occasional paper - undp partner...reconstruction included the break-up of states like the ottoman...

International Peace Support Training CentreNairobi, Kenya

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AS A MEANS OF POST-CONFLICT

RECONSTRUCTION IN EASTERN AFRICA:What Role for Regional Organisations?

Leah KimathiInternational Peace Support Training Centre

P.O. Box 24232-00505, Karen KenyaTel No: 00254 (0) 20 883164/58

Fax: 00254 (0) 83159 Email: [email protected]

IPSTCThe International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC) is a training and research institu-tion whose focus is capacity building at strategic, operational and tactical levels for peace operations within the context of the African Peace and Security Architecture. The Centre endeavours to address the complexities of contemporary UN/AU integrated peace support operations by exposing actors to the multidimensional nature of these operations. The training and research undertaken cuts across the broad spectrum of conflict; prevention, management and post conflict recovery. The Centre is a key training institution for the Eastern African Standby Force (EASF) of the African Standby Force (ASF) through the neces-sary cooperation with partners from all over the world including, Japan, The United King-dom, Germany, Canada, and the United States of America.

The PaperPromotion of democracy and good governance in countries emerging from conflict helps to establish institutions and mechanisms that guarantee peaceful mediation of disputes both in the post conflict reconstruction period and after. The ensuing stability is not only felt nationally but also regionally especially in places like Eastern Africa where conflicts and their impact have been regionalized. Regional organizations therefore, have a direct inter-est in promoting democracy and good governance in member states. Within this context, this paper critically analyses the role of the East African Community, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in democratic promotion and consolidation. While these organizations face several challenges, the paper highlights that there exists sufficient opportunities among regional organizations to promote democracy and good governance in the Eastern African region.

The AuthorLeah Kimathi holds a Masters in History of International Relations from Kenyatta Univer-sity. She also holds a fellowship in International Philanthropy from Johns Hopkins Univer-sity, USA. A recipient of the Claude Ake Award from the African Studies Association and the African American Institute, she has undertaken extensive research in the area of the state in Africa and also published in the same. Her other areas of academic interest include the civil society in Africa, the role of non formal institutions and grass roots peace building. She is currently the Post Conflict Recovery Analyst at the International Peace Support Training Center in Nairobi and a Subject Matter Expert in Regional Security Studies, Security Sector Reforms and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. She is a member of several international professional and academic organizations including the Council for Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Women in International Security (WIIS), Interna-tional Society for the Third Sector Research (ISTR) and the International Sociological Asso-ciation among others.

Publication Supported By The Government of Japan Through UNDP

Series 1 No. 3

Occasional Paper

Series 1

Promoting Democracy i

Promoting Democracy as a Means of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Eastern Africa:

What Role for Regional Organisations?

Leah Kimathi

Promoting Democracyii

International Peace Support Training Centre,Westwood Park,

P.O. Box 24232-00502, Karen, KenyaTel No; 00254(0) 20 883164/58

Fax: 00254(0) 883159E-mail: [email protected]: www.ipstc.org

© 2010 All Rights Reserved

No part of this publication may be produced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, by any means –mechanical, via photocopying, recording

or otherwise –without prior permission of the International Peace Support Training Centre. Statements and views expressed herein are those of the author

and are not necessarily those of IPSTC, Nairobi Kenya.

Editorial Advisory Board:

Brigadier Robert Kibochi, Director IPSTCJudy Wakahiu, UNDP Project Manager

C.A. Mumma-Martinon (PhD), Conflict Prevention AnalystLeah Kimathi Post-Conflict Recovery Analyst

Francis Onditi Post-Conflict Recovery ResearcherJulius Kiprono Conflict Prevention Researcher

Editor:Enid Burke

Printers:PANN PRINTERS LTD.

Promoting Democracy iii

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................iv

Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................v

Abstract .............................................................................................................................. 1

Scope and Methodology ................................................................................................. 2

The Role of Democracy in Post-Conflict Reconstruction........................................ 2

Regional Organisations and Promotion of Democracy.............................................11

The Promotion of Democracy by Regional Organisations in Eastern Africa.......15

East African Community ............................................................................................................................... 15

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development ...................................................................... 17

International Conference on the Great Lakes region ................................................................ 20

African Union and the Promotion of Democracy in Africa.....................................21

Conclusion ................................................................................................................23

Policy recommendations..................................................................................................25

References ...................................................................................................................... 26

Promoting Democracyiv

Acknowledgements

I would like to sincerely thank all those who in one way or the other made this work possible, including the IPSTC Director, Staff, the Peace, and Security Research De-partment (PSRD) and all those people who made time to be interviewed on the various aspects of this research. Special thanks go to UNDP and Government of Japan, for their continued support which has made possible this research and pub-lication.

Promoting Democracy v

Abbreviations

ALS Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia AMISOM African Union Mission in SomaliaAPSA Africa Peace and Security Architecture ASF African Standby Force ASWJ Ahlu-Sunna-Waljamaa AU African Union CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement CPRM Conflict Prevention and Resolution Mechanism DRC Democratic Republic of CongoEAC East African Community EASF Eastern African Standby Force ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EOM Elections Observer Mission EU European Union ICGLR International Conference on the Great Lakes RegionICNRD International Conference of New or Restored Democracies IDP Internally Displaced Persons IFP International Partners Forum IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on Development IGADD Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification ISS Institute for Security Studies ISSNEC National Elections Commission OAU Organization of African UnityPSC Peace and Security Protocol REC Regional Economic Community SNRC Somali National Reconciliation Conference TFG Transitional Federal Government TNG Transitional National Government UN United Nations UNOPS United Nations Political Office for Somalia

Promoting Democracyvi

Promoting Democracy 1

Promoting Democracy as a Means of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Eastern Africa:

What Role for Regional Organisations?

Abstract

In countries emerging from violent conflicts in the Eastern African region as elsewhere on the con-tinent, the promotion of democracy has been adopted as a key post-conflict reconstruction strategy. This is because it is believed that not only will democracy guarantee intra-state peace and stability, but also through democratic peace; democracies not fighting each other-a region with a growing num-ber of countries that are democratising achieves stability overtime. Because of the peace dividends guaranteed as many countries adopt democracy, regional organisations have been at the forefront in promoting democracy and good governance.

Within this context, this paper looks at the role of regional organisations in the promotion of de-mocracy and good governance among member states of the Eastern African region. To achieve this broad objective, the paper critically interrogates the role of democracy in post-conflict reconstruction as well as the engagement of regional organisations in promoting it. It then addresses individu-ally the efforts of the East African Community (EAC), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) as far as promoting democracy among their member countries is concerned.

Promoting Democracy2

Scope and Methodology

The study is both descriptive and analytical in its approach. Accordingly, the main body of the paper gives a critical overview of the role of democracy in post-con-flict reconstruction and that of regional organisations in promoting democracy and good governance. The paper then critically analyses the role of EAC, IGAD, and ICGLR in promoting democracy. Their constitutive acts, mandates, and practices are interrogated to establish this role as well as to identify gaps and opportunities for the promotion of the same. Finally, the paper provides policy recommendations to both the regional organisations and member states for the promotion of democ-racy and good governance.

