offshore pipeline failures
TRANSCRIPT
AD-A259 708
Submitted in Partial Satisfaction of the Requirements forthe Degree of Master of Engineering
Offshore Pipeline Failures
by
Ross D. Woodson
December 1, 1990 D T I
IJ.'
Professor R. G. Bea, Advisor
Department of Civil EngineeringUniversity of California
Berkeley, California
90 0593-0050993 1 07 05 9 illlllilUQ !
An overview of current concerns in the regulation of offshore pipelines is presented along with
tabulated summaries of pipeline failure causes, failure prevention techniques, and pipeline
monitoring and early intervention techniques. A database of over 1000 offshore pipeline
failures in the Gulf of Mexico Offshore waters has been compiled from combined records of
the Department of Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety, U.S. Coast Guard National
Response Center, and the Department of Interior Minerals Management Service. The data has
been analyzed to identify trends and initial recommendations for future data collection have
been suggested.
Aooesslon For
XTIS QRA&IDTIC TAB 0tiarzoiced 0Just Livt J a on,,
Avrilabibl.t Codes
fl~iv. lI&*
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This study was performed at the request of the Marine Board, National Academy ofEngineering, National Research Council. This report is intended to outline preliminaryinformation for a study to be performed by the Marine Board Committee on Marine PipelineSafety. The Marine Board Representative was Mr. Donald W. Perkins. All work wasconducted under the direction of Professor Robert G. Bea, Department of Civil Engineering,University of California Berkeley. The opinions expressed in the report are those of the authorand do not necessarily represent the opinions of the National Research Council.
Study information was provided by the following individuals and organizations:
Professor R.G. Bea, U. C. BerkeleyMr. Ceasar DeLeon, DOT Office of Pipeline SafetyPete Johnson, California State Lands CommissionCharles Smith, DOI Minerals Management Service (Herdon, VA)Alex Alvarado, DOI Minerals Management Service (Metairie, LA)U. S. Coast Guard, National Response CenterMr. Charles Batten, National Transportation Safety BoardAssosciation of Oil Pipelines, Washington, D.C.
Particular appreciation is due my wife, Virginia, who assisted with data input to the computerand provided her loving support to me during the research and preparation of this report.
ii
The objectives of this research were to:
1. Characterize current concerns about pipeline structural integrity assessment and regulation.
2. Introduce a matrix summarizing pipeline failure mechanisms, the controlling factors foreach mechanism, methods used to prevent damage,'-and methods used to mitigate damage orprovide early detection/intervention.
3. Introduce an outline of current internal inspection technologies, pipeline surveyingtechnologies, and pipeline monitoring systems.
4. Develop a first generation "user-friendly" public database on personal computer software ofmarine pipeline failures in the Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental Shelf Area compiled fromcombined data from the Department of Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety, the U. S.Coast Guard National Response Center, and the Department of Interior Minerals ManagementService.
5. Provide an informal, qualitative review of the information on pipeline failures available
from the regulating authorities.
6. Provide recommendations for future data collection and organization.
7. Present some initial summaries of trends in pipeline failures versus year of failure, month offailure, nominal diameter of pipeline, age, and burial status.
I.
11, QMR CONCERN REGARDING O]•nMRE PIEPELIME REGULATION
The present (1991) concerns regarding regulation of offshore pipeline structural integrity are asfollows:
1. A substantial percentage of the OCS pipeline infrastructure is approaching or operatingbeyond its design life.
2. Pipeline companies are under high pressure to keep pipelines in service because of high-costs of replacement and, in some cases, because of difficulties with the permitting ofreplacements.
3. The current system of pipeline regulation is not very well coordinated in terms of outliningthe specific responsibilities, jurisdictions, and functions of the different agencies. Themaintenance of records on existing pipelines is especially in need of improvement.
4. Because of multiple jurisdiction and because trunk lines are often usea by multipleoperators, it is sometimes difficult to determine who is using a particular pipeline and who hasjurisdictional authority.
5. Existing federal safety regulations for gas and liquids transmission pipelines requirehydrostatic testing of pipeline segments before initial operation and after relocation, however,pipeline operators are not required to retest pipelines after they are in operation.(U.S. DOT1983 Sections 192.503 and 195.302) Legislation has been proposed in Congress to mandate theuse of internal inspection devices (intelligent pigs) but currently federal regulations are silenton this issue.
6. After several recent fatal accidents in which fishing vessels have struck exposed pipelines,Public Law 101-599 (commonly referred to as HR 4888) was passed in November of 1990.This law requires pipeline operators in the Gulf of Mexico to inspect all pipelines betweenMean High Water and 15 feet below Mean Low Water to determine if they are exposed and ifthey pose a hazard to navigation.
2
IM. TABULATED SUiMMARY OF OFFSHORE PH)ELMI FAnMURF, MECHANISMS AN51TRATGIE FOR THEIR, PREVENTIO
The following matrix of offshore pipeline failure mechanisms provides an overview of all the
different factors which can lead to the failure of an offshore pipeline. This matrix was
developed with the intent of providing an efficient introduction to offshore pipeline failure
mechanisms for those who are not currently familiar with this subject and to provide a
convenient organization of data for those who are already familiar with this subject and wish to
expand upon the chart for their own use. The matrix lists the following information for each
failure mechanism:
FAILURE MECHANISM/ PROCESS: The force, action, or phenomenon which leads to the
failure of an offshore pipeline. With few exceptions, these are the failure mechanisms
represented in the offshore pipeline failure database which has been prepared with this report.
FUNCTION OF: This category describes the physical, quantifiable characteristics of the
environment that are factors in determining whether or not a failure will occur. These factors
are important not only in the design of the pipeline, but also in a retrospective analysis of
historical failures. These items should be the focus of any data collection on historical pipeline
failures, since they can be used to directly correlate pipeline failure to specific parameters of
the environment. More recommendations on this subject will be made in Section VII of this
report.
AVOIDANCE TECHNIQUES: This category describes procedures that can be used to
prevent failures by the mechanism being described. Methods that can employed on both newand existing pipelines have been listed.
PREDICTION/INSPECTION/EARLY INTERVENTION/ SPILL MITIGATION:
This category describes methods that a pipeline operator can employ to manage existing
pipelines as part of a well coordinated Inspection/Maintenance/Monitoring/Repair Program. It
also lists techniques for mitigating the effect of spills that can be used on new and existing
pipelines.
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IV. A REVIEW OF INTERNAL INSPECTION TECHNIOUES (INTELLIGENT PIGS)
The innovation in the area of the internal inspection of pipelines over the last twenty years hasbeen nothing short of amazing. Within the next ten or twenty years it may be possible byrunning an electronic device (intelligent pig) inside an in-service pipeline to provide arelatively complete analysis of its condition including:
"* accurate surveying data, along with indications of spanning"* the condition of its weight coating,"* the location and size of internal and external defects,"* the presence of any leaks,
"* the condition of internal coatings and the effectiveness of the corrosion
prevention program.
Obviously, large economic incentives exist for further research in this area. A note of interestis that the Battelle Columbus Division in Columbus, Ohio is working under the auspices of theGas Research Institute to build an independent research center for testing and development inthis area. The project was projected to be completed this year and its goal is to work with bothpipeline operators and vendors of in-line inspection technology to evaluate existing systems,make improvements, and develop new concepts.
The following matrix of internal inspection tools and techniques provides a survey of proposedand existing technologies in this area. The information has been tabulated after a thoroughsearch of many articles in the literature on this subject. It is difficult to come up with objectivedata on this subject since many of the reports available are written by the proponents of aspecific idea. In some cases, it is difficult to determine from reading the article if the techniqueis actually available or whether it is in the early stages of development. Where specificationshave been listed, they represented an average figure of the claims of several articles.
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V. AN OVERVIEW OF PIPELINE SURVEYING SYSTEMS
Pipeline surveying is important to provide accurate data on the locations of pipelines forcharting, conducting offshore operations in the vicinity of pipelines, identifying pipelinespanning problems, and for back calculating stresses based on changes in the configuration ofthe pipeline. Especially in shallow waters, pipeline surveying is required to verify thatpipelines remain buried in spite of coastal erosion and other changes in the morphology of theseabed. The passage of Public Law 101-599 (commonly referred to as HR 4888) whichrequires pipeline operators in the Gulf of Mexico to inspect all pipelines between Mean HighWater and 15 feet below Mean Low Water to determine if they are exposed and if they pose ahazard to navigation has brought a lot of attention and innovation to this area of pipelinemonitoring and maintenance.
