2003 BAR REVIEW LECTURE OUTLINE

183

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER 2006207664LEAVE NO MAN BEHIND - SANDOVAL

This reviewer is based on the 2006 BAR REVIEW LECTURE OUTLINE (Political Law and Public International Law [April 2006]) of Atty. EDWIN REY SANDOVAL with his permission.

- Compiled by Rene Callanta, Babut Bacena, Joy Tablatin -

POLITICAL LAW

Political Law defined

That branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the government organs of the state and defines the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory.Macariola v Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77 (1982)

Political law has been defined as that branch of public law w/c deals w/ the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the state w/ the inhabitants of its territory. Scope of Political Law.-- The entire field of political law may be subdivided into (a) the law of public administration, (b) constitutional law, (c) administrative law, and (d) the law of public corporations. These four subdivisions may be briefly described for the time being, as follows: The first deals with the organization and management of the different branches of the government; the second, with the guaranties of the constitution to individual rights and the limitations on governmental action; the third, with the exercise of executive power in the making of rules and the decision of questions affecting private rights; and the last, with governmental agencies for local government or for other special purposes.

THE NATIONAL TERRITORY

Art. I, 1987 Constitution

The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.

The Philippine ArchipelagoBasis of Art. 1 of the 1987 Constitution [PIL, I. Cruz]

1- All the waters within the limits set forth in the:a) Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898 (Cession of the Philippine Islands by Spain to the U.S.),

b) between Spain and U.S., The Treaty of Spain and U.S. at Washington, November 7, 1900 (Cagayan, Sulu & Sibuto),

c) Treaty between U.S. and Great Britain, January 2, 1930 (Turtle and Mangsee Islands);

2- All the waters around, between and connecting the various islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of their width or dimension, have always been considered as necessary appurtenances of the land territory, forming part of the inland or internal waters of the Philippines;

3- All the waters beyond the outermost islands of the archipelago but within the limits of the boundaries set forth in the aforementioned treaties comprise the territorial sea of the Philippines.

4- The baselines from which the territorial sea of the Philippines is determined consist of straight lines joining the appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago (straight baseline method);

The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine archipelago is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE

> Outermost points of the archipelago shall be connected by straight baselines and all islands and waters therein are regarded as one integrated unit

Treaty Limits (Treaty of Paris, Art. III; Treaty between Spain and the US concluded at Washington DC, on November 7, 1900 and that between US and Great Britain on January 2, 1930)1. Treaty of Paris of 10 December 1898.

Article 3 defines the metes and bounds of the archipelago by longitude and latitude, degrees and seconds. Technical descriptions are made of the scope of the archipelago as this may be found on the surface of the earth.

2. Treaty of Washington of 7 November 1900 between the United States and Spain.

Ceding Cagayan, Sibuto and Sulu.

3. Treaty of 2 January 1930 between the United States and Great Britain.

Ceding the Turtle and Mangsee Islands.

The SPRATLEYS group of islands is not a part of the Philippine archipelago but it is a part of our national territory. It belongs to the 2nd part of the composition of the national territory [All other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction] P.D. No. 1596 (Declaring Certain Areas Part of the Philippine Territory and Providing for Their Government and Administration), promulgated on June 11, 1978.PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1596

68;DECLARING CERTAIN AREA PART OF THE PHILIPPINE TERRITORY AND PROVIDING FOR THEIR GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

WHEREAS, by reason of their proximity the cluster of islands and islets in the South China Sea situated within the following:

KALAYAAN ISLAND GROUP

From a point [on the Philippine Treaty Limits] at latitude 740' North and longitude 11600 East of Greenwich, thence due West along the parallel of 740' N to its intersection with the meridian of longitude 11210' E, thence due north along the meridian of 11210' E to its intersection with the parallel of 900' N, thence northeastward to the intersection of parallel of 1200' N with the meridian of longitude 11430' E, thence, due East along the parallel of 1200' N to its intersection with the meridian of 11800' E, thence, due South along the meridian of longitude 11800' E to its intersection with the parallel of 1000' N, thence Southwestwards to the point of beginning at 740' N, latitude and 11600' E longitude are vital to the security and economic survival of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, these areas do not legally belong to any state or nation but, by reason of history, indispensable need, and effective occupation and control established in accordance with the international law, such areas must now deemed to belong and subject to the sovereignty of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, while other states have laid claims to some of these areas, their claims have lapsed by abandonment and can not prevail over that of the Philippines on legal, historical, and equitable grounds.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree as follows:

P.D. No. 1599 (Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone and For Other Purposes), promulgated on June 11, 1978.There is established an exclusive economic zone extending "to a distance of two hundred nautical miles beyond and from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured. Provided, That, where the outer limits of the zone as thus determined overlap the exclusive economic zone of an adjacent or neighboring state, the common boundaries shall be determined by agreement with the state concerned or in accordance with pertinent generally recognized principles or international law on delimitation." (Sec. 1 thereof.)

Other states shall enjoy in the exclusive economic zone freedoms with respect to navigations and overflight, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea relating to navigation and communications. (Sec. 4 thereof.)

Purposes:

1. Sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the natural resources, living or non-living, renewable or non-renewable of the seabed, subsoil, and super adjacent waters.

Economic exploitation and exploration of the resources of the zone such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds.

2. Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to the establishment and utilization of artificial islands, off-shore terminals, installations and structures; the preservation of the marine environment, including the prevention and control of pollution and scientific research.

3. Such other rights as are recognized by international law.

Other states are prohibited from using the zone to:

1. Explore or exploit any resources;

2. Carry out any search, excavation or drilling operations;

3. Conduct any research;

4. Construct or operate any artificial island, off-shore terminal, installation, or other structure;

5. Perform any activity which is contrary to, or in derogation of, the sovereign rights and jurisdiction herein provided.

Other states are allowed to use the zone for:

1. Navigation and overflight;

2. Laying of submarine cable and pipelines;

3. Other lawful uses related to navigation and communication.

In case of overlapping of EEZs, the common boundaries are to be detemined by (i) agreement and (ii) international rules on delimitations.

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (30 April 1982.)

The exclusive economic zone which shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, is recognized in the UNCLOS, of which the Philippines is a signatory. Its concept is that although it is not part of the territory, exclusive economic benefit is reserved for the country.

C. Amendments and revisions

AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION

Art. XVII, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 1.Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1)The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

(2)A constitutional convention.

SECTION 2.Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. ( * remains to be a non-self executing provision )

SECTION 3.The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.

SECTION 4.Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition. Modes of Proposing Amendments or Revision

Proposal

Ratification

Thru CongressThru Con. Con.

Thru Peoples initiative

By a vote ofBy a 2/3 vote of

By petition of at least By Majority of

All its membersall members of

12% of the total no.votes case in a

Congress

of registered voters ofPlebiscite

Which at least 3% of

Each legislative dist.

Must be represented

Here it will not By a majority voteNo amendment shall beThe plebiscite

Act as a legisla-of all its members

authorized oftener thanshall be held not

tiveBody but a if calling is submittedonce every 5 yearsearlier than 60

Constituent Bodyto the people

beginning Feb. 3 99days nor later

Than 90 days

After the approval

Of such amend-

ment/revision, or

after the certifica-

tion by the

COMELEC of the

Sufficiency of the

uPetition as the

Case may be

AMENDMENT- Isolated or Piecemeal change REVISION- Revamp or Rewriting of the entire instrumentDOCTRINE OF PROPER SUBMISSION

> The entire constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. Submission for ratification of piecemeal amendments disallowed

Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106, March 19, 1997 [Peoples Initiative on the Constitution]

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalidxxx

It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.

SOVEREIGNTY

Distinguish sovereignty from dominion. Sovereignty is the right to exercise the functions of a State to the exclusion of any other State. It is often referred to as the power of imperium, which is defined as the government authority possessed by the State. On the other hand, dominion, or dominium, is the capacity of the State to own or acquire property such as lands and natural resources. (Separate Opinion, Kapunan, J., in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000, En Banc, See Footnote 86)

Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 [1997], En Banc [Panganiban] [Is sovereignty really absolute?]

While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties . . . A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken."