The study makes use of both primary and secondary sources and draws heavily on official documents such as treaties, declarations, and policy instruments. These sources and documents supplement information gathered through personal inter-views with officials of the three organisations.

The Role of Democracy in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Introducing democracy in the wake of civil war raises a stark question: How can societies shattered by war, with all the deep social enmity, personal suffering, and economic devastation move towards peace and democracy when competitive politics and hard fought elections exacerbate social and political conflict (Jarstad and Sisk, 2008)? While there is no universal definition of democracy, it ranges from minimalist concerns with election procedures to sweeping requirements for socio-economic equality. Promotion of democracy after war is preferred because among other benefits, it introduces structures and rules in society for peacefully mediating conflict.

Democracy within this context is therefore a form of government that offers vari-ous choices in life and politics that lead to fair and just ways of deliberating over and negotiating values and value disputes. As such, it is attractive in a post-conflict context because it is the disputed methodologies of resolving differences in soci-ety in the first instance that precipitated the war. In societies where violence has formally ended or a formal peace settlement has been concluded, the population faces the massive task of rebuilding their respective nations. In this post-conflict reconstruction phase, the state’s authority has often collapsed or is highly contested. What remains of the government has often lost its legitimacy because it has failed to provide its citizens with security or the incentives leading to prosperity. In an overwhelming number of cases, post-conflict phases are thus periods of precarious


and chaotic transition rather than the more ordered progress previously envisioned at the negotiating tables (Debiel and Terlinden 2005).

The lack of legitimacy for these transitional authorities is also a function of their composition; usually, they will have been formed as a result of negotiations be-tween warring parties without the involvement of the majority of the population or include former combatants perceived by the population to be responsible for the crimes. They also exercise limited control over the country’s assets and often times, its territory.

Ordinarily, post-conflict reconstruction is expected to proceed from the emergency phase where the priorities are humanitarian relief and stabilization acquired during transition where legitimate local capacities emerge leading to the eventual develop-ment phase of peace consolidation. This ensures that there will be no relapse to violence. However, the transition from war to peace is not smooth and the peace established is often fragile, making it difficult to apply the term ‘post-conflict’ to many countries. War could reoccur after a period of disturbed peace (Angola and Sierra Leone), localised rebellion often follows a regime change (DRC), cross bor-der insurgency poses a constant risk (Rwanda and Uganda) and widespread human rights violations can continue after a civil war ends (Liberia). However, notwith-standing this precarious nature of the post-conflict state, the international com-munity has assumed that it is both possible and essential for all collapsed states to be reconstructed within their old borders. Even after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the greater Ethiopia in the 1990s, the inter-national community refuses to entertain the possibility that some collapsed states may be simply too dysfunctional to be patched together and that other solutions need to be considered. In contrast with the twentieth century and earlier when state reconstruction included the break-up of states like the Ottoman Empire, in the twenty-first century, collapsed states are expected to rise as soon as possible, with international support and don the trappings of democracy as well (Ottaway, 2002). This partially explains the current preoccupation to restore Somalia to its pre-1991 status and the refusal to recognise Somaliland as an independent state despite the apparently stable statehood of the latter and the unsettled political state of the for-mer in the last two decades.

The transition process from war to peace not only entails overcoming the structural causes that originally sparked the fighting, but also effectively mitigating ongoing conflict and its legacies that define the challenges of the post-conflict situation (UNAIDS, 2003). These challenges are numerous. The fragility of post-conflict sit-uations creates multiple openings for corruption while the lack of a common ethos


of governance undermines the political will for transparency and accountability. A continuing culture of impunity, because of a lack of rule of law or compro-mises made for initial stability also undermines the legitimacy of the state. Unstable populations including Internally Displaced People (IDPs), returning refugees, and unsupported youth as well as (former) child soldiers/ex-combatants and others are particularly vulnerable to being co-opted into unproductive or illicit activities counterproductive to the effective functioning of the state.

The delay to embark on reconciliation processes due to urgent humanitarian or political and economic conditions makes it much more difficult to achieve social cohesion when eventually reconciliation is undertaken.

Continuing insecurity and violence affect the provision of basic services and rees-tablishment of government authority at local levels. Lack of institutional authorities and a weak security sector, in particular the police forces, lead to continued mistrust of the population in public authorities on the one hand and on the other hand, at best, a state lacking legitimacy. At worst, such an environment becomes a breeding ground for the re-eruption of unresolved conflicts and violence (REGOPA, 2007). Conflicts spilling across borders represent an additional source of continued post-conflict instability, at both national and regional levels. Such cross-border conflicts include issues such as the illegal traffic of small arms, light weapons, and anti-personnel mines. Human trafficking, especially of women and children, may also be rife during such conflicts. Rwanda’s case after the 1994 genocide in that country is instructive. The country was devastated by serious conflict on a large-scale, a ru-ined infrastructure and a non-operational economy. At the time, the major immedi-ate post-conflict reconstruction challenges revolved around security, both intrastate and cross border-politics, judiciary, economy, administration, and social cohesion.

In this early phase of post-conflict reconstruction, Eastern African countries as elsewhere have few alternative routes; a choice of internationally driven reconstruc-tion or internally driven reconstruction, or a mix of the two. The international reconstruction process is usually donor driven. The donors often include powerful states in Europe and North America, inter-governmental organisations like the UN and international non-governmental organisations. Their major preoccupation fo-cuses on the rebuilding of institutions ranging from the security sector to political reconstruction that usually includes developing an electoral infrastructure, rewriting the constitution and instituting the rule of law and economic institutions (Ottaway, 2003). The rehabilitation of these institutions commences almost simultaneously. The logic of this reconstruction model is that all issues are interlinked and a state that does not address all of them virtually simultaneously risks reverting to violent


conflict. While this may be true, occasionally multiple actors pulling in different di-rections have often complicated the process defying implementation and common sense. Furthermore, the competing donor interests may override the conceptual framework on which recommendations are based. Another deficiency is that while the model might be good for the long-term establishment of state legitimacy, newly created institutions do not generate immediate authority, which is necessary to es-tablish order. Therefore, it is difficult to curb raw power prevailing in the society at the emergency post-conflict reconstruction phase.

In recent times, especially in the early 1990s, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea emerged as the major cases of internal reconstruction in the region, driven by internal actors. While there might still be pockets of conflicts in the three states, life has largely stabilised for most citizens with governments of the respective states able to make and enforce decisions over most parts of their territories. In all three countries, the first step in reconstituting or constituting the new state was a military victory. Since in this scenario, institutions either had ceased to exist or were greatly inca-pacitated, raw power generated by superior force created the initial stabilising ef-fect (Ibid). Authority obtained from raw power was used to regularise institutions and processes of government thereby leading to the reconstruction of the state. However, for political reasons, the authorities in the three states did not go far enough to encourage the emergence of democratic states once they had regularised governments. This led to the reconstruction of the state but not the emergence of democratic states. In the emergent states, Uganda encouraged the “party-less” de-mocracy, Ethiopia a highly centralised state that was ethnically zoned, while Eritrea largely remains a closed society.

