ostapchuk crimean tatar long-range campaigns-view from remmal khojas history of sahib gerey khan...

8/12/2019 Ostapchuk Crimean Tatar Long-Range Campaigns-View From Remmal Khojas History of Sahib Gerey Khan 2012-Li

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History ofWarfareEditors

KellyDeVriesLoyola University Maryland

John FranceUniversity of Wales, Swansea

Michael S.NeibergUnited States ArmyWar College, Pennsylvania

Frederick SchneidHigh Point University, North Carolina

VOLUME 72

The titles publishedin thisseries are listed at brill.nllhw

Warfare in Eastern Europe1500 1800

EditedbyBrian J.Davies

R LL

LEIDEN BOSTON2012


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MIX

Coverillustration: Detailof the Viewof the Siege ofPolotsk by StephenBathory(1533-86) in1579 (engraving), Mack, Georg the elder (c.1556-1601).Image ID: CZA 228782. CzartoryskiMuseum, Cracow, Poland / The Bridgeman Art Library.This book is printed on acid-free paper.Library of Congress Cataloging-in-PublicationDataWarfare in Eastern Europe, 1500-1800/ editedby Brian 1. Davies.p. em. -- (Historyof warfare, ISSN 1385-7827; v.72)Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 978-90-04-22196-3 (hardback: alk. paper) 1. Europe, Eastern--History, Military--16thcentury. 2. Europe, Eastern--History, Military-vlZth century. 3. Europe, Eastern--History,Military--18th century. I. Davies, Brian 1.,1953- II. Title.DJK47.W372012355.020947'0903--dc23 2011042137

ISSN978 9004 22196 3 (hardback)ISSN978 9004 22198 7 (e-book)ISBN 1385-7827Copyright 2012 by KoninklijkeBrill NY,Leiden, The Netherlands.Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, GlobalOriental, Hotei Publishing,IDC Publishers, Martinus NijhoffPublishers and VSP.All rights reserved. No part ofthis publicationmay be reproduced, translated, stored ina retrievalsystem, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,photocopying, recordingor otherwise, without prior written permissionfrom the publisher.Authorizationto photocopy items for internalor personaluse isgrantedby Koninklijke BrillNVprovided that the appropriatefeesare paiddirectlyto The CopyrightClearanceCenter,222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA.Fees are subjectto change.

r J perfromr sponsi l sourcesFSC C004472

PRIl. TEDBYDRUKKERIJ WILeOB.V.- MERSFOORT THENETHERLANDS

CONTENTS

Introduction 1Brian Davies

Economic Effectiveness of the MuscovitePomest e System:An Examination of Estate Incomes and MilitaryExpensesin the Mid-16th Century 19Janet Martin

The HabsburgDefense System in Hungary Againstthe Ottomans in the Sixteenth Century: A Catalyst ofMilitaryDevelopment in Central Europe 35GezaPaljfy

The Polish-LithuanianArmy in the Reign of King StefanBathory (1576-1586) 63Dariusz Kupisz

Guliai-gorod, Wagenburg, and Tabor Tactics in 16th-17thCentury Muscovy and Eastern Europe 93Brian Davies

The FlodorfProject: Russia in the International MercenaryMarket in the Early Seventeenth Century 109Oleg A. Nozdrin

Food and Supply: Logistics and the Early ModernRussian Army 119Carol B. Stevens

CrimeanTatar Long-Range Campaigns: The View fromRemmal Khojas History of Sahib Gerey Khan 147Victor Ostapchuk

The Siege ofAzov in 1641: Military Realities andLiterary Myth 173Brian Boeck


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vi CONTENTSThe Generation of 1683:The Scientific Revolution

and Generalship in the Habsburg Army, 1686-1723 199ErikA. Lund

Command and Control in the Seventeenth-CenturyRussian Army 249Peter B. Brown

Ottoman Military Power in the Eighteenth Century 315Virginia Aksan

List of Contributors 349Bibliography 353Index 357


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CRIMEAN TATARLONG-RANGE CAMPAIGNS:THE VIEW FROM REMMAL KHOJXS HISTORY OF SAHIBGEREYKHANl

Victor Ostapchuk

In terms of military prowess, longevity, and historical impact, theCrimean Khanate (1440s-1783) was the most successful ofthe Chinggisid successor states to the Mongol Empire in the West (the Ulus[uchi), One of the greatest claims to fame of the Chinggisid states ingeneral was their manner of waging war. Thus in their initial advancethrough most of Europe Mongols and Tatars were able to inflict anuninterrupted sequence of crushing defeats upon every army or statethat stood in their way. Even in the 14th-16th centuries, that is, roughlyuntil the effectiveintroduction of gunpowder weapons, the Tatarswereoverwhelming in their military prowess. Certainly until the 16th century they won many more battles than they lost. Even with the introduction of gunpowder weaponry-muskets and cannons-it wouldstill be a long time before the Tatars were no longer a force to be reckonedwith. Despite the clear achievements of the Mongols and Tatars inthe art and science of war, there are many aspects that elude us. Asidefrom prowess in actual combat, they were masters at the technique oflong-range campaigns. To give an extreme example, the western campaign of 1221-1223 led by the Mongol generals [ebe and Subedei inwhich a relativelyminor force of about twenty, thirty thousand men onwhat was basically a reconnaissance mission, rode nearly fifteen thousand kilometers, winning more than a dozen major battles, usuallyagainst superior numbers. James Chambers, the author of a book onthe Mongol conquests, has called this campaign the most outstandingcavalry achievement in the history of war ?

Of course the Crimean Khanate and its military were much different entities than the initial Mongol Empire and its war machine.

I This chapter originally appeared in Festschrift in Honorof EleazarBirnbaum, ed.Virginia Aksan (Cambridge: Department of Near Eastern Languages and Literatures,Harvard University, 2005) = Journal of Turkish Studies 29 (2005): 271-287 and isreprinted here with the author's revisions and permission.2 James Chambers, The Devils Horsemen: The Mongol Invasion of Europe(New York:Atheneum, 1979), 17.


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3 A noteworthy example of the possibilities that the Ottoman archives provide forstudy of the Ottoman military campaigns is Caroline Finkel, The Administration ofWarfare: The Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606, Vienna: VWGb,1988) /=Beihefte zur Weiner Zeitschriftfur die Kunde des Morgenlandes, ed. Arne A.Ambros and Anton C. Schaendlinger,vol. 14/. This workalso containsa section basedon Ottoman archival materials devoted to Khan Gazi Gereys expeditions in centralEurope.

Nonetheless, the Tatars of the Crimea too were masters oflong-rangemilitary expeditions. And though t he ir forte in mounting longrange expedit ions were those t ha t t ook them across the Black Seasteppes and into Muscovy or into the Ukrainian lands of PolishLithuania, they also carried out operations in less familiar territorynot only in the Caucasus but, at the behest of the Ottomans, in centralEurope on the Hungarian and in Eas te rn Anato lia on the I ranianfronts. All such expeditionsrequired skill in organization, some knowledge of paths and of hostile territory, ability to survive in difficult environments, and so forth. They were not alwaysforays by nomads greedyfor plunder and often seemingly well-planned and carefully executedmilitary operations. Thus far we have only a superficial knowledge ofhow the Crimean Tatars mounted their long-range campaigns. Muchof what we think we know is based on scant evidence-often one ortwo testimonies of contemporaries whose information was not necessarily gained firsthand.

