offense versus defence in the air 1917

8/8/2019 Offense Versus Defence in the Air 1917

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PART I.

THE R.F.C.1.-Early Days.

The Royal Flying Corps, which accompanied the E.F. t o- France at -th e beginning of t hc war, co nsi sted~ of four

squadrons and one Aircraft Park, all under a singlecommsnder and working directly under G.H.Q. The AircraftPa rk undertook the repair of aeroplanes and engines, and thesupply and issue of store s an d spare parts .

Tho squadrons consisted of a heterogeneous collection. ofall the machines available at the time, and squadrons, andeven flights, were equipped with several different types ofmachine.

The work of the R.F.C. consisted a t first solely ofrcconnaissance, and aerial fighting only took place, and thatvery occasionally, as an incident of reconnaissance work. ,

There was no idea of keeping machines, much less .flights,for the primary purpose of fighting. Observers carried arifle or an automatic pistol, bu t no aeroplanes carried amachine gun a t. th is time.

A dctailed scheme for co-operation with artillery h ad beenworked o ut prcvious t o th e outbreak of war, b ut t h e systemwas in the earl5- expcrimcntal stage, and very little artilleryobservation was done. Wireless had not been adapted toaerial work a t th is time, and observations were signalled bycolourcd lights, smoke bnrsbs, or by movements of t h emachine.

Aerial photography was in its infancy, and although *photographs of the German cntrenchments were taken on th eAisne they wcre not regarded as of much interest. ,

Bombing, as now understood, was non-existent, thoiighpilots occasionally threw out a few bombs in the coursc oftheir reconnaissance.

~. During the battle of the Aisne flights were attachedto. Corps, b u t were regarded as detachments from G.H.Q . ,whehcc they were controlled. As soon as the opposing forcessettled down to trench wauiare, t h e organization under onecommnnd.was found t o be too centralized and squadron8 weredefinitely allotted to Corps. On tho formation of Armies thesquadrons with each Corps belonging to ;m Army wcrc

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grOUpcd into a Wing un&r Lltc cornitland of LL Lieutenant-Coloncl.

The expansion of the R.F.C. now began, and ibn additionaltiqoadron w a s formed n t 48 hours' notice irnd dcspatchcd LO

Ostend to co-opomte with the Antwerp expedition.O ne flight of special fighting machines arrived in October,

1014, and w a s assigned a purely defensive role, iiamely, toprevent hostile irerial rcconnaissance.

As t he R.E.F. grew larger and gradually took over moretrench line, and as co-operation with tho artillery becameniorr spstomatimd and more general, t h e necd for furtherexpansion became inow a n d niorc ibpparent, ;~nd. in tlic? .umrner of 1915 i t \>-as dccided t h a t the fol lowing a t Ii:astwere I I I : C C S S ~ II .

-Ono sqondron to cnch A r m y Corps for artillcrywork arid close rcconnnissance, including photography.

O n e squadron per Army, and a t l ens l . onc forC.H.Q., fo r reconnaissitricc work.

One squadroil per Army fo r special work, such asbombing raids.

Aerial fighting still took place on a minor scale only, hutwas gmdually increasing, 26 fights taking place i n May, 1915,

32 in June, and 47 in July. Many more than this often occurin one Jay in present conditions. It miis already apparent,however, that fighting would be necessary on an cvcr-increasing scale to secure liberty of action for our artilleryand photographic machines, an d to int er fer e with si mila r workon the par t of the enemy, and the need fo r the provision ofpurely fighting squadrons was realized.

The enemy's anti-aircraft gun8 had by the summer o f 1015bccomc very troublesome, and the necessity for a largeincrease in our ow n A . A . artillery was also recognized.

I t is interesting to note t ha t arrangeme nts wcrc made forco-operation between eeroplancs and infantry very much onth e lines of t he present conta ct patrol i n connection with ana1 ta ck south of ArmentiOrcs i n Mny, 1915. Little expcrimicewais gaincd, however, as the attack was not succossful.

Ry the autumn of i915 the necessity of specislization hadbecome still more apparont,and tho division of the R.F.C. withcach Army into two Wings mas decided upon, one Win foroffensivc action and rcconiiaissance, and the other fo r artiflerywork, trench rcconnaissance and photography. A consider-able increase to the number of G.R.Q. quadrons was alsoapproved, and these were formed into a Wing curly in 191G.