Kinds of Sovereignty

LegalPoliticalInternalExternal

Refers to the Refers to the powerRefers to the powerRefers to the power

Authority that hasbehind legal of the state to of the state to

the power to issuesovereignty, ie, thecontrol its domesticdirect its relations

Final commands,different sectors affairswith other states

That is the Congressthat mold publica.k.a. Independence

Opinion

(Separate Opinion, Kapunan, J., in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000, 347 SCRA 128, 268-270, En Banc [Per Curiam] (Concept of Jura Regalia vs. Concept of Native title)Generally, under the concept of jura regalia, private title to land must be traced to some grant, express or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the American Colonial government, and thereafter, the Philippine Republic. The belief that the Spanish Crown is the origin of all land titles in the Philippines has persisted because title to land must emanate from some source for it cannot issue forth from nowhere

In its broad sense, the term "jura regalia" refers to royal grants, or those rights which the King has by virtue of his prerogatives. In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has over anything in which a subject has a right of property or propriedad. These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by the king as the sovereign.

The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally held by the King, and while the use of lands was granted out to others who were permitted to hold them under certain conditions, the King theoretically retained the title. By fiction of law, the King was regarded as the original proprietor of all lands, and the true and only source of title, and from him all lands were held. The theory of jura regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest.

The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial. In the landmark case of Carino v. Insular Government (41 Phil. 935, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. Ed. 594 [1909]), the United States Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the pre-war Philippine Supreme Court, made the following pronouncement:

x x x Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. x x x The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.

Carino was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1909, at a time when decisions of the U.S. Court were binding as precedent in our jurisdiction (Section 10, Philippine Bill of 1902). We applied the Carino doctrine in the 1946 case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]), where we stated that [a]ll lands that were not acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain, but [a]n exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. .Dominium was the basis for the early Spanish decrees embracing the theory of jura regalia. The declaration in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that all lands of the public domain are owned by the State is likewise founded on dominium. If dominium, not imperium, is the basis of the theory of jura regalia, then the lands which Spain acquired in the 16th century were limited to non-private lands, because it could only acquire lands which were not yet privately-owned or occupied by the Filipinos. Hence, Spain acquired title only over lands which were unoccupied and unclaimed, i.e., public lands.

CITIZENSHIP Art. IV, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 1.The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1)Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

(2)Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3)Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

(4)Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2.Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

SECTION 3.Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.

SECTION 4.Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.

SECTION 5.Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

Valles v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc [Purisima] [Jus sanguinis principle; renunciation of Philippine citizenship; Application of Res Judicata in citizenship issues]

Jus sanguinis principle

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Renunciation of Philippine citizenship

The mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. As held by this Court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of ones citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passpo rt, as in the case of Mercado v. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.

Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a ground for losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioners claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water.

Application of Res Judicata in citizenship issues

Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e., the principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca v. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:

1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;

2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and

3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, Oct. 1, 1999, En Banc [Kapunan] [Failure to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority]

Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. xxx

The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. xxx

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Bengzon, III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, En Banc [Kapunan] [Natural-born Philippine citizenship; Effect of Repatriation; Naturalization and Repatriation]There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.

As defined in the x x x Constitution, natural-born citizens are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530xxx

To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any government announced policies (Section 1, R.A. 530).Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may x x x reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act No. 63 enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.xxx

Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63 (An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired [1936]). Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces (Section 4, C.A. No. 63); (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II (Section 1, Republic Act No. 965 [1953]); (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 2630 [1960]); (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 8171 [1995]); and (5) political and economic necessity (Ibid).

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last residedxxx

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. Angat v. Republic, G.R. No. 132244, Sept. 14, 1999 [Vitug] [Repatriation under R.A. 8171]

R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on October 23, 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.

An application for repatriation could be filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization chaired by the Solicitor General with the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency as the other members. Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630, May 26, 1999, En Banc [Mendoza] [Dual citizenship and dual allegiance]

Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volitionxxx

Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) (Local Government Code) must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, x x x, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

Instances when a Philippine citizen may possess dual citizenship:

1- Those born of parents whose country adopts the jus sanguinis principle in fereign countries which follows the jus soli principle.

2- Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and an alien father, if by the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country.

3- Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country, the former are considered citizens, unless, by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

* The royal prerogative of dishonesty

Sec, 3, Art. XVI, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 3.The State may not be sued without its consent.

Sec. 2, Art. II, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 2.The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

Basis of the Doctrine of State Immunity

EthicalPractical

As to a local stateAs to a foreign state

"There can be no"Par in parem nonThe state will be

legal right against habet imperium"busy defending

the authority thatDoctrine of sovereignitself from lawsuits

makes the law onequality of all states

which the right

depends"

The Holy See v. Rosario, 238 SCRA 524, Dec. 1, 1994, En Banc [Quiason]

In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See.