Here we would like to bring to the fore dataon Crimean Tatar military expedit ions preserved in the sixteenth-century chronicle ofQaysuni-zade Mehmed Nidai, better known as Remmal ( the Geomancer, the Astrologer ) Khoja, Tarih-i Sahib Gerey Khan, or TheHistory of Khan Sahib Gerey. Unfortunately, because most of thearchives of the Crimean Khanate have perished, wehave no chance togain as good an understanding of the Crimean mil itary as we, forexample, do have for gaining an understanding of the Ottoman military concerning which tens of thousands of documents and registerssurvive.' Instead, we are for the most part forced to glean data fromnarrative sources relating to the khanate, of which also relativelyfew are extant. Fortunately, the chronicle on which we will be focusinghere and which we consider as being one of the great works of sixteenth-century Ottoman historiography (we say Ottoman becausethe author was an Ottoman and the language of the chronic le isOttoman Turkish), is a very rich source on the Crimean military and

4 For example, V. D. Smirnov knew it but used it somewhat superficially on SahibGerey and did not use it asa source on the s truc tu re and workings of the CrimeanKhanate (V. D. Smirnov, Krymskoe khanstvo pod verkhovenstvom Ottomanskoi Portydo nachala XVIII veka [St.-Petersburg: s.n., 1887], XII, 422,425).5 Tarih-i Sahib Giray Han (Historie deSahib Giray,Khan deCrimee de 1532a1551 ,ed. Ozalp Gokbilgin (Ankara: BaylanMatbaasi, 1973) (henceforth Tarih).6 Ozalp Gokbilgin, 1532-1577 ytllart arastnda Kirtm hanligt ntn siyast durumu(Ankara: Servinc Matbaasi, 1973). Being devoted primarily to politics and international relations, Gokbilgin does not devote much attention to analysis of militaryaspects, thoughhis extensive direct citations from RemmalKhoja containmuch information on the military.7 Halil Inalcik, The Khan and the TribalAristocracy: The Crimean Khanate underSahib Giray 1; Eucharisterion: Essays Presented to Omeljan Pritsak on His SixtiethBirthday by His Colleagues and Students (Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian ResearchInstitute, 1980)= Harvard Ukrainian Studies 3- 4 (1979-1980): 445-66.

149RIMEAN TATAR LONG-RANGE CAMPAIGNSalso other topics. Although the chronicle of Remmal Khoja has beenknown to scholars since the 19th century, onlyin the past generationhave scholars begun to more fully appreciate its value. It was publishedby Ozalp Gokbilginin 1973, a useful text and translation editionalbeitwith frequent misprints and mistakes and with only a rudimentarycommentary.' In the same year Gokbilgin published a monograph onthe political historyof the Crimean Khanate during the reigns of SahibGerey and Devle t Gerey which for the reign of the former khan islargely based on Remmal Khoja and in which thevalue of his chronicleas source on the Crimean military becomes evident, However it wasHalil Inalcik who in a seminal art icle on the polit ics of the CrimeanKhanate has given us the hitherto most complete presentation of theexcellence of Remmal Khoja's Tarih as a historical source. ' Moreover,although Inalcik's article is primarily devoted to Crimean politics, healso pays attention to military matters, particularly Sahib Gerey'sOttoman-style musket-armed troops and field artillery (the Crimeanarmy can be divided into two parts-the smaller one, a force of musketbearinginfantry and begs (ich oglan, ichki begleri) attached to the khanand the larger one, the nomadic tribal cavalryof the aristocraticqarachibegs).Here we will mostlyconcentrate on other aspects Crimean military operations, especially non-combative aspects of campaigns, suchas organization, travel, protocol, and rituaL Of interest willbe information on daily life. Wewill dwell less on those aspects alreadycoveredbylnalcik and instead refer the reader to his work. Although our knowledge of the Crimean Tatar military is still not very advanced, therehave been some noteworthy contributions on i t. Aside from the work

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8 V. E. Syroechkovskii, Mukhammed-Geraj i ego vassaly,' Uchenye zapiskiMoskovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta 61 (1940): 3-71.9 L. D. Collins, The Military Organization and Tactics of the Crimean Tatarsduringthe Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries;' in War, Technology andSocietyin theMiddleEast,eds. V. Parry and M. E. Yapp(London, New York, Toronto: OxfordUniversity Press 1975),257-76. This study also givesreferences to other authors whohave dealt with the Tatar raids.

10 The above comments on Sahib Gerey and Remmal Khoja are mostly based onInalcik, Khan and TribalAristocracy:'

of Inalcik, we would like to mention two other studies that deal withthe Crimean Tatar military: the work on Mehmed Gerey I by V. E.Syroechkovskij based on the published materials of the Muscoviteposol skiiprik az (foreign office) and the study of Crimean Tatars raidson the northern countries-Poland-Lithuania (i.e., mainly Ukraine)and Muscovy-by Leslie Collins based on Polish, Russian, and othernon-Ottoman sources.

Before proceeding further, i t is necessary to devote a few words toCrimean Khan Sahib Gerey (1532-1551) and to Remmal Khoja andhis chronicle. Sahib Gerey was the third son ofthe great Mengli Gerey(reigned intermittently between 1466 and 1476 and then 1478-1514)to become khan of the Crimea. Between 1521 and 1524 Sahib Gereyruledover the Khanateof Kazan. Sahib Gerey's longrule in the CrimeanKhanate was characterized by an assertion ofthe authorityof the khanand by an a tt empt to l im it of the power of the four main Crimeantribes, the so-called qarachi, and ofthe Nogays who were based in thesteppes outside the Crimean peninsula. Most of the years between hiskhanship in Kazan and the Crimea, Sahib Gerey spent at or near theOttoman court-he went on the hajj and even par ticipa ted inSuleymans campaign against the Habsburgs in 1532. Thus he knewthe Ottoman state and societyquite well and it served asthe model forhis vision of the Crimean Khanate-a strong state centralized aroundthe authori ty of the Khan in the manner of the Ottoman sultanate.Remmal Khoja, a well-educated Ottoman erudite, joined Sahib Gereywhen he departed Istanbul for the Crimea in 1532 and served as hisastrologer, physician, and close advisor throughout his reign. Hischronicle is based largely on what he witnessed himself; that which isnot based on his own eyewitness testimony can be assumed tocome from other participants in the events. In comparison with mostother chronicles devoted to the Crimean Khanate, whether Ottomanor Tatar, the Tarih is outstanding for i ts author's preference to give a

relatively clear narration of events and provide concrete details, ratherthan to encumber his workwith a display of high-flown style and rhetoric. The Tarih is a veritable mine of information not only on Crimeanpolitics, institutions, and military, but also on the daily lifeof the peoples of the khanate and even of its neighbors (particularly the peoplesofthe north Caucasus region) and on geographic conditionsas well. Asto Crimean military affairs we note here that to a great degree campaigns take center stage in the Tarih-approximately two thirds of thework is devoted to narrations of campaigns: preparation, organization,travel to and from a given theater of action, combat i tself, and otheractivities related to the given campaigns, such as ceremonies and celebrations. In large part information on Crimean politics, institutionsand even daily lifein general is to be found within of Remmal Khoja'srelations of military activities.

To gain an appreciation ofthe rich tapestry of Crimean Tatar military endeavors during the reign of Sahib Gerey as presented in theTarih it would be useful to retell some of Remmal Khoja's accounts ofTatar campaigns. Lack ofspace precludes suchan approach and, in anycase, reference to Ozalp Gokbilgins text and translation edition canprovide sufficient access to the chronicler's presentation of theseendeavors. Herethe goal isto givea more analytical surveyof some ofthe features ofthe CrimeanTatar war machine, i.e., more of an outlineof the anatomy of Crimean Tatar military campaigns with referenceto their physical environment. We seek to cull concrete data on military affairs preserved in the Tarih. In a topic withsuch a thin data baseevery concrete and well-attested detail is important. Significant to us isnot just information that gives a new picture of some aspect of Tatarsat war, but also information that might be essentially the same as thatgiven by other primary sources. This is so because often our sources ofconcrete information on the Crimean Khanate, for example, travelerssuch as M. Litvin, d'Ascoli, and Beauplan, while being contemporariesand to some extent observers, also collecteddata from other observers,data which may havebeen either common knowledge or untrue rumor.Moreover, these travelers were in any event outsiders to the khanate.Often their testimony on a given aspect of Tatar l ife is the only suchand this testimony could just as easily be false, relate to a one-time orrare occurrence, or be concernedwith a phenomena restrictedto a certain time and/or place. Of course we tend to trust the veracity of theseauthors, given the lack of better alternatives and, relying on the traditional nature of Tatar society, wehopethat their picture can be applied

