Notes

Preface

1. CHA Newsletter, Vol 6 Issue 6, December/ November 2001, p. 21.2. It should be noted that in 2000 and 2001, that he Ministry of Defence back-

tracked and refused to allow the supply of electricity into uncleared (i.e.,rebel held) areas in Batticaloa – for which Rs 10.0 million was already allo-cated two years previously under the village development programme. CHANewsletter, Vol 5 Issue 5, September/October 2001, p. 24.

3. This episode is dealt with in greater detail in the text. Similar in bizarre-ness,though not significance, was the local level truce negotiated by the RedCross in the jungles of Amparai District in June 2000, to allow a Governmentveterinarian into rebel-held territory to tend to an injured wild elephant.Dilip Ganguly, Associated Press, June 14, 2000.

1 Beyond Billiard Ball Analysis

1. This introduction is the reflection of an on-going discussion with FuatKeyman of Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey. It draws from Bush andKeyman (1997).

2. It is important to distinguish between conflict ‘resolution’ and ‘manage-ment.’ The former refers to the efforts to resolve or eliminate the underpin-ning grievances and irritants which sustain a conflict, while the latter appliesto efforts to control or ‘de-escalate violence’ without necessarily eliminatingthe root causes of the conflict. Some analysts employ the term ‘conflict set-tlement’ to ‘indicate the formal ending of armed hostilities and the renunci-ation of the use of force. They believe the objective of conflict resolution tobe unattainable, on the grounds that conflicts over fundamental values andneeds will never be resolved to the complete satisfaction of the partiesinvolved. In these circumstances, the best one can hope for is a settlementwhich ends the violence and in some small measure takes those conflictingvalues and priorities into account’ (Fen Osler Hampson and Brian Mandell,‘Managing Regional Conflict: Security Cooperation and Third PartyMediators,’ International Journal, XLV, no. 2 (Spring 1990: 193). In somecases, conflict management efforts may inhibit the broader conflict resolu-tion process. This is particularly true for cases of ‘protracted social conflict’ inwhich antagonists interpret the world in zero-sum terms. Any perceived gainby one side is viewed as a loss by the other. While a measure may dampenovert conflict in the short-term, it may also sustain or exacerbate conflict inthe long-term.

3. For example, Buzan, People, States and Fear; Klare and Thomas,r World Security;and Seymon Brown, ‘World Interests and the Changing Dimensions ofSecurity,’ in Klare and Thomas, World Security, pp. 10–26.

204

4. For example, Stephen Walt, ‘The Renaissance in Security Studies,’International Studies Quarterly, 35 (1991): 211–39; and Kolodziej, ‘Renaissancein Security Studies?’.

5. For another attempt in this context, see Ole Waever, ‘Identity, Integrationand Security,’ Journal of International Affairs, 48, no. 2 (1995): 389–431.

6. Jack Snyder, ‘The New Nationalism: Realist Interpretations and Beyond,’ inRichard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, eds, The Domestic Bases of GrandStrategy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 180.

7. Ibid., p. 181.8. Edward Azar, ‘Protracted Social Conflicts: Ten Propositions’, in Azar and

John W. Burton, eds, International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice(Sussex: Wheatsheaf, 1986), pp. 28–41.

2 Learning to Read between the Lines

1. For example, the 1987 government offensive against the Tamil north of theisland was preceded by prisoner swaps between government forces and themain Tamil paramilitary organization, the (LTTE, as well as by governmentoffers to release hundreds of Tamils interned under the Prevention ofTerrorism Act, in an effort to facilitate direct negotiations. A more recentexample is discussed in Chapter 9 the 1994/95 peace initiative of ChandrikaKumaratunge which led to a formal ceasefire with the the LTTE. However,the high expectations and optimism of the initiative were ultimatelydashed when a re-armed and reinvigorated LTTE broke the ceasefire agree-ment by attacking and destroying two naval craft and two SLAF Planes inApril thereby initiating what came to be known as Eelam War III. The gov-ernment’s response was equal in ferocity and destruction, described byKumaratunge as ‘a war for peace.’ As discussed in greater detail in the text,both examples illustrate the ways in which conflict escalation or resistanceto peacemaking is a function of intra-group politics within the Sinhaleseand the Tamil communities.

2. Newcomers to Sri Lankan politics sometimes find it surprising that despitethe escalating violence, which characterizes the Sinhala-Tamil ethnicdivide, an array of Tamil paramilitaries have now allied themselves with theSinhalese-dominated government – the same paramilitary groups whichpreviously had been warring with the Sri Lankan security forces. The pointmade here is that the funnelling of resources across the inter-ethnic divideto sub-groups within the Tamil community has had a profound effect inthe Tamil intra-group arena as these paramilitaries jostle to build a supportbase and increase their influence. Conspicuously, this process has includedthe terrorizing and brutalizing of other Tamils and Tamil-speaking Muslimsby Tamil sub-groups. Personal interviews, Sri Lanka, 2002, 2001, 2000,1999/ May-July 1992. See also Bush (1993), Hoole et al. (1992), and mostpublications by UTHR (Jaffna).

3. The perennially problematic issue of causality in the social sciences isincreasingly being challenged and recast. For example, in a unique study ofreforming an irrigation system in Sri Lanka, Norman Uphoff draws onchaos theory which ‘explores different kinds of order and causation which

Notes 205

are nonlinear and only loosely determinant, finding surprising patterns inthe dynamics of open systems that match human realities better than theclosed system reasoning of classical physics’ (1992: 14).

4. See Chapter 6, Critical Juncture III: 1971 JVP Insurrection and 1987 JVPResurgence.

5. For example, the confrontation between the Liberation Tigers of TamilEelam and the Eelam Peoples’ Revolutionary Liberation Front in mid-1990.

6. The distinctions between and within these groups will be examined inChapter 3. At this stage it is sufficient to note that the Sinhalese are pre-dominantly Buddhist and Sinhala-speaking; they constitute 74 per cent ofthe total population. The Tamils are predominantly Hindu and Tamil-speaking; they constitute 18 per cent of the total population. All demo-graphic data is based on the most recent (1981) census.

7. In Sri Lanka, this would include the strong inter-communal ties amongEnglish-educated elites, particularly in the early post-colonial period. In thearena of violence it would include the episode discussed later in this bookwhen former President Premadasa supplied arms, money and materiel tothe Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (see Chapter 8 on the Indo-Sri LankaAgreement of 1987).

8. For such chronologies of events in Sri Lanka, see INFORM Sri LankaInformation Monitor (Colombo), and Anton Philip (1991), ‘Sri Lanka:Chronology of Events’ produced by the Sri Lanka Resource Centre in Oslo,Norway.

9. Sources of information are similarly varied and include: newspapers;archival sources; government reports; chronologies of events; human rightsreports; reports of fact-finding missions; and interviews.

10. In this study, as in Allison’s essay, the use of the term ‘model’ withoutqualifiers should be read ‘conceptual scheme.’

11. Refer to summary tables at the end of Chapter 9.12. The identification of ‘mediating’ factors of ethnic conflict may prompt the

question: what is being mediated? In general terms, these factors mediateand condition the social, economic and political relations between andwithin ethnic groups.

13. For two useful discussions of the primordial-instrumentalist debate, seeJames Mckay, ‘An Exploratory Synthesis of Primordial and MobilizationistApproaches to Ethnic Phenomena,’ Ethnic and Racial Studies, 5, no. 4,(1982): 395–420; and George M. Scott, ‘A Resynthesis of the Primordial andCircumstantial Approaches to Ethnic Group Solidarity: Towards anExplanatory Model,’ Ethnic and Racial Studies, 13, no. 3 (1990): 147–71.

14. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1985), p. 66.

15. As suggested in extreme instrumentalist arguments, for example, Eugeen E.Roosens, Creating Ethnicity: The Process of Ethnogenesis (California: SagePublications, 1989).

16. Donald Rothschild, Ethnonationalism (New York: Columbia University Press,1981), p. 8.

17. This was the case in India when the state boundaries were redrawn in the1950s (Horowitz 1985: 66). Lebow asserts that this was also the case inNorthern Ireland (1974: 208–9) and, as discussed further below, Sri Lanka,

206 Notes

too, reflects this shift in the politically salient axis of identity (Nissan andStirrat 1990; Spencer 1990).

18. Personal interviews, Colombo, Kandy, Batticaloa, May–July 1992; 1998;2000). See also ‘Scott’ (1984).

19. Uphoff (1990), building on Uphoff and Ilchman (1969) and (1972), pro-vides a useful basis for conceptualizing and operationalizing politicalresources. He develops the following resource categories: economicresources, social status, information, force, legitimacy, and authority. Theutility of this approach is that it incorporates both material and non-mater-ial resources within a single analytical (resource-exchange) framework.

20. Regarding the motivation for ethnic mobilization, I agree with Esman thatthe most likely cause of ethnic mobilization is a serious and manifest threatto the vital interests or established expectations of an ethnic community,its political position, its cultural rights, its livelihood or neighborhood.However, as addressed below, while defence against threat may stimulatethe mobilization of collective identity, the mobilization of collective actionwill be affected by, among other things, the opportunities and limitationsarising from the political and economic environment (Esman 1990: 54).

21. Like Tilly (1978), my use of ‘organization’ does not necessarily imply‘formal organization.’ The more extensive the common identity and inter-nal networks of the group, the more organized it is. ‘Mobilization processesdo not have to start from scratch. They can build on pre-existing networksof informal relations as well as on preexisting networks of formal organiza-tions, political and otherwise’ (Kriesi 1988: 362).

22. By ‘institution’ I refer to those implicit or explicit principles, norms, rulesand decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations con-verge in a given area (Krasner 1983). It is important to note that while suchinstitutions channel the expression of collective sentiments and the mobi-lization of resources, the institutions themselves are neither unchangingnor static. Institutions can be modified over time and used in ways thatthey were not originally intended. However, although institutions may bemalleable, they are not completely fluid. They possess a ‘stickiness’ that canhelp or hinder intergroup accommodation (Krasner 1988).

23. For details on the arms transfers, see A. K. Menon. ‘The Other Battle Field,’India Today, 15 October 1991: 99; The Hindu (Madras), 6 September 1991: 1;Frontline (Madras), reprinted in Christian Worker (Colombo), 2nd & 3rdQuarter 1991: xvi. These same supplies are now being used by the LTTEagainst the Sri Lankan Army, East Coast Muslims, Tamil civilians, pro-gov-ernment Tamil paramilitaries, and Sinhalese settlers in the North. For otherinstances of Sri Lankan Government assistance to the LTTE, see Gunaratna(1993: esp. pp. 357, 359, 363).

24. Socially constructive examples of ‘cross-border excursions’ may also be found:the mutually supportive inter-ethnic relationships that developed as a by-product of the Gal Oya Water Management Project (Uphoff 1992: 119–21);pilgrimage sites shared by Hindus and Buddhists, such as Kataragama andSiripada; even cultural symbols have been shared including (somewhatincongruously) the late M. G. Ramachandran, the South Indian film star-turned-politician who was a ‘cultural hero’ not only among Tamils but alsoamong the urban proletarian Sinhalese as well (Uyangoda 1989: 37–43).

Notes 207

25. When the notoriety of a particularly brutal Loyalist killer became a embar-rassment and liability to Loyalist paramilitaries, the (Loyalist) UDA andUVF are reported to have facilitated an assassination operation by theProvisional IRA (Feldman 1991: 59–65; 289).

26. The use of ‘India’ as a short-hand designation should not obscure the het-erogeneity of Indian actors. Particularly important is the tension betweenthe Central government in Delhi and the State government of Tamil Naduin Madras (a state with 55 million Tamil speakers) which has led to differ-ent policies toward Sri Lanka at various points in time.

27. Early work includes: Laitin 1985, 1986; Brown 1989; Brass 1984, 1990;Horowitz 1985, 1991.

28. Susan Strange’s The Retreat of the State is an effort to push the theoreticalpendulum back in the other direction.

29. It should be noted, however, that the state may not even be the dominantauthority within its own borders, particularly when considering that ‘themodern state’ is a relatively recent innovation in many Third World coun-tries compared with other authority structures. As Migdal (1987, 1988)points out, the ‘real’ politics of Third World countries lies in the strugglebetween the state and societal authority structures. While the state mayhave more material resources at its disposal, it does not necessarily have thenonmaterial resources (such as ideological support or legitimacy) needed formaintaining its authority and power. This points to the need to incorporateboth state and societal structures and processes into the examination ofethnic groups in conflict.

3 An Overview of Sri Lanka

1. Although Ceylon was renamed Sri Lanka in 1972, this study will use ‘SriLanka’ to refer to the country even in the pre-1972 period. Additionally,although the government changed the spelling of the country’s name toShri Lanka in November 1991, this study uses the former version, whichremains the convention in Western publications.

2. The Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) combines measures of lifeexpectancy, infant mortality and literacy into a single index with amaximum value of 100. In the 1970s, Sri Lanka scored 82 despite a percapita income of $US179 (Lal Jayawardena in Tambiah 1992: ix–x).

3. Medicins Sans Frontier, reported in The Globe and Mail, 23 November 1992:A12. The human rights violations which accompany displacement areextensive. As a recent report puts it: ‘These people, whom the internationallegal jargon has reduced to the acronym IDP, do not enjoy the same rightsas their fellow citizens. At best they are patronized, mostly ignored and leftto their own mercy, at worse harassed, arrested, abducted, raped, tortured,executed, exploited, imprisoned’. Indeed, every single right spelt out in theUN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement is violated in Sri Lanka.CPA/CHA/LST 2001.

4. The government has invoked the Prevention of Terrorism Act (patterned onthe South African model) and emergency legislation, both of which violateSri Lanka’s obligations as a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil

208 Notes

and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Socialand Cultural Rights.

5. Kelegama (1999) offers the following estimate for 1996: Army – 129,000, AirForce – 17,000, Navy – 21,000, and Police – 68,000 for a total armed forcesstrength of 235,000. See also Matthews 1989: 437–39. The estimate ofdeserters is based on newspaper reporters and interviews in Sri Lanka in1999.

6. Sri Lanka’s Directorate of Military Intelligence estimates that 60 per cent ofthe LTTE fighters are below the age of 18. Another assessment of LTTEfighters killed in combat put the figure at 40 per cent, both male andfemale. (Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Childhood – a Continuous Casualty of theConflict in Sri Lanka,’ Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1998.) If we accept theestimate from Jane’s Intelligence sources that the LTTE fighting force in1997 was 13,200, then the number of active child soldiers on that sidewould be between 5,280 and 7,920. That the practice of (ab)using childrenas soldiers is continuing, was evident to those organizations and individualsworking in the field, particularly in the LTTE controlled areas – though it isnot uncommon to see Government armed Home Guards in border villageswho are clearly under the age of eighteen. And, although not discussedpublicly by those involved in the LTTE Sri Laukan Army–(SLA) bodyexchanges of soldiers killed in combat, the volume and size of the contentsof the body bags add evidence the continued (ab)use of child soldiers.

7. UNDP, Mine Action Pilot Project Jaffna, 1998. p.1 8. Cited in David Dunham and Sisira Jayasuriya, ‘Is All So Well with the

Economy and with the Rural Poor?,’ Pravada, vol. 5, no 10&11 (1998) 24.9. Nisha Arunatilake, Sisira Jayasuriya, and Saman Kelegama, The Economic

Cost of the War in Sri Lanka, Research Studies: Macroeconomic Policy andPlanning Series No. 13 (Colombo: Institute of Policy Studies, January 2000)

10. Unlike any other guerrilla or paramilitary organization, it has a large, andseemingly limitless, supply of suicide bombers and operational suicidesquads. Suicide bombers are idolized as ‘martyrs’ in gaudy public memorialsfound in public spaces and training camps within LTTE-controlled territory.All LTTE fighters wear an amulet of cyanide around their necks, which theyvow to swallow rather then be captured. It appears that in the LTTE-controlled North, the culture of militarism and martyrdom feeds the labourneeds of military machine which are replenished with the help of atrociousliving conditions characterized by systemic human rights abuses by govern-ment security forces, a future characterized by hopelessness, and a nobleescape through death for the Eelam cause (see Trawick 1999). A recruitmentofficer for the LTTE insisted that they were not pressuring youngsters tojoin the ranks of fighters: ‘It is not the Tigers who are recruiting youngpeople, it is the government who are driving the children to join the Tigers’(BBC 1998). In light of the the practice of the LTTE to use child combatants(including suicide squads), concerns have been raised about the use of theseorphanages as a mechanism to fill the ranks of the so-called LTTE ‘BabyBrigades’ (Gunaratna 1998a). Even more numerous than the orphanscreated by the war, are the children who have lost one parent, rather thanboth, to the war. It was recently estimated there are 19,000 ‘war widows’ inJaffna, of which 9,000 are below the age 35 years (CHA 2000). Both orphans

Notes 209

and single-parent children are especially vulnerable in such precarioussituations.