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fighting absorbing the very great proportion of their cnergies.The f i r s t Success in this struggle for superiority in the air

mas scored by the encmy, when he produced large numbersof single-seater fighting scouts of t h e Fokke r type in th e earlyspring of 1916, temporarily interfering to a considerableextent with the w.ork of our Corps machines, and forcingus t o carr y ou t our rcconnaissancos with a number of machinesflying in fo rma tion ins tead of with single machines a s formerly.The need of more fighting squadrons, already realized, becamemorc urgent, a s did th e necessity of faste r types and be tt erarmament, and these conclusions wore confirmed by tho 'esperience of th e French a t th e battle of Verdun.

It was biccming incrcasingly cvident that defensivcmeasures can not secure immunity from aerial attack . Owing

to the unlimited space in the air, thc di5culty one machinehas in seeing another and the accidents of wind and cloud,it is impossible for aeroplanes, howevcr powerful and mobile,however numerous and however skilful their pilots, to preventdetermined opponents from reaching their objective, whetheri t be a machine engaged 'on artille ry work, troops on t h cground, or the target of a bombing raid. I n the air evenmore than on th e ground, th e true defence l ies h a t t a c k .and th is was fully borne out , if fu rt he r proof were needed,by t he lessons learnt a t Verdun.

.At t h e beginning of th e hatt lc t he Frcn ch had fewmachincs on the spot, A rapid concentration was made anda vigoroiis offensive policy adopted. The result was t h a t

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superiority i t , the iLir u'as :ctLa.ned i n ;L very short timc, nr:di ~ rt i ll c ry nd photographic machines sc r e cnHhled to CILI'I 'Y

out their work with a large mcasurc of immunity f rom

interference.As frcslr units, which had less experience of working with

aeroplanes, were p i t into tho fight, a demand arose , however,for close protection. This demand was for a short timecomplied with. As n result thc enemy resumed the offensive,an d t he Frcnch machines found themselvcs unable t o pre ventthe raids which thc cnemy, no longcr attacked himself, wasable to make. The mistake was a t once realizcd and promptlyrectified. A general offcnsive policy was again adop ted; t hcenemy's machines were kept so busy by constant attack thatthoy werc unable t o undertake raids on thcir own account,und aerial superiority was oncc morc gained.

Profiting by these lessons, every effort was made toincrease the number of fighting and bombing squadrons inthc R.P.C. prior to the Sommc offensive, and immcdiiLtelythe batt lc started a policy of relentless an d incessant offensivcwas pursued. Thc enemy ha d no t as yet learnt his Icsson. . .His Fokkor machines iverc out of date and out-classed, andhe had not yet provided anything to take their place. It is

hardly t b o much to say that hc was temporarily driven fromthe air, and the statements of many hundreds of prisonersshowed to what extent his aviation was disorcdited amonghis own troops 01:other arms.

Drastic action was tak en by the oiiemy. H is sgstcins ofcommand and supply werc rc-organized, and h e began t ostudy and, o n papcr a t all events, to copy our methods.

That such a regeneration of the German Flying Corpswics incvitabfe had boon recognised from the first, and an

cxtensivo programme of devclopment w a s approved in t h esummer o f 1016, and cvcry endeavour madc to plibce t h e R.P.C.i n a position, when act ive ope rat ions commenced in th e springof 1017, to continnc and carry thrpugh the policy which hadproved so .successfd . This programme contcmplatcd aproportion of two fighting squadrons of the purely dghti ugtype to each Corps squadron, a i!urnber of fightingreconnaissance squadrons, and a t least .Lei> squadronsspccially designed for bombing. Th c ex te nt to which thedcvelopmcnt of a c r i d fighting ha s governed th e expansion of

tho R..F.C. will be realized if this programme is comparedwith the two or three scouts i n each Corps squadron, whichha d bcen conuidercd sufficient two ycars earl ier, whilc eveni n Lhe spring o t 1016 the programme of expansion contemplated

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only two fighting reconnaissancc squadrons and onc purelyfighting squadron in cnch ‘Army Wing, with two fightingrcconnaissance and three bombing squadrons groupod intoa Wing under G.H.Q

The expcricnces of the currcnt year have fully borne outoxpectations. The cncmy, too, mado str enuous endeavoursto improve his relative position during the winter, and thenrnount of aerial fighting has increased by hundreds percent. . ~

‘ I t has not so fa r proved possiblc to seciirc the I I IUI~SUI’C

of a c r i d superiority achievcd in the early stages of th c Sommebnttle, but th e continual offensive action of th e A r m y andG.E.Q. Wings, bo th by fighting and bombing, has cnablcd ou r

Corps machincs to accomplish a grcntly increased ainountof artillery and photographic work, and to workuninterriiptedly and without undnc interf erence every hour

~ of cvery da y thiLt weatlicr permits.

