Trad 104Lecture Notes

J. Christopher MaloneyFormatting by Christopher Evans

1) Presocratic Lecturesa) Philosophical Problems for Ancient Greeks 2000 Years Before Science

i) Is the physical universe orderly or random?(1) Some change appears regular; some does not. Why?(2) Is the universe run by capricious gods?(3) Is it otherwise determined by something fixed and constant?

ii) Presocratics who say that change is real and orderly(1) Thales (600 BC)

(a) Everything = Water(b) So: all change is regular, predictable and determined by the internal nature of water(c) Explanation by reduction to the unobservable

(2) Pythagoras (560 BC)(a) Everything is number (even music)(b) Pythagorean formula shows how abstract thought (as opposed to perception) can reveal the

true nature of things(c) Abstracta (numbers) are real(d) Change is explainable by mathematics

(3) Heraclitus (540 BC)(a) Perpetual Flux: “you can’t step into the same river twice”(b) Logos = abstract law that ensures the necessity and constancy of the pattern of change(c) Logos is knowable only through the process of abstract thought

(4) Democritus (460 BC)(a) Posits: atoms, the void, swerve(b) All atoms are physically the same and without internal differentiation; atoms are internally

simple(c) Explanation of change by reductive appeal to number, position, and motion of atoms

iii) Presocratics who deny the reality of change(1) Parmenides (500 BC)

(a) Appearance of change is illusory(b) Sensation is unreliable(c) Change presupposes plurality of objects but plurality is also illusory(d) Monism

(i) The thesis that only one thing exists which is itself internally simple and lacking any form of differentiation

(ii) The “one” cannot literally be described or comprehended(e) Argument for monism

(i) If change were possible then something (e.g. a butterfly) could come from nothing (that is a butterfly)

(ii) But that is impossible (it is not possible to produce a butterfly from something that is not a butterfly, appearances to the contrary!)

(iii) So, change is impossible; it is illusory(f) Argument against plurality

(i) Plurality means that many different things exist, e.g. X and Y(ii) If X is not Y, then X is the same as the absence of Y(iii) But the absence of Y is nothing(iv) So, if X is not Y then X is nothing(v) If X is nothing, then X does not exist(vi) That contradicts the assumption of plurality(vii)So, the very idea of plurality is contradictory and impossible

(viii) Hence, monism must be true(2) Zeno (Parmenides’ Student)

(a) All change is motion; but motion is impossible(b) Achilles and the tortoise: aims to show, through abstract (as opposed to perceptual) reasoning

that motion and change are impossible(c) Change and knowledge

(i) Distinguish knowledge from opinion(ii) Knowledge requires a certain unchanging representation that corresponds to what is

represented(iii) What changes cannot be so represented(iv) So, knowledge of change is impossible(v) What is real can be known, so change can’t be real

iv) Basic Presocratic Questions(1) Is change real?(2) Is change orderly or chaotic?(3) Is plurality real: is the universe composed of many different things, or is the universe one, simple,

indivisible thing?(4) Can sensation lead to knowledge of the universe or can only abstract thought (as exemplified by

pure mathematics) lead to knowledge?2) Plato Lectures

a) Socrates (470-399 BC)i) Plato’s teacherii) Oracle of Delphi: “No one is wiser than Socrates”iii) Moral philosopher and social criticiv) No extant writingsv) Athenian democracyvi) Trial and execution of Socrates

b) Plato (428-348 BC)i) Athenian philosopherii) “Student” of Socratesiii) Aristotle’s teacheriv) Founded the academy (Closed 525 AD; Justinian)v) Composed Dialoguesvi) Theories of

(1) Morality(2) Knowledge (also see Notes for Paper)(3) Reality

(a) Abstract Objects(i) Forms(ii) The Soul

(b) Physical Objectsvii) Apology: Trial of Socrates

(1) Charged with: impiety and corrupting youths(2) Accusers: Meletus, Anytus, Lycon(3) Socrates defense against corrupting the youth is a version of the “Socratic Paradox”

(a) To corrupt the youth is to make them evil(b) Evil youths would harm Socrates(c) No rational person would intentionally harm him/herself(d) Socrates is rational(e) So either

(i) Socrates did not corrupt the youth(ii) He did so only unintentionally

(f) If Socrates did not corrupt the youth he should not be punished(g) If he unintentionally corrupted the youths he should be educated but not punished(h) Hence, in either case, Socrates should not be punished

(4) The Socratic Paradox reveals something about Plato’s conception of rationality: A rational person will, of necessity, always do what he/she judges to be the best; a rational person cannot knowingly do wrong

(5) Generalized Socratic Paradox(a) Rational persons act deliberately(b) Deliberation = the use of reason to select what is judged to be the best alternative action(c) So, rational persons always do what seems best(d) Hence, they never intentionally do what they think is wrong(e) Therefore, rational agents should never be punished for wrongdoing. At worst, they should

be taught what is right or best. For once they know this, they will inevitably do what is right or best

(6) Consequence of the Socratic Paradox(a) The unexamined life is not worth living

(i) The examined life is the life of a rational person who undertakes to know what is generally good and valuable in life. Only such a person may come to know what is best to do or how to live so as to optimize what is valuable in life.

(ii) The unexamined life, by contrast, is one in which a person does not attempt to know what is generally good and valuable in life. Such a person cannot rely on deliberation to guide life. So, rationality is wasted in such a person. In this case, the person cannot hope to have a good or rewarding life. Such a life, the unexamined life, is not worth living.

viii) Crito(1) Should Socrates flee prison in order to escape his unjust condemnation?(2) Crito’s reasons for escape

(a) The majority will think ill of Socrates and his friends if he does not escape(b) Since the court erred, it should not be obeyed(c) The welfare of the children of Socrates requires his escape(d) Death is an evil to be avoided

(3) Socrates’ Replies(a) The majority opinion is important only if it is correct or true. So, the question is simply

whether escape would be right, not whether someone happens to think it is right.(i) Relativism

1. Relativism is the doctrine that truth is simply a matter of belief, that a proposition is true if and only if it is believed by some designated set of people.

