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Ny�ya Perceptual Theory: Disjunctivism or Anti-Individualism?

Anand Jayprakash Vaidya

Philosophy East and West, Volume 63, Number 4, October 2013, pp.562-585 (Article)

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562 PhilosophyEast&WestVolume63,Number4October2013562–585 ©2013byUniversityofHawai‘iPress

NYĀYA PERCEPTUALTHEORY: DISJUNCTIVISM OR ANTI-INDIVIDUALISM?

Anand Jayprakash VaidyaDepartmentofPhilosophy,[email protected]

I. Introduction

Misperceptionispartofthehumancondition.Consideraclassiccaseofcoming to confirmthatonehashadamisperception.Onastrollthroughthewoodsyousee,inthedistance,whatseemstobeaperson.Asyoudrawnear,whatlookedlikeapersonnowappearstobeawoodenpostwithahatonit.Onarrivalyoutouchtheposttoconfirm that it isnotaperson.Fromapre-theoreticalperspective,whathashap-pened?Onyourapproachyoujudgedthattherewasaperson,basedonwhatyousaw.Whennear,youjudgedthatitwasapostandnotaperson,andthenbytouchyouconfirmedthatwhatyouinitiallysawwasamisperception.

Inexaminingcasesofmisperceptionitisimportanttoask:whatroledoescon-ceptpossessionplayinexplainingthemisperception?Theconceptualistansweristhatanecessaryconditiononxmisperceivingapostasapersonisthatxpossessboththeconceptofapostandtheconceptofaperson,sothatxcanbeinacognitiveposition tomisperceive thepost foraperson.Theguiding idea is that ifonepos-sessesneithertheconceptofapostnortheconceptofaperson,itisunintelligiblehowonecouldhavesuchamisperception.Forhowcouldonejudgeonthebasisofone’sperceptionalonethatonapproachitwasapersonbutthatuponarrivalitwasapost, ifone failed topossess theseconcepts?Theconceptualistmaintains thatasubject’smisperceptionsarecontrolledbytheconceptualschemethattheypossess.In general, our conceptual schemes determine a limit boundary to what we canmisperceiveandwhatotherscantakeustohavemisperceived.1

Philosophers both East andWest have taken note of the fact that at least insomecasestheincoherenceofmisperceptionwithoutconceptpossessionyieldstotheviewthaterrororfalsecognitiondependsontruthortruecognition.Theviewthaterrormetaphysicallydependson truth,but truthdoesnotmetaphysicallyde-pendonerroriscalledtheasymmetric dependenceoferrorontruthortheparasit-ism of error on truth. The guiding idea of asymmetric dependence is that thepossibility of false cognition depends on a prior true cognition, and as a conse-quenceerrorisparasiticontruth.Ifoneneverperceivedcorrectlythenonecouldnotmisperceive.

In his illuminating comparative essay Parasitism and Disjunctivism in Nyāya Epistemology,MatthewDasti(2012)carefullyarguesthattheNyāyaschoolofclassi-calIndianphilosophyofferedmanyargumentsfortheparasitismoferrorontruth,

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andthatthepositionstheyheldrelativetotheseargumentsanticipatetheepistemo-logicaldisjunctivismofcontemporaryWesternepistemology,especiallythatofJohnMcDowell(1996,2009).2Disjunctivism,ingeneral,is,roughly,adenialoftheclaimthatthereisacommonkindofexperiencebetweenmisperceptionsandperceptionsthatisofrobustexplanatoryvalueforthepurposesofthephilosophyofperception.Atahighlevelofabstraction,disjunctivismclaimsthatperceptionsandmispercep-tionsaresimilarinthesamewaythatsuperficiallysimilar,butchemicallydistinct,compoundsaresimilar.Forexample,goldandfool’sgoldorjadeiteandnephritearemacroscopicallysimilarbutchemicallydistinctsubstances.Byanalogy,atadeeperlevel of explanation, disjunctivism claims that perceptions and misperceptions,thoughphenomenologically similar,are fundamentallydistinctandshouldnotbecategorizedasbeingofthesameepistemickind.

HereIarguethatontheassumptionthatNyāyaperceptualtheorydoesadvanceargumentsforparasitism,weshould notconcludesoquicklythattheirworkentailsoranticipatesMcDowell’sspecificformofepistemologicaldisjunctivism.Therearetwomainreasonsforthis.First, IarguethattheBurge-McDowelldebateoverdis-junctivismputspressureontheideathatepistemicdisjunctivismisaplausiblethesis.Second,Burge’sownperceptualanti-individualismprovidesaplausiblealternativethathasthebenefitofbeingconsistentwithargumentsforasymmetricdependence,aswellaswithcontemporaryresearchinthevisionsciences.

Theoverallapproachofthisessayisexploratory.Itaimstoprovideaconstructiveengagementbetweentemporallydistantandculturallyunrelatedphilosophicaltra-ditionsfor thepurposesofenhancingphilosophicaldiscussion.Ontheonehand,itseekstobringtothetableconceptualresourcesfromcontemporaryanalyticepis-temologyandthevisionsciencesthatcanhelpshedlightonwhatpotentialoptionsareavailableforunderstandingNyāyaperceptualtheoryandepistemology.Ontheotherhand,itseekstoenrichthepoolofideasfromwhichcontemporaryanalyticepistemologyshoulddrawwhentheorizingaboutperceptionbypositioningforfur-therdiscussionthesubtleandnovelaccountofmisperceptionadvancedinNyāyaepistemology.

Theplanofthisessayisthefollowing.Inthesecondsectionbelow,Ipresentthecentralcomponentsandargumentsinvolvedintheasymmetric dependenceoferrorontruth,Burge’santi-individualism,andMcDowell’sepistemological disjunctivism.Inthethird,IpresentandanalyzetheBurge-McDowelldebateoverepistemicdis-junctivismasawayofdefending theclaim that epistemicdisjunctivismdoesnotfollowfromasymmetricdependence.Inthefourth,IusetheanalysisinthethirdtoanalyzeDasti’sargumentandtoquestionwhethertheNyāyaargumentsfrompara-sitismgenuinelyanticipateepistemologicaldisjunctivism.Inthefifth,IpresenttheNyāyamisplacementtheoryofillusion,orMTI.Inthesixth,IarguethatMTI(a)offersametaphysicaldistinctionbetweenperceptionsandmisperceptionsthatfallsshortofepistemologicaldisjunctivism,but(b)isconsistentwithperceptualanti-individualism.Inconclusion,intheseventhsection,IdiscusshowNyāyaperceptualtheoryshouldbeofinteresttothoseworkingincontemporaryepistemologyandperceptualtheory.

564 PhilosophyEast&West

II. Asymmetric Dependence, Disjunctivism, and Anti-Individualism

Asymmetric DependenceAt leastwithrespect tonatural-kind termsandempiricalconcepts,suchaswater,human,shell,anddog,errororfalsecognitionasymmetricallydependsontruthortruecognition.3Itispossibleforonetopossessandlearnanatural-kindconceptandneverbeinerrororhaveafalsecognitionwithrespecttodeployingit.Forexample,onecouldlearntheconceptshellthroughobservationofateacherwhousesitcor-rectlytopickoutshellsfromstones,andtheninsubsequentusenevermisapplytheconcept.However, it isconceptually impossible foronetopossessaconceptandalwaysbeinerrorwithrespecttodeployingit.Thepossibilityofmisapplyinganem-piricalconceptthatislearnedfromone’senvironmentpresupposes(a)thattheindi-vidualpossesstheconceptinquestionand(b)thattheirconceptpossessionitselfbeafunctionofatleastsomecorrectcasesofapplication.Againconsiderthecaseoftheshell.Supposeachildisbeingtaughttheconceptshell throughostentionfromateacher,andeachtimetheteacherattemptstogetthestudenttoapplytheconcepttoasetofdiverseobjects,thestudentfails.Itisplausibleinthiscasethatthestudentdoesnotpossesstheconceptorevenunderstandit.Thatis,thestudenthasnotac-quiredtheconceptthroughostentionbecauseitisnevercorrectlyapplied.Thefail-uretoeverapplytheconceptcorrectlyleadstothejudgmentthatthestudentdoesnotpossessit.

Inanothercase,supposeonemisappliestheconceptcow toazebrathatoneseesoffinthedistance,becauseoneisnotabletodistinguishadequatelybetweenacowandazebrafromthedistanceoneisat.Foronetomisapplytheconceptcowtoazebra,onehastopossesstheconceptcowtobeabletomisapplyittoazebra.Theissueofmisapplicationrequiresdiscussionofconceptpossession,sowemustask:whatdoesittakeforonetopossesstheconceptcow?

Iftheconceptcowreferstocows,thenasubjectthatisinanenvironmentcannotpossess the concept cow unless there is some causal chain terminating in cowsthroughwhichthepersoncouldhavelearnedtheconcept.Thecentralideaofasym-metricdependencecanbeunpackedasacommitment to twoclaims,oneaboutconceptpossessionandoneaboutmisapplication:

1. Possession.IfanindividualApossessesaconceptCattimet,then,priortot, A must have correctly applied C. Concept possession requires correctapplication.

2. Misapplication. A necessary condition on an individual A misapplying aconceptCisthatApossessC.IfAdoesnotpossessC,thenAcannotmis-applyC.