A blend of the two models, where there is effective internal power to generate authority but also an external push towards an early establishment of institutions, works best for long-term stability and democracy in a post-conflict society. Even more stabilising is the situation where the internal power works in collaboration with an international force like the Eastern African Standby Force (EASF). In this context, leadership is crucial in welding the various emergent institutions together using authority derived from the presence of raw power but also ensuring that dem-ocratic governance is instituted from the outset. Merely establishing formal institu-tions and processes does not guarantee policy development and implementation by all relevant actors. What is required is to integrate institution building with skills and capabilities of civic leadership including those of constructive negotiation and consensus formation. A solid governance infrastructure, based on well-articulated horizontal and vertical divisions of power is crucial to managing diversity and com-petition among different groups without resorting to violence and authoritarianism


and in a manner, which delivers access to political and economic opportunities equitably to all citizens irrespective of identity or pre post-conflict reconstruction political orientation.

The early push for the establishment of institutions by the international community entails, among other efforts, the (re) establishment of democracy. Unfortunately, for many of these countries, democracy has not been a tradition in their recent political history especially since the establishment of the colonial state and thus there is not much by way of institutional memory and traditions to begin from. While in pre-colonial times, many societies in Africa, both acephalous and centralized, practised various aspects of indigenous democratic governance in their political systems both internally and across communities, the colonial and postcolonial states systematical-ly abused these institutions as the state was increasingly crafted to serve the needs of the ruling class. In the absence of this pre-colonial heritage, therefore, much of the democratic principles and institutions adopted at the time come from liberal democracy that does not always blend well with the reality of the recipient nation. From the outset of colonialism in the late 19th century, the colonial state in Africa was externally oriented towards meeting the needs of the metropole. To achieve this, the parent state put in place an administration mechanism that supplanted the traditional authority along with their instruments of democracy. This remained the practice throughout the colonial period and it was only at independence that the first elections were held. The colonial state did not see the need to encourage democracy in the colonies because their project was predicated on total domination of the native Africans. Thus, the indigenous political systems were relegated to pro-viding containment and order through the traditional communal authority.

At independence, the emergent ruling elite that took over power from the depart-ing colonialists inherited the state and its institutional challenges, rather than shape it as an instrument of its existing or developing hegemony (Leornard and Straus, 2003). This colonial state legacy decanted into a patrimonial autocracy in much of Africa’s post independence period which deteriorated into crisis by the 1980s bring-ing external and internal pressures for economic and political state reconfiguration. However, the serious erosion of statehood of many African polities by the 1990s limited the scope for effective reform and opened the door for state ruptures and implosions along fault lines that were previously held in check, usually by the cold war.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the governance crisis facing the African state led to an internal and external push for democracy. Beginning with the urban riots in Algerian cities in 1988, street challenges to fossilised single party autocracies sprang


up in many countries, emboldened by the dramatic fall of the Berlin wall. At the beginning of 1990, a striking new pattern of civil society confrontation emerged, when Benin’s ruler Mathieu Kerekou was compelled by an empty treasury and a mobilised populace to accept a sovereign national conference which proceeded to dissolve the existing order in favour of a democratic constitution. Through the national conference processes in many parts of francophone Africa or other pro-cesses, nearly all regimes had to make at least some gestures towards political open-ing (Young, 2004). As a result, whereas only eight African presidents went into vol-untary retirement and only one stood down after an election defeat between 1960 and 1989, the corresponding figures from 1990 to 2004 were 17 and 15 ( Ansie Van Wyk, 2007).

However, by the middle of the 1990s, the democratisation euphoria had faded. The political opening was in many cases only partial. Some of the external trappings of democracy were adopted without its internal substance. In many instances, external presentability seemed to drive political reform rather than a genuine commitment to liberalisation leading to the phenomenon of ‘virtual democracy.’ Former autocrats who had bankrupted their countries re-invented themselves and using the language of democracy legitimated their hold on power. Democracy was also used to bar-gain for aid and other support from the international community by these despots-turned-democrats. But while neither democratisation nor economic reform came close to meeting the expectations of their initial advocates, taken together, they did erase the earlier postcolonial state’s claim to unencumbered hegemony. However, the partially reformed state proved to be substantially weakened, a condition that expressed itself in new forms of violence and disorder in the 1990s. Novel patterns of internal warfare dramatised the limitations of statehood in several countries in Eastern Africa including Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Uganda, Somalia and Ethiopia.

In the emergent phase of post-conflict reconstruction in the region therefore, it might be misleading to talk about restoring or reconstructing democracy since as a practice it did not constitute much of the region’s political culture prior to the conflicts of the 1990s. While there were pockets of democratic practices at both community and national levels, this may not be said to have constituted the region’s political norm. Thus in the reconstruction phase of the 1990s and beyond, promo-tion of democracy, as a post-conflict means of peace building has come to occupy a central role. Increasingly, experience demonstrates that without democracy, peo-ple-centred development is not sustainable and has direct implications for stability. Therefore, democracy is a critical component of post-conflict reconstruction.

In Africa, the role of democracy in resolving a myriad of conflicts is recognised in the AU’s Constitutive Act which sets out a range of objectives and principles for


the establishment of the African Union namely: to promote peace, security and stability …democratic principles and institutions of popular participation and good governance; to promote and protect human and people’s rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AU, 2000).

While regarded, as a fundamental prerequisite for development and stability, there is yet no agreed consensus regarding a precise definition of “democracy”. This is because while there are universal characteristics identified with it, including popular participation, rule of law, transparency and accountability, responsiveness, consen-sus orientation, equity and inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency in governance, there are also regional particularities born out of differences in history, culture and religion among other factors. In this respect, the African Human and Peoples’ Rights Charter, the lead guiding document on democracy and human rights on the continent speaks of the virtues of the ‘historical tradition and the values of African civilisation’ which should ‘inspire and characterise’ African reflection on the con-cept of human and peoples’ rights (Graham and Falicio, 2006). Unlike the Ameri-can and European charters, it stresses the right to development, and the duty of states, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of that right. Other regions, based on their peculiarities, have specific provisions, especially in their interpreta-tions of human rights, which are the founding tenets for democracy.

The institutional diversity of democracy has been explicitly affirmed by the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. While warning that resistance to the democrat-isation process in some cases seems to ‘cloak authoritarianism in claims of cultural difference’, he stresses the ‘undeniable fact’ that there is no one model suitable to all societies. The reality is, he suggests, that individual societies decide when to begin democratisation, and that, throughout that process, each society decides its nature and pace. The heterogeneity of democracy was further stressed by the former UN Secretary-General in his address to the 5th International Conference of New or Re-stored Democracies (ICNRD) in Ulaan Baatar. Democracy, he observed, could not be imposed ‘from abroad’ even though it can be encouraged and assisted through international efforts. He further pointed to the centrality of a global dialogue on democracy since all these divergent democracies would be operating within the global context. This dialogue would ensure that not only new and restored democ-racies could learn from each other, but that old and established democracies could also learn from newer ones (Danilo, 2003).