2. Contrast relativism about: art, morality, mathematics, science3. In the Crito, Socrates assumes that relativism about morality is false. Why?

a. The fact of final and deep disagreement about moral questions is evidence for the objectivity of morals

b. The fact that it is possible reasonable to disagree with the ‘moral majority’ demonstrates that morality is not defined by the opinion of the moral majority

c. If morality is determined by the conditions for human happiness or well-being, then since that is not determined by the opinion of the ‘moral majority’, relativism is false

d. If relativism were true, then what the Nazis did was right (for them). But this is contrary to fact. So, relativism is false.

(ii) Given Socrates’ rejection of relativism, he concludes that he should flee only if flight is right. So, what might make it right?1. Welfare of Socrates’ children? No: it is better for them to remain in Athens than

suffer exile2. Is death an evil to be avoided? It is uncertain whether death is an evil. Perhaps it is

an advantage to the soul, if there is one3. Does the court’s error in convicting Socrates make it right for him to escape?

a. No: to escape would harm the stateb. It can’t be right to answer a harm (erroneous conviction) with a harm (given the

Socratic paradox)c. So, escape is not right

(b) Socrates’ obligation to accept execution

(i) Socrates has promised to abide by the laws of Athens(ii) This promise is not qualified to obey only the correct laws or only the correctly enforced

laws(iii) Socrates recognized in his promise that he ran the risk of bad laws and badly enforced

laws(iv) So, since promising imposes obligation, Socrates is obliged to accept execution

(c) Question: Does every promise result in an obligation? What of a promise to break a (moral) law? Certainly such a promise does not produce an obligation.(i) But, Socrates’ situation is more complex. He is in a moral dilemma. His alternatives

both involve doing something wrong in order to do something right.(ii) So, he can’t avoid doing something wrong(iii) Hence, he must select the alternative that is the better balance of good over evil

1. Socrates thinks that the balance favors respecting his promise to follow the laws of Athens. His reason is that unless citizens conform to laws, society is itself impossible

2. Creatures must live in society3. So, since Socrates is rational, he infers that he must obey the laws and accept

executionix) Phaedo

(1) The execution of Socrates is an opportunity for a discussion of the nature of the soul(2) Plato’s thesis: a person = his/her soul

(a) Soul is distinct from body(b) Soul is immaterial; body is material(c) Soul is cognitive and affective; body is non-cognitive and non-affective(d) Soul can be separated from body while remaining cognitive(e) Soul is immortal; body is mortal(f) Soul is the seat of knowledge; body is the conduit of sensation(g) Soul is naturally inclined to pursue what is good and valuable; body can draw the soul away

from the good towards what is not good(h) So, death of body is an advantage to the soul

(3) Arguments for immortality(a) The argument from recurrent opposites

(i) Everything comes to be from its opposite(ii) Being alive and being dead are opposites(iii) So, being alive comes from being dead and conversely(iv) This cycle from life to death must be eternal or otherwise there would be no life now(v) So, life is eternal

(b) Objections(i) The principle that everything comes to be from its opposite is dubious(ii) The premise that the life/death cycle is eternal is not established(iii) In any case, the argument does not address the question of personal immortality

(c) Argument from recollection(i) In sensation we know only the particular: e.g. in sensing two approximately equal sticks,

we sense the particular sticks but not equality in general(ii) Sensing the equal sticks may make us think of or enable our understanding of equality in

general (iii) The only way that sensing could enable understanding of what is fully general is if

sensing is a mnemonic cue for something known independent of and prior to sensation(iv) This knowledge of the fully general must therefore exist in us before the possibility of

sensation, i.e. before birth(v) Hence, we must exist before the birth of the body(vi) If we exist before the birth of the body, then we can exist without our bodies(vii)Since we are identified with our souls, our souls exist before and independently of our

bodies(viii) Hence, death of the body does not imply death of the soul

(ix) This does not prove immortality of the soul, but it does aim to prove that death is not in itself a reason for thinking the soul to be mortal

(d) Objection: the crucial premise is that the only way that sensing could enable understanding of what is fully general is if sensing is a mnemonic cue for something known independent of an prior to sensation. But what compelling argument demonstrates this point? (See the Meno)

(4) Argument from simplicity(a) What is simple cannot be destroyed and is therefore immortal(b) The soul is simple because

(i) It is non-sensible and as such is likely simple(ii) The soul is that which has knowledge of what is simple and indestructible (i.e. forms).

So, it is likely similar to the simple and indestructible(5) Objections

(a) The concept of simplicity is undefined. Numbers are non-sensible. But they seem composite in the sense that, for example, 4=3+1

(b) So, it is unclear that the non-sensible must be simple(c) We are offered no reason to suppose that the knower must be similar to the known with

respect to simplicity. So, even if the soul knows what is simple, it remains open whether the soul is simple. Also notice that the soul does know what appears to be complex (e.g. the soul can know that a cake is composed of many ingredients). Would this knowledge make the soul complex?