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For example, thatwhich is the basis for Syroechkovskii, Mukhammed-Geraj12 We only includelargerexpeditions. The chronicle also covers smalleroperationsand skirmishes, for example, in the struggles of thekhan with Islam Gerey and BaqiBeg.

to other periods. This potential problem can apply to informationgiven in the diplomat ic papers of the posol skii prikaz, for examplereports by Muscovite envoys. When a completelyoriginal, independent source such as the Tarih that stems from within the khanate givesinformation that supports or ispracticallyidentical with that given bysources stemming from beyond the khanate, the result may at firstseemnot asinteresting asdata thatis new and unprecedented.However,such repeated data is, in fact, more valuable as it allow us to begin toconstruct a historical edifice rather operate according to single facts.Hence to isolate concrete and, we hope, authentic details concerningevents and dailylife ofthe khanate isof prime importance.Meanwhile,at this still not very advanced stage in the study of the Crimean Tatarmilitary we will avoid making generalizations on the nature of theTatar military. Because oflimitations ofspace, fuller comparison of thedata in Tarih with that in the other sources will have to been made inanother place. In otherwords, the main aim here isto probe the Tarihfor concrete data and provide a samplingof the wealth of its informat ion which can be a basis and stimulus for fur ther work on this andother sourceson the CrimeanTatar practice ofwar.

All in all ni ne campaigns are described in the Tarih. To givethe reader a not ion of the course of these events and to make laterreferences to them below more intelligible we give the followingsynopses :1. Moldavia, 1538: This is the same campaign as the one personally

headedby Sultan Siileyman the Magnificent to suppress and deposethe disloyal Moldavian voyvoda, Petru Rares, One of the results ofthis expedition was the detachment of southern Bessarabia, or theBujaq, from Moldavia and occupation of Ozi, or Ochakiv, by theOttomans. Sahib Gereyis ordered to join the expedition and indeedhe part ic ipates with the Crimean Tatar forces, but no t beforerebuildingthe fortress at the Isthmus ofPerekop (Or Agzror simplyOr, the Ditch ) so as to pro tect the Crimea from the threat of aNogay invasion in his absence. Remmal Khojas account gives fewconcrete details of Sahib Gereys actual military contributions to

13 Tarih, 25-31. See also Gokbilgin, Kirim siyasi durumu, 14-17.14 Tarih, 35-45. Seealso Gokbilgin, Kirim siyasidurumu, 18-19.15 At first, during the process of deciding where exactly the expedition is it to go,Muscovy, or Moscow itselfare named as one of the potential memleketiin chapub Rusun tahtgahina eriib) and again once the expedition IS underway, theoperation isreferred to asRus aqini and i t issaid that Tatars h.ave. rea.ched a

near the Rus frontier (Rus serhaddi). However there IS no clear indication that thisfrontier was crossed andthat Muscovy was entered. Instead the Tatars seek information from captured informants dil so as to lea rn the locat ion ofa cer ta in Kii re l orKorel (Giirel accordingto Gokbilgin-c-in the original KWRL)-a a ora place. Gokbilgin does not attempt to identity this and the ra id asbeing mounted against Muscovy. However, Kurel/Korel most l ikely stems from theRuthenian version of the common word for king, korol (kral, originally from Karol[Charlemagne)). The late Iaroslav Dashkevych, this to the Gal ic ianKingdom (Galicia-Volhynia), whose rulers had the title of korol (IaroslavDashkevych,Monhol'ske I irans'ke I tiurks'ke kerel : Etymolohiia ta semantyka etnotopommu(XIII-XIV st.)., V.Skhodoznavchi chytanniaA. Kryms koho: Tezy dopovidei mizhnarodnoi naukovoi konferentsii: Kyi v, 10-12 zhovtnia 2001 r. (Kiev: Instytut skhodoznavstaAkadernii nauk Ukrainy, 2001), 85-86). Since Volhynia was then in the Grand Duchyof Lithuania, perhaps Kiirel/Korel came to designate the latter? We also note thatthe

153RIMEAN TATAR LONG-RANGE CAMPAIGNSthis Ottoman campaign aside from telling us that he aided in thesearch for the rebellious voyvoda and giving the approximate routehe following in this search. He provides much more informationabout the preparations and journey to and from Moldavia as wellas of a meeting there between the Crimean khan and the Ottomansultan.13

2. Circassia, 1539: In response to attacks by the Circassians againstMuslims near 'Iemriik, Sahib Gerey mobilized his forces, crossedthe Straits of Kerch and set off to punish the Circassians. Along theway the khan encounters Qansavuq, chieftain of the Janey Circassian tribe. The khan intends to punish him severely for not controlling the offendingCircassiansresponsiblefor the raids near Temruk(according to the chronicle, Qansavuq was an Ottoman vassal, andin exchange for stipends and symbols of investiture from the Porte,he was to keep the local Circassians in control). However, Qansavuqmanages to save himself by offering to supply a Significant numberofslaves to the sultan, khan, and Ottoman beg ofKefe.Although anexpedition into the high Caucasus is unsuccessful in reaching theoffending Circassians (see below), on the return trip Sahib Gereyallows his forces to acquire captives from among the Circassianpopulation. 14

3. Kurel/Korel? (northwestern Ukraine-Galicia or Volhynia-orBelarus), winter 1539-1540: A campaign led by Sahib Gerey's son,

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Ottomans and Crimean Tatars frequently referred to Ruthenians (Ukrainians andBelorussians) alsoas Rus; in fact, itseems that to them Rus wasmore ofa designationfor East Slavs rather than just the Muscovites. In other words, a raid on Rus did notnecessarily mean a raid on Muscovy.16 Tarih,46-51. Seealso Gokbilgin, Kinm siyasi durumu, 19-20.17 Tarih,56-66. Seealso Gokbilgin, Kinm siyasi durumu, 20-22.18 In general Remmal Khoja givesvery fewdates. Here we followthe dating established or assumedin Gokbilgin, Kmm siyasidurumu. More work with other sources isneeded before the dates of some of the campaigns described the Tarih can be morefirmly established.19 Tarih, 72-82. Seealso Gokbilgin,Kirtm siyasi durumu, 24-26.

Emin Gerey, but under the oversight of his tutor (atali q), a certainibrahim Pasha, aimed at raiding one of the northern countries forcaptives. The campaign is successful in capturing substantial booty,particularly captives, but there is a disastrous return tripbecause ofextreme winter conditions and an attackby the Nogays (for detailssee below). 16

4. Muscovy, 1541: On the urging of the renegade Muscovite princeSemeon Bel'skii,Sahib Gerey mounts an expedition hoping to crossthe Oka and strike deep into Muscovy.The chance ofsuccess seemsquite high, because Bel'skiipromises to show the Tatars a shallowford of the Oka River while the defending Muscovite forces, notknowing where the Tatars plan to cross , d is tr ibute their forcesamong the many possible fords. However, because of a well-foundedmutual mistrust between Sahib Gerey and BaqiBeg,chieftain oftheMangit branch of the Nogays, neither of them dares to be the firstone to cross the Oka for fear of betrayal and attackby the other. Inthe meantime the element of surprise is lost and the Muscovites,finding out the location of the Tatar army, bring sufficient musketbearing and artillery forces to the intended fording site and thwartthe Tatar incursion. On the return trip the Tatars obtain some captives for enslavement (esir, captive,slave ).

5. Circassia (Janey tribe), 1542m8: Janey chieftain Qansavuq's failureto deliver annual supplies of slaves and otherviolations leads SahibGerey to mount another Caucasian expedition. Attempts by Qansavuq to allay the anger and determination of the khan by sendingmessengers with a promise to definitely deliver plentiful captives isrejected by the khan. When Sahib Gerey proceeds into the mountains the Circassians launch a night raid against his force. Howeverthe Circassians are defeated and the Crimeans return with a greatnumber of captives.

