nicholas greenwood onuf-world of our making_ rules and rule in social theory and international...

8/18/2019 Nicholas Greenwood Onuf-World of Our Making_ Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Studies in International Relations) (1989).pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/nicholas-greenwood-onuf-world-of-our-making-rules-and-rule-in-social-theory 1/168

Worldof Our Making



Studies in lnternationalRelationsCharles W. Keoley, Jr., and DonaldJ. puchala,Series Editors

WORLDOF OURMAKING:Rules and Rule in Social Theoryand InternationalRelations

by NicholasGreenwood Onuf

Universityof South CarolinaPress

MarvinS. SoroosBeyond Sovereignty: The Challengeof Gtobat poticy

ManusI. MidlarskyThe Disintegrationof potiticalSystems:War and Revolutionin Comparátive ierspectiveLloydJensenBargainingfor NationalSecurity:The Postwor DisarmamentNegotiations

LloydJensenNegotiolingforNuclear ArmsControl

1le H. Ferguson and RichardW. MansbachThe Elusiveeuest:Theory and Internationat potitics

WilliamR. ThompsonOn Global War:HistoricalStructuralApproaches to Worldpotitics

BenjaminA.Mostand HarveyStarrInquiry,Logicand Internationatpotitics

t l t



Copyright@ Universityof South Carolina 1989

Published in Columbia,South Carolina, by theUniversityoÍ South Carolina Press

ManuÍactured in the United States oÍ America

Libraryof Congress Cataloging-in-PublicationData

Onuf , Nicholas Greenwood.World of ourmaking: rules and rule in socialtheory and

internationalrelations / by Nicholas GreenwoodOnuf'p. cm.-(Studies in internationalrelations)

Bibliography:p.lncludes index.lsBN0-87249-626-0.-ISBN0-87249-680-5 (pbk.)1. lnternatlonalrelations-Philosophy'l. Title.ll.Series:

Studles ln lnternationalrelations (Columbia,S.C.)JX1245.0581989327' .01 * dc20 89-14814

crP

tI uNryrnsrvI

l:uuiï'jq,:l$rtz+íbsÍnn

.,

.:. -i :.{ Iri:

.:ji l t:rgil ffi '' ffiWi

For Sandra

.$.ì"r

Ìq'\4,

i-

''[J'ütì



Ì'rí j' Ì ' ff l

CONTENTS

Editors'Preface

Preface

INTRODUCTIONThe QuestParadigmsPlan of the Book

PART 1: RULESChapter1: ConstructivismIn the BeginningWittgenstein's Place

Structuration

Chapter 2: Law and LanguagePositivismThe Limitsof kgal TheoryPerformative Language

Chapter 3: Cognition,Judgment, CultureCognitiveUniversals

Competence withRulesCulturalDifferences

Chapter 4: The Problemof OrderLawand OrderRegimesRhetoricand Privilege

lx

xl

I2

t227

33353643

52

66677278

9697

n0t20

l2'l128144155

I

l



vilt Gontents

PART 2:RULEChapter 5: The Presumption of AnarchyLiberalismVirtue,Rights, MannersAnarchy Emptiedof Content

Chapter 6: PoliticalSociety (withFrankHerrschaftHegemony, Hierarchy, HeteronomyRules of the Game

Chapúer 7: WorldPoliticsSkillsPower PoliticsVoices of Modernity

Chapter 8: Rationalityand ResourcesComparisonMeans, Ends,and InterestsExploitation

Synoptic Table

References

Index

E

161163164169185

Klink) 196197206219

228229237248

2582s8270283

290

297

329

EDITORSOPREFACE

The pace of global change has accelerated greatlyin the last decadesof the twentiethcentury, and new problems ocurringunder novelconditionsare challenging the academic studyof InternationalRela-tions. There is today a renaissance in scholarship directedtowardenhancing our understanding of worldpolitics, globaleconomics,and foreign policy.To examine the transformedstructure of the inter-national system and the expanded agenda of globalaffairs, research*ers are introducingnew concepts, theories, and analyticmodes. Knowl-edge is expanding rapidly.

Our goal in this series of books is to record the findingsof recentinnovativeresearch in InternationalRelations, andmake these readilyavailable to a broader readership of professionals and students. Con-tributorsto the series are leadingscholars who are expert in particu-lar subfields of the discipline.Their contributionsrepresent the mostrecent work located at the discipline'sresearch frontiers.Topics, sub-

jects, approaches, methods and analyticaltechniques vary fromvol-ume to volumein the series, as each book is intended as an originalcontributionin the broadest sense. Commonto allvolumes,however,are carefulresearch and the excitementof new discovery.

Worldof Our Making isa major contributionto contemporarysocial science. We welcome it to our series of new studies in Interna-tional Relations because it is most fundamentallyconcerned withpeople and peoples, how theyrelate to one another and why beinghuman compels themto relate as they do. Yet Nicholas Onuf'swork

flF i ffiffi&**



ït

Editors'PreÍace

is anything but a standard treatise on InternationalRelations.Savefor its poignantpassages of criticismdirected at much that thesedays is called"theory"in InternationalRelations, Worldof OurMakingis more basicallyconcerned withthe sources of peoples' be-havior discoverable in primalstructures and processes of humanthinking.Allhuman behavior,Onufsuggests, is bounded by rules

of syntax and logicwhich influencecognitionand ultimatelyaffectall levels of individualand collectivebehavior, includinginterna-tionalbehavior. Formulatinga theory of InternationalRelationsthen is most properlyaciomplished by seekingout these fundamen-tal rules, explainingtheir sources and elaborating theirimplications.This is preciselywhat NicholasOnufdoes in this volumeby drawingtogether, and expanding, the insightsof a vast array of thinkersfrommany disciplines.Reading Worldof Our Makingis both anemotionallyexciting andan intellectuallyrewarding experience. Thedesignation "monumental"scarcely describesOnuf's accomplishment.

Donald J. Puchala and CharlesW. Kegley, Jr.

PREFACE

In this worldof our making,scholarship is social construction,and any piece of scholarship has many authors. Most ofthe authorsof this bookI cannot name because I do not remember who they

are and how theyhelped. The influenceof others I acknowledge byreference to theirwritten workas the book proceeds. A fewpeoplehave made contributionsI cannot forgetand deeply appreciate.

Amongthem were my teachers. As I worked on this book,I re-peatedly encountered the names of Frederic Lane, Maurice Mandel-baum, and HillisMiller.These scholars were teachers of mine re-spectively in History,Philosophyand Literature duringmy firstyearat Johns HopkinsUniversity.They and their likeprovidedme witha matchless introductionto the worldof scholarship. Later, otherteachers made more specificcontributionsto thiswork.Robert Tirckerintroduced me to InternationalRelations as a field ofstudy and thentaught me how to read closely. George Liskaimparted botha loveof theoryand a viewof internationalrelations that findsit clearestexpression in the last pages of chapter 6. Harold Lasswell'sandMyres McDougal'sshared concern forcategories and classificatoryschemes pervades this book. KarlDeutsch's adviceto distinguishbe-tween constitutionand regulation for the purposes of a paper I waswritingforhimproved to be a bomb witha verylong fuse. It goesoffin chapter L A paper I wrote for Robert Osgoodsaw the first,tentative articulationof one of chapter 8's major themes.

Louis Henkin's invitation toaddress a seminar at ColumbiaUni-



xtl PreÍace

versityearly in 1982 prompted my firstsketch of what was to be-come the book's conceptual structure.Worksubsequently undertakenwithSpike Peterson decisivelyadvanced this structure,withchapter4 one consequence. Ather urging, Ialso engaged postpositivistsocialtheory seriously and foundmyselfrethinkingmost of my scholarlyconvictions. Chapter I is only themost tangibleresult. FriedrichKratochwiland I discussed issues raised in chapter 2 on many oc-casions, always to my benefit.His support andcriticalassistancealso made a mark on chapters 5 and 6. Theodore Couloumbisplayeda similarrole in the developmentof chapter Z as did FrankKlinkin the instance of chapter 8. RobertKeohane's carefulreading ofwhat was to become chapter 5 significantlyaffected the finalver-sion. A remark of his about the project overall, and a similar remarkof Peter Cowhey's, both made at a criticaljuncture, clarified formechoices I had yet to make about the book's formand thrust. Neitherof them willfindme havingchosen as they recommended.