(6) Arguments from the soul’s essence(a) By definition the soul is alive (just as by definition the number three is odd)(b) What is true by definition cannot be otherwise(c) So, the soul cannot be other than alive(d) Hence, the soul is immortal

(7) Objection: by definition, green shirts are green. However, from that it does not follow that any green shirts exist. So even if it is true by definition that the soul is alive, it does not follow that the soul exists (after the death of the body).

x) The Complex Soul of the Republic(1) Argument for the tripartite soul

(a) Nothing can be in incompatible states at once(b) The soul displays apparently incompatible states:

(i) Inclination/disinclination to drink water known to be poisoned(ii) Best explained by positing that the soul has at least two parts, reason and desire, each

with only compatible states(iii) Apparent incompatibility of self-reprimand and desire on the one hand and the possible

separation of courage and reason best explained by positing a third part of soul = spirited part

(c) Conclusion: parts of the soul(i) Reason(ii) Spirit(iii) Desire

(d) How does the tripartite soul of the Republic compare to the simple soul of the Phaedo?(2) Health of the Soul

(a) Given the division of soul into parts, how should these parts optimally interact?(b) Reason as ruler of the other parts(c) Nature of soul = seek knowledge(d) Happiness = a well-ordered soul = a soul ruled by reason in pursuit of knowledge

xi) Forms(1) Principle of the one over many: if two or more things are similar with respect to R, then R itself

must exist as distinct from the similar things themselves(2) E.g. if Daffy and Donald are similar with respect to ‘being a duck’, then ‘being a duck’ itself

exists as distinct from Daffy and Donald(3) E.g. if Oscar and Matilda are both good, then being good (goodness itself) exists as distinct from

Oscar and Matilda

(4) Form = that which makes numerically different individual objects similar and that which is known in correct judgments of similarity

(5) Characteristics of forms(a) Necessary existents(b) Abstract(c) Not sensible(d) Separated realm(e) Objects of non-empirical knowledge/definition(f) Immutable(g) Eternal(h) Determine individual concrete objects(i) Hierarchically ordered(j) Superior in being and value to sensible objects(k) The natural objects of desire and source of true happiness for rational beings

(6) Examples of forms(a) Moral forms: justice, courage, temperance(b) Non-moral forms: equality, humanity, liquidity, solidity, felinity, animality

xii) Significance of Republic’s metaphor of the cave and divided line of objects and cognition

OBJECTS COGNITIONForms and Numbers Knowledge and ThinkingSensible Things and Images of Sensible Things

Belief and Imagination

xiii) Cave Metaphor(1) Inside cave

(a) Original perspective – fire and shadows(b) Improved perspective – fire and artifacts

(2) Outside cave: sun, natural objectsxiv) The Meno

(1) Knowledge = recollection(2) What is knowledge? Certainty about the universal and necessary(3) Sensation cannot provide certainty about the universal and necessary(4) Such knowledge cannot be learned:

(a) To learn about the universal and necessary is to learn about forms(b) To learn about a form one first be ignorant of the form(c) To learn a form one must have an idea or representation of the form in the mind and already

know that the representation matches the form(d) But this presupposes knowledge of the form, which contradicts the presumed ignorance of the

form(e) Hence learning forms is impossible(f) Example of the slave boy

(5) Theorem: double the area of a square = the diagonal squared(a) 2(ABCD) = (BD)2

(b)

(c) AEFG = 4(ABCE), ½(AEFG) = 2(ABCD), ½(AEFG) = BHID = 2(ABCD), Area of BHID = (BD)2 = 2(ABCD)

(d)(6) Significance of slave boy example: attempt to show that knowledge of forms/the universal and

necessary is recollected or innate rather than learned3) Aristotle Lectures4) Background

a) Greek philosopher 354-322 BCb) Plato’s studentc) Tutor of Alexanderd) Rejected Plato’s theory of formse) Rejected Plato’s theory of knowledge

5) Central Ideas in Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Epistemologya) Matter and formb) Substancec) Substantial formsd) Accidental formse) Universalsf) Soul as form of bodyg) Knowledge = informed soulh) Unmoved mover

6) Matter and Forma) Matter: the source of potentiality in objects capable of change

i) Matter is that which can be anything but which is itself nothingii) All physical objects include matteriii) When physical objects persist through change their matter remainsiv) Matter exists only in physical, sensible objects; matter cannot exist isolation

b) Formi) Aristotle holds that forms exist as that which determines the qualities, properties and relations that

objects haveii) Forms ordinarily exist only in (physical) objectsiii) Forms is what is knowableiv) Forms are universals: forms can exist in many different objects in many different places at once

7) Substancea) Definitions

i) That which is the subject of predication (Socrates is the object of predication in the sentence ‘Socrates is tall’)

ii) That which persists through change (Socrates is that which persists through change of stature from short to tall)

b) Hence, individual objects are (primary) substances for Aristotlec) Composite substances: physical objects are substances consisting of matter and form

i) Such substances can change only because they contain matterii) Such substances owe their qualities, properties and relations to their forms

d) Substantial form: the substantial form of a substance is that form which determines the kind or species into which the substance falls (e.g. the substantial form of Socrates is the form of rational animality since that form determines that Socrates is the kind of thing that he is: a human being). Essence = substantial form according to Aristotle.

e) Accidental form: any non-substantial form in a substance (Socrates has a snub nose. So, he has the form of being snub-nosed. That form is an accidental form in Socrates because it does not determine his kind or species)

f) Hence, an individual object is typically a composite of matter, substantial form and accidental forms8) Plurality and Diversity

a) Plurality refers to the number of objectsb) Diversity refers to the difference in qualities, properties and relations that objects displayc) Matter accounts for plurality: numerically different objects include numerically distinct bits of matterd) Form accounts for diversity: objects with different qualities have different forms