Theconjunctionofpossessionandmisapplicationallowsforaninterestingaccountofconceptpossessionandlearning.Topossessanempiricalconcept,onemustlearnit.Tolearnaconceptonemustattempttouseit.Butinattemptingtouseit,onecanmakeamistakewithrespecttoapplyingtheconceptonlywhenonecanbesaidto


possesstheconcepttoasufficientdegree.Ifonefailstouseitcorrectlyfarmoreoftenthannot,onecannotbecreditedwithpossessionoftheconcept.Ifonedoesnotpos-sessaconcept,thenonecannotbesaidtomisapplyit.4

Tyler Burge on Anti-IndividualismTylerBurge(1979and1986)defendsanti-individualismwithregardtomentalcon-tent.Anti-individualismwith regard tomentalcontentcanbe statedbroadlyasathesisabouttheindividuationofcontent.Burge’santi-individualismmaintainsthat

(1) Foran individual topossessacertainclassofconcepts,naturalkindsandsocialkindsinparticular,it isnecessarythattheindividualbeinacertainkindofphysicalandsocialenvironment.

(2) Itispossiblefortwoindividualstobeintrinsicduplicatesofeachother,whilepossessingdistinctconceptsbecause theyare in, andcome from,distinctphysicalandsocialenvironments.

(3) Thephysicalandsocialenvironmentplaysanessentialroleintheindividua-tionofwhatempiricalconceptsanindividualcanorcannothave.

(4) Forcertainkindsofconcepts,anindividualcannotpossessaconceptCiftheindividualhasnocausalconnectioneitherphysicallyorsociallytoanenvi-ronmentthatcontainsC.

Althoughanti-individualismwithregardtomentalcontentisnotuncontroversial,itis supported by a host of thought experiments and considerations. Burge (1986)advances the thesis by considering terms such as ‘arthritis’ and ‘sofa.’ AlthoughBurge’santi-individualismisnotidenticaltoPutnam’s(1973)semanticexternalism,boththesesgainsupportfromtheTwinEarththoughtexperimentpropoundedini-tiallybyPutnamandexaminedlaterbyBurge.5Inhisthoughtexperiment,Putnaminvitesus toconsider two individuals indistinctpossibleworlds thatare intrinsicduplicatesofoneanother.

OscarandTwinOscar liveinphysicalandsocialenvironments thatareexactduplicatesofeachotherineveryway,exceptforonefeature.OscarlivesonEarthinanenvironmentwhereH2Oispresent,and‘water’referstoH2O.TwinOscarlivesonTwinEarthwhereXYZispresent,and‘water’isusedtorefertoXYZ.XYZisasub-stancethatisdistinguishablefromH2Oonlyatthelevelofmicrostructureandnotatthe levelofmacroscopic features suchas taste, color, andboilingpoint,or func-tional features such asdrinking, bathing, andwashing.Moreover, everything thatH2OisusedonEarth,XYZisusedonTwinEarth,andviceversa.

PutnamasksustoimagineOscartravelingtoTwinEarthandtoconsiderOscar’suseof‘water’onTwinEarthuponseeingariver.WereOscartosay,“Thereiswater!”uponseeingXYZinariver,wouldhisutteranceof‘water’refertotheXYZflowingintheriver?Anti-individualiststakethestancethatOscar’sutteranceof‘water’wouldnot refer toXYZ,sinceOscarhasnoprior interactionwithXYZandnohistoricalconnectiontoitthroughacommunityofusersoftheterm‘water’thatareinphysicalcontactwithXYZ.Moreover,althoughH2OandXYZhavethesamefunctionalrole


ineachenvironment,OscarcannotmeanXYZbyhisuseof‘water,’andTwinOscarcannotmeanH2Obyhisuseof‘water.’

Thefundamentalideaofanti-individualismisthattheindividuationconditionsfor mental content depend on factors that go outside the head of the individual.OscarandTwinOscarareintrinsicduplicates.Partofwhatmakesit thecasethat‘water’forOscarreferstoH2OandnotXYZisthefactthatOscarispartofanH2O,andnotanXYZ,environmentandcommunity.Partofwhatmakesit thecasethat‘water’forTwinOscarreferstoXYZandnotH2OisthefactthatTwinOscarispartofanXYZ,andnotanH2O,environmentandcommunity.

John McDowell’s Epistemic DisjunctivismMcDowell’sepistemicdisjunctivism,ED,isofferedasanalternativetothehighest common factorviewofexperience.Thehighestcommonfactorviewofexperience,HCF,maintainsthatveridicalandnon-veridicalcasesshareacommonkindofmen-talstate.TheHCFismotivatedinpartbytheargumentfromillusionthathasbeenprevalentinmanydiscussionsanddebatesonperception,fromDescartesandHumetoAyerandAustin.McDowelldescribestheHCFandthelineofreasoningleadingtoit:

[T]heargumentisthatsincetherecanbedeceptivecasesexperientiallyindistinguishablefrom non-deceptive cases, one’s experiential intake—what one embraces within thescopeofone’sconsciousness—mustbethesameinbothkindsofcase.Inadeceptivecase,one’sexperientialintakemustex hypothesifallshortofthefactitself,inthesenseofbeingconsistentwiththerebeingnosuchfact.So,thatmustbetrue,accordingtotheargument,inanon-deceptivecase,too.One’scapacityisacapacitytotellbylooking:thatis,onthebasisofexperientialintake.Andevenwhenthiscapacitydoesyieldknowl-edge,wehavetoconceivethebasisasahighest common factorofwhatisavailabletoexperienceinthedeceptiveandnon-deceptivecasesalike,andhenceassomethingthatisatbestadefeasiblegroundfortheknowledge,thoughavailablewithacertaintyinde-pendentofwhatevermightputtheknowledgeindoubt.(McDowell2009,p.80)

McDowell’scharacterizationoftheHCFlineofreasoningisasfollows:

1. VeridicalperceptionofayellowlemoncausedbyayellowlemonYundernormalviewingconditionsandanon-veridicalperceptionwhosecontentisofayellowlemonbutiscausedbysomethingotherthanayellowlemonarefirst-person phenomenologically indistinguishable.

2. Iftwostatesarefirst-person phenomenologically indistinguishable,thentheyshouldbecategorizedasfallingunderacommonepistemickind.

3. Iftwostatesfallunderthesameepistemickind,thentheyprovidethesameepistemicwarrant.

4. So,veridicalandnon-veridicalperceptionsprovidethesamewarrant.5. Iftwostateshavethesamekindofwarrant,thentheyprovideasubjectwith

thesameexperientialintake.6. So,one’sexperientialintakeisthesameinveridicalandnon-veridicalcases.


ThecentralideaintheHCF,inMcDowell’srendering,isthatconceivingofex-perienceaccordingtotheHCFviewleadstotheideathattheultimatebasisofourbeliefsabouttheexternalworldliesinmereappearancesthatcannotacquiremorewarrant thanwhatisprovidedbywhatis incommonbetweenveridicalandnon-veridicalcases.ThealternativeviewMcDowellendorsesisthedisjunctiveconcep-tionofexperience.Hisepistemicdisjunctivism,ED,hasfourmaincomponents:

(1) Perceptionisacapacity for knowledge:

Aperceptualcapacity...isacapacity—ofcoursefallible—togetintopositionsinwhichonehasindefeasiblewarrantforcertainbeliefs.Thatiswhatthecapacityisacapacitytodo,andthatiswhatonedoesinnon-defectiveexercisesofit,exercisesinwhichitsacknowledgedfallibilitydoesnotkickin.Forinstance,acapacitytotellwhetherthingsinone’sfieldofvisionaregreenisacapacity—ofcoursefallible—togetintopositionsinwhichthegreennessofthingsisvisiblythereforone,sothatonehasindefeasiblewarrantforbelievingthattheyaregreen.(McDowell2011,p.245)

(2) Perceptualappearancesaremetaphysically distinct:

Theconceptionof[experience]Ihavefound...canbeput,inoppositionto[thehighestcommonfactorconception],asadisjunctiveconceptionofperceptualappearance:per-ceptualappearancesareeitherobjectivestatesofaffairsmakingthemselvesmanifesttosubjects,orsituationsinwhichitisasifanobjectivestateofaffairsismakingitselfmani-festtoasubject,althoughthatisnothowthingsare.(McDowell2008,p.381)

(3) Perceptualappearanceshaveasymmetric warrant:

Experiencesof the first kind [objective statesof affairsmaking themselvesmanifest tosubjects]haveanepistemicsignificancethatexperiencesofthesecondkinddonothave.Theyaffordopportunities forknowledgeofobjectivestatesofaffairs.Accordingto thehighestcommonfactorconception,appearancescanneveryieldmore,inthewayofwar-rantforbelief,thandothoseappearancesinwhichitmerelyseemsthatone,say,seesthatthingsarethusandso.(McDowell2008,p.381)

(4) Perceptualexperience is non-factorizable:

[I]tispartofthepointofmydisjunctiveconceptionofexperiencethathavinganaspectofobjectiverealityperceptuallypresenttooneentailshavingitappeartoonethatthingsareacertainway.Butthatisnottosaythathavinganaspectofobjectiverealityperceptu-allypresenttoonecanbefactoredintosomenon-mentalconditionsandanappearanceconceivedasbeingthementalstateitisindependentlyofthenon-mentalconditions.Thefactoringfails;thestateistheappearanceitisonlybecauseitisastateofhavingsome-thingperceptuallypresenttoone.(McDowell2011,p.251)

Epistemicskepticismwithrespect toapotentialdomainofknowledgeis theviewthathumansubjectsdonothaveknowledgeofpotentiallyknowableitemsinthatdomain.AtleastpartofMcDowell’s(2008)motivationforadvancingepistemicdis-junctivism is his belief that it provides resources for a transcendental argument


againstepistemicskepticismabouttheexternalworld.Hisstrategicargumentcanbeseentobethefollowing:

1. Ifepistemic disjunctivism is true, then thereare transcendental reasons forrejectingepistemicskepticism.

2. Epistemicdisjunctivismistrue.3. So,therearetranscendentalreasonsforrejectingepistemicskepticism.

Asaconsequenceofthestrategicargument,McDowell’spositioncanbeevaluatedattwodistinctpoints.Ontheonehand,onecanevaluatewhetherornotepistemicdisjunctivismistrue.Ontheotherhand,onecanevaluatewhetherornotthetruthofepistemicdisjunctivismprovidesatranscendentalargumentforrejectingepistemicskepticismabouttheexternalworld.

