osborne, review of rose hegel contra sociology

8/13/2019 Osborne, Review of Rose Hegel Contra Sociology

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Hegelian Phenomenology and theritique of Reason and Society

eter sborneAbhot Terrasson has r e m ~ c k e d that i f the size ofa volume be measured not by the number of i t spages but by the time required for mastering i t ,i t can be said of many a book, that i t would bemu h shorter i i t were not so short.(Kant, Preface to First Edition, Critique oPure Reason

Gill ian Qnse s Hegel Contra Sociology (Athlone Press,1981, 6.95 pb, 26lpp) would be much shorter were i tnot so short. I t is unashamedly, and sadly, anextremely diff icul t book; not just in terms of thecomplexity and subtlety of the position i t puts forward, but, primarily, in terms of the way in whichthis posit ion is presented. But i t is , nonetheless,in many ways an important book. For i t challenges,at a fundamental level , the generally accepted framework within which Hegel has been interpreted; and,in so doing, i t challenges accepted bel iefs not onlyabout the relat ionship between Marx and Hegel, butalso about the philosophical adequacy of Marxism andthe redundancy of Hegelianism. I t contains a denselyargued and philosophically sophisticated piece ofHegel scholarship which is mobilised against al l theprevailing tendencies of contemporary social theory,and i t will be of part icular interest to the materia l i s t friends of the idealist dialect ic [1].In this essay my aim is two-fold: (i) to producean account of some central themes of the book, and,in particular, of the reading of Hegel around whichi t revolves; and (i i) to offer a provisional assessment of the standpoint i t adopts, not so much withregard to the textual credibil i ty of the interpretat ion of Hegel from which i t derives, as with respectto i t s immanent viabil i ty and more general implicat ions. For Rose t reats the conception of Hegelianphenomenology which she outlines as the only possiblecoherent theoretical basis for the development of acr i t ical theory of subjectivity, culture, and hence,pol i t ics . She wants to appropriate aspects of Hegel sphilosophy. The idea which the book develops is thatthe philosophical basis of Hegel s thought must beappropriated by Marxism i f the la t ter is to be ableto generate a cr i t ical pol i t ics . So i t is theinternal cogency of Rose s account of Hegel, ratherthan i t s historical veracity, which is important.Hegel Contra Sociology announces i t se l f as anattempt to retr ieve Hegelian speculative experiencefor social theory [2], and i t concludes with a briefoutl ine of a projected Hegelian social theory(labelled cr i t ical Marxism - I will come back tothis) as the exposition of capitalism as culture ,a presentation of the contradictory relationsbetween Capital and culture [3] in the phenomenological (speculative) mode. In the meantime, i tdevelops a philosophical critique of sociology andof Harxism, and a strikingly original interpretation8

of Hegel s thought which focuses on the sociopoli t ical significance of his idea of speculativeexperience.The argument is that Marx s critique of Hegel isbased on a Fichtean reading of his system which fai lsto grasp the t rue meaning of his concepts of actuali ty and spir i t , and that in fact these concepts provide the theoretical basis for the conceptualisationof the subjective mediations of objective socialforms. Marx s own conception of practical materialism is seen as theoretically incapable of.conceptualising such mediations, since i t i n v o l v ~ s abstractdichotomies between being and consciousness, andtheory and practice, which can only be unifiedabstractly in an ought . Without such mediations,the relation between Capital and poli t ics is seen tobe indeterminate. Capital gives an account of theobjective determinations of social relations, butMarxism is seen to be theoretically incapable ofuti l is ing this knowledge through a poli t ics whichaccounts for how these social relations may be pract ical ly transformed on the basis o their objectivedeterminations because i t cannot develop adequateconcepts of subjectivity and culture [4].In what follows, I f i r s t give an account of Rose sunderstanding of Hegel, contrasting i t with that onwhich Critical Theory is based, since (i) th is is astandard interpretation, and ( i i ) Rose s reading ofHegel functions as a reformulation of the foundationsof Critical Theory; then I discuss i t s implicationsfor Marxism, and I discuss Rose s understandingof Harx. I conclude with a few comments of a generalnature on the overtly philosophical character ofthe project that Rose outlines. ne of the mostinteresting things about the book is that, while i tcr i t ic ises existing formulations of Cri t ical Theory,i t demonstrates and clearly endorses the explic i t lyphilosophical nature of i t s project .Hegelian Phenomenology and the Radicalisation o Kant sCritique o ReasonHegel Contra Sociology is perhaps best understood asa response to Habermas s account of the developmentof German philosophy from Kant to Marx, which preparesthe ground for his formulation of Critical Theory asa theory of knowledge-constitutive interests , and tothe understanding of the idea of metacritique, as theradicalisation of Kant s critique of reason, on which


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hat theory is based [5]. It is this interpretationof the idea of metacritique which determines theeaning Habermas gives to the statement that 'a radical critique of knowledge is possible only as socialtheory' [6]. As we shall see, Rose's reading ofegel involves a reinterpretation of this fundamentalaxiom of Critical Theory, which changes i ts orientation from an, at least formal, directedness towardsHarx back towards Hegel.Habermas's understanding of the idea of metacritique has recently been elaborated by GarbisKortian in his book Metacritique: The Philosophicalof Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge UniversityPress, 1980). A brief examination of the differentways in which Kortian and Rose t reat the concept ofmetacritique will serve to introduce Rose's positionand to si tuate i t in relation to Critical Theory [7].Kortian characterises 'metacritique' as an argumentative strategy with reference to Hegel's Phenomenologyof Spirit, which is taken to provide i t s paradigm [7].He develops an account of the philosophical structureof Habermas's work in terms of the idea of metacritique, and he uses the difference in the form ofthe arguments that Hegel and Habermas use to determinethe theoretical specificity of Habermas's work.Critical Theory generally, and Habermas's work inparticular, are presented as a response to the failureof Hegel's attempt at metacritique: 'Crit ical Theoryis intended as the experience and expression of thefailure of the Hegelian concept [8].In agreement with Kortian's acceptance of a distinction between the epistemological structures of phenomenological and other forms of metacritical argument,ut in opposition to his account of their difference,Hegel Contra Sociology presents a reading of Hegelhich is buil t upon a claim for the epistemologicalsuperiority of the phenomenological form of Hegel'sargument. Hegel's thought is counter-posed to thatof the advocates of Critical Theory, and of sociological thought generally (of which Critical Theoryis seen to be an instance, despite i t se l f ) , as representative of the only possible form of thoughtcapable of superceding the dilemmas of Kantianism,which are taken to be reproduced within al l sociological thought (and most strikingly in Habermas)because of i t s reliance upon Kantian forms of argumentation [9]. So while Habermas claims that his ownwork is genuinely metacritical, and that Hegel's ismetaphysical - in i t s failure to eliminate all'absolute' presuppositions - Rose claims that onlyHegel has achieved genuine metacritique, and thatHabermas s work remains Kantian. The basis of thisclaim i s that Hegel has been almost universally misunderstood.Kortian uses the term 'metacritical ' to characterise the epistemological structure of a theory whichis, broadly speaking, cr i t ica l in the sense inwhich Horkheimer uses the term; that is , whichreflects upon the relation between the epistemicsubject engaged in critique and the object crit icised;which reflects upon the presuppositions of critique[11]. Kortian distinguishes, none too clearly,between genuine or ' radical ' metacritique - ' themovement associated with the meta is only radicalso long as i t resolutely refuses any . . . absoluteposition' [12] - and metacritique which fai ls tocarry through the radicalisation of critique which isi ts task [13] because i t rests on some absolute presupposition, but which nonetheless presumably revealssome of the preconditions of critique. He placesHegel's Phenomenology in the la t ter group. This isthe source of a certain amount of conceptual confusion since i t means that the paradigmatic example ofmetacritique is a failed instance of that which i texemplifies. This is the result of defining i t as anintention. But I think i t is clear what Kortian isgetting at .