11. The extent of the violence was variously presented. Amnesty Internationalreported that 1,000 people a month were being slain in JVP violence in thelatter part of 1989 (New York Times (NYT), 14 December 1989: A 18). SanjoyTTHazarika of the reported that ‘at least thirty people die every day because ofthe civil war’ (‘In Sri Lanka, the Dainty and the Dead,’ NYT, 5 SeptemberT1989: A 11). In August 1989, diplomatic sources estimated that 30–40people were killed every day in Sri Lanka. More than 1,000 members andsupporters of Premadasa’s ruling UNP alone are estimated to have beenkilled since Premadasa’s election in December 1988 (Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER), 17 August 1989: 17). By November 1989, James Cladreported that ‘in recent months a couple of hundred murders take placeevery week’ (FEER, 9 November 1990: 37). He later revised his estimate to‘300-400 bodies a week’ (FEER, 16 November 1990: 59). The Wall StreetJournal reports that 15,000 have died in the last six years (30 October 1989:A 6). Ninety-four political killings were recorded on the day of presidentialelections alone (December 1988) and 417 killings within the 13 days afterthe election (Sunday Times (London), 15 January 1989: A 3).

12. That is, vigilante squads often containing out-of-uniform security forces.13. As discussed further below, ‘legitimate targets’ for attack or ‘disciplinary

action’ went beyond security personnel and public officials. At times, itincluded families of security forces and all levels of public employees (suchas post men and bus drivers). It came to include any non-supporter of theJVP cause and anti-social elements (such as neighborhood drunks and pettycriminals), somewhat similar to the purges employed by the Khmer Rougein Cambodia.

14. This disintegration has included the incorporation of massacres into themilitary repertoire of all combatant groups. For details on recent Army mas-sacres, see INFORM, Sri Lanka Information Monitor Situation Report(September 1992: 14; February 1993: 14), US Committee for Refugees (1991:16, 22), and British Refugee Council, Sri Lanka Monitor (March 1992: 3;January 1992: 1). For details on Tamil paramilitary massacres (i.e. theLiberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), see University Teachers for HumanRights – Jaffna (1991), Amnesty International (1991); AmnestyInternational (1993), Pieris and Marecek (1992), and Abeyesekera (1992).

15. This is evident in the work of Robert Kearney, Mick Moore, GananathObeyesekere, A. J. Wilson and K. M. de Silva.

16. Spencer (1990) contains a selection of scholars who challenge the rigidly bi-polar model I interpretations of Sri Lankan history. See also Kemper (1991)and Rogers (1987), and (1987a).

17. Also called ‘Indian Tamils’, ‘Hill Country Tamils’ or ‘Estate’ Tamils. Some ofthe less rigorous discussions of Sri Lanka, categorize Up Country Tamilswith Sri Lankan Tamil.

18. Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 February 1985: 36. 19. The LTTE is the largest and most powerful Tamil paramilitary organization.

It has controlled significant portions of territory in the north and east ofthe island. The LTTE rose to power due to the organizational and militaryabilities of its leader Velupillai Prabakaran and its efficiency in murdering

210 Notes

opponents (individuals and other Tamil paramilitaries). The LTTE isextremely well armed and manufactures a number of its own weapons andmunitions, such as mortars and rounds, rifle grenades, rocket-propelledgrenade launchers, and improvised torpedoes. For discussions on the rise ofthe LTTE, see Hellman-Rajaanayagam 1994; Gunaratna (1990a); and Hooleet al. (1992). For details on weapons, see Gunaratna (1990a: 45–57).

20. The town currently designated ‘Ampare’ or ‘Ampara’ was previously spelled‘Amparai.’ The change from the Tamil to a Sinhala spelling reflected aninflux on Sinhalese settlers in and around the town. According to the 1921census for the district, the demographic composition was 8.2 per centSinhalese, 37.7 per cent Tamil, and 54 per cent Muslim (Kemper 1991: 145).This compares with the 1981 census which found 37.5 per cent Sinhalese,20.1 per cent Tamil, and 41.6 per cent Muslim. Thus, the slight alteration inplace spelling reflects a demographic shift which is politically unsettling tomany East Coast Tamils. Just as the geographical designations ‘Derry’ and‘Londonderry’ have been politicized, so have ‘Ampare’ and ‘Amparai,’ withthe former connoting a pro-Sinhalese sentiment and the latter connoting apro-Tamil sentiment.

21. For example, according to the 1981 Central Budget, the capital expenditurein the Jaffna District (approximately 6 per cent of the total population) wasonly 2.6 per cent of the national capital expenditure. On a per capita basis,the capital expenditure in the Jaffna District was Rs. 313, while the nationalexpenditure was Rs 656. In addition, foreign aid allocation to the JaffnaDistrict for the period 1977–82 was nil (CRD 1984: 15). Furthermore, as lateas 1975 almost 90 per cent of industry on the island continued to belocated in the Sinhalese majority Western Province (Shastri 1990: 70). Ofthe 40 major government-sponsored industrial units, only five were locatedin predominantly Tamil areas – of these four were established in the 1950sand one in the 1960s (Manogaran 1987: 130–4, 139). All of these figures arebased on a period which was relatively peaceful. While such economic dis-crimination added to the disgruntlement of Northern Tamils and was criti-cized by Tamil politicians, it is the full-scale warfare since 1987 which hasdecimated the regional economy. A development worker who had justreturned from Jaffna in May 1992 described the Northern Province ashaving been bombed and brutalized (by state and LTTE forces) back into apre-industrial economy. In April 1993, a Canadian academic reported:‘Meanwhile, the Jaffna Peninsula is locked off by the army, and life there isworse than ever. You will know that Jaffna has lost half of its population.Those that remain under the de facto Prabhakaran [i.e. LTTE] governmentlive hellish lives.’ Bruce Matthews, personal correspondence, 29 March1993. The area has suffered under the double burden of economic discrimi-nation and, more recently, war.

22. For examples, see: in United States Committee for Refugees (USCR) (1991:3), Hyndman (1985: 290) and Ponnambalam (1983: 268)

23. In an 1992 interview with Lalith Athulathmudali, former UNP Minister ofNational Security and founder of the DUNF, he suggested that the solutionto the ‘Tamil Problem’ had to start with the military annihilation of theLTTE and that if he won the 1993 presidential elections he would ‘translo-cate’ the residents of the North (particularly the youth). It was explained

Notes 211

that they would live in ‘nice’ camps in the South and that ‘ideally’ theywould have complete freedom. In this way, ‘the LTTE fish would bedeprived of the life-sustaining water of public support.’ As a hurried post-script, Athulathmudali added that ‘of course’ this would be done only withthe consent of the public. The assassination of Athulathmudali in April1993 silenced one influential voice, but such sentiments continue in otherextremist Sinhalese sub-groups. Personal Interview. Colombo, February1992.

24. Also called the interior or highland Sinhalese and the West and South CoastSinhalese.

25. Personal interviews, Sri Lanka, May–June 1992. Wet Zone Tamils livemostly in urban areas like Colombo, Kandy and Galle in the South-Westquadrant of the country. This gets two monsoons a year while the rest ofthe country getting only one monsoon is referred to as the dry zone.

26. Personal interviews, Batticaloa, June 1992. Determination of popular senti-ment in a war zone is problematic, however. Attitudes and allegiances arecontext-dependent according to who is asking the question and whichgroup is ‘in control’ at the moment. As a resident of the East Coastexplained with only a hint of sarcasm: ‘there is always undying support forwhich ever group is holding a gun to your head.’

27. ‘Muslims sought and obtained membership and achieved positions ofinfluence in all major national political (except Tamil) parties, particularlythe [UNP] and [SLFP]. Indeed the link with the UNP has given that partythe majority of the Muslim vote at every election since 1947. The UNP hasalways had more Muslim Members of Parliament than the SLFP. Within theParty, Colombo-based Muslims have been until very recently the dominantelement’ (de Silva 1988: 208).

28. LTTE attacks on Muslims took place before 1990, but they appear to be partof a two-track strategy which included efforts to build a common frontagainst the Sri Lankan Government. Following 1990, LTTE strategy becameexclusively antagonistic towards Muslims.

29. Personal interviews. Batticaloa, February 2002 and December 2002.30. Somasundaram 1998: 42; Manogaran 1994: 114; UTHR (J)/University

Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) 1994;Weaver 1988: 67; FEER21 February 1985: 39; SLA Spearheads Sinhala Colonisation, TamilNet, 25 March 1998.

31. Such as the Dollar and Kent Farm Massacres in 1984.32. Personal Interviews. Kattankudi, February 2002.33. http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Asia-08.htm34. The Up-Country Tamils are the descendants of migrants from South India

brought over by the British during the past century-and-a-half to work onthe tea and rubber estates in the Central Province. Approximately 80 percent are plantation workers on tea and rubber estates and a small but animportant segment is engaged in trade and business in Colombo and up-country towns (Hollup 1992: 320). Within the South Indian caste system,the majority of the Up Country Tamils are lower caste than the Sri LankanTamils in the north of the island. A rural development worker in the plan-tation area estimated that about 80 per cent of the Up Country Tamilswould be low caste – of which, about 60 per cent would be harijans or

212 Notes

untouchables by the Indian ranking system, and the remaining 40 per centwould be from the next highest low caste. This, as well as spatial distanceand political powerlessness, has contributed to limiting the interactionbetween the two groups of Tamils.

35. This was recounted to me by a Jesuit Priest, Father Paul Casparsz, whoworked with Bishop Nanayakara at the time.

36. The term ‘Sinhalese’ means ‘people of the lion race.’ This mythical accountplays down the existence and the rights of the original (aboriginal) popula-tion of the island, known as the Veddhas. There are a few thousand descen-dents of this population facing cultural extinction more imminantly thanthe aboriginal population of Australia.

37. Although Max Muller initially defined ‘Aryan’ as a race, he later withdrewthis definition arguing instead that ‘Aryan, in Scientific language, isutterly inapplicable to race. It means language and nothing but language,and if we speak of Aryan race at all, we should know that it means nomore than X + Aryan speech.’ Max Muller, Bibliography of Words and theHome of the Aryans, (1888), cited in Committee for Radical Development(CRD) (1984: 42).

38. There is a dearth of material specifically addressing the political dimensionsof caste. This section benefits from an excellent unpublished paper byMatthews (n.d. (a)). Also useful are Roberts (1992) and Jiggins (1979).

39. These are ritual occupations only. They originated in the pre-colonialperiod in connection with rajakariya (lit.: obligatory ‘king’s service’), caste-regulated corvee work for those who did not own wet paddy land or werenot involved in rice cultivation. E.R. Leach notes ‘the Washermen are onlyritual washermen, the Drummers only religious drummers; in their ordi-nary life, Goyigama, Washermen, Drummers and the rest are all alike, culti-vators of the soil’ (Leach (1953) cited in Matthews n.d. (a): 8).

40. Although no political party represents the exclusive interests of a particularcaste, caste is always a consideration in the choice of candidates andcabinet ministers. Further, as Matthews points out: ‘since Independenceevery government and every political party has had a Goyigama leader,except for a brief and freakish interim leadership of the SLFP by C.P. deSilva from March–May 1960, and the present United National Party admin-istration’ (n.d. (a): 3). The low caste background of President Premadasa wasa constant, if usually unspoken, issue in domestic politics. Some argue thatit better enabled him to respond to Tamil concerns, while others arguedthat it inhibited him from forming a solid consensus within the Sinhalesecommunity which is a prerequisite for inter-group dialogue.

41. A.J Wilson argues that caste was a significant catalyst in JVP recruitmentcampaigns, especially among the Karavas and Duravas in the low-countrysouthern districts (1974: 46). This is reinforced by Jiggins’ assessment ofcaste in the 1971 Insurrection. She points out that with within the ‘innercircle’ or ‘politburo’ of the movement, twelve of the fourteen were Karava(1979: 127).

42. The Buddhist sangha in Sri Lanka has three principal Nikayas (‘sects’): theSiam, the Amarapura, and the Ramanna. Matthews explains that the divi-sions arose primarily as a result of caste differences. (Matthews n.d. (a): 9;Matthews n.d (b): 1; Matthews 1988–89: 621).

Notes 213

43. ‘Although it is somewhat of an over-generalization, it is still fair to say thatGoyigama Christians tend to be Anglican, Karavas are frequently Catholic orMethodist and other still lower castes are more often than not members ofthe Methodist and other Protestant denominations. Ceylon Tamil Christiansociety is also informally regulated by caste tradition, particularly in mar-riage custom’ (Matthews n.d. (a): 11).

44. For a thickly detailed discussion of this process, see Jayawardenja (2000)and Jiggins (1979).

45. Brahmins do not figure prominently in Tamil politics. Although they rankhigher than the Vellalars in the sacred framework, they rank decisivelylower in the secular sense. On the whole, they are mere employees of theVellalar who according to Banks (1971: 67) ‘do not hesitate to disciplineBrahmins whom they consider to be behaving badly’ (p. 68) and even have‘a recognized right to interfere in the details of the temple ceremonial, par-ticularly in the matter of temple festivals and their organization.’

46. This is the Tamil caste equivalent to the Sinhalese Goyigama.47. Such reports increased as the LTTE gained exclusive territorial control of

regions in the North and North East. (Sri Lanka Infromation Monitor, March1993: 8; India Today, 15 October 1991: 91. Such practices were continuingin 2001 and early 2002. Bush 2002.

48. This action was undertaken under the cover of the extreme violence of theSecond JVP Insurrection (1987–90). See Chapter 6: The 1971 JVPInsurrection and 1987 Resurgence.

49. Personal interviews. Sri Lanka, May–July 1992; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001;2002.

50. One NGO worker commented on pervasiveness of this phenomenonoutside of the political arena as well, saying: ‘Factions, factions, everywhere.Even the International Youth Hostel Association is divided into warring fac-tions.’ Personal interviews, Colombo June 1992.

51. For useful studies of the politics of patronage in Sri Lanka, see Jayasuriya(2000), Jiggins (1979) and Warnapala and Woodsworth (1987).

52. Bandaranaike’s assassin was a monk who was aided by Buddharakkhita, thechief incumbent of the influential Kelaniya Temple and the leader of theEBP (Eksat Bhikkhu Peramuna) or ‘United Monks Front,’ an ‘organization ofpolitical monks’ (Bechert 1979: 206) which had originally supportedBandaranaike in his 1956 election victory.

53. The B–C Pact was signed by Bandaranaike and S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, theleader of the Federal Party, the major Tamil political party at the time andthe precursor to the Tamil United Liberation Front.

54. An incident noted by INFORM illustrates the intra-Party struggles: ‘Mrs.Bandaranaike left the island for Malaysia on March, leaving behind a letternominating veteran SLFPer K.B. Ratnayake to act as the Leader of theOpposition, in her absence; the 45 MPs supportive of Anura Bandaranaikepetitioned the Speaker to recognize Mr. Bandaranaike as the Acting Leaderof the Opposition, flouting Mrs. Bandaranaike’s wishes. On [24] March, theSpeaker said he would acknowledge Mr. Bandaranaike’s claim’ (Sri LankaInformation Monitor, Situation Report, March 1993). In November 1993,Anura Bandaranaike exited the SLFP and Joined the UNP as a CabinetMinister.

214 Notes

55. Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 September 1988: 38. In the belief that it wasgoing to win the 1988–89 elections, the SLFP is reported to have offered theJVP three ministries (FEER, 27 October 1988: 30).

56. Critics argue: ‘All power in the 1978 Constitution is concentrated nearly100 per cent in the President. He is more an Executive President. He is theHead of State, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, Head of theGovernment, Head of the Cabinet, source of appointment to the upper tiersof the judiciary. I don’t know what is left to concentrate on him… BothParliament and Prime Minister have been so heavily devalued that the onlything that I can think of comparing them to is our rupee’ (Colin R. De Silva,quoted in Matthews 1992: 223).

57. Matthews observes the following shift: ‘Writing about Parliament in theearly 1970s, Jupp [1978] remarked that the great majority of importantpoliticians in Sri Lanka were drawn from the “oral professions” like law,and had Anglicized backgrounds. The social and educational background ofmost MPs in all political parties has now dramatically shifted. For example,in 1970 an estimated 75% of members of Parliament spoke English. Now Iestimate that approximately only 40% have competence in this language’(1992: 225).

58. For a review of events, see Matthews (1992) and Christian Worker, 2nd & 3rdrQuarter (November 1991: i–xviii).

59. US Department of State (2001) Department of State Human Rights Reports for2000, February 2001, http://www.humanrights-usa.net/reports/srilanka.html

60. Lalith Athulathmudali was the first Asian President of the Oxford Unionand spoke five languages (English, Sinhala, Tamil, French and German). Hewas a lecturer at the University of Singapore prior to launching his politi-cal career and was able to discuss knowledgeably topics ranging from colo-nial history and 18th century Church politics to military and educationpolicy.