In the immediate post-conflict environment, the adoption of democratic gover-nance has several positive implications, both internally and regionally, as conflicts in Eastern Africa also tend to destabilise neighbouring states. Internally, democracy


can help to resolve the struggle for power by providing an internationally accept-able standard of who is entitled to govern. This standard is based on open and fair competition of power, structured around the popular vote.

Moreover, conflict-mediating structures and increased opportunities for partici-pation encourage non-violent resolution of conflicts. As this norm matures, the polities reflect politics that are more inclusive where ethnic, religious and political differences among groups are moderated by inclusive and representative political institutions that preclude the need for groups to ground political mobilisation in cultural identity. As a result, the more a state becomes democratic, the less the like-lihood of domestic political instability linked to interstate friction and militarised conflict (Enterline and Greg, 2005).

Regionally, democratic polities are assumed less likely to support or pursue desta-bilising policies in neighbouring states, thereby providing a foundation for stable regional relations. Further, democratic peace theory holds that democratic states are less likely to go to war with each other, thereby increasing the likelihood for regional peace and stability. Other benefits include the regional ‘diffusion’ of democracy (Siverson and Starr 1991) and the emergence of ‘zones of peace’ regionally that could spur democratisation (Thompson, 1996).

However, despite the many and obvious benefits associated with democracy, cau-tion must always be taken when promoting it in fragile post conflict societies. De-mocracy accentuates diversity and provides room for multiple popular demands and if this diversity is not well managed and demands not met, instability could result. Thus while democracy grounds post conflict recovery, if not well managed it could trigger instability or political decay. Under conditions where the institutional foundation of democracy is weak and popular demands are huge and not met by the state, the result is instability leading to political disorder.

The decay and disorder could become costly to both democracy and post-conflict reconstruction (Matlosa, 2006). The practice of democracy in post-conflict societ-ies is also problematic in other ways: willingness to share the powers of governance with an opposition group might be limited especially after protracted and bitter fighting; democratisation might also destabilise society, at least in the short run when elites are highly threatened by democratic change like in Burundi.

In such a situation, elites may mobilise ethnic sentiment or use ethnic violence to retain power. Trouble is less likely to occur when the elites are guaranteed a satis-factory position in the new order (Barnes, 2001). One of the biggest challenges in actualising the implementation of democracy in post-conflict societies in Africa has


been its reduction to multi party elections. Elections are at the core of democracy. In its preamble, the AU’s African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Gover-nance ‘seeks to entrench in the continent a political culture of change of power based on the holding of free, regular, fair and transparent elections conducted by competent, independent and impartial national electoral bodies’ (AU, 2007). One of the inherent objectives of elections is to transform the state and the political system in order to allow pluralism.

In liberal democracies, elections represent the main form of political participation for the majority of the citizens. It is the only way to legitimise a government (Ko-tze and Solomon, 2008). In societies emerging from conflict, elections play several critical roles such as formal war termination, conferring international legitimacy to post-conflict governments, promoting democracy and reconstruction and devising a strategy for conflict management or resolution (Sisk and Reynolds 1998).

However, for elections to play a constructive role in consolidating democracy and minimising conflicts, they must occur in an environment of mutual trust among stakeholders. There must be transparency in the way elections are organised with rules agreed upon by the stakeholders and guaranteed independence of institutions responsible for administrating and managing the elections. These conditions are hardly present in societies emerging from conflicts and using elections to consoli-date a fragile peace.

In such a situation, elections are meant to provide an inescapable means for jump-starting a new post-conflict political order, for stimulating the development of democratic politics, for choosing representatives, forming governments, and for conferring legitimacy upon the new political order. They are also meant to provide a clear signal that legitimate domestic authority has been returned and hence the role of the internal community may be coming to end (Braham, 2005).

Despite the nature of elections as ‘good in themselves’, they also are instruments of a global agenda for a post-Cold War order hinged upon certain values. The effort of building peace in the aftermath of war therefore is not a neutral process, but an attempt to promote a particular kind or model of peace. The questions that arise relate to the sustainability of such a peace often imposed by regional and global powers and, more importantly, how post-conflict elections fit into the new peace agenda and its consequences for societies emerging from war (Obi, 2007).

Elections could also be a source of tension, becoming a lightning rod for popular discontent and extremist sentiments. Elections in conflict situations often act as a catalyst for the development of parties and other organisations primarily used as


vehicles to assist local elites gain access to governing power. They could promote a focus on regional rather than national issues. Elections might serve to place in posi-tions of elected authority leaders committed to exclusionary visions of the country; leaders who are in many cases, the very same ones who started or fought the con-flict in the first place. Commenting on the ascendancy to power through elections of Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia, Amos Sawyer observed that ‘the state we produced turned out to be a criminal state, legitimised by elections’ (Samuels, 2005).

Therefore, while elections are core to the promotion of democracy, they could also have the perverse effect of undermining democratisation. This especially happens when they are held too soon after a conflict and before national political issues have progressed beyond the concerns of the previous conflict, and before more normal peacetime politics have had time to develop. Consequently, while elections are an essential part of many peace agreements, ill timed, badly designed, or poorly run elections have often served to undermine peace processes in fragile post-conflict environments.

Regional Organisations and Promotion of Democracy

One of the more common and successful support mechanisms aiding countries emerging from conflict to consolidate democracy is their membership to regional organisations. When a country emerging from conflict is a member of one or more regional organisations, there are clear benefits that accrue to a country in terms of democratic consolidation.

Regional organisations have acquired new relevance during the last two decades, particularly regarding peace, security, development and the prevention or mitiga-tion of conflict (Wulf, 2009). According to the UN Charter nothing “precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relat-ing to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations” (Art. 52.1).

Regional agencies have been given the task to “make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such re-gional agencies before referring them to the Security Council” (Art. 52.2). With the UN finding itself overburdened with resolving conflicts between and within states, especially since the 1990s, it is increasingly relying more and more on regional and sub regional organisations and engaging in shared responsibility of peacekeeping, especially in situations of state fragility where violence is perpetrated by non-state actors.


In Eastern Africa, most countries have multiple memberships in regional organisa-tions recognised by the AU. As with regional organisations elsewhere on the con-tinent, these institutions have made substantial strides over the past decade by as-suming the primary responsibility for promoting peace and security. Acting on the rationale that the regional conflicts in Africa necessitates a regional response, many of the continent’s regional institutions have added issues of peace and security to their original, mostly economic purpose.

In this regard, the AU’s architecture for peace and security is premised on the in-tensive cooperation between the AU and regional institutions, which are consid-ered as the essential building blocks and implementation agencies for its many pro-grammes. This cooperation ensures that the AU not only profits from the regions’ comparative advantage in military and security matters, but also from their experi-ence with peace operations in the case of Western, Eastern and Southern Africa. Further, their established frameworks and mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution grants them a significant stake and a central role in all processes. Under this approach, the primary responsibility for peace and security remains squarely with the regional economic communities, while the AU serves as an authoritative clearinghouse and framework for all initiatives. Arising from this, the AU conceptually fills the institutional gap between the UN with its higher moral authority for ensuring international peace and security on the one hand and the regional institutions with their perceived greater political will, interest and executive power on the other (Oloo, 2008).