Emphasising the specificity of Hegel's thought,Rose restr icts her usage of the term 'metacritique'to refer to that particular form of reflection onthe presuppositions of theory developed by those whorejected Hegel's philosophy; that is , quasi-transcendental reflection - inquiry into the ontological orsociological preconditions of critique by transcendental argument. Habermas's theory of knowledgeconstitutive interests is established by an argumentof this kind. This kind of argument is quasi-transcendental because i ts results are both a priori (asthe ground of critique) and seemingly natural is t ic(as external to the mind). Consequently:The status of the relation between the sociological precondition and the conditioned becomescorrespondingly ambiguous in al l sociologicalquasi-transcendental arguments.

[14 ]In opposition to such an ambiguous form of argument,Hegelian phenomenology is presented as a form ofcognitive activity which successfully radicalisesthe critique of reason, which presents i t s social preconditions through a process of speculative selfreflection in which the exposition of critique andthe derivation of i t s ground are united:The exposition of abstract thinking and thederivation of the social insti tutions whichdetermine i t are completely integrated in thetracing of the education of self-consciousnessat specific histor ical moments.[15 ]The reason that Kortian does not distinguishphenomenological and quasi-transcendental argumentsin this way is that his reconstruction of Habermas'sargument shares the presuppositions of Habermas'sthought. In this sense, i t is less a reconstructionthan a restatement. I t presupposes the validi ty ofthe interpretation of Hegel from which Habermasstar ts out. This interpretation (which is a standardone) maintains that Hegel .employs the radicalisation of critique, or thisexperience which he terms ' speculative' , in theservice of an absolute system of knowledgegoverned by the presupposition of the identityof thought and being.[16 ]The Phenomenology o Spirit is taken to be groundedin idealist metaphysics. Rejecting this metaphysic,Habermas separates the idea of the self- ref lect ionfrom the phenomenological form of i ts presentation.It is this abstraction which gives r ise to the ideaof metacritique which Kortian explicates.Now from the point of view of Hegel's thought,which Rose adopts, this abstraction of the idea ofmetacritical argument from i t s original form appearsas a regression to that Kantian form of argumentwhich separates off the subject from the object ofcritique, and defines their relation abstractly, interms of a cri t ical method. It was just this methodological conception of r e f l ~ t i o n which Hegel sought toovercome, because i t takes for granted certain ideasabout cognition as an instrwnent and as a medium andassumes that there is a difference between ourselvesand this cognition [17]. The methodological appropriation of the idea of the self-reflection of knowledge robs i t of i t s primary cri t ical function.Metacritique, as opposed to phenomenology, is thusan essentially ambiguous enterprise which attempts toreveal the presuppositions of critique through thedirection of the cri t ical method towards previouslyneglected aspects of human existence [18].In Kortian's terms, we can say that the ambiguityof metacritically (quasi-transcendentallY) establishedpreconditions constitutes a failure on the part ofthose theories which are grounded on them to overcome,or to ' radical ise ' , critique. For their combinationof a priority and naturalism gives them just that

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absolute character which defines the objects ofmetaphysical thought. However, although they arephilosophically unsatisfactory, Rose acknowledges thefact that such metacri t ical arguments can be extremelyf ruitful sociologically. Indeed, she argues that theyare the method by which the basic paradigms of sociology were established. The f i rs t chapter of Begelontpa Sociology The Antinomies of SociologicalReason , gives a comprehensive, i f condensed,historical account of the development of sociologyin terms of i t s philosophical foundations in neoKantianism, which shows how a variety of sociologicalenterprises were established by different metacri t ical arguments, each designed to uncover differentpreconditions of neo-Kantian epistemology. NeoHarxist sociology is also seen to exhibit th is syndrome of reaction to, but incorporation within, neoKantianism. Although both attempted to overcome thephilosophical problems of traditional sociology, i tis argued that L u k ~ c s and Adorno in fact representdifferent positions within neo-Kantianism [19]. ndAlthusser is seen to combine neo-Kantian epistemology (his conception of science) with sociologicalmetacritique (his theory of structures of socialformation), and so to make al l the classic neoKantian moves solely within a project of rereadingMarx [20].Rose s argument is that Hegelian phenomenology isthe only way out of these philosophically inadequateforms of neo-Kantianism. The reason a way out isneeded (although this is never actually made explicitin the text - an example of i t s unnecessarily enigmatic stance) is that, while neo-Kantian metacritiquemay be sociologically ( i .e . descriptively) adequate, i t s philosophical inadequacies make i t ppact-ically impotent, because i t is incapable of generating a social theory in which the ground of critique,of theory generally - objective social determinat ions - is conceived other than as dist inct from,and externally related to, consciousness. I t isincapable of giving r ise to a social theory whichgrasps i t s object in terms of the subjective mediations through which i t is experienced and reproduced,and through which i t can be transformed. The argument for Hegelian phenomenology (as opposed to simplycontra sociology ) rests on two premises: (i) that ,despite almost universal belief to the contrary,Hegel s philosophy does not rely on the metaphysicalpresupposition of the identity of thought and being;that the fact that the Absolute alone is true, orthe t ru th alone is absolute [21] is not a ppe-supposition of Hegel s thought at all : and ( i i ) thatthe philosophical foundations of Marxian materialism(as opposed to simply i t s sociological revisions)are themselves in some way Kantian or Fichtean insofar as they are not Hegelian.Although a demonstration of the validi ty of thissecond premise is attempted, brief ly, a t the end ofthe book (to which I will return), i t is assumedfrom the beginning. For i t is claimed, withoutargumentation, that Kant s philosophy of consciousness, with i t s theoretical contradictions and practical moralism, can only be cri t icised i f the infini te is knowable [22]. e are offered an exclusivechoice between the possibil i ty of Hegelianism andthe impasse of an impotent Kantianism, since, accepting Kant s cri t ical destruction of previous metaphysics, Rose, along with Hegel, recognises that theinfini te can only be knowable in i t s unity with thef ini te, i .e . as the absolute.This doctrinaire insistence on the exclusivetheoretical option of Kant (and Fichte) op Hegel,reminiscent of the falsely exclusive choices offeredby L u k ~ c s in his essays on aesthetics in the thir t ies)but lacking their possible poli t ical vindication, isa theoretical flaw which has the unfortunate effectof closing the discourse art iculated by the text at10