Finally,inclarifyingEDitshouldbenotedthatthetargetformofepistemicskep-ticismabouttheexternalworldthatitaimstoundercutisaradicalformofepistemicskepticism.That is,EDattempts tounderminea formofepistemicskepticismthatthreatenstheideathatourthoughtscanbeaboutobjectivereality.EDdoesnotentailtheviewthatperceptionisinfallible.Rather,perceptionisacapacitytoknowinthesensethatwecangetintopositionswhereperceptionyieldsknowledge.

III. Burge and McDowell on Disjunctivism

Burge’scriticismofMcDowell’sepistemicdisjunctivismisanattempttoevaluatethetruth of epistemic disjunctivismandnot the claim that it provides transcendentalreasonsforrejectingepistemicskepticismabouttheexternalworld.Hisassessmentand evaluation of epistemic disjunctivism rests on an examination of perceptualpsychologyandvisionscience.Hismeta-theoreticalaccountof thephilosophyofperceptionmaintainsthatanytheoryofperceptualcontentmustpayrespecttoper-ceptualpsychologyandthevisionsciences.Itisinconsistencywithvisionsciencethatrendersatheoryimplausible.

Inhisworkonperceptualpsychology,Burgehasargued thatperceptualanti-individualismisconsistentwithcontemporaryperceptualpsychologyandthat,in-deed,thevisionsciencespresupposethetruthofit.Perceptual anti-individualism,PAI,isthethesisthata constitutively necessary condition on perceptual representa-tion by an individual is that any such representation be associated with a background of some veridical perceptual representations (Burge2005,p.1). IncontrasttoPAI,Burgeargues thatepistemicdisjunctivismandnaive realismaboutperceptionareuntenable theses.Thecoreclaimsof theseviewscannotbemadeconsistentwithcontemporaryworkinperceptualpsychology:

Disjunctivismisimplausible.Notonlycommonsensebut[also]thescientificknowledge[inthevisionsciences]supportthisinitialevaluation.DisjunctivismisincompatiblewiththeProximalityPrinciple,whichisbasicinnearlyallscientificstudyofperception.


Given thatdifferentdistalcausescanyieldproximal stimulation that is relevantlythesame,perceptionofentitiesinthedistalenvironmentisfallible.TheProximalityPrin-ciple,togetherwiththisempiricalfact,entailsthatthesametypeofperceptualstatecanbe veridical or non-veridical, perceptually referential or non-referential. (Burge 2005,p.27)

HisbasicargumentagainstEDisasfollows:

1. EDdeniesthatthereisanyimportantexplanatorykindbetweenveridicalandnon-veridicalstates.

2. TheconstitutionoftheperceptualsystemrequiresthetruthoftheProximality Principle.

3. TheProximality Principlerequiresthatperceptioninvolveanability-generalkindincommonbetweenveridicalandnon-veridicalstates.Theability-generalkindisinconsistentwiththeclaimthatthereisnoimportantexplanatorykindbetweenveridicalandnon-veridicalstates.

4. So,EDisfalse.

TheProximalityPrinciple,PP,maintainsthat

holding constant the antecedent psychological set of the perceiver, a given type of proximal stimulation (over the whole body), together with the associated inter-nal afferent and efferent input into the perceptual system, will produce a given type of perceptual state, assuming that there is no malfunctioning in the system and no interference with the system.

AsetofrelevantcaseswherePAI,throughPP,andEDdisagreeisshownbythefol-lowingseries:

Supposethatoneseesanobject.Thenasoneblinks,theobjectisremovedandreplacedbyaduplicate thatonecannotdiscern fromtheoriginal in thecontext.Asoneblinksagain, the duplicate is removed. One is induced by an abnormal confluence of lighttohaveavisualillusionasofanobjectthatisindiscriminablefromtheoriginallyseenobject.Thelightarrayhittingtheretinais,weshallsuppose,type-identicalinthethreecases—oratleastsufficientlysimilarthattheperceptualsystemcannotmakeuseofthedifference.(Burge2005,p.26)

PPrequires thatonehaveageneralability tousetheinformationincommonbe-tweenthethreecases.InBurge’saccounttheabilityisexplanatoryforhowwecometohaveaperceptualsystematall.Werewenottohaveageneralabilitytousetheinformation in common between the three states, we could not have evolved tohave a perceptual system. Of course, the possibility of the system evolving alsorequires that thereareveridicalstates.ED,bycontrast,denies that there isanex-planatorilyrelevantkindincommonbetweenthethreestates.WhilePAIindividu-atesperceptionatatype-levelcommonality,EDdoessobyvirtueoftheveridicality


conditions at the token level. Given that in the three cases the perceptual state isonlyphenomenallysimilar,andnot targetsimilar,EDmaintains that thestatesaredifferentinanexplanatorilyrobustmannerrelevanttotheclassificationofepistemickinds.

InunderstandingPAI,itis ofcentral importancetotakenoteofthekindofac-countthatBurgebelievesthattheproximalityprincipledelivers.Inhisaccount,PPissupposedtodeliverstatesthatarenotmerelyofthesub-personalvisualprocessingsystem.RatherPPgovernsthelevelofperceptualstatesthatareattributabletoindi-vidualsasconsciousperceivers.ThistheoreticalstanceonPPisimportantbecauseofapotentialobjection thatonecanmake to the relevanceofvisionscience to thephilosophyofperception.IfPPonlyexplainedsub-personalvisualprocessingbelowthelevelofphenomenalconsciousness,itwouldbepossibleforanepistemicdis-junctivisttorespondasfollows:sinceEDisathesisthatappliesatthepersonallevelofperceptual theorizing,andnotat the sub-personal system-processing level, themechanismbywhichpersonal-levelperceptionisdeliveredisirrelevanttothedis-junctivist thesis. In effect, the disjunctivist would block the significance of PP asprovidingaproblemfortheplausibilityofED.

Theissuecanbeseentoleadtoapotentialconflictofmethodologies.Ontheonehand,theepistemicdisjunctivistdoesnotattendtotheoriesinthephilosophyofperceptionthatengageperceptionat thelevelofsub-personalprocessing.Ontheotherhand,PAIattemptstobringintothephilosophyofperceptiontherelevanceofworkinthevisionsciencesandperceptualpsychology.

IbelievethatBurge’sworkisusefulata theoretical levelwhereitcanbede-ployedasamechanismfordisentanglingtherelationsbetweenasymmetric depen-dence, anti-individualism, and epistemic disjunctivism. In theaccount Iwilloffer,McDowellandBurgecanbeseentobeinagreementovertheimportancethattheasymmetricdependenceoferrorontruthplaysinatheoryofperception.Thatis,theyagreethatveridicalityisanecessaryconditionforthepossibilityofperception.Con-cept possession and perceptual capacities are enabled by veridicality. However,whattheydisagreeoniswhatfollowsfromasymmetricdependence.Inshort,PAImaintains that veridicality is necessary for a perceptual system to arise, but thatveridicalityisnotanessentialpropertyofaperceptualtype.

For the purposes of distinguishing further between ED and PAI, consider thefollowingcases:

(a) Rickmisperceivesaropeforasnake. (b) Varshamis-identifiesapieceoftofuforapieceofchicken. (c) Manjulamisperceivesregularcoffeefordecaffeinatedcoffee. (d) Zuleicamis-identifiesFsharpwithCsharp.

Ineachofthesecasessomethinggoeswronginsofarasthepersonmistakesxfory.Furthermore,givenasymmetricdependence,eachoftheindividualscanonlymakethemistakethattheymakebecausetheypossesstherelevantconcepts.However,we


mightfurtherask:whatfollowsfromasymmetricdependence?Therearethreeargu-mentsrelatingasymmetricdependence toepistemicdisjunctivism.Eachargumentmoves from thepremiseconcerningasymmetricdependence to someclaimcon-cerningepistemicdisjunctivism.Onemightlegitimatelyaskif(2)through(4)belowfollowfrom(1):

1. Non-veridicalperception requiresveridicalperception (asymmetric depen-dence).

2. So,aperceptioniseitheramereappearanceorapresentingofanobjectivefact(metaphysical distinctness).

3. So,theepistemicwarrantinaveridicalcaseisnotthesameastheepistemicwarrantinanon-veridicalcase(asymmetric warrant).

4. So, a veridical perception cannot be factored into an appearance and theobjectivefactthatmakesitaveridicalperception(non-factorizability).