In general, the two methods of pipeline surveying are:
Transverse Surveying (spot surveying) - instruments are towed across the pipeline atpredetermined intervals to fix its location at these points.
Longitudinal Surveying (continuous surveying) - instruments are towed over thepipeline along its length to provide continuous fixes
The following table provides a summary of some of the deep and shallow water pipelinesurveying methods that are available:
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VI. AN OVERVIEW OF PIPELINE EXTERNAL INSPECTION & MONITORING SYSTEMS
Besides the internal inspection techniques previously presented, there are many techniques forthe external inspection of pipelines. These devices are presented in this section together with
techniques for monitoring the pipeline system as a whole.
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VII. Pmm FAILURE DATABASE
A. Benefits of Mai'ntaining Historical Failure Information
1. Provides operators and regulators with a tool to assess the overall effectiveness of their
efforts.
2. Provides an indication of trends in failures which may require further investigation.
3. Could be used by pipeline operators and designers to provide statistical data for use in
decision making
4. Could provide more information for investigations of failure mechanisms which cannot yet
be analytically modelled
B. Objectives of This Database
1. Provide an historical record of pipeline failures that can be used to improve current offshore
pipeline design, operation, and maintenance.
2. Demonstrate the value of a database of failures.
3. Indicate the type of failure information currently available through regulating agencies.
4. Identify different sources of pipeline failure data.
5. Highlight areas in current data collection that may be lacking.
6. Provide initial data for a possible study into designing a comprehensive approach to datacollection which is coordinated among all pipeline regulating organizations.
7. Present the database in a "user-friendly" status along with sufficient information on itsorganization so that it can be easily accessed and maintained.
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C. Approach Taken in Comilin ft Datbaw
1. Every attempt was made to maintain all of the quantitative data fields applicable to a study
of offshore pipeline failures that were available from each source of failure reports.
2. An attempt was made to combine information from as many different sources as possible.
3. The source of each failure record was maintained separately so that a comparison of the
records maintained by each agency could be made.
4. Some judgement and assumption had to be applied in interpreting incomplete failure
reports. This was done only where there was a rather high degree of confidence about what the
report was attempting to state.
5. Where multiple reports of the same failure were encountered and there were discrepancies
between the reports, the most detailed or the most current account was assumed to be the most
accurate.
6. Only reports of leaks ftom gas, crude, or condensate lines were included in the database.
Reports of lube oil leaks, diesel, etc. from offshore production equipment were discarded since
this report makes no attempt to address failures on platforms( except for risers).
D. The Organization of the Database
1. After-a review of the data collected, a decision was made to compile only the data from the
Gulf of Mexico Federal OCS Region. This decision was made for the following reasons:
a. there was not enough time allotted for this report to compile all of the information
collected
b. the system of block descriptions and block numbers used in the Gulf of Mexico OCS
Region make it easy to recognize this information
c. this represents the bulk of information collected
d. the Gulf of Mexico data has been used in several other studies that can be used for
comparison with this study
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e. all of the different sources of information had data on the Gulf of Mexico, whereas
only one source of information provided significant numbers of data on other
areas
2. Data was collected from a total of four different sources. The fact that the organization ofthe data from each source was different presented some difficulties in structuring a single
database. In order to maintain the maximum amount of information from each source and in
order to facilitate updating of the database, an approach was chosen whereby a separatedatabase was first compiled for each source and then a master database with all the fields fromeach of the databases represented was compiled by combining all the individual databases.After the separate databases were combined, a manual screening for duplicates was made to
produce a single record with all the information from the different sources.
The master database was named PIPELINE.DBF. A listing of all of the fields contained in this
database along with their descriptions is given in Appendix B.
E. Sources of Data
1. Department of Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS):
a. Gas Pipelines-For gas transmission lines and gas gathering systems governed byTitle 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191.5 and 191.15, failures meeting
any of the following criteria must be reported to the Department of Transportation on theirform RSPA 7100.2(3-84) "Incident Report - Gas Transmission and Gathering Systems":
a)results in death or personal injury requiring hospitalization,
b)results in any segment of a transmission line being taken out of service,
c)causes gas to ignite,
d)results in property or product loss in excess of $50,000 (prior to 1984, the
property loss threshold for reporting was $5,000.), or
e)is significant in the judgement of the operator even though it did not meet the
specified criteria.
A total of 77 incident reports on offshore gas pipelines from the period 9/9/84-7/7/90 werereceived from the OPS for this report. The information was provided in the form of copies of
28
actual reports. The number of reports received for each year were as follows: 1984(6);1985(14); 1986(6); 1987(11); 1988(11); 1989(19); 1990(10). All but one of the incidents werein the Gulf of Mexico. The one exceptional report was in California. An example of a GasTransmission and Gathering System Incident Report is shown in Appendix A. The reportprovides by far the most useful information of any of the data collected, however, thethreshold for reporting of $50,000 filters out all but the largest failures. The data from thesereports were organized into a separate database named GASLIST. DBF prior to placing theminto the combined database. A listing of all of the fields contained in this database along with
their descriptions is given in Appendix B.
b. Liquid Pipelines- For liquid pipelines governed by Title 49 of the Code of FederalRegulations (CFR) Parts 195.50, failures meeting any of the following criteria must bereported to the Department of Transportation on their form DOT 7000-1 "Accident Report -Hazardous Liquid Pipeline":
a)results in death or bodily harm,b)results in an explosion or fire not intentionally set by the carrier,
c)results in an escape to the atmosphere of more than 5 barrels a day of highly
volatile liquids,d)results in property damage to a second party of $1,000 or more, ore)results in property damage to the carrier of $5,000 or more.
A total of 12 accident reports for offshore liquids pipelines from the period 12/20/85-7/26/90were received from the OPS for this report. This information was also provided in the form ofcopies of actual reports. The number of reports received for each year were as follows:1985(1); 1986(2); 1987(1); 1988(3); 1989(4); 1990(3). All but one of the incidents were in theGulf of Mexico. The exception was in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska.
An example of a Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Accident Report is shown in Appendix A. Thereport is similar in detail to the Gas Incident Report. The data from these reports wereorganized into a separate database named LIQLIST.DBF prior to placing them into thecombined database. A listing of all of the fields contained in this database along with theirdescriptions is given in Appendix B.
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2. Department of Interior Minerals Management Service Data:
The MMS provided its complete current listing of pipeline failures in the Gulf of Mexicowhich consists of 826 incidents during the period from 8/27/67 to 10/26/90. This represents byfar the largest single source of failure data on the Gulf of Mexico found in the preparation ofthis report. The data is kept-in a typewritten tabular format and apparently has not been placedinto a database except by some other researchers doing work in this area. Unfortunately noneof these electronic listings were available for this report, so this data was also manually enteredinto the database. An example page from the data kept by the MMS is included in AppendixA. A second source of MMS information on pipeline failures was provided in OCS ReportMMS 88-0011 "Accidents Associated With Oil & Gas Operations-Outer Continental Shelf1956-1986". The information in this report was compared with that given in the tabular listingof failures and the most complete version of the information was put in the database.
The MMS also provided a printout of its electronic database inventory of pipelines in the Gulfof Mexico OCS Region which provides a segment number along with information on pipelinediameter, age, length, status, burial, and ownership for approximately 19,000 miles of GOMOCS pipelines. An example page of this information is included in Appendix A.
For each failure in the MMS data an attempt was made to manually look up the segment in thepipeline inventory to identify the segment number, the length, the construction date, and theburial code. This information was added to the failure information and compiled into aseparate database named RMMSDATA.DBF and then combined into the master database. Alisting of all of the fields contained in this database along with their descriptions is given inAppendix B.