just that point at which i t promises to become mostinteresting. I t leaves the question of the theoretical value of the position outlined (which is alwaysalso a practical question) unexplored, by implici t lyassuming that i t is the only way out of a certaintheoretical dilemma. The perspective within whichtHat-dilemma arises, and epistemology, which determiRes-its form, is never i t se l f quethat dilemma arises, and which determines i t s form(epistemology), is never i t se l f questioned. Thecompositional structure of Begel ontpa Sociologywhich combines philosophical argument with textualcita t ion in a complex and often ambiguous manner,and i ts terse, assertive style, which at timesborders on the cryptic, are the f o r m a ~ correlatesof this refusal to consider, concretely, the generalsignificance of the position i t puts forward (whichis essentially a refusal to open a dialogue with thereader).Let us examine the argument put forward in defenceof the fi rst premise (above) - the denial of anyabsolute presuppositions in Hegel s thought. Thebulk of Begel ontpa Sociology is devoted to i t ssubstantiat ion.Rose s reading of Hegel, in conscious oppositionto Harxist appropriations of his thought, revolvesaround her analysis of the roles played by that pairof concepts most often rejected, i f not ridiculed,by those appropriations as representative of i t ssystematic, and so idealist and ultimately theological, aspect. These are the concepts of theabsolute and of speculation (in all i t s variousforms as speculative thinking, speculative discourse,speculative experience, and, part icularly importantto Rose s interpretation, speculative rereading).Marxist sociology has mystified Hegel by makinga distinction between a radical method and aconservative system . s a result of this

ar t i f ic ia l distinction, the central i ty of thoseideas which Hegel developed in order to unifythe theoretical and practical philosophy of Kantand Fichte has been ignored.[23]Rose sets out to reassert the central i ty of theseideas. Her t h s i ~ is that Hegel s philosophy haso social import i f the absolute cannot be thought[24], since, as the unity of the f ini te and theinfini te [25], i t represents the unity, and hencethe d i f ~ e r e n c e of actuality and possibil i ty. So,how can the absolute be thought? What are the conditions of such a form of thought? nd how can theybe derived without being implicitly presupposed?i .e . how can the transcendental circle, which involves


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the implicit presUpposItIon of that which is to bededuced in the specification of that from which i t isto be deduced, be avoided? [26] How can the absolutebe shown to be thinkable without this being presupposed in the form of the assumption of the identityof thought and being?The key to this set of problems is the idea ofphenomenology.The only consistent way to cr i t ic ise Kant sphilosophy of consciousness is to show thatthe contradiction which a methodological, orany natural, consciousness fal ls into when i tconsiders the object to be external, can i t se l fprovide the occasion for a change in that consciousness and in i t s definition of i t s object.[27]The only way to cr i t ic ise Kant within the problem-atic o modern epistemology, one might add) is thusthrough a phenomenology, which presents the forms ofknowledge according to their own methodological standards, as they appear to consciousness, and whichthereby presents the realm of appearance as definedby limited forms of consciousness [28]. Such apresentation is a genuine radicalisation of Kant scri t ique of reason because i t involves no presuppositions about the nature of knowledge as i t is presented

in a series of diverse forms, other than the bareaxiom that knowing is the being of something for aconsciousness [29], which is a necessary conditionof al l epistemology; a universally shared presupposition.Such a presentation, Hegelian phenomenology, ispossible, because of the unity of the processes ofcognItIon and reflection within consciousness. AsHegel explains in the introduction to thePhenomenologyConsciousness examines i t s own self . . . . [I t ]is , on the one hand, consciousness of theobject, and on the other, consciousness ofi tself ; consciousness of what for i t is theTrue, and consciousness of i t s knowledge ofthe truth. Since both are for the same consciousness, th is consciousness is i t se l ftheir comparison; i t is for the same consciousness to know whether i t s knowledge of theobject corresponds to the object or not.[30]The series of contradictory experiences which theobserving (reading) consciousness undergoes as i tprogresses through the different histor ical forms ofknowledge recreated in their determinate series by aphenomenology, is seen by Rose to lead, by implication, to the concept of the absolute. I t is arguedthat the experience of the contradictory nature ofhitherto apparently valid forms of knowledge subvertsthe distinction between f ini te and infini te on which

those forms - as different relations between consciousness and objects external to i t - were based,and implies a notion which does not divide cons i o u s ~ e s s or real i ty into f ini te and inf ini te [31]:the absolute. As implied, however, the absolute ispresent but not yet known . Only i t s concept isknown. That i t is present can be acknowledged butnot sta ted [32], since to sta te that i t is presentwould suggest that i t is present to consciousness( i .e . known), which i t is not. This acknowledgementis not an abstract statement about the absolute,but an observation to which we have now attained,by looking a t the experience of a consciousnesswhich knows i t se l f as an anti thesis , asnegati ve . . .[ ]So, the concept of the absolute is derived, byimplication, phenomenologically. I t arises out ofHegel s critique of Kant s epistemology. But thederivation of the concept is equivalent only tothe attainment of the observation that the absolute