I am gratefulto Fouad Ajamiand my brother Peter Onuffor theirencouragement over the course of my labors. Bothread the fulltext,

and Peter most of its pieces before their assembly. My wifeSandraKeowen andJason Wittenbergalso read the fulltext, and in so doingprovidedme withindispensable editorialassistance. TimothyBuch,KurtBurch,WilliamOlson and,as readers for the UniversityofSouth CarolinaPress, FritzKratochwil(again),Donald Puchala,and R. B. J. Walker all made useful suggestions for the finalrevision.I must also acknowledge theinnumerableways in which mygradu-ate students at AmericanUniversityshaped my thoughts on so manyof this book's concerns.

Muchof the materialin these pages first tookan independentform.AtRaymondDuvall's invitation,I presented a versionof theintroductionat the AmericanPoliticalScience Association's1987Conventionunder the title,'AfterInternational Relations: TheCon-stitutionof Disciplinesand Their Worlds."Substantial parts of chap-ter 2 firstappeared in 1985 under the title,"DoRules Say rWhatTheyDo? From OrdinaryLanguage to InternationalLaw,"Harvard Inter-nationol LswJournsl26:385-410.They are copied withpermission.Copyrighto 1988 by the President and Fellowsof Harvard College.Chapter 3 incorporates materialfirstappearing in 1987 in HumanDevelopment30: 257-267, under the title,"Rules in MoralDevelop-ment." Reprintingis withthe permissionof S. KargerA.G., Basel.

Preface

A smallgrant fromthe College of Public and InternationalAffairs,AmericanUniversity,expedited the developmentof chapter 3.

Chapter 5 grew out of my comments onpapers presented by Hay-ward Alkerand Richard Ashley at the Griffithkcture Series, Schoolof InternationalService,American Universityin 1986. Anotherver-sion willappear in a volume entitledAfterAnarchy, with AlkerandAshley its editors. Chapter 6 first tookthe formof a paper FrankKlinkand I presented to the InternationalStudies Association's1986 Convention. Muchof it is appearing this year inlhe Internu-tionalStudies Quarterly under the title 'Anarchy, Authority,Rule."Anonymous reviewersand RickAshley, as one of the journal's editors,deserve credit for many improvementsin the published versions ofthis material. Chapter7 began as a presentation before a postgradu-ate seminar in the LawSchoolof the AristotelianUniversityofThessaloniki,Greece. Anotherversionwas to have appeared in theHellenicReviewof InternationqlRelations, whichhas regrettaplyceased publication.Excerpts from Goethe's Faust, Part I, translatedby Randall Jarrell,are reprintedby permission of Farrar, Straus and

Giroux,Inc. Copyright1959, 1961, 1965, 1973byMary von SchraderJarrell.I thank Charles Kegley and Don Puchala for their invitationearly

in 1984 to undertake a bookfor the Series in InternationalRelationswhichthey edit for the Universityof South Carolina Press. TèdCouloumbisand DimitriConstantopoulosprovidedme withsuperbworkingcircumstances in Thessalonikiin the fallof 1984, and AmalJayawardane and StanleyV/ijesunderadid the same in Colombo,SriLanka, duringthe firstsix months of 1987. Wherever I have workedon this book,my wifeSandi made the circumstances ideal.

xill

á l ' t



"* '

Worldof Our Making

i



It is written,"Inthe beginning was the Word "AlreadyI have to stop \ü/ho'llhelp me on?

It's impossible to put such trust in the lWordI must translate some other wayIfI am trulyenlightened by the spirit.It is written:"Inthe beginning was the Thought "Thinkhard of that firstline,Make sure that your pen does not outrunitselfIs it the Thoughtthat moves and creates everything?It should be: "Inthe beginning was the Power "Yet even as I writeit down,Alreadysomething warns me not to keep it.

The spirithelps me Allat once I see the answerAnd writeconfidently,"Inthe beginning was the Deed "

Johann Wolfgangvon GoetheFaust (1976: 62)

INTRODUCTION

The point of this bookis to rç.constr.ucta self-consciouslyorga-nized fieldof study, or discipline,called InternationalRelations. ïbdõTOT ree*sdrïji"ltrvolvesreconsiderationo f internationalrelationsas something to study.t I use the term 'íreconstruct" deliberately,both because my goal is ambitiousand because I am committed toa philosophical position,detailed in chapter l, whichI call "con-structivism."In my view, people always construct, or constitute, so- r

cialreality,even as their being, whichcan onlybe social, is con- '

structed for them.2In order to show how, why, and in what degree I part company

withother scholars, I begin this introductionwitha briefconstruc-tion oftheir endeavors. This I do firstby definingthe terms "poli-tics"and "internationalrelations"and then by showing that theirroutine sense constitutes PoliticalScience and InternationalRelationsas disciplines.By presenting an informalhistoryof International Re-lations and then, more abstractly, the properties of disciplines, I situ-

ate myself inrespect to my own disciplineand its constitutivepremises.

For convenience, disciplines andfields of study willalways be designated in theUpper Case, their subjects of concern in the lower case.Hereafter I willuse the terms "construct"and "constitute"interchangeably.Thisis the usual practice of scholars taking apositionlikemine.



Rules and Rule in SocialTheory

FinallyI state my difficultieswiththe disciplineas constituted andannounce an alternative.The rest of the book is givenover to thisalternative.

THEQUEST

The term "internationalrelations"is generallyunderstood to be lack-ing in precise definition.Nevertheless, it would seem to have a coremeaning both in ordinarylanguage and current scholarship. "Inter-national relations"refers to an ensemble of activities that is recogniz-ably politicaldespite its sweep and diffuseness. Activitiesare politi-cal when membersof a social unitconstrue those activities tobe themost importantones engaging their attention. When those activitiesextend beyond the immediate,established locale withinwhichmem-bers of a social unit ordinarilyact on theirurgent concerns, interna-tionalrelations result. \

I am not aware that any one scholar has proposed just this definitionof politics.On the contrary, I findmyself chastizedfor its vague-ness and context dependence; it cannot be made operational (com-pare Connolly1974: 15-17).The same can be said of many otherdefinitionsof the term. Tâke Vernon Van Dyke's:

Activityis politicalwhen it relates to a publicissue, and it re-lates to a public issue when two conditionsare met. In the firstplace, it must relate to the decision makingof a group, i.e., itmust concern group policy, group organization, or group lead-ership, or it must concern the regulationof intergrouprela-tions. In the second place, it must comewithinthe realm ofthe controversial(1960: 133).

Surely everyone agrees that politicsare a social activity.Thus forVan Dyke,politics"must relate to the decision making of a group. . . ."He went on to say that politicsreside in "the realm of the contro-versial."Not allcontroversies yieldto decision. Ïb say, as is oftensaid, that not decidingis indeed a way of decidingis to rob the term"decision"of any content. Rather, we quite often speak as if failureto decide identifieswhat iscontroversial for any group. Further-

lntroduction

more, politicsmay well concern"the regulation of intergroup rela-tionships,"but, in Van Dyke's terms, decisionis a group,and notan intergroup,activity.

Problems raised by Van Dyke's attempt to specifyconditionsneces-sary forpoliticsdisappear ifone resorts instead to importanceasa criterionof politicalactivity.We know that any givèü"Ëô"üË'tates

matters to be importantwhen controversyattends them. We knowthat mattersare importantwhen groups establish sites and methodsfordeciding them.Whilecontroversy and establishedvenues for de-cision are undoubtedly the two most reliableclues that politicsarepresent in people's affairs,we can hardly suppose that they exhaustthe possible manifestations of politics.Noticealso that words andphrases like"controversy"and "established venues for decision"foster the illusionof concreteness withoutbeing any less vague orcontext dependent than the term "importance"(compare Van Dyke1970: 135 on the term "institution").

Does Van Dyke's moregeneral definitionof politicsas activityrelating to publicissues do better? The term"issue" wouldseem tosubstitute for"controversy"as wellas for matters available for groupdecisionwithoutany great change in specificity.The term"public"adds nothing if it does no more than describe a group. I suspect thatVan Dyke had something more in mind. Nevertheless, what one canmean by "public"-beyondthat connoted by reference to matterssubject to decision, controversy,that which is at issue or matters ofimportance to members of a social unit-Icannot begin to say.

I knowof two alternativedefinitionsof "politics"that avoid theproblem of vagueness. One findsany social unit'spoliticsconfinedto formallyand specificallydesignated sites and methods for decid-ing important matters-governmentand law in the usual sense. Theother findspoliticsin everything social.In the firstinstance, pre-cision is achieved by excluding activitiesas sweeping and diffuseas

those covered by the term "internationalrelations." In the second,precision is offsetby the mass and diversityof those activitiesthatare included. Iocatingpoliticsbetween these poles is both necessaryand contentious.