3. U. S. Department of Transportation, U. S. Coast Guard, National ResponseCenter(NRC):
A request was made to the NRC under the Freedom of Information Act for "all data recordedfor all pipeline failures occurring offshore back to 1982"(which was when the NRC begancollecting data). The Coast Guard offered the option of delivering this information onmagnetic tape or as printed material. Printed material was chosen since the data was to beinputted into a PC versus a main frame computer. The Coast Guard responded with 881records from the period of January 1982 to October 1991. Of this data 206 reports could beidentified as occurring in the Gulf of Mexico OCS Region from the block description and
V0
block numbers used in the description of the location of the accident. This data was the last tobe inputted into the master database and it is interesting to note that 154 of these accidents
were not included in the data from either the DOT or the MMS. The rest of the data was fromthe following areas. This information is provided because it gives an indication of the scope of
the problem of pipeline failures in internal waters of the United States and it might give someindication of the completeness of the records being received at the NRC. Please note that these
figures include all failures regardless of the commodity spilled, much of which is refined
products:
Texas: 136 reports, mostly from state waters, bays, and bayous of the Gulf of MexicoLouisiana: 375 reports, mostly from state waters, bays, and bayous of the Gulf of
MexicoMississippi: 8 reports, all from bays and bayous of the Gulf of MexicoAlabama: 1 report from state waters of the Gulf of MexicoFlorida: 4 reportsCalifornia: 49 reports (17 of these were crude oil leaks in the Pacific Ocean)Oregon: 1 reportWashington: 2 reportsAlaska: 1 reportArkansas: 9 reportsOklahoma: 6 reportsTennessee: I reportVirginia: 3 reportsMaryland: 1 reportWest Virginia: 1 reportNew Jersey: 4 reportsMaine: 2 reportsPuerto Rico: 5 reportsVirgin Islands: 4 reports
The NRC data from the Gulf of Mexico was compiled into a separate database named
NRCINFO.DBF and then mcnbined into the master database. A listing of all of the fieldscontained in this database along with their descriptions is given in Appendix B.
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4. Failure Data From Literature:
Reports of 46 different pipeline failures were taken from an article written by M.D. Reifelentitled "Storm Related Damage to Pipelines, Gulf of Mexico" which was published in
Pipelines in Adverse Environments, ASCE, New York, N.Y. 1978. These records were
entered directly into the master database and identified by the number I in the REF (reference)
field. Information from other sources in the literature on this subject could be readily added in
a similar manner.
5. Failure Data From State Agencies:
No information from state agencies were include in the database. The State Lands Commission
of California was very helpful in providing a computer printout of 22 failures over the periodfrom November 1980 to August 1989 but this was after a decision had been made toconcentrate on Gulf of Mexico OCS information. This data has been saved along with all the
other raw information. Representatives of other state agencies ( the Texas RailroadCommission and the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources) who were contacted
telephonically at the beginning of this project indicated that the information collected by the
Department of Transportation OPS was indicative of almost all pipeline failures in their states.
From a review of the data received from the NRC, it is apparent that many failures occur
which are below the DOT thresholds and therefore are not included in DOT records. Further
efforts toward collecting state records might be of interest to help further define the scope offailures in non-federal waters of the Gulf of Mexico.
7. Failure Data From Pipeline Operators:No information from pipeline operators was collected. A future effort towards collecting such
data or, -at least, soliciting input on the data collected to date is recommended.
8. Failure Data from Non-Petroleum Related Sources:No information from non-petroleum related sources (e.g. commercial fishing organizations andenvironmental protection organizations) was collected. There was no verification that suchrecords exist, however, future attempts at recording facts and opinions from theseorganizations is recommended.
32
F. Hihflights of the Database
1. The database was compiled on Fox Software, Incorporated's Foxpro Software. The program
offers pull-down menus, it is compatible for use with a mouse, and it is relatively easy to learn
and use.
2. A total of 1047 records of pipeline failures in the Gulf of Mexico OCS Region from
2/27/67 to 10/9/91 have been compiled.
3. The data is comprised of records from the sources described previously as follows:
DOT Data: 89 records from 9/9/84 to 7/26/90
MMS Data: 826 records from 2/27/67 to 10/26/90
NRC Data: 206 records from 1/11/82 to 10/9/91RP. '! Data: 43 records from 2/27/67 to 7/5/78
D,,ring the 5 1/2 year period from 1/1/85 to 6/30/90, reports from DOT, MMS, and NRC are
all represented. This period, since it is the most well represented, provides the best overalldata for studying trends of total failures. A separate database covering this period wascompiled and named STUDY.DBF for convenience in doing further analyses.
4. A unique feature of the database report is the fact that it contains information on the age,length, and burial of pipeline segments that was collected from the MMS inventory. Thenumbers of records with this information are relatively small since it was difficult to identifypipeline-segments, in many cases, from the information provided on failure reports.There areenough records, however, to provide some insight or verification of how these factors effect
failure rates.
5. A diskette containing all of the databases is provided in Appendix G.
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VII, jNITIL ANALYSES OF THE.DATA ANm RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ANALYSIS
A. Tabulated Summaries of Data
The following summaries of the databaseare provided on the following pages:
Gas Pipeline Incidents - Failure Mechanism Per Year ....................... pg. 35Oil Pipeline Incidents - Failure Mechanism Per Year ........................ pg. 36All Pipeline Incidents - Failure Mechanism Per Year ........................ pg. 37
Gas Pipeline Incidents - Failure Mechanism Per Month ..................... pg. 38Oil Pipeline Incidents - Failure Mechanism Per Month ...................... pg. 39All Pipeline Incidents - Failure Mechanism Per Month ...................... pg. 40
Gas Pipeline Incidents - Failure Mechanism Per Nominal Diameter ....... pg. 41Oil Pipeline Incidents - Failure Mechanism Per Nominal Diameter ........ pg. 42All Pipeline Incidents - Failure Mechanism Per Nominal Diameter ........ pg. 43
Corrosion Failure Versus Pipeline Age ......................................... pg. 44Failure Mechanism Versus Burial ............................................... pg. 44
These tables are representative of some of the information available on the database and of thetypes of data that can be analyzed. A summary of trends identified from these and otheranalyses is presented on page 45.
Printouts of condensed versions of the database sorted chronologically and by block numberare included in Appendices E and F respectively.
34
35
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B. Summary of Trends Identified from Initial Analyses:1. An offshore pipeline failure occurs in the Gulf of Mexico OCS Region every five days. Thisfigure is based on the period of data which was represented by the most sources of failurerecords.
2. A separate pipeline failure occurs approximately every six days in state waters, bays, andbayous of the Gulf of Mexico. This figure is based on information from the National ResponseCenter and includes refined products.
3. The number of total failures (GOM OCS) has been fairly constant over the last ten years.The average is 59 failures with a standard deviation of 18 failures based on a normal
distribution.
4. The numbers of failures due to internal corrosion have increased markedly in the last fiveyears.
5. The numbers of failures at flanges has increased (presumably as their use has become morecommon). The only recorded failures for the largest pipelines (36" diam.) occurred at flanges.Weld failures have remained very low in spite of the increased total inventory of pipelines overthe years.
6. Corrosion seemed to show up as a failure mechanism in pipelines of around 10 years of ageor in pipelines over 20 years old. This variability is likely a function of the diligence of theoperator's corrosion prevention program.
7. 40 of 52 pipelines damaged by storms for which burial information was available were notburied or surface mounted(risers). This would appear to support an assumption that burial ofpipelines on the average provides better protection from both hydrodynamic or geotechnical/hydrodynamic forces, however, the decision to undergo the expense of burying a pipeline
should be made on a case by case basis. This decision should include options of applying themoney saved from not burying the pipeline to other programs for avoiding and mitigating
failures.
8. Visual techniques are the most common means of detecting pipeline failures. Thisinformation was collected for 16 failures. One leak was detected by an ROV, the others wereobserved from the air or from a platform.
45
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE DATA COLLECTION
These recommendations are made based on the following premises:
1. Collection of failure reports is required to ensure adequate operation and regulation
"of offshore pipelines.
2. If data is to be collected, it should be of sufficient detail and completeness to provide
for a retrospective analysis of trends and correlations between failure rate andcharacteristics of the environment, the pipeline type and configuration, and
operator performance.3. Reporting should be streamlined so as not to overburden either operators or
regulators.