61. Such as Premadasa’s Janasaviya program (an acronym for several words,together meaning ‘a movement for spreading adaptable resources amongthe people’), a poverty-alleviation program under which he has pledged togive 1.4 million families Rs1,458 each month for two years in coupons (notcash) for necessities. At the same time Rs1,042 is to be deposited monthlyin a compulsory National Savings Bank account so that a family may amassRs25,000 at the end of that period. Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 October1988: 30; Matthews (1989: 435); and Janasaviya Programme, Implementa-tion Guidelines No. 1, Draft for Starting Work, National HousingDevelopment Authority, Colombo, January 1989.

62. This is discussed in further detail in Chapter 9.63. For successive failures in attempts by Tamil political parties to negotiate

viable alternatives, see Wilson (1989).64. By all accounts, the LTTE is responsible these and many other assassina-

tions. See: Hoole et al. (1992); Law and Society Trust, State of Human Rights2000; and regular UTHR (J) human rights reports.

65. This ethnicization has exacerbated tensions and Tamil mistrust of the secu-rity forces – helping to maintain inter-group stresses.

66. For example, the murder of Inspector Bastianpillai and a number of otherpolice officers in 1978 (Hoole et al. 1992: 22).

Notes 215

67. Fredrika Jansz, ‘Where did the third C130 go?,’ The Sunday Leader, 24 Februaryr2002: 13. It was reported in many interviews in Batticaloa that in early 2001the Sri Lankan Army extorted large amounts of money (Rs1.1 million by oneestimate) from the local population to hold a ‘song and dance cultural event’for the troops. Sources of funds included the Traders’ Association (61 leadingbusinesses and shops) and 35 government-registered contractors, as well asschools and private individuals. Efforts were made to force locals to entertainthe troops and TELO visited performers to remind them of their commitment.In the end, the LTTE called a hartel and cut electricity for the day of theperformance. Personal Interviews. Batticaloa, January 2001.

68. See for example, ‘Colombo Sacks Soldiers Having Links with JVP,’ TheHindu, 20 April 1987: 1.

69. ‘An army officer has been charged under the PTA [Prevention of TerrorismAct] with helping JVP Committee member and present leader to escape toIndia last year. Capt. Dharmasiri Nissanka will appear before theAvissawella magistrate on April 27 for his involvement in the escape ofSomawansa Amarasinghe, military sources said. Somawansa Amarasingheand at least 200 other members of the JVP escaped to South India beforesome of them successfully sought political asylum in the West, reliablesources say’ (‘Army Officer Charged with Helping JVP Leader,’ The Island, 5April 1992). See also, The Sri Lanka Monitor, December 1991: 4.

70. Sri Lanka Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999, Bureau ofDemocracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State, February,2000, Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 12, 2000

71. See ‘A Wake Up Call,’ Frontline, vol 18: Issue 17, 18–31 August 2001.72. Monks (bhikkhus) currently constitute 24 per cent of the arts enrolment, up

from 8.8 per cent in 1982 (Matthews 1989: 482).73. This was pointed out by a number of interviewees. However, Up-Country

Tamil support for the JVP cause was the exception rather than the rule,motivated in a few cases by a common ‘opposition to the same oppressivesystem.’ Personal interviews, Kandy, May–July 1992.

74. Personal interviews, Kandy, June 1992.75. Personal interviews, Colombo, Kandy, Batticaloa, May–July 1992.76. EPRLF: Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front; TELO: Tamil Eelam

Liberation Organization; PLOTE: People’s Liberation Organization of TamilEelam.

77. The paramilitary tensions are evident in most cities with a significant SriLanka Tamil population. Members of Tamil communities in Europe andNorth America are frequently harassed and forced to pay ‘donations’ to thewar effort. The LTTE is particularly efficient in the collection of foreignfunds both through such donations and a broader range of illicit activities(Chalk 2000; personal interviews).

78. This was brought to my attention by Dennis Cole in 1993, Coordinator ofIntelligence, Immigration and Refugee Board of the Government ofCanada.

79. Jane’s Intelligence (2000). Sentinel-South Asia, November 1999–April 2000,www.janes.com

80. This includes Soviet made SAM-7s ‘ purchased from corrupt governmentofficials and insurgent forces in Cambodia, [and recently acquired] far more

216 Notes

deadly and accurate, US-made Stinger missiles acquired from Afghanistan.’Chalk 2000: 9.

81. Even old data from August 1998 reveals the place of primacy of the LTTEuse of suicide bombers. Chalk (2000) estimates that it had conducted 155battlefield and civilian suicide attacks, compared to the 50 carried out by allother groups worldwide, including Hamas, Hizbollah, the Kurdish Worker’sParty (PKK) and Babbar Khalsa.

82. ‘Martin Comes to Tamils’ Defence,’ National Post (Toronto), 31 May 2000.See also, National Post (Toronto), 3 June 2000.

83. Ottawa Citizen, 4 October 2001.84. Eelam People’s Democratic Party is a Tamil paramilitary group which split

off from the EPRLF in 1987. The EPRLF was a major actor while it receivedthe full backing of the IPKF and Indian government. With the departure ofthe Indian troops, a large portion of EPRLF members and their families havere-located to South India fearing retribution from the LTTE. Other memberssought protection by joining the government side to fight the LTTE witharmy support.

85. However, according to the terms of the February Ceasefire, all of thesegroups are to be disarmed and disbanded. Art. 1.8: ‘Tamil paramilitarygroups shall be disarmed by the GOSL by D-day +30 at the latest. TheGOSL shall offer to integrate individuals in these units under thecommand and disciplinary structure of the GOSL armed forces for serviceaway from the Northern and Eastern Province.’ Preliminary reports indi-cate that this is being done. Time will tell whether this is a permanentstate of affairs.

86. A. K. Menon, ‘The Other Battle Field,’ India Today, 15 October 1991: 99; TheHindu, 6 September 1991: 1; Frontline, reprinted in Christian Worker, 2nd &3rd Quarter, 1991: xvi.

87. Christian Worker, 4th Quarter, 1989: viii–x.88. This view is candidly shared by both military and paramilitary leaders.89. The assassination of Gandhi may be identified as a critical juncture because

it appears to have radically altered the relationship of the LTTE with sup-porters in South India and in the Indian government. The impact ofPremadasa’s assassination appears to have been ambivalent regarding majorchanges in inter-group or intra-group relations.

4 1948 Independence and Disenfranchisement

1. Relevant sections from the Ceylon Citizen Act, No. 18 (reprinted inPonnambalam 1993: 75):4 (1) a person born in Ceylon before the appointed date (15 November

1948) shall have the status of a citizen of Ceylon by descent, if (a) hisfather was born in Ceylon, or (b) his paternal grandfather and pater-nal great grandfather were born in Ceylon.

4 (2) a person born outside Ceylon before the appointed date shall have thestatus of a citizen of Ceylon, if (a) his father and paternal grandfatherwere born in Ceylon, or (b) his paternal grandfather and paternal greatgrandfather were born in Ceylon.

Notes 217

5 (1) a person born in Ceylon on or after the appointed date shall have thestatus of a citizen of Ceylon by descent, if at the time of his birth hisfather is a citizen of Ceylon.

2. Citizenship was possible if the following conditions were met: that theIndians or Pakistanis possessed ‘an assured income of a reasonable amount’,had no disabilities which made it difficult for them to conform to the laws ofSri Lanka, had their wives and dependent children residing with themduring the required period of residence, and had renounced any other citi-zenship if they possessed it. The residency requirement was ten years ifwithout a spouse and seven years if married (Wilson 1977: 30).

3. For full details, see Kurian (1989), Jayawardena (1990: 64–98); Tinker (1977);and Wilson (1977: 28–38).

4. Agreements along the way include: the Indo-Ceylon Agreement of January1954, the Sirima–Shastri Agreement of 1964, the Indo-Ceylon AgreementImplementation Act of 1968, and the unilaterally enacted legislation in 1986to repatriate 94,000 Plantation Tamils.

5. I have argued elsewhere that: ‘many of the ‘new’ political voices among thePlantation Tamils are from those who are increasingly disgruntled with theability of the pro-UNP CWC, the largest Plantation Tamil trade union, todeliver ‘the goods.’ That the Plantation Tamils have in the past articulatedpolitical demands through a pro-UNP political organization has also helpedto maintain political barriers between them and other Tamil sub-groups. Itwas estimated that the CWC has captured approximately 25 per cent of orga-nized worker support (Personal interviews with a range of union organisersand workers, Kandy, May to July 1992). The UNP linkages of the CWC haveearned it the disparaging label, the ‘mini-UNP,’ by opposing unions. In thepast, political dissent and demands could be pacified/defused by the adroitmanoeuvring of the late leader, UNP Minister S. Thondaman, whichincluded cracking down on opposing unions as well as delivering [some]political gains on paper such as citizenship for those Plantation Tamils whohad been disenfranchised at independence. However, the death of MrThondaman has given rise to jostling for leadership within the CWC whichhas set in motion a battle for succession that challenges an element of stabil-ity within the Plantation Tamil areas. At this stage, a struggle for politicalcontrol will likely take place both within the CWC and among the politicalgroups in the Hill Country.’ (Bush 1993).

6. The idea of being ‘swamped’ is a recurrent theme in these debates.Jayawardena (1990: ff. 69) offers a sample of Sinhalese chauvinist remarksand arguments drawn from Parliamentary debates.

7. This compares with 1: 66,400 for the Sinhalese (68 MPs) ; 1: 63,831 for theMuslims (6 MPs); 1: 61,919 for the Sri Lankan Tamils (13 MPs); 1: 11,224 forthe Burghers (3 MPs); and 1: 608 for the Europeans (4 MPs) (Manor 1989:189).

8. Kumari Jayawardena places similar emphasis on both the class and ethnicmotivations (though in an intellectually more sophisticated way thanPonnambalam), concluding that the Citizenship Acts ‘[brought] to a conclu-sion the legal manoeuvres of the Sinhala majority to exclude the Plantationworkers from citizenship, thereby disenfranchising the largest section of theworking class’ (1990: 81).

218 Notes

9. See Jayawardena (1990: 92–95) for the voting record on the Indian andPakistani Residents Citizenship Act (1948) and for an account of the ethnicbackgrounds of those minority MPs voting in favor of the legislation.

5 1956 Election and S.W.R.D Bandaranaike

1. For example, in the economically hard times of the 1930s and the immedi-ate post-WWII period, the political status of Plantation Tamils was repre-sented as a threat to Sinhalese labor interests.

2. At that time, the Sinhalese as a whole were less advantaged than the SriLankan Tamils because of lower educational opportunities. Consequently,the Sinhalese generally had less status and income associated with goodemployment and commercial opportunities.

3. Bandaranaike denounced UNP leaders as ‘treacherous of their race and lan-guage’ and claimed that language parity ‘would mean disaster for theSinhalese race’ (Manor 1989: 236). A bhikkhu (Buddhist monk) from Mataraexpressed a similar level of emotion: ‘It is not necessary to actually assaultthe Tamils. If ten to fifteen youths of Matara get together and with knivesabout on the public road, that alone will make the Tamils run back to thenorth’ (quoted in Manor 1989: 236).

4 Such as loss of political confidence and material resources, increased attacksfrom within, defections to competing groups, escalating extremism, and soon.

5. Sir John Kotelawala was known as ‘Asia’s foremost playboy politician, thecard-playing two-fisted drinker in the white dinner jacket with an eye forthe ladies’ (Manor 1989: 223). He relished and cultivated the image of ‘thestrong man of Ceylon’ as a tough and virile man about the town as well asa thug politician able to intimidate and coerce with private cadre of goons(ibid.). As Manor explains:

Sir John’s lifestyle and public indiscretions soon made him a symbol ofwesternized crudity in the eyes of campaigners for indigenization. His well-publicized penchant for jodhpurs by day and dinner jackets by night, for cock-tails and extravagant entertainments, seemed alien and offensive to manyCeylonese, particularly to the Buddhist clergy. He seemed game for anything.It took scathing editorials in the press to dissuade him from riding to a recep-tion in a chariot pulled by sixty girls. In July 1954, he outraged pious Buddhistopinion by attending a barbecue where a calf was roasted on a spit, an inci-dent which became part of the island’s folk memory and haunted him everafter. As the Buddhist upsurge gained momentum in 1955, Sir John blithelydescribed it as ‘madness’ and blamed the monks for the decline of the faith.He seemed to represent all that the revivalists loathed, and this forced them toseek champions from outside the government (Manor 1989: 230).

6. Official photos of the first cabinet show only Bandaranaike and J.R.Jayewardene in ‘national dress.’ Death sentences for convicted Buddhistcriminals concluded with ‘May God have mercy on your soul.’ Cabinetministers gambled openly at race tracks and appeared in press photos, cock-tails in hand. None of this endeared the UNP government to the Buddhistsangha or laity (Manor 1989: 199).

Notes 219

7. Many commentators have argued that the ‘enerving and castrating effect’of foreign rule, which separated sangha from society was actively pursuedby colonial rulers – particularly, the British. Rahula Walpola was one of themost influential exponents of this argument. See Tambiah (1992: ff. 28).

8. See Walpola (1974), especially Appendix I ‘What is Politics?’, Appendix II‘Bhikkhus and Politics’, and Appendix III ‘The Kalaniya Declaration ofIndependence’. Note that this was originally published in Sinhala in 1946and had an important effect in stimulating political debate within thesangha.

9. Walpola discusses the historical precedents in his Heritage of the Bhikkhu(1974) and his The History of Buddhism in Ceylon (1956). The moral obliga-tion is represented as follows: ‘What the mind is to the body, religion is topolitics. Politics bereft of religion becomes sin and evil’ (Rahula 1974: 122).This sentiment is given operational form in the 1946 declaration of theVidyalankara Pirivena, the monastic collage where Rahula was a seniorteacher at the time: ‘Even today bhikkhus by being engaged actively in edu-cation, rural reconstructions, anti-crime campaigns, relief work, temperancework, social work and such other activities, are taking part in politics,whether they are aware of it or not. We do not believe that it is wrong forbhikkhus to participate in these activities. We believe that it is incumbent onthe bhikkhu not only to further the efforts directed towards the welfare of thecountry, but also to oppose such measures as are detrimental to the common good’(emphasis added); reprinted in Rahula (1974: 131–3).

10. This was especially important since the election commissioner’s recommen-dation to increase the number of polls (in order to increase access) had beenignored by the ruling UNP government. This increased the transportationproblem for SLFP supporters and because polling stations were located inUNP strongholds, it increased the opportunities to impede and intimidatethem as well.

11. Ironically, the EBP would later be implicated in the assassination ofBandaranaike only three years later.

12. A similar phenomenon occurred in Burma in 1917 and 1938 (Bechert 1979:204).

13. Tambiah cautions that ‘we should be careful not to credit the EBP with astrong organizational structure for systematic and long-term action’ (ibid.).The EBP was a extremely useful to the SLFP in the short-term but it lackedthe formal linkages for longer-term staying power.

14. For a Tamil Model I analysis, see Ponnambalam (1983). Government publi-cations and pro-government publications generally offer crude variants ofSinhalese Model I analysis, see Society for Ethnic Amity (n.d.).

15. Coincidentally, his ancestors also appear to have converted to RomanCatholicism under the Portuguese, Dutch Reformism under the Dutch, andto Anglicanism under the British (Manor 1989: 11, 110; Gooneratne 1986:3–6).

16. Manor further notes that Bandaranaike was not always comfortable in his‘national dress.’ In 1931, it was reported that he wore socks with his sandals– a breach of custom – and that they were held up by suspenders ‘of foreignorigin’ (Manor 1989: 96). He was also frequently to be seen in Europeansuits with stiff collars and occasionally he would appear in a newspaper

220 Notes

photograph in a Western suit along side his prize greyhound, BillyMicawber (ibid. 130). In the 1950s, this ambiguity was captured in acartoon which depicted Bandaranaike clad in national dress on the left sideof his body and in a European suit on the right (ibid. 97)

17. Most immediately, the violence of 1958. For details, see Vittachi (1958);Manor (1989: 286–299); and Tambiah (1992: 46–57).

18. This distinction is important because each configuration of intra-groupconflict leads to a different set of political outcomes. If the conflict hadbeen between a traditional elite and Anglicized elites, as Horowitz (1973)erroneously suggests, and if the traditional elite had won the contest, thenthe resulting system of government probably would have deviated from thecolonially bequeathed Western model. While it would unlikely be a theo-cracy, it would have positioned the Sinhalese Buddhist elite (the sangha,vernacular literati and educators, ayurvedic practitioners and so on) in a farmore prominent and influential position in the affairs of state. But as longas the dissent of the indigenous elite was channeled through an instrumen-tally indigenized elite, the Western structures of government would be main-tained, indeed reinforced, albeit in an ethnicized form. In other words, theset of outcomes in the first scenario would more likely entail a transforma-tion of the system, whereas the second set of outcomes would more likelyentail a reconfiguration of power within the existing system.