9) Knowledge and cognitiona) Mind = soul = that which thinks = that which determines the nature, kind or species of humansb) Therefore, mind = form of rational animalityc) Therefore, since the form of rational animality is universal and one for all humans, the soul is universal and

one for all personsd) When soul is separated from matter at death of body, soul can survive as form. However, it loses all

personal individuality. So, the soul may be immortal, but this is short of personal immortality.e) Thought: soul takes on the same form as found in the object thought about (e.g. when Socrates thinks about

a cat as a cat, the soul takes on the form of cat. When he thinks about a black cat as a black cat, the soul of Socrates takes on the combines forms of black and cat).

f) So, the content of thought is determined by the form occurrent in thought.g) Hence, if two substances, say Fido and Lassie, are similar with respect to being brown dogs, then if

Socrates thinks of Lassie as being a brown dog he thereby thinks of Fido as a brown dog. However, can that be correct; is that the way thought really operates?

h) Note: since Aristotle holds that only form is subject to cognition, he also holds that matter cannot be thought. Matter is unintelligible for Aristotle.

10) Aristotle on Causationa) Explanation and understanding typically involve one or more types of causal explanationb) Four types of causation

i) Efficient causation: mechanistic relation by which motion or change of states is transmitted or induced (e.g. billiard ball X collides with billiard ball Y and transmits motion to Y or induces Y to move). Efficient causation makes change in state necessary.

ii) Material causation: physical substances of different kinds include different kinds of matter (1) E.g. a copper pipe includes copper, which is a certain type of matter(2) Suppose that the pipe is exposed to air and becomes green(3) The explanation of the color of the copper pipe refers to the fact that the pipe is made of copper(4) An explanation that explains the state of a substance in terms of the matter in the substance is an

explanation from material causation.(5) Such and explanation serves to indicate necessity.

iii) Formal causation:(1) Consider the question: why does this statue represent Socrates?(2) Answer: the statue is similar to Socrates with respect to shape(3) For Aristotle, the shape of the statue is a form of the statue(4) Hence, the explanation of why the statue represents Socrates refers to a form in the statue(5) Explanations that refer to forms as found in primary substances are explanations from formal

causation(6) Notice that explanations from formal causation serve to indicate that the situation to be explained

is necessary as a result of the influence of the cited form(7) E.g. the form in the statue has so determined the matter in the statue as to make it necessary that

the statue be similar to (and thus represent) Socrates.(8) Notice also that most examples of material causation reduce to examples of formal causation.

This is because most examples of material causation refer to matter as constrained by form. (e.g. copper = matter + the form of copper)

iv) Final causation: (1) Consider the question: why does the heart palpitate?(2) Answer: to pump the blood(3) This explanation of the palpitation of the heart refers to the purpose of function of the heart(4) Explanations of this sort are explanations from final causation(5) Does final causation presuppose that the function or purpose of a substance result from the

creative activity of an intelligent being?

(a) Notice that evolutionary biology appears to recognize that function is a factor in adaptation. Nevertheless, adaptation is not dependent on the creative activity of an intelligent being).

(6) Final causation and unmoved mover(a) The universe is complex unchanging structure(b) So, it must have a cause(c) There could not be a first efficient cause since every efficient cause requires a prior efficient

cause(d) Therefore, the universe is eternal (in the past) and uncreated(e) But why is the eternal universe structured as it actually is rather than in any other way?(f) There must be an unmoved mover that is immutable, eternal and immaterial = pure form(g) The unmoved mover influences the structure of the universe as the beloved influences the

lover(h) So the unmoved mover must be good(i) The unmoved mover thinks, but it thinks only of itself; it is therefore alive(j) The unmoved mover is unique since it is immaterial, consisting of form alone(k) Since it exists of form alone, it exists of necessity(l) Given the above, the unmoved mover can be considered to be God

11) Problem of Evila) The Problem of Evil

i) Is god incompatible with evil?ii) Who is God?

(1) An existing being who is:(a) Omniscient(b) Omnipotent(c) Omnipresent

iii) What is Evil?(1) God is defined as benevolent

(a) That is: God will us well, that we have good lives(b) Hence, the definition of God presupposes the concept of what is good(c) Evil can then be defined as “Evil = Opposite of Good”

(2) Human Evil(a) Intentional production of evil(b) Accidental production of evil

(3) Natural Evil(a) Natural disasters(b) Illness

(4) Suffering is characteristic of eviliv) Argument for incompatibility

(1) An omnipotent being can prevent all evil(2) An omniscient being knows how to prevent all evil(3) A benevolent, omniscient and omnipotent being would intend that there be no evil(4) Hence God – who exists as benevolent, omniscient and omnipotent intends that there is no evil(5) Whatever God intends to be actually is(6) Hence there is no evil(7) But this contradicts the fact that we know evil to exist(8) Contradictions cannot be true(9) The assumption that leads to the contradiction is that God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient

and benevolent(10) Hence, God does not exist as an omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent being(11) If God does not exist as an omniscient, omnipotent, benevolent being – then God does not exist at

all(12) Hence, God does not exist at all

v) Analysis of the argument(1) Agree that Evil exists and God does not exist (in this case, defend your position against the theist)(2) Deny that Evil exists but assert that God exists (in this case, defend and explain the denial of evil’s

existence)

(3) Argue that Evil is, in fact, compatible with God (in this case, explain what evil is and how it is compatible with the divine attributes. It may be useful to investigate the difference between natural and human/moral evil).