Recommendations:
1. The DOT, MMS, and NRC should agree on a specific format for offshore pipeline failurereports. These reports should preferably be uniquely designed and maintained for offshore
pipelines. Further, if they have not done so already, the regulators should create a system so
that this information can be shared among agencies and among pipeline operators. A central
electronic database and electronic reporting formats would greatly facilitate this process.
2. A coordinated approach to identifying pipeline segments similiar to the system used in the
MMS inventory should be developed between regulators and operators.
3. Methods of identifying geographical locations similar to the Gulf of Mexico OCS Region
block description and block numbers should be instituted for other regions.
4. A review of the quantifiable characteristics of the pipeline operating environment presented
in Section III of this report will facilitate development of agreements between regulators and
operators on the information to be collected.
5. Failure reports should be verified for completeness and accuracy prior to their acceptance.
Forms designed specifically for offshore pipelines and increased involvement by operators in
data collection should ease this process.
46
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
Audibert, J.M.E., N.W. Lai, and R.G. Bea, "Design of Pipelines to Resist SeafloorInstabilities and Hydrodynamic Forces", ASME, New York, N.Y. 1979
Beller, M. and K. Germerdonk; C. Mattheck, and D. Munz; U. Schneider, "On theProblem of Detecting and Assessing Cracks in Pipelines", OMAE, 1991, Vol. V, pg.169.
Bickham, K.L., "Trials of Four Offshore Pipeline Locating Systems", OMAE,Houston, 1988, Vol. V, pg.349
Demars, K.R., V.A. Nacci, and W.D. Wang, "Pipeline Failure: A Need for ImprovedAnalysis and Site Surveys", 1977 OTC 2966
Ellinaas, C.P.(ed.), Advances in Subsea Pipeline Engineering and Technology, Volume24, Society for Underwater Technology, the Netherlands 1990, pgs. 263-278.
Ellinaas, C.P.(ed.), Advances in Subsea Pipeline Engineering and Technology, Volume24, Society for Underwater Technology, the Netherlands 1990, pgs. 321-353.
Farmer, E.J., G. Edwards, D.F. Wallis, and T.W. Kennedy, "Long-term field testscompleted on pipe leak detector program", Offshore, August 1991.
Farmer, E.J., R. Kohlrust, G. Meyers, G. Verduzeo, "Leak Detection Tool UndergoesField Test", Oil & Gas Journal, Dec. 19, 1988, pg. 48.
Gamble, R.B., D.G. Jammal, and M.J.K. Craig, "Deepwater Pipelines: East BreakArea, Offshore Texas", 1985 OTC 4924
Gwartney, W.R., "Pipeline Internal Monitoring Techniques Now and in The Future",
OMAE, The Hague, 1989, Vol. V, pg. 253
Hopenfield, J., "Continuous Automatic Detection of Pipe Wall Thinning",
"It's 1990. Do you know where your pipeline is ?", (cean Industry, June 1990, pg.48-49.
Jones, D.J., G.S. Kramer, D.N. Gideon, and R.J. Eiber, "An analysis of ReportableIncidents for Natural Gas Transmission and Gathering Lines 1970 through June 1984",American Gas Association Publication NG-18 Report No. 158, 1989.
47
Jones, D.J., and R.J. Eiber, "An analysis of Reportable Incidents for Natural GasTransmission and Gathering Lines June 1984 through 1989", American GasAssociation Publication NG-18 Report No. 196, 1989.
Keifner, J.F., R.W. Hyatt, and R.J. Eiber, "In Line Inspection-Two Part Series", Oil& Gas Journal, Apr. 17, 1989 pgs. 30-38, and April 24, 1989 pgs. 69-71.
Mandke, J.S., "Evaluation of Offshore Pipeline Failure Data for Gulf of Mexico",OMAE, Houston, 1990, Vol. V,pg. 57
McCabe, Charles, "Shallow-water pipeline survey systems", Ocean Industry, June1991, pg. 40-48.
Moore, D.P. and H.G. Byars, "Oil Field Corrosion-Three Part Series", Oil & GasJournal, July 9, 1990 pg. 97, July 30, 1990 pg. 91, and August 6, 1990 pg. 69.
Pipeline and Public Safety, Transportation Research Board Special Report 219, 1988.
Reifel, M.D., Storm Related Damage to Pipelines, Gulf of Mexico, Pipelines inAdverseEnvironmentsASCE, New York, N.Y. 1978, pg. 169.
"Research efforts advance oil spill response effectiveness", Offshore, Jan. 1991, pg.36.
Shah, B.C., C.N. White, and I.J. Rippon, "Design and Operational Considerations forUnsupported Offshore Pipeline Spans", 1986 OTC 5216
Shannon, R.W.E., and R.N. Knott, "On-Line Inspection: Development and OperatingExperience", 1985 OTC 4923
Shannon, R.W.E., and C.J. Argent, "Condition Monitoring-Two Part Series", Oil &Gas Journal, Feb. 6, 1989 pp. 41-44 and Feb. 20, 1989 pp. 42-44.
Swinney, Eric, "Factors in acheiving a legally defensible survey", Ocean Industry,June 1991, pg. 37-39.
Terdre, Nick, "High-tech piggery", Euroil, March/April 1991, pp. 65-69
True, W.R., "Recent Gulf of Mexico pipeline activity reflects industry's recovery", Oil& Gas Journal, August 27, 1990, pg. 45.
48
APPENDIX A: SAMPLE DATA SHEETS:
Samples of incident reports from the following sources are included:
Department of Transportation, Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS)Incident Report - Gas Transmission and Gathering System .... pgs. 50 and 51Accident Report - Hazardous Liquid Pipeline ................... pgs. 52 and 53
Department of Interior, Minerals Management Service (MMS)Table of Pipeline Failures in Gulf of Mexico OCS Region .... pg. 54Pipeline Inventory for Gulf of Mexico OCS Region ............ pg. 55
49
-- atv 'a t -c". S20 00 ls O'Ov0-ded -f 49 USC 1678 06AS %a 2137
INCIDENT REPORT -GAS TRANSMISSION AND GATHERING SYSTEMSCSAftwatch anda scot-oi eraa,o,rs
PART 1 - GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION 'S11 ..)[ktRLCTIOS.S 90008 ý81 a Operator's 5 dligit identification no. 4 Reason for' Reporting
.0 0 4 0 5. 0 Fatality Number personsb Name at Operator MNR Pipeline Company 0l injury requiring inpatientC. 500 Renaissance Center hoiaainNumber I persons
d. Nu oi~t, tichigan 48243 9j P.roperiy damage' loss Estimated S _63, 000City. County. State and Zip Code 0 Operator Judgment
2. Location of Incident
a Eugene Island Block 266 E0 Supplemental Report
City nd Cunty5. Elapsed time until area was made safe
b Offshore Louisiana, Federal Waters, LLhr ' )mnState and Zip Code Gulf of Mexico
6. Telephonic Reportc Mile PostiValve Stat X = 1,881.731.56 10, 3 ,mo Lj'3 rLday 9 Oý rd. Survey Station No y = -
6 6.264.35
e Class Location 7. a, Estimated Pressure at Point and Time of !ncident
Onshore C1 1 0 2 0 3 C3 4 jPSI6('1 880offshore M] Eugene Is land Block 266 b. Maxi-mum altowable operating presiure .IMA UP) (PSIG, 1250
area blOck number c. MAOP established by.