19. Frequent and spectacular disputes between Bandaranaike and other minis-ters were reported in Senanayake-owned newspapers. The Byzantine in-fighting is well presented in Manor’s (1989) biography of S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike.

20. This is literally as well as figuratively true. Bandaranaike was from a high-caste aristocratic Kandyan clan while Senanayake was from low-countryaristocracy. The political significance of this is reflected in the competingnetworks of political and economic resources each was able to drawn upon.There was an on-going rivalry between the Senanayakes and theBandaranaike–Obeyesekere clans; the latter had built up considerablewealth and influence collaborating with colonial authorities, while theformer had led the nationalist and reform struggles against the British.Further tension was generated by the fact that the Bandaranaike–Obeyesekere clan members were long-time property owners while theSenanayakes were more recently propertied (Manor 1989: 108). The nepo-tistic structure of the UNP is outlined in Jiggins (1979: 96–110). For furtherdetails, see Manor (1989).

21. For details, see Manor (1989: 271–272).22. For details, see Bechert (1978).23. ‘Both Sinhala and Tamil would be used in Parliament and all laws would

be promulgated in both languages. Sinhala would be the language used byall courts, government offices and local boards except in the Northern andEastern Provinces where the language should be Tamil and the medium ofinstructions in the schools would be the language of the local majority.Although the resolutions rejected parity for the two vernaculars, the SLFPhad accepted something very close to it. The headlines read “SinhalaOnly” but the small print contained a rather different message’ (Manor1989: 233).

Notes 221

6 JVP 1971 and 1987

1. ‘Authority’ is used here in its Weberian sense: ‘the probability that acommand with a specific content will be obeyed by a given group ofpersons’ despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which that probabilityrests (Weber 1947: 152).

2. Although it is possible to analytically and chronologically separate the 1971and 1987 episodes, they are treated together here to enable the examina-tion of shifts in ideology and mobilization over time.

3. At different points in time, with varying degrees of emphasis, JVP rhetoricdistinguished between Plantation Tamils (particularly as workers) andTamils from the North and East. See for example, Samaranayake (1987).

4. Chandraprema (1989: 6) dates the ‘inception of the JVP’ ‘around 1964when a group of youthful dissidents broke away from the pro-PekingCeylon Communist Party.’ Gunaratna (1990: 5) suggests that the JVP beganin 1966–67.

5. For examples, see Jiggins (1979: 139–42), Gunaratna (1990: 37–61, 89, 127),and Chandraprema (1991: 33–43).

6. Interestingly, the JVP rarely made direct reference to religion. ‘It realizesthat no anti-Buddhist party could survive in Sri Lanka and therefore doesnot discourage Buddhist ‘patriotic’ activism (in fact, it is assumed that someJVP opportunists have even donned robes, including perhaps evenWijeweera himself)’ (Matthews 1989: 430). Thus, although the JVP was ableto mobilize support from the sangha, particularly the young bhikkhus, mobi-lization was based on revolutionary or ‘patriotic’ principles rather thanSinhalese Buddhist principles per se. During the 1987 JVP resurgence, the‘Number 3 in the organization’ was D.M. Nandasena (alias D.M. Ananda), amonk who had given up the robes in his final year of study at Peradeniya(Chandraprema 1991: 10).

7. The following statistics are from Jiggins (1979: 123).8. Jiggins (1979) makes a convincing case that the both leadership and follow-

ers were low caste. In the inner circle or ‘Politburo,’ 12 out of 14 (or 10 outof 11 depending on one’s source of information) were Karava.

9. See Alles (1977); Matthews (1989); Obeysekere (1974); Jiggins (1979);Samaranayake (1987); Jayawardena (1990); Gunaratna (1990); andChandraprema (1989, 1991).

10. Two recent accounts of the JVP suggest that the premature attack on policestations which eliminated the element of surprise in the 1971 insurrection wasthe result factional in-fighting: Chandraprema (1991); and Gunaratna (1990).

11. At the time, the Sri Lankan military services were still largely ceremonial.Political leaders neither perceived the need nor commanded the resourcesto radically increase the military forces. In addition, following failed mili-tary coups in 1962 and 1966, governments were hesitant to build up themilitary apparatus, preferring instead to rely on the police forces to main-tain law and order (personal interviews with Sri Lankan Army militaryofficers, Colombo, May–July 1992).

12. For one estimate of costs, see Gunaratna (1990: 104).13. The events of 1971 can be labelled an ‘insurrection;’ the JVP organized its

members to launch a mass attack against police stations throughout the

222 Notes

country on a certain date. The preparation of the members may have beeninadequate and the attacks may have been uncoordinated, but there was asufficient level of organization and resources to enable identifiable actors toengage in a particular collective action at a particular point in time. In con-trast, the events starting in 1987 lacked such structure. The JVP had onlyrecently adopted a cell organizational structure and was in the process ofreconstituting itself into an underground revolutionary movement(Gunaratna 1990: 200–201). It did not have sufficient resources to launchan insurrection. Instead, independently of JVP activity, events catalyzed polit-ical dissent within the Sinhalese intra-group arena and created ideal condi-tions for launching a sustained challenge to the status quo and therepresentatives of the state. The JVP responded to, rather than initiated,events. As discussed elsewhere in this chapter, the signing of the Indo-SriLanka Agreement proved to be the pivotal event which galvanized theopposition from many diverse sub-groups and enabled the resurgence ofthe JVP. Thus, while the events of April 1971 may be accurately labelled afailed insurrection, the period from 1987 to 1990 is more appropriatelyidentified as a period of JVP ‘resurgence.’ Although the latter episode was a‘resurgence’ rather than an ‘insurrection,’ it was much more destabilizingand bloody.

14. On 31 July 1983, the JVP was proscribed with two other Marxist organiza-tions, the Sri Lanka Communist Party (Moscow) and the Trotskyite NavaSama Samaja Party. Opponents of the government and independentobservers stressed the improbability of involvement by these groups. Meyerpoints to ‘the paradox of an attack directed against the Tamils by the JVPand the NSSP whose recent writings revealed a desire for rapprochmentwith the terrorists and an attempt to analyse the minorities problem’ (1984:141). It is also unlikely that such an organized and concerted action as thatin 1983 could have been planned without attracting the attention of theCentral Intelligence Bureau which had claimed to have unearthed aNaxilite plot the day after the 1982 presidential elections (Obeyesekere1984: 169).

15. Wijeweera was, however, a distant third place finisher. By percentage ofvotes cast, the results were: UNP 52.91; SLFP 39,07; JVP 4.19; All CeylonTamil Congress 2.67; Lanka Sama Samaj Party 0.88; Nava Sama SamajaParty 0.26.

16. The following statistics are from Matthews (1989: 427–8).17. The 1987 Insurrection had a very different leadership from that of the 1971

Insurrection. With the exception of Wijeweera, the 1971 leadership was notinvolved in organizing for the 1987 Insurrection. After the 1971 experiencethey entered other areas of activity. While some continued political activi-ties, they did so through the legal political channels (Chandraprema 1991:2; Gunaratna 1990: 143). Some of those who had been in leadership posi-tions in 1971 became disillusioned with Wijeweera and joined anti-JVPpolitical parties in 1977 when it was un-banned (Chandraprema 1991: 52).Premachandra’s (1991: 6–14) biographical sketches of the JVP leadership in1987 indicate that 16 of the 35 leaders (for whom sketches were provided)had been involved in the 1971 Insurrection but none held positions in theCentral Committee or ‘inner council.’

Notes 223

18. See, for example, the International Alert report, Political Killings in SouthernSri Lanka (Marino 1989) which includes 31 pages of the names of victimsand the circumstances under which they were murdered in JVP-relatedviolence. See also, Gunaratna (1990: 270–290). Chandraprema (1989:30–31) writes: ‘Knives and swords are used in preference to guns to do theactual killing … guns being used only for intimidation of intended victims.Victims are very often cut to ribbons part by part … slowly. Whole familieshave been chopped to bits … the children often being burnt alive. Manymembers of the public – very ordinary people – like bus drivers, scavengers,small time shop-keepers have been shot for disobeying JVP orders. This hasbeen done regardless of the fact that their orders were disobeyed onlybecause of counter-orders by the armed forces.’

19. As discussed below, the JVP initially avoided direct attacks on the militaryforces and, instead, attempted to recruit them to the JVP cause.

20. Each of these incidents, and those below, were confirmed in personal inter-views conducted in Sri Lanka in May–July 1992. Abductions, disappear-ances, and hostage-taking were still occurring at that time on the East Coastand in the North. The culprits, however, were not the JVP, but governmentforces, pro-government Tamil paramilitaries, and the Liberation Tigers ofTamil Eelam (Amnesty International 1993; USCR 1991; INFORM Sri LankaInformation Monitor). Discussions with an individual involved in a projectrrdocumenting disappearances and human rights abuses on the East Coast,and an examination of a computer print out of over 3,000 missing personsfrom the Southern Province (made available to me by a Sri Lanka-basedhuman rights monitoring group) reveal a striking fact: the majority of indi-viduals (who had the courage to file affidavits) know who abducted theirchildren, parents, siblings or friends. Details are frequently available on: thesecurity force responsible; the identity of members of the abducting group;license plate numbers of vehicles involved in an abduction; and locationwhere the abducted individuals were initially taken. Yet prosecution ofthose responsible for flagrant humans abuses has been almost non-existent.

21. With a specific focus on Sri Lankan and Mozambique, Nordstrom (1992)provides an insightful anthropological examination of the construction andthe use of terror as a mechanism employed by state and non-state forces forgaining or maintaining socio-political control over a population. Such‘dirty wars’ ‘seek victory, not through military and battlefield strategies, butthrough horror. Civilians, rather than soldiers, are the tactical targets, andfear, brutality, and murder are the foundation on which control isconstructed’ (p. 261).

22. For example, JVP leaflets have placed the following restrictions on theburial of its victims: forbidding the burial to be a ceremonial occasion; lim-iting the service to only two bhikkhus for no more than a half hour; forbid-ding the body to be transported in a hearse or to be carried more than onefoot above ground level; prohibiting notices of grief, photographs orannouncements; prohibiting the cremation of the body and stipulating thatthe burial plot must be at ground level; and limiting funeral rites to nomore than ten individuals (Gunaratna 1991: 299).

23. For a detailed discussion of Udugampola’s specific allegations, see thespeech by the lawyer who convinced him to write down a full statement of

224 Notes

all he knew about government-related death squads: Batty Weerakoon inthe Yukthiya (1 August 1993), reprinted as an insert in INFORM, Sri LankaInformation Monitor, August 1993. See also: Christian Worker (2nd & 3rd Qr.)1992: i–ii; and the Ottawa Citizen, 11 April 1992: A 6. Udugampola, nick-named the ‘butcher cop,’ was well-known for his brutality: ‘Udugampola’smother, brother, sister-in-law and two children were killed and burnt [bythe JVP]. Subsequently, the Udugampola brothers – a DIG, another anInspector and an Army Major vied (sic) each other in heading the anti-JVPwar with their own special teams. Udugampola, who was very active inanti-JVP operations transformed the strategy of combatting the JVP fromcordon and search, to search interrogate and destroy. It was he togetherwith Brigadier Laksman Algama who first started to fight the JVP unconven-tionally’ (Gunaratna 1990: 286). His brutality was frequently mentioned ininterviews with development and human rights workers on the island (per-sonal interviews, May–July 1992). Most felt that peacebuilding and recon-ciliation were not possible until human rights abusers were heldaccountable for their actions.

24. Following the assassination of President Premadasa in May 1993 and thesubsequent change in UNP leadership, secret contact was made betweenUdugampola and the government which resulted in their respectivewithdrawal of allegations and criminal charges. In August 1993,Udugampola was appointed Acting Chairman of the Port Authority witha handsome salary and allowances for housing, entertaining, and fuel.Udugampola claims that the signatures on the incriminating documentsare not authentic and the UNP government appears anxious to let thewhole episode drop out of sight. What makes the Udugampola–UNPreconciliation and declaimers incredible is that when Udugampolapassed his press statement (based on his affidavits) over to the lawyerBatty Weerakoon, the whole episode was videotaped by a BBC correspon-dent in Sri Lanka. The video shows Udugampola signing his name at thebottom of every page. Opposition party members maintain their accusa-tions that the UNP government is implicated in vigilante murders. Thegovernment is unwilling to set up a commission of inquiry into theUdugampola allegations, e.g. verification of the lists of victims, politicalaffiliations, and circumstances of death (Sri Lanka Information Monitor,August 1993)

25. The Rajarata Rifles regiment was deployed against Tamil militants in Northin 1984/85 when it went on a rampage of indiscriminate killing of civiliansfollowing the murder of some of its members by Tamil militants. Followingthe incident there was a mass desertion of the regiment. The governmentresponded with the complete disbanding of the regiment, the revocation ofmilitary honours and the regiment’s colors. Personal interview with BruceMatthews, Colombo, June 1992. See also Marino (1989: 5).

26. The 21 April 1989 issue of the JVP newspaper, Ranabima contained the fol-lowing passage: ‘The main reason why the respect of the people for theArmy has deteriorated is not because the shortcomings and faults of the sol-diers but because the Army has been utilized in committing various crimesagainst the people for political motives. Service chiefs like … are responsiblefor this’ (reprinted in Chandraprema 1991: 294).

Notes 225

27. Death threats were sent to the families of known JVP members. They con-cluded as follows: ‘Is it not among us, ourselves, the Sinhalese people thatyour son/brother/husband has launched the conflict in the name of patrio-tism? Is it then right that you who are the wife/mother/sister of this personwho engages in inhuman murder or your children should be free to live? Isit not justified to put you to death? From this moment, you and all yourfamily members must be ready to die!. … May you attain Nirvana!’(reprinted in Chandraprema 1991: 296).

28. It should be noted that Wijeweera was arrested three weeks before the 1971Insurrection and spent the duration in a Jaffna prison. During the legalprosecution of the insurgency leaders, Wijeweera conducted his owndefence (resulting in a transcript of over 400 pages). His fiery defence of JVPactions served to imbue the movement with a romanticized tinge in the eyes of the youth of the mid-1980s; something which helped JVPmobilizational efforts.

29. The identification of the ‘class’ basis of the JVP is problematic. It was notbased particularly on the urban working class or the peasantry.Premachandra (1989: 7) describes its support base as a ‘bitterly discontentedlayer of rural middle class youth.’ Wijeweera, however, specified the sociallocation of this group more explicitly when he characterizes the unem-ployed youth as a group waiting to enter the rural proletariat (Jiggins 1979:125). Jiggins explains ‘the movement was thus not among rural wagelabourers, but characteristically, was the expression of those either waitingto sell their labour or engaged in improving its saleability’ (ibid.).

30. The original ‘Five Lectures’ were: ‘The Economic Crisis of the CapitalistSystem,’ ‘Indian Expansionism,’ ‘Independence,’ ‘The Leftist Movement’and ‘The Path the Sri Lankan Revolution Should Take.’ For details, seeGunaratna (1990: 61) and Chandraprema (1989: 71–77).

31. In the form of Indian capital domination of the Sri Lankan import–exporttrade, cultural ‘infiltration,’ smuggling, and so on.

32. A Sinhalese development worker in the Plantation areas explained thetension faced by the JVP vis a vis Plantation Tamils. As self-proclaimedMarxists, the JVP cannot deny the Plantation Tamil right to struggle forself-determination – as this ‘resonates ideologically with the JVP.’ However,the JVP must also recognize that its support base is in the rural villages, thatis, the Sinhalese villages. Thus, according to this observer, mobilizationmust pander to anti-Tamil sentiment; the difficulty is in determining thecost-effective balance between support for Plantation Tamil self-determina-tion and the representation of Plantation Tamils as a facet of ‘Indian expan-sionism’ (personal interviews, Kandy, May–July 1992).

33. ‘A Message to the People of Sri Lanka’ (1984), quoted in Jayawardena (1990:150).

34. Personal interviews, Sri Lanka, May–July 1992. See also Gunaratna (1990:131–3.)

35. Subsequently murdered in Madras by LTTE in June 1990 with 15 othersmembers of the EPRLF.

36. It was alleged in the interview that because the Sri Lankan governmentfeared the PLOTE–JVP connection, it provided aid to the LTTE in an attackagainst a PLOTE camp in Wilpattu Wildlife Park in May 1989. The Sri

226 Notes

Lankan military support is alleged to have included air, sea and land trans-port. The dynamics here are parallel to the allegations during the impeach-ment procedings that President Premadasa had supplied money andmaterial to the LTTE for use against the IPKF and IPKF-supported defenceforces (see Episode V).

37. See also Gunaratna (1993: 333–4) for further instances of cooperationbetween Sinhalese and Tamil militant groups, including joint training inIndia and Sri Lanka and JVP efforts to use PLOTE connections to acquirearms from North Korea.