To solidify this relationship between the AU and regional organisations and mecha-nisms, a Memorandum of Understanding defines relations between the two levels in peace and security. The major objectives of this agreement include contributing to the full operationalisation of the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), ensuring regular information exchange on the activities of the parties to the agree-ment, and designing ways by which peace-and-security related activities can be joint-ly implemented in keeping with the principles of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol (AU, 2007). The agreement also aims to regularly review the contri-bution of each Regional Economic Community (REC) and regional mechanism in the areas of the major pillars of APSA, which include early warning, both regional and continental, Panel of the Wise, which calls for creation of mediation structures, and the establishment of the Africa Standby Force (ASF). In general, therefore, the development and implementation of APSA depends upon the regional organi-sations, without whose cooperation and commitment APSA cannot be effectively implemented at the continental level.


Regional organisations should have an immediate interest in promoting peace since inter-state and intra-state wars normally affect the region through destabilising spill-over effects. According to the regional security theory, since most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters called security complexes within which the processes of securitisation and/or desecuritisation are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another (Buzan, 2003). Theoretically, regional organisations could have two differ-ent functions for regional peace: the classic neo-functional theory perceives region-al integration as an engine for peace where the creation of zones for peace ensures that neighbours do not fight wars. The EU exemplifies this model. The second perspective played out by ECOWAS and in the Eastern African region more so in the two conflict systems of the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region is the regionalisation of conflict as a reason for region building (Wulf, 2009).

In societies emerging from violent conflicts, often times there are various forces at work especially those in support of reforms and those who are afraid of losing out because of democratic reforms. The latter would often times be either the war prof-iteers or those that held power formerly in the authoritarian regime. Sometimes, the military also forms part of the opposition. In such a case, membership in a regional organisation would assist reformers in making a credible commitment to political reform when their own domestic options for credible commitment are limited. This happens when regional organisations, themselves committed to democrac,y set in place mechanisms to increase the cost of anti-regime behaviour. This will deter the losers from going overboard by overtly sabotaging the new reformist regime. Even for the regime itself, any reversal on reform could bring sanctions, even expulsion from the organisation. This conditionality is a credible signal to internal and exter-nal actors that the regime is serious about reform.

Regional organisations have been noted for their ability to constrain the actions of member states. Specifically, it is argued that membership to regional organisations is a credible way to lock-in policies or reforms to guard against future policy reversals because these organisations serve as an external enforcement agent and therefore the credibility of the commitment is enhanced. In addition, the high costs imposed by these organisations like sanctions or expulsion create a clear incentive for mem-bers to work within the rules of the system. It also serves as a potential deterrent to winners who would undermine democratic reform and thus a key source of cred-ibility for domestic reformers. This external constraint could guard against back-sliding arising from time-inconsistent preferences of leaders or changes in state leadership (Pevehouse, 2006). The Eastern African region has several examples of


former reformists turned autocrats or leaders who once in power have gone back on some of the promises that propelled them to power in the first place

The public relations costs are uniquely high in post-conflict settings and flow from the fact that the young democracies are attempting to establish reputation as up-standing members of the regional organisations and, by extension, the international community. In these circumstances, the population is most likely keenly following the country’s association with the regional organisations since this association of-fers an early chance to break with the images of an authoritarian past. Losing this membership risks a backlash from the elite and the public both of which would blame the regime for losing their opportunity at international acceptance. These same structures could deter the losers because they would be afraid of embarking on polices that would cost their country valuable international links. While regional organisations buttress democracy in emerging democracies among their member states, their proximity might also compromise the neutrality and impartiality of their responses. In some instances, it might generate tensions and undermine the spirit of impartiality between neighbours to the point of becoming part of the problem. Neutrality might be further undermined by the existence of a regional hegemony like Nigeria and South Africa, which while providing their respective regions with the requisite resources, capacity and political legitimacy to execute a regional response to the conflict may through their domestic problems and national interest shape the peace and security agenda of the region (Powell, 2005). Reliance on regional powers also raises profound questions about how to design regional responses to conflicts in which the dominant state is party to.

Another challenge associated with regional responses is that regional organisations in Africa generally lack the expertise needed to handle complex conflict situations. As their experience in this field is usually limited, they do not have the capability to prevent violence from breaking out or the ability to develop a comprehensive peacekeeping capacity. Other challenges include the lack of resources and political consensus to carry on effective operations.

Despite these challenges, regional organisations, especially in the Eastern African region, aspire to be primary vehicles for the promotion of democracy and good governance among member states.


The Promotion of Democracy by Regional Organisations in Eastern Africa

East African Community (EAC)

The former East African Community consisting of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania was originally established in 1967 to promote regional economic integration but collapsed in 1977 due to political and ideological differences among its member states and squabbles over the sharing of economic benefits of integration. In 1993, the three countries established a Permanent Tripartite Commission for East Afri-can Cooperation. Full East African cooperation efforts began on March 14, 1996 when the Secretariat of the Permanent Tripartite Commission was launched at the headquarters of the EAC in Arusha, Tanzania (ISS, 2009). Subsequently, the treaty establishing the current community was signed by the three leaders in December 1999.

The membership of the community has since grown to five with Rwanda and Bu-rundi joining it. The primary focus of the current community is regional economic integration with the eventual goal of a political federation by 2013. The main or-gans of the EAC are the Summit of Heads of State and Government; the Council of Ministers; the Coordination Committee; Sectoral Committees; the East African Court of Justice, the East African Legislative Assembly and the Secretariat.

In principle, EAC recognises the need to promote democracy among its member countries to guarantee peace and stability and as a prerequisite for effective regional integration, more so because four of its five member states have variously been involved in internal conflicts in the last two decades. Therefore, Article 6 of the EAC Treaty provides for “good governance including adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law, accountability, transparency, social justice, equal op-portunities, gender equality, as well as the recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.” However, the Treaty does not clearly stipulate how democracy and good governance will be achieved by member states. To respond to this omission, the Community has developed a draft Framework on Good Gover-nance and a Draft Protocol on Prevention and Combating Corruption.

The draft Framework on Good Governance is being developed within the context of the fundamental principles to achieve the Community objectives. It envisages


harmonisation and approximation of policies, strategies, programmes and practices for the EAC integration (Kiraso, 2009). It has several pillars: constitutionalism; rule of law and access to justice; protection of human rights and equal opportunities; democracy and harmonisation processes; preventing corruption and upholding ethics and integrity in the region. The process of developing this framework has brought together all key stakeholders from member states over a period. This has been necessary to ensure full engagement and ownership of the eventual frame-work by member states in recognition of the centrality of good governance to regional peace and stability.1

The stakeholders include chief justices, electoral commissions, human rights bod-ies, anti corruption agencies, law enforcement agencies, members of parliament as well as civil society organisations.