is present . e cannot yet think the absolute. Howcan this be done?The absolute can never be thought or 'known' inthe ordinary sense of being a determinate object forconsciousness (viz. Hegel s definition of knowledge,above), despite the t i t l e of the final chapter ofthe Phenomenology because i t is not a possibleobject of consciousness. It is not a possible objectof consciousness because i t is , by definition, beyondthe opposition of consciousness and i t s objects, andconsciousness is always this opposition betweeni t se l f and i ts object [34]. As implied oralluded t o , i t cannot so much be thought or'known' as experienced in a particular way. I t canbe experienced negatively, or speculatively, as theformal unity of the multiplicity of contradictoryexperiences or relations by which i t is implied. I tis the production of such a form of experience of theabsolute, which Hegel calls speculative thought,which Rose takes to be the purpose of a phenomenology.In a phenomenology, a sequence of shapes of consciousness is assembled in order to see the absolute by presenting the series of i t s determinations,of i t s misapprehensions [35], both histor ical ly andcontemporaneously. Because no one set of determinations, no one part icular form of phenomenal knowledge,can grasp the absolute, philosophy is necessarilysystematic. This idea of a whole which cannot begrasped in one moment or in one statement for i t mustbe experienced is the idea of the system [36]. Butbecause the absolute is not a stat ic total i ty,neither is the system through which i t is presented.The essentially negative determination of the absolute means that i t s systematic apprehension is neverending; i t involves the continual re-cognition ofphenomenal knowledge or prevailing forms of experience (which may themselves be changing) as speculative experience [37].As I understand i t from Rose s exposition, phenomenal knowledge is re-cognised, specula tiv ely, bythe observing (reading) consciousness of a phenomenology in the following way. The presentation of formsof natural consciousness (that is , of forms of consciousness natural to particular historical p e r i o ~as forms of phenomenal knowledge (that is , as part ofdeterminate cultural configurations), leads theobserving consciousness to see their series asnecessary, and to see them as determined. Theexperience this consciousness undergoes is speculative, i t is the experience of the transgression ofthe l imit between the posit ive and i t s condition[38], because the recognition of determination whichi t involves explodes the distinction between thef ini te and the infini te which grounds the purelycontemplative att i tude of ordinary thought, whichconceives of i t s objects as external to i t [39]. I tthus involves the concept of the absolute (as theunity of the conditions and the conditioned), inrelat ion to which the prevailing form of phenomenalknowledge is revealed to be inadequate to i t s object(which is now conceived in i t s unity with, ratherthan as external to, consciousness).So, speculative thought is the re-thinking ofphenomenal knowledge from the point of view of theabsolute, the re- thinking of phenomenal knowledge asinadequate knowledge of the absolute. As such i t isa form of thought which acknowledges a lack ofidentity between the subject and predicate of propositions which represent phenomenal knowledge.Propositions, ordinarily construed, are taken toposit a false identity between the concepts withwhich they operate and the objects these conceptsare used to represent, insofar as the logic ofpropositional grammar dictates that subject and predicate are conceived as independent prior to predicat ion, and ~ e l t e d by predication. From the perspective of the absolute, on the other hand, subject and


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predicate are determinations which acquire theirmeaning in a series of relations to each other [40],and which are consequently not independent of eachother, but in some way mutually constitutive. Thisleads to the idea of speculative (re)reading; thereading of propositions as speculative ident i t ies .In such speculative propositions ,The subject of the proposition is no longerfixed and abstract with external , contingentaccidents, but, init ially, an empty nameuncertain and problematic, gradually acquiringmeaning as the result of a series of contradictory experiences.[41 ]Rose s interpretation of Hegel s system i s thusthat i t is constituted by the phenomenological representation and speculative rereading of phenomenalknowledge and gives r ise to knowledge of theabsolute through the speculative experiences whichi t provokes. nd these experiences are cr i t ica l .For example in terms of moral and polit ical consciousness, i t s speculative apprehension involvesexperience of the fact that ethical l i fe Sit t l ich-keit, a term used by Hegel to designate the unity ofthe spheres of morality and legality, the practicalrealm) is misrepresented by the prevailing cultural

forms through which i t is experienced and reproduced..Although i t is an essentially negative mode ofcognition, which reveals the untruth of phenomenalknowledge in al l of i t s forms, speculative experienceis positive in three ways: (i) purely formally, insofar as i t involves determinate negation [42], ( i i) tothe extent that i t reveals the determination of themisapprehension which i t uncovers (as we shall see,this is problematic), and ( i i i ) insofar as the revelation of misapprehension contains, implicitly, thedemand for a change in that which determines thatmisapprehension. I will examine the second and thirdof these posit ive aspects of speculative experience,and the relation between them in a moment for thisis the issue on which the way in which Rose s form ofHegelianism can contribute to the development of acr i t ical Marxism rests . But f irst , I will quicklycomplete my account of Rose s posit ion.To sum up: according to Rose the Phenomenology oSpirit, and any phenomenology for that matter,. . . is not a teleological development towardsthe reconciliation of al l oppositions betweenconsciousness and i t s objects, to the abolitionof natural consciousness as such, but a speculative presentation of the deformations ofnatural consciousness;[43]

[ i t is] not the experience of consciousnessrecapturing i t s alienated existence, but thepresentation of the formation of consciousnessas a determination of substance, and (or ratherthrough consciousness misapprehension ofthat determination;[44 ]. . . not a success, but a gamble. For theperpetual occurrence of inversion and mis. representation can only be undermined, orbrought into f luidi ty , by allusion to thelaw of their determination . . .[45 ]This open-ended interpretation of Hegelian phenomenology and i t s culmination in speculative experience of the absolute, which Rose develops primarilythrough an examination of Hegel s Jena works, layingparticular emphasis on the System o Ethical Life of1802 as the f i rs t phenomenology [46], is used toproduce cr i t ical reading of most of Hegel s matureworks.The Philosophy o Right and the Logic are read asphenomenologies, as representative of the standpointof consciousness . (Accordingly, one might say that

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the Logic ends the Phenomenology rather than thatthe Phenomenology introduces the Logic. Whereas theformer is a phenomenology of natural consciousness,the la t ter is taken to be a phenomenology of abstract,philosophical consciousness - a form of consciousnessderived, histor ical ly, in the Phenomenology. TheAesthetics is read as a philosophy , as representative of the standpoint of the absolute, of thecollect ivi ty. This is possible because the phenomenon i t presents - art - is taken by Hegel to behistor ical ly transcended, to be no longer a formative, educative, polit ical experience [47]. Thelectures on the philosophies of religion and historyare read as methodologically mixed texts:In both lecture series there is no sustainedphenomenology. Instead the standpoint of theabsolute is abstractly and repeatedly statedand contrasted with the standpoint of religiousrelation, difference, representation or consciousness. The two texts reveal the aporia of subjectivi ty: the subjective standpoint i s cri t icisedby means of the exposition of i t s fonnation;but the absolute is thought as subject.[48 ]Significantly, there is no discussion of theEncyclopaedia.