38. It should be noted that the number of students directly involved in pro-JVPactivity was actually quite small relative to their impact. Matthews (1989:432) estimates that in 1989 only 10–20 per cent of the students wereactively involved in violence and intimidation.

39. A belief also held by A.C.S. Hameed, Minister of Education, who arguedthat the single primary factor contributing to student unrest was theabolition of student assemblies without providing an alternative arrange-ment for student representation (in an interview with Bruce Matthews(1989: 432).

40. ‘Legitimacy’ is used in its Weberian sense: a conviction on the part ofpersons subject to authority that it is right and proper and that they havesome obligation to obey, regardless of the basis on which this belief rests(Weber 1947: 324).

41. Athulathmudali’s proposal is also mentioned in Chapter One. In the initialstages of ‘translocation,’ the Tamil youth could live in ‘nice’ camps in theSouth. Ideally, they would ‘have complete freedom’ and would enjoy ‘trainingprograms.’ Athulathmudali argued that this way the ‘LTTE fish would bedeprived of the life sustaining water of public support.’ As an after-thought,Athulathmudali added that ‘of course’ he would do all this only with theconsent of the public (personal interviews, Colombo, May–July 1992).

7 1983 Riots

1. ‘Militarization’ is used here to refer to the tendency for intergroup relationsand conflict to be defined in narrow military terms. This typically coincideswith an increase in military-related expenditures and military crack-down oncivilian and combatant groups. After 1983, the Sri Lankan government beganto view the ‘Tamil problem’ exclusively as a ‘military’ one. The statement byPresident J.R. Jayewardene illustrates the phenomenon: ‘I shall have a mili-tary solution to what I believe is a military problem. After doing so, I shalltackle the political side’(quoted in The Times (London), 26 January 1986). It isargued below that the friction within the Jayewardene administrationbetween ‘hawks’ (advocating militarization) and ‘doves’ (advocating politicalsolutions) was a factor in the outbreak of the riots. In September 1993,President Wijetunga expressed similar sentiments when he stated his convic-tion that ‘there is not ethnic conflict … one only has to overcome a terroristproblem.’ The same position was articulated by Sirimavo Bandaranaike (SriLanka Information Monitor, September 1993), as well by her daughter in herrole as president, most evidently in her ‘War for Peace.’

Notes 227

2. This frustration was aggravated by the perception that education andemployment opportunities were being denied to them (CRD 1984: 7–13;Gunawardene 1975; Kapferer 1984; Kearney 1975; De Silva 1977; C.R. DeSilva 1979). After the declaration of a state of emergency in Jaffna in 1979,the presence and activities of the ‘Sinhalese Army of Occupation’ added tothe frustration of Tamil youth. For a discussion of the 1979 imposition of astate of emergency in Jaffna, see MIRJE (1980).

3. The text of the resolution is reprinted in de Silva (1986: 403–406). TheResolution concludes with the statement: ‘And this Convention calls uponthe Tamil Nation in general and the Tamil youth in particular to comeforward to throw themselves fully into the sacred fight for freedom and toflinch not till the goal of a sovereign socialist state of Eelam is reached.’Although the TULF officially eschewed violent means to achieve this end,its public ambivalence and provocative speeches caused many in theSinhalese audience to doubt its commitment to a non-violent pursuit ofEelam. A number of individuals interviewed in Sri Lanka (including aformer TULF strategist and Tamil academics) felt that the TULF was tacti-cally inciting the youth militancy as a means of extracting political conces-sions (such as devolution of political power) from the UNP government. Itwas a tactic, they pointed out, which back-fired.

4. Hyndman (1988: 83) estimates that by May 1985, there were over 100,000Tamils from Sri Lanka in South India – an estimate confirmed in April 1985,by the Acting High Commissioner of India to Canada in a presentation atCarleton University (Canada). The Tamil diaspora is large and especiallywell-organized in Canada, Australia, the US, Britain, Norway, and Germany.The US Committee for Refugees (1991) estimates that by 1991 more than210,000 had fled to the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu and at least700,000 people from all communities had been displaced within Sri Lanka(News Release, 12 November 1991). For a general discussion of displacedpersons in Sri Lanka, see CPA et al. (2001) and Thambayah (1992).

5. The full text of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other emergency regu-lations are available through the Law Library of Congress. See TheDemocratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ‘Legislative Enactments of theDemocratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka’ in force on the 31st Day ofDecember 1980, Revised Edition (Unofficial), Volume II containingChapters 25 to 30. Since the mid-1990s, Law and Society Trust has annuallypublished Sri Lanka: State of Human Rights, which offers regular assessmentof this, and related, security legislation.

6. Within Sri Lanka, NGOs include the Law and Society Trust, the Centre forPolicy Alternatives, the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, the Centrefor the Study of Human Rights, Lawyers for Human Rights and develop-ment, MIRJE, INFORM, the Civil Rights Movement of Sri Lanka, theUniversity Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), and the Batticaloa PeaceCommittee. Outside Sri Lanka, the list of groups includes: AmnestyInternational, the International Commission of Jurists, International Alert,Lawasia, Asia Watch, and the British Refugee Council.

7. For details, see Tiruchelvam (1999); Matthews (1987, 1993) and Islam (1987).8. The Jaffna Public Library contained over 95,000 volumes, many of which

are irreplaceable and were of great cultural value (MIRJE 1983: 17;Obeyesekere 1984: 163; Leary 1981: 32).

228 Notes

9. In a Statement to Parliament (9 June 1981) on the violence in Jaffna,Gamini Dissanayake said: ‘ … there is no doubt whatever, that there was avery serious situation in Jaffna because the police force was on the verge ofa virtual mutiny’ (reprinted in the Sri Lanka Resource Centre (1981: 57).

10. Gamini Dissanayake’s statement in Parliament suggests that the govern-ment lost control, but denies responsibility: ‘The duty of maintaining lawand order is the responsibility of the Government, and the police force is anarm of that process, but when the police force is shot at and people arekilled [by Tamil militants], the behavioral patterns of those officers who areshot at is something we cannot be responsible for’ (reprinted in Sri LankaResource Centre 1981: 68).

11. See for example: ‘Statement made in Parliament by the Leader of theOpposition, Mr. A. Amirthalingam on 9th June 1981’ (Sri Lanka ResourcesCentre 1981: 9–24) and ‘Statement in Parliament by Mr V. Yogeswaran,M.P. for Jaffna’ (ibid.: 25-30).

12. The communalist rancor in Parliamentary debates of this period is illus-trated in excerpts reprinted in Sri Lanka Resource Centre (1981). See also,MIRJE (1983: 16–25).

13. One poster pasted throughout Colombo read: ‘Aliens, you have danced toomuch; your destruction is at hand. This is the country of we Sinhalas’(USCR 1991: 8).

14. While the violence in Ampara is generally identified as the the startingpoint for this outbreak, the violence there was ‘spill over’ from a sportingevent in Batticaloa. The violence in Ampara was ‘communalist’ in terms ofthe axis of confrontation, it may not have been communalist in terms of its‘trigger.’ According to Norman Uphoff, the violence there and in parts ofGal Oya were spontaneous, in contrast to the more structured incidentswhich followed elsewhere (personal correspondence, January 1994).

15. President Jayewardene seems to have recognized this fact. According toLeary (1981: 21): ‘The International Herald Tribune reported that PresidentJayewardene, in an interview with a Reuters correspondent on August 14,stated that attacks on Tamils in Ratnapura appeared to have been orga-nized. The Guardian (London) reported on August 15th that ‘it seems tohave been established that an unnamed group is organizing the present vio-lence for motives of its own.’ An editorial in The Hindu (India) of 18 August,1981 stated that ‘a close look into the riots would show that behind them isa planned and systematic effort to aggravate racial animosity.’ It was widelyreported that attacks in Negombo as well as attacks against passengers on aJaffna to Colombo train were made by organized gangs. Tamil sourcesstated that it could not be ruled out that people close to the governmentwere behind the organized violence. They also claimed that police andarmy forces did not intervene to prevent attacks until the declaration of thestate of emergency many days after the attacks began.’

16. There were three identifiable categories of targets attacked by Tamil mili-tants at this time: 1.) the military and police personnel stationed in theNorth; 2.) moderate Tamil politicians who were seen to be cooperating withthe UNP government; and 3.) those identified as informers by the militants.

17. In May 1983, a Defence Ministry spokesman announced: ‘The armed forcesand the police in the North are to be given legal immunity judicial andwide ranging power of search and destroy’ (Hoole et al. 1992: 58). In early

Notes 229

June The Sun reported: ‘Under such circumstances soldiers were compelledto react as during a war particularly in their role of fighting armed terroristswho had no compunction about killing servicemen or members of thepublic. In view of this, it has been felt that police and service-men in theNorth should be given the freedom of the battlefield rather than have theirmorale sapped through conflicts with legal niceties. This is not a peacetimesituation and the police and services must be provided with adequate safe-guards when attempting to control the problem’ (ibid.).

18. On 23 July the Sri Lankan Army began an operation to remove some of thePlantation Tamils from the predominantly Tamil areas of Mannar,Vavuniya, and Trincomalee where they had resettled following the anti-Tamil riots of August 1977 and August 1981. In the early hours of themorning, an estimated 600 displaced Plantation Tamils were herded intotrucks and brought to the Nuwara Eliya District (Bastian 1993: 22). Thisevent may, or may not, be directly related to the ambush in Jaffna. It was,however, an act that was sure to provoke a negative response from Tamilsub-groups in light of the political volatility of state-sponsored settlementof Sinhalese in Tamil majority districts. Hyndman (1988: 8) reports allega-tions that the ambush was in retaliation for the rape of several Tamilwomen by soldiers.

19. The fact that the patrol was initially ambushed with a land mine issignificant because it is a result of Indian government support for Tamilmilitants: ‘India had begun to supply the Tigers with Claymore land minesas a way of better withstanding the Sinhalese armies superiority in mobilityand its increasing resort to a military solution’ (Tambiah 1992: 72).

20. Hyndman (1988) suggests that reporting of the rampage by security person-nel in the newspapers in the South might have moderated the Sinhalesebacklash.

21. There are many horrifying stories of the experiences of Tamil families (seefor example, Kanapathipillai 1990; and Tambiah 1993). It should bestressed that there were many instances where Sinhalese and Muslim indi-viduals and families took great risks to protect Tamil friends and strangers.Tambiah (1993) discusses some of these incidents.

22. These statements by Jayewardene were confirmed by The Guardian, 9 August 1983. Both passages are reprinted in Tambiah (1986: 25).

23. The magisterial inquiries into each incident are assessed by Hyndman(1988: 19–26). The prison authorities have been criticized for not removingthe remaining Tamil detainees following the first attack. Many of thedetainees, being held under the PTA, had not been charged with any crimi-nal offence. Among the victims was a medical doctor who was the Secretaryof the Gandhiyam movement. Prison officials claimed to be unable to iden-tify any individuals involved in the massacre. The corpses could not beexamined by an independent coroner because after both incidents theywere claimed by the Detective Superintendent of Police (Colombo) underRegulation 15A of the emergency regulations which allows state authoritiesto dispose of corpses. Hyndman observes: ‘From the list of those participat-ing in the inquiries it can be seen that lawyers for surviving Tamil prisoners(Mr. Yogarajah apart) were not present at the hearing. … On the secondoccasion [i.e. the 27 July massacre] the prisoners were all in the same build-

230 Notes

ing and many of them may have had the opportunity to see who theirassailants were, or to be able to provide other evidence of assistance to theinquiry’ (1988: 23). While the deaths were found to be ‘all cases of homi-cide as a result of a riot in prison’ (ibid.: 22), no one has been charged.

24. Such as Gampaha, Kalutara, Matale, Nuwara Eliya, Badulla and Bandarawella.25. ‘Quasi-legal’ because the measures were sanctioned by emergency regula-

tions which were often in contravention to international legal conventions.26. The militant groups are more appropriately identified as ‘incipient paramil-

itary organizations’ because they had not yet acquired the size, structure, ormaterial resources associated with full fledged paramilitary organizations.

27. Concurring with the study of the 1981 communal violence by the Councilfor Communal Harmony through the Media, MIRJE (1983: 18) concludes:‘As it turned out, not only the bulk of Sinhalese people were kept in thedark and even misled in regard to the truth about events in Jaffna, but theywere also, at the same time, subjected to dangerously anti-Tamil propa-ganda.’ See also Siriwardene (1984: 226–228).

28. This point was confirmed during a seminar of researchers at theInternational Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, June 1992.

29. Radhika Coomaraswamy, Director, International Centre for Ethnic Studies(ICES). Personal interview, Colombo, 28 May 1992.

30. Lalith Athulathmudali, then Minister of Trade and Shipping, opened hisspeech to the nation as follows: ‘A few days ago, my friends, I saw a sightwhich neither you nor I thought we should see again. We saw many peoplelooking for food, standing in line, greatly inconvenienced, seriously incon-venienced.’ Obeyesekere comments bitterly: ‘Here was the leading intellec-tual in the government speaking of the hardship faced by Sinhalese peoplequeuing for food [because Sinhalese mobs had burned down Tamil shops]when 70,000 Tamils were in refugee camps. Equally astounding is the factthat neither the President nor any minister of the government made anofficial visit to single refugee camp to console the dispossessed’(Obeyesekere 1984: 167).

31. Many middle class Tamils were dismayed by the rationalization for theviolence which they often heard from some Sinhalese: ‘if you call forseparation, what do you expect?’ However, following the JVP terror of1987–90, which coerced Sinhalese into not denouncing a repugnant politi-cal program, there was an increase in the sympathy by some Sinhalese forthe victimization of Tamil civilians in the North caught between govern-ment forces and anti-government forces. Personal interviews, Sri Lanka,May–July 1992. See also Spencer (1984) and Nissan (1984).

32. The work of external agencies should not be seen as minimizing or over-shadowing the courageous role played by Sri Lankan development andhuman rights organizations which have consistently spoken out on behalfof victims of injustice from all communities. Despite the governmentclamp-down, Goonetileke (1984) lists over 400 articles written on the 1983riots. See also Rupesinghe and Verstappen (1989) whose annotated bibliog-raphy includes over 2,300 entries. An up-dated version was subsequentlypublished by Rupesinghe, Verstappen and Philip in 1993.

33. Identification of such vehicles and their license plate numbers is presented invarious publications, for example Piyadasa (1984) and in reports of earlier

Notes 231

instances of anti-Tamil violence (MIRJE 1981: 19). Frequently, affidavitsreporting abductions by security forces also include badge numbers, licenseplate numbers and other pieces of ‘firm evidence’ identifying those respon-sible. In Sri Lanka editions of Hoole et al. (1992), the government censorblacks out the license plate numbers of the Sri Lanka Transport vehicle usedto transport rioters in the 1983 riots (p. 64).

34. Tambiah describes the rioters which were mobilized. They were Sinhalesemales, ‘virtually all drawn from Colombo and its suburbs’ (Tambiah 1992:74). More specifically, they were ‘the urban working class, particularly thosein government factories, the laborers, small businessmen and othersemployed in the congested bazaars and markets, secondary school studentsand recent dropouts, the urban underclass of unemployed and underem-ployed, the residents of shanty towns. A more detailed enumeration wouldinclude the following ‘occupational’ categories: wage workers in factorymills; transport workers such as bus drivers and conductors, workers inrailway yards and electrical installations; petty traders and workers inmarkets, including fish mongers and market porters; small shopkeepers andsalesmen in government corporations; hospital workers and attendants;high school students and students of technical institutes and tutoriesincluding recent school dropouts’ (Tambiah 1992: 74).

35. Discussions by Tambiah (1992: 73) and Obeyesekere (1984: 160) point tothe same conclusion.

36. For full details see, Christian Worker, 2nd and 3rd Quarters 1992 (November).r37. Dissanayake subsequently split with the UNP in 1991 (after Premadasa

replaced Jayewardene as president) to form the Democratic United NationalFront with another former UNP Minister Lalith Athulathmudali.

38. The censorship guidelines are presented and discussed in Hyndman (1988:31–34). The guidelines established on 2 August 1983 include: #5. No state-ments will be permitted on any subject by political parties or political per-sonalities other than statements arranged for broadcast through Statemedia; and #6. No comment will be permitted by any person on thepresent security or political situation. The continued government repres-sion of the media and freedom of expression generally gave rise to the ‘FreeMedia Movement’ in early 1993. A reminder of the government censor’spresence is offered in the blacked-out sections of ‘politically sensitive’ booksin Sri Lanka, for example, the passages in Hoole et al. (1992: 47, 64, 66)dealing with the 1983 riots.

39. Commenting on the conduct of the armed forces during the riots, GaminiDissanayake noted, ‘It was only when they realized that this was not a merecommunal outburst that they thought of doing their duty of maintaininglaw and order’ (Daily News, 6 August 1983, quoted in Nissan 1984: 180).