The issue of petitioner's non-suability can be determined by the trial court without going to trial in the light of the pleadings, particularly the admission of private respondent. Besides, the privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. As the department tasked with the conduct of the Philippines' foreign relations (Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title I, Sec. 3), the Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country (Rollo, pp. 156-157). The determination of the executive arm of government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts (International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]). Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the country's foreign relations (World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1972]). As in International Catholic Migration Commission and in World Health Organization, we abide by the certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Republic v. Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124, March 19, 1993, En Banc [Campos] [When is suit deemed suit against the State? Liabilities of public officers who exceeded their authority]

Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are:

1) When the Republic is sued by name;

2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;

3) When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.

4) When the suit is against a foreign state or embassy

As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority. Until recently in 1991 (Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282 [1991]), this doctrine still found application, this Court saying that immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic.

While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except when it has given its consent, it cannot be invoked by both the military officers to release them from any liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the government. The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the State in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants. This Court has made it quite clear that even a high position in the government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another.

The inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths that followed the incident. Instead, the liability should fall on the named defendants in the lower court. In line with the ruling of this Court in Shauf v. Court of Appeals (191 SCRA 713 [1990]), herein public officials, having been found to have acted beyond the scope of their authority, may be held liable for damages. DA v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, Nov. 11, 1993 [Vitug] [Can government properties be levied to satisfy judgment against the State? Waiver under Act No. 3083]

Waiver of State Immunity

The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principle of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them - between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii.The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contracts relate to the exercise of its sovereign functions. EXPRESSLY IMPLIEDLY

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with money claimsgovernment in itspossible counter-

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vbfile the suit with thehave impliedly waived

courts.its immunity from suit

Lansang v. CA, G.R. No. 102667, Feb. 23, 2000, 2nd Div. [Quisumbing] [Suits against public officers]

The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the State where the satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the State itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff.

The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith.

Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.

When public officials can be sued personally

1- To REQUIRE him to do a duty required by law

2- To RESTRAIN him from doing an act alleged to be unconstitutional or illegal

3- To RECOVER from him taxes unlawfully assessed or collected

CIVILIAN SUPREMACY CLAUSE

Sec. 3, Art. II, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 3.Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, Aug. 15, 2000, En Banc [Kapunan]

The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. x x x The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines' authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority.

ACADEMIC FREEDOM

UP Board of Regents v. CA, G.R. No. 134625, Aug. 31, 1999, 2nd Div. [Mendoza]

Academic freedom of institutions of higher learning is a freedom granted to institutions of higher learning which is thus given a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students. If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.

Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the graduation of a student, for it is precisely the graduation of such a student that is in question. Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc., 227 SCRA 595, Nov. 8, 1993 [Vitug]

The essential freedoms subsumed in the term academic freedom encompassing not only the freedom to determine x x x on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught (and) how it shall be taught, but likewise who may be admitted to study. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT

R.A. No. 8371

AN ACT TO RECOGNIZE, PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES/INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, CREATING A NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, ESTABLISHING IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Isagani Cruz v. Sec. of DENR, G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000, En Banc, [Puno and Kapunan, Separate Opinions]

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native titlexxx

Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-governance and empowerment (Sections 13 to 20), social justice and human rights (Sections 21 to 28), the right to preserve and protect their culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual rights, and the right to develop their own sciences and technologies (Sections 29 to 37)xxx

Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group ownership.

The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only. (Separate Opinion, Puno, J., in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, et al., G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000, En Banc)Concept of "native title"Native title refers to ICCs/IPs preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be recognized and respected (Section 11, IPRA). Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineatedxxx

The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial. In the landmark case of Carino v. Insular Government (41 Phil. 935, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. Ed. 594 [1909]), the United States Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the pre-war Philippine Supreme Court, made the following pronouncement:

x x x Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. x x x (Carino v. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 941)The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regaliaxxx

Carino was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1909, at a time when decisions of the U.S. Court were binding as precedent in our jurisdiction (Section 10, Philippine Bill of 1902). We applied the Carino doctrine in the 1946 case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]), where we stated that "[a]ll lands that were not acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain, but [a]n exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. (Separate Opinion, Kapunan, J., in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000, En Banc)THE FILIPINO FIRST POLICY

Sec. 10, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 10.The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 [1997][Bellosillo]

When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinosxxx

Where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic lawxxx

From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified Filipinos must be preferred

OWNERSHIP/ACQUISITION OF LANDS BY ALIENS

Sec. 7, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 7.Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

Sec. 8, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 8.Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.

THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY

Sec. 16, Art. II, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 16.The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 [1993] [Davide] [the Concept of Inter-Generational Responsibility]

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation, the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.

THE PREFERENTIAL RIGHT OF MARGINAL AND SUBSISTENCE FISHERMEN

Sec. 7, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 7.The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of local marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

Tano v. Socrates, G.R. No. 110249, Aug. 21, 1997

The preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their exploration, development and utilization x x x shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. Moreover, their mandated protection, development and conservation x x x imply certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone. What must be borne in mind is the State policy enshrined in the Constitution regarding the duty of the State to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature (Section 16, Article II). THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO RECOVER PROPERTIES UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS OR EMPLOYEES

Sec. 15, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 15.The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials and employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.

Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, et. al. v. Desierto, G.R. No. 130140, Oct. 25, 1999, En Banc [Davide]

Section 15, Article XI, 1987 Constitution provides that The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees as transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel. From the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, however, it was clear that this provision applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases. Thus, the prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated in Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution may be barred by prescription. SEPARATION OF POWERS

May the Government, through the PCGG, validly bind itself to cause the dismissal of all cases against the Marcos heirs pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts in a Compromise Agreement entered into between the former and the latter?

Held: This is a direct encroachment on judicial power, particularly in regard to criminal jurisdiction. Well-settled is the doctrine that once a case has been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction, the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion and control of the judge. In a criminal case, the manner in which the prosecution is handled, including the matter of whom to present as witnesses, may lie within the sound discretion of the government prosecutor; but the court decides, based on the evidence proffered, in what manner it will dispose of the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution, even by the justice secretary, to withdraw the information or to dismiss the complaint. The prosecutions motion to withdraw or to dismiss is not the least binding upon the court. On the contrary, decisional rules require the trial court to make its own evaluation of the merits of the case, because granting such motion is equivalent to effecting a disposition of the case itself.

Thus, the PCGG, as the government prosecutor of ill-gotten wealth cases, cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases against the Marcoses pending in the courts, for said dismissal is not within its sole power and discretion. (Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744, Dec. 9, 1998 [Panganiban])

DELEGATION OF POWERS

Potestas delegatas non delegari potest

What has been delegated cannot be further delegated.

Sec. 23, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 23.(1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

(2)In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

Delegation of Emergency Powers to the President

Article VI, Sec. 23, Constitution

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

[notes]Conditions for a valid delegation of Emergency Powers to the President:

1) There must be a law

2) There must be a war or other national emergency

other national emergency may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence, or epidemic, typhoon, flood or other similar catastrophe or nationwide proportions or effect

3) The delegation must be for a limited period only

4) The delegation must be subject to Congressional limitations & restrictions

5) The power must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress

Tests of a valid delegation of powerEmpowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority x x x. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. (Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106, March 19, 1997)THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM

The Party-List Law (R.A. No. 7941)

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 136781, Oct. 6, 2000, En Banc [Panganiban]

A simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.

In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives. X x x

Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown x x x that Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.

[NOTES]

Inviolable Parameters in Party List System (Republic Act No. 7941)

1) The twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.

2) The two percent threshold - only those garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives.

3) The three seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.4) Proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes." Method of Allocating PL Seats

a) Rank all the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received.

b) The ration for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system.

c) All the parties with at least 2% of the total votes cast for PLS are guaranteed one seat each. (Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats)

Formula: Allocation of Additional Seats

Divide the votes received by a party who is entitled to a Qualifying Seat (QS) by the total number of votes cast in favor of the party who received the highest number of votes cast under the party-list, then multiply it to the number of seat to which the latter is entitled.