State -___ or Outer .-3ntinentai shelf X fItI Test pressure 2683 :i~
Plrnciapnit on Federal Land caner Than Outer Continental Shelf 12) 49 CFR § 192.6191dt1f3f 0
YnNo 8 Time and Date of the Incident3. lnc'den-. Type 1.:6 3.5. hour 0
3 m lrj. 2 -day 19 .Q v,2- Lecak 0Rupture El Otzher CST
Ruoture Length errrri - ___
PART 2 - APPARENT CAUSE
IS] Corros~on 01 Damnage by Outsdce Forces C0 Constructio-i Mater-at Defect ElOther ___________Cioiiripiue in Pai r t I ..- ntinuie in Parr B) 'Conrrinue ini Parr C,
PART 3 - NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE INCIDENT (A4ttach additional sheertsj as necessary)
PART 4 - ORIGIN OF THE INCIDENT
t ncident Occurred On: 3 Material Involved:(R Teansmission System 0 Gathering System S Steel 0 Other. Specify _______________
o Transmission Line ol Distribution System 4 Part of System Involved in tncident
2. Failure Occurred On: a Part
M3 Body of Pipe 0 Fitting. Specify 0___________ Pipeline 0 Regulator/ Meteriong Syster-,o Msechanical Joint 0 Other, SPecmfy ___________ 0 Compressor Station 0 Other ____________
o Valve 0 Wefd, Soecofyfgiwth. longitudinal. Jilletj b. Year instalted 1/91 ~,710~
PART 5 - MATERIAL SPECIFICATION I PRT -ENVIRONMENTJ
I Nominal Pipe Site -0 0! 0 l/ 2 in. Area of Inc~ident2 Wao; Thickness 0.3.7.5L i - 03 Under Pavement 03 Above Ground3 Specification APL-5LX SMYS /4/61 1/Ot ` Uiider Giou-id 0 Under Wdter4 Seam Type ERW ZOther________5. Valve. Type __________________________
6Manufacturedoy American Steel in year Ll.97 01
PART 7 - PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE Donald E. Cross, C.S. & P.. 313/ 496-2460rtpe nr print, Preparc 1.. N ý. --.* e Te ephone iSvcrber
Author led S'Cndture and Di.!: Telephone lu-nre-
For",. R-PA F 'I r, 1,j a
50
PART A - CORROSION I
1 Where did corrosiot occur 2. Visual Descriotion 3. Cause
* Internally 3 Localized Potting 0 Galvanic0 General Corrosion
o Externally 0 Other _0 Other
4. Pipe Coating Information
o Bare [ Coated
5. Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering incident?
R] Yes Year Protection Started I1 91 71 0/o No
6. Additional Information
PART B - DAMAGE BY OUTSIDE FORCES NI N/A
1. Primary Cause of Incident
o Damage resulted from action of operator or his agent
o Damage resulted from action by outside party/third party
o Damage by earth movement
o Subsidence
o LandslideAashout
o Frost
o Other
2. Locating information (for damage resulting from acrion ofourside partylthird party)
a. Did operator get prior notification that equipment would be used in the area?
o Yes Date received IL/ mo L-/ day LjI yr
o Nob. Was pipeline location marked either as a result of notification or by markers already in place?
j Yes Specify type of marlking:
o Noc. Does Statute or ordinance require the outside party to determine whether underground facility (ies) exist?
o Yes
o No3. Additional Information
PART C - CONSTRUCTION OR MATERIAL DEFECT N/A
1. Cause of Defect
0 Construction 0 Material (describe in C.4 below)
2. Description of Component Other than Pipe
3. Latest-Test Data
a. Was part wasich leaked pressure tested before incident occurred?
o Yes Dote of Test L.I mo L/LJ day L yr
0ONob. Test Medijm 0 Water 0 G1 0 Other
c. Time held at test presaure L.L./hir
d. Estimated test pressure at point of incident (psif)
4. Additional information 1,
900088
51
Report Date
ACCIDENT REPORT-HAZARDOUS LIQUID PIPELINE I-I0-8•8600 No. 7000- I" I 8600i000To
PART A-OPERATOR INFORMATION _.T* H U
I.) Name of operator ARCM pe Tni,,,n r,•_y2.) Principal business address ARCO Building
Independenc4, Kansas 67301
(city) (state) (zip code)3.) Is pipeline interstate? (M yes 0 no
PART B-TIME AND LOCATION OF ACCIDENT I1.) Date: (rmoh) December (day) 20 (Year) 1985
2.) Hour (24 hour clock) 1500
3.) If onshore give state (including Puerto Rico and Washington. D.C.).and county or city.
4.) If offshore, give ofl.hore coordinates Satu_ 1 gInark f•n z = 2 760 -141 S1 = 11- S
5.) Did accident occur on Federdl Land? 14 yes(See instrucions for deinition of Federal Land.) t. ,• /(
6.) Specific location (If location is near offshore plaforms. buildings, or other landmarks, such as highways. aterways, orrailroads. anach a sketch or drawing showing relationshp of accident location to these aindmnar)
Approx. 750 feet southeast of South Pasg Blnek 60 Plarfnim "C" in th- r_,I*f of Mexico
PART C-ORIGIN OF RELEASE OF LIQUID OR VAPOR. I (OCeck all applicabl items)
1.) Part of system involved:Sline pipe 0 tank farm - pump station
2.) Item Involved: 11 pipe 0 valve O scraper trap 0 pumpO welding fitting 0 girth weld 0 tanko bolted fitting 0 longitudiai weld
Other (specify)3.) Year item installed 1973
PART D-CAUSE OF ACCIDENT Io corrosion 0 failed weld 0 incorrect operation by operator personnelo failed pipe 0 outside force damageo malfunction of control or relief equipmentq other (specfy) Buckled due to Unknrn n
PART E-DEATH OR INJURY I1.) Number of persons kIlled. 0
Op* employees Non-employe2.) Number of persona b*wr. n
Operor eompoye Non-employes
PART F-ESTIMATED TOTAL PROPERTY DAMAGE$ None to outside parties -- only a sheen on the w.ater resulted from this leak.
PART G-COMMODTY SPILLED j1.( Name of commodity spilled: Crite. ni1
2.) Classification of commodity spilled:0 Petroleum Petroleum product 0 HVL or E Non-HVL
3.) Estimated amount of commodity involved._I Barrels spilled .-. 0 Barrels recoverd
4.) Was there an explosion?0yes Kino
5.) Was there a Fire?(7 yes l- no
52
PART H-OCCURRED IN LINE PIPE
1.) Nominal diameter (inches) 6" 2.) Wall thickness tinches) 14413.) SMYS (psi) 15,- 0.04.) Type of joint: Q(welded C flanged E-_ threaded _ coupled 7- other
5.) Pipe was El Below ground 0 Above ground (submerged)6.) Maximum operating pressure (psig) 14407. Pressure at time and location of accident (psig) 4008.) Had there been a pressure test on system?
3 yes - no9.) Duration of test (Mrs) 8
10.) Maximum test pressure (psig) .18.3.11.) Date of latest test 7-3-83
PART I-CAUSED BY CORROSION
1. Location of corrosion 3. Facilty under cathodic protection?0 internal 0 external 0 yes 0 no
2. Facilty coated? 4. Type of corrosion0 yes 0 no 0 galvanic r0 other (Spe,"fyl
PART J-CAUSED BY OUTSIDE FORCE
1. 0 Damage by operator or its contractor 2. Was a damage prevention program in effect"o Damage by others yes 0 no"o Damage by natural forces 3. If yes, was the program"o Landslide 0 "one-call" X] other AOMC Annhor Prn&Anrp,o Subsidence 4. Did excavator call? N/Ao Washout Qyes Ono0 Frostheave 5. Was pipeline location temporarily marked for the excavator?0 Eakthquake G yes 3 no N/AO Ship anchorO MudslideO Fishing Operations
Other Unknown at this time
PART K-ACCOUNT OF ACCIDENT I
On Friday, December 20, 1985, at approximately 3:00 P.M., a sheen was detected onsurface of the water approximately 750 feet southeast of South Pass Block 60 "C"Platform. Investigation by divers revealed a buckle in the pipeline. A seepagefrom buckled pipe was determined to be the location of the leak.