Disagreement over theterm "politics"suggests the relativity ofitssubject. Myrecourse to the criterionof importancesuggests thesame. Yet acknowledgment that politicsare relativeneed not betaken as capitulationto the positionthat everythingsocial is politi-



Rules and Rule inSocialTheory

cal. On thisI concur withWilliam E.Connolly(1974: 13-15) andFred M.Frohock(1979: 860-862). Politics is a"cluster concept."3As such it has a limitednumber of "structuralfeatures" identifiedby "core terms"(Frohock 1979: 865). Frohock foundtwo such terms,"directiveness"and "aggregation" (pp. 865-867).

Obviouslymy definitionincludes the second of these terms. Onlyin aggregates can people practicepolitics.I am also persuaded bythe first term, "directiveness,"whichforFrohock"denotes agents act-ing on one another, 'directing'oneanother's behavior" (1979: 865),but not by his explicationof it.a Frohockheld that directiveness

is suggested by traditionalconcerns for power, authority, inthe history ofpoliticalthought, butalso describes more moderntransactions likebargaining, gaming (actionin conditionsofno-authority),providingrational incentives..., control ofagendas and general social conditions. 'Directiveness'also con-cerns human behaviororiginatingin both decisions and non-decisions, where the lattercan accommodate tradition,habit,unconscious behavior

ingeneral (mapscan give'directions,'

for example), as wellas that species of politicsemphasized oflate . . . where people act upon one another by not makingde-cisions whichcould transformsome state of affairs (p. 865,twocitationsdeleted, his emphases).

The difficultywithFrohock's attempt at specificityis inclusiveness.Everything is thrownin, from"general social conditions"to "un-

3. Both Connollyand Frohockdiscussed the concept of "cluster concept" in thecontext ofW. B. Gallie'sinfluentialidea that some concepts, includingmany thatare political(his examples are democracy and justice), are "essentiallycontested"(1962). Gallieargued that one of the conditions definingsuch concepts is thatthey derive "froman originalexemplarwhose authorityis acknowledged byallthe contestant users of the concept" (p. 131). While this conditioneffectivelyde-limitscontested concepts, it does so too narrowly.The clusteringof invocationsand applications to whicha given concept may be subjected can have other bases.

4. AlthoughI am persuaded by Frohock's criterionof directiveness, I willabstainafter the discussion athand fromusing the word"directive"or any of its cognatesas he did. Thisis to avoid confusionwith the terms "directivespeech act" and"directive-rule,"whichI introduce in chapter 2 and use extensively thereafter.

lntroduction

conscious behavior in general'(my emphases). I-ost is any conceiv-able gain fromthe kindof terms that Van Dykeand I have used.

The term"directiveness"can help, however, if itis taken to ex-clude much of what Frohock included. Membersof an aggregationtell, or somehow makeit known, whatothers in that aggregationshould do.They can do the tellingdifç-çl,ly,as the authorityof "thehistory ofpoliticalthought"directs us to believe, or indirectly,throughcontrollingagendas, deciding what maps should say, and so on. Ifdirectingis at the core of politics, it is because some or all membersof a social unit treat some matter as importantenough to expendresources to affect the dispositionof that matter. Directionresultswhen some member or members prevail.What they say serves as adirection to others, withconsequences that we think ofas mappingthe directionin which a mattergoes.

The nexus of directingand direction,givingand taking,suggeststhat politicshas to do withcontests of willsor, as Van Dykeem-phasized, struggle-"struggleamong actors pursuing conflictingdesires on publicissues" (1960: l3l;see also p. l3a). It suggests that

contestants use resources to prevail. In popularunderstanding andmost treatments of internationalrelations, power and struggleareinextricableelements of politics.(Consider the titleof Hans J. Mor-genthau's legendary textbook:Politicsamong Nations,The Strugglefor Power and Peace, 1948.) Finally,the directivenessof politicssug- ,

gests that contests and consequences are asymmetrical.Some mem- ;

bers of a social unitprevailmore often than others do, and theyU"n.-|fitmore fromhaving doneso.This last conclusion is difficultto resist insofar as politicsis under-

stood mainlyby reference to specificinstitutions likethe state. It isresisted when such institutionsare not inevidence, internationalrela-tions beinga case in point. Since these activitiesescape the confine-ment of established venues, collisionsof willsand endless contestsmake for uncertaintyamong the diverse people affected by themand fosteran unwillingnessby at least some of those affected to ac-cept the consequences. As mostpeople see it, the result is plenty ofstruggle but littleof the stable asymmetry impliedby politics'di-rectiveness. Dependingon one's perspective, internationalrelationsare politicsat the limit,perhaps the limitingcase of politics,perhapsbeyond.

The ambiguous way in whichpoliticsand internationalrelations

\




come together is not just a matter of sloppy usage or popularmis-understanding. Scholars reproduce this ambiguitywhen theyreferto international relationsin terms of decentralization,self-help, andespeciallyof late, anarchy.5 These terms are nearly synonymous,con-veyingas they do the same two notions. First, international relations

/ forma.bquud-e3*aç3"*4-rAqr.*çLf-v"9.S*o.Si*l,f"gli y.Second, what makes

this particularset of social relationsdistinctiveis that they are m_ani-/eçtly_p_e_l4içalqpn t_treqgb_qif9_cJ_'f9t_9_9-l_i1-tit1ru{gsts-e1t-l-e_il_n-otto" he-found. As PoliticalScientists are wontto say, the element of

authorityis lacking.,, PoliticalScience is a disciplinemarked byits preoccupation withl[,relationsof authority-stableand accepted asymmetries in capaci-\ ties and outcomes. One need only recall DavidEaston's extraordi-Inarilyinfluentialdecree that "politicalscience be described as thelstudy of the authoritativeallocationof values for a society" (1953:

ItZg;t.. also later in this chapter). Most scholars whodevote their'attentionto internationalrelations are trainedin PoliticalScience.Yet they profess to work in a disciplineof their own'one whichis

onlya few decades old. The insecuritiesofyouth are compounded

by ambiguous relations withneighboringdisciplines.Stanley Hoff-mann has suggested that the need to be free fromHistoryand Lawwhilemaintainingproprietary interests in diplomatichistoryand in-ternational law inspired earlydisciplinaryclaims (1977 44).I wouldadd to this the need to be free of PoliticalScience whileprofessingthat internationalrelations, as a bounded and distinctivesocial re-ality, is nevertheless manifestly political'

At least in the United States, most scholars identifyingthemselveswithInternationalRelations hold appointments in departments ofPoliticalScience. Manymore of these scholars are active membersof the AmericanPoliticalScience Associationthan of the AmericanHistoricalAssociationor the AmericanSocietyof InternationalLaw.They are more frequently members of editorialboards of scholarlyjournals in PoliticalScience than in Historyor Law. In these circum-stances, we could reasonably expect that in recent decades scholars

5. Illustratively:"Internationalsystems are decentralized and anarchic"(Waltz 1979:88)."Self-helpisnecessarilytheprincipleofactioninananarchicorder"(p.lll).

6 lntroduction

of internationalrelations have been more mindfulof their uncom-fortablyinitimaterelation to PoliticalScience than of theirdistant,occasional, even opportunisticassociation withother disciplines,in-cludingAnthropology,Psychology,and Sociology.

The situation is less clear outside the United States. In Britain,forexample, Historyand Lawhave always appealed to scholars within-

terests in internationalrelations. Nevertheless,as

Hoffmann(1917)

so forcefullydemonstrated, InternationalRelations is substantiallyan Americandiscipline.As such, its initiativesand achievements, de-tours and disappointmentsare the work of a small band of scholars.They share many assumptions, not least about politicsand PoliticalScience. They findin each other support and solace, and they followeach other likezigzagging shoals of minnows.

To a degree unmatched in the proliferationof disciplinesin themodern university,InternationalRelations was shaped fromthe be-ginningby the exhortationsand example of one scholar-the sameHans Morgenthauwhose textbookI remarked on a page or twoback. Morgenthau's lastinggifts to the disciplinewere two. One washis p_re-o_c--c.up_4t _ojt.ül-t"bSlg-s -ç.q"glp91Wç,1agdinterest (see further inchaptéis 7 and 8), whichwrested a piece of politicsfor the new disci-pline.The second was his commitmentto "scientificinquiry. . ."(1948: 4; see also Hoffmann1917: 44).