I t is a feature of Rose s interpretation thatHegel s phenomenologies are taken to involve speculative rereadings of the propositions of phenomenalknowledge. Paradigmatically, these are the propositions of Kant and Fichte s philosophy which is takenby Hegel to be the philosophical articulation of theprevailing forms of knowledge and experience, determined by the bourgeois property form. So speculativerereading is an Hegelian or philosophical equivalent to Marxian critique (in the sense of the critiqueof polit ical economy - we can see here how Rose sreading of Hegel reformulates the philosophical foundat ions of Critical Theory). I t is at once a demonstrat ion of the inadequacy of a p r t i c u l ~ theoreticalperspective to a particular object, and a cri t iqueof the form of social relations which correspond tothat perspective insofar as they determine i t . How-ever, as we noted at the star t of this essay, Rose sclaim for Hegelian phenomenology is much strongerthan this. I t is that i t is the only philosophicallyadequate form of theory capable of cr i t ica l ly conceptualising subjectivity and culture. I t is to thisclaim that I now want to turn.

Hegelian Phenomenology and Marxism The Critique o SocietyThere is an ambivalence in Rose s att i tude to Marxismand to the question of the relationship betweenHegelian phenomenology and ~ ~ 3 . r x i s m which ref lects acrucial and unresolved ambiguity in her conceptionof phenomenology. This ambiguity is the result of afailure to resolve the tension within her account ofHegel s thought between i t s philosophical and sociopolit ical aspects; the tension between i t s functionas critique of reason and i t s function as critique ofsociety. This, in turn, is a consequence of a failureto acknowledge the extremely limited sense in which aphenomenology can be socially cr i t ical , which is aneffect of over-estimating the cognitive value ofspeculative experience. Perhaps the strangest thingabout Hegel Contra Sociology is that while i t givesprobably the clearest account in English of theprecise character of Hegelian speculation i t fai ls tograsp the significance of the limitations i t soexpertly delineates. s I suggested earl ier , thisis because i t remains within the problematic ofmodern epistemology.The ambiguity in Rose s conception of phenomenology(essentially an ambiguity in her conception of thesense in which i t can lead to knowledge of the social


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determination of consciousness) is displayed in thestatement, that in phenomenologies,the i l lusions and experiences of moral andpoli t ical consciousness are presented in anorder designed to show how consciousness mayprogress through them to omprehension o f thedetermination o f ethical l i fe[49]On the basis of this claim i t is further claimed thatphenomenology is not only a presentation of poli t icalexperience , but i t se l f the definitive pol i t icalexperience [50]. Harxism seems, very definitely, tohave been replaced. But does speculative experienceof the absolute really involve comprehension of thedetermination of ethical l i fe? I think not. I tinvolves only comprehension (in the pol i t ical lycrucial form of experience , i t is true) of thefact that ethical l i fe is determined. And this is avery different thing. A theory of this determinationis s t i l l required. Only by exploiting this ambiguityin the phrase comprehension of the determination ofethical l i fe is Rose able to make such a strong casefor Hegel.This brings us back to the second and thirdposi t ive aspects of speculative experience notedabove, to the question of the relation between thekind of determination revealed in speculativee x p e ~ i e n c e and possibil i ty of real social change.For i t is Rose s belief that a phenomenological socialtheory ( the exposition of capitalism as culture ) isthe only way to link the analysis of the economy tocomprehension of the conditions for revolutionarypractice [51]. Such a theory is labeled cr i t icalMarxism because the analysis of the economyinvolved is to be Marx s. There are two problemshere: (i) the reduction of Harxism to the analysisof the economy , and (ii) the incorporation of anyform of analysis of theory within a phenomenologicalpresentation . I will argue that an examination ofthe nature of speculative experience and i t s theoretical conditions reveals a fundamental incompatibility(thoup,h not inconsistency) between e ~ e l i a n p p ~ ~ o -menology and Marxian critique. And that, consequently, phenomenology is incapaule of tulf i l l ing thetheoretical expectations which Rose has of i t . But,f irs t , le t us see how phenomenology is sociallycr i t ical , in i t s own r ight .Rose takes speculative experience to be cr i t ica lnot just epistemologically, in i t s independence frompresuppositions, but also, and consequently (and thisis the problem), pol i t ical ly , in i t s orientationtowards other philosophies and to society. I t iscr i t ical in this la t ter , dual, sense because i tinvolves the recognition of a form of mediationbetween consciousness and i t s objects which is notacknowledged ei ther by other philosophies, or by theexisting forms of law and property relations to whichthese philosophies correspond. This recognition istaken to subvert both the validi ty of these philosophies and the legitimacy of the forms of socialrelation which condition them and sustain theircredibility. Now as we noted above, such negativecri t icism has a positive function, and i t is herethat a new problem arises which demonstrates quiteclearly how l imited is a social critique grounded inepistemology.One of the posit ive functions of speculativeexperience isto make a different form of ethical l i fepossible by providing insight into the displacement of actuality in those dominantphilosophies which are assimilated to andreinforce bourgeois law and property relations.[52]The problem is : (i) that this insight can contr ibuteto the development of a new form of ethical l i fe onlyin a minimal sense, and ( i i ) that merely to conceive