The draft Protocol on Prevention and Combating Corruption is based on the prin-ciples of transparency and proper management of the public resources. It provides for development of joint policies and strategies to prevent and combat corruption in the region and to promote transparency, ethics, and integrity (Ibid).

EAC has also developed a policy establishing the EAC Forum of Electoral Com-missions. The forum brings together regional electoral bodies with a view to shar-ing experiences, challenges and mapping out common strategies to facilitate free, fair, and credible elections in the region. This is in recognition that while elections are the cornerstone of democracy, they are also a key source of conflicts in the re-gion.2 As an inter-governmental authority, the EAC does not have mechanisms of enforcing its decisions on democratic consolidation in member states.

Therefore, it relies on the political will of governments to implement any decisions taken towards democracy. Like other regional organisations in Eastern Africa, it also respects the principle of sovereignty and cannot easily intervene in the internal affairs of member states. Partly and in accordance with this principle, EAC was not able to decisively engage as a regional organisation following the 2008 post-election violence in Kenya.3 This situation is complicated by a lack of guiding policies on the constitution and implementation of democracy in member countries. However, once the draft documents are ratified, EAC expects to influence significantly the regional dynamics in democracy.

1 I. Waffubwa, Principle Political Affairs Officer, East African Community, Personal Interview, July 22. 2010.2 Ibid.3 D. Kaguta, Peace and Security Officer, East African Community, Personal Interview, July 22, 2010.


Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) was formed in 1986 with a very narrow mandate focused on the issues of drought and desertification. This was because of the recurring and severe droughts and the natural disasters that plagued the Horn of Africa between 1974 and 1984 and which caused widespread famine, ecological degradation, and economic hardships. While individual countries with the help of the international community undertook substantial measures to cope with the emergent challenges, their extent called for a regional approach to supplement national efforts. Since then, and especially since the early 1990s, IGADD became the acceptable vehicle for regional security and political dialogue.

When in 1994 the organisation began to help in the Sudanese civil war and became increasingly active in solving development issues, it changed its name to Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and its mandate was broadened through an amendment of its Charter. The revitalised organization was launched in November 1996. Greater emphasis was placed on the need for peace and security as essential prerequisites for development. Three priority areas were identified: con-flict prevention, management and resolution and humanitarian affairs; infrastruc-ture (transport and communications), development; and food security and environ-ment. Particular emphasis was given to the need to reactivate peace and security initiatives in Southern Sudan and Somalia (Ibid).

Since 1996, IGAD has been intricately involved in the region’s peace and security agenda. Its mandate is drawn from Article 18A of the agreement establishing the organisation. The Article states that member states will take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional cooperation, peace, and stability; to estab-lish an effective mechanism of consultation and cooperation for the pacific settle-ment of disputes and accept to deal with disputes between member states within the sub region before they are referred to other regional or international organisa-tions. While the agreement establishing IGAD does not explicitly refer to the pro-motion of democracy as one of its core functions, nonetheless it draws its mandate to engage in the promotion of democracy from the above Article 18A and also Article 6A on Principles which talks of “recognition, promotion and protection of human and people’s rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Char-ter on Human and People’s Rights”. In addition Article, 7 on aims and objectives speaks of the promotion of peace and stability in the sub region and the creation of mechanisms within the sub region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts through dialogue. The organisation is currently in


the process of drafting the IGAD Charter on democracy and governance4 that will guide it in promoting democracy in the region. It is within this context that IGAD has been intricately involved in the Sudan and Somali peace processes.

Beginning in 1994 when IGAD took an active role in the resolution of the Sudan conflict, it midwifed the peace process until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 after which it has been the lead external agency in the follow up of the post-conflict reconstruction of Sudan as spelt out in the CPA, more so in monitoring the implementation of the various agreements within the CPA.5 It is crucial for IGAD to assume the lead role so as to ensure a regional ownership of the reconstruction process. Through its special envoy to Sudan, and its liaison office in Juba, IGAD collects information and provides advice to govern-ment in both Khartoum and Juba on the implementation of the various protocols and instruments of the same. The information collected by the two offices is then shared out to its partners, both state and non-state, who then take appropriate ac-tion as deemed necessary. In March 2010 and arising out of the recommendations of the Juba and Khartoum offices, an extraordinary meeting was called because preparations for important milestones in the CPA were lagging behind, including elections and the referendum.6

In regard to monitoring the implementation of the CPA in Sudan, IGAD was in-tricately involved in the monitoring of the elections that took place in April 2010. At the invitation of the National Elections Commission of the Republic of Sudan (NEC), IGAD sent an Elections Observer Mission (EOM) through the office of the special Envoy to the Assessment and Evaluation Commission of the CPA es-tablished in June 2010.

The objective of the Mission was to assess whether the environment was favour-able for democratic elections according to the Sudanese constitutional and legal provisions, and also whether they met the international bench marks as set out in the African Union Declarations on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa (African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance) and the Dec-laration of Principles for International Observers adopted by the UN in October 2005 (IGAD, 2010).

The mission, which was deployed in 13 locations throughout Sudan, consulted with observers from the AU, European Union (EU), and ICGLR as part of IGAD’s col-laboration with other regional and international organisations. In its communica-tion on the conduct of elections in the Sudan, the mission concluded that given that

4 Y. Okubo, Acting Director of Peace and Security, IGAD, Personal Interview, July 12, 2010.5 K. Mwangi, IGAD, Program Officer, Personal Interview, July 20, 2010.6 Ibid.


this was the first time Sudan was undertaking such a massive exercise in 24 years as well as considering the vastness of the country and the challenges of the infra-structure, the elections were generally credible. This verdict was important because it lends legitimacy to processes that are laid out in the CPA and which eventually will culminate in the January 2011 referendum, the highlight of the normalisation of Sudan, as envisaged in the CPA.

With the successful completion of the elections, both the CPA and the role of IGAD seem to be strengthened and with the regional bilateral push on the govern-ment of Sudan, especially from Kenya, to remain on track towards the referendum, IGAD will play an even bigger role in the January 2011referendum in the Sudan peace process. In the past, IGAD has proven to be a useful diplomatic channel, especially for the regional states, when requisite pressure has to be applied on Khar-toum to honour the provisions of the CPA. Now more than ever, IGAD will pro-vide that platform, as there seems to be faltering commitment from Khartoum on the referendum (Siebert, 2010).

In the Somali peace process, IGAD has actively participated in the various peace processes that have been undertaken, beginning its engagement in 1997 when it (IGAD) initiated its own peace process. IGAD gave its backing to the Arta Con-ference in 2000, although the hosting and mediation was provided by the Djibouti Government, which led to the formation of Somalia’s Transitional National Gov-ernment (TNG). In 2002, IGAD made a strategic break-through with the start of the Somali National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC), which has been the most inclusive forum in the last decade. The Eldoret Declaration signed on October 27, 2002 provided for a Cessation of Hostilities and for the specification of structures and principles of the Somalia National Reconciliation Process, in particular the creation of federal governance structures and commitment to the principle of de-centralisation (IGAD, 2003).