20 Seen. 17.21 Tarih, 83-96. Seealso Gokbilgin,Kirim siyasidurumu, 26-27.22 Tarih,97-105. Seealso Gokbilgin, Kmm siyasidurumu, 27-28.23 Tarih, 106-13. Seealso Gokbilgin, Kirim siyasidurumu, 29.

155RIMEAN TATAR LONG-RANGE CAMPAIGNS6. Qabarda (Qabartay), 1544 (?)20: Elbozadi, a Qabardinian chieftain,

whose own tribe rose up against him, arrives at the court ofSahibGerey with a plea for help in suppressing and punishingthe rebels.Sahib Gerey consents and this time travels to the Caucasus by land(Perekop/Or-the Dnieper-Azaq at the mouth ofthe Don-acrossthe Kuban steppes). The key tact ic in this campaign is to arriveatthe fieldsofthe Qabarda (Qabartaymezra lari)duringthe harvesttime (araq zamani) when most of the Qabardinians would be outon the fieldscollectingthe harvest and thus easier to capture. However, the Crimean forces arrive too early so this tactic is not fullysuccessful. A night attackby the Qabardinians also proves unsuccessful (see below)-the Tatars prevail and return to the Crimeawith a great number of captives.7. Astrakhan, 1545: Yagmurji, who seized the Astrakhan throne,attacks a caravan on itswayfrom Kazan to the Crimea. The wrongedmerchan ts come to Sahib Gerey to complain. Outraged by thisinterference with trade betweenKazan and the Crimea, Sahib Gereymounts a full-scale campaign to Astrakhan. Astrakhan is seizedthanks to Sahib Gerey's field artillery and musket-bearing troops.Yagmurji fleeswhile part ofhis retinue and entourage is takento theCrimea with the promise thatthey willnot be harmed.

8. Nogays, 1546: Basically a defensive expedition mounted into thesteppes north of Perekop/Or to preempt a planned Nogay attackinto the Crimean peninsula. In a great battle the Crimean Tatarsprevail thanks to cannon and musket fire aswell as a vicious manto-man saber battle (see below). The result is a massacre of theNogay forces (the so-called Nogay Qirgini).23

9. Circassia, 1551:The Ottoman Porte orders the khan to go againstthe Circassians again, but this time the true motive isto get him outofthe Crimeaand therebymore easily remove him from throne andinstall a new khan, Devlet Gerey (the official reason for the campaign is complaints from pilgrims returning from Mecca that theywere attacked by the Circassians). As in some of the previous Circassian campaigns, Sahib Gerey enters the mountains in an attemptto capture the leaders ofthe Circassians responsible for these alleged

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24 Tarih,121-43.25 Tarih,46.26 E.g.,Guillaume LeVasseur,Sieur de Beauplan, Description d Ukraine quisont plusieurs provinces du Royame de Pologne contenues depuis les confins de la Moscouie,jusques aux limites de la Translivanie, Rouen, 1660,41-46 (Ukrainiantranslation: OpysUkrainy, kil kokh provintsii Korolivstva Pol s koho.. . (Kiev: Vydavnystsvo Naukova

violations. The expedition includes an incident in which the placewhere a Circassian leader is hidingis fully surrounded yet he managesto escapewhich causesthe khan to vent his wrath on his commanders. Eventually the Tatars catch up their foes with and attack.The result isa great number ofcaptives. However on the return tripSahib Gerey is abandoned by his troops, put in a dungeon in thefortress ofTaman, and killed there.

Almost allof these militarycampaigns areportrayed byRemmal Khojaas being initiated or provoked by outside forces-by the order of theOttoman sultan (or at the suggest ion of the Ottoman beg of Kefe),aggression or potential aggression by neighbors or subjects of thekhanate, complaints byparties in neighboringlands against their rivalsthere. Only one is presented as being mounted purelyby the initiativeof the khan-in the winter of 1539-1540 Sahib Gerey proclaimed tothe Crimean begs let us this year not be deprived from making raids(aqi n) and from the meritorious act ofholy war (gaza) and then suggested either to cross the Straits ofKerch while it was still frozen or tomake a raid to the north. Indeed in our chronicle the discussion ofthe CrimeanTatar expeditions, gaza or holy war rhetoric isfrequentlyused. In our opinion, references togaza were not necessarily interpolations by our Ottoman author. Even if the degree of Tatar religiousitywas not great, references to gaza can be connected with Tatar awareness of and receptivity to this powerful justification or excusefor waging war. In addit ion, judging by the frequent mentions of captivesthroughout the work and the receptiveness of the Tatars to the prospect of enslaving members of the population of areas targeted by theirraids, itis not unreasonableto assume that often the greater motivationbehind a campaign was not so much the given external reason, but thedesire to acquire valuable slaves(formore on esir see below).

On several occasions statements made by Sahib Gerey provide someinteresting information on optimal campaign times. While othersources stress winter being a favorite time for Tatar raiding expeditions, surprisingly, in the Tarih winteris mentioned only once in this

Dumka, 1990),58-62; English translation: A Description of Ukraine, tr., ed.AndrewB. Pernal, Dennis F.Essar (Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1993),48-53. Note that the Ukrainian edition has an excellent commentary, much superiorto that in the English edition. However the latter has a more complete treatment ofBeauplan'smaps and includes a boxed setof reproductions of them.

27 Tarih, 26, 46. Naturally the harvest is the time of most plentiful food supply inagricultural societies and this was a factor to be considered when campaigningoverlong distances with large forces (ef.Archer Jones, The Art of War in the(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 46-48). ThIS informationprovided by Remmal Khoja raises some questions: Taken literally it implies that insummer campaigns the Tatars were dependent or at least reliant on the produce ofpeasants. Or perhaps it is a reference to the time of optimal availabilityof fodder forhorses? However,note that grass and grains mature at different times and bythe harvest time steppe grasses have long since dried away.Whatare the implications ofinformation on winter campaigns? Did the Tatars move faster because of the rivers beingfrozen? (And therefore need less food and fodder byvirtue ofthe presumed short timeof such expeditions?) Obviouslythis point needs further investigation.28 Tarih, 26, 36, 57, 72, 84, 98.

157RIMEAN TATAR LONG-RANGE CAMPAIGNScontext. Mentionedmore often asan optimal campaigning time isthatofthe harvest. Thus, during his proposal to the Crimeanbegs tomounta campaign in winter 1539-1540, Sahib Gerey says: in this land(vilayet) there are two times for a raid: one of them is harvest time(oraq zamanii and the other is winter (qish eyyamiduri Prior to the1538 Moldavian campaignSahibGerey partly explains whythe harvestwasa good time fora campaignin hiswritten replyto SultanSiileyman'smobilization order: in the secondmonth (i.e.,starting from a month'stime from now-VO.) [and] during the time ofthe harvest wetoo willcross the Dnieper River (Ozi Suyi) and move towards Aqkerman.. .because if the harvest time does not yet arrive the army will sufferhardship'?'

For the actual mobilization offorces, typicallythe khan orderedthatthroughoutthe realm proclamations or calls to arms (nida) be made inwhich the time and place ofassembly are specified.In mostcases itwasalso stated that each warrior was to bring three months provisions(azi q or zahire). The time limit for mobilization to be completedvariedfrom five, ten days to one month. In some cases a specific day ofthemonth bywhen the troopswere to report was mentioned (for example,the fifteenth of the month ). In campaigns directed at the northerncountries aswellas against the Nogaysnaturally the point of assemblywas at the Isthmus of Perekop. However, though in the Moldaviancampaign the initial rallying point was Or where Sahib Gerey firstreconstructed the fortress, the ultimate rallying pointwasthe leftbankof the Dnieper River.One would assume that the site of assembly was

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29 On one occasion, the campaign against the Circassian Janey tribe in 1542, itseemsthat the Crimean forcesassembled near Kefe(Caffa)atSariGol ( Yellow Lake ),Tarih, 73.In the other cases itis onlysaid that in so manydaysthe forcesareto set outfor Kerch.30 Tarih, 72.31 Tarih,98-99.

on the Qil Burun peninsula (Kinburns'ka kosa), that is, opposite thefortress of Ozi (Ochakiv)-this was a common place of crossing theDnieper when traveling to Moldavia, though the Tarih does not specifythe site as such. On the eastern campaigns there were two differentroutes. When the mainlandwas followed (the campaignto the Qabardaand to Astrakhan) Perekop/Orwas the place of assembly. On the otherCaucasian campaigns the Straits of Kerch were crossed, though in theproclamations as Remmal Khoja cites them, Kerch itselfis not specified as the place of assembly.