of the possibil i ty of a new form of ethical l i fe is ,on Hegel s terms, epistemologically unjustifiable.The contradiction within Hegel s project registeredhere takes us to the heart of Rose s understanding,and defence, of Hegel s concept of speculation.The reason i t is unjustifiable even to conceive ofan alternative form of ethical l i fe is that to remaincr i t ical epistemologically, consciousness must positno form of relation between i t se l f and i t s objectswhich does not arise natural ly out of i t s selfreflection upon the objects present to i t in phenomenal knowledge. And, as we noted above [53], Rose smater ia l is t appropriation of Hegel denies that thedialectic of consciousness is spontaneously selfgenerating, understanding i t instead as the sourceof speculative experience. (Despite her descriptionof Hegelian philosophy as the definitive pol i t icalexperience , in fact in contradiction to i t , Roseacknowledges the poli t ical impotence of philosophywhen she says that the possibil i ty of becomingethical depends on neither the recognition of determination, nor on any moral decision, but on a t ransformation of intuit ion [54]. The determination ofwhich is , of course, by definition, beyond theindividual consciousness.) So absolute ethicall i fe (the social ideal) is an unstatable alternative [55]. What is more, even in this empty, abstractform i t is unjustifiable.Simply by virtue of being an alternative, Roseargues, however unspecif iable, the concept of theabsolute contains an abstract imperative , a momentof Sollen ( ought ) [56], despite i t se l f , despite i t spurely negative derivation. For once i t has beenderived i t cannot but present i t se l f to consciousnessas an alternative. Ironically, i t is precisely theneed to avoid the abstractness of a posit ivealternative (one which is posited by consciousness,and unrelated to the exist ing sta te of things) whichleads Hegel to defend an unspecifiable alternative,that is ultimately equally abstract insofar as i ttoo presents i t se l f to consciousness as an oughtdespite i t s phenomenological derivation.But rather than rejecting the standpoint of consciousness as a starting point because of this contradiction, Rose acknowledges i t and accommodates i twithin her exposition. I t is here that the originali ty of her interpretation l ies . Rejecting bothr ight- and left-wing Hegelianism as attempts toresolve the contradiction by unjustifiably adoptingone of i t s sides and neglecting the other, sheembraces the contradiction as definitively characteri s t ic of Hegel s thought, calling i t the paradox ofHegel s philosophy of philosophy [57], and taking i tto show that an element of Sollen of ought , ofepistemologically unjustifiable striving for analternative sta te of affairs , must be present inphilosophy, and that this is quite consistent withHegel s critique of Kant. This element of Sollenis taken to appear as a subjective l imitat ion onspeculative experience.The argument is that once i t has been acknowledgedthat the ? ~ s o l u t e cannot be thought (c8Dnot becomepresent to consciousness through i t s objects [58]while the dichotomies which i t s concept transcendsremain a feature of the world which our consciousnessesinhabit , we can think the absolute by acknowledgingthe element of Sollen in such a thinking [60],speculatively. This restatement of the idea ofspeculative experience from the point of view of i t spractical aspect reveals the unity of theoretical

and pract ical reason in the unity of the epistemological and practical limitations from which speculative experience suffers. Such experience is presumably only subjectively limited in the sense that i t sobjectively determined limitations appear as l imitat ions o f the subject.So, thinking the absolute speculatively is some-13


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thing of a Pyrrhic victory, both sociologically andpractically. For while the acknowledgment and explanation of an unjustifiable element of Bollen inspeculative experience reasserts i t s theoreticalconsistency, i t also serves to emphasise both i t stheoretical and practical impotence [60]. This isparticularly clear from a comparison of Rose'sdescription of Hegel's idea of the vocation ofphilosophy with her understanding of his philosophy.Philosophy, we are told, has the vocation ' topresent a notion of law to our abstract consciousnesswhich will re-form ethical l i fe without being reformed by i t [61]. I t 'urges us to transformethical l i fe by re-cognising the law of i t s determinat ion ' [62]. This re-cognition, i t is argued,commends a different way of transforming [ i t ] [63]from that of the arbi t rary and tyrannical impositionof a new form without regard to determinations of theexist ing form - a mode of transformation paradigmatically represented by the Terror of the French Revolut ion, and taken to be theoretically articulated inthe categorical imperatives of Kant's and Fichte'spractical philosophies. But philosophy cannotspecify concretely what this new mode of transformat ion is . And so, I would argue, i t cannot bringabout such a transformation. A notion of law'will not transform anything.Rose describes Hegel's new mode of transformationas ' transforming the specific determination in relat ion to the total i ty of i t s real possibi l i t ies [64].No further specification is possible, because of thelaw of the determination of ethical l i f e whose formalrecognition is seen to lead to recognition of thenecessity of such transformation, the specific formof which would determine the mode of transformation,is , by definition, unknowable in any ordinary senseof the word 'know'. I t can only be known as thenegation of al l forms of determination which presuppose the independence of condition from conditioned. Hegel thus commends an 'unstatable' al ter-native, and 'urges' us to seek i t through the transformation of determinations which are 'unspecifiable 'This is where Marxism comes in.The attempted incorporation of Marxist theorywithin Hegelian phenomenology which Rose undertakesis necessitated by the fact that, despite indicationsto the contrary, Hegelian phenomenology i s incapableof generating knowledge of the concrete determinationswhich give r ise to the correlat ion between forms ofconsciousness and forms of social relations which i tpresents, and by the fact that such knowledge isnecessary I f speculative experience of the deformations of natural consciousness is to lead to atransformative practice based on (rather than simplyagainst) objective social determinations. But thereis a fundamental contradiction here. For the absencefrom Hegelian phenomenology of a theory of objectivesocial determination is no accident. I t is a consequence of a particular epistemological argument, theone from which the phenomenological form is i t se l fderived.This argument maintains that to avoid the ambigui ty , and practical impotence, of quasi-transcendentally established, Kantian, metacri t ical theories ofthe social determination of consciousness, the standpoint of consciousness must be cri t icised immanently.In a phenomenology, the critique of the standpoint ofconsciousness is achieved, exclusively, through i t sadoption; through i t s 'presentation' in a formdesigned to reveal i t s limitation. Such an adoptionof the standpoint of consciousness is theoreticallyincompatible with any social theory. I t involves thepresentation of social forms (forms of social relation) in a form designated to provoke the readingconsciousness into experiencing their determinationof the forms of consciousness to which they correspond and along with which they have been 'presented'.14

I t does not involve a social theory. 'Theory' isprecisely what i t rejects.Rose's ambivalence towards Marxism centres on thisproblem of the status of theory, and of the theoretical status of Marxism. I t is the result of herstrident crit ique of the philosophical foundations ofMarxism, as they are presented in Marx's early writings. Her argument is that because of the inadequacyof his conceptualisation of the theory-practicerelation, Marx 'misunderstood the relation betweenhis own (later) discourse and the possibil i ty of atransformed poli t ics [65]; that he misunderstood themeaning of his own discourse. She does not object tothe analysis in Capital, but to 'any presentation ofthat analysis as a comprehensive account of capital-ism, . . . any pre-judged, imposed "real isat ion" ofthat theory, any using i t as a t h o r y ~ as Marxism[66] .Now i t seems to me that what we have here is astraightforward confusion, and false identification,of the realms of theory and practice, in the idea of' theory' which is presented. The idea of Marxism inthe above quotation quite unjustifiably, and almostincomprehensibly, identifies the theorisat ion of anobject, as opposed to i t s 'presentation', with the'pre-judged, imposed realisa t ion ' of some theory ofhow that object ought to be. No allowance is madefor mediations between social theory and pol i t ics .And i t is assumed that the theoretical structure ofCapital is such that i t takes social real i ty to be an'object ' and ignores the subjective aspect of i t sreproduction.Rose's problem is that she has no other conceptionof theory. Marx is placed within the Kantian problemat ic on the basis of a cursory reading of a few earlytexts, in which his philosophical posit ion is neitherfully developed nor discussed at any length [67].But this negligent treatment of Harx (compare i t tothe care lavished on the details of Hegel's mostobscure works ) is not contingent. For "Rose's maintenance of the subject-object problematic of modernepistemology, while i t allows her to conceptualisethe mediation of the objective within the subjective(phenomenologically), rules out the possibili ty of atheoretical mode in which the subjective is mediatedwithin the objective, and this is the only possibleform of a materialist theory of subjectivity, cultureand pol i t ics , which aims to go beyond the mere recognition of the 'deformation' of exist ing forms ofphenomenal knowledge to theorise their real determinat ions and possible modes of transformation. TheHegelian approach which Rose adopts excludes thepossibil i ty of an understanding of Marx.