12) Augustine Lecturesa) Background

i) Begins a Manicheanii) Becomes a Platonistiii) Converted by Ambrose “God, give me purity but not yet”

b) Augustine’s Platonismi) Accepts Platonic formsii) Equates God with the set of Platonic Forms (So, God = Truth)iii) Accepts the Platonic hierarchy and the principle that the lower cannot act on the higher

c) Augustine on knowledgei) Knowledge is of the formsii) Humans are lower than the formsiii) Since the lower cannot act upon the higher, humans cannot so act upon the forms as to create

knowledge of the formsiv) But, humans do have knowledge of the formsv) Hence, they must have this knowledge as the result of something higher acting upon them

(1) Only the forms could so act upon humans(2) But, God is the set of forms(3) Hence, human knowledge results from God acting on humans = illumination

vi) Additional arguments for illumination(1) Argument from language

(a) Knowledge of language requires semantic knowledge (i.e. knowledge of what words mean)(b) To know the meaning of a predicate, one must know the property or form that the word

signifies(c) This knowledge cannot result from ostension or observation because ostension and

observation do not distinguish equivalent but different properties or forms (e.g. triangularity and trilaterality)

(d) So, semantic knowledge must result from some non-empirical source(e) Only God could be this source

(2) Argument from necessity(a) Knowledge of what is necessary rather than contingent cannot be empirical (e.g. mathematics,

physics?)(b) Such knowledge – even if innate – can only result from God’s direct action on us(c) Hence, knowledge of necessity must result from illumination

d) Augustine argues that the universe is createdi) The universe changes constantlyii) To change is to become what was notiii) Nothing that changes can make itself become what was notiv) So, there must exist something – God – that never changes and creates the changing universe from

nothing (ex nihilo)v) To create ex nihilo is to create without using matter; it is to create simply by decree, command or

thoughtvi) Since God creates the universe ex nihilo, God is in some sense responsible for everything in the

universe – both good and badvii) In creating the universe, God foresees or knows the entire history of the universe in full detail viii) So God knows everything that each person does before he/she does it

e) Creation ex nihilo and evili) By hypothesis, God is benevolent, omnipotent, and omniscientii) Evil existsiii) God created the universe ex nihiloiv) So, God is responsible for evilv) But if God is perfect, God could not be responsible for evilvi) (iv) and (v) together are contradictory

vii) Hence, either (i), (ii), or (iii) must be falseviii) Augustine rejects (ii); he asserts that what we take to be evil is really good

(1) Suffering is really a good thing; it appears evil to us because we do not understand God’s purpose in allowing it

(2) Immorality results when people freely choose what is good but not as good as what they might otherwise have done

f) Divine providence and freedomi) In creating ex nihilo, God knows the entire history of the universeii) So, God knows every human action before it occursiii) What God knows shall occur must occuriv) So, every human action that does occur must occurv) So, every human action occurs necessarilyvi) What occurs necessarily cannot be freevii) So, no human action is free

g) Augustine on Freedomi) Divine providence is compatible with human freedom despite the above argumentii) Human freedom is really the result of voluntary actioniii) Voluntary action is what an agent wantsiv) Divine providence may entail that human action is necessary, but it may still be voluntaryv) So, since freedom is really voluntary action, it is compatible with necessary actionvi) Hence, divine providence is compatible with freedom

13) Boethius Lectures (Boethius on Free will)a) The problem

i) Human freedom is incompatible with necessity. That is, if all human actions are necessary, then humans are not free

ii) Since God is omniscient, God knows everything that humans ever do, including their future actionsiii) But if God knows all that humans shall do, then future human actions are determined and made

necessary by God’s knowledge of the futureiv) Hence, human actions are not free

b) The solution from Modal Logici) What God foreknows must happen exactly as it does happenii) God foreknows my futureiii) So, my future must happen exactly as it doesiv) If my future must happen exactly as it does, then my future is necessaryv) So, my future is necessaryvi) If my future is necessary, I am not freevii) So, I am not free

c) Boethius’ Solutioni) The statement of the problem conceals a mistakeii) The mistake pertains to how the concept of necessity is presented in the argumentiii) It is true that I am not free if my future is necessaryiv) But the correct formulation of the argument fails to prove that my future is necessaryv) Hence the argument fails to prove that I am not free

d) Incorrect versioni) If God foreknows the future, then the future is necessaryii) God foreknows the futureiii) So, the future is necessaryiv) If the future is necessary, then I am not freev) So, I am not freevi) Boethius says that (i) is false. Hence, neither (iii) nor (v) are proven. So, the incorrect version fails to

show that freedom is incompatible with providencee) Correct version

i) It is necessary that if God knows the future, then the future will happen as God knows itii) What is necessary is trueiii) Hence, if God knows the future, then the future will happen as God knows itiv) God knows the future

v) So, the future will happen as God knows itvi) Since (v) does not make my future necessary, it does not preclude my freedomvii) So, providence is compatible with freedom after all!

f) Boetheus says that the correct version of the problem contains only true premises. He points out that the conclusion of the correct argument is consistent with human freedom. So, he concludes that providence is consistent with human freedom.

14) Anselm Lectures (St. Anselm of Canterbury)a) Background

i) 1033-1109

ii) Catholic archbishop of Canterbury

iii) Aims to establish the existence of god on the basis of reason/logic rather than faith

b) Arguments for the existence of god raise the general question: how do we prove the existence of anything?

c) Distinguish sensible from nonsensible objects

i) Note: proof of existence of x from

ii) Sensation of x is an instance of proof of existence of x from  an idea of x

iii) It is important to keep this point in mind when considering Anselm’s ontological argument

d) Ontological argument (short form)

i) God = that than which nothing greater can be conceived

ii) Assume god does not exist

iii) It is possible to conceive of something, x,  exactly similar to god except that x exists

iv) It is greater to exist than  not to exist

v) So, x is conceived to be greater than god

vi) But this contradicts the identity or definitionspecified in the first line of the arguement

vii) Since this contradiction depends on the assumption that god does not exist, this veryassumption must be false

viii) Hence, god exists!

e) Gaunilo’s objection

i) In the ontological argument:  replace the definition of god with a definition of the perfect island", (i.e. The island than which none greater can be conceived.)

ii) The resulting proof "proves" the existence of the island if the ontological argument proves anything

iii) But it is absurd to suppose that we have proven the existence of the perfect island from this argument so, the ontological argument proves nothing

f) Role of definitions in proofs:

i) If we may use definitions in geometrical proofs, may we also use a definition in the ontological argument?

ii) Are proofs from sensation better than proofs that are independent of sensation when the question is existence?

