On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem by Paul J. GriffithsReview by: Charles S. PrebishJournal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 108, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1988), pp. 178-179Published by: American Oriental SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/603282 .

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178 Journal of the American Oriental Society 108.1 (1988)

to Jacques May's remarks in Hobogirin, s.v. Chiigan or to my Nagarjuniana (Copenhagen 1982), p. 21, n. 67, calling attention to the available evidence so as to convince him of the opposite. Also his claim that MK is nothing but a grand commentary to the Buddha's "Discourse to Katyayana" is almost too much to warrant a serious reply. No doubt this text is an important one for Nagarjuna-we all know that- but there are dozens of other old sitras of equal importance to him (see, my Nagarjuniana, passim). To reduce MK to a commentary on just one sitra is a neat case of the kind of ekdntavdda that Nagarjuna takes great pains to reject in MK, though, obviously, not alxw ays with success.

Prof. Kalupahana has a chapter on the "Structure of the MK" (pp. 26-31) as well as an "Analysis of the MK" (pp. 31-80). These could have been very valuable, but again the author's lack of philological training renders them almost valueless.

The previous attempts of Inada, Streng and Sprung to render Nagarjuna's MK into English were, to say the least, not successful and though I am only too happy to say that Prof. Kalupahana's translations are seldom as bad as any of theirs, it is still bad-real bad. The most positive feature of Prof. Kalupahana's book on Nagdrjuna is, I think, his endeavor to trace "the source material and the arguments utilized in his refutation back to early discourses of the Buddha." Though Prof. Kalupahana has only been partially successful in this regard (and hardly offers anything more than La Vallee Poussin already did in the notes to his edition of MK), it is nevertheless a sound and good old meth- odological principle with which no one dare disagree.

CHR. LINDTNER UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN

On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-

Body Problem. By PAUL J. GRIFFITHS. Pp. 220. LaSalle,

Illinois: OPEN COURT. 1986. Cloth, $24.95.

Those potential readers who might be attracted to Paul

Griffiths' recent volume on the basis of its rather curious title

had best beware, for this book deals not so much with

meditation as it does with "the philosophical implications of

meditative practice" (p. xiii). This by no means suggests that

the book is not worth owning. Quite the contrary is true.

Griffiths' work is extraordinarily well organized, clear in its

objectives, cogent and insightful in its presentation, and

valuable as a research tool. In trying to bridge the gap between philosophical theory

and soteriological practice in the Indian Buddhist tradition,

Griffiths addresses the rather specific case of nirodhasamd- patti, here translated as the "attainment of cessation." The author tells us that he has aimed his volume at three groups of scholars (who perhaps do not communicate together as often as he might hope): (1) philosophers exploring the same problem in Western traditions, (2) scholars in the history of religions, and (3) Buddhologists. No doubt he is successful in the latter case. The book is profoundly useful for those possessing appropriate philological-textual, historical, and doctrinal skills. Nonetheless, the work is far less useful for the former two groups who, despite the author's hopes, are simply not likely to fathom the inordinate amount of tech- nical knowledge that is presupposed.

The book is organized around three major chapters. The first focuses on the attainment of cessation in the Theravada tradition. The author draws not only from the Nikdyas and Visuddhimagga, as expected, but also from Dhammapala's important Paramatthamanijiusd ("Casket of the Supreme Meaning"). Griffiths is right not only when he points out "that the attainment of cessation was not an issue of major significance for the scholastic thinkers of the Theravada tradition," but also when he remarks that "the study of this particular piece of Buddhist psychotropic marginalia sheds light on some key points in the conceptual system of Bud- dhism as a whole" (p. 4). He devotes major sections of this chapter to the nature of nirodhasamdpatti, methods of reach- ing it, evaluations of it within the tradition, and debates on how practitioners emerge from it.

The second chapter centers on the Vaibhasika tradition. Initially, some historical matters are considered as well as identification of key textual sources: the Mahdvibhdsd, Abhidharmakosa, Abhidharmdmrta, Abhidharmahrdaya, and Abhidharmadipa. A lengthy discussion of the signifi- cance of the Abhidharmakosa (referred to as the "Treasury of Metaphysics") is offered, followed by a consideration of the attainment of cessation in this text and its commentaries. He compares the Vaibhasika and Sautrantika positions, followed by a description of the debate between Vasumitra and Ghosaka, concluding with a critique of the various

positions. The third major chapter considers the Yogacara tradition.

Again, an initial section outlines the Yogacdra historical tradition and its chief texts: the Samdhinirmocana-sitra, Yogdcdrabhiimi, Mahdydnasamgraha, Abhidharmasamuc- caya, Vimsatikd, Trimsikd, and so forth. Sections on Yoga- cara ontology, functioning of mind, the dlayavzjijdna, and several other related topics follow, concluding with a critique of the Yogacara position. A rather short fourth chapter (seven pages) attempts to draw the prior three chapters together. Following the basic text (pp. 1-1 13), we are offered a short Glossary, summary of abbreviations, and a series of three technical Appendices. The volume is concluded by a

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Reviews of Books 179

lengthy section of notes (pp. 139-83), and a rather extensive, useful bibliography.