Conclusion The End o Philosophy?If Capital is not 'a comprehensive account of capitalism', or at least the beginnings of, and basis for,such an account, what is i t? And how can i t be ofuse to a theory which aims to present the contradictions between capital and culture, to expose capitalism as a culture? I do not think that there areanswers to these questions which do not involve theabuse of basic hermeneutic standards in the readingof Capital. But where does this leave Hegel andHegelian phenomenology?The short answer to this question is outsideMarxism . Rose s c r i ica l Marxism is incoherent.But her idea of Hegelian phenomenology is not. I t ismerely limited. I t represents the end-point of mod-ern philosophy; a point at which the self-cr i t ique ofepistemology has reached i t s l imit, and from which i tcan progress no further, condemned to eternal repetition, the never-ending production of a speculativeexperience of society which remains trapped withinthe confines of the perspective i t knows to be false


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[68]. For through her cri t ical reading of Hegel,has arrived at just that point at which Adorno,path was more tortuous, came to rest : recogniof the fact that the essential negativity of theof consciousness means that i t can have noplace, can secure no t rue knowledge [69].

ootnotesAn earl i e r version of th i s essay was read to the Philosophy Society atCambridgeshire College of Arts and Technology in February 1982. I would 1 iketo thank those present on that occasion, and Chris Arthur, for the i r commentson the draft .

The strangeness of th is phrase when taken outside of i t s s t r ic t ly pedagogicalcontext is particularly appropriate here, since i t locates Rose's projectmost precisely while at the same time questioning i t s coherence. (For whilehis tor ical materialis ts may be friends of the dialectic - practi t ioners ,hopefully - are they f r iends of the ideal ist dialect ic?) The phrase a tonce asser ts and subverts the idea of materialisJ11 . . I t raises the problemof subject ivi ty. By reconstructing the idea l i s t dialectic as a dialectico f consciousness in the in terests of materialism, Rose too raises theproblem of sUbjectivity. However, as I hope to show below, by acceptingthe construction of such a dialectic exclusively f rom the standpoint o fconsciousness, despite the fac t that material determinations are acknowledged, the phenomenological dialectic which Rose sanctions is incapable ofsol ving th is problem which t so acutely poses.O ne of the implications which can be drawn from such an understanding ofRose's text is that while the phrase materialis t friends of the idea l i s td ia lec t ic registers a central philosophical problem of mater ial ism - theproblem of subject ivi ty - i t does so in terms of categories which give r iseto i t , but through which i t cannot be solved. In th i s sense, Joe HcCarneyis r ight to use the phrase to define a particular theoret ical task, butwrong to suggest that i t can be used to define a problematic. The construct ion of a problematic within which the problem of which i t is an index canbe coherently posed is the task I would therefore suggest that RP becomes,not the house ;ournal of "the mater ial is t friends of the idea l i s t dialect ic" ,but the house j ~ u r n a l of those concerned to deconstruct and then reconstructthe enigma of which that phrase is the mark. (Cf. J. HcCarney' s correspondence, RP30, pp. 51-52.)HCS, p. l .HCS, p.220.HCS, p.2l4-220.Cf. Habermas, J . , Knowledge and Human In terests 2nd edi t ion, H. E. B., London,1978, Part One, 'The Cris is of the Critique of Knowledge', pp.1-63.Habermas, J . , op.c i t . p.vi i .Rose does not discuss Kortian' s book, though she does refer to i t in a footnote as 'an excellent discussion of Habermas' HCS, f t .18l to ch.l , p.228).Elsewhere, i t has been described as ' too s t a t i c and one-sided' because ofi t s attempt to ' thoroughly Hegelianise Habermas' (Kellner, D. and Roderick,R., 'Recent Literature on Critical Theory' , pp.14l-l70, New German Cri t ique23, p.165). But i t is for just th is reason that i t is useful here. Ithighlights the originali ty of Rose's reading of Hegel and demonstrates i t seffect on the philosophical foundations of Critical Theory.8 Kortian, G., Metacrit ique, Cambridge University Press, 1980, p.29.

9 ib id . p.32.10 Cf. HCS, Chapter 1, pp.1-47.11 Cf. Horkheimer, M., 'Trad i t ional and Critical Theory' , pp.188-243, Cr i t i ca lTheory: Selected Essays, t rans . ~ I J O'Connel, New York, 1972.12 Kortian, G., op.c i t . pp.29-30.

13 'Metacrit ique is t rue crit ique, or rather , t is what crit ique becomeswhen i t is made radical - Kortian, G., op.c i t . p.29.14 HCS, p.14.15 HCS, p.185.16 Kortian, G., op.c i t . p.30.17 Hegel, G.W.F., Phenomenology o f Spi r i t t rans . A.V. Hiller , Oxford, 1979,p.47. .18 Kortian expresses th is d is t inction very clearly when he says: I t is pre

cisely by vir tue of what is ar t iculated through speculative experience thatthe discourse of the speculative proposition is to be distinguished fromtheoret ical enterpr ises which are content to bring together differentpos i t ive f ie lds, and to pass from one to another by a transference meta-phopa) which produces a synthesis in the metaphor and not in the concept. 'Kortian, G., op.c i t . p.28.

9 HCS, pp.27-33.2 HCS, p.37.21 Hegel, G.W.F., op.c i t . p.47.22 HCS, p.44.23 HCS, p.42.24 HCS, p. 42 .25 HCS, p.4726 For an account of the expositional, rather than s t r ic t ly deductive, struct-ure of transcendental arguments, cf. S. Kl:frner, On the Impossibili ty ofTranscendental Deductions ' , Monist 51, 1967.27 HCS, pp.45-46.28 HCS, p.46.29 Hegel, G.W.F., op.c i t . p.52.30 Hegel, G.W.F., op.c i t . p.54.31 HCS, p.46.32 HCS, p.158.33 RCS, p.181.34 RCS, p.153.35 HCS, p.181.36 HCS, p.182.37 'Absolute knowledge is a path which must be continually t raversed , HCS,p.182.38 The phrase is Kort ian ' s . Kortian, G., op.c i t . p.28.39 Rose's claim is that to see the determination in the act is to see beyondthe dichotomy between act and non-act ' . HCS, p.205. The claim is crucial ,for i t i s the experience of 'seeing the determination in the act , which i t

is claimed that only a phenomenology can give r i se to, that is the basis ofRose's idea of po l i t i ca l (educative) experience, which in turn is the basisof her crit ique of Marxism.

