the common property is filtered by an institution that is mediating the access. This

institution is Obstea, a bureaucratic institution, although dressed up in a participatory principle, that they

can not control.

The cognitive conflict appears as soon as collective memory is reactivated and they remember the free

access in the old days before Second World War. Of course that most of them understand that today the

technology is more developed and they may create ecological problems. However, this argument does not

function in what concerns overexploitation from the local firms, as the trucks full with trees passing their

village there can be seen every day.

Aditionnaly, the phisycal direct access has a major influence on representing property: if you never saw

your property is hard to believe that you will invest in it. Your legendary right becomes an empty word

with no power in front of political parties and its „administrative” networks; you become disgusted of all

that concerns village property.

Mismanagement increases illegal activities and illegal activities affect local identity.

III3. Investments

The third aspect of the link between common property and local identity is the one of investments in

property. We consider that local identity might be measured in this case with the level of investments

people are willing to invest in their communal property. Investments might have the form of collective

work to plant new trees, so the investment of work and time; to invest money in governmental programs

for the acquisition of capital that might be used as family fare with wood; or an educational investment. In

the entire period that our research took place, we haven’t discovered any situation in which a family

encourages its members to follow forestry studies, although before and during the communist period these 12 Even in Bucharest you may find it rarely. Proudly he told us that he pays 600 euros each month for it.


studies were highly evaluated on social status scale, the jobs in forest management are very well paid and

with a lot of „opportunities” to make fortune.

Investment in property means not only to profit from the investment, but it is a measurement of

one’s affective affiliation. As an example of such affiliation, considering the forest not merely as a

commodity, but as a heritage to be preserved, most of the villagers told us that in the past the elders were

cutting only the worst trees, the good ones being kept for their children, or for hard times (although two

World Wars have passed, what can be worst?!). The conscience over the importance of the community’s

future, over the necessity of continuity on the given territory is a sign of local identity. This conscience is

still vivid today, but as a reverse of the coin, as a reaction. When people see illegalities, the forest

devastated, stolen sometimes by themselves, it is the image from the ideal past that comes in their mind of

how it should be done, of how the forest should be saved for their future.

Investments are a measurement of affective affiliation to property, and for common property it stands as a

sign of consciousness for community’s future.

III4. The legacy of name

The fourth aspect is the legendary legacy of the right over the property. Each village was formed, as the

tale says, by one of the seven sons of Vrancioaia, each of them receiving one of the boys’ names. In

Descriptio Moldaviae, Dimitrie Cantemir counts 12 villages in Vrancea. Henri H. Stahl attests 14

historical villages (Stahl,1958, vol.1). Is not important how many villages there were, the interesting thing

is that most of the villages are claiming the historical right, although Vrancioaia had only seven sons and

so, there should be only seven villages. There is a continuous debate on this topic between people in

Vrancea: who comes from a historical village, in other words who is the true nephew, and who is not. This

is a real and a permanent combat to establish local identity, to protect it, on the grounds of commons.

People are inventing names that doesn’t exist in Romanian language to identify their village with one of

the seven founders. As an illustrative qualitative matter, in the anthropological research that took place in

1928 at Nereju, a large number of persons were detected with syphilis. The peasants were revolted against

the doctors and researchers saying that they come “from the blood of Stephen the Great”, they have noble

blood, hence, it is impossible to have a blood disease. People from Nereju perceived the highest nobility

degree, as they represent themselves not only as descendents of one of the seven sons of Vrancioaia, but

as truly descendents of Stephen himself. (Stahl, 1958, vol.1:165)

The legacy of name has also a negative example: Bodesti village. This village is one of the

historical ones, nobody has a doubt about this, because he was found by Bodea, one of the sons. This

village has no forest property anymore, they have no Obstea Institution at the moment. At the middle of

XIX century their property was sold by the administrative board of the village, we don’t know very clear


in what conditions, to Obstea Nereju. If there exists an example that people are using to demonstrate the

importance of their common property nowadays or an example of losing your local identity, the case of

Bodesti is the first. They are giving Bodesti example to argue how poverty is possible in Vrancea, how a

community losses its respect, how it becomes enclosed. Bodesti is the place for fools, “you are not

advised to get married there because there are only stupid men and they are living like in the Middle

Ages. The village population hasn’t increased since then, they are totally backward”. And all these

negative considerations for they did not preserve their common property and not because of their

correspondence to reality. The true facts are not like the image perceived by other villages. When we have

been there, Bodesti appeared not as the poorest village from Vrancea, but as one of the most traditional.