Griffiths has three stated goals in mind for his book. In the first place, he hopes "to shed some light on the history of Buddhist views about a specific altered state of consciousness and its relationship to specified soteriological goals" (p. xvi). At least with regard to the three traditions considered, he is enormously successful here. Secondly, he wants to examine, in early Indian Buddhism, the way in which the relationship between the physical and mental was considered, as pre- sented in philosophical discussions about nirodhasamdpatti. Here too, he must receive high marks, not only for his text, but also for his extensive notes which often times are per- haps of more value than the text itself. Finally, he hopes to "ask and attempt to answer some questions about the ade- quacy of the Buddhist view of the causal relations between the mental and the physical" (p. xvii). It is here that I am not convinced that he is quite so satisfactory. He warns us early (p. 4) of his disdain for those who think that the only proper way to study Buddhism is to examine the practices of living Buddhists, and his note here mentions Steven Beyer's intro- ductory quote in The Cult of Tara: Magic and Ritual in Tibet. Griffiths treats all three traditions in question from what he calls the "perspective of the history of ideas" (p. 5). In so doing, he misses the mark by at least as much as Beyer. Of course Griffiths' thoroughgoing stance in the Abhidhar- mika tradition does not detract from the value of his fine scholarship. It merely points the way for a future, more complete approach.

CHARLES S. PREBISH

PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY

Early Buddhist Philosophy in the Light of the Four Noble Truths. By ALFONSO VERDU. Pp. 241, with Sanskrit-En- glish Glossary and Index. Delhi: MOTILAL BANARSIDASS. 1985. Rs. 120.00.

The abhidharma exegeses of basic buddhist concepts are organized under the headings of the four noble truths (suffer- ing, its origin, its cessation, and the path to that cessation). The AbhidharmakoSa of Vasubandhu is Verdu's primary source, but the Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa is also uti- lized, especially in the discussion of meditation (under Path). To designate the four truths as "the original Buddhist mani- festo," and to claim that all major doctrines of the later schools derive from them, is to overstate the case. The cost of this generalist frame is a "totalism" that is ill substan- tiated. Relying upon T'ien-tai and Hua-yen for evidence, it ignores the more sophisticated developments of Indo-Tibetan

Buddhism after Asanga. And those two Chinese schools have unacknowledged non-buddhist antecedents.

Within this staged setting, the volume is a masterful exposition of highly technical materials. Part One elucidates suffering and life in general; it includes explanations of the "three marks," dharma theory, the skandhas, and the planes of existence. Part Two elucidates the classical theory of karma, the cause of renewed existence; here the explanation of dependent origination may be the best available. Part Three covers cessation, including the three "non-conditioned" dharmas, and the path to nirvdna.

Parallels are drawn with Heidegger (on suffering), Hume (on non-self), and other Western thinkers. Sanskrit technical terms are elucidated by their analogues. For example:

In its original etymology the term vi-jfidna is espe- cially significant. The prefix vi- plays the role of the Latin dis-, the German ent-, or the Greek dia-, such as in the verb dis-cernere, or in such Lain rooted English nouns as dis-tinction, dis-cernment, etc. As the prefix dis- entails some sort of separation (whether this be real or purely notional), the prefix vi- in the term vi- jnidna seems to connote the distinct sense of subjective awareness that accompanies and thus dis-tinguishes itself from every objectively appearing object of con- sciousness ... Thus vi-j]Mna is the dharma of pure discriminative awareness whereby the empirical sub- ject not only discerns objects from objects, but dis- cerns any given objects from itself. The notion of vi-jtdna thus comes closest to what Husserl called "pure subjectivity." (50)

There are minor slips. Anusaya is defined as passion, paryavasthdna as tendency; whereas the former represents karma as latent, the latter as manifest. The three "synonyms" of mind (citta, manas, vijfidna) would be better designated as three functions of the same dharma. Does andtman, in the abhidharma, apply only to the notion of "absolute and permanent ego"?

There is little reference to other scholarship, for example explications by Lamotte and others of karma, or Warder of the chain of dependent origination in early stitras. The author assumes that the theory of skandhas precedes that of dependent origination in time; but the two systems merely answer different questions: "What is the nature of the indi- vidual?" and "What is the process of rebirth?"

The chain of dependent origination is convincingly shown to derive from karmic process. An especially felicitous de- scription of the twelve links likens them to the hours of a clock.

In general, the book is most strong in explaining the process of karma. Verdu uses the adjective "genetic" to

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