15) Aquinas Lectures (1225-1274)a) Background

i) Born to Italian nobilityii) Entered prestigious Benedictine monastery of Monte Casino at age 5; his family intended that he

would become a Benedictineiii) At age 19 Aquinas rejects the Benedicts to join the Dominicansiv) Studied under Albert the great in Parisv) Becomes a serious student of Aristotle’s works and Aristotle’s Arabic commentators, especially

Avicenna and Averroesvi) Engaged in controversy with St. Bonaventure (Fransiscan) regarding conflicts between Aristotelianism

and Christian doctrinevii) Wrote extensively on almost all areas of philosophyviii) Appears to have renounced some of his own teaching at the time of his death

b) Aquinas’ Five Waysi) Aims to prove the existence of God in order to reply to the problem of evil and the supposition that

God is superfluous in the face of (Scientific) Naturalismii) Note: Aquinas rejects Anselm’s Ontological argument, holding that it fails to prove the reality of God

as opposed to the idea of Godiii) Argument from motion

(1) Things do move(2) Motion is reduction from potentiality to actuality(3) So, what is moved first is potentiality(4) Only what is in actuality can reduce something from potentiality to actuality(5) Nothing can reduce itself from potentiality to actuality(6) Therefore, nothing can move itself(7) There cannot be an infinite sequence of movers (i.e. reducers of potentiality to actuality)(8) So, there must be a prime mover = God

iv) Argument from efficient causation(1) The sensible world is a series of effects of efficient causes(2) Nothing can be an efficient cause of itself(3) It is impossible that there be an infinite historical sequence of efficient causes(4) So, there must exist a first efficient cause = God

v) Argument from possibility and necessity(1) Some natural things exist contingently(2) For each contingent thing, there is a time at which it does not exist(3) If everything were contingent, there would be a time (long past) when nothing existed(4) If there were such a time, then nothing would now exist(5) So, something must exist that is not contingent but rather necessary which gives rise to all things(6) This necessary being = God

vi) Argument from gradation(1) Everything is comparable with respect to value and being(2) Some are better and some are worse(3) Such gradation presupposes a thing that is maximally or perfectly valuable and real against which

all other things are compared(4) This being is God

vii) Argument from governance(1) Even unintelligent things act towards ends (i.e. such things have purposes or functions – the hear

beats for the purpose of pumping blood)(2) Such purposeful activity presupposes intelligent direction or design(3) Such design presupposes a designer = God

16) Descartes Lectures

a) Lecture Set Ii) Substance and attribute

(1) Pin cushion model(2) Essential and accidental attributes

ii) Types of substance(1) Mental substance (essence = to think)(2) Material substance (essence = extension)

iii) Dualism(1) I = mental substance(2) My body = material substance(3) I am not by body

iv) Arguments for dualism(1) Conceivability of difference implies real difference(2) How could matter think?

(a) Where is an idea?(b) What does it look like?

(3) Self knowledge is not knowledge of a body(a) I can know who I am and what I am without knowing anything about my body

v) Search for certainty(1) Universal doubt in Meditation I – all evidence is dubious

(a) What is matter like?(b) Does matter exist?(c) Logic and mathematics

(2) Certainty and the cogito(a) Certainly, I exist as a substance(b) Certainly, I know what I think(c) Certainly, I know the essence of matter(d) Certainly, there is no demon

(3) God and science(a) Since there is no demon, I can prove with certainty God’s existence(b) God ensures my scientific knowledge of matter’s existence and attributes

(4) Problems with the cogito(a) The dubious character of first-person belief

(i) Evil sophomores(ii) Unattended channel(iii) Rhyme(iv) Pain and near-pain

(b) Cogito and other minds(i) How do I know that you exist as a real person with a Cartesian mind rather than as a

mindless robot?(ii) Communication?(iii) Then computers have minds too(iv) Are you just a computer?

(5) Rehearsal of foundationalism(a) Knowledge requires certainty(b) Certainty requires conclusive evidence(c) Skepticism = no conclusive evidence; no certainty; no knowledge(d) The cogito demonstrates certainty about one’s own mind and ideas(e) So, skepticism about one’s own mind must be false(f) What about knowledge of the universe beyond one’s own mind?

(i) Knowledge of other minds?(ii) Knowledge of the material world?