The mobilization proclamations applied to both the forces of theCrimean tribes located throughout the peninsula (often outside thepeninsula as well) and to the khan's own troops the core ofwhich weresalaried musket-bearing Ottoman janissaries and local Crimeanrecruits. Regarding the tribal forces, only on two occasions was thescale of the mobil izat ion indicated in the call to arms. In the 1542Circassian campaign whose main goal was to obt ai n captives forenslavement, Sahib Gerey warns the great begs (ulu begler), that is, theqarachi begs (chieftains of the four main Crimean t ribes), to bringonly select men (yarar nokiirve erenlerden ihtiyar, suitable retainersand choice men ) and not to allow the common subjects (reaya) tobe deceived int o j oi ni ng the campaign , for the Circass ians are apaltry people (garet edejegimiiz Cherkes azdur) and t hu s too large aforce might end up short of booty. On t he o ther hand, for theAstrakhan campaign a full mobilization was made and the yarli q ororderissuedby the khan isquotedas saying, no doubtwith some exaggeration, that no one isto remainin the land (i.e. , the Crimea-V.O.),the entire people (or army, halq) is to go on war footing (sefer ayaginediib), and if t he re is anyone who is not at the khan's side after OrAgzi, his property is to beraided and his head struckdown:' Thereafterthe khan's divanor council adjournedand proclamationswere made inall corners of the l an d that if any male between age fifteen andseventy failed to join this campaign they would face severe capitalpunishment (muhkem siyaseti, As to the troop totals that went on

32 Inalcik, Khan and TribalAristocracy:' 459; Tarih,49, 61,73,100.33 Tarih, 26,36,74, 92.34 Inalcik, Khan and Tribal Aristocracy:' 459-461. On its effective use by theZaporozhian Cossacks see Beauplan, Description d Ukraine... , 47-51 (Ukrainiantranslation, 63-65; English translation, 56-57).

159RIMEAN TATAR LONG-RANGE CAMPAIGNScampaign, the khan's troops varied between 200 and 1,000 for themusket-bearing infantry and 10,000 for all the khan's forces includingbegs a ttached in service to him, while the t riba l forces, if RemmalKhoja's figures are to be believed, numbered between several tens ofthousands and 250,000.32

Asto the actualpreparations, being a close aid of the khan, RemmalKhoja focuses more a tt en ti on on the pr epar at ions of the khan'sforces rather than thoseof the tribal cavalry. Inalcikhas alreadyfocusedon the khan's Ottoman style units and their effectiveness in battlejanissaries and local Crimean musket-bearers (tufengchi), field artillery(zarbuzan), and wagons carrying various necessities for a campaign(zarbuzan arabalari or top arabalari, field-artillery wagons or Simplyartillery wagons ; jebehane arabalari, munitions wagons ; matbaharabalari, kitchen wagons ; zahire arabalari, provisions wagons ).Like the Hussites, Hungarians, Ottomans, Cossacks and others, so toothe forces directly under the command of the Crimean khans (asopposed to the tribal forces) adopted the powerful defensive field-tactic of the wagon-camp or Wagenburg, which allowed a force armedwith gunpowder weapons to withstand an attacking cavalryforce manytimes its size.The Tarih has a wealthof information on various aspectsof CrimeanTatar military operations both combative and non-combative beyondthe initialstage ofpreparations-travel and camping, intelligence gathering, search and destroy missions, plundering expeditions, battles,and even fortress construction. Enhancing the value ofRemmal Khoja'saccounts ishis frequent attentionto geographic environments in whichthese operations occurred. Aside from aspects ofhuman geographyin this context movement and survival in faraway and often hostileenvironments-as will be seen below, our chronicle often gives apparentlyauthentic and rare details ofphysicalgeographyand it also revealsa subjective aspect-the perception and conceptualization of geography and environments.Here we can only givea sampling ofsuch data. Remmal Khoja provides ample information on river crossings by the khanate 's forces.

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35 Beauplan,Description d Ukraine..., 50-54 (Ukrainian translation, 67-68; Englishtranslation, 60-61). Seealso Collins, Military organization;' 267.36 Tarih, 37, 124.

We must remember that the East European steppe zone, that is, theDesht-iQipchaq,was not simplya monotone expanse offlat and rollingplains in whichone roamedwithease to and fro; to a significant degreeit was a patchworkof great fields divided by gullies and, above all, rivers, some of which are large and not easy to cross. Thus fording suchgreat rivers as the Dniester, Dnieper, Don, and Kuban by a significantforce meant mounting a careful operation usually lasting a day and an ight or longer. In add it ion, to reach the Caucasus reg ion usuallymeant crossing the Straits of Kerch. In various degrees of detail, theTarih describes a total of eleven different crossings of rivers or straitsby Crimean forces-one at the Dnieper, Dniester, and an unnamedriver in the Caucasus, two across the Kuban River,and fiveacross theStraits of Kerch. There is also a description of an unsuccessful attemptto cross theOka River in Muscovy. In the case of the Straits of Kerch,boats or ships supplied bythe beg of Kefewere used. In the other cases,even at such a wide river as the lower Dnieper, rafts were constructed(sal bagla-).The exact utilization of the rafts is not specified, but i t isassumed that, as other sources indicate, the Tatars placed their equipment and supplies on the rafts while the horses swam alongside, possibly with their owners on them or only holding onto their manes.Each unit of the army would cross together. The khan is depictedas being in charge of the crossing operation, actively directing i t -deciding when to cross and the order in whichthe units were to cross;when the time came to beginthe operationhe gavethe permission (theterm used is ijazet permission, permit ) to begin the crossing. Theforces of the four main tribes, the qarachi, crossed first, one afteranother. Often the Shirin or the Barin tribe were the first to go across.In all cases the khan went after all the main forces had crossed. Forsome of the crossings it is said that the khan had his tent pitched onhigh ground from which he could observe the operation. The lengthof the operations could last a day and intothe night (Straits of Kerch inthe 1539 Circassian expedition), a day and a n ight (the Don in theAstrakhan expedition, Straits of Kerch in the 1551 Circassian expedit ion) , a day and a half (Straits of Kerch in the 1542Circassian expedition), and on one occasion three days (the Dniepe r in the 1538Moldavian expedition). On a crossing ofthe Kuban River nearTemruk

37 Tarih, 38.38 Tarih,126.39 Tarih, 26,74, 92.40 Inalcik, Khan and Tribal Aristocracy;'460-461.41 Tarih,39-40. Cf.a similar scene in the 1542 Circassian campaign, Tarih, 77.42 Reluctance to report defeats suffered by one's own side can be seen in manyOttoman chronicles. For example,in their accounts ofbattles between Ottoman navalforces and the Cossacks in the BlackSeaonlythose in which the Cossacksweresupposedly defeated arereported, which leads the reader to believe that the reverse s tuation did not occur, which from o ther sources we know was not so. See VictorOstapchuk, The Human Landscape of the Ottoman Black Sea in the Face of theCossack NavalRaids;'OrienteModerno,n.s., 20 (2001): 23-95, esp. 89-94.