The firsteditionof Politicsamong Nations fails to mentiontheoryspecifically.Morgenthau nevertheless saw theory as the centerpieceof scientificinquiry."science is theoretical, or it is nothing"(1959):16). Thus the opening words of a later editionof Politicsamong Na'/lons.' "Thisbookpurports to present a theory of internationalpoli-tics"(1967: 3).

Morgenthau held that "a scientifictheory is a system of empiri-1

callyverifiable,general truths, sought for theirown sake" (1959: 16). IHe believed in objective"lawsof politics"and "in the possibilityof I

developinga rationaltheory that reflects,however imperfectlyandonesidedly, these objective laws"(p. 4). Thisis, as Hoffmannob-served in 1960, "theory as a set of answers" (p. 30)' Morgenthaupre-sented no such theory. Instead his "peremptorypronouncements . . .

incited readers to react and by reacting, criticizing,correcting,refut-ing, to hold ontoother designs. He was both a goad and a foil"(Hoffmann1977:45).Theory as a set of questions invited alterna-tiveassumptions, more rigorousformulations,the kindof science

ì;I'i.i1'ir rií' r{




that Morgenthau did not himself pursue. Onlythen coulda better,clearer set of answers eventuate and the promise of a disciplinebefulfilled(Hoffmann1960: 40).

I Hoffmannlater called this complexresponse to Morgenthau"theI quest for certainty"(197'7:57).For Hoffmann,this quest is specificallylan American concern.Peoples withlonger histories anda less self-

iconscious willto change the worldare less likely totake up the quest.

rFor James N. Rosenau, "the restless quest" (although,properly speak-ing, scholars are restless, not the quest) is shared by allthose whoengage in science, whatever their specificdisciplinaryconcerns (1976:l). Restlessness defines the enterprise. For Yale H. Ferguson andRichard W. Mansbâch, the vicissitüdeS-oTinternational relationsareresponsible for "the elusive quest," as their bookis entitled(1988).Althoughit is the goal of theory, not the "quest for theory"(p. 3),that eludes us, their point is clear:The comfortsof theoryas a setof answers, and withit a tidydiscipline,seem farther away now,fortyyears later, than they ever did (see, forexample, pp.23-24).

Not every scholar holdingforth on the subject speaks of quest.To me the metaphor hints that theoryis a holygrail.Once found,it willgive us some kind oftranscendental knowledge that I for one

, do not believe is possible (see chapter l). Yet I share withalmostI everyone committed to the disciplinea sense of disarray and loss of, well being, toparaphrase K. J. Holsti(1985: l-2).Howhave we got-

ì r, ten here?' Even to ask this question is to invitethe charge of historicism,thepresumptionthat historyis goingsomewhere in particular(Mandel-baum l97l:4l-138).I risk this charge to followthe convenienthistori-cist practice of breaking up historyintoepochs. For thispurpose,I start, as Hoffmannhas (1977:43-47), withthe Second World Warand the response in the UnitedStates to its end. The discipline'sformativeperiod,dominated bythe redoubtable figure of Morgen-

thau, continued forabout a decade. (See also Liska1966: 5; Olsonl97lused a differentperiodization,retained by Olson and Onuf1986, noting twopriorphases in "an emerging discipline,"p. 6) Thenext period, 1955-1965, GeorgeLiska aptlycalled "the heroic decade"(1966). If the "firstdecade was one of discovery," then the second"was one of heroic effortat conquest . . ." (p. 5). The conquerorswere few in number and mostlyyounger scholars. Each proposed ahighlygeneralized account of the way that internationalrelations

lntroduction

work.Each account was unrelated to the others. Yet each was heldto get at the core of internationalrelations.

This was a time of high hopes. Liska, himselfone of the decade'sheroes and writingat its end, eloquentlycaptured both thehopesand soon to be realized fears of the time.

Here was an effort tobreak through to a really new mode,level, and scope of theoretical investigation which wouldmakeconventionalstyles of analysis and generalizationobsolete andwouldliftinternational relationsto the self-same exact andsocial sciences by whichnew approaches were largely inspired.The problem from the outset was how to connect refined andrigorous abstractformulationswiththe crude and contingentdata of internationalrelations, to produce new insights and ex-planationsrather than elaborately overlaidrestatements andtautologies, and to do so withreference to questions and datawhichwere at once amenable to the new techniques of inquiryand intrinsicallysignificant(p. 6).

The decade from1965 to 1975 saw proliferatingefforts to copewiththe problemLiska foresaw. Inevitablyattention turnedfromtheory tomethods. Coincidentallysúbstantial funding and poweifulcomÈúìinÉ'maehinerybecame available in the United States to sup-port empiricallydirected research into internationalrelations. Suchtheoryas we find is carefullybounded. For example, Dina Zinnes(1976) elaborated formalmodels of arms races. Robert Jervis (1976)ransacked social psychology for hypotheses on misperception. Ineach instance, formal rigor orempiricalcredibilitywas achieved bylocating theoryat the edge of what Morgenthau had heldto be thediscipline'score concerns. Under the influenceof Thomas S. Kuhn'sdepictionof "normalscience" (1970a), many scholars saw themselvesengaged in"purzzlesolving"and identified"the cumulationof knowl-edge" as theirprimaryconcern (Rosenau 1976a:145-215).

The nextdecade, 1975-1985, is one in whichfundingfor largeresearch projectsevaporated and interest in problemsof methoddiminished.There was also a modest revivalof theory. The intrusionof doubt in the United States about Morgenthau'sviewof the world,long ensconced in publicpoliry,played a part in this change (Fergu-son and Mansbach 1987: 104-106).The Americandisciplineof In-



lntroduction

is to deny the disciplineany directionat all. Sensing stasis' a fewscholars have begun to test the criticalcurrents washing through the '

rest of the social sciences.Conspicuous among them is RichardK.Ashley, who has emerged

as championof a "criticalsocial theory of iniernationalpolitics"that is,BggjgfggÍ.313li*-i]gl"p_lt*jlg"( I e 8 7, I 9 8 8 ). Po ststru cturalism

céntèiiìïïÌretièli6éiâièlvprovocativeworkof twoFrench writers,

MichelFoucault and Jacques Derrida,.andhas become especiallyprominent in literary criticismin the United States. Poststructuralistcriticsuse "language against itself,"a practice Derrida called "decon-str-qglioq"(see Norris1982 fòr a úseful introduction,quotingherefroma chapter title,p. l8).As willbecome clearer in the next chap-ter, poststructuralismrep-udiateg he-$99P9 -t*?:ly-*P.L1-9nsof-Westernrationalismand all that is builtupon them. Given that all is built,on'*otaràna wittrwóidi,dèconsiruction ií ttre methòd ôf choiceiin pursuing this extraordinaryreversal.

One of the crowningachievements of the West over the past severalcenturies is the edifice of theory:theoryas an idea and objective,theory as an ettìèifiïise, thèoiias an economicstatement of whatwe thinkwe know aboutthe worldand ourselves, theory as thegrounds for judgment.Much,most of whatpoststructuralists andindeed most postpositivists have to say against this edifice is welltaken. I sqbsc-{lglo- t- -w.lthgptgtu*ip-g-.qtt-ç.9op.9ìusionthat the ïquest for ìóménna of theorymust be abandoned. Thus I take to ',Ëãáii rou.uurt;s injunctionto ;dirp.nr"with'things;"(see the quota- 'i

tion introducingpart I),not just as a criticalstrategy, but as a guide-lineforconstitutinga social theoryof internationalpolitics.

This is where Ashleyand I differ.For allhis talkof theory, Ashleycannot do theorywithoutdoingwhat is incorrigiblyimplicated inthe Western projecthe wouldcast off.The best he can achieve is"a view fromafar, from uphigh"(1987: 408). I thinkit would help

to quote at length the passage in whichthese words appear.

Eschewing any claimto secure grounds, the appropriate pos-ture wouldaspire to an overviewof internationalhistory in themaking,a viewfromafar, a viewup high. The appropriateposture is disposed to a viewvery much likethat of MichelFoucault's genealogical attitude:"a formof historywhich ac-counts for the constitutionof knowledge, discourses, domains

1í10 Rules and Rule in SocialTheory

ternational Relations opened up to a larget previouslyuncongenialworldof ideas on how international relations take place and what ac-tivitiesthey properly encompass. Terms like"dependency," "world-system,",,interdependence," and "transnational relations"were muchdiscussed.