(g) Role of proof of God’s existence(i) Three “proofs”

1. Formal vs. objective reality2. From source idea of God

3. From ontological argument(ii) Proof of God insures inference from certainty of ideas to existence and nature of

1. Other minds2. Matter

(6) Problems for foundationalism(a) Cartesian circle(b) Self-certainty and the cogito(c) Solipsism

(i) Regarding minds(ii) Regarding matter

(d) Proofs of God’s existence(i) Compatibility of error and God

1. Descartes’ theory of belief and free will2. Why did God not make doxastic saints?

(7) Cartesian representationalism(a) Direct realism(b) Representational realism(c) Causal realism

b) Lecture set IIi) Rene Descartes (1596-1650)

(1) French philosopher, mathematician, physical scientist (optics, physiology)(2) Contemporaries:

(a) Copernicus (1473-1543)(b) F. Bacon (1561-1626)(c) Galileo (1564-1642)(d) Kepler (1571-1630)(e) Descartes (1596-1650)(f) Boyle (1627-1691)(g) Newton (1642-1727)

(3) Descartes’ questions:(a) Should we take the “scientific turn”?(b) What can we know with certainty?(c) What can we know on the basis of our certainties?

ii) Skeptical challenge(1) Knowledge (as opposed to mere opinion) requires certainty

(a) Certainty is impossible because certainty requires evidence from either sensation or reason, neither of which allows for certainty

(b) Therefore, knowledge is impossible(2) Certainty and evidence the problem with sensation

(a) Illusion: uncertainty about the properties of material substances(b) Hallucination: uncertainty about the existence of selected material substances(c) Dream hypothesis: uncertainty about the existence of the entire material world, including my

own body(3) The problem with reason

(a) Even in dreams, logic and mathematics remain confirmed(b) However, consider evil demon hypothesis: uncertainty about logic, math and reason itself

iii) Descartes’ refutation of skepticism(1) The cogito

(a) Assume that the evil demon hypothesis is true(b) In order for the demon to deceive me, I must exist(c) So, even if the demon exists, I can know with certainty that i exist(d) Put differently, even if the demon exists, I can know that I am thinking and, hence, that I

exist(2) Limitations on the cogito (what we still don’t know)

(a) Offers certainty only about one’s own mind and one’s own existence

(b) The cogito is silent on the existence of others; it says nothing about what we can know with certainty about objects or people other than ourselves. So, the cogito is consistent with solipsism

(c) The cogito refers to my mind, not my body; so, it is silent about what can be known with certainty about bodies

(3) What we do know(a) Even though our ideas may not correctly represent the world, we still know (with certainty)

what our ideas are.(b) I believe there are unicorns. There are no unicorns. My belief is incorrect. But I still know

(with certainty) that I have an idea of a unicorn.(4) How can we use our knowledge of our ideas?

(a) We can use it to prove the existence of god(b) Descartes argument for the existence of god

(i) I have an idea of god(ii) There must be at least as much reality in the cause (of an idea) as in the effect (the idea

itself).(iii) God is the only being with as much reality as my idea of god.(iv) God is the cause of my idea of god.(v) God exists.

(c) Our connection to the world(i) God is good, so he does not deceive us.(ii) God is perfect, and he created us, so our faculties are perfect (as perfect as they can be in

a person).(iii) So, when we use our faculties correctly (i.e. clearly and distinctly perceive) they deliver

truths that are certain.iv) Foundationalism

(1) Certainty about the self plus certainty about inferences from the self to the world underwrites knowledge of the world

(2) Remaining problems:(a) Persistent illusions(b) Are we certain about ourselves:

(i) Hot iron case(ii) Unattended channel external conditions on mental content

(3) What makes inference to the external world reliable?(a) Descartes’ answer(b) But the fact of error remains(c) Conclusion: certainty is too high a condition on knowledge

c) Lecture set IIIi) Attributes: qualities of objectsii) Substance: that which is the subject of attributes within an objectiii) Pin cushion model of objectiv) Role of Substance

(1) Bind and unify attributes(2) Persist through change(3) Individuate similar objects(4) Serve as the subject of thought

v) Role of Attribute(1) Constitute qualities and relations of objects(2) Bases of similarity and differences among objects(3) Fluctuate in change(4) Elements recognized in sensation and thought

vi) Types of attributes(1) Essential

(a) Loss of an essential attribute = destruction of the object(b) Determines object kinds, types, categories, genus or species (c) Critical to our understanding of the object (e.g. triangularity of triangles)

(2) Accidental(a) Fluctuate in change consistent with persistence(b) Not critical to our understanding of the object (e.g. the color of a triangle)

vii) Dualism = there are two kinds of substance(1) Mental substance: essential attribute = thought without extension(2) Material substance: essential attribute = extension without thought(3) Arguments for dualism

(a) Conceivability(i) I can conceive of my mind as existing only if I also conceive it as thinking(ii) So, thought is an essential attribute of my mind(iii) But, I can conceive of my mind existing without an extended body(iv) Hence, extension and body are not essential to the mind(v) Hence, it is possible that the mind exist without a body(vi) Hence, the mind must be a different substance than the body. Dualism must be true

(b) Objection to conceivability argument(i) It is a mistake to infer from the fact that body is not essential to the mind that the mind

can exist without the body(ii) My mind may not need my body to exist but it needs some body(iii) E.g. Triangles do not have color among their essential attributes. But, every real triangle

must have some color or other. Perhaps minds are related to bodies in the way that triangles are related to their color. Since we do not think that dualism with respect to triangles is true, neither need we say that dualism with respect to the mind is true.