8 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement

1. The judgment that the Agreement was unanticipated is reinforced by areview of the literature and media reports written at the time. For example,Premdas and Samarasinghe (1988: 677) write that ‘the Accord came as asudden thunderbolt.’ This view is expressed by Professor Virginia Leary

232 Notes

(who headed the 1981 International Commission of Jurists fact-findingMission to Sri Lanka) in an address to the Paterson School of InternationalAffairs, Carleton University (Canada) in October 1987. And it is the view ofthe author based on field work in South India from 1986 to 1987 while on aShastri Indo-Canadian Institute Fellowship (Bush 1989). Recently, K.M. DeSilva (1993) has claimed that the Agreement was the product of a negotiat-ing process which began in 1983. This assessment is untenable for manyreasons, most obviously because the issues and actors have changed since1983, making the identification of a single negotiating process impossible.

2. For example, in Clause 2.9 of the Agreement the Governments of India andSri Lanka committed the Tamil paramilitary organizations to the following:‘ … A cessation of hostilities will come into effect all over the island within48 hours of the signing of this agreement. All arms presently held by militantgroups will be surrendered in accordance with an agreed procedure to authorities tobe designated by the Government of Sri Lanka. Consequent to the cessation ofhostilities and the surrender of arms by militant groups, the army and othersecurity personnel will be confined to barracks in camps as on May 25,1987. The process of surrendering of arms and the confining the securitypersonnel moving back to barracks (sic) shall be completed within 72 hoursof the cessation of hostilities coming into effect.’

3. The main IPKF offensive was concentrated in the Jaffna peninsula wheremilitary confrontation with the LTTE took the form of conventional mili-tary engagements. Military confrontations on the East coast consistedmostly of hit-and-run operations by the LTTE.

4. See for example, de Silva (1991) and Kodikara (1989).5. Including, inter alia, ballot box stuffing, impersonation, and omissions from

the voters list. (‘Samarakone’ 1984). The monitoring of election violenceand irregularities has been undertaken effectively by a local NGO, TheCentre for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV). For past reports, see:http://www.cpalanka.org

6. The unprecedented UNP majority won in 1977 was largely the consequenceof voters’ overwhelming rejection of Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s SLFP govern-ment which had extended its mandate through emergency legislation. Therejection of the SLFP was so thorough that the TULF became the officialopposition party. Regarding the possible discrepancy in a ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system between percentage of popular vote won by a Partyand the portion of seats allocated to it, ‘Samarakone’ observes: ‘it was toavoid such extreme incongruities that the government had introduced pro-portional representation in 1978. It was to reproduce such incongruity that itset aside proportional representation in favour of a referendum in 1982’[emphasis in original] (1984: 84).

7. The continued anti-TULF policy of the LTTE and its ability to infiltrate intoColombo are seen in by the LTTE’s assassination of the top TULF leaders inJuly 1989, Appapilai Amirthalingam and V. Yogeswaran (FEER, 27 July1989: 10–11), as well as Dr Neelan Thiruchelvam in July 1999.

8. INFORM reports that in September 1993 the government promulgation of acoastal security zone ‘barred to civilians [from] north of Mannar toTrincomalee’ resulted in over 90,000 fisher families losing their sole meansof livelihood (Sri Lanka Information Monitor, September 1993).

Notes 233

9. There are many references to such training bases: Gunaratna (1990a: 48–54)Tambiah (1986: 109); O’Ballance (1989: 19, 31, 42) India Today, 31 March1984, 15 July 1987; South, March 1985; and Far Eastern Economic Review, 21February 1985. An especially detailed discussion of the covert involvementby Indian actors is provided by Kadian (1990: 98–109): ‘[The Sri LankanTamil Militant groups] activities in India were broadly under the aegis ofthe Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of the Cabinet Secretariat [India’sforeign intelligence agency], i.e. directly under the Indian Prime Minister’soffice’ (p. 98).

10. While I was in Jaffna in January 1981, a Catholic priest explained to me thatfunding, training, and arms were being supplied to ‘the Boys’ (a generic termfor Tamil militants) by the PLO, the Soviet Union, Libya, and the IRA. In aJune 1992 interview in Sri Lanka, a leader in PLOTE claimed that he hadreceived training in Lebanon in 1984 from the Popular Front for theLiberation of Palestine (PFLP). He also identified the Palestinian LiberationOrganization (PLO) as a source of support for EROS as early as 1976–77.

11. The following list draws from Marino (1987: 5).12. The context of this episode does not detract from the heinousness of the

massacre but it does point out the role of government policies in adding toethnic tensions. Rubin (1987: 112) explains: ‘These farms had been theproperty of a well-to-do Tamil who donated them in 1978 for the resettle-ment of Indian Tamil plantation laborers who had been driven from theirhomes by anti-Tamil violence in 1977. The government subsequently tookover the farms, expelled the Tamils, and settled Sinhalese convicts and theirfamilies there in a rehabilitation scheme. Tamils perceived the scheme aspart of a government effort to settle Sinhalese in predominantly Tamil areasin order to counteract Tamil demands for control of those areas.’

13. O’Ballance (1989: 35) claims that: ‘the government admitted that, to avoidattacks and ambushes [in early 1984], Sinhalese policemen had all beenwithdrawn from outlying police stations in the Jaffna Peninsula area to thetwo main police stations at Jaffna and Kankesanturai.’ The ultimate resultof this decision could only be the strengthening of paramilitary control ofthese areas – which came to be known locally as ‘Tiger country,’ after theLTTE became the most powerful Tamil paramilitary organization.

14. Marino (1987: 2–8) provides a concise chronology of violence and counter-violence in the period from 1983 to 1986.

15. A comprehensive study of Sri Lankan politics from 1983 to the present hasyet to be written.

16. See Frontline, Vol. 4, No. 12 (13–26 June), 1987: 4–16. For further details onthe extent of the Sri Lankan military offensive, see: ‘Four Tamils Killed,’ TheHindu, 22 January 1987: 9; ‘20 Killed in Fighting in Batticaloa Dt.,’ TheHindu, 29 January 1987: 1; ‘200 Civilians Killed, Says LTTE,’ The Hindu,31 January 1987: 1; ‘Sri Lankan Planes Strafe Village in Mannar,’ The Hindu,7 February 1987: 9; ‘Sri Lanka Armed Forces Launch Major Attacks,’ TheHindu, 7 February 1987: 9; ‘Massive Army Operations in Mannar,’ TheHindu, 8 February 1987: 2; ‘22 Militants Die as Battle Continues,’ The Hindu,9 February 1987: 9; ‘Massacre in Mannar,’ The Hindu, 11 February 1987: 1;‘50 Civilians Killed, Tamil Village Wiped Out,’ The Hindu, 12 February 1987:9; ‘Tamils Facing Starvation, Says LTTE,’ The Hindu, 14 February 1987: 1;

234 Notes

‘Unacceptable Response from Colombo’ (editorial), The Hindu, 24 February1987: 8; ‘Jaffna Operation Leaves 30 Dead,’ The Hindu, 9 March 1987: 1; ‘NoLet Up in Sri Lankan Army Attack on Civilians,’ The Hindu, 11 March 1987:1; ‘Gunships Attack School,’ The Hindu, 13 March 1987: 1; ‘Jaffna Civiliansto Get Some Relief,’ The Hindu, 13 March 1987: 1; ‘20 Die in JaffnaShelling,’ The Hindu, 30 March 1987: 1; ‘11 Patients Killed in JaffnaShelling,’ The Hindu, 31 March 1987: 1; ‘Sri Lanka Planes Bomb Jaffna,’ TheHindu, 23 April 1987: 1; ‘Over 150 Tamils Killed as Bombing Continues,’The Hindu, 24 April 1987: 1; ‘MPs Want Jaffna Bombing Condemned,’ TheHindu, 24 April 1987: 9; ‘Jaffna Bombed for Third Day,’ The Hindu, 25 April1987: 1.

17. Government Forces and the IPKF were also accused of using civilians asshields from enemy fire (Rubin 1987).

18. Media reports at the time put the toll at 107 people (The Hindu, 18 April1987: 1). O’Ballance (1989: 76) provides the figure of 127 deaths including31 servicemen. He adds that another 60 were injured, ‘the majority beingSinhalese.’ According to de Silva (1993: 116), 130 people were ‘moweddown by automatic weapons.’

19. Parliamentarians were apparently unaware that their government wasalready actually involved in the conflict, training and assisting the TamilParamilitaries.

20. If Pakistan provided similar aid in this fashion to the suffering Muslim resi-dents of Kashmir, Government of India objections would have been heardaround the world.

21. This was the unanimous assessment of all military and paramilitary actorsinterviewed by the author in Sri Lanka. It was also the view of LalithAthulathmudali, who was Minister of National Security at the time and aclose advisor of Jayewardene. Personal interviews, Sri Lanka, May–July1992.

22. For a useful overview of the movement for an independent Tamil state ofDravidistan, see Gunewardene (1986: 125–144) and Irshick (1969).

23. There had been gun fights in Tamil Nadu among rival Tamil paramilitaryorganizations throughout the 1980s. In late 1986, a rash of bombings inTamil Nadu fuelled the fear that Indian Government-sanctioned materialsand training to Sri Lankan Tamil militants might be acquired by SouthIndian separatists: General Post Office explosion, Madurai (11 December1986); train explosion, Tiruchi (23 December 1986); railway explosion,Madras (29 December 1986); and the Wallajah Road explosion, Madras(1 January, 1987).

24. Athulathmudali, the Minister of National Security at the time of theAgreement, claimed that India intervened precisely because Sri Lanka was‘winning’ in the ‘Tamil War’ and that Indian pressure increased after theArmy’s victory at Vadammarachichi (north-east of Jaffna). Athulathmudalclaimed that at this point, the Indian High Commission in Colombo said tohim: ‘Under no circumstances will we allow you to take Jaffna.’

25. Eelam People’s Democratic Party is a Tamil paramilitary group which splin-tered off from the EPRLF in 1987.

26. ‘As the Indians waited patiently for the weapons, the Jaffna-based LTTEattacked two Eastern Province militant groups, [PLOTE] and [EPRLF], as

Notes 235

leaders of the two groups were on their way to a ‘peace conference’ with theLTTE. A round of attacks and counter-attacks followed, leaving more than150 dead. The conflict demonstrated the durability of a long-standing polit-ical rift between Jaffna Tamils and their Eastern Province counterparts whohave long complained of the Jaffna penchant for trying to dominate Jaffnapolitical affairs’ (Pfaffenberger 1988: 143). Sustained attacks on members ofPLOTE and EPRLF caused an unspecified number of casualties. Similarly inVavuniya, on 22 September, the LTTE killed about 18 PLOTE members inan attack on the latter’s camp (Rubin 1987: 45–6). O’Ballance (1989: 97)reports that 66 people died in Tamil paramilitary feuding ‘and over 70Tamil separatists of various groups surrendered to the police for their ownsafety. In the face of such LTTE deadly hostility, many other members ofthe EPRLF, TELO and PLOTE either surrendered to the authorities with theirarms, or disappeared deeper underground.’

27. On completion of basic paramilitary training all LTTE forces are ceremoni-ously presented with a cyanide capsule which is worn on a thong aroundtheir necks. They pledge to fight until the last bullet and then swallow thecyanide rather than be captured by the enemy. There have been questionsraised about how the 17 LTTE captives retained their cyanide after theircapture.

28. Rubin (1987: 50) provides details: ‘In late August, in response to the releaseof several thousand Tamil detainees by the government, the LTTE freed thethree policemen. One soldier, perhaps a Muslim, was subsequently let go,leaving eight Sinhalese soldiers in [LTTE] custody. The militants had offeredto arrange visits by the family of the prisoners, had taken journalists to seethem, and had promised to treat them well. Within hours of the suicides …however, the LTTE executed the prisoners and dumped their bodies at theCentral Bus Stand in Jaffna.’

29. ‘… at nearly seven percent of the men who fought, the rate was almosttwice as high as in the wars against Pakistan. … Sources in South Blockconfirm that the ratio of officers to men of other ranks killed in Sri Lanka isat an all time high’ (India Today, 31 January 1988, cited in Austin andGupta 1988: 16).

30. ‘It should be a short, sharp exercise and our boys should be back soon’(Rajiv Gandhi, quoted in Far Eastern Economic Review, 31 August 1987).

31. Initially, the IPKF successfully performed its peacekeeping task: ‘to halt andreduce the manifest violence of a conflict through the intervention of mili-tary forces in an interpository role’ (Harbottle 1979). With the commence-ment of offensive military confrontation to disarm the militants, its roleceased to be one of peacekeeping.

32. As noted in Chapter Two, according to the 1981 Census, the ethnic compo-sition of the Eastern Province was Sinhalese 24.8 per cent, Tamil (all sub-groups) 41.57 per cent, and Muslim 31.5 per cent.

33. Clause 2.2: ‘During the period which shall be considered an interim period(i.e.) from the date of elections to the Provincial Council, as specified inpara. 2.8 to the date of the referendum as specified in para 2.3, theNorthern and Eastern Provinces as now constituted, will form one adminis-trative unit, having one elected Provincial Council. Such a unit will haveone Governor, one Chief Minister and one Board of Ministers.’

236 Notes

34. Such tactics continue to be used by the LTTE. As in the Balkans, civiliansare not simply caught in the crossfire, they have become targets. This is aview shared by UTHR – Jaffna (1991: 22) and USCR (1991: 2).

35. In Batticaloa, for example, it was reported that 79 per cent of the votersrisked Tiger reprisals and went to the polls (The Economist, 26 Novembert1988: 32).

36. The LTTE was not always the most powerful paramilitary. Until the mid-1980s, no particular paramilitary was dominant. At that time, PLOTE lostthe favor of the Indian government for publishing anti-Indian pamphletsand for attempting to smuggle a cargo of weapons into India without tacitgovernment permission. It thus began to atrophy due to diminished IndianGovernment patronage. TELO was weakened by the murder of its leaders inthe Welikade prison massacre in 1983 and further hampered by subsequentassassinations by the LTTE. Continued LTTE assassinations of paramilitaryand political opponents ultimately established it as the foremost Tamilparamilitary organization.

37. For example, during the SAARC Conference in Bangalore in 1986, the Tigerleader, Prabhakaran, was flown from Madras in an Indian airforce plane formeetings with Indian officials who were simultaneously meeting withJayewardene. It is also well-known that the late Chief Minister of TamilNadu, M.G. Ramachandran, enjoyed a close relationship with Prabhakaran.

38. ‘Though India is not formally backing this group, it is believed to be sup-ported by the Indian intelligence agency known as RAW (the Research andAnalysis Wing). RAW is keen not only to protect the Tamils who cooper-ated with India, but also to stop the Tigers from lording it over the north-east again … . According to the Sri Lankan government’s intelligenceagency, the Tamil National Army’s men arrived at the camps [vacated bythe IPKF] in Indian lorries and helicopters. They had been trained byIndians and carried Indian weapons’ (The Economist, 11 November 1989:t71). For detailed discussions, see Gunaratna (1993) and Kadian (1990).

39. This is a view that was candidly shared by both military and paramilitaryleaders. Personal interviews, Sri Lanka, May–July 1992.

40. For details of the LTTE–UNP discussions, see: The Economist, 31 March 1990:t65; FEER, 25 May 1989: 28 and 29 June 1989: 27–8; and India Today,15 May 1989: 88–9.

41. Following the IPKF pull-out, the LTTE attacked all Tamil competitors andthe Sri Lankan security forces which had been confined to barracks as partof an agreement it had signed with the Government.

42. For details on the arms transfers, see A.K. Menon. ‘The Other Battle Field,’India Today, 15 October 1991: 99; The Hindu, 6 September 1991: 1; Frontline,reprinted in Christian Worker, 2nd & 3rd Quarter 1991: xvi.

43. Lalith Athulathmudali, who led the impeachment attack against PresidentPremadasa in Autumn 1991 alleged that the list of UNP supplies to theTigers included: 4000 T56 automatic rifles (the Chinese equivalent toAK47s), 38 vehicles (Pajero Jeeps which had formerly been used by theIPKF), cement (though Athulathmudali admitted that he did not yet havedocumentary proof of this), communications equipment, and Rs90 million(of which the vouchers for Rs25 million had so far been traced). Personalinterviews, Colombo, May–June 1992.

Notes 237

44. The first incident is reported by the UTHR – Jaffna (1991). It was alsorecounted to the author in the course of discussions with residents ofBatticaloa. The murder of the policemen is reported in AmnestyInternational (1991).

45. The Agreement received strong support from the parties on the left – theUnited Socialist Alliance formed in 1987 by the Lanka Sama Samaja Party(LSSP), the CP, the Nawa Sama Samaj Party (NSSP) and the Sri LankaMahajana Pakshaya (SLMP). However, these parties were electorally mar-ginal and had very limited popular support. Two small but prominentgroups of intellectuals supported the Agreement as well – the MIRJE and theCRD.