C-4
C,-. ,
860010
NAME AND TITLE OF OPERATOR OFFICIAL FILING THIS REPORT
V. P. Drt,ý,. •-.3-ional Manager
Telephone no. (Including area code) Date
DOT Form 7000-1 4a-8-)
53
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APPENDIX B: DATABASE FIELD DESCRIprTONS:
Descriptions of the fields used in the following database are provided:
PIPELINE.DBF (Master database of all recorded failures) ............ pgs. 57 and 58GASLIST.DBF (DOT Gas Pipeline Incident Reports) .................. pgs. 59 and 60LIQLIST.DBF (DOT Liquid Pipeline Incident Reports) ................ pg. 61RMMSDATA.DBF (MMS Pipeline Incident Records) ................. pg. 62NRCINFO.DBF (NRC Database Pipeline Incident Reports) ........... pg. 63
56
The database "PIPELINE.DBFW is organized as follows:
FIELD TYPE WIDTH DEC DESCRIPTIONREF C 3 0 DESCRIBES SOURCE OF INFORMATIONMMSINFO L 1 0 DESCRIBES SOURCE OF INFORMATIONDOT INFO L 1 0 DESCRIBES SOURCE OF INFORMATIONOP ID NO C 5 0 OPERATOR IDENTIFICATION NUMBEROP_NAME -c 40 0 OPERATOR NAMEOPSTREET C 40 0 OPErATOR ADDRESSOP_CITY C 20 0 OPERATOR CITYOP STATE C 2 0 OPERATOR STATEOP ZIP C 5 0 OPERATOR ZIP CODEINC STATE C 2 0 STATE IN WHICH INCIDENT OCCURREDINTERSTATE L 1 0 LOGICAL: INTERSTATE PIPELINE?FEDERAL L 1 0 LOGICAL: FEDERAL JURISDICTION?MP VLV STA C 20 0 MILE POST/VALVE STATIONSURVSTA C 40 0 SURVEY STATION OR LAT. AND LONG.BLOCK DESC C 3 0 TWO LETTER ABBR. FOR GOM BLOCK NAMEBLOCKNUMB C 5 0 GOM BLOCK NUMBERPLATFORM C 3 0 PLATFORM DESIGNATIONLOC MEMO M 10 0 AMPLIFYING INFORMATION ON LOCATIONINCTYPE C 10 0 TYPE OF INCIDENT:LEAK, RUPTURE OR OTHERRUP LENGTH C 10 0 LENGTH OF RUPTURE IN FEETNO FATAL N 3 0 NUMBER OF FATALITIESNO INJ N 3 0 NUMBER OF PERSONS INJUREDAMTDAMAGE N 8 0 ESTIMATED PROPERTY DAMAGEEXPLOSION L 1 0 LOGICAL:WAS THERE AN EXPLOSION?FIRE L 1 0 LOGICAL:WAS THERE A FIRE?.HRSTO SAFE N 4 0 EST. TIME UNTIL AREA MADE SAFEDT PHON RP D 8 0 DATE OF TELEPHONIC REPORTINCPRESS N 4 0 PRESS. AT POINT AND TIME OF INCIDENT (PSIG)MAOP N 4 0 MAX. ALLOWABLE OPERATING PRESSURE (PSIG)TESTPRESS N 4 0 TEST PRESS. USED TO ESTABLISH MAOP (PSIG)CFR L 1 0 LOGICAL: MAOP ESTABLISHED BY 49 CFR
192.619?INC TIME C 4 0 TIME OF INCIDENTINC DATE D 8 0 DATE OF INCIDENTAPCAUSE C 20 0 APPARENT CAUSE OF INCIDENTPRODUCT C 10 0 PRODUCT TRANSPORTEDSERVICE C 10 0 SERVICE CLASSIFICATION PER MMS INVENTORYCLASSIFICA C 10 0 CLASSIFICATION OF COMMODITY SPILLEDPOL BBLS N 8 1 POLLUTION IN BARRELSSYSTYPE C 30 0 SYSTEM TYPE: GATHERING, TRANSMISSION,ETCSYSPART C 30 0 PART OF SYSTEM: PIPELINE, METER,ETCPARTDAM C 10 0 PART OF SYSTEM DAMAGEDPLINE PART C 40 0 SPECIFIC PART FAILED: WELD, FITTING, ETCPLINE MATL C 10 0 PIPELINE MATERIALPIPE SIZE N 2 0 NOMINAL DIAMETER OF PIPELINEPIPEWALL N 4 0 WALL THICKNESS x 104PIPE SPEC C 20 0 PIPE SPECIFICATION AND SMYSPIPESEAM C 20 0 SEAM TYPE
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Organization of PIPELINE.DBF continued:
JOINTTYPE C 10 0 TYPE OF PIPE JOINTS USEDPARTAGE N 2 0 AGE OF PART FAILEDPIPEAGE N 2 0 AGE OF PIPELINEPIPEMANUF C 20- 0 PIPE MANUFACTURERMATL_MEMO M 10 0 AMPLIFYING INFQRMATION ON PART FAILEDPREPARER C 20 0 OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE FILING REPORTPREPPHON C 12 0 OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE PHONE NUMBERCORRLOC C 10 0 LOCATION OF CORROSION: INTERNAL,
EXTERNALCORRVIS C 25 0 VISUAL DESCRIPTION OF CORROSIONCORR CAUSE C 20 0 CAUSE OF CORROSIONCOATED L 1 0 LOGICAL: WAS PIPELINE COATED?CATHODIC L 1 0 LOGICAL: WAS CATHODIC PROTECTION USED?CATHDATE D 8 0 YEAR CATHODIC PROTECTION STARTEDCORR MEMO M 10 0 AMPLIFYING INFO ON CORROSIONDAM CAUSE C 30 0 CAUSE OF DAMAGE BY OUTSIDE FORCESDAMMEMO M 10 0 AMPLIFYING INFO ON DAMAGECONSTCAUS C 50 0 CAUSE OF CONST OR MATERIAL DEFECTCONSTMEMO M 10 0 AMPLIFYING INFO ON CONST OR MATL DEFECTOTHERCAUS C 50 0 OTHER CAUSE DESCRIPTIONOTHER MEMO M 10 0 AMPLIFYING INFO ON OTHER CAUSECAUSEI C 10 0 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF PRIMARY CAUSECAUSE2 C 10 0 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF SECONDARY CAUSESEGNUMB N 7 0 MMS SEGMENT NUMBERLENGTH N 6 0 LENGTH OF PIPELINE SEGMENT PER MMS
INVENTORYCONSTDATE D 8 0 DATE PIPLEINE CONSTRUCTED PER MMS
INVENTORYBURIED C 1 0 BURIEDDETECTION C 10 0 METHOD BY WHICH LEAK WAS DETECTEDMAXDEPTH N 4 0 MAXIMUM DEPTH OF PIPELINE SEGMENT
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The database "GASLIST.DBF" is organized as follows:
FIELD TYPE WIDTH DEC DESCRIPTIONDOT INFO L 1 0 DESCRIBES SOURCE IN MASTER DATABASEOPIDNO C 5 0 OPERATOR IDENTIFICATION NUMBEROPNAME C 40 0 OPERATOR NAMEOPSTREET C 40 0 OPERATOR ADDRESSOPCITY C 20 0 OPERATOR CITYOPSTATE C 2 0 OPERATOR STATEOPZIP C 5 0 OPERATOR ZIP CODEINC-STATE C 2 0 STATE IN WHICH INCIDENT OCCURREDMPVLVSTA C 20 0 MILE POST/VALVE STATIONSURVSTA C 40 0 SURVEY STATION OR LAT. AND LONG.BLOCKDESC C 20 0 GOM: 2 LETTIER ABBREV. FOR BLOCKBLOCKNUMB C 10 0 GOM: BLOCK NUMBERLOCMEMO M 10 0 AMPLIFYING INFORMATION ON LOCATIONINCTYPE C 10 0 TYPE OF INCIDENT:LEAK,RUPTURE OR OTHERRUPLENGTH C 10 0 LENGTH OF RUPTURE IN FEETNOFATAL N 3 0 NUMBER OF FATALITIESNO_INJ N 3 0 NUMBER OF PERSONS INJUREDAMTDAMAGE N 8 0 ESTIMATED PROPERTY DAMAGEHRSTOSAFE N 4 0 EST. TIME UNTIL AREA MADE SAFEDTPHONRP D 8 0 DATE OF TELEPHONIC REPORTINC-PRESS N 4 0 PRESS. AT POINT AND TIME OF INCIDENT(PSIG)MAOP N 4 0 MAX. ALLOWABLE OPERATING PRESSURE(PSIG)TESTPRESS N 4 0 TEST PRESS. USED TO ESTABLISH MAOP(PSIG)CFR L 1 0 LOGICAL: MAOP ESTABLISHED BY 49 CFR 192.619INC-TIME C 4 0 TIME OF INCIDENTINC DATE D 8 0 DATE OF INCIDENTAPCAUSE C 20 0 APPARENT CAUSE OF INCIDENTPRODUCT C 10 0 PRODUCT TRANSPORTED. E.G. GASSYSTYPE C 30 0 SYSTEM TYPE: GATHERING. TRANSMISSIONSYSPART C 30 0 PART OF SYSTEM: PIPELINEMETER, ETC.PLINEPART C 40 0 SPECIFIC PART
FAILED: WELD, VALVE, FITTING, ETC.PLINE MATL C 10 0 PIPELINE MATERIALPIPE SIZE N 2 0 NOMINAL DIAMETER OF PIPELINEPIPEWALL N 4 0 WALL THICKNESSX1O"4 INCHESPIPESPEC C 20 0 PIPE SPECIFICATION AND SMYSPIPESEAM C 20 0 SEAM TYPEPART AGE N 2 0 AGE OF PART FAILEDPIPE-AGE N 2 0 AGE OF PIPELINEPIPE MANUF C 20 0 PIPE MANUFACTURERMATL MEMO M 10 0 AMPLIFYING INFORMATION ON PART FAILEDPREPARER C 20 0 OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVEPREPPHON C 12 0 OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE PHONE NUMBERContnued on next page.