Inanalyzingtheargument,weneedtotakenoteofthenatureofeachoftheclaims.Asymmetric dependence isametaphysicalclaimabouttherelationbetweentruthanderrorastheyapplytothethingsthatcanbethebearersoftruthanderror—truth-evaluable contents. The metaphysical distinctness of veridical and non-veridicalstatesisametaphysicalthesisaboutthepropertaxonomyofperceptualstates.Theasymmetric warrantbetweenveridicalandnon-veridicalstatesisanepistemicprin-cipleconcerningepistemicwarrantforbelief.Andthenon-factorizabilityofveridicalstatesisametaphysicalclaimaboutthecomponentsinvolvedinaveridicalstate.

ThedistinctionbetweenBurge’sPAIandMcDowell’sEDcanbeunderstoodasaquestioningofeachoftheinferencesfrom(1).WhileMcDowellisfarmoreopento inferring fromasymmetricdependencevariouscomponentsofED,Burge is farmore cautious. In Burge’s account, asymmetric dependence is amenable to anti-individualism,understoodastheideathatperceptiononlymakessenseagainstthebackgroundofveridicalstates.Thismetaphysicalclaim,whichisconstitutiveofper-ceptionforBurge,entailsneitherthatthereisnocommonfactorofexplanatoryim-portance between veridical and non-veridical perception nor that veridical andnon-veridicalstateshaveasymmetricwarrant.6TheBurge-McDowelldebateleavesuswiththefollowingquestion:isperceptualanti-individualismorepistemicdisjunc-tivismasuperiorplatformforfurthertheorizingaboutperceptionandforcategoriz-ingNyāyaepistemologyandperceptualtheory?

IV. Dasti on Disjunctivism from Parasitism

Matthew Dasti maintains that “Nyāya [epistemology] privileges veridical truth-entailing mental states and considers error conceptually parasitical upon knowl-edge.” And that “This [asymmetric dependence] entails a disjunctive account ofpramana andnon-pramanastates”(Dasti2012,p.3).InhisaccountofNyāyaepis-temologyandphilosophyofmindtherearethreeformsofargumentfromparasitism:


(1) Epistemic parasitism.Recognizinganerrorisparasiticaluponknowingtruth.(2) Causal parasitism.AnyconceptVthatonedeploysinvarioussortsoferror

statesultimatelydependsonone’soriginalveridicalapprehensionofsomeinstanceofV.

(3) Parasitism of content or meaning.Divorcedfromconnectionwithexternalreality,conceptswouldbedrainedofcontent,aswould thewordswhosemeaningsaretiedtotheconceptstheyexpress.

Asanexampleofepistemic parasitismDasticitesUddyotakara’sresponsetoaBuddhistinterlocutorwhocontendsthateverythingexistsinastateofflux,andthere-foreallcognitionsofenduringthingsarefalse:

Falsecognitionsareimitationsofcorrectcognitions.Therefore,youmustprovidesomeexampleofcorrectcognition.(Dasti2012,p.4)

Asanexampleofcausal parasitismDasticitesanargumentbyVātsyāyana:

Themis-cognitionofsomethingdependsonanoriginal.Thecognitionofapost—whichisnotaperson—asapersondependsuponanoriginal.Indeed,thereisnoexperienceasofapersonregardingsomethingthatisnotaperson,ifapersonwasneverexperiencedinthepast.(Dasti2012,p.6)

Asanexampleofmeaning parasitismDasticitesUddyotakara:

Hemustbeaskedhowconsciousnessarisesinthat very form(theformofspecificob-jects). Ifconsciousness takes the formofblood, thenyoumustexplainwhatblood is.Similarly,theformofwaterandrivermustbeexplained.Inthesentence,“theyseeariverofpus,”eachword,whenexaminedindividually,isfoundtobemeaningless,iftherearenorealexternalobjects.(Dasti2012,p.7)

Dastiarguesthatthethreeformsofparasitismleadtoimportantfeaturesofepistemicdisjunctivism:

1. Default Trust. Arguments from parasitism show that the default epistemicpositiononeshouldtakeistrustandnotdoubt.

2. Denial of HCF. Argumentsfromparasitismtendtoblocktheneedtofindacommonstatebetweenveridicalandnon-veridicalperception.

3. Metaphysical Distinctness. Non-veridical states are fake perceptual states;they are only phenomenally indistinguishable from genuine or veridicalperception.

InevaluatingthemeritsoftheNyāyaperceptualtheoryandDasti’sargumentfortheclaimthattheiraccountanticipatesMcDowell’sepistemicdisjunctivismitisimpor-tanttolookatthecomplexityoftheBurge-McDowelldebateoverdisjunctivismandanti-individualism.Thedebateprovidesadditionalconceptualresourcesforcatego-rizingandthinkingaboutNyāyaperceptualtheory.

RecallthatBurgemaintainsthat“Acloselyassociatedthesis[ofanti-individualism]isthataconstitutivelynecessaryconditiononperceptualrepresentationbyanindi-


vidualis that any such representation be associated with a background of some ve-ridical perceptual representation”(Burge2005,p.1;emphasisadded).ItakeBurge,inmakingthisclaim,tobeendorsingtheviewthaterrordependsontruth,buttruthdoesnotdependonerror,atleastwithrespecttothegenerationofperceptualstates.For in saying thataconditiononany perceptual representation is that therebeabackgroundofveridicalrepresentation,Burgeismaintainingthatthepossibilityofhavingarepresentationatalldependsonveridicality.ThecoreclaimofparasitisminNyāya,asDastiargues, is thaterrorandnon-veridicalcognitionareconceptuallyparasiticontruth.Thepassageshecitesshowthisclearlytobethecase.However,BurgearguesthatPAIisconsistentwiththeProximality Principle,andthatEDisnot.GiventheargumentationbetweenBurgeandMcDowell,twoquestionsarise.

First,ifBurgeiscorrectinarguingthatEDisinconsistentwiththevisionsciences,weareleftwithanevaluativequestion:shouldwetakeseriouslytheNyāyapercep-tual theoryas aworthy theoryof study for theorizing further aboutperception incontemporaryphilosophy?Onemightwonder,whatcanwelearnfromatheorythatisinconsistentwithaprinciplethatisthebenchmarkforcontemporaryresearchonperception?Second,giventhatNyāyaperceptualtheory,Burge’sPAI,andMcDowell’sEDallendorsetheasymmetricdependenceoferrorontruth,weareleftwithaninter-pretive question:giventhatBurgeandMcDowelldisagreeover theconsequencesthatfollowfromasymmetricdependence,mightthereberoomtoinvestigatecriti-callywhetherNyāyaperceptualtheoryalsoleansmoretowardPAIthanED?

Withrespecttotheinterpretivequestion,fourcomponentsofDasti’sargumentareimportant.First,EDdoesnotgiveusabetterfootingforunderstandinganepis-temicpositionasbeingoneofdefaulttrustratherthandoubt.ItispossiblethatPAIcanprovideforadefaultpositionoftrust,andperhapsevenamoreaccurateaccountoftherelevantkindoftrustthroughhowitexplainsthewaythatveridicalityisanec-essaryconditiononperception.Weneedamore robustaccountof thenotionofdefaulttrustinordertoevaluatetheclaimthatEDprovidesabetterpositionforthebasicnotionthananyothercompetitortheory,suchasPAI.

Second,neitherepistemic,causal,normeaningparasitismshowthatthere is nocommonkindofmentalstatebetweenveridicalandnon-veridicalstatesthatplaysanimportantexplanatoryrole.Atbesttheseformsofparasitism,asDastipointsout,showaresistancetofindingahighestcommonfactorfromacertainphilosophicalframeofinvestigation.Thatisaphilosophicalframethatdoesnotattemptatheoryofperceptionbasedonanattempttoansweratotalizingformofepistemicskepticism.GiventhatNyāyaperceptualtheoryaimsatprovidinganetiologicalaccountofthesourcesof knowledge, itmaynotneed to findan internal componentof a givensourcethatisalsoatplayincaseswhereknowledgeisnotproduced.Moreover,itmaybethecasethatwerethecertaincomponentsoftheirviewsatisfied,thetheorywould be amenable to the existence of an important explanatory factor betweenveridicalandnon-veridicalcasesofperception.

Third, the three forms of parasitism that Dasti draws attention to—epistemic,causal,andmeaning—donotleandirectlytowardED.Ontheonehand,epistemicparasitismappearstobeathesisaboutwhatisanecessaryconditionforidentifying


andrecognizingafalsecaseofperception.Itdoesnotrequirethattherebe no com-mon kind of elementbetweenveridicalandnon-veridicalstates.WhatitrequiresisthatknowledgeofFisimplicatedinrecognizingthatsomethingisanon-F.Theclaimofepistemicparasitismisquiteinnocuous:to identify that a zebra is not a cow, one must know what a cow and a zebra are(thinkhereoftheMenoproblem).Ontheotherhand,causalparasitismappearstobenomorethanthethesisofasymmetricdependence,whilemeaningparasitismappearstobeanoutrightexampleofanti-individualismaboutmeaning.