The late 1970s amplified the incoherence of competingtheoreticalorientationsleftover fromthe heroic decade. Perhaps in responseto thisincoherence, and certainlyin response to widelyheld anxietiesabout the changing positionof the united States in the world(Fergu-son and Mansbach 1988: 106-107),many scholars returned to Mor-genthau's visionof politicsnot beholden to authorityas the core ofinternationalrelations. That core was enlarged by recognition thatm41l-eë-gÍT-qleTJ are indubitablvpoliticaland stiffened bv a re-newe-e-.p--t"l qt.tt"1ò"iQgï.-Tliisïe1go16i6*'*t*l-õriêïtationsecuiãaìmúiiànt, ttróüghhardly simiiãr,expositions fromKennethWaltzand Robert Gilpin(1979 and l98lrespectively)'By theendof this period, we finda younger scholar (Snidal1985a) makingclaimson behalf of theory worthyof the young heroes of an earlier

time (forexamPle, KaPlan196l).while InternationalRelations experienced a revivalof theory be-tween 1975 and 1985, many other branches of intellectualand schol-

1, arly lifeexperienced their own, more spectacular, changes. The com-mon point of departure was a repudiationof the positivistmodelof science as a canonical characterizationof theory and its relationto methods of inquiry.This model had, of course, dominated all thesocial sciences fromthe time of their emergence.as disciplines' orsoon thereafter, untilthe mid-1970s.To read outside of InternationalRelations in recent years is to drinkfrom theswirlingwaters ofpostpositivism.Thisis a heady experience, disorientingin its criticalà$uut1' against established ways of systematic thinkingand refresh-

ing in its challenge to thinkdifferently.

since 1985, most scholars in InternationalRelations seem to havebeen intent on consolidatingthe gains of the preceding decade' Thisentails substantiating availabletheoretical propositions. The prob-lem is to do so withoutthe cost and distraction of returning to the

I methodologicalconcerns of an earlier time. For many of these schol-ï ars, the solution is to undertake case studies and submit them to in-I formalcomparison. They guide their students into doing the same.

I Wtritethere is an attractivemodesty to this kindof activity,its effect



12 Rules and Rule in SocialTheory

of knowledge,etc. withouthaving torefer to a subject, whetherit be transcendental in relation to the fieldof events or whetherit chases its empty identitythroughouthistory."

From a distant genealogical standpoint,what catches theeye is motion,discontinuities,clashes, and the ceaseless playof pluralforces and pluralinterpretationson the surface ofhuman experience. Nothingis finallystable. There are no con-stants, no fixedmeanings, no secure grounds, no profoundsecrets, no finalstructures or limitsof history. Seen fromafar,there is onlyinterpretation,and interpretationitselfis com-prehended as a practice of dominationoccurringon the sur-face of history. Historyitselfis grasped as a series of interpreta-tions imposed on interpretations-none primary,all arbitrary(pp. 408-409,Ashley'semphasis, twoparenthetical referencesto Foucault deleted).

j Evidentlymethod, includinginterpretationas the onlymethod ad-;rmissibleto most postpositivists,must be discarded along withtheory

' lin favorof the viewfromafar. Whatdoes this leave fordealing withithe close at hand? Poststructuralists variouslysuggest politicsas

,r irhetoricalsubversionand play as rhetoricalexercise. Lackinganyf direction, denying theory, parodyingmethod (Megill1985: 227 -231, 284;, these activitieswillnot satisfyeveryone. Norwillthey turnaround a disciplinelike InternationalRelations, which is predicatedon premises quite differentfromLiterature. For the latter, criticismand not politicsis its primaryvocation,and the notion thatonereads forpleasure its deepest claim.

PARADIGMS

Claimsthat international relations are matters of politicsfallingout-side the purviewof PoliticalScience constitute that set of relationsas a bounded and distinctivesocial reality. At the same time, theyconstituteInternationalRelationsas a discipline.There is nothingunusual about this. That alldisciplinesare constituted by claimsofdistinctivenessmakes them conspicuous examples of the general,and more generallydiffused,phenomenon of social constitution.

lntroduction

Claimsconstituting a disciplinedo more than this, however. Theyserve a paradigmatic function.The term "paradigm,"now.'so widelyifcarelessly appropriated fromKuhn(1970a), suggests %_99Lsgg9:_lrpnp:qlejl:lg_Kuhn'sfamous accountof natural science para-digms, such a projectoffersan exclusive communityof scholars a"paradigmtheory"(pp. 26,27) demarcatingthe limitsof their in-terests and a series of puzzles - empirical questions unanswered by

the theoryas initiallyproposed-waitingto be solved.6 Most solu-tions that come along clarifyand strengthen the theory orientingthis kindof activity.This isnormal science. Those not doing socumulativelythreaten the theory's integrity,and conditions are metfor the consolidation of dissonant puzzle solutions under the termsof a new, more powerfulparadigm theory. The process then repeatsitself.

In the natural sciences, theories that plausiblyrepresent realityand allowfor puzzle-solvingorient science; in the social sciences,claims about reality-constitutiveclaims, as argued above-orientpuzzle-solvingas science duly leading to theory.TAtbest the socialsíiéícei Éosijëss-proïoìÏiêõiïes;whíóh -âÈsemble constitutiveclaims

Gary Gutting(1980: 2, 12-13) has called the contents of a Kuhnianparadigm a"super-theory" inasmuch as "a diverse assemblage of law, method and metaphysics"is included (p. 2). WhileI thinkGuttinghas aptlycharacterizedthe contents ofa paradigm, Kuhn meant to separate out laws and their explanation when he re-ferred to theory.RichardBernstein (1978:243-246)has contended that Kuhnnever wanted theoriesto be central to his scheme. When pressed to clarifywhat he had meant by the term"paradigm,"Kuhnidentifiedjust two mutually reinforcingelements: "communitystructure" as shared commitmentsand "exemplars"or shared examples of prob-lem solving.He was careful to say that exemplars are not theories or theory state-ments (laws and rules), but rather "physicalsituations" to whichtheories relate in

an especially revealingway (19?0a: 191). Unhappilythis attempt atprecision weak-

ens Kuhn'smodel ofthe growthof science, because growthcomes not fromchal-lenges to exemplars, but fromexemplars that challenge theory and thereby bringon a revolution,necessarily in theory. In keeping with thismodel,Kuhnelsewhereremarked that "the proto-sciences, likethe arts and philosophy,lack some elementwhich,in the mature sciences, permit some of the more obvious formsof pro-gress. . . . These conditionsare, of course, tantamount to the description of agood scientifictheory"(1970b: 244-246).For a position similarto the one takenhere, see Pocock (1971: l3-14).

13

6.

Ití

7.




in a reasonably coherent doctrine. Yet social science proto-theorieslookenough like thetheories of natural scientists to persuade peoplethat the communitiesof scholars espousing them are warranted intheir disciplinaryclaims and projects. Theyalso providescholars

, witha stock of puzzles.t These same scholars are keenly aware that theirproto-theoriesfail

to providemuch help inrecognizingeitherpuzzle solutions as such

or their role in supporting or challengingthose proto-theories. Theresponse to these limitationsis a quest, the same quest animatingscholarship in InternationalRelations. Each discipline's scholarlycommunityseeks a proper paradigmtheory. Those theories that areproposed are either too narrowor too vague to satisfy. Thereuponfollowceaseless self-criticismand finallydejection.

In the instance of InternationalRelations, the puzzles in questionuteïtr. pttõënce òf9i lì è{-fqíQra%eEüìIi6rìüm,or coôRêrationiq úÌe rAÇ-e-[lúgúinedpgiiiiCâlactivities.Whvdoes not anarchvai;àtiËile ;àt to chaos? In short, constitutiveclaimsabout inter-national relationssupplypuzzles. A prospectiveparadigm theorymust generalize pttzzlesolutions to explainwhat is onlynow stipu-lated for constitutivepurposes-explain, that is, howthe social re-alityof internationalrelations works as a decentralized order, self-help system, or anarchY'

\r I do not be gfqg.*pgta.$s-gr* bS*o-IJ-fpf.LljçrgaliqnalRel-atip-npisl\ rorttriõmins.ldo.4di:bËüè"-u"ç,"ii-is.,""-u.çnpossible"This is because I\traue ËrauJããúútr ãUoíitfr.claimthat anarchy is the central and

r[ ,definingfeature of internationalrelations. I would not deny the in- I'cidence of anarchical events, but these events always take place un-'^ der conditionsthat must be characterizedotherwise.