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Organization of GASLAST.DBF continued:
FIELD TYPE WIDTH DEC DESCRIPTIONCORR LOC C 10 0 LOCATION OF CORROSION: INTERNAL, EXTERNALCORR VIS C 25 0 VISUAL DESCRIPTION OF CORROSIONCORR CAUSE C 20 0 CAUSE OF CORROSIONCOATED L 1 0 LOGICAL: WAS PIPELINE COATED?CATHODIC L 1 .0-- LOGICAL:WAS PART CATHODICALLY PROTECTED?CATHDATE D 8 0 YEAR CATH. PROTECTION STARTED (01/01/YEAR)CORR MEMO M 10 0 AMPLIFYING INFO ON CORROSIONDAM CAUSE C 30 0 CAUSE OF DAMAGE BY OUTSIDE FORCESDAM MEMO M 10 0 AMPLIFYING INFO ON DAMAGECONST CAUS C 50 0 CAUSE OF CONSTRUCTION OR MATERIAL DEFECTCONST MEMO M 10 0 AMPLIFYING INFO ON CONST OR MATL DEFECTOTHERCAUS C 50 0 OTHER CAUSE DESCRIPTIONOTHERMEMO 10 0 AMPLIFYING INFORMATION ON OTHER CAUSE
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The database "LIQLIST.DBF" is organized as follows:
FIELD TYPE WIDTH DEC DESCRIPTIONDOT INFO L 1 0 DESCRIBES SOURCE IN MASTER DATABASEOP ID NO C 5 0 OPERATOR IDENTIFICATION NUMBEROP NAME C 40 0 OPERATOR NAMEOP STREET C 40 0 OPERATOR ADDRESSOP CITY C 20 0 OPERATOR CITYOP STATE C 2 0 OPERATOR STATEOPZIP C* 5 0 OPERATOR ZIP CODEINTERSTATE L 1 0 LOGICAL: INTERSTATE PIPELINE?INC DATE D 8 0 DATE OF INCIDENTINC TIME C 4 0 TIME OF INCIDENTBLOCK DESC C 20 0 GOM: 2 LETTER ABBREV. FOR BLOCKBLOCK NUMB C 10 0 GOM: BLOCK NUMBERSURV STA C 4 0 SURVEY STA OF LAT AND LONGFEDERAL L 1 0 LOGICAL: FEDERAL JURISDICTION?LOC MEMO M 10 0 AMPLIFYING INFORMATION ON LOCATIONSYS PART C 30 0 PART OF SYSTEM INVOLVED: LINEPIPE, ETC.PLINE PART C 40 0 SPECIFIC PART FAILED:VALVE,WELD,ETC.PART AGE N 2 0 AGE OF PART FAILEDPIPE AGE N 2 0 AGE OF PIPELINEAP CAUSE C 20 0 APPARENT CAUSE OF INCIDENTNO FATAL N 3 0 NUMBER OF FATALITIESNOINJ N 3 0 NUMBER OF PERSONS INJUREDAMT DAMAGE N 8 0 ESTIMATED PROPERTY DAMAGEPRODUCT C 10 0 PRODUCT TRANSPORTEDCLASSIFICA C 10 0 CLASSIFICATION OF COMMODITY SPILLEDPOL BBLS N 7 1 POLLUTION IN BARRELSEXPLOSION L 1 0 LOGICAL: WAS THERE AN EXPLOSION?FIRE L 1 0 LOGICAL: WAS THERE A FIRE?PIPE SIZE N 2 0 NOMINAL DIAMETER OF PIPELINEPIPE WALL N 4 0 WALL THICKNES X 10^4 INCHESPIPE SPEC C 20 0 PIPE SPECIFICATION AND SMYSJOINT TYPE C 10 0 TYPE OF PIPE JOINTS USEDMAOP N 4 0 MAX. ALLOWABLE OPERATING PRESSURE(PSIG)INC PRESS N 4 0 PRESS. AT POINT AND TIME OF INCIDENT(PSIG)TEST PRESS N 4 0 TEST PRESS. USED TO ESTABLISH MAOP (PSIG)CORRLOC C 10 0 LOCATION OF CORROSION: INT. OR EXTERNALCOATED L 1 0 LOGICAL: WAS THE PIPELINE COATED?CATHODIC L 1 0 LOGICAL: WAS CATHODIC PROTECTION USED?CORR CAUSE C 20 0 CAUSE OF CORROSIONCORR MEMO M 10 0 AMPLIFYING INFO ON CORROSIONDAM CAUSE C 30 0 CAUSE OF DAMAGE BY EXTERNAL FORCESDAMMEMO M 10 0 AMPLIFYING INFO ON CAUSE OF DAMAGEDETECTION C 10 0 METHOD BY WHICH LEAK WAS DETECTEDPREPARER C 20 0 OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVEPREPPHONE C 12 0 OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE PHONE NUMBER
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The database "RMMSDATA.DBF" is organized as follows:
FIELD TYPE WIDYrH DEC DESCRIPTIONMMS INFO L 1 0 DESCRIBES SOURCE IN MASTER DATABASEINC DATE D 8 0 DATE OF INCIDENTPOL BBLS N 8 1 POLLUTION IN BARRELSOPNAME C 20 0 NAME OF OPERATORPIPE SIZE N 2 0 NOMINAL DIAMETER OF PIPELINE
-SERVICE C 10 0 SERVICE CLASSIFICATION PER MMS INVENTORYBLOCK DESC C 2 0 GOM: 2 LETITER ABBREV. FOR BLOCKBLOCK NUMB C 3 0 GOM: BLOCK NUMBERPLATFORM C 3 0 PLATFORM DESIGNATION (IF ON PLATFORM)CAUSEI C 10 0 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF PRIMARY CAUSECAUSE2 C 10 0 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF SECONDARY CAUSESEGNUMB N 7 0 MMS SEGMENT NUMBERLENGTH N 6 0 LENGTH OF PIPE SEGMENT PER MMS INVENTORYCONST DATE D 8 0 DATE PIPELINE CONSTRUCTEDBURIED C 1 0 BURIED?:YES(Y),NO(N),SURFACE(S)PARTDAM C 10 0 PART OF SYSTEM DAMAGED
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The database "NRCINFO.DBF" is organized as follows:
FIELD TYPE WIDTH DEC DESCRIPTIONNRCINFO L 1 0 DESCRIBES SOURCE IN MASTER DATABASEOP NAME C 20 0 NAME OF OPERATORBLOCKDESC C 2 0 GOM: 2 LETTER ABBREV. FOR BLOCKBLOCKNUMB C 3 0 GOM: BLOCK NUMBERPLATFORM C 3 0 PLATFORM DESIGNATION -(IF ON PLATFORM)NOFATAL N 3 0 NUMBER OF FATALITIESNO INJ N 3 0 NUMBER OF PERSONS INJUREDAMTDAMAGE N 8 0 ESTIMATED PROPERTY DAMAGEEXPLOSION L 1 0 LOGICAL: WAS THERE AN EXPLOSION?FIRE L 1 0 LOGICAL: WAS THERE A FIRE?INC TIME C 4 0 TIME OF INCIDENTINCDATE D 8 0 DATE OF INCIDENTSERVICE C 10 0 TYPE OF SERVICE (PRODUCT)POLBBLS N 8 1 POLLUTION IN BARRELSPARTDAM C 10 0 PART OF SYSTEM DAMAGEDPIPESIZE N 2 0 NOMINAL DIAMETER OF PIPELINECAUSEI C 10 0 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF PRIMARY CAUSECAUSPe2 C 10 0 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF SECONDARY CAUSEDETECTION C 10 0 METHOD BY WHICH LEAK WAS DETECTEDMAXDEPTH N 4 0 MAXIMUM DEPTH OF PIPELINE SEGMENT
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APPENDIX C: KEY To ABBREVIATIONS IN DATABASE
Caries of failures: Data Fields CAUSE1 and CAUSE2:
CATEGORY ABBREVIATION DESCRIPTLONUNKNOWN
UNK CAUSE STATED AS "UNKNOWN" ON REPORTNOT GIVEN
NOT GIV CAUSE STATED AS "NOT GIVEN" ON REPORTEXTERNAL FORCESANCHORS ANCHOR DAMAGE BY ANCHOR FROM ANY VESSEL
WB ANCHOR DAMAGE BY ANCHOR KNOWN TO BE FROM AWORKBOAT
TRAWLS/NETS TRAWL (ALSO NET)-DAMAGE BY FISHING TRAWL ORNET
BOATWORKBOATS JACKUPRIG (ALSO JACKUPBARG/LIFT BOAT/ FIELDBOAT)