Recallthatthecentralthesisofanti-individualismwithregardtomeaningisthatanindividual’suseofatermdependsonfactorsoutsidetheirpersonalpsychology.Thesefactorsincludesocialandphysicalfactsabouttheirenvironment.IntheclassicTwinEarthcases,OscarandTwinOscarareclaimedtobeskin-deepduplicatesofeachotherwithidenticalskin-deephistorieslivinginenvironmentsthatareexactlysimilar,exceptforthefactthatOscar’scontainsH2OandTwinOscar’scontainsXYZ.AlthoughthesubstancesH2OandXYZplaythesamewaterroleintheirrespectiveenvironments,Oscar’suseof‘water,’andnotTwinOscar’suse,referstoH2O.Thegenerallyacceptedexplanationofthisfactisthat(a)OscarlivesinanenvironmentwherepeoplerefertoH2Osampleswhenusing‘water,’and(b)thefactin(a)playedakeycausalroleinOscar’suseof‘water.’Here,(a)and(b)explainhowOscar’suseof‘water’comestomeanH2OandcannotmeanXYZ.ThestandardupshotoftheTwinEarthexamplesofnaturalandsocialkindsisthatacannotmeanybyxunlessahascausallyinteractedinsomewaywithy,nomatterhowmuchsimilaritythereistakinginothernon-causalfactors,suchasresemblanceormatchingofdescriptivecontent.

Keepinginmindthecentralthesisofanti-individualism,parasitism of content or meaningmaintainsthatdivorcedfromaconnectionwithexternalreality,conceptswouldbedrainedofcontent,aswouldthewordswhosemeaningsaretiedtotheconcepts they express.The thesis leans strongly toward the central idea of anti-individualism:content and meaningare determined by factors outside the psychol-ogy of the individual,becausewhatisemphasizedistheroleoftheexternalworldindeterminingcontent.Parasitismofcontentandmeaningdoesnot lean towardEDmorethanPAI.

ThepassagethatDasticitesfromMcDowellasawayofmakingtheconnectionbetweendisjunctivismandthekindsofparasitismfoundinNyāyaepistemologydoesnotannouncethefullrobustnessofthekindofdisjunctivismthatMcDowellfavors:

Butsupposewesay—notatallunnaturally—thatanappearancethatsuch-and-suchisthecasecanbeeitheramereappearanceor thefactthatsuch-and-suchisthecasemak-ing itselfperceptuallymanifest tosomeone.Asbefore, theobjectofexperience in thedeceptivecaseisamereappearance.Butwearenottoacceptthatinthenon-deceptivecasestootheobjectofexperienceisamereappearance,andhencesomethingthatfallsshortofthefactitself.(McDowell2009,p.80)

InthepassageaboveMcDowellappearstobeannouncingEDviathenon-factorizabilityandmetaphysicaldistinctnessofveridicalandnon-veridicalmentalstates.However,


hisfullaccountistiedtotheadditionalthesesthatperceptionisacapacitytoknow,andthatveridicalandnon-veridicalstateshaveasymmetricwarrant.TherobustnessofMcDowell’sEDshouldleadustoaskcriticallywhethertheparasitismfoundinNyāyaepistemologyreallyreachesasfarasED.

Finally,itisshouldbenotedthatMcDowell’sEDisinpartmotivatedbyanat-tempttoprovideatranscendentalargumentagainstepistemicskepticism.Intermsofaphilosophicalpointofdeparture,epistemicdisjunctivismappearsasaresponsetotheCartesian skeptical frame. It isgeneratedasaresponsetoa traditionofphilo-sophicaltheorizingintheModernperiodofWesternphilosophythatturnedtowardtakingtheskepticalargumentandthemethodofdoubtasastartingpointforphilo-sophicalreasoning.OneofDasti’skeycomparativeinsightsisthatNyāyaepistemol-ogystartsfromthedefaultpositionoftrustasopposedtodoubt.Ifhisunderstandingofthisclaimiscorrect,thentheclassicalIndianframeforphilosophicalreasoningwouldnotbesimilartotheCartesian skeptical frame,andourinterpretationofanydisjunctive-likecomponentsofNyāyashouldbereadinanappropriatelyadjustedmanner.InthemodelofinterpretationthatIfavor,ImaintainthatamotivationfortheNyāyaaccountisthesearchforcriteriabywhichonecanexplainhowperceptionisan instrument of knowledge by looking at how the causal processes involved inmisperceptionaredistinctfromthoseinvolvedinperception.Ibelievethatthiscom-ponentalsomakestheirviewamenabletoBurge’sPAI.

V. Misplacement as a Route to Metaphysical Disjunctivism

TheNyāyamisplacementtheoryofillusion,MTI,isoneofthemostinterestingac-countsofillusioninphilosophybothEastandWest.TheNyāyaMTIallowsonetoattributetotheNyāyatraditionofepistemologytwoclaims.First,veridicalandnon-veridicalstatesaremetaphysicallydistinctbecauseofthecausalprocessesthatgointoeachstate.Second,thecausaldifferencebetweenveridicalandnon-veridicalstatesrendersMTIdifferentfromMcDowell’sED,butconsistentwithBurge’sPAI.

ForthepurposesofunderstandingthescopeofMTIitisimportanttotakenoteofthefactthatnon-veridicalstatescanbefurtherclassifiedasbeingmisperceptionsorhallucinations.MTIispropoundedprimarilyasatheorythatappliestomisperceptions.

Misperceptionsareclassifiedascaseswhereanobjectisseentohaveapropertyitinfactdoesnothave.Classicalcasesofthisareseeingasnakeasarope,seeingasticksubmergedinwaterasbent,seeingawhiteshellasbeingyellow,orseeinganobjectainthedistanceasFwhenitisG(whereFandGareincompatible).Ineachofthesecasesanobjecta isseentohaveaproperty,F,thatitinfactdoesnothave.Hallucinations,ontheotherhand,occurwhenthereisnoobjectthatisthefounda-tionforfalsepropertyattribution.Classiccasesofhallucinationdonothaveapar-ticularworldlyobjectas thegroundofpredication.Wakinghallucinationsof thiskindaresimilartocasesofdreaminginthefollowingsense:whenone’seyesarenotbeingstimulatedthroughinteractionwithanexternalenvironmentthereisnoparti-cularoftheexternalenvironmentthatisthegroundoffalsepredication.Althoughitistemptingincasesofhallucinationtothinkthatthereisanobjectthatismisperceived,


thisisamistakeusuallymadeonthebasisofthefactthatintheorizingwemaybeover-focusedonthefactthatinbothcasesone’seyesareengagedwiththeirexternalenvironment.Toseparatemisperceptionfromhallucination,contrastseeingapersonasapostwithhallucinatinganelephant.Inthelatercase,ifonemovesone’sfieldofvisionbymovingone’shead,onecontinuestoseetheelephant.Bycontrast,inseeingapersonasapost,whenonemovesone’sfieldofvisiononedoesnotcontinuetoseesomethingaboutwhichoneisinperceptualdoubt,sincetheobjectthatisseentobeeitherapersonorapostisfixedintheexternalenvironment.Incasesofhallucination,the external environmentmerely facilitates thehallucinatedobject byproviding abackground.Thebackgrounddoesnotinvolveanobjectthatcausesthehallucination.

ThecoreofMTIasanaccountofmisperceptions,andnotofhallucinations,canbegraspedthroughanextendedexaminationofacaseofcoming to confirmthatonehashadamisperception.Supposethatuponapproachingfromadistanceoneseesasnake,butasonecomesnearitisrevealedtobearope.Furthermore,asoneleansforwardtograbitoneconfirmsthatitisaropeandnotasnake.Inthissuccessionofeventswehaveamisperceptionthatyieldstoaperceptionthatisthenconfirmedviaadistinctperceptualmodality—tactileperception.ThestandardNyāyaanalysisofthissequenceofeventsisasfollows.

First,ontheapproachtotherope,foronetoseetheropeasasnakeandthenasarope,onemustfirstpossesstheconceptofasnakeandtheconceptofarope.Forifonehasneverseenasnakebefore,thenonecannotseetheropeinfrontofone,firstas a snakeandsubsequentlyas a rope.Second,inseeingtheropeas a snake,whathashappenedisthatthenormalcausalprocessbywhichonewouldseetheropeasaropehasbeeninterruptedbyamemory.Thememoryofasnakehasariseninoneandhasbeenimposedintoawareness.Bycontrast,whenonecomesclosertothe ropeand sees the ropeasa rope,nomemoryhas intervened into thecausalstreamthatbringsabouttheawareness.Rather,thecausalconditionsthatgiverisetotheawarenessaretruthproductive.