Later I propose and defend a differentset of claims responsive tothose conditions. In so doing, I question whether, or to what extent,internationalrelationsconstitutea "paradigmof an operative kind,"

to borrowSheldon Wolin'sprovocativeextension of the Kuhnianidea of paradigm (1980). operativeparadigms are those ensemblesof human practices seen by those engaging in orobservingthem tohave a coherence setting them apart fromother practices. Those thatare seen as coherent in furthest degree are taken as havinga naturalobjective reality.

Kuhn's model presupposes that whilenatural science disciplines

lntroduction

constitute themselves, they do not constitute what I have here calledthe operative paradigms to which theyrespond. Physicistsbelievethat physics is a discerniblyindependent part of "_q4 -ure,l'thecoher-ence of whichstems from features exclusiveto it; so does almosteveryone else. That this is how people treat the matter makes it trueforoperative purposes. Even when Physics as a disciplineundergoesparadigmaticchanges, it is seen as havinga continuous identitycor-responding to the operative paradigm of physics, itselfsubject to in-cremental redefinitionin the face of disciplinarychanges.

For Krrhrt'spurposes, it does not matter whether operative nara-digms are naturallyreal or sociallyconstructed.s Eitherway, claims 'constitutingnatural science disciplinesonlymarginallyaffecttheir i

operative paradigms. Those claims do not generate paradigmaticac-tivity.Theories do that. The latter'sgenerative power'at least inKuhn's model, stems from the fact that they are never entirelyade-quate representatiòns óf what is taken to be a substantiallyindepen-dê;iit ,.uìity.Fullythe oppositesituationholds for a disciplinelikeILiterature.Ifnatural realityin the formof operative paradigms issafely construed as separate fromcorrespondingdisciplinarypara-

digms, literatureis indistinguishablefromparadigmatic assertionsthat particular texts are, or are not, Literature.In otherwords, litera-ture is not an operative paradigm; no set of human practices can beidentifiedas such in the absence of disciplinarycues.

The socialsciences fallsomewhere in the middle of this continuum.Far more evidentlythan withthe operative paradigms attributedtonature, social reality, and thus its operative paradigms, can onlybeconstitutedby human practices. Constitutiveclaimson behalf ofsocial science disciplines,and the projects they engender' are amongthese practices. Clearly they affectthe ensemble. So do an indeter-minately large number of other practices, not to mentionmaterialconditions. In degree an economy is what Economistsinstruct us to

thinkit is; in degree it operatesas an economy whatever Economists 1

8. There is currently a furiousdebate among philosophersof science, prompted inpart by Kuhn's work,over whether science discloses a reality independent of humanconstruction.I touch on it in chapter l.

15

I

$

Ë




say about it. Nevertheless, because Economicswas constituted longago, any operative paradigminspiringits development has itselfbeen transformed by the disciplinecreated in its name.

The situation is somewhat differentfor internationalrelations.The disc_ipìinc*^o_flllernationalRelations constituteditselfon the be-

_tje{, hetjt_çgriilnp-*gl.t__q-"9" "_"."riâlj,yëË_â_iãdib_rilTÉïíïiêïãóïiíïhemeaning of claims that internationalrelations make up a boundedand distinctivesocial reality. Such claims have somé plausìuitity,irthev ãie râkênïõ-ìefëi-ïô"thèénséúble-òïãètiïit-iéïenêáeêa in uva bgyndéd ãniïllôwgclïansins sët'ôf"eítìtiêíõiffièïieriíiaenomi_natêd by the tèim 'iiiàìès."Histôricalôôncieteness, as conveyed bythe tèrm "western itate system," reinforces the propensity to see in-ternational relations in operative terms. Indeed, these claims are per-suasive to a great number of people who have no stake in constitut-ing a disciplineon them. were InternationalRelationsnot to exist,internationalrelations wouldstillbe seen rather much as they arenow-andalways have been.t Allthis said, I must reassert my doubt that internationalrelationsfconstitute an operativeparadigm in nearly the degree presupposed

Jby the constitutionof InternationalRelations as a disciplú.Asr much is revealed by the ambiguityin InternationalRelations' con-stitutiveclaims and early development. whileit was claimed that an-archy is the distinctiveconditionto whichthe discipline responds,it is by no means clear that the western state system is the oniy con-crete instance ofinternationalrelationsavailable forstudy. yet fromthe 1950s on, this is the overwhelmingif largelyunarticulated judg-ment of scholars in the discipline(fordetails see onuf l9g2a). Nor,as intimatedabove, do I findthe Western state system to be a par_ticularlygood example of an operative anarchy, even if the incidènceof importantbut uncoordinated activitiesis high and, on occasion,the conditionsof anarchy achieved. (chapter 5 treats this mattermore systematically.)what's worse, recent

scholarship has stridentlyinsisted that internationalrelations are overwhelminglyanarchicalin character, withthe resultthat those withinthe disciplineare dis-suaded froman examination of the operative paradigm as it is_heterogeneous, amorphous, elusive.

The way to proceed should now be clear. It is to lookfor a substan_tialensemble of practices, the coherence of whichis not reflectedin, much less produced by, the constitutiveclaimsof established so-

16 lntroduction

cial science disciplines.In other words, we must stop thinkingthateach disciplinaryparadigm corresponds to its own distinctiveopera-tiveparadigm. Ifviewed skeptically,claims constitutingthese disci-plines, especially claims made by more than one of them, can leadus to operative paradigms cuttingacross the current mapof socialscience disciplines.Three such paradigms are discernible.

Surprisinglythe firstpossibilityis suggested by what may be takenas the strongest,most plausible disciplinaryparadigm in the socialsciences. Microeconomics,as the centralpart of liberal Economics,is covered by a theoryof high formalspecificity and enormousex-planatory power-propertiesachieved by postulatingthat autono-mous individualsact rationally, thatis, use whatever means at theirdisposal to maximize benefits tothemselves. (On rationalityso con-ceived, see furtherchapter 8).To keep matters simple,microeco-nomic theoryconfines this postulate to a particularslice of socialreality knownconventionallyas the market.

A market is any large set of exchanges (paired choices) amongautonomous entities,in whichexchanges are expedited through amediumof exchange, allowing arate of exchange, or price, to becalculated, butwhichare otherwise uncoordinated. By specifyingitsrange of application,microeconomictheoryconstitutes Microeco-nomics as a distinctive disciplinaryendeavor. That marketexchangesare not coordinated, on the presumption that no single one of themis importantenough to'warrantintervention,demarcates the disci-pline from itsneighbors likeSociology,Anthropology,and SocialPsychology, whichdo not preclude the presence of politics,and evenmore, PoliticalScience and InternationalRelations, in whichpoli-tics in one form oranother prevails.

After\WorldWar II,scholars versed in microeconomic theorysought to extend its range of application,in the firstinstance tocover a new slice of social reality brought intobeing bypublicwel-fare policies.In so doing, these scholars poached on the disciplinarydomainof PoliticalScience most successfully-theyproduced ele-gant and satisfying solutionsto a number of puzzles that had eitherdefied PoliticalScientists or had eluded their attention. Thismovebeyond themarket came at no cost to microeconomic theory'sformalspecificity and explanatorypower. Indeed microeconomictheorywas seen as a special, highlydeveloped case of a more general, andrapidlydeveloping, theory of social choice. (For an accessible intro-

17

jÀ




ductionto social choice theory, seç*Qggnp;.198$,and, for a formal,ipresentation, Schwartz 1986). Adherents argue that all relations of i?

authoritystroliã bg'considered in its light.This of course is a claim \

to constitutea new, far-reaching discipline,now dubbed Politicali

Economy, forwhichthe theory of social choice is said to be a p.op., I

paradigm theory.e )Social choicetheorists recognized the applicabilityof their theorywhenever a disciplineassigned paradigmatic significanceto terms

like"rationalactor"or "interest," whether thecontext was market-ing, voting,or fighting.The range of relevant practices stretchedacross several, perhaps all,of the social science disciplines.As soonas we abandon disciplinarypreconceptions,we see a coherence soreadily identifiedthat it has a longstandinglabel: the operative para-digm towhichPoliticalEconomy is a latter-day response is liberalism.toThat Microeconomics,as the source of PoliticalEconomy's para-digmtheory of social choice, is the core of LiberalEconomics comesas no surprise under the circumstances.Nordoes the fact that liberal-ism posed a series of paradoxes forPoliticalScience that couldonlybe solved withhelp from the theoryof social choice.Finallythereis no surprise to renewed assertions, influencedby the theory of so-cialchoice, that internationalrelations are purely anarchic (Young1978, Oye 1985a), foranarchy is liberalismcarried to its logicalex-

Proponents of PoliticalEconomy as a new disciplinehave settled on this labelat least in part because they claim to Íecoverthe original,wider scope of Economicswhen it emerged and when it was appropriatelycalled PoliticalEconomy' Ofcourse Marxistsnever accepted the subsequent divisionof labor between LiberalEconomistsand PoliticalScientists, withscraps going to Sociology'and held onto the term "PoliticalEconomy"for themselves. The result is considerable confu-sion, withtwo rivalcamps of PoliticalEconomymaking incompatible constitu-ive claims andconducting unrelated disciplinaryprojects.By liberalismI mean the view of human beings as individuallyautonomous, "re-lated to each other as proprietors of their own capacities and of what theyhaveacquired by theirexercise" (Mcpherson1962: 3.) This account of liberalism's prem-ises by no means exhausts the content of liberalism as an operative paradigm'Thus the liberal presumption of equal opportunityis implicithere, as it is in thetheoryof social choice (Frohock1987: 45-'12), Moregenerally, liberalconcernfor the conditionof societyas a whole yiclds PoliticalScience its many puzzlesand the theory of social choiceits particular relevance (sce furtherFrohock 1987).

lntroduction

treme: The only limitson rational conductare those imposed bymaterialconditions.