(c) Argument from thought for dualism(i) All thoughts and ideas are intentional (ideas are about things which are typically real

things but can be non-existent things)(ii) Some thoughts and ideas are conscious(iii) It is inconceivable, and hence impossible, that selected material objects such as rocks are

intentional or conscious(iv) Hence, there is nothing in matter that allows for intentionality or consciousness(v) Hence, intentionality and consciousness can only occur in something that is immaterial(vi) Hence, dualism is true

(d) Objection(i) It is true that rocks can be neither intentional nor conscious(ii) However, from that it does not follow that no sort of material object can be intentional or

conscious(iii) It seems possible that intentionality and consciousness emerge from material complexity

that rocks lack, but things like brains have(iv) In that case, intentionality and consciousness are not grounds for endorsing dualism

17) Berkeley Lecturesa) Background

i) 1685-1753ii) Irishiii) Anglican bishopiv) Early opticsv) Tar water!

b) Idealismi) Deny existence of material substanceii) Only mental substance and ideas exist

c) Berkeley’s empiricismi) All ideas arise form sensationii) All meaningful words are definable in terms of sensationiii) All knowledge depends on sensation

d) Contrast Cartesian Rationalismi) Innate ideasii) Pure reason as the source of some knowledgeiii) Some meaningful words are not definable through sensation

e) Berkeley vs. skepticismi) By hypothesis: skepticism is falseii) So, whatever implies skepticism is also falseiii) Cartesian materialism is false because it implies skepticism

f) Berkeley against abstract ideasi) All ideas arise from sensationii) Sensation is always of “the particular”iii) So, ideas are always particular and never general or abstractiv) So, abstract terms are meaningless

g) Three dialoguesi) Philonous: (Greek) lover of the soul/mindii) Hylas: (Greek) matter

h) Philonous: matter isi) Absurd, contradictory, repugnantii) Therefore, it does not exist

i) Definitionsi) Skeptic: one who denies or doubts the reality of sensible thingsii) Sensible thing: whatever is immediate perceived

j) Contrasti) Immediate perception of sensible qualities (colors, sounds, tastes, shapes)ii) Mediate perception/inference (do you really hear the coach?)

k) Sensible thing: collection of sensible qualities and nothing more (e.g. trees, electrons, stars)l) Arguments for idealism

i) Strategy I: show that all sensible things, as collections of sensible qualities, must be ideasii) Argument from contraries

(1) Heat = Pain(2) Pain = Idea(3) So, heat = idea is not a property of matter

(a) Note that heat is among the subjects of physics(b) Are all basic ideas in physics ideas?

iii) Hylas’ reply(1) Philonous’ argument shows at most that only intense heat/cold is an idea(2) So, other degrees of heat/cold (indolences) might remain as properties of matter

iv) Philonous’ reply(1) What holds for one type or degree of heat holds for all(2) So, if any type or degree of heat is an idea, then all are ideas

v) Argument from contraries(1) No material substance can have contrary/ contradictory properties(2) Sensible things are as we perceive them(3) Water is sensible and can be perceived as both hot and cold(4) So, water is both hot and cold(5) Therefore, water cannot be a material substance; it could only be a collection of sensible qualities

all of which are themselves ideasvi) Hylas’ reply

(1) The correct interpretation of the argument from contraries is not that water is not a material substance but rather than sometimes matter is not as it is perceived

(2) Philonous: but that implies skepticism, which is falsevii) Perceptual relativity

(1) All perception is relative to observers(2) There is no non-skeptical way to distinguish veridical and non-veridical sensation under the

assumption of materialism(3) So, materialism must be false

m) Idealismi) Given that the above arguments refute materialism, idealism must be trueii) Idealism is the doctrine that all sensible qualities are ideas and that sensible things are just collections

of ideas existing only in minds

n) Hylas on primary and secondary qualitiesi) Primary qualities exist as perceived in matter (e.g. figure, motion, extension, number, solidity)ii) Secondary qualities are only ideas in mind caused by primary qualities (e.g. colors, tastes, odors,

etc…)o) Philonous against primary qualities

i) Perceptual relativity demonstrates that primary qualities are ideasii) Empiricism is inconsistent with primary qualities being “absolute” or abstract or nonsensible

p) Absurdity of matteri) By definition, matter is: “substratum” of qualities, extendedii) A substratum is that which has no qualities but “underlies” qualitiesiii) So, matter has no qualitiesiv) If matter has no qualities, it cannot have the quality of being extendedv) So, matter is extended and not extendedvi) That is “absurd” and contradictoryvii) So, the very “definition” of matter is absurd and contradictoryviii) Hence, matter does not exist

q) Unintelligibility of matteri) According to Hylas, matter is essentially extendedii) But, perceptual relativity shows that if extension is sensible, it must be an ideaiii) Matter cannot have ideasiv) So, extension cannot be sensiblev) If extension is not sensible, empiricism implies it is unintelligiblevi) Hence, if matter is essentially extended, it is unintelligiblevii) It is philosophically absurd to posit what is unintelligibleviii) Hence, it is best to deny the reality of matter

r) Against representational realismi) Recall that representational realism is a version of materialism asserting that ideas resemble material,

sensible qualitiesii) By hypothesis, ideas are passive and material qualities are activeiii) This difference is fundamental and precludes any resemblanceiv) This contradicts representational realismv) Hence, representational realism is false

s) God and the stability of the worldi) Idealism = the sensible world exists as collections of ideas in mindsii) Sensible things do not depend for their existence on human mindsiii) So there must exist a God in which sensible things exist as ideas apart from human ideas

t) God and redundant matteri) God exists as the source of sensible stability of the sensible worldii) Hence, it is redundant to posit matter as the source of the stability of the sensible worldiii) It is absurd to posit what is redundantiv) So, it is absurd to posit matter

u) Hylas’ critique of Idealismi) Idealism = mental substance exists as distinct from its qualities (ideas)ii) Empiricism = only the sensible is intelligibleiii) Hence, mental substance is unintelligible and therefore absurd

v) Philonous’ replyi) Mental substance is indeed intelligible because for each of us, the following is true: I know what I am;

I know what “I” meansii) Note: this denies Empiricism and undercuts the idealist argument on the unintelligibility of matter

w) Hylas’ second critiquei) Idealism states

(1) Real things = sensible things(2) Sensible things = collections of ideas

ii) Fictitious things = collections of ideasiii) Hence fictitious things = real things which is absurdiv) So, idealism must be false

18) Hume Lectures