On a further elaboration of MTI, Bimal Krishna Matilal explains the view byclaimingthatthemisperceptionisitselfbasedonobjectivefeaturesofthesituation.MorepreciselyheclaimsthatitisveryunlikelythatasubjectcanmisperceiveAasB iftherearenofeaturesincommonwherebyAcanbeconfusedwithorseentobeBbyanimpositionfrommemory.Inthecaseofthesnake-ropemisperception,itisbecausearopecanlook like a snake thatitcanbemisperceivedasasnakebytheimpositionof thememoryofa snake into thecausal streamof theperceiver.Thepointisthatwhileitislikelythatamemorycaninterveneandcausearopetobeseenasasnake,itisunlikelythatamemorycaninterveneandcause,forexample,anoceantobeseenasaspider.Thelattercasewouldlikelybeahallucinationofaspiderimposedonanocean,ratherthanamisperception.Moreover,theobjectivepropertiesoftherelevantobjectsplayakeyroleinexplainingthepossibilitiesformisperceptionthroughtheperceptualsystem.

MTIallowstwoimportantfactorsinaccountingformisperception.Ontheonehand,thereisthesubjectiveprofileoftheindividualthatincludesthememoriesandconceptsthattheindividualpossesses.Ifanindividualdoesnotpossesstheconcept


ofasnake,theindividualcannotperceivearopeasasnake.Ontheotherhand,theobjectivepropertiesFandGofobjectsA andBaresuchthatonecanmisperceiveA andBbecauseofFandG.Moreover,inthesnake-ropemisperception,itisbecausesnakesandropessatisfyanobjective sufficient-similaritycondition,thatitispossibleforonewhopossessesboththeconceptofasnakeandaropetomisperceive theropeasasnake.

TheNyāyaMTI isquitenatural and insightful.The ropehas thedispositionalpropertytobemisperceivedasasnakebecauseithassomecharacteristicsincom-monwithasnakethatallowthecausalnexus,whichincludesthepersonapproaching,andtheperson’sconceptualrepertoire,tomisperceiveitasasnake.Themispercep-tionproceedsbywayoftriggeringamemoryofasnakethatisthenimposedintothecognitivestreamwherebytheropeisseenasasnake.Bycontrast,intheveridicalcase,asonecomesnear,theropehastheabilitytobeseenasitisbyonewhohastheconceptofa rope.Nomemoryintervenesinthecausalstreambetweensenseorganandobject.

Returningtoourquestion:whatisthefeaturethatmakesveridicalstatesmeta-physicallydistinctfrommisperceptionsofthesnake-ropekind?MTImaintainsthatthecausalpathwayandproperfunctioningbywhichthecognitionarisesintheindi-vidualexplainsthedifference.Inmisperceptionamemoryhasintervenedinaninap-propriateway.Inveridicalperceptionthereisnosuchintervention.

Gautama,afoundingcontributortotheNyāya,definesperceptualcognitioninhisNyāya-sutraas:

[a]cognition[that]arisesfromthecontactofsensefacultyandsenseobject,[which]doesnotdependonlanguage,isinerrant,andisdefinite.(Nyāya-sutra1.1.4)

Matilal(1986)explainsthedefinitionbyshowingthatitisintendedtoruleoutcertainkindsofcaseswhereperceptionisabsent.Heliststhreemaincases:

(1) Perceptual doubt.Oneseesfromadistancesomethingthatlookslikeitcouldeitherbeamanstandingoratreetrunk.Onedoesnotknowwhichitisandhasaperceptualdoubt.

(2) Misperception.Oneseesasnakewhenthereisonlyaropebeforeone,orawhiteshellasyellow.

(3) Non-identification. Oneseessomethingbutdoesnotknowwhatitis,sinceonehasneverseenitbeforeorhearditdescribed.

Thethreecasesareallcasesinwhichwefailtoperceive.Inthefirstcase,wedonotperceiveanythingbecausethereisepistemicindeterminacy.Weareneithercertainthatitisamannorcertainthatitisatreetrunk.Inthesecondcase,wefailtoperceivebecausewemisperceive.Thereisonlyarope,anditismisperceived asasnake.Thethirdcaseisafailuretoperceivebecausebydefinitiononedoesnotknowwhatonesees.7

StephenPhilipsalsooffersaneloquentexpositionofMTI.Inexplainingthecaseofmisperceivingaropeforasnakeheaddressesthekeyfeaturethatisimportantfor


understandingthedifferencebetweenmisperceptionsandperceptionsinNyāyaper-ceptualtheory:

HerewetouchtheheartofNyāyarealism....Snakehoodisavailabletobecomeillusorypredicationcontentthroughpreviousveridicalexperiencesofsnakes.Itgetsfusedintoacurrentperceptionby means of a foul-up in the normal causal processthroughthearous-ingofasnake-hoodmemoryformedbypreviousexperiencesofsnakes.Thecontentofanillusionistobeexplainedcausallyasgeneratedbyrealfeaturesofrealthingsjustasve-ridicalperceptionistoo,althoughillusioninvolvestheprojectionintocurrentperceptionofpredicationcontentpreservedinmemorywhereasatleastinsomecases(forexample,thosewhereanindeterminateperceptionfurnishesthequalifier)veridicalperceptionisnotshapedbymemory.(Phillips2004,p.111;emphasisadded)

Thegroundofthedistinctionistherecognitionof“afoul-upinthenormalcausalprocess.”Veridicalcases for theNyāyaaremetaphysicallycasesofpropercausalfunctioningacrossallcausallyrelevantfactors.Non-veridical(atleastcaseswhereasubjectisperceivedtoseeanobjectwithapropertyitdoesnothave)arecaseswherethereisanerrorinthenormalcausalprocessing.Themetaphysicaldistinctionbe-tween the two cases comes from the main factor that produces each, the causalnexus.IntheNyāyaaccountveridicalperceptioncomesaboutwhenourmemorydoes not interveneintheproductionofacognitionthatarises fromsensecontactwithanobject.Innon-veridicalperception,atleastinmisperception,ourmemoryintervenesandintroducesintothecausalpathwayacontentthatisimproper.

VI. MTI, ED, and PAI

McDowell’sEDincludesfourtheses:(1)perceptionisacapacitytoknow,(2)veridicalandnon-veridicalstatesaremetaphysically distinct,(3)veridicalandnon-veridicalstatespossessasymmetric warrant,and(4)veridicalstatesarenon-factorizable.MTIgroundstheclaimthatNyāyaepistemologyandtheirtheoryofperceptionendorseametaphysicaldistinctionbetweenveridicalandnon-veridicalstates.However,IwillarguethatMTIfallsshortofED,andthatMTIiscompatiblewithPAI.MystrategywillbetodiscussMTIrelativetoeachofthethesesthatarepartofED.

ItisunclearwhetherNyāyaepistemologywouldendorse(1).Whileitmaybethecasethattheirepistemologyisinterestedintheideathatperceptionisaninstrumentforknowledge,itisnotatallclearthattheiraccountconceivesofperceptionasacapacitytoknowinthewayexplainedbyMcDowell:“Aperceptualcapacity...isacapacity—ofcoursefallible—togetintopositionsinwhichonehasindefeasiblewarrantforcertainbeliefs.”ThemainissueisthataperceptualcapacityinMcDowell’saccountisacapacityonehasinordertogetintoapositionwhereonehasindefea-siblewarrant.InorderfortheNyāyaaccounttobesimilartoMcDowell’saccountitwouldhavetobethecasethatdefeasibleandindefeasiblewarrantareimportantfac-torswithinNyāyaepistemologyandperceptualtheory.Additionally,theclaimthatperception isacapacity toknowis toobroad. Inparticular,Burge’sPAIdoesnotpreclude perception from being a capacity for knowledge. It simply explains the


detailsbywhichperceptionisacapacityforknowledgeinadistinctmanner.Whatisimportantinidentifyingperceptionasacapacityforknowledgeishowatheoryframes fallibility.BurgeandMcDowellagree thatperception is fallible;what theydisagreeonistheproperwaytounderstandfallibilityinperception.8

ThereisstrongevidencethatNyāyaepistemologywouldendorse(2),theclaimthatveridicalstatesandnon-veridicalstatesaremetaphysicallydistinct.However,itshouldbenotedthattheirreasonforacceptingthisclaimisbasedontheideathatthecausalprocessesthatgointoveridicalperceptionaredistinctfromthosethatgointo non-veridical perception. In advancing this metaphysical account they differfromthedisjunctivistinsofarasthedisjunctivistemphasizesthatthedifferencebe-tweenveridicalstatesandnon-veridicalstatesstemsfromthefactthattheyareonlysuperficiallyorphenomenologicallysimilar,andthatphenomenologicalsimilarityisnotsufficientforcategorizingepistemickinds.Ingeneral,thefactthattwoaccountsofferametaphysicaldistinctionbetweenveridicalandnon-veridical statesentailsneither that both accounts offer the same distinction between veridical and non-veridicalstatesnorthattheyofferthedistinctionforthesamereason.

ItislikelythatNyāyaepistemologywouldalsodeny(3),theclaimthatveridicalstatesandnon-veridicalstateshaveasymmetricwarrant,forreasonssimilartothosepresentintherejectionof(1).Theideaofjustificationasacomponentofknowledgeprovidedbyperception isnotoperative in the frameofperceptualandepistemictheorizing that is present in Nyāya epistemology. Moreover, Nyāya epistemologydoesnotappeartoengagethe internalist intuitionthat justificationasanecessaryconditionofknowledgerequiresthecapacitytoarticulatereasonsinargumentation.Inparticular,giventhat(a)theideaofasymmetricwarrantisproposedagainstthebackgroundoftheCartesian frame of skepticismandtheargumentfromillusion,inwhichinternalismoperates,and(b)thesecomponentsareabsentinNyāyaepiste-mology,itisunlikelythattheiraccountwouldendorse(3).