People were very nice and peaceful. The village is very isolated, has only one store, there are only 4 cars,

but a village full of life. The store keeper, and the richest person in the village, told us that he has a trial to

regain the property from Nrereju because it was an unfair trade. It is hard to believe that this is possible.

As we saw the original paper in Nereju, it is written: sold.

The inheritance of name is a part of collective memory process. What it is important in sustaining local

identity is not the name it self, but the power of its heritage and the preservation of property.

At this point we can define local identity as the cognitive structure that relies in perception over the

inhabited space, over the property and within the property rights, de jure and de facto, and provides

consciousness for individuals as being part of a community located geographically, with responsibilities

for their community and for its future. Individuals obtain their local identity not by being born on the

community’s territory but by being recognized by the others as one of the locals and hi s/ her family being

attested by collective memory. Rather than being an exclusive characteristic for individuals, local identity

is a characteristic of groups.

This is a work definition, and it might be challenged at any of its levels. This is not an attempt toward a

universal definition for all small communities owning CPRs. Encircling the characteristics above

mentioned we only underline the importance of identity in small communities and its connection with

property. Vrancea was never collectivized by the communist regime, people keeping their individual

properties. In post-socialist Romania these people are facing a great cognitive conflict: they are caught

between two divergent tendencies that are part of their social life.

IV. OUR FOREST AND ONE AND A HALF CUBIC METERS OF WOOD.

The bureaucratic institution that was reestablished in 2001 named Obstea is at strife with the

representation of old institution Obstea before 1950. The conflict is at the cognitive level between two

types of representation of property: one that sustains local identity by affective affiliation and which is


vivid every time villagers are looking backward in time for an example that Obstea should function by,

and the other, is the representation over a property that they don’t have access to, contrary to customary

practices, lead by a bureaucratic institution which is not representing them and which is interposed

between them and their property. The mediated access to their property estranged people from the forest,

the direct access being transformed in relations of power, in what Ribot and Peluso (2003: 156) named

ability. This leads to a low level of investments into property and further to a lack of monitoring as

incentive for mismanagement that permits illegal activities which affect in turn the representation over the

property. This vicious circle permits the involvement of political interests from administrative networks of

the county, lead by PSD party, which in our opinion is the first reason for the mismanagement of the

commons. People do not have the total independence in organizing their activities and sometimes are

deceived by local authorities and by Obstea’s board of administration affiliated to PSD. We saw the trucks

passing at each hour full with trees. Than we saw the uncovered mountains and it was obvious that there

are no rules to keep in exploiting the forest. Probably, the people’s access was restricted not to see the

devastations. When we asked about this in Nereju, the major keep silent but his father said: “The forest is

never ending!”. This is also a sort of representation, we said to ourselves.

For the question “What does Obstea represent for you?”, we obtained the next percentage: The

board of administration (of Obstea), 61.4%, The village 24.4%, The forest 6.9%, Other 7.3%. At the

declarative level most of the people have the first representation of Obstea as a bureaucratic institution

that provides them with fire wood for winter, and some wood for construction. This representation is

imposed also by the fact that Obstea has a center in the village, like the village hall. As we mentioned,

5.33% from a household’s annual income is provided by the rights over the communal property. It is a

conflict between the old CPR, with its unrestricted access for villagers but great restrictions for strangers,

with its vital importance for local economy, hence, with strong elements in providing local identity; and

the new CPR bureaucratically configured, with restrictions to people access, with taxes for strangers, and

with a management that people can not understand, and that is politically corrupted. The changes from one

type to another were not made in time of a generation, demographically speaking, so that the new model

to be successfully applied, to be monitored and easily assimilated. A period of 50 years of communism

and deprivation of property rights was interposed. The characteristics of both types can be found in the

same time, and the fact that the new model is not properly imposed enforces the other and attaches to it a

golden age representation. Moreover, there is always available the example with State’s property during

the communist period, when, “better or not, the forest was protected and it was not devastated like now”.