3.-Other Developments.Apart € r o d th e fighting, tho most imp ortan t development

its regiirds tho cmployment of the R.F.C. has been i n thodirection of closer co-opcration with t h e infan try. Con tac tpatrol work was introduced at the. boginning of the bat t leO F thc Sornme, and hns becoinn ;I regular part of all activcoperationn, b oth prior t o an atla ck to reconnoitre tho resultof our artillery pieparation a n d th e st at e of th e enemy’s wircand othor dnicnces, an d during a n at ta ck to kcep those i ncommand const;LnLIs-informed as t o its progress. L:Ltterly,aeroplanes havo tak en a niorc immediate sharc in t he i nfan tryattack itself, activclr co-operating by atlacking the dcfcndingtroopn with machine gnii fire from a low hcight, and b ysimilarly attacking his reinforcements on thcir way to thebatt le fr on t with machine gun and bomb. Fiirthcrdevelopments i n this direction a r e almos t certain.

4.-Training and Supply.Questions of the supply and training of personnel, and

the design and supply o f ninterial, have not been toocliedu p u u i n the above short account; it i s su 5c ien t to say th a tthe R.P.C. in France has alrcady increased twclve-fold, thatthe cu rrcnt programrno shows an incrcasc to double its present .

strength with an eventual fnrthc r increase, an d t h at a mnchincwhich is of t h e very latest typ e to-day is probably out-classeda r i d obsolcte i u six months’ time.

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PART 11.

T H E G E R M A N AIR S E RV IC E .

The present organization of the German Air Forces mustnot in any nay bo looked upon as a final organization, but .mcrely as the staiidard to which the authorities had attainedin Ju ly, 1017.

Fr om t he commencement of the w a r , -one changc hasfollowed another, each, no doubt, being dictatod by the ne&of the moment, and by a study of thosc changes i t is possiblot o form an impression a s to the views of tho Highe r

Authorities regarding the eniploymknt of thc " Air " Branchof the fighting forces.The following account is intended t o show the various

changes in organiaatioii which havo takcn place, and in asmal l way to po in t out thc significance of these ChangCS, sotha t by a comparison with our own organization a n insightmay be gained a8 t o the f u tu re policy the encmy may ado ptwith regard to the air.

Wit h th is object in view a n endeavou; will be made to

trac c th e history of th e diff eren t typcs of Flights," tak ingeach one in dividual ly, a n d finally to, present the cxiptingorganization a8 a reflection of the policy which our offensivea tt i tu de ha s forced upon thc cnemy.

The deta ils of organization, such as home cstablishmenta nd administration, training, etc., have been purposelyomitted, as it is not the scopc of this pamphlet to dcal withthem, but rather to point out in ' a general manner theprincipl es which have brought +bout the present org aniz ation.

GENERAL ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATIONPRIOR TO MARCH. 1916.

A t th c beginning of the wnr the interior zone ofadminis tr ati on comprised two Inspections undcr t he GeneralInspector of Military Communications (General-Impelitiondes Nil i t~~r-Ve~liehruwesel ls) .

Thcsc two inspcctions corrcsponded to the two g roups in towhich the units of the German Military Air Scrvicc weredivided :-

1. Prus sian formations, t o which the Sa xon,Wiirttemborg, etc., form ati ons were att ached .

2. Bavarian formations6



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A t the outbreak of w a r the Prussian Inspection appointeda Fie ld Officer to the G cnera l Headq uar ter s Staff t o commandthe Ai r Service i n the xone of the Armies, an d gave him th et i t le OB Chef des Feldflugwesens. The Bavarian Inspcction

*-appointed a snbordinatc assistant a3 Plugchef of thcBava rian Flights. I n each A.rmy a Stabs-Offizier (FieldOfficcr) w as appointed with tho rank of major to control theaviation within the Army. I n effect, however, air cr aft unit swere looked upon very much as Army an d Corps Troops, a ndreceivcd their -orders direct^ from art i l lery and othercommanders as operations nccessit.ated.

