our focus on sustainability anderson.pdf · • new linux cluster for fire and natural hazard...
TRANSCRIPT
1
Supporting Sustainability
Dennis Anderson, P.E.
FM Global: Protecting the Value Your Business Creates
Our Focus on Sustainability
Loss PreventionIntegral to Sustainability
Car
bon
Emis
sion
s
Time
Disposal, Rebuild
Fire
Standard Construction
Green Construction
DemolitionOperationConstruction
www.fmglobal.com/researchreports
Risk Factors = 2-14% of CO2“Green” can increase by 3X
2
Alternative Energy Sources: Wind
Alternative Energy Sources: Solar
Breaking New Ground for 175 Years
Innovating Then
Innovating Now
3
01101010110101010101101010101010101010011010101010101101101010101011010101101010101011010101010101010100110101010101011011010101010110101011010101010110101010101010101001101010101010110110101010101101010110101010101101010101010101010011010101010101101101010101
Unique ToolsScientific Computing• New Linux Cluster for Fire and Natural Hazard Analysis• 2.7*1012 Calculations/Second
Scanning Electronic MicroscopeMagnifies up to 300,000 X
Unique ToolsForensic Analysis and Material Science Labs
No DefectsPart Overloaded
Failed Sprinkler Part
Boiler TubeMicro X-Ray Fluorescence
Remove Copper DepositsTo Prevent Failure
Materials Lab
Electrical Lab
Unique Tools: Research Campus
Hydraulics Lab
Large Burn Lab Improvements• Two Movable Ceilings• Humidity Control
Multimedia Center
Fire Technology Lab
Natural Hazards Lab• 7,000 sq m• EQ Lab
4
Fire Technology Lab: Photo Album Tour
Fire Technology Lab
Fire Technology Small Burn Labs
Fire Technology Small Burn Labs
5
Fire Technology Small Burn Labs
Fire Technology Small Burn Labs
Fire Technology Small Burn Labs
6
Fire Technology Small Burn Labs
Fire Technology Large Burn Lab
Fire Technology Large Burn Lab
7
Fire Technology Large Burn Lab
Why such a $100M+ investment?
Fire Technology Lab
$12,000,000$12,000,000$12,000,000
Hydraulic Oils burn
8
Combustible aircraft hangars burn
$31,507,000$31,507,000$31,507,000
Wet sand burns?
$32,470,000$32,470,000$32,470,000
$42,763,000$42,763,000$42,763,000
Plastics burn
9
Oil-cooled milling machines burn
$56,205,000$56,205,000$56,205,000
Plastic conveyors burn
$200,000,000$200,000,000$200,000,000
The Common Theme: No Sprinklers
10
Fire Protection System Innovation
Research/Testing and Technology Come Together
Ceiling Density and Performance
K 5.6(K80)K 5.6(K80)
K 25.2(K360)K 25.2(K360)
#1- Key Sprinkler AttributesK Factor
11
#2 - Key Sprinkler AttributesOrientation
PendentPendentUprightUpright
#3 - Key Sprinkler AttributesResponse Time Index
QRQRSRSR
• BetterProtection
• More Cost Effective
• More Sustainable
1970 vs. 2010
12
One Constant
• Less fire• Less smoke• Less water• Less carbon emissions• Less to landfill• Less to repair, replace, or rebuild
Sustainability: Got sprinklers?
Wall Panel CombustibilityFM Global: Protecting the Value Your Business Creates
13
What is the Hazard?
Wet sand burns?
$32,470,000$32,470,000$32,470,000
Somebody Else’s Burn Lab
14
FM Approvals 25’ (7.5 m) Corner Test
Open Source Fire Model
www.fmglobal.com/modeling
Natural HazardsFM Global: Protecting the Value Your Business Creates
Natural Hazards Lab• 7,000 sq m• EQ Lab
15
Natural Hazards LabEarthquake Shake Table
Key Capability of New Earthquake Laboratory
Earthquake: Why should we care?
T Ve i s et w
ing
Control Room
Test Preparation/Instrumentation
Shake TableShake Table
16
5-ton Capacity
Initial Testing of the System
3 g 3 g
1.5 g
Mother Nature’s LabHurricane Ike (2008)
Mother Nature’s LabHurricane Ike (2008)
17
Natural Hazards LabRoof Uplift Table
Mother Nature’s LabHurricane Frances & Jeanne (2004)
Mother Nature’s LabHurricane Frances & Jeanne (2004)
18
Research Campus Remote Site
Research Campus Remote Site
Ammonia Refrigeration HazardsFM Global: Protecting the Value Your Business Creates
19
Basic refrigeration cycle
Refrigeration – indirect systems
Compressor Package (Centrifugal)
20
Compressor Package (Reciprocating)
Condenser
Receiver/Accumulator
21
Expansion Valves
Evaporator (direct refrigeration)
What is ammonia?
• Refrigerant is anhydrous ammonia (NH3)– Colorless– Strong Odor
• Noticeable to humans at 15-20 ppm– Liquid heavier than water– Boils at -28oF
22
What is ammonia?