Ifinternationalrelationsare purelyanarchic, then PoliticalEcon-omy istheir perfected description. Ifanarchy is the general condi-,tion of internationalrelations, then PoliticalEconomists can puzzleiover exceptionalinstances of internationalcooperation undertakenfin response to marketfailures (Keohane 1982: 332-337, 1984:80-83).'If,as I have insisted, internationalrelations are not primarilyanar-chic, then they stand largelyoutside the operativeparadigmof liber-alism. InternationalRelations constituted itselfon the assumptio4that internationalrelationsconstitutea coherent operative para-\digm.Behindthis assumption is another one-that the practices 1

identifiedwithinternationalrelations come as close to unalloyed",liberalismas human practices are ever likelyto. Insofaras interna- \,

tionalrelations resist encapsulationand incorporation inthe opera-tive paradigm of liberalism,InternationalRelations is a liberalillusion.'

Marxismoffersa second operative paradigmcrossing existingdisõiplïn'arylïnéí-Rèlãüons õf piôdu'ôtìõn1iâralléllibeiãliímï'rèla-tionsof exchange, and they are no less abstractly conceived than is

the market.Aftercriticizing liberalsfor taking theoperative cen-tralityof the market for granted, Marxistssituate historicalmani-festations of theiralternativein a materiallygrounded, logicallynecessary succession of modes of production.Liberalsare deeplysuspicious of this feature of Marxism fora varietyof reasons. Theyfindits determinism philosophicallyalien, its dialectical logicun-dulysimplified,its formulationin the universalizing languageofnineteenth-century evolutionismoutmoded,and its conception ofmaterialgroundingmuddled.

V/hilemost of these suspicions have some merit,they do not addup to a decisive rejection of relations of productionas an operativeparadigm. Nor is that the intentof liberal criticism.Afterall, liber-

als acknowledge that feudalism and capitalismare significantandconnected historicalexperiences exhibiting distinctivemodes of pro-duction, just as Marxistssay. Rather, liberal criticismtargets theideologicaland programmaticimplications that Marxistsdraw fromtheir constructionof an undeniable operativeparadigm. Manyschol-ars today are more interested in clarifyingthe operativeparadigmthan in saving a particularconstructionof it for partisan reasons.The result is a burgeoning of a disciplinaryparadigm long estab-

19

9.

10.

rr .:Ë ffH :




lished under the name "PoliticalEconomy."As noted, there are thustwodisciplinescalled PoliticalEconomy, one Liberal,one Marxist'on the face of it, relations of productionare importantto a social

unit;they are political.The operative paradigm of Marxismis indis-putáUty centeiedon politicaleconomy. Yet this is not so clearly the

case withthe Marxistdisciplinaryparadigm'

KarlMarxoriented his systematic workon capitalismwitha theory

of considerable elegance and power-the labor theory of value (see

weeks lgglfor an ãxposition).It is the closest thingto a paradigmtheory that MarxistPoliticalEconomyhas today' This theory gains

itspowerbyexcludingfromitstermsmostoftheactivitiesthatmembers oicapitalistsocieties take as importantenough to be called

.political.Insteadpoliticsisconfinedtothedirectconnectionbe-Ì ï*..nthe valuationof products and the appropriationof surplus

l-*ualu".Thelabortheoryofvaluegivesaneconomicaccountofwhathap-

pens to appropriated surplus - it comes to a market - but not a po-liticalaccount, except in the vaguest sense - some of that surplusmay be used to snppãtt relationsof authority,pay for internationalrelations and so on. Secondary, ad hoc theories abound' such asV.I.Irnin'stheoryofimperialism,butdisciplinarycoherenceislost.EvidentlyMarxistPoliticalEconomy, like its Liberalcounterpart, is

not a disciplinewitha paradigm theory suited to the whole of politicaleconomy. Thus the disiiptinecannot replace its rivals - LiberalPoliti-cal Economy, PoliticalScience, and InternationalRelations - whatevertheirlimitationsand defects.

There is a thirdpossibilityfor an operative paradigm reachingacross disciplines. This one overlaps the operative paradigms ofliberalismand Marxism,thoughits coherence depends on neither.As an operative paradigm, it is matched historicallyto a long tradi-tion of foüticaland soõial theory which, though relevant to Liberal

and Maìxistparadigms, is coterminouswithneither. wolinhad itin mind when he ProPosed that

we conceive of politicalsociety as itselfa paradigm of an opera-tivekind.Fromthis viewpointsociety w-oUld-bg-e4Vig.4gedas

a coherent whole in the sense of it3 custemar*.political.prac-ticés, instiiütions,laws, structure of authorityand citizenship'and.õpeiãt.iíebeliefsbeingorganizedandinterrelated.Apo-

lntroduction

liticallyorganized society contains d-qfipi1gs,oç {-arr,a-ngements,certain widelyshared understandings regarding the locationand use of politicalpower, certain expectations about howauthorityought to treat members of society and about theclaims that society can rightfullymake upon its members. . . .

r$ev-rvpJe-elpJ?9119-ejgl9*ugtlgryq31 _ -qxrq- 9-tets1p1f"dlcú-Fttrei 1sg th,a-

1o_9i91y1ri99Lo-ç?Lry9nits political

i_{gi"acgordancg withthem (1980: 183-184).

Wolin'ssense of the social realityat stake is inclusivebut stillbounded. His formulationis wanting to the degree that it dependson,both ButologJand organic iryagtlyfo1 boul$lp.boliticalso-ciety iiâ ijaradigminsofaras it tries to carryon politicallife).Tohis credit, however, he used the term "au-thority"(twice)withoutgiv-ing it pride of place, much less claimingthat relations of authoritydelimitthe paradigm. Were Wolinto have used authorityto boundthe ensemble of practices constitutingthe operative paradigm ofpoliticalsociety, then he couldhave aligned it neatly withEaston'sparadigmatic claimthat PoliticalScience describes "the authorita-tive allocationof values for a society" (1953: 129). The next step,which Easton himselfdid not take,but HarryEcksteindid in refin-ing Easton's claim,wouldhave been to exclude internationalrela-tions fromthe operative paradigm (Easton 1953: 138-139, Easton1965: 382 Eckstein 1973: 1157-1158).

Wolinrefused a narrowviewof what politics is about, such as theterm "authority"connotes when it is used by paradigm guardianslikeEaston and Eckstein. This leftV/olinwithouta better idea ofwhat theoperativeparadigm is than can be provided by a checklistof evidentlypoliticalpractices, includingthose associated within-ternational relations.Wolin'schecklistis even less helpfulin guidingus towarda disciplinaryparadigm corresponding to the operative

paradigm of politicalsocietY.What is required firstis an effort,however preliminary,to identifyt h e c o mm-on. {gg,gmi4-41.o,f

- -i -.,Wq-liBlso r any comparab I e checklist.In othéi úords, we must characterize the operative paradigmin lterms sufficientlygeneral that they fitany set of practices we would ;want toincludein the paradigm. I believe there are two such general ï 7properties pertainingto politicalsociety in all its manifestations. ï {bni ir trtS Bgty-ltlygp1.t9199-9-{.$l9sryhiç-h, -tt.gui.dge-bg,nstd"-Y

.

j

21

': ffi




,i termining,human conduct, gives it social meaning. Vy'henever rulesN naue the effect of distributingadvantages unequally, the result isr iúle; úhióh is úê'iéôóiiri"gineiaipïõpêitvôf @ti.{i_99-ìëtv.Thè-

p*,"r.raof .üie renectfihãìmportánóttÏatpeopiã áiüàòh to théadvantages rule-throughrules-helps them seÇure and maintain.