I n October, 1915, a general order N ~ Sssucd cmphasijdngthe autonomous character of the Air Service, and increasing

the powcrs of theStabs-Ofizier

with the Hcadquarter s of eachArmy. I n f ut ur e requests fo r the co-operation of ai rcraf t"were to be submitted through the Stabs -Offz i e r der FZieger,who would be rcsponsible for the selection of the Flight to beemploycd and for the orders regarding the cxccution of theduty. The Stabs -Of i z i e r with the Army Head quar ters becamca commander, an d h is titl e w as shortly after ward s changed t oRomtnandetw der ?'liegcr. This corresponds to o u r ownorganiEation, under which a Brigadier, R.F.C., commands allthe R.F.C. un its allo tted to each Army.

With the increase of the Air Service, however, themachinery of the W ar Ministry evidently became entirelyunable to cope with the difficulties in the way of technicalquestions an d with thc supply of machines, etc:, a n d on th e6th March, 1016, an Order in Council provided , for th eestablishment '' expcrimentally " of a separate ndmmmtrativccontrol in tho shapc of a Directorate of AeronauticalOperations (7ntendantw der L u ff . s t r e i t k r u f t e )with a Chief .of the Army Air Service, who was to be given authoritycquivalcnt to that of a General in command of an Army

Corps.At the same time all anti-aircraft defences werc placed

undcr this directoretc.The admini st ra ti on of the Mili!ary Ai r Serviec i n t h c

inter ior had up to this dntc maintained Its peace-timeorganization under thc jurisdiction of t he Gcneral Inspectionof Military Communications, but i t was now cxpressly statedth at t he new command would,cnrry with it contro! as regardsBerlin and t he suburbs, the re-organlzation hclng In cffect th c

establishment of an independcnt central control of th e wholeArmy Ai r Servicc, which was t o be administered on the linesof an Army Corps.

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Thc dch i l s u i this new organization wcrc to IJC workedO U L by t h c .Prussian Ministvy of War. This organization is

L very similar t o our own, thc Director-General of Mil it ar yAcronautics, who is also G.O.C., R . F. C . , having a scat on theAriuy Council. In our ease AA. artillery is noL under theI? , . l~ .C.

The foregoing traces roughly the break i n the oldwganization and Lhc lormation of a separate directorateand commnnd for the Air Forccs. I t had thc rcforc t&en t!lcGermans onc y e w and seven inoirths of w a r to recognise thcdifficultics o f the old system and to piovide an organizationto meiit th eir ~.cqu irc mcn ts oth i n the interior an d i n the field.

’ TYPES OF FLIGHTS IN 1915.A p a r t Irom units i n thB in terior such as the military

training establishments (Plie(/cr.-l~’1..satr-~ll,teil.ILll//t.n)nd thcflights for home defcncc, th e fol lo\ ring types of flights existedi L t Lhe f r o n t to deal with the diffcrent duties: -

(i.) FelrlJl%el/e?.abteil.rLng.-Reconnaissance, artil-lery work, pho tography, etc:-These un it s consisted ofa total of eight machines; six of which were. forreconnaissance and artillery work a n d for bomb

dro pping, the rerndining two being machincs of alighter and fastcr type intended‘ ,For fighting, eitherindcpenderitly or as escort.

(i i .) I{nm If wnd % ’ e l ~ ~ ; e y / e ? . a b t e i l ~ ” , , g . - R e c o n -naissancc and fighting (chiefly the latter).-Theseunits were mainly employed ou fighting duties, andcomprised about six machines each. There were,howcvcr, only a few off these units in existence.

I n the autumn of 1915 the K a m p f ,und Feldf l ieger-rrbteil.tmg was given u p , and the follorving iiew unitsmade their appearance : -

* (i.) A7ul le i ; e~Z~~ege~i~~te i l z~~ , . -Des igncd ntirelyf o r art.illcry work, and fitted with wirelesstra nsm itt ing sets. The estahlishment was sixmachines.. (ii.) 7Cmnpf 07’ Foklier ” A b t e i l w a o . - C o m -

posod of six fast machines, and dcsigned cntircly forfighting duties.

(iii.) ~ n ? , L / ~ f o ~ s ~ h r ~ n d e r . .Pigh8ing squadrons,designed ILS . special offensivc formatjons, a n dconsisting o f six R~?,rpfs t i , f /e l r rc w h , iniLkirig a totnl

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.,of 36 machines. Mobility wiis the chief feature of

’’hese units as compared .with the ‘.‘K a n r ~ ~ i f or

ORGANIZATION BY UNITS.( i . ) FELDFLIEGERABTEILUNG.