DAMAGE FROM ONE OF THESE VESSELSDRAGGEDOBJ (ALSO FOREIGN OBJECT)-UNKNOWN OBJECT
ON SEAFLOORJETBARGE (ALSO JETSLED)-DAMAGE BY JETSLED
WORKING ON NEARBY PIPELINEDREDGE DAMAGE BY DREDGE
GENERAL EXTFORCE CAUSE STATED AS "EXTERNAL FORCE" W/NO FURTHER DESCRIPTION
PIPELINE RUBBING ABRASION DAMAGE FROM PIPELINE RUBBING AGAINSTOBJECT
CONSTRUCTION CONST DAM DAMAGE FROM CONSTRUCTION (NOFURTHER EXPLANATION GIVEN)
2ND PARTY VESSELS FREIGHTER DAMAGE BY FREIGHTER STRIKINGPLATFORM
VGROUNDING DAMAGE BY VESSEL "GROUNDING" ONPIPELINE
HYDRODYNAMICWAVES (ALSO WIND AND WAVES) DAMAGE BY WIND
AND WAVESSTORM DAMAGE DURING STORMHURRICANE DAMAGE DURING HURRICANEFATIGUE FAILURE DUE TO FATIGUE
GEOTECHNICALMUDSLIDE DAMAGE BY MUDSLIDE
CORROSIONCORROSION CORROSION NOT SPECIFIED AS INTERNAL OR
EXTERNALEXTCOR EXTERNAL CORROSIONINTCOR INTERNAL CORROSIONEROSION EROSION CORROSION
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Causes of failures: Data Fields CAUSEI and CAUSE2(caminued):
ATEORABBREVIATION DESCRIPTIONGASKET MISALIGNED OR FAILED GASKETWELDFAIL FAILURE OF WELD
VALVELEAK LEAK AT VALVECLAMPLEAK LEAK AT CLAMP OR PREVIOUS REPAIRFITTINGLK LEAK AT UNSPECIFIED FITTINGSEAMLEAK LEAK AT PIPE SEAMJOINTLEAK LEAK AT UNSPECIFIED "JOINT"FLANGELEAK LEAK AT PIPELINE FLANGE
MAINTENANCE/OPERATION
STUCK PIG (ALSO PIGGING)PIG STUCK OR LEAKDEVELOPED DURING PIGGING
PARAFFIN PARAFFIN PLUG IN PIPELINEHUMAN HUMAN OPERATING ERROR
Block Descrglpions:
ABBREVIATION BLOCK DESCRIffIONBA BRAZOSBM BAY MARCHANDBS BRETON SOUNDCA CHANDELEUREB EWING BANKEC EAST CAMERONEl EUGENE ISLANDEW EWING BANKGA GALVESTONGB GARDEN BANKSGC GREEN CANYONGI GRAND ISLANDHI HIGH ISLANDHA HIGH ISLAND ADDITIONMC MISSISSIPPI CANYONMI MATAGORDA ISLANDMO MOBILE
MP MAIN PASS__MU MUSTANG ISLANDPL SOUTH PELTOSA SABINE PASSSM SOUTH MARSH ISLANDSP SOUTH PASSSS SHIP SHOALST SOUTH TIMBALIERVK VIOSCA KNOLLVR VERMILLIONWC WEST CAMERONWD WEST DELTA
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APPENDIX D - POINTS OF CONTACT FOR FIRTHER STUDY"
American Gas Association
1515 Wilson Blvd
Arlington, VA
(703)841-8400
American Petroleum Institute
2101 L. Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202)457-7000
API Pipeline Committee-Des & Const
Chairman: John Moore, Exxon (713)656-5829
Vice Chairman: Andy Dakis, Chevron (415)842-6961
API Pipeline Committee-Op & Maint
Chairman: Larry Clynch, Conoco (405)767-6352
American Society of Civil Engineers
290 Temple Street
Long Beach, CA 90803
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
United Engineering Center345 East 47 Street
New York, NY 10017
(212)644-7722
American Welding Society
2501 NW Seventh StreetMiami, FL 33125(305)642-7090
Army Corps of Engineers
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Association of Oil Pipelines1725 K Street, Suite 1208Washington, DC 20006
(202)331-8228
California Coastal Commission
(916)543-8555(Sacremento)
(415)904-5200(SF)
California Dept of Conservation
State of California
Department of Conservation
Division of Oil and Gas
1416 Ninth Street, Room 1310
Sacremento, CA 95814
(916)445-9686
California Dept of Conservation(Field Offices)
-District One(Long Beach)-(213)590-5311
-District Two(Ventura)-(805)654-4761
-District Three(Santa Maria)-(805)937-7246
California Dept of Transportation
(916)445-2201
California Seismics Safety Council
(916)322-4917
California State Fire Marshall
(818)937-7246
California State Lands Commission
245 West Broadway, Suite 425
Long Beach, CA 90802-4471
(213)590-5229
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Coast Guard
CONCAWE
Concerned Shrimpers of America
Cutter Information
Arlington Mass-
(617)648-8700
Dept of Commerce
National Ocean Service
Dept of Energy
National Petroleum Council
(202)393-6100
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(202)586-5000
Dept of Transportation
Office of Pipeline Safety
400 Seventh St SW
Washington, DC(202)366-4583
Det Norske Veritas
GAO
(202)275-6241
Golups
(800)666-4430
(617)491-5100
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Institute of French Petroleum
Bureau Veritos
Louisiana Office of Conservation
La. Dept of Natural Resources
P.O. Box 94275
Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9725
(504)342-5505
Louisiana Shrimp Association
Minerals Management Service
Department of Interior
Minerals Management Service
Washington, DC 20240
Charles Smith (Herndon,VA)-(703)787-1559
Alex Alvarado (Metarie)-(504)736-2547
National Response Center
2100 Second St SW
Room 2611
Wash,DC 20593
National Technical Information Service
(800)553-NTIS
National Transportation Safety Board
Charles Batten, Chief,(202)382-0760
Offshore Magazine
Oil and Gas Journal
(918)835-3161
Oil Pipeline Research Institute
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Petroleum Information Service
University of Tulsa
Tulsa, OKHouston-(713)961-5660
Pipeline and Gas Journal
Pipeline and Utilities Construction(713)622-0676
Pipeline Digest
(713)468-2626
Southwest Research Institute
San Antonio, TX(512)522-5086
Texas Railroad Commission
(512)463-7058
Texas Shrimp Association
TransCo Energy (TransWestem)
(713)439-2000
Transportation Research Board
World Information Systems
PO Box 535
Cambridge, MA 02238
(619)491-5100
World Offshore Accident Database
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