Formula for determining Additional Seats of 1st party (with highest votes)

Number of votes of First Party = Proportion of votes of

Total votes for the Party List System FP relative to votes of PLS

Rules:

a) If proportion is greater than 6% - entitled to 2 AS

b) If proportion is between 4% to 6% - entitled to 1 AS

c) If proportion is less than 4% - NOT entitled to AS

Formula for determining AS of other qualified parties

Number of votes of party entitled to QS x # of AS of 1st party

Total votes cast of 1st Party

( Do away with fractional representation

Formula for determining No. of Party List Representatives

Number of District Representatives = No. of PLR

4

Ang Bagong Bayani OFW labor Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, En Banc [Panganiban]

The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the States benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. The party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. Guidelines for screening Party-List Participants

1) The political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interest, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.

2) While even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives. In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented.

3) In view of the objections directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x Furthermore, the Constitution provides that religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. (Sec. 2 [5], Article IX [C]) The prohibition was explained by a member of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: [T]he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party.

4) A party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:

1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;

2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

3) It is a foreign party or organization;

4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it had registered.

Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become members of the House of Representatives. A party or organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.

5) The party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organization to be elected to the House of Representatives.

6) The party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. x x x

7) Not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties. Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.8) While lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. x x x PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES

Sec. 11, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 11.A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Feb. 3, 2000, En Banc [Ynares-Santiago]

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives x x x arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION

Sec. 21, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 21.The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

Legislative Contempt

ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO [G.R. No. L-3820. July 18, 1950.]

No person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.

Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to the subject of the inquiry, subject of the course to his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.

The materiality of a question that it may be propounded to a witness is determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation.

AUTHORITY OF EITHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO COMMIT A WITNESS FOR CONTEMPT BEYOND PERIOD OF LEGISLATIVE SESSION. There is no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. While the existence of the House of Representatives is limited to four years, that of the Senate is not so limited. The Senate is a continuing body which does not ceases to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted.

Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self. The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone. As held in Jean L. Aznault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member. Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in its judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.

The critical element is the existence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that over-balances any private rights affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly."

THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

Secs. 18 and 19, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 18.There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.

SECTION 19.The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.

Guingona v. Gonzales [G.R. No. 106971. October 20, 1992.]The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a majority representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can by sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power. No party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule. To allow it to elect more than its proportional share of members is to confer upon such a party a greater share in the membership in the Commission on Appointments and more power to impose its will on the minority, who by the same token, suffers a diminution of its rightful membership in the Commission.

THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS

Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 17.The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

Bondoc v. Pineda [G.R. No. 97710. September 26, 1991.]As judges, the members of the House Electoral Tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal.

Aquino v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400, Sept. 18, 1995, En Banc [Kapunan]

Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members. The electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House only when the latter become members of either the Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives subject to Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution. While the proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec. 6 of RA. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner's contention that "after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral exercise from the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the question of qualification" finds no basis in law, because even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of candidates.

Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300, Sept. 18, 1995, En Banc [Kapunan]

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

Guerrero v. COMELEC, 336 SCRA 458, July 26, 2000, En Banc [Quisumbing]While the COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by Farias is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives (HRET). Under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. Thus, the COMELEC's decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in deference to the HRET's own jurisdiction and functions.

Libanan v. HRET, 283 SCRA 520, Dec. 22, 1997 [Vitug] (No appeal from Decisions of the Electoral Tribunal)

The Constitution mandates that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall each, respectively, be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members.

The Court has stressed that x x x so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. The power granted to the Electoral Tribunal x x x excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.

The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in exceptional cases. In Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780), the Court has explained that while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference, the Court may do so, however, but only in the exercise of this Courts so-called extraordinary jurisdiction x x x upon a determination that the Tribunals decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero (Morrero v. Bocar [66 Phil. 429]), upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.

The Court does not x x x venture into the perilous area of correcting perceived errors of independent branches of the Government; it comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution itself calls for remedial action.

POWER OF EACH HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO ADOPT RULES OF PROCEDURE

Sec. 16, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 16.(1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.

Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.

(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268, Aug. 14, 1997 [Mendoza]The cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the right of private individuals. In Osmena v. Pendatun (109 Phil. At 870-871), it was held: At any rate, courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate that action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.

It must be realized that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on the part of the courts to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. Courts must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise their power.

THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

Bills That Shall Originate Exclusively in the House of Representatives

Sec. 25, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law

(2)No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

(3)The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.

(4)A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposed therein.

(5)No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, b