46. As a means of ensuring full Party support, Jayewardene had each UNP MPsign an undated letter of resignation with the understanding that it couldbe accepted at any time at the President’s discretion. For a discussion of thisand other measures employed to ensure obedience, see Matthews (1992).

47. See, for example, Gunaratna (1987: 18–26); O’Ballance (1989: 31, 61–63, 67,77); and Hoole et al. (1992: 75–98).

48. For example, the April 1985 formation of the ENLF (Eelam NationalLiberation Front) which included Eelam Research Organizations of Students(EROS), TELO, and the EPRLF; and in May 1987 the formation of theENDLF Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (EWDLF) which joinedthe EPRLF and PLOTE.

49. From the early 1980s to the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, there had beendirect, though covert, military assistance to Tamil paramilitary organiza-tions from the governments of Tamil Nadu and the Central Government inDelhi (personal interviews, Sri Lanka, May–July 1992; Hoole et al. 1992:345–347; Rao 1989). This fact, and the ‘natural linkages’ across interna-tional boundaries (cultural, economic, historic), underscores the continuousinternational elements of ‘domestic’ politics in Sri Lanka.

9 2002 Ceasefire Agreement

1. This chapter draws on the field work and subsequent report prepared forDFID Sri Lanka in early 2002 (Bush 2002).

2. Perhaps most interestingly, in the process of conducting field work for thischapter, it was possible to encourage successfully the adoption of multi-leveled perspectives into the discussions and decisions of the internationalcommunity as they sought to nurture and support peace before and afterthe signing of Ceasefire Agreement – suggesting the policy relevance of atwo-level approach. (Bush 2002; Bush 2001a; Bush 1999)

3. Thus, for example, immediately prior to, and following, the signing of theCeasefire Agreement, G.L. Pieris (Minister for Constitutional Affairs, andchief architect of the peace process) held a detailed briefing with the Press,the donor community, and the Mahanayaka, while the Prime Minister flewstraight from the signing ceremony in the Vanni to Batticaloa to addressthe troops. Comments supportive of the Peace Process are reported regu-larly in the local media. In other words, the support of potential spoilers ofthe peace process was very specifically cultivated.

238 Notes

4. The bombing appeared to be in protest against the Sarvodaya Movement’seffort to organize a peace meditation in Anuradhapura (14 March 2002).

5. In two waves, LTTE strike teams penetrated the high-security complex atKatunayake at 3.30 a.m. and destroyed a total of 11 aircraft and damagedthree. Three passenger aircraft – two A 330s and an A340 – of Sri LankanAirlines and eight Air Force military aircraft - two Israeli built Kfirs, aUkrainian MiG-27, two Mi-17 helicopter gunships and three-Chinese K8advanced training aircraft – were destroyed. Two other passenger aircraft –an A320 and an A340 – were badly damaged. See ‘A Wake Up Call,’Frontline, Vol 18: Issue 17, 18–31 August 2001.

6. According to an Apparel Industry Executive quoted in the USAID supportedstudy by Price Waterhouse Coopers, Sri Lanka Competitiveness Study,September 1998.

7. Kelegama (1999) offers the following estimate for pro-government forces in1996: Army – 129,000, Air Force – 17,000, Navy – 21,000, and Police –68,000 for a total armed forces strength of 235,000. However, this figuredoes not include the tens of thousands of village militias (or ‘HomeGuards’); nor the pro-government Tamil Paramilitary Organizations; northe estimated 30,000–40,000 army deserters who may, or may not, havekept their weapons. Further, any calculation of island-wide armed labourforce must include the LTTE, estimated to be 13,200 (40–60 per cent ofwhom are estimated to be under the age of eighteen, Sentinel South Asia2000). Related to the size of the armed forces, is the bloated size of the mili-tary budget. In a recent and rigorous study on the costs of the war in SriLanka, it has been estimated that from 1982 to 1996 defence expenditure asa percentage of total government expenditure has increased from 3.1 to21.6 per cent. As a percentage of the GDP, the defence budget has increasedfrom 1.1 to 6.0 during the same period of time (Arunatilake, Jayasuriya, andKelegama 2000; National Peace Council/Marga 2001). Thus, military expen-ditures dwarf combined expenditure on education and health, the conse-quences of which affect availability and access to basic social services by allSri Lankans (especially children). See Bush 2000a for an overview of theimpact of militarized violence on children in Sri Lanka – inside and outsideof the conventionally defined ‘war zones.’

8. The details in this paragraph are based on an interview with a member ofthe foreign diplomatic community who was present at G.L. Peiris’s briefingto the diplomatic community on 24 February 2002.

9. The details in this paragraph are based on an interview with a member ofthe foreign diplomatic community who was present at G.L. Peiris’s briefingto the diplomatic community on 24 February 2002.

10. Peace Support Group Press Release, 19 July 2002, ‘PSG Calls on all Parties to Strictly Abide by Ceasefire,’ Centre for Policy Alternatives,http://www.cpalanka.org

11. Though as discussed elsewhere, relations with Tamil populations in theSouth – particularly the Hill Country and Colombo – were also character-ized by oppressive, sometimes abused, security measures.

12. Field Interviews, Batticaloa District, February 2002.13. The details of this assault were widely reported in the media. See for

example: Sambandan 2000.

Notes 239

14. ‘Taxes in the north and east: Tigers openly flout truce agreement,’ColomboPage News Desk, Sri Lanka. 27 June 2002. http://www.colom-bopage.com/#Saturday64004

15. Field Interviews, Colombo, Kandy, Batticaloa, February and December 2002.16. In a particularly heart-rending case, the father of two scholastically oriented

teenaged boys in the East was approached by the LTTE to donate Rs 5-million – despite years of donations and moderate support to the Eelamcause. When he pointed out that he was unable to pay even if he soldeverything (as would have been clear from the bank statements the LTTEhad in their hands), he was told to choose which son he would donate tothe cause. When I left him, he was still unsure about what he would do.Field Interviews. Batticaloa, February 2002.

17. Father Harry Miller. Batticaloa. February 2002.18. http://www.colombopage.com 9 July 2002.19. Field Interviews, Colombo, February and December 2002.20. ‘Diplomats based in Colombo are preparing to visit Jaffna,’ [ColomboPage

News Desk, Sri Lanka] 2002 March 25: Colombo: Reports said a group ofaround 30 foreign diplomats based in Colombo is preparing to visit Jaffnaon Thursday. The diplomats intend to have firsthand experience of the situ-ation in the peninsula after the implementation of the ceasefire. The groupis also expected to look into measures that needed to be taken to improvecommon amenities in Jaffna. These diplomats are from countries includingthe United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, France, Italy, India andCanada.

21. Most publications by University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) includeextensive details of LTTE killings. See UTHR (J) 1998.

22. According to the terms of the February Ceasefire, all of these groups were tobe disarmed and disbanded. Art. 1.8: ‘Tamil paramilitary groups shall bedisarmed by the GOSL by D-day 130 at the latest. The GOSL shall offer tointegrate individuals in these units under the command and disciplinarystructure of the GOSL armed forces for service away from the Northern andEastern Province.’ This process was initiated within the time frame of theAgreement.

23. These specific villages were identified by families in the East as well as localand international development and humanitarian NGOs

24. While conducting interviews in the Eastern Province, I heard the stories oftwo boys who were pulled out of a van of a recruiter who was in the processof transporting them into an uncleared area; and the story of a young boywho was in hiding after having escaped from training camp and walkedthrough the jungle back to his village. Both stories came from very crediblesources. February 2002. The indicator that this is public knowledge is whenit is reported on the front page of the New York Times, see 6 January 2003A1, A6.

25. Discussions in this section rely on intensive discussions with Muslim com-munity leaders in the Eastern Province in February 2002.

26. This includes the Muslim Home Guard armed by the Government of SriLanka ostensibly to protect Muslim villages from attacks by the LTTE.However, being poorly trained and equipped, they were easy targets forexperienced fighters of the LTTE, and there are stories of their fleeing

240 Notes

attacks on Muslim civilians only to launch reprisal attacks on unarmedTamil civilians. Another armed faction within the Muslim community isJihad.

27. This section draws directly on the excellent fact-finding mission report bythe Centre for Policy Analysis (2002).

28. http://www.colombopage.com 09 July 2002.29. http://www.colombopage.com 10 July 200230. Patricia Lawrence. Telephone interview. 1 July 200231. The JVP’s strength in the Parliament climbed from one to 16 MPs in the

preceding seven years. In October 2000, it polled 5.99 per cent of the totalvalid votes – a figure which climbed to 9.10 for the 2001 Election. Whereas,the JVP polled 518,774 votes countrywide in 1999 elections, it received815,353 in December 2001. The JVP achieved this by exploiting the PA’spolitical crises and internal divisions

32. Field Interviews, Colombo, Kandy, Batticaloa. February and December 2002.

10 Fitting the Pieces Together

1. Some analysts employ the term ‘conflict settlement’ to ‘indicate the formalending of armed hostilities and the renunciation of the use of force. Theybelieve the objective of conflict resolution to be unattainable, on thegrounds that conflicts over fundamental values and needs will never beresolved to the complete satisfaction of the parties involved. In these cir-cumstances, the best one can hope for is a settlement which ends the vio-lence and in some small measure takes those conflicting values andpriorities into account’ (Hampson and Mandell 1990: 193).

2. Often nudging states towards becoming terroristic themselves. As the mili-tary strategist, Martin Van Crenfeld put it: ‘he who fights terrorists for anyperiod of time is likely to become one himself’ (1990).

3. The term ‘protracted social conflict’ was coined by Edward Azar to refer to‘situations which arise out of attempts to combat conditions of perceivedvictimization stemming from: (1) a denial of separate identities of partiesinvolved in the political process; (2) an absence of security of culture andvalued relationships; and (3) an absence of effective political participationthrough which victimization can be remedied’ (Azar 1986: 30). The conflictin Sri Lanka meet these criteria.

4. The term ‘conflict mediating’ is used self-consciously to refer to mecha-nisms that manage, resolve, or settle conflicts and disputes non-violently asthey arise. These are distinct from ‘conflict dampening’ mechanisms whichhave as their primary objective the limitation of the level of conflict usingwhatever means are deemed most effective, whether violent or non-violent.For example, in South Africa the apartheid system was certainly successfulin dampening anti-apartheid challenges, but it did so through direct andindirect mechanisms of violence – using everything from security forces, tourban planners, to structural violence of poverty, illness, and illiteracy.

5. N.B. These would be indicators of prevalence, not efficacy.6. One of the strongest sentiments that came out of a number of interviews

with Athulathmudali was his adamant belief that any ‘solution’ must begin

Notes 241

with the ‘total military annihilation of the LTTE’ (personal interviews,Colombo, May–July 1992).

7. As Foreign Minister in 1988, Ranjan Wijeratne told Western correspon-dents: ‘We have to deal with terrorists in the most ruthless manner … wehave taken a hard line. There is no question about that.’ Acting in hiscapacity as deputy defence minister, Wijeratne announced a series of mea-sures to deal with the growing JVP violence and control in the south: ‘Wehave given orders to shoot at sight, arrest, detain, or deal with incitersincluding trade union officials, strikers and all troublemakers attempting todisrupt normal life’ (Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 July 1989: 13).

8. Just prior to the signing of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, the rhetoricof Sinhalese political leaders became increasingly antagonistic, as illustratedin the speech in parliament by Prime Minister Premadasa on 24 April 1987:‘When the lives of our people are in danger, we are not prepared to go infor a political solution … any friend who tells us to find a political solutionwill be considered as the biggest enemy’ (The Hindu, 25 April 1987: 1).

9. On 7 October 2001, American and British aircraft began bombingAfghanistan. While the Bush regime may define the world in ‘post-9–11’terms, the central point of reference for much of the rest of the world is‘10–7’. The uncritical appropriation of ‘9–11’ terminology, is a mark of thesuccess of the Bush regime’s domination of political discourse.

10. This was further enshrined in the Constitutions of 1972 and 1978. 11. Article Nine of the 1978 Constitution states: ‘The Republic of Sri Lanka

shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be theduty of the state to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana.’

12. ‘Ethnicization’ is used to refer to the process by which the potential auton-omy of state actors is increasingly harnessed in the pursuit of the particular-istic interests of a specific ethnic sub-group.

13. Warnapala and Woodsworth specifically address this in their 1987 mono-graph, ‘Welfare as Politics in Sri Lanka.’

14. In interviews in December 2002 in Batticaloa with individuals who werebeing intimidated and extorted by the LTTE, I was particularly struck by theaggression shown towards one Tamil development worker because he hadmarried a foreign woman, as well as the frequent challenges to a victim’s‘Tamil-ness’ if they did not support the LTTE – i.e. cough up contributions,in cash or in kind.

15. A violation of what is otherwise known as the Law of Equifinality. 16. Although the number of people displaced by violence in Sri Lanka

increased dramatically after the 1983 riots, the intimidation of Sinhaleseout of the North began in the late 1970s. Some Sinhalese ethnic mobilizershave attempted to justify the 1983 riots as retaliation for the dislocation ofthe Sinhalese from the North.

17. For example: Centre for Policy Alternatives; the Consortium ofHumanitarian Agencies; Law and Society Trust; Sarvodaya; the NationalPeace Council; Peace and Community Action; Family Rehabilitation Centre;Satyodaya, INFORM, Lawyers for Human Rights and Development;Organizations for the Parents and Families of the Disappeared (OPFMD);Centre for the Study of Human Rights; the International Centre for EthnicStudies; INPAC; the Batticaloa Peace Committee, the Mothers Front, the

242 Notes

Movement for Inter-Racial Justice and Equality, the Civil Rights Movement,and the Centre for Society and Religion. These NGOs include workers fromall ethnic communities.

18. As happened to the Christian Children’s Fund of Canada (CCF) which wasaccused of attempting to send supplies to the LTTE in the North.Accusations in the government-run newspapers persisted even after theshipment in question was found to contain nothing suspicious or incrimi-nating. Death threats and intimidation were directed to the head of CCF inColombo. See The Ottawa Citizen, 24 November 1991: B6.

19. The definition of an NGO by the government was so vague that it couldinclude any actor or agency not formally associated with the government.

20. Médecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) and the International Committee of theRed Cross (ICRC) have consistently raised concern over the shortage ofmedicine in the Vanni due to blocking by the Sri Lanka army, and in earlyMay 2000, the surgery of the Mallavi hospital and two branches of theMullaithivu hospital were particularly hampered by a severe shortage ofmedical supplies in the Vanni.

21. Field Interviews. Colombo, Batticaloa, Kandy, 17–28 February 2002.22. Examples of the former are listed in Jayasuriya (2000) and Warnapala and

Woodsworth (1987). Examples of the latter are found in any Human Rightsreport which includes a discussion of conditions in LTTE controlled areas –for example publications and reports by University Teachers for HumanRights (Jaffna). A recent but classic example is offered in local media reportsof 17 March 2002 which noted the following: ‘LTTE leader V. Prabhakaranhas issued a strict warning to his followers that any violators of the trucesigned with the government would be punished severely. He has told polit-ical leader Thamil Selvan that he would not hesitate to punish any cadresviolating the ceasefire, even with death. Selvan told journalists who methim in Wanni over the weekend that the leader was very clear on hisinstructions.’ www.lankapage.com

23. In the current context, I am referring to the militarization of relationsbetween government actors and Tamil sub-groups. During the 1987–90 JVPresurgence, relations between the government and Sinhalese sub-groupswere similarly militarized. A Sri Lanka development worker in Colomboreported that the experience of government and JVP violence by Sinhalesecivilians in Sinhalese majority areas has softened some attitudes towardsthe plight of innocent Tamil civilians caught in the cross-fire in the Northand East (Personal interviews, Colombo, May–July 1992).

24. The British Refugee Council reports that ‘police units regularly extort up toRs 30,000 in bribes to release suspects. [Those] too poor to pay, stay in jail’(Sri Lanka Monitor, February 1993: 3). The same system is employed by theLTTE. While conducting interviews on the East Coast, I met with a busi-nessman who had been released from LTTE custody in order to raise the restof his ransom (personal interviews, May–July 1992). From Fall 2001 to early2002, there was a considerable increase in the scale and scope kidnappings:scale in terms of the excessively exorbitant demands for ransom money andscope in terms of the number and status of those being kidnapped – some ofthe most prominent businessmen and community leaders have beenspecifically targeted and affected. According to a human rights worker who

Notes 243

approached the military authorities concerning the kidnappings s/he wastold that there was nothing they could do, because they feared destabilizingthe security environment during the precarious ceasefire. One communityleader in the East suggested that many of these extortionist activities mighthave been the actions of LTTE individuals rather than the organization as awhole. The motive behind them might may have been to collect theresources necessary to allow them to leave the country before the nextphase of the military-political game. A kind of pension scheme that fits themodus operandi of the organizational culture of the LTTE and paramilitaryorganizations generally.