Finally,itisunclearwhetherNyāyaepistemologywouldendorse(4).Theideathatperceptionisnon-factorizablecanbeapproachedintwodistinctways.

Ontheonehand,MTIallowsonetoclaimthatamisperceptioncanbefactoredinto object, sense organ, and memory, and perception can only be factored intoobjectandsenseorgan.Asaconsequence,MTIallowsfor theviewthatveridicalperceptionisnon-factorizablebecauseitdeniesthepresenceofthememorystate,whichispresentinnon-veridicalperception.

Ontheotherhand,McDowell’sclaimthatperceptionisnon-factorizable isadenialoftheclaimthat

havinganaspectofobjective realityperceptuallypresent toonecanbe factored intosomenon-mentalconditionsandanappearanceconceivedasbeingthementalstateitisindependentlyofthenon-mentalconditions.(McDowell2010,p.251)

Anditisanendorsementoftheclaimthat

[a]stateistheappearanceitisonlybecauseitisastateofhavingsomethingperceptuallypresenttoone.(McDowell2010,p.251)


Thenon-factorizabilityclaimamountstoapositionontheelementsofexplanatoryrelevanceforastatebeingveridical.Thestateisaveridicalappearancebecauseitisanoccurrencebasedonsomethingbeingperceptuallypresenttoone.Objectivere-alitybeingpresentiswhatexplainstheveridicalityoftheperception.Theveridicalstatecannotbefactoredintothenon-mentalconditionsthatbringitaboutandthementalconditionsthatbringitabout.Thestructureoftheobjectiveworldisanes-sentialingredientinexplainingtheveridicality.ThestructureofMcDowell’saccountofnon-factorizabilitydoesnotallowforacleanlocationoftheviewinNyāyaepis-temologybecausewhileMTIdoesgiveusanaccountofmisperceptionitdoesnotgiveusadirectpositiveaccountofperception.TheconditionsthatNyāyaimposeonperception, for examplebeingnon-erroneous, are statedasnecessary conditions,andnotaspositiveexplanatoryconditions.

Perceptualanti-individualismoffersabetteroptionforcategorizingMTI.Therearetwocentralreasonswhy.First,PAIandMTIrequirethattherebeobjectivefea-tures of the perceiver’s environment that can play an explanatory role in how amisperceptionisproduced.RecallthatPAImaintainsthatallperceptionrequiresabackground of veridical perception. MTI also maintains that a misperception re-quiresabackgroundofveridicalperceptionwherebythemisperceptioncanoccur.Onewaytoseethispointisbylookingathowobjectivesimilarityintheperceiver’senvironmentisusedtoexplainmisperception.Inordertomisperceivetheropeasasnakeonemustcorrectlyperceiveobjectivefeaturesof theropewherebyitcanbemisperceivedasasnake.Ifoneweretofailtoseethecoiledropeascoiledina specific way, it is unlikely that one would misperceive it as a snake.The ob-jective similaritybetweencoiled ropeandcoiled snakeenables thepossibilityofmisperception.

Second,theproximalityprinciple,PP,isconsistentwithMTI.PPstatesthathold-ingconstanttheantecedentpsychologicalsetoftheperceiver,agiventypeofproxi-malstimulation(overthewholebody),togetherwiththeassociatedinternalafferentandefferentinputintotheperceptualsystem,willproduceagiventypeofpercep-tualstate, assuming that there is no malfunctioning in the system and no interference with the system.AsnotedearlierinPhilips’explanationofMTI,thekeyfeatureofthetheoryisthat“Snakehoodisavailabletobecomeillusorypredicationcontentthroughpreviousveridicalexperienceofsnakes.[Thisisbecause]itgetsfusedintoacurrentperceptionby means of a foul-up in the normal causal processthroughthearousingofasnake-hoodmemoryformedbypreviousexperiencesofsnakes”(Philips2004,p.111;emphasisadded).

Whatboththeoriestakeintoconsiderationistheimportanceofproperfunction-ingandnon-interferencewiththecausalsystem.PPmaintainsthatacertaintypeofperceptualstateis theoutputof therelevantcausalprocessas long as there is no malfunction or interference.MTImaintainsthatmisperceptionisaconsequenceofaninterferencewiththecausalsystem.Thus,Nyāyaepistemologycanmaintainthatin casesof perception the causal systemacross all relevant factors is functioningproperly,butwhenamisperceptionoccursitisbecauseinterferencehasoccurredinthenormalcausalprocessing.9


Ultimately, it is theemphasisonobjectiveproperties in theworldandcausalprocessingthatmakesPAIasaferpositioningforMTIthanED.

VII. Conclusion

Thereareatleasttwodistinctkindsofcomparativephilosophy.Ontheonehand,there iscomparativephilosophythataims tocompare twoseparate traditionsanddebatewhichtraditionscanlayclaimtotheownershipofaphilosophicalidea.Forexample,acomparativequestionofthiskindis:isthekindofpragmatismfoundintheworkofWilliamJamesandJohnDeweyonlytobefoundintheWestasaproductofpriorthoughtonEuropeanphilosophy,orareitsbasicprinciplesalsofoundintheEast,inChinese,Japanese,orIndianphilosophy?Ontheotherhand,thereiscom-parativephilosophythatseeksconstructiveengagementforthepurposesofcontin-uedtheorizingonaphilosophicalissue.Forexample,acomparativequestionofthiskindis:whatcancontemporaryprojectsinlogicaltheory,suchasworkonlogicalpluralism,learnfromanexaminationoftheJaintheoryofsevenfoldpredication?Incontrastingthesetwokindsofcomparativephilosophy,oneshouldlegitimatelyaskwhatkindofcomparativeexplorationhasbeenpresentedhere.SofarIhaveaimedtoestablishacomparativepointofthefirstkind.Thatis,Ihaveaimedtoshowthatacarefulunderstandingofthedifferencebetweenperceptualanti-individualismandepistemicdisjunctivismshouldleadustowardtheviewthatNyāyaperceptualtheorycanbeunderstoodasatheorythatisamenabletoPAIratherthanED.IhavetriedtoshowthattheevidencedoesnotclearlyleantowardED,andthatthereisconsistencybetweenMTIandPAI.However,Ihavenotarguedwhatthewidersignificancewouldbeforcontemporaryepistemologyandperceptual theory,werethis thesiscorrect.Moreover,onemightask:whatinsightforepistemologyandperceptualtheorizingcanwegainthroughacomparativeanalysisofcontemporaryepistemicdisjunctiv-ism,perceptual anti-individualism, andNyāyaparasitism? Ibelieve that thereareseveraladvantagesthatcontemporaryepistemologyandperceptualtheorycangainfromacomparativeinvestigationofNyāyaepistemology.

First, there is themethodologicalpointconcerning (1) the relationbetweenathesisandtheframeofinquiryfromwhichthethesisisadvanced,and(2)whateffectaframeofinquiryhasonthedevelopmentofaspecificthesis.Thefactthatcontem-poraryepistemicdisjunctivism,atleastintheworkofMcDowell,findsitsrootsinareactiontoCartesianskepticismmakesitthecasethatithasaquitedifferentframeofinquiryfromthetheorizingthatgoesintotheworkofNyāyaepistemology.Thelatter’sadvancementofametaphysicaldistinctionbetweenveridicalandnon-veridicalstatesdoesnotdepartfromaconcernforrefutingskepticismoftheCartesiankind.InthisregardDastiiscorrecttopointoutthatNyāyaepistemologydepartsfromade-fault positionof trustasopposedtoCartesiandoubt.Thedeparturepointchangeshowweshouldunderstandtheimportandconsequencesoftheformofthepercep-tualtheoryrendered.

Second,whileitistruethatincontemporaryanalyticphilosophyofmindthereareperceptualtheoriesofemotionsanddiscussionsoftheepistemicroleofemotions,


thereappearstobelittleornodiscussioninanalyticepistemologyovertheroleofemotionsinperception.10Thatis,nophilosophicaldiscussionofhowtheemotionsoneishavingatacertaintimecanaffecthowoneseesobjectsintheirenvironment.NeitherMcDowellnorBurgeengageinhowtheemotionsmayplayasubstantiverole inhowourmisperceptionscomeabout.Bycontrast, theNyāyaMTIaccounthighlightsthisfactorasoneaccountofhowmisperceptioncancomeabout.Bypro-vidingsuchanaccount, theyoffer severalquestions forepistemicandperceptualtheorizing,suchas:(1)whichemotionsarelikelytocausemisperceptionsand(2)howexactlydoemotionscausemisperceptions?While itmaybe true thatNyāyaepistemology isnot theonly tradition to investigate therelationbetweenemotionandperception,theirdiscussionofitalongwithothertraditionspresentsanewop-portunityforfurtheringresearchinepistemologyandperceptualtheory.