Very noticeable, annoying100 Annoying, gas mask suggested200
Very annoying, gas mask needed, annoying to skin
500Toxic, cartridge mask, short time1,000
Highly toxic, full face oxygen mask, skin highly irritated
3,000 ppm (0.3%)
Effect Concentration
IIAR Operations Manual - 1987
Ammonia – key physical properties– Heat of combustion = 8000 BTU/lb – Vapors lighter than air.– LEL = 16% (160,000 ppm)– UEL = 25% (250,000 ppm)– Autoignition temp. = 1204oF– MIE much higher than hydrocarbons– Burns much slower than hydrocarbons– TLV-TWA = 25 ppm (ceiling 35 ppm)
Environmental issues
• Montreal Protocol, Clean Air Act (1987, 90)– Phase out CFC (R11 & 12) by 2000– Substitution by HCFC (R123 & 134a) & NH3
• Kyoto Protocol (1999)– Target greenhouse gases (CO2, methane)– Phase out production HCFC by 2020/2040
• Some switching to ammonia
23
Codes for refrigeration systems
• ANSI/ASHRAE 15-2007, Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems
• ANSI/ASHRAE 34-2007, Designation and Safety Classification of Refrigerants
• ANSI/ASME B31.5, Refrigeration Piping
ANSI – American National Standards InstituteASHRAE – American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air Conditioning EngineersASME – American Society of Mechanical Engineers
Codes for refrigeration systems
• ANSI/IIAR 2 - 2008, Equipment, Design and Installation of Closed Circuit Ammonia Mechanical Refrigeration Systems
• NFPA 1, Fire Code – 2009, Chapter 53, Mechanical Refrigeration
• NFPA 5000, Building Construction and Safety Code® - 2009, Chapter 50, Mechanical Systems
IIAR – International Institute of Ammonia RefrigerationNFPA – National Fire Protection Association
Codes for refrigeration systems
• OSHA Process Safety Management Regulation (29 CFR Part 1910.119)
• EPA Risk Management Program (40 CFR Part 68)– Apply if over 10,000 lbs of ammonia
OSHA – Occupational Safety & Health AdministrationEPA – Environmental Protection Agency
24
Other information sources
• NFPA Fire Protection Handbook®, 20th
Edition, Section 8, Chapter 12, Refrigeration Systems
• FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets 7-13 & 12-61 Mechanical Refrigeration
Other useful documents
• Ammonia Sensor Overview, Industrial Refrigeration Consortium, Madison, WI; December 2002
• EPA Alert – Hazards of Ammonia Releases at Ammonia Refrigeration Facilities (Update), August 2001
Loss history in past 15 years by type
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Gross loss ($M) Number
FireB&MCollapseImpact ExplosionEscaped LiquidsMiscellaneousContaminationVehicle
25
Loss history in past 15 years by cause
05
10152025303540
Gross loss ($M) Number
Component FailedElectricLeakageUnknownOptg parameterMiscellaneousHuman Element
Ammonia Loss History – Bottom Line• Cause - mechanical failure of a part due to
impact, poor installation or maintenance• Ignition - electrical equipment• Explosions - occur but usually don’t result
in huge losses• Fire following explosion - generally not
significant addition to loss• Contamination – direct refrigeration issue
What will reduce the hazard?
• Location of equipment• Construction of machine room• Arrangement of equipment• Management programs• Protection features
26
What will reduce the hazard?
• Location– Never in basement– In a detached building– In a separate machine room building
• attached to an outside wall• in the building but on an outside corner• in the building on an outside wall
What will reduce the hazard?
• Location
What will reduce the hazard?
• Construction– Non-combustible– 1-hour fire rating for walls to adjacent areas– Vapor-tight walls to adjacent areas– Seal pipe openings to adjacent areas– Damage limiting (venting) construction
27
What will reduce the hazard?
• Occupancy– No boilers/fired equipment in machine room– No combustible storage in machine room (lube
oil, ordinary combustibles, etc)– Minimize holdup – receivers & accumulators
outdoors, preferably not on roof– Ventilation for leakage & temperature control
powered independent of other systems
What will reduce the hazard?
• Occupancy - Piping & Equipment– Key valves accessible outside machine room– Piping per ANSI B31.5– No threaded joints on pipes larger than 1 in– Threaded joints seal-welded or brazed– Label all refrigerant piping
What will reduce the hazard?
• Occupancy - Piping & Equipment– Eliminate liquid gage glasses or protect
from damage (armored, ball excess flow checks)
28
What will reduce the hazard?
• Occupancy - Piping & Equipment– Protect pipe from mechanical damage
What will reduce the hazard?
• Occupancy - Piping & Equipment– Seal pipe openings to adjacent areas
Protection for compressors DS 7-95• Provide relief valves on
– discharge of compressor before shutoff valves– between stages – on all pressure vessels– route discharge outside– test valves annually
• Interlocks– high pressure alarm– high temperature alarm and trip
29
What will reduce the hazard?
• Ignition source control– Minimize electrics in machine room– Class I Division 2 rated electrical – Where rated retrofit not economical
• Continuous ventilation at 1 cfm/sq. ft• Emergency ventilation at 10 cfm/sq. ft• Ammonia detector (FM approved) set to alarm at
4% and shut down electrical at 8% ammonia
What will reduce the hazard?