25. There is a danger that this may well contribute to producing the oppositeoutcome than was intended: increased support for groups which use terrorin the pursuit of political ends.

26. The British Refugee Council offers a more conservative estimate. In a reportpublished at the time, it estimated that ‘in the last eight months of 1993,Sri Lankan authorities arrested 8,000 Tamils in Colombo, of whom an esti-mated 1,000 to 2,000 remained in detention in December [1993] … [Y]oungmen without jobs or relatives in the capital and who do not possessNational Identity cards, which Tamils find difficult to obtain, are particu-larly vulnerable … [A]ccording to sources in Colombo, police there ‘runflourishing extortion rackets,’ demanding large sums of money from rela-tives seeking to secure detainees release’ (USCR 1994: 6).

27. See Bush (1993), Abeysekere (1992), and Pieris and Marecek (1992) forexamples of the Muslim Home Guard involvement in retaliatory massacresof Tamil villagers following attacks by the LTTE.

28. http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Asia-08.htm29. It should be noted that, in any given episode, a particular mediating factor

or set of factors may be more or less salient.30. For example, the rise of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, and the mobilizational

tactics of the JVP in both 1971 and 1987.31. For example: the material benefits acquired by the LTTE through its imposi-

tion of a ‘taxation’ and ‘tariff’ scheme in the Northern Province of Sri Lankaand the grey and markets inside and outside the war zones as a result ofrestricted access and the prohibition of goods.

32. For discussion of ‘war weariness’ and ‘hurting stalemate,’ Zartman (1985);on collective learning, see Nye (1987); and on ‘re-perceptualization,’ seeKeashly and Fisher (1990).

244 Notes

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260 Bibliography

Allison, Graham, 12–13, 16, 206nAmirthalingam, A., 30, 60, 63, 121,

229n, 233nAnnuradhnapura Massacre (1985),

139Ariyaratne, Dr A.T., 157Aryan race, 213nassassination, 29–30, 32, 56, 57, 58,

60, 63, 64, 67, 71, 85, 94, 119,120, 123, 139, 145, 157, 169, 185,202, 214n, 215n, 217n, 225n,233n, 237n, 238n,

Athulatmudali, Lalith, 43, 58, 59,117, 152, 153, 185, 210n, 215n,227n, 231n, 232n, 235n, 237n,241n

Azar, Edward, 8, 34

Balasingham, Anton, 169, 171Balkans, xviii, 237nBandaranaike, Anura, 57, 102Bandaranaike, Sirimavo, 57, 63–4,

103, 104, 117, 152, 214n, 227n,233n

Bandaranaike, S.W.R.D., 55, 56,84–98, 99, 101, 117, 180, 186,196, 200, 202, 214n, 220n, 221n,244n

Bandaranaike Katanayake AirportAttack (2001), 63, 158, 168

Batticaloa Peace Committee, 168B–C Pact / Bandaranaike–

Chelvanayakam Pact, 56, 94,214n

B-Specials (Northern Ireland), 193Betrayal of Buddhism, 96Bhikkhus (Buddhist monks), 64, 86,

89, 94, 96, 105, 142, 152, 216n,220n, 222n, 224n

Black Cats (vigilante group), 54, 65,106

Bopage, Lionel, 110, 111Bosnia, 3, 6, 7, 8

Brass, Paul, 10, 12, 22, 33Buddha Jayanthi, 95Buddhist clergy, see SanghaBuddhist Revival Movement, 86Burma, 220n

Canada, 66, 67, 165, 228n, 240nCasparsz, Paul, 213ncaste, 48–53, 101, 102, 110, 111, 202,

212n, 213n, 214n and Tamil paramilitaries, 51–3

causality, 10–11, 205nCeasefire Agreement (CFA) of 2002,

42, 44, 59, 66, 70, 156–76, 181,186, 190, 192, 205n, 217n,238–44n

Ceylon Citizenship Bill, 41, 45, 217n,218n

Ceylon Tamil Congress, 81–2, 136Ceylon–UK Defence Agreement

(1948), 70Ceylon Workers’ Congress, 77, 146,

218nChandrasekeran, P., 53, 54Chelvanayakema, S.J.V., 214nchild soldiers, 30, 67, 165, 168, 209nChina, 71, 144Citizenship Bills, 76–7, 189class, 35, 39, 50, 58, 110, 114, 126,

134, 181, 202, 218n, 226n, 231nconflict management vs conflict

resolution, 204n, 241ncosts of war, 31coups d’état, 61CTC/ Ceylon Tamil Congress, 75

demobilization, 16, 194demography, 35, 40, 42, 79, 101,

within Armed Forces, 60deserters, 30, 62, 157Dharmapala, Anagarika, 46disenfranchisement, 73–83, 180Dissanayake, Gamini, 58, 120, 229n

261

Index

Donoughmore Commission, 78–9double minority complex, 36Druckman, Daniel, 201DUNF/Democratic United National

Front, 58, 59Dunham, David and Sisira Jayasuriya,

158Dutta Gamani (King), 47

EBP/ Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna (UnitedFront of Monks), 89, 220n

education, 30 ,38, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46,47, 48, 49, 53, 101, 110, 186,228n

emergency regulations, 30, 118, 124,128, 137, 140, 162, 189, 190,192–4, 205n, 208n, 216n, 228n,229n, 230n, 231n, 233n

environmental scarcity, 7Eelam War III, 156, 205nENDLF/ Eelam National Democratic

Liberation Front, 149, 238nENLF/ Eelam National Liberation

Front, 238nEPDP/ Eelam people’s Democratic

Party, 68, 145, 146, 154, 217n,235n

EPRLF/ Eelam People’s RevolutionaryLiberation Front, 66, 68, 69, 145,146, 149, 150, 151, 154, 168,206n, 216n, 217n, 226n, 235n,238n

EROS/ Eelam Research Organizationof Students, 154, 234n, 238n

Esman, Milton, 207nethnic cleansing, 36, 41, 42, 187, 188

Federal Party, 80, 90, 94, 136, 187,214n

Gandhi, Rajiv, 29, 50, 61, 71, 143,146, 149, 153, 217n, 236n, 238n

Gal Oya Water Project, 207n, 229garment industry, 158

Hakeem, Rauf, 171–6Hisbullah, M.L.A.M., 173history

anachronistic renderings, 33–5, 109

colonial rule, 29, 38, 45and myth, 45–8, 127, 213n

Hogan, Paul, xivHameed, A.C.S., 227Hollingworth, Steve, 61Home Guard, 30, 43, 153, 193, 209n,

240n, 244n Horowitz, Donald, 3, 20, 92, 203

identity, 3, 5, 39, 206nand conflict, 195–7contingent identities, 20–3formation, 4–7, 8, 10, 11, 155mobilization and politicization,

17–23, 45–8, 55–6, 65, 182,186, 194, 196

and legitimation, 9, 46, 187India, 24, 51, 69, 70–71, 103, 113,

135–155, 161, 191, 206n, 208n,234n

India–Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987(‘Indo-Lanka Accord’), 36, 54, 57,64, 70, 71, 105, 115, 135–55, 157,181, 191, 223n, 232–8n, 242n

India–Sri Lanka Free TradeAgreement, 191

inter–intra-group relations, xvii–xix,10, 12, 14, 18, 21, 24, 32, 33, 34,53, 56, 61, 81–3, 91–4, 112, 114,115, 125, 130–34, 142, 146,177–203

IPKF/ Indian Peacekeeping Force, 24,36, 55, 61, 66, 68, 71, 135,144–55, 181, 191, 227n, 233n,235n, 236n, 237n

Israel, 67, 71

Jaffna Public Library, 228nJayrawardene, J.R., 47, 56, 57, 58, 64,

70, 87, 94, 103, 104, 115, 118,122, 124, 126–7, 131, 132, 136,142, 143, 144, 149, 152, 153, 155,200, 227n, 229n, 230n, 235n

Jiggins, Janice, 91, 102, 226nJVP/ Jathika Vimukti Peramuna

(People’s Liberation Front), 12,32–33, 53, 57, 62, 63–66, 68,99–117, 133, 144, 146, 150, 151,152, 153, 157, 175, 179, 180, 182,

262 Index

213n, 216n, 222n–227n, 231n,241n, 242n, 243n, 244n

Karikalan, V, 174Kataragama, 207nKattankudi Mosque massacre of 1990,

43, 169Kent and Dollar Farms Massacre

(1984), 139, 212nkleptocracy, 7Kotelawala, Sir John, 85, 87, 88, 92,

95Kumaratunge, Chandrika

Bandaranaike, 23, 51, 57, 63, 66,156, 157–61, 175, 185, 205n,227n

landmines, 30, 63, 112, 113, 123, 130,139, 158, 230n

LTTE (Liberation Tigers of TamilEelam), 14, 29, 30, 31, 36, 37, 38,40, 41, 42, 43, 52–5, 60, 63, 65,66–70, 112, 119, 135, 137, 141,142, 144–6, 147, 147–55, 156–76,181, 182, 184–6, 190, 191, 194,199, 205n, 207n, 210n, 216n,217n, 233n, 234n, 235n, 236n,237n, 239n, 240n, 243n, 244n

Mahavelli Water Project, 42Manor, James, 20, 81, 85, 87, 90,

221nmassacre, 43, 106, 107, 108, 123, 124,

139, 141, 142, 145, 147, 148, 151,169, 170, 210n, 230n, 234n

Mathew, Cyril, 50, 117, 120, 122,128–9, 132, 185

Matthews, Bruce, 55, 57, 64, 105, 112,115

media, 62, 68, 121, 123, 125–7, 128,132–33, 139, 147, 152, 153, 166,170, 181, 189, 230n, 231n, 232n

MEP/Mahajana Eksath Peramuna,84–98, 196

methodology, xvii, 12–28, 156, 182,194–5,

billiard ball models, 3–9, 10, 195indicators, 15large-N studies, 12

multidimensional approaches, 4thick description, 16two-level critical juncture

approach, 15–17Miller, Father Harry, 168, 240nmilitarization, 227nmilitary expenditures, 31military remittances, 30, 158Mohamed, M.H., 173monks, see bhikkhusMovement to Protect the Motherland,

152Muslim, 36, 37, 39, 40–4, 68, 76, 129,

131, 147, 169–75, 181, 187, 188,207n, 212n, 235n, 240n, 244n

National Framework for Relief,Rehabilitation, andReconciliation in Sri Lanka (3–RFramework), 190

Northern Ireland, 3, 6, 7, 13, 14, 22,24, 77, 184, 188, 192–4, 196, 200,206n, 208n

Norway, Government of, 161, 191

O’Neill, Terence, 200opportunity structure, 17, 25–6, 94–8,

115, 182, 194

PA (Peoples’ Alliace), 57, 62, 66, 156,174–5

Pakistan, 144, 235n,Palestine, 13, 67, 167Palestinian Liberation Organization,

234pass system, 159Peace Support Group, 239nPerumal, A., 149Pieris, G.L., 160–1, 238n, 239nPlantation Tamils, see Up-Country

TamilsPLOTE, 53, 66, 68, 145, 146, 154,

216n, 226n, 234n, 235n, 237nPonnambalam, G.G., 75, 90Popular Front for the Liberation of

Palestine, 234npopulation displacement, 30, 36, 42,

43, 51, 77, 117, 118, 125, 138,148, 171, 188, 208n, 228n

Index 263

Posen, Barry, 8poverty alleviation programmes, 158,

215nPrabhakaran, V., 145, 151, 162, 165,

166, 167, 169, 171, 174, 210n,237n, 243n

Premadasa, Ranasinghe, 29, 57, 58,59, 64, 68, 71, 85, 106, 117, 132,142, 150–1, 152, 184, 185, 199,206n, 217n, 232n, 242n

proscription, 104, 111, 112, 115, 121,127, 133, 137, 163, 181, 188,223n

Radzek, 168Rajarata Rifles, 225nRamachandran, M.G., 207n, 237nRattwatte, Anuruddha, 62realism, 4–9referendum of 1982, 57, 83repatriation, 77, 111resource mobilization and

competition, 17, 23–5, 85–6,92–4, 108, 114–15, 155, 182, 194,

riots of 1915 (Anti-Muslim), 41riots of 1958, 94, 101, 221nriots of 1983, 38, 49–50, 51, 63–4,

104, 112, 115, 118–34, 136, 137,149, 179, 181, 188, 197, 198,232n, 242n

riots of 1983 and economicliberalization, 130–31

Rothschild, Donald, 22Rwanda, xviii, 3, 6, 7

Sangha, (Buddhist Clergy) 68, 86, 89,95, 152, 186, 213n, 221n, 222n,238n

SAARC Confernece (1986), 237nsecurity/ insecurity, 3, 4, 7–8, 196segregation, 188–9Senanayake, D.S., 55, 75, 78, 86,

92Senanayake, Dudley, 55, 92, 221nSinhala, 36, 86Sinhalese Buddhism, 36, 45, 64,

84–98, 186Sinhalese Nationalism, 36, 45, 117,

128, 186

Sinhala-Only language policy, 41, 44,84, 87, 89, 90, 94, 97, 101, 117,200, 221n

Siripada, 207nSLFP/ Sri Lanka Freedom Party, 54,

55, 57, 58, 68, 84–98, 106, 116,117, 118, 121, 146, 152, 153, 185,200, 220n, 221n, 223n

SLMC/ Sri Lanka Muslim Congress,44, 146, 171–6

SLMM/ Sri Lanka MonitoringMission, 161, 162, 165

South Africa, 14, 71, 208nSri Lankan Security Forces, 30, 36, 52,

60–3, 103, 107, 147, 157, 158,160, 162, 164–5, 182, 209n,217n, 222n, 225n, 229–30n,231n, 237n, 238n, 243n

suicide bombers, 29, 30, 31, 67, 157,164, 209n, 217n,

Tamil diaspora, 66, 165, 216n, 228nTamil Eelam, 36, 38, 55, 59, 115, 119Tamil Madrasi Regiment, 148Tamil Nadu, 39, 50, 51, 66, 70, 137,

138, 141, 143–4, 149, 159, 207n,208n, 217n, 226n, 228n, 234n,235n, 238n

Tamil National Army, 237nTamil paramilitaries, 30, 32, 33, 36, 42,

50, 53, 55, 60, 61, 66–70, 108, 109,112, 113, 114, 116, 118, 119, 121,122, 123, 125, 127, 135, 136, 137,138–141, 144–6, 149–51, 154, 184,187, 194, 205n, 207n, 225n, 234n,235n, 237n, 240n, 243n

Tamil paramilitary feuding , 66–9,139–41, 145, 206n, 226n, 235n

Tarrow, Sidney, xv, 25tautology, 8, 26TELO, 51, 61, 66, 68, 69, 145, 146,

154, 168, 216n, 235n, 237nThamilchelvam, 171, 243Thamil Selvan, see ThamilchelvamThondaman, S., 218nTilly, Charles, 13, 16, 24, 207nTiruchelvum, Neelan, 30, 60, 223nTNA, 68, 69, 149, 151, 168trade unions, 80, 122

264 Index

TULF/ Tamil United Liberation Front,30, 55, 59–60, 119, 120, 121, 123,127, 136, 137, 140, 146, 187,214n, 228n

Udagampola, P., 106, 107, 224–5n, UNP/ United National Party, 50, 54,

57, 58, 79, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88,90, 92, 94, 95, 96, 112, 116, 117,118, 120, 123, 126, 128, 130,131–4, 136, 142, 146, 148,149–52, 153, 174, 175, 181, 185,188, 200, 218n, 220n, 223n,225n, 233n, 241n

Up-Country Peoples’ Front, 54, 77Up-Country Tamils, 35, 39, 44, 49,

50, 53–4, 65, 73, 83, 108, 109,111, 112, 113, 118–20, 180, 182,210n, 212n, 216n, 221n, 226n,230n, 239n

Uphoff, Norman, xiv, 17, 23, 205n,207n, 229n

UTHR (Jaffna)/ University Teachersfor Human Rights (Jaffna), 66,210n, 212n, 238n, 240n

vigilantism (see also Black Cats), 65,106, 107, 125, 210n,

Vikalpakandayama, 113,violence, 29, 43,

violence, patterns, 11–12, 31, 33,37, 66, 103, 118, 120–5,128–34, 138–41, 145–6, 153,157–8, 171, 183–4, 188, 210n,224n, 229, 234–5n, 235n,236n

violence, post-election, 14, violence and shifting identities, 22

Walpola, Rahula 86, 220nWar for Peace, 156, 175, 185, 205n,

227nWar on Terror, 3, 7, 163–4, 185, 242n,

244war weariness, 163, 202Weerakoon, Batty, 225nWeerawansa, Wimal, 66Welikade Prison massacre, 124, 230nWickramasinghe, Ranil, 59, 156–62,

165, 174, 175, 181, 185Wijeweera, Rohana, 100, 103, 104,

108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 222n,223n, 226n

Yogeswaran, V., 229n, 233n

Index 265