After the communism fell, most of the people thought that things will be improved, and some of the

matters will be like they were in the past. The same expectations concerned property. The cognitive

conflict between the two is illustrative for post-socialist Romania.


References

Benda-Beckmann F. and K. von, 2004. Struggles over communal property. Rights and law in Minangkabau, West Sumatra, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Papers, 64. Blum J., 1971. The Internal Structure and Policy of the European Village Community from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century, Journal of Modern History, 43(4): 541- 576. Craciun, C., 2006. Reconstructia identitara in doua sate din “Tara Vrancei”, unpublished paper presented at Student’s Conference of Faculty of Sociology and Social Work, University of Bucharest. Cantemir D., 1986. Descrierea Moldovei (Description of Moldavie), Bucharest, Minerva. Gardner, R., Ostrom, E., Walker, J., Rules, Games and Common-Pool Resources, Ann Arbor, The University of Michagan Press, 1994. Hann C, 1998. ‘Introduction: the embeddedness of property’, in Property relations. Renewing the anthropological tradition. C. M. Hann (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-47. Lynch K., 1960. The Image of the City, in The City Reader, Le Gates R., Stout F. (ed.), Routledge, pp. 98-102 McKean M., Ostrom E.,1995. Common property regimes in the forest: just a relic from the past? Unasylva, 180(46), FAO. Ostrom E., feb. 1999. Self-Governance and Forest Resources, CIFOR, occasional paper no.20. Ostrom, E., 1990. Governing the commons. The evolution of institutions for collective action, Cambridge University Press. Ribot C. J., and Peluso N. L. 2003. A Theory of Access. Rural Sociology 62(2): 153-181. Sava V., A, 1929-1931. Documente Putenene, (Putna’s Documents), Focsani, Tipografia Curtea Putnei. Stahl H., H., 1939. Nerej – une region d’un evillage archaique: monographie sociologique, Bucarest, Institut de Sciences Sociales de Roumanie. Stahl H., H., 1958. Contributii la studiul satelor devalmase romanesti, Vol. 1, 2, 3 (Contributions in studying Romanian joint property villages), Bucuresti, Ed. Academiei Stahl H., H., 1969. Les anciennes communeauteses roumaines – asservissement et penetration capitaliste, Bucarest, Paris, Ed. de l’Academie de la Roumanie, Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. Stahl Henry H. (1980) Traditional Romanian Village Communities, Cambridge:. Cambridge University Press. Stahl Paul H. (1986). Household, Village and Village Confederation in Southeastern Europe. New York: Columbia. University Press. Tajfel H., Fraser C., (ed.)1978. Introducing social psychology, Harmondsworth : Penguin Books


Verdery K. 1998. Property and Power in Transylvania’s decollectivization, in Property relations. Renewing the anthropological tradition.C. M. Hann (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 160-180.

*** Statistical Data Base of National Institute of Statistics, Romania, 2004


ANNEXES

Table 1.

Correlation between collective property sense and social memory

collective memory level

nonepoorgoodvery good

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

do you fell as owner

not at all

slight of

very much

31151214

37

2426

29

32

626257

Table 2 The nine communities that we are analyzing here have a very different demographic structure:

Demographic

Characteristics

P�u le�t i H�u li�ca Spine�t i Poiana Vrânciaia N�ru ja Paltin Nereju Negrile�t i

Inhabitants 1390 770 638 769 658 1922 1331 4228 1715

Nr. of men 727 387 311 379 332 966 666 2212 816

Nr. of women 663 383 327 390 326 956 665 2016 899

Birth rate 12.23 3.89 10.97 7.80 9.10 10.92 12.02 13.95 9.32

Official nr. of

migrants less

than 12 months

39 21 17 3 37 12 8 25 115

More than 12

months

21 29 12 3 0 22 4 6 172


Maps

Map 1: Historical region of Vrancea and the investigated villages

Map 2: Vrancea Mountains in Romania Mental Maps Instruments