161RIMEAN TATAR LONG-RANGE CAMPAIGNSan interesting detail isgiven:the khan had scribes placedat each end ofthe crossing and they counted the number of men in each unit (ta ife)as it crossed. Altogether 40,000 men were written down (qalemealdi lar), which suggest that registers or defiers with the names of themen were compiled. During a forced march in the Caucasus mountains in pursuit of the enemy, the khan decided to ford a large river inthe night. He ordered a large fireto be made to illuminatethe crossing.As his force crossed the r iver he spread out his prayer rug and satobserving the operation.Remmal Khoja provides very detailed descriptions of how theCrimeanarmy camped while on campaign-where various forces werearranged in relation to the khan, how the Wagenburgwas formed withthe arabas chainedto one another, and how the musket-bearing troopsguarded the khan's station and patrolled around it all night, serving inshifts (nobetle).39 AsInalcikhas alreadydiscussedthis point we do notfurther elaborate on it here and refer the reader to his study. But wewould like to point out another example ofRemmal Khoja's ability forproviding realistic scenes from the daily life of campaigns. Describinghow a special force (see below) during the 1539Circassian expeditionsettled in for the night in a desertedCircassianvillagethe author givesus the following very human picture: here and there [the men] havelighted fires. Some of the gazis are busy telling stories, others chant theKoran (telavet) , yet others occupythemselves in prayer ( ibadet): 41

As to actual combat, in comparison with the information that heprovides on other aspects of campaigns, Remmal Khoja is not veryfor thcoming. In general in his wo rk the re is a bias in favor of theCrimean side-serious defeats of the Crimean army in battle are notreported and one wonders if indeed it was always so victorious. Atmost there isa tough fight,but in Remmal Khoja's rendition, the Tatars

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43 In typical fashion our chroniclerinforms us that not even single Tatar's nose wasbloodied, Tarih, 91-92.44 Tarih, 112.

always come out on top. Nonetheless in the few accounts of battlesthat he gives, one-sided though they may be, there are apparentlyauthentic details that revealthe art and methodof combatas wellas itsvagaries and ficklenature. In the 1544expedition against the Qabarda,the Qabardinians decided to make a night attack against the Tatarcamp. The khan and his forces was well-defended by a wagon-camp,which included constant sentry patrols armed with muskets-herewe have a clear example of the effectiveness of gunpowder weaponsand wagon-camp tactics, for the Qabardinians realized that to attackthe khan's camp would be futile. And so they decided to mount a surprise cavalry attack on the camp ofthe Tatar tribal forces. However thebattle asdescribed byRemmal Khoja was decided asmuch by accidental factors asby weapons and tactics: in the fury oftheir attack the firstwaves of Qabardinians attackers was trampled under the hooves ofthe horses of the succeeding waves.As to weapons, it was the Tatararrow-fire that is mentioned as kil ling or repelling the remainingQabardinians attackers. In a battle with the Nogays in 1546 we cansee the advantages over cavalry that fire by field-cannons and musketsgave. A charge by two units of Nogay cavalry,totaling seven thousandmen (each Nogay with two horses to combine speed and endurance),atfirstbrings confusionand nearpanic to the Crimean force.However,in the last moment Sahib Gerey manages to arrange his own forces ina row facing the approaching enemy and fire a blast with forty fieldcannons darbuzan / zarbuzan and followup with a volleyby his musket-bearing troops. This combination broughtgreat disorder and damageto the enemy.However here gunpowderweapons are not presentedas necessarily being decisivein the outcome of this battle: at this pointfrom several directions the Crimean cavalry swept down upon theNogays. Remmal Khoja informs that the battle was too close for arrowfire, and had to be decided by saber qiUch fighting. Here we stressthatin the 1544and the 1546examplesmentioned here, while the greatimportance of gunpowder weapons is evident, in neither case is thebattle won only by virtue of their utilization-at least in the eyes ofRemmal Khoja disorganization or ill-fortune of the enemy and traditionalarrow fire and saber fighting alsoplayed an important rolein theoutcome.

However Remmal Khoja is much more forthcoming about specialmissions, particularly in the Caucasus Mountains where it was usuallynecessary to seek out an enemy that knew wellhow to use the terrainas a sanctuary. Perhaps because mountain warfare posed a greaterchallenge to the Tatars who where for the most part folk of the steppe,when relating the Caucasian campaigns Remmal Khoja takes less forgranted and instead goes to greater lengths to describe the unfamiliarand awe-inspiring alpine environment and the difficultiesof operatingin it. This is in contrastto operating in the steppe, which presumablywas more familiar to the author and/or the reader and so did notrequire as much explication. Thus, in Sahib Gerey's first Circassiancampaign (1539), we are presented with a graphic description of thehardships encounteredby a Crimean force that entered the zone of theCaucasian peaks in the vicinity ofMt. Elbrus (Elbruz), which RemmalKhoja informs the reader, is the greatest mountain in the world afterthe mythical Mt. Qaf.He adds thatthe snows on and aroundMt.Elbrushave never melted since the origin of the world and its snowfieldsstretch halfwayto the province ofShirvanin the Transcaucasus. Belowthe snow isa zone where the trees willnot growand below thata forestso thick that not even a bird can flyor wild ass move through it. Belowthat, as one descends towards the open country sahra one must passfor three days through mountains and valleys which can be traveledonlyby one road. Having made their way into this mountain region theTatar forces captured an informant and sought to learn where theirCircassian foeshad gone. Thiscaptive promised to lead them to a placenear the source ofthe Kuban River where he claimed the fully armedand fullyequippedCircassians were in their stronghold (which according to the informant included a ditch implanted with sharp pointedstakes). After some hesitation Sahib Gerey decided to make an ascentto this stronghold and to this end he selected a special force-fromevery unit qosh two men with one horse per man-while the rest ofthe army was to remainencampedwhere itwas. With this special force,which in the words of Remmal Khoja, amounted to eleven thousandmen, the khan entered the high mountains. The terrain was so steepand narrow that the Tatars could only proceed in single file. Belowthem were precipices. Remmal Khoja notes that if a man slipped andfellhe would break into a thousand pieces ; Sahib Gereys entourageinformed the khan that since the time of Timur no one has been ableto pass through this area (here we might add, no one aside from thelocal mountain folk). The force proceeded for several more days until

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45 Tarih, 43.46 Tarih, 44. Theaccounts of the otherthree expeditions to the Caucasus region alsocontain excellent material on the nature ofmilitaryoperations there.47 At least officially, the campaign against Muscovy in 1541 did not seem tobe primarily aimed at gaining esir, thoughon the way north a proposalis made that esirbe

it wasutterly exhausted, itsfood supplies dwindled, and doubtset in asto the correctness of the route laid out bythe informant. Several hundred horses and several scoresof men had falleninto the abysses.Withthe force and its commanders demoralized and confused, the khanfinally announced that those who wished to return may,but that hewould remain in the mountains through the winter. However,his advisors talked him out ofthis folly. The argument that they presented tothe khan puts in a nutshell why throughout history lesser mountainfolkhavebeen ableto endurein the faceofthe superiormight ofneighboring states and empires: Oh, our padishah These [Circassians] area tribe [that amounts to only] a handful and they have no chance tooppose you. What worth is it to pay attention to them?.. Right nowtime istight and itis correct to turn around and with good fortune setofffor your country...for this Circassian people (Cherkes ta ifesi) are anaked people (i.e., impoverished- 0.):'45 Deciding that such anenemy was not worth the risk and suffering that this expedition hadbrought and that such exertion was even beneath his dignity, SahibGerey found comfort in these words and after a two-day rest on thethird day with his special force began the descent from the mountainsto return to the Crimea. Tocompensate for the lackof military successof his special mission in the mountains, on the return trip the khanallowed his men to console themselves with an all-out foray for captivesamongst the Circassian civilianpopulations, which resulted in thecapture of drovesof slaves.Although in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries raids into thenorthern countries-Muscovy and the Ukrainian lands of PolandLithuania were probably the most common Crimean Tatar militaryoperations (usually with the purpose of obtaining captives, also toenforce payment of tribute or gifts:'and sometimes also with political aims in mind), the Tarih provides relativelylittle material on suchundertakings. Theonlyexample ofan expedition mountedpurely withaim ofseizing captivesin the north was the campaign of the winter of1539-1540 headed byEmin Gerey,son ofthe khan, into northwesternUkraine. The picture presented by Remmal Khoja is similar to that