Third,muchofthecontemporarydebateconcerningskepticisminanalyticphi-losophyconcernseitherCartesian skepticismordiscussionsofPutnam’sbrain-in-a-vathypothesis.Inbothofthesecasesweareconcernedwithatotalizingformofskepticism. In the former, thestrong formcomesaboutbecauseanevildemon ishypothesizedtobeproducingourperceptions;inthelatterthestrongformcomesaboutbecauseamadscientisthaspluggedourbrainsuptoacomputer.Bothoftheseformsofskepticismdepartfromanunnaturalsource.Whilebotharelogicalpossi-bilitiesthatthestrongestformofanti-skepticismmustrespondto,neitherarenaturalpossibilities that a weaker form of anti-skepticism would respond to. In terms ofprovidinganaturalizedaccountofhowtoexplainmisperception, theNyāyaMTIaccountfocusesonafeatureofmisperceptionthat,althoughnon-scientificallypre-sented, isnevertheless insightful.Theaccount focuseson theway inwhich somemisperceptionsmustbeafunctionofageneralizedformformisperception:x canbemisperceivedforybyagentAbecausex hassomepropertiesobjectivelyincommonwithythat,alongwiththeemotionsandconceptsthatAhas,provideforanaccountofanaturaldispositiononA’sparttomisperceivexforyincertaincircumstances.

Hopefully,futureworkinepistemologywillaimtoengageincomparativeworkoftheconstructivekindattemptedherewiththeaimofenrichingresearchandwid-eningthepoolofsourcesfromwhichaphilosophicaltheorycanbeconstructed.

Notes

IwouldliketothankPurushottamaBilimoria,KarinBrown,ManjulaRajan,KrupaPatel,andthestudentsinmySpring2012PhilosophyofMindSeminarforinspira-tion,discussion,andcriticismofthiswork.Thefailuresthatremainareduetomyowninabilitytounderstandtheintricatedetailsofthetheoriesinvolved.Myhope,ofcourse,iseventuallytounderstandthem.

ThisessayisanextendedversionandtreatmentofanargumentthatIdiscussinmymuchlongertreatmentofperception,“PerceptionanditsContent:AnExamina-tionofDisjunctivismandConceptualismaboutPerceptionfromthePerspectivesofPhenomenology,VisionScience,NYĀYA,andBuddhistEpistemology.”


1–Itisimportanttonotethatevenincaseswhereasubjectmaylackrobustcon-cepts,suchascow and zebra,itispossibleforthemisperceptionofacowforazebratobevoicedintermsofdemonstrativeconcepts.Forexample,onemightonapproachthink,“thatobjectlookslikethat,”wherethefirstdemonstrativepicksoutacowandthesecondazebra,inapasturewherebothzebrasandcowsarepresentandthestatementisunderstoodtobeacomparativejudgmentalongasetofproperties.However,onarrival,onemightrecoilfromone’sini-tialjudgmentandthink,“Thatobjectdoesnotlooklikethat,”recognizingthatfromadistanceonehadamisperceptionofsimilarityandthatthetwoanimalsinone’sperceptualfieldarenotsimilarbecausetheyarenotbothcowsorbothzebras.

2–WhileitistruethatmanyphilosophershavetakensomekindofdisjunctivistturninrecentWesternepistemology,itwouldbeincorrecttonotethiswithoutpointingoutthatthereareagreatnumberofphilosophersthathavenot.

3–InAnglo-Americanphilosophytheterm‘asymmetricdependence’ismostoftenassociatedwithJerryFodor’sworkinsemantics(1987).Whiletherearesomecomponents incommonbetween thatusageand theuse Imakehereof theterm,IwanttonotethatFodor’saccountisnottheonethatisunderdiscussionhere.Rather, thesimple idea thatgetting things right isprior togetting themwrongiswhatisofcentralimportancetotheuseof‘asymmetricdependence’inthisessay.

4–It is important tonote that thereare issuessurrounding therelationbetweenconceptpossessionandthecompleteandincompleteunderstandingofacon-ceptthatarerelevanttotheissueofasymmetricdependencethatgobeyondthescopeof thisessay.Forexample, itappears tobepossible foroneto incom-pletelyunderstandaconceptonepossesses.OnecanpossesstheconceptofarighttrianglewithoutgraspingthatthePythagoreanTheoremholds.However,itappearsimpossibletopossesstheconceptofarighttriangleanddenythatitisathree-sidedclosed-planefigure.Thus,thefollowingquestionarises:whichjudgmentsaboutagivenconceptarenecessarysothatonecanbesaidtopos-sesstheconceptsoastobeabletomisapplyitinagivencase?

5–ItisimportanttorecognizethatBurgeandPutnamdifferintheirunderstandingofwhatexactlyfollowsfromtheTwinEarththoughtexperiment.Anti-individualismisnotthesameassemanticexternalism.Atleastonekeydifferencebetweenthetwoviewsisconcernedwiththerelationbetweensenseandreference.Itisabitodd to present Burge’sAnti-individualism through theuseof Putnam’sTwinEarthcase;however,Idosobecauseofthepopularityoftheexampleandthefactthatitcanbeusedtoestablishthebasicpointthatfactorsoutsideanindi-vidual’sinternalpsychologyarerelevantforindividuationofmentalcontent.

6–There is another way to separate the difference between perceptual anti-individualismandepistemicdisjunctivism.Thedifferencecomesinlookingatan analogybetween chemical kinds and epistemic kinds. In thebasic case,


becausetheyarebothexternalistsortsof theoriesperhapsPAIandEDagreeoverthefactthatchemicalkindsareindividuatedbyfactorsoutsidetheindi-vidual.So,forexample,becausechemicaltheorystatesthatchemicalcomposi-tionisessentialtothecategorizationofchemicalkinds,andXYZandH2Oaredifferentchemicalcompounds,XYZandH2Oaredistinctnomatterwhatsuper-ficialsimilaritiestheypossesses.However,inthecaseofperception,EDmain-tains thatsinceveridicalstatesare trueandnon-veridicalstatesare false,nomatterwhatphenomenologicaldifferencesthereareincommonbetweenthetwostates,theyareepistemicallydistinct.PAI,incontrasttoED,maintainsthatwhileitisimpossibleforconceptpossessiontooccurwithoutveridicality,itispossiblefortwoperceptualstatestobeidenticaleventhoughoneisveridicalandtheotherisnot.Moreover,PAIdeniesthatperceptualtheorywillmaintainthattruthandfalsityaretherelevantindividuatingfactorsforperceptualstatesinthesamewaythatchemicaltheorymaintainsthatchemicalcompositionistherelevantfactorforcategorizingchemicalcompounds.InlookingatBurge’sexampleofviewingtwodistinctbutphenomenologicallysimilarobjectsovertime—dime1anddime2—thedifferenceisapparent.Disjunctivismmaintainsthatthetwoperceptualstatesaredistinctperceptualstatesbecausetheirveridi-calityconditionsaredistinct.PAImaintainsthatthetwoperceptualstatesaresimilareventhoughtheyhavedistinctveridicalityconditions.

7–ItisimportanttorecognizethatthedefinitiongivenbyGautamaanddiscussedbyMatilalappearsasifitsupportsdisjunctivism.Themerefactthatperception,inthedefinitiongiven,hasthreenecessaryconditionsthatseparateseeingfromperceivingallowsforthepossibilitythatonecouldbeinastatephenomeno-logicallysimilar toaperceptual state,yetnotbeenjoyingaperception.Thisreadinggivesthedisjunctivistpositionaninitialpositivegrounding.Forexam-ple,onecouldarguethatineachofthecasesMatilal’sexplanationshowsthatastatethatisphenomenologicallysimilartoagenuineperceptualstateisnotaperceptualstatebecausesomefactorofrelevanceismissing.Butgiventhatthefactorsarenotphenomenological,phenomenologicalsimilarityisnotsufficientforastatetobeaperceptualstate.Whiletheargumentisclearlyavailable,thecounter-considerationsthatIdiscussofferanotherwayofinterpretingtheover-allperceptualtheoryoffered.

8–ForextensivediscussionofthisissueseeBurge2011.

9–ItisimportanttonotethattheclaimbeingmadehereisthatbothPAIandMTIlookcarefullyat thecausal roleof theenvironmentand themake-upof thesubjectintheproductionofaperceptualstate.Whatisnot beingclaimedisthatbothaccountsofferthesamecausalstory.ItmayverywellbethecasethatPAIandMTIdisagreeon thecorrectcausalstory,andeven thatMTI is incorrectfromascientificstandpointoverwhatthecausalstoryis.However,MTIisclosertoPAIthanEDbecauseitlooksatthecausalstoryinrenderinganaccountofmisperceptionandperception, justasPAIdoes.EDis inessenceadenialof


HCFanddoesnotlookatcausationinexplainingthedifferencebetweenve-ridicalandnon-veridicalstates;itsimplylooksattheveridicalityconditions.

10–Whileabrief surveyof the literatureshowsnoserious investigationofemo-tional states and perception in analytic epistemology, I doubt that the samewouldbe trueofEuropeanphilosophy. Iam inclined to think thatEuropeanphilosophers have discussed in some depth the relation between emotionalstatesandperceptualstates.

References

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Matilal,BimalKrishna.1986.Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge.Oxford:ClarendonPress.

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Putnam, Hilary. 1973. “Meaning and Reference.” Journal of Philosophy 70, no.19:699–711.

nyya perceptual theory: disjunctivism or anti-individualism? · 2018-08-15 · nyya perceptual...

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