The~dut ies of this type of unit conrprised the following:--(i: j Reconnnissancc.

(ii.) Artillery work..( i i i . ) Fighting.(iv.) Photography.(v.) Bombing.

I n October, 1915, art i l lcry work had Imcoinc o f primaryimportailcc and rlr.li l lc:, . lapiL!/r,o/rlcila,rqcrL wcre formed. andtook ovcr artillcry work cxclusivcly, the ~‘eldp%e~er~, , l , te%l,rr,a! ,hcing thcrclly relicved of one of ,its most important duties.

About the same timc it was rocognised t ha t ae ria l fightingwas v e r y much on the increase, and th a t a special organizationwas ncccssary to mcct“ the situ atio n. Cert ain fighting unit swew there fore .formed, an d a t the samc tim e offeiisive fg h l ingceased Lo como within thc scope o f the , ’ ) l i / p i e ! / r ” ~ i ~ ~ l c ~ Z , ~ ~ , . ! , ,

and Lhc two machines fo r th is purposc were xitlrdrawn. !Phisdcvolopmcnt was similar. to nnd contemporaneous witli ourown.

The P c l ~ ~ i l i e ! / e , . ~ r b l e i l r ~ ? ~ ~ /ow hccamc simply a u n i t fu rrccpnniiissancc, photographic and bombing work, and as suchit rem;tined until the end o f 1916, when a fu r the rre-organiziition took placo.

Omirrg to the cnorrnous incrense i n art i l lery, the i l ~ l i l -Ic.rie~icllerableil.rrrr!/e,r could evidently not cope with the

additional demands fo r ai rc ra ft Co-operation, an d th esolution to this difficulty was apparently to ‘‘ pool ” theduti es of i l ~ t l l l e r i c ~ ! f l i ~ ! / r r , .urd h’eZdfiieqw-A DteilrrrL!/eir, ancl+tore-namc, these two un it s ,IS Eliey/e,.rLbi.eilrnl!, purc and simple(the former unit being numlicred from 200 upwards andretaining tho letter “ A ”), and making their dutiesidenticnl. Our Corps squadrons hiLvc always undcrtnkcnthc whole of thc work, a n d w e have n e k had separate-artillery squadrons. A certain ;miourit of specialisation is ,hoivevcr, uccessarg, nnd nornially two flights of each Corps

squadron d u couotcr-birttery work, and the t h i d flight contactpatrol, trench rcconaaissnncc and trench homhardmcnt.

The t ra in i ng of so many observers in iirtillery work under

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th e new organi zation inevitably took a considerablc time, a ndth e re-organization ha s only rccently becn complcted. Theduties of th is type of flight are not likely to undergo further

altcration, there being little scope now left for changc; it is,however, inter esting to note : -

(i.) Rs.far as fighting work was conccrned, theneed 'for re-organization due to our a c r i d aggression.

( i i . ) As f.ir as artillery work was concerned, thenecessity for increase in aircraft co-operation due tothe growth of our artillery.

( 1 KAMPF OR ( 1 FO-ER 9 1 ABTEILUNG.

. Thesc units werc formed in the autumn of 1915 to dealwith the increasc of aerial combats and to relieve PeZdfEiegm-, ab te i lunge?zof this duty, with which they had become entirelyunable to cope. As the m m c suggests, they were, a s f a r aspossible, equippcd with the new Folilieer machinc, and, tojudg e fro m the ir subscquent. development, thcy fu ll y justifiedtheir ereation.

About August, 1916, these units werc still furthcrdevelopcd-it i s repor ted at the instigation of Boelckc-andthey became wha t a r e now known a s

Ju&tafleln(Pu r su i t

Flights), with an establishment of 18 machincs of the latcsttypes, the original Fokke? machiies hcing outclassed andorerwhclmed by our acrid offensivc a t the commencement ofth e Somme battl e. Their developmint N ~ Sa direct result ofour offcnsivc policy. It was evidently cousidercd, and righ tlyso, t h a t a fighting u ni t with an establisbmcnt o f six machincsw & s merely a waste of power, a n d th at in order t o dcal with an

.a re a of activity a unit of at least three times this strengthwas ncccssary. . .

It is noteworthy that the Jaudstuffel was to he a purelydefensive unit , an d was not intended.to attack t he enemy ovcrhis lines. Thcir dutics ve r e laid down as pri mari ly to make" b ar ra ge " flights on their own ground t o prevent thopen ctr ation of ou r machines within theirJines. Tho? ent ire lyfailed to accomplish this, but this defcnsivo idea, whethcr hvdesign or by neccssitx, sti ll holds good i n these un it s along th eWcstcrn front.