These efforts culminated in the creation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004 whose efforts to bring peace and national reconciliation, IGAD has continued to support. Towards this end, the IGAD Somalia Peace Facilitator was appointed in December 2008. Through a strategic plan designed by the facilitator’s office, IGAD aims at assisting the TFG in its efforts to negotiate peaceful settle-ments in the country and assist variously towards democratic consolidation.7

As a ‘way forward’ in negotiating peaceful settlements, IGAD has facilitated the signing of various agreements between the TFG and armed groups like Ahlu-Sun-na-Waljamaa (ASWJ) and the Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia (ALS). These

7 Ibid.


agreements are within the framework of the Djibouti agreement of June 2008 signed between TFG on one hand and IGAD and its partners, including the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and EU on the stabilisation of Somalia.

The promotion of democracy in Somalia by IGAD or any other organisation is problematic, largely because of the cumulative effects of conflict, spanning about two decades. IGAD’s efforts are further challenged by its very nature, being state centric and therefore supporting and largely working with the TFG whose legitima-cy is highly contested.8 While the EU peace dividends model also faces challenges, it at least reaches out and takes cognisance of other lower level societal organisations key to the re-emergence of democracy and stability in Somalia.

International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)

Of all the sub-regional organisations in the Eastern African region, the constitutive documents of ICGLR are the most explicit in the promotion of democracy and good governance as key to regional peace and stability. In the Dar-es-Salaam Dec-laration establishing the organisation, the 11 member states categorically undertake to ‘promote in our states and in the region, policies and strategies based on respect of values, principles and norms of democracy and good governance as well as ob-servance of human rights’ (ICGLR, 2004). In Article 6 on the Protocol on Democ-racy and Good Governance within the Pact on Security Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, member countries further undertake to promote and observe democratic principles and standards, and to set up institutions to promote good governance, the rule of law and the respect for human rights through consti-tutional systems based on the separation of powers, political pluralism, the regular organisation of free, democratic and credible elections (ICGLR, 2006). To actualise its commitment to democracy, ICGLR adopted the Regional Programme of Action for the promotion of Democracy and Good Governance as one of the four ac-tion pillars of the organisation in 2006. The programme aims to: establish regional mechanisms to promote the rule of law, human rights, and combat impunity; con-solidate a democratisation process by enhancing institutional capacity, promoting political participation of all segments of society; and harmonise and coordinate policies on the protection and rational exploitation and management of resources.

The programme consists of four sub-programmes reflecting the priorities defined under the various protocols of the Pact that promote democracy and rule of law. Subsequently, the first sub-programme concerns the Regional Centre on Good Governance, Democracy, Human Rights, and Civic Education in Lusaka, Zambia

8 Ibid.


and regional forums for parliamentarians, civil society, youth, women, and vulner-able groups. The second sub-programme deals with the regional initiative for the prevention and the punishing of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, and the fight against impunity. Sub programme three covers economic governance and rational management of resources while the last sub programme deals with regional information and communications council (ICGLR, 2009). Each of these sub programmes contains various projects.

While ICGLR has a very good blueprint on democracy in the region, it has, how-ever, not actualised much of these programmes. Therefore, its impact in promoting democracy in the region is yet to be felt. It has, however, been involved in a few activities either singularly or jointly with other regional organisations. In Burundi, Sudan, and Rwanda, ICGLR sent observer missions to the elections that took place in those countries. In the Sudan, the observer mission closely collaborated and consulted with that sent by IGAD. The organisation also was involved in negotia-tions with the Burundi opposition prior to the elections when they boycotted the presidential elections and threatened to boycott the parliamentary elections. ICGLR encouraged the opposition to at least take part in the parliamentary elections.9

The Regional Centre on Good Governance and Democracy is currently being es-tablished in Lusaka. The first of its kind in Africa, it will assist member states in promoting good governance and the rule of law. The Centre is also expected to explore and come up with home-grown solutions affecting governance, especially in member states and generally in Africa.10

Through the national focal points, ICGLR is encouraging the domestication and implementation of most of the protocols that have already been ratified on gov-ernance. However, because of its overreliance on governments to implement its programmes and protocols, this is expected to take some time.

African Union and the Promotion of Democracy in Africa

The African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, which was ad-opted in Addis Ababa on January 30, 2007, aims at entrenching a culture of democ-racy and respect for human rights throughout the continent. This arose out of the concerns of the aborted democratic experiments in the continent beginning in the 1990s and the subsequent civil conflicts that engulfed several African states.

9 Ambassador J. Kimani, Representative, ICGLR Kenya, Personal Interview, June 16 2010.10 Ibid.


While the Charter does not explicitly define democracy, it emphasizes in various articles the institutional and policy foundations requisite for the functioning of a democracy. To this end, Article 4 commits states to promote democracy, the rule of law and human rights towards the development of a democratic culture and peace, while chapter 6 dwells on the establishment and strengthening of demo-cratic institutions. Chapter 7 is dedicated to the conduct of transparent, free and fair elections in accordance with the Union’s Declaration on the Principles Gov-erning Democratic Elections (AU, 2007 Art 17).

Compared to the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights (popularly known as the African Charter) which is arguably the founding document for the promo-tion and protection of human rights on the continent, the former adds value to this promotion. It extends benefits of rights to constituencies like the marginalized and vulnerable groups not formally recognised in the African Charter while still hold-ing intact the obligation of states on the rights of the individual. The Charter also brings together various earlier efforts by the AU and its predecessor in the fields of democracy, elections, and governance. Taken together with the Constitutive Act of the AU which obliges member states “to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights; to consolidate democratic institutions and culture; to promote good gover-nance and the rule of law; to promote democratic principles and institutions and to condemn and reject unconstitutional change of government” (AU, 2000), the two documents of AU provide a solid basis upon which states of the African continent should promote democracy and human rights.

As the building blocks of the AU, the continental organisation relies on regional organisations primarily to actualise these various charters through domestication of democracy and good governance. These organisations while taking their cue from the AU and from the realities in their regions have subsequently adopted some of the principles of democracy, not just from the Charter but also from earlier ef-forts. Some organisations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have domesticated the former Organisation of African Unity’s (OAU) strategy in the setting up of penalty measures in terms of coercive diplomacy con-sisting of measured and targeted pressure and interventions (Fall, 2008). However, the Eastern African region, for various reasons, is still very slow at this domestica-tion and this has a direct bearing on the levels of democracy among states in the region.


Conclusion

The African post independence record regarding democracy and the observance of human rights has been a wretched one, although not universally so. While there have been redeeming spots like Botswana and Mauritius, they pale alongside the lengthy conflicts of Sudan and Somalia; the genocide of Rwanda; the excesses of Obote and Amin regimes in Uganda and the Dergue in Ethiopia; the warlord cus-tom of recent times in Sierra Leone and Liberia and the intermittent periods of military rule in a number of African countries.