• Protection– Sprinklers for combustible construction or
occupancy– Extinguishers– Areas with storage subject to contamination
• Visits by responsible personnel at least once per 8 hours OR
• Ammonia detector (<1000 ppm) alarming to attended location
What will reduce the hazard?
• Operation & maintenance– High level of preventive maintenance– Follow manufacturer’s guidance for frequency– Don’t step on piping during maintenance– In refrigerated areas, train lift truck operators
to avoid refrigeration system piping and components
30
What will reduce the hazard?
• Emergency response– A written emergency response plan– A well-trained emergency response team– Proper emergency response equipment
• vapor detectors• SCBA• protective clothing• fans
– Identify outside personnel to be notified
Preventive Maintenance: Why?
Combustible Dust HazardsFM Global: Protecting the Value Your Business Creates
31
Overview
• What is an explosion?• What is a combustible dust?• When does a dust explosion hazard exist?• How do dust explosions behave?• How are dust explosions mitigated?
What is an explosion?
• Rapid release of energy that produces damage
• Chemical explosion– Reaction based
• combustion reaction• decomposition
• Physical explosion– Rapid failure of vessel under pressure
What is a combustion explosion?
• This is a fire, a really, really fast fire• A fast fire requires fuel premixed with air• To develop pressure, you need confinement
– Fire increases gas temperature– Hot gas expands– If volume is fixed, pressure will rise
32
How bad will it be?
What is a combustion explosion?
• Deflagrations– Flame front moves slower than speed of
sound– Uniform pressure in enclosure
• Maximum pressure 8 to 9 times ambient– Time to react and mitigate damage
• Detonations– Flame front moves at/above speed of sound– No time to react
What is a combustion explosion?
33
What is a combustible dust?
• Organic material• Unoxidized metal• Other oxidizable
materials (e.g. zinc stearate)
What is a combustible dust?
• 500 microns (1/50th inch) or smaller– different materials have different size
threshold– usually range of particle sizes– fines segregation = increased hazard
• Might not burn in pile or solid form• Simple version – Did it start as a rock?
Why do dusts explode instead of burn?
• High surface to volume ratio– Instant vaporization when heated
• Air around every particle• Explosion severity is driven by
– Explosivity characteristics – Particle size– Moisture content– Ease of ignition
34
When does a dust explosion hazard exist?
• When dust is combustible• In dust collection equipment• In buildings
– Dust suspended in air– Dust accumulated on building structure (1/16”)– Dust handling equipment
• WHEN DUST IS IN A BUILDING!!!
When is dust “suspendible”?
• Above floor level• At floor level with other explosion hazard
capable of creating disturbance– equipment explosion hazard in same area– room or equipment explosion hazard in
adjacent area
How do dust explosions behave?
35
How do dust explosions behave?
• Assume explosion propagates readily between connected volumes– unburned dust is pushed ahead of expanding
cloud of burning dust– fuel rich explosion: explosion can continue as
the fireball finds new air– pressure wave moves well ahead of flame front– pressure piling effect in interconnected vessels
How are dust explosions mitigated?
• Control the dust
• Control the ignition sources
• Control the damage
How do you control the dust?• Find & eliminate fugitive dust sources• Properly design dust collection equipment• Properly maintain dust collection equipment• Pre-cleaning coarse material (remove fines)• Minimize accumulation & migration• Phlegmatization• Oil mist dust suppression• Housekeeping
36
How do you minimize accumulation?H H HH H
H
How do you minimize accumulation?
H H HH H
HModify the construction
How do you control the ignition sources?10,00010,000
10001000
100100
1010
11
.1.1
.01.01
Overheated Overheated bearingsbearings
Open FlamesOpen FlamesHot SurfacesHot Surfaces
Hard to
Ignite
Hard to
Ignite
FrictionFrictionSparksSparks
ElectrostaticElectrostaticDischargeDischarge
37
How do you control the ignition sources?
• Annual infrared scan of electrical equipment• Hot Work prohibition; permits when safe• Prohibit smoking and open flames• Hazardous location electrical equipment• Magnetic separators• Motion/alignment interlocks• Grounding/bonding
How do you control the damage?
• DLC – Damage Limiting Construction– Pressure relieving (i.e., venting)– Pressure resisting
• Open structures• Containment• Isolation
Explosion Quench Pipe
38
Explosion Blocking: Chemical Agent
Control Unit
Pressure Sensor
ChemicalSuppressantCanister
Rotary Airlocks
Rapid-action Valve
• Closes in milliseconds using high pressure gas
• Distance between explosion detection device and valve long enough to allow valve to close before flame front arrival
39
Control Unit
PneumaticDriven Gate Valve
Pressure Sensor
Explosion Blocking: Rapid-action Valve
Flame Front Diverter (Explosion Diverter)
High Speed Abort Gate
40
Knowledge, Not Guesswork
Questions?
Dennis Anderson, P.E.
FM Global: Protecting the Value Your Business Creates