KAMPFGESCHWADER.The Xampfpschzoider (Battle Squadrons) werc formed

Lowards th e cnd'of 1915, with a view to offcnsivc action withino u r linos. Their general organization consisted of six

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l i nmpf . s l a ff e l ,L (Bat tle Flights). Thcy wCrc to h: undertho direct control o f th e C:i:rnian lligher Colnrnarid for special

9:ffomivc operntions, ;tnd as such they cxistcd.ul, ti ll the latcnutnmri of 1916.

The special fea tur e of the /innri’fi/c.~chzorrde?. as mobility,with thc objeox O S tr;msfowing them mpid1.y to variouspoints along the front to w r r y o u t an aerial offensive as‘circumstmces denrandcd.

These u nit s had scarcely conio i nto being ~bc fo fc t wasobvious that the devolopment of our fighting machinesrendered them unable to cnrr>- ou t their offcnsivc duties, m das w r l y ns August, 1911i, w e find the 31.d R ~ ~ i i y ’ f ! , e s e h i u a ~ ~ e rcarrying out .“ barrage ’‘ nights long thc Somrnc f r o n t withthe object of preventing our niaehines penctrating theGerman l ines , thus proving the corrccbness of our policy thatthe only true means of aerial defence lies i n t h o offensive.

l?rom this time forward a coinpletel) dctensivc attitudewas taken up, a number of l i ( w r ? ~ f s t n f l e l r ~eing re-organizedinto Seluutzstoffelir. (Protective Flights), with the object ofallotting cventually one ~ Y c l ~ r t z a t n f l e lto e v c r g P l i c g m -nbtailar~!/ as a pennancnt escort. Sr i spite of th i s we stillaccornplidill a t least three h i e s the amount of a rt il le ry nork

done by the enemy, and with comparntively l i t t le loss to ourCorps machines.The ~ - ( ~ L n L ~ , f ~ e a c h z e i ~ ~ l a ~enceforth disappeared a y a ‘

fighting un it , aiid this, name v a s then givcr i to a ncworganimtion of Boinbing Squadions which are now i n courseof formation.

Thcsc units, us they &re a t prcscnt constituted, form theonly offensivc power lef t to the Cernialn Aviation, a n d i t i swith these fo rmat ions thiLt th o bombirig nttxkli on Englnndand elsewhere t o a large extent are carried out.

GERMAN AIR ORQANIZATION-JULY, 1911.I n th e German organization at proscnt provision is i i iudc

for the following duties to be carried out : -(i .) Rcconn;iiss;mce and ar ti ll ery work.

(ii.) Protection.(iii.) Defensive fighting.(iv,) Bombing.

Thcrc is, however, no organization f o r carrying out anae ri al offensivc, the impor tance of which, p rcvious tooperations on a large scale, had been pointed out i n more

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tha n one o5ci al German document, The lack of an offensiveorganization is not therefore a matter of want of kuowledge,h u t of lack of opportunity caused by our continually offensivo

attitude, which thcy evidently consider must he dealt withprimarily by an organized system of defence. Thus theyhave:-

(i.) Fl iegerab te i lungen and Fl iegerab te i lwngen “ d,”to carry out rcconnaissancc and artillery work.

( i i. ) Schutzsta,feZn,to carry out the protection of the Fl ieger-abteiltcngeqr.

( i i i . ) J a g d s t a f e h ,to pat rol the f ront and pr ev en to ur machinescrossing the lines, and to engage them whenthey do so.

(iv.) K a m p f g e s c k o u d e r ,to carry out bombing raids;

and, in a d d i t i o n , ’ h ’ a m p f e i r r s i t i e r s t a ~ e ~ ~ ~ ,single-scatcr battl?flights), which a r e located along the Rhine an d in Alsace, andare pure ly for the defonce of the interior.

To sum up, it seems clear that tKe enemy throughout has .been al ive to the impo rtance of ae ria l offencc s n d . h a s had thewill t o carry it ou t, b ut has never. hew allowed‘ t o make areally satisfactory start. I t is a certain development th a t theduties of the Jagdstaffel would vary Soon be changed fromdefence to offencc should the enemy he given the opportunityby tho slackening of our offensive.

offense versus defence in the air 1917

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