captured before crossing the Oka, which Sahib Gerey rejects. A reason why fewraidsagainst the northern countries are recorded in the Tarih may be that such operationswere mainly the prerogative of the Crimean tribal forces and of the steppe Nogays,ratherthan ofthe forcesof the khan to which the Tarih allots the most attention.48 Tarih, 49. Cf. Beauplan, Description d Ukraine... , 42 (Ukrainian translation, 59;English translation, 48-49); Collins, Military organization:' 266.49 Remmal Khoja does not articulate the reason there were twohorses per man, butas is known from other sources, the extra horse was so that there would be a freshermount for greater speed, which could also act asa pack-horse on the return trip, thatis,for carrying booty.Cf. Collins, Military organization:' 267-68.so Tarih, 50.51 Tarih, 50-51. Whilesuch cavalry raids arecommonlyknown bythe term chapgul(from chap-,to gallop; to raid ), in the Tarih the term does not only apply to raidingexpeditionsby horsemen,but also to special missions ofthe khan'sinfantryand wagon

165RIMEAN TATAR LONG-RANGE CAMPAIGNSgiven in other sources: First of all,to saveenergy for the actual operation at the destination, the Tatar army moved slowlyon its journeytoenemy territory-in this expedition the frontier wasreached in twentyfive days. Once the border of the target territory was reached, EminGerey designated a raiding party (chapgul) of unspecified size, withtwo horses for each man. The raiding party was to return to the mainforce within a set number ofdays (here ten days).Meanwhile the commander, Emin Gerey together with his milk brothers (emeldesh) andretinue (hass nokorleri two thousand men total-stayed behind,though they too mounted their own operations locally raiding villagesin the vicinity.50Thissame northern campaign ofthe winter of 1539-1540 provides agood example ofthe dangers ofthe steppe. On the return from successful raids, laden with booty, Emin Gerey's force was caught in heavysnows and extreme cold. The conditionswereso bad that, in the wordsof Remmal Khoja, from morning until night they could [only] proceed the distance ofthree arrow shots:' After a said forty daysof travelthey managed to emerge from the border zone, but were completelyexhausted and unable to move any further. It was necessary for EminGerey to choose one hundred men and push ahead with them to theCrimea to obtain a rescue mission, leaving the main force (and itsbooty) behind. In the meantime another danger of the steppe took itstoll: as the hapless main force reached the Dnieper River,the MangitNogaysled by the khan's great enemy,BaqiBeg,took advantage of itsweakened condition and attacked and plundered it. Though the partywas eventually relieved by fresh forces from the Crimea, according toRemmal Khoja four to five thousand men perished from the coldalone.

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We have already made several references to the Tatars' capture ofbooty in general and especially humans as chattel, which is referredto as esir in the Islamic sources (from this the Slavicword iasyr).Theimportance ofthe slavery institution in pre-modern Islamic societies, especiallyin the Ottoman Empire and for the Crimean Khanate,isbeyond a doubt. The Ottomans were to a great degree dependent onslavesas laborers in craft production and agriculture, agents in commerce and domestic servants, and of course as soldiers. The Tatarsalso relied on slave labor, but it seems that their main interest was inthe veritable business of capturing slavesfor the vast Ottoman slavemarket. Wenow know that there were significantsectors ofthe khanate s economy besides that connected with the capture and selling ofslavesand that the old view that the khanate was a purely parasiticalplunder-based entity is not true. However,this does not mean that weshould try to minimize the importance of slavery for the khanate.Forsome time historians have been awarethat slavery in Muslim societies was not alwaysan abject condition, that the status of slaveswasregulated by law, that slaveshad a chance to obtain their freedom,and that the status ofa slaveof the sultan or ofa wealthy master couldentail substantial or even great privilege and social status. This beingsaid, it is hoped that today we can be even more open-minded aboutslaveryin the OttomanEmpire aswellas in the Crimean Khanate. Thatis, being ever conscious of the fact that societies ofthe past had theirrules and moral systems that could be quite different from that of oursocieties in this century, we need not conceal from ourselves and ourreaders aspects which were clearly unpleasant. Yes, it is undeniablethat the capture and transport ofhumansbyTatarswas frightening andcruel, though after a captivewas sold into slavery his or her fatecouldvary. Hopefully the days when historians could condemn and distortthe entire historical existenceof the CrimeanTatarson account oftheir

raiding activity are gone forever and we can present the realities ofthe past not with il l intentbut simplywith the aim ofunderstanding.Beingthe productof his ageand itsethos, RemmalKhoja isan excellent source on the Ottoman and Tatar attitudes towards enslavement.He makes no attempts to conceal the keen interest of the Tatars incapturing humans-unabashedly he speaks of the great numbers captured and after each successful operation he conveysthe great satisfaction that acquiring slavesgave to the Tatars-the heart of the people(or troops-V.0.) was joyous and happy is a typical refrain.53 Beforeclaiminghis share the khan tried to make sure that the troops and theircommanders received sufficient portions of captives and other booty.Often officials and notables in the Crimea who did not attend weregiven a share of the bounty as well. 54 Clearly the khan took measuresto see that his subjects were satisfied in this regard, even if his owngain might be diminished. If an expedition was a military failure, itseems that in the minds ofthe Tatarwarriors this could be offsetbythecapture of sufficientslaves; conversely,without enough captives a military victory could seem hollow.55 Without a doubt the basis for thepositive emotions connected with acquirement of captives was thateach captive represented a substantial material reward; to gain severalcaptives could mean rising from poverty to solvency or from solvencyto wealth.Despite the great enthusiasm for slaving expeditions, the Tarihrelates situations that show that this activitywasbound by regulationsimposedby the khan. In general, operations to capture slavescould notbe commenced without the permission of the khan (ijazet).56 On thereturn from MoldaviaSahibGereyforbade his forcesfrom taking captives,presumably because the Moldaviansweresubjects ofthe Ottomansultan. This was in spite of protests and claims by the Tatars that thepoor who had gone into debt in order to be ableto join the campaign

166 VICTOR OSTAPCHUK CRIMEAN TATAR LONG-RANGE CAMPAIGNS 167

forces.Thus in the Astrakhanexpedition an advance expeditionaryforce with wagons,fieldcannons (zarbuzan),and janissaries wassent ahead to Astrakhan-its mission iscalled a chapgul, Tarih, 102. In the 1551 Cherkes campaign, a special force sent on amission that consisted of 1000 musket-bearing men and 20 zarbuzans is cal led awagon chapgut (uraaa chapguli), Tarih, 125-26.52 On slavery in the Ottoman Empire, including the Crimea see Halil Inalcik,Servile Labor in the OttomanEmpire:' in TheMutualEffects ofthe Islamic and[udeoChristian Worlds: TheEastEuropean Pattern, eds.Abraham Ascher,Tibor Halasi-Kun,Bela K. Kiraly (Brooklyn, NY:Brooklyn College Press, 1979),26-52.

53 Halqungonliishenveshadman,Tarih, 80, see also 44, 128-29.54 Tarih, 44, 80, 128-29. Nor does he haveany inhibitionsrelating to crueltyby theTatars toward their enemies: on occasion torture or execution of captured warriors,wrongdoers,or even simplecaptives arementioned or even described. In practically allcases the cruelty is not necessarily wanton, but rather serves a purpose-either to setan example, to punish, or for reasons of revenge etc., Tarih, 78, 93, 127.55 A clearcaseof the former situation isthe 1539 Circassian expedition; the successful Moldavian expedition of 1538 might have been considered a failure had SahibGerey not allowed the Tatars to raid for cattleon the way back (seebelow).56 Tarih, 63,89.