But while the re i terat ion of such a posit ion may clearour philosophical consciences, and represents a timelyreminder of the fal lacy of epistemological absolutism,i t remains impotent in the face of contemporaryr0ali ty.

40 HCS p.49.41 HCS, p.49. This 'Hegelian' semantics hardly seems as original as Roseappears to suggest. By referr ing to the 'purely formal' posi t ive aspect

of determinate negation, I mean that i t is posi t ive insofar as i t offersthe l imited t ru th about an object , that i t is not some particular thing.I do not mean to imply that I agree with Hegel that a new form immediatelyarises, i . e . that the dialectic of consciousness is spontaneously self-generating (cf. Hegel, G.W.F., op.c i t . p.5l) . Nor is Rose committed toth i s posi t ion. By construing spi r i t as a structure of recognition'rather than a metaphysical enti ty , she is absolved from the s in of makingthe Idea the subject of his tory. However, as we shall see, th is underminesher claim for the po l i t i ca l sign i ficance of phenomenology.

42 By referr ing to the 'purely formal' posi t ive aspect of determinatenegation, I mean that i t is posi t ive insofar as i t offers the l imitedt ru th about an object , that i t is not some particular thing. I donot mean to imply that I agree with Hegel that a new form immediately

43 HCS, p.150.44 HCS, p.152, parthenthese added.45 HCS, p.159, f i r s t emphasis added.46 HCS, pp.59-73.47 HCS, p. 121.48 HCS, p. l06. It is not clear to me how Rose can account for those texts

which ' think the absolute as subj ect or 'adopt the standpoint of theco l lec t iv i ty since they t ransgress the c r i t i c a l rule of relentlessnegativi y . It is for this reason that i t only seems possible to understand her reading of Hegel as r evi s ioni s t , for i t seems to inval idate anumber of his mature texts . Not that th is is a bad thing, of course; toattempt to render al l of Hegel ' s texts consis ten t with each other, and todefend them, would be a bizarrely ahistorical , and fut i le , enterpr ise.

49 HCS, p.50, emphasis added.5 He S, p.209.51 HCS, p.220.52 HCS, p. 208. Indeed, Rose describes th i s as the overal l intent ion of

Hegel s thought ' .53 See note 42 above.54 HCS, p.65.55 HCS, p.202.56 HCS, p.78, parentheses added.57 RCS, p.78. .58 While the absolute cannot ever be an object of consciousness, i t i ssuggested that i t could be 'known', naturally in a society tha t wassocial ly transparent insofar as each 'obj ect of consciousness, each

piece of phenomenal knowledge, would contain and display i t s mediationof every other aspect of phenomenal knowledge, thereby giving the absolutein full , in a cer tain sense. This is the (purely formal) idea of absoluteethical l i fe.59 HCS, p.204.60 The, at least formal, theoret ical consistency of Rose's posi t ion has notbeen grasped by other reviewers, who have accused her of fall ing back upona left-Hegelian reading, and have then noted the inconsistency between sucha posi t ion and other claims made for her reading. Such readings of Rose'stext fa i l to get to grips with i t s central point, because they underestimate i t s subt lety. Berki, for example, thinking that he i s arguingagainst Rose, concludes his review with the statement that Hegel 'emanatesonly "res t lessness" but no d i rec t ion , inferring from this , 'he i s not"contra sociology"' . But the whole point of Rose's reading is to showthe compatibil i ty of Hegel' s restlessness with his cont rariness tosociology, and thereby to specify ppecisely the way in which Hegel' s thought

is rest less . Berki ignores rather than refutes Rose.This kind of misunderstanding is compounded by Rose's use of theexpression ' speculat ive thought ' , and her, at t imes unqualified, ins is tencethat such ' thought ' is thought o f the absolute. I t i s most clear ly revealedin the 'Yes, I d id , 'No, you didn t character of the exchange between Roseand Hawthorn on the question of whether Rose actual ly shows the absolute tobe thinkable. As I argue here, Rose seems not to ful ly grasp the signif ic-ance of her own posi t ion. (Cf. Berki, R.N., 'Thinking the Absolute' , TLS,23/10/81, p.1242; Hawthorn, G., London Review o f Books, Vo1.3, No.21, andthe exchange of le t ters between Rose and Hawthorn, LRB, Vo1.3, No.24.

61 HCS, p.184.62 HCS, p.187.63 HCS, p. 201, parentheses added.64 HCS, p.191.65 HCS, p.2l9.66 HCS, p.2l9.67 The section on ~ l a r x 'The Culture and Fate of Harxism', is only six pagesin length. Apart from a reference to the GpundPisse to support the misleading claim that 'Marx saw the appeal of a r t as eternal and ah is to r ica lHCS, p.2l6) , the la tes t text referred to is the 'Theses on Feuerbach' ,

which is t reated, quite unjus t i f iably, as i f i t were a def ini t ive statementof Marx' s philosophical posi t ion. In general, the issue of the 'phi losophical ' status of Marxism is t reated as i f i t were quite unproblematic.(For a detai led, and br i l l iant , reading of Marx' s texts up to 1848, whichaddresses the dual question of the meaning of philosophy for Marxism, andi t s fate within Marxism, see Labica, G., M=xism and the Status o fPhi losophy, Harvester Press, 1980, t rans . Soper, K. and Ryle, M.. Labica'sins is tence on peading Marx, in the fu l le s t sense of that term, produces anaccount of his ear ly writings which emphasises the fact , and complexity, ofthe conceptual development they embody. Rose, on the other hand, botht r ea t s these texts as homogeneous, and considers that they represent thephilosophical framework in relation to which the la ter , 'economic' worksacquire their meaning.)68 Cf. HCS, p.182: 'Absolute knowledge is a path which must be continuallytraversed.69 Cf. Adorno, T., Negative Dia lect ics Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973, t rans.E. B. Ashton. Rose's own account of Adorno' s thought The MeZancholyScience, Macmillan, 1978) provides an interes t ing point for a comparisonof Adorno with Rose's Hegel.

15

osborne, review of rose hegel contra sociology

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