Taken together, however, there has undoubtedly been some progress made in the democratisation of African state structures. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the governance crisis facing the African state led to both an internal and external push for democracy. Although these efforts had been largely frustrated by the mid 1990s where former despots reinvented themselves and became the leading proponents of democracy which had by then been adopted without its internal logic, rigor and substance, they nonetheless led to an expanded political space for the citizenry and challenged the earlier post colonial state’s claim to domineering hegemony.

In the Eastern African region, while this assault on the state institutions and struc-tures in several countries led to new forms of violence and conflicts, the democratic space gained in the earlier period was not lost and formed a basis to negotiate for the expansion of civic rights in the post-conflict reconstruction period. However, this struggle for democracy and human rights in the region is still very national in character. While the Eastern African region is home to several regional organisa-tions and other international non-state actors, there is still a rather limited collabo-ration between the state and regional organisations and initiatives in the promotion of democracy and human rights at both the national and sub-regional levels. This limitation arises both from challenges within the organisations and the states.

At the organisational level, the relatively young organisations, most of which are less than ten years old, do not yet have in place most of the specialised protocols and policy documents. The organisations, therefore, rely on the constitutive docu-ments and founding treaties, which are vague in reference, to promote democracy. The exception is ICGLR, but even here, while there are guidelines on the promo-tion of democracy, the organisation is yet to fully implement them. Furthermore, these regional organisations and to some extent, even the AU, have not precisely defined democracy, especially within an African context.


Regional organisations also lack enforcement mechanisms to implement decisions taken and have, therefore, to rely on the political will of the member states. Other challenges facing these regional organisations include: the lack of a clearly defined political interest; the principle of non- interference in the internal affairs of mem-ber states as opposed to ECOWAS; lack of commitment by member states; limited resources and capacity; little or no follow up on decisions taken and policies made; absence of coordination and harmonisation and the still largely top down approach to policy making and development (Oloo, 2008). Multiple memberships in different regional organisations with similar mandates also pose a threat to loyalty, maximum utilisation of scarce resources and confusion created by overlaps in mandates.

Despite the challenges, significant democratic gains made at the national level are also positively affecting regional organisations. The presence of a growing number of democratically elected heads of state at regional summits will open up debate on democracy at a regional level, and propel these organisations to embrace demo-cratic principles and in return, plough back these virtues to member states. Their presence will also open up dialogue and partnerships between these organisations and civil society in the region, which will further promote the emergence of a democratic culture within the Eastern African region. After all, these organisations are inter-state governmental agencies and therefore their progress will largely mir-ror the constituent states’ progress in advancing democracy.

The nascent but growing engagement of civil society by these regional organisa-tions will broaden the scope of state engagement, giving the much-needed political legitimacy to engage with state actors, sometimes against the wishes of the actors themselves.

This paper set out to interrogate the role of regional organisations in the promo-tion of democracy and good governance among member states of the eastern African region. The study established that there is much goodwill towards the pro-motion of democracy by these organisations. However, they face many challenges emanating from both the organisations and the members state themselves. These challenges revolve around mandates, political will, enforcement mechanisms, and multiple memberships of states in regional organisations.

Notwithstanding these challenges, the study reiterates the key role of regional or-ganisations as primary vehicles for the promotion of democracy and good gover-nance among member states. The paper also established that there exists numerous opportunities for these organisations to engage both amongst themselves and with member states to ensure the growth of a democratic culture in the region.


Policy recommendations

Regional organisations

Regional organisations need to develop a common understanding of democracy. Both its composition and implementation should be informed by the particular experiences of the region and should also be based on the AU’s African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights as well as the African Charter on Democracy, Elec-tions and Governance and other relevant protocols of the AU.

These organisations need to speed up the development and adoption of relevant policy guiding documents because it is only then that they will gain the requisite legitimacy to engage member states in promoting democracy.

They need to encourage member states to ratify requisite documents and protocols like the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. This will spur the promotion of democracy at the state level thereby leading to the achievements of the democratic aims of regional organisations.

Regional organisations need to strengthen their linkages and networks with civil so-ciety organisations in the region to bolster their efforts and enhance their legitimacy among the population of Eastern Africa. They also need to strengthen their own internal democracy for credibility.

They need to enhance relations between themselves and the AU through formal and non-formal structures and feedback to compliment regional and continental efforts towards democracy. There should also be horizontal collaborative efforts among the regional organisations to solidify the gains of regional peace and de-mocracy.

Regional organisations should develop enforcement mechanisms in case of non-compliance rather than relying on a member state’s political will.


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International Peace Support Training CentreNairobi, Kenya

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AS A MEANS OF POST-CONFLICT

RECONSTRUCTION IN EASTERN AFRICA:What Role for Regional Organisations?

Leah KimathiInternational Peace Support Training Centre

P.O. Box 24232-00505, Karen KenyaTel No: 00254 (0) 20 883164/58

Fax: 00254 (0) 83159 Email: [email protected]

IPSTCThe International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC) is a training and research institu-tion whose focus is capacity building at strategic, operational and tactical levels for peace operations within the context of the African Peace and Security Architecture. The Centre endeavours to address the complexities of contemporary UN/AU integrated peace support operations by exposing actors to the multidimensional nature of these operations. The training and research undertaken cuts across the broad spectrum of conflict; prevention, management and post conflict recovery. The Centre is a key training institution for the Eastern African Standby Force (EASF) of the African Standby Force (ASF) through the neces-sary cooperation with partners from all over the world including, Japan, The United King-dom, Germany, Canada, and the United States of America.

The PaperPromotion of democracy and good governance in countries emerging from conflict helps to establish institutions and mechanisms that guarantee peaceful mediation of disputes both in the post conflict reconstruction period and after. The ensuing stability is not only felt nationally but also regionally especially in places like Eastern Africa where conflicts and their impact have been regionalized. Regional organizations therefore, have a direct inter-est in promoting democracy and good governance in member states. Within this context, this paper critically analyses the role of the East African Community, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in democratic promotion and consolidation. While these organizations face several challenges, the paper highlights that there exists sufficient opportunities among regional organizations to promote democracy and good governance in the Eastern African region.

The AuthorLeah Kimathi holds a Masters in History of International Relations from Kenyatta Univer-sity. She also holds a fellowship in International Philanthropy from Johns Hopkins Univer-sity, USA. A recipient of the Claude Ake Award from the African Studies Association and the African American Institute, she has undertaken extensive research in the area of the state in Africa and also published in the same. Her other areas of academic interest include the civil society in Africa, the role of non formal institutions and grass roots peace building. She is currently the Post Conflict Recovery Analyst at the International Peace Support Training Center in Nairobi and a Subject Matter Expert in Regional Security Studies, Security Sector Reforms and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. She is a member of several international professional and academic organizations including the Council for Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Women in International Security (WIIS), Interna-tional Society for the Third Sector Research (ISTR) and the International Sociological Asso-ciation among others.

Publication Supported By The Government of Japan Through UNDP

Series 1 No. 3

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Series 1

occasional paper - undp partner...reconstruction included the break-up of states like the ottoman...

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