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57 Here a compromise was effected-Sahib Gerey permitted limited capture ofcattle-onehead from each flock,Tarih,31.58 Tarih,p. 63.59 Tarih,93-94.60 Tarih,36-37.

would not have a chance to repay their debts if theywere barred fromthe opportunityto plunder and seizehumans.57 On the way to Muscovyin 1541 the khan ruled out any capture ofhumans before the militaryobjective was achieved.58 In the 1544 Qabardinian expedition there is adifferent situation connected with captive-taking: When a nokor ofEmin Giray robbed a lowly man ( referred to as a faqir) of his slave,Sahib Gerey was supposedly so outraged that he did not rest untilthe guilty nokor was located and the slave returned. The offendingpartywas then subjected to a humiliating public punishment-he waschained by his neck to an artillery wagon and whipped at every stopalong the way back to the Crimea. The khanmade it a point thatallthearmy saw this spectacle and what would happen to anyone who daredto steal someone else'sslave.

In his presentations of Crimean Tatar military endeavors RemmalKhoja pays no less attention to protocol, ritual, ceremony, and festivities than he does to concrete militaryactions. His frequent and lengthydescriptions of solemnities and festivities-public prayer, troop displays, parades, celebrations-are an indication of their importance tothe Ottoman and Tatar mentality (in this respect probably they wereno different than other peoples of the age) and these activities can beconsidered integral components of a campaign. Thus when in 1539Sahib Gerey set out from his capital Bakhchesaray against the Circassians, we are given a description of a splendid spectacle: The royalgrooms saddled the khan's horses with jewel-encrusted saddles anddressed them in gold-plated harnesses. The horse-tail standards (tug)were planted and the flags (sanjaq) unfurled. Meanwhile the streetswere lined with spectators as Sahib Gerey, having bid farewell to hisharem, emerged from the maingate ofhis palace in ceremonious dressand gi rded with a saber. He turned in the dir ec tion of Mecca andprayers were said and then for a final time before setting out he turnedin the direction of the palace gate. Throngs of people chanted prayersas he and his entourage and escor t-service begs (ichki begleri) andjanissaries-withthe flags above them and their extra horses followingbehind rode awayon theirgaza-bound joumey.'

61 Tarih,47-48.62 Onthe of departure forthe 1539 Circassiancampaign SahibGereylikewisespent the entire night in hisprayer chamber, Ibid.,36.

169RIMEAN TATAR LONG-RANGE CAMPAIGNSSimilarly,before Sahib Gereys son Emin Gerey set out on the cam

pa ign of the winter of 1539-1540 to the Ukraine, Remmal Khojadescribes a series of solemn ceremonies and festive events. First, upongranting his son permission (ijazet) to lead the campaign, the khandressed him in a rich ceremonious robe (the khil at ceremony), girdedhim with a gilded sword, and proceeded to give him advice (nasihat)on how to act dur ing the coming exped it ion (main tain discipl ine,inspect the armywell-both i ts vanguard and its rear, and of course,always be courageous). Thereupon a gathering (mejlis) was called.Pitchers of mead that gives pleasure to the heart were brought out.No doubt with intended humor, Remmal Khoja tells us that at thispoint those who did not drink withdrew from the convivial gathering(sahbet). Then the musicians tookup their sazes (lute-like instruments)and playing and dancing commenced. People of delight and amusement rushed into the gathering. Amidst the merriment, the khan ceremoniously presented to the ga the ring his three sons, from theyoungest aged seven, Gerey, to the oldest, aged twenty-two, EminGerey.Gifts were distributed to all asthe gathering lasted the entire dayand into the evening. The next day a similar gathering (sahbet) wasorganized with further spectacles of sumptuous merry-making andintoxication. As this was the eve of his departure, at one point EminGerey asked the khan for permission to retire for the night. Upon hisdeparture the party continuedthrough the night untilthe morning.

In the case ofSahib Gereys own campaignagainst Muscovy in 1541Remmal Khoja gives a different picture of the eve before departure:after seeing to all the necessary preparations the khan retired to hisspecial room for solitary prayer and meditation (halvet hanesi) andbowing spent the entire night there. With the arrival of morning heperformed the morning prayer (sabahnamazi) and emerged from hisprayer chamber to bid farewell to the palace women. Thereupon hemade a festive departure with a fanfare parade similar to that of the1539 campaign.?

There are scenes of celebration and ceremony on other types ofoccasions. Arrival of the army at friendly fortresses along the way wasoccasioned by a display of public rejoicing, so-called shenlik, whichusually included a demonstration of cannon and musket fire by the

VICTOR OSTAPCHUK68


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fortress garrison. Victory in battle was, of course, another occasionfor great celebration. Thus, on repelling the night attack of the Qabardinians mentioned above the Crimean army spent the rest of thenight in celebration (shenlikler etdilery Finally,the return from campaign was also occasioned by great celebrations, often lasting severaldays,which included banquets, readings of a celebratorywork devotedto the triumphantcourse ofthe campaign (gazaname, zafername), giftgiving, khil at ceremonies, and distribution of captives amongst theeliteof the khanate. In describing the celebrations after the Astrakhancampaign, Remmal Khoja makes the social and psychological utility ofsuch events evident: ... the meals were prepared and a general spectacle (gorunush-i amm) was made. The ulema and the pious and the richand the poor (bay u geda) and the townsfolk and the strangers (garib)and the prayer-leaders (imam) and the preachers (hatib) all came, andthe spectacle was filledwith people. Allthe people offered prayers andeulogies (sena ): Remmal Khoja goes on to mention Koran readingsand attendance of the convocation mosque (jami -i sherif) and howwhen the spectacle began to disperse each person was in his own worldof tranquility, happiness, and delight. Here Remmal Khoja, idealizations and exaggerations aside, conveys the consolidating and integrating role for the society of such celebrations involving its high, middle,and lower orders. The importance in Crimean Tatar society of thekhan's personal participation in public occasions is also evident in acomment by the Habsburg ambassador to Muscovy, SigismundHerberstein, on Sahib Gerey's predecessor, Sa'adet Gerey: Beingbeholden to the Turkish (i.e.,Ottoman-V:O.) custom, Sadakh Gerey,contrary to the mores ofthe Tatars, very rarely appeared in public andwould not show himselfto his subjects. For this reason he was expelledby the Tatars: 68

In this survey of Tarih-i Sahib Giray Khan asa source on CrimeanTatar campaigns we have restricted ourselves to giving a sampling ofthe relevant information contained in this chronicle. There are othermilitary activities on which the chronicle has information as well as

subtleties and problematic points of Remmal Khoja's work which wehave not discussed because of the lack of space.Togain a full appreciat ion of the data in this chronicle would require a larger s tudy thatwould also provide a comparativeperspectivefrom the point ofviewofothersources and other areas. Wewould like to add an observation onthe relat ive usefulness of chronicles and archival documents. It isregrettable that so few documents or registers (defters) exist for ourtopic, materials that would giveus a multitude of names, dates, numbers, organizationalunits, and so forth. However it isalso the case thatbureaucratic documents or registers rarely allow an individual of thecaliber of Remmal Khoja to convey the information that his curiousand perspicaciousmind and eye for detail have gathered. With the helpof chronicles such as Tarih-i Sahib Gerey Khan we have, despite inevitable distortions and blind spots, the opportunity to gain an authenticand fascinating view of the workings of a society that has largelyremained concealed, a viewthat no amount ofarchival documentationcan provide us with. Despite the scarcity of documents, as is evidentfrom the Tarih, thanks to narrative sources we have the possibility togain a rather precise picture of various aspects of the successor khanates ofthe Ulus Djuchi.

170 VICTOR OSTAPCHUK CRIMEAN TATAR LONG-RANGE CAMPAIGNS 171

63 Tarih, 85,88.64 Tarih, 92.65 Tarih, 30-31, 44-45, 81-82, 95-96.66 Tarih, 105.67 On the importance of spectacles (gorunush) seealso Tarih, 32.68 Sigismund Gerbershtein [Herberstein],Zapiski 0 Moskovii, tr.A. 1.Malenina andA. V. Nazarenko (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1988), 184.


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