/ Of course people also use resources to their advantage, but never

\' withoutrules being implicated.The paradigm of politicalsociety is\ aptly named because it links irrevocablythe sine qua non of society-\ ttte availability,no, the unavoidabilityof rules - and of politics- the

\ Rgrsistence of asymmetricsocial relations, knownotherwise as the\.r.donditionof rule.

I dwellon these properties and their implicationslater in thisbook. I assert them now as a plausible construction ofthe propertiesofthe operative paradigm ofpoliticalsociety and note that, as such,they should also constituteessential elements in any disciplinaryparadigmcorresponding to this operative reality.Acceptingthis,however, does not mean that an equallyplausible theory centeredon the general propertiesof politicalsociety and orienting any suchdisciplinaryparadigm is just around the corner.

Wolinunderstood that "great theories"of the Western politicaltraditionare responses to the operative realityof politicalsociety(1980: 182; see further1969: 1078-1080 on "epic theorists").Yet noneof them sufficeas a paradigmtheory. That they were put to selectiveuse in the constitutionof PoliticalScience and InternationalRela-tions and thus contributed to their respective proto-theoriessuggeststhe same procedure could help in the constructionof a new disciplin-ary paradigm.Althoughit is immodestto say so, I see my work hereas a tentative firststep toward that paradigm. Taking a cue from

, Wolin,I support this step by having recourse to the great theoriesr of the past, but not just those of the Western politicaltradition'If, the emphasis is on politicalsociety, then comparable theories of so-

Lcietyare equallypertinent.Use of these materials is necessarily selective. Once selected, I sub-

ject them to the most carefulscrutinyI can manage. The close read-ing of texts is a favorite methodof Philosophy. Myendeavors hereshould be construed not as Philosophybut as a philosophicallyin-formed foray into the socialsciences. One mightask, to quote Jef-frey C.Alexander,"whyengage in readings rather than embark on

lntroduction

a more straightforwardand contemporary discussion of tellingem-piricalproblems, . . . ?" (1982: l).Myanswer is Alexander's. I doclose reading "because, in certain criticalrespects, it is by interpret-ing and reinterpreting 'classical'worksthat fundamental argumentis conducted in the social sciences" (p. l). In other words, I thinkthis method pays offwitha supply of materials fora disciplinary

constructionproject.In this workI propose to take a second step as well.Myclosereading is intended torender the operative paradigm of politicalso-ciety in an overarchingset of categories. Moreprecisely I believe Ihave identifiedthree categories of rules-categories understood inthe traditionalsense of the term as "abstract containers, withthingsinside or outside the category" (Lakoff1987: 6). These categoriesderive froma consideration of language as enabling people to per-\formsocial acts and achieve ends by making statements of assertion, I

direction,and commitment.Once aware of these categories, I encountered various formula-

tions of them in many of the texts, classic and contemporary, to en-gage my attention. They are discernible in great theories fromwhichInternationalRelations scholars have adduced the centralityof an-archy for internationalrelations,and they are conspicuous in discus-sions of the conditionsof rule. Because these categories apply equallyto rules and rule, I see them significantlysupporting the rules-rulecouplingas decisive for politicalsociety. Because they bear on the fullrange of human practices for whichpoliticalsociety is the operativeterm, they are indispensable for sorting out the materials that closereading provides for the disciplinaryconstructionproject.

Again there is nothingoriginalor surprising in mymethod-It .

goes back to Aristotle.To establish categories presupposes that withinithe operativeparadigm are nodes of practice. These we may see asresponse to the puzzles that humanity repeatedly confronts in its so-

cial existence.P:uzzlesolutionsare passed on, diffused, or reinventedwithsuch consistency that they lend themselves to observers'typifi-cation, which then contributesto their social constitution.They areMaxWeber's ideal types (Shils and Finch1949: 90-ll0).This isamisleadinglabel, however, because it is so widelytaken to mean thatthe act of typificationtakes place onlyin the observer's mind.

As we saw withthe term "paradigm,"tendencies in practice and

23

t' : '

l t d ti 25




observers'portrayals are separately constituted but mutuallyrein-forcing.This is just rüy'eber's position.rrweber understood the interac-tionof practices and portrayals to operate in large ensembles of prac-tices not seen fromwithinas having any coherence, liberalismbeingan example (Shils and Finch1949: 97). He also identifiedit in smal-ler containedand recurrent ensembles of practices, the coherence ofwhichis evident even to those engaging in them. The formerarewhat I have already called operativeparadigms. The latterare typi-fied puzzle solutions,typed in the firstinstance by those whose solu-tions they are. Inasmuchas typifiedp:uzzlesolutionsshare withparadigms a constitutive functionin relating practices and portray-als, there is a point in callingthem paradigms and, more particu-larly,pu;zzle paradigms.

The close reading oftexts discloses observers'renditions ofpuzzleparadigms. These too are recurrent. Oftenthey are highlyabstract,the observer presenting them as "pure" types. To claimthat there areonly three pure types of rule in politicalsociety, as did Weber (1968:215; see chapter 6 for elaboration), is to hold that humanity has de-

vised only three durable solutions to the problem of using rule toadvantage. I also claimthat there are only three durable solutionsto the problem of rule. They are not identical to Weber's. I believemy three categories of rule, and not his types, are pure.

Types cannot be pure, because they are swarms of things, includ-ing ensembles of practice, having no firmboundaries. Instead ofpure types, we are likelyto have proto-types'stereotypes (Lakoff

1 1. Weber used the term "ideal"because ideal types are "mental constructs" (Gedan-kenbitd,also rendered by his translatorsas "constÍuctions,""analyticalcon-

structs" and "conceptual constructions"; Shils and Finch1949: 88-93)'but not

just an observer's. Weber noted that

there are certain relationships between the "idea" in the sense of a ten-dency of practical or theoretical thought and the "idea" in the sense ofthe ideal iypica ponrayal of an epoch constructed as a heuristic device'An ideal type of certain situations, which can be abstracted fromcertaincharacteristic social phenomena of an epoch, might-and this is quiteoften the case-have also been present in the minds of the persons livingin thatepoch as an icleal to be striven for inpractical life oras a maximÍor the regulation ofccrtainsocial relationships (p. 95, emphasis in original)'

lntroduction

1987), and exemplars (compare note 7). Categories can be pure,however; "a container form mightbe called a'pure form"'(Lakoff1987:354).Boundariesmust be definiteand candidates for member-ship determinatelyin or out,not inand out or in between. In turn,an observer must independentlyformulatecriteriaforboundingcategories and judgingcandidates for inclusion.(HereinafterI usethe term "category" only forpure categories.)l2No category standsalone. Atminimum,categories come in pairs, because all candidates I

excluded fromone category must be a member of a second category I

defined by what is bounded out of the first.In other words, catego- irizingpuzzleparadigms, as withanything else, requires a classifica-tory scheme.

UnlikeWeber, I attempt to relate puzzle paradigms of rule toeach other as categories. Each categoryof rule corresponds to oneof three categories of rules, which are themselves solutions to prob-lems raised by the social character of language. Maker-users of suchpuzzle paradigms need not relate these paradigms to each other orthe operative paradigms withinwhich they arise'Yet they often,perhaps always, do so.r3 Scholars have no choice but to do so ifthey wish to have their typificationsin categories, their categories

I should emphasize that most categories are not puÍe. The longstandingpresump-tion is that concepts are containers for kinds of things, metaphoricallyextendedto allpredicates. (On container metaphors, see Johnson and Lakoff1980: 29-30).Recent research, masterfullysynthesized by George Lakoff(1987)' decisivelychallenges this view. One might betterdescribe impurecategories as families,understood by reference to "familyresemblance" among members (p. 16; see alsochapter l, footnote l0), orspecies and genera (Lakoff1987: 3l-38'185-193).Claude Levi-Strauss has argued that categorizingand classifying,so conspicuousin preliterate social experiences, are a universalconsequence of a cognitivecon-

stant: The human mind, likea computer, performs binary operations, whichitthen nests and compounds in systems of transformations(1966; see Gardner 1981:133-144 for a useful summary).This Structuralistview strikesme as a congenialone for social choice theory, whichalso presupposes the primacyof binary opera-tions - making choices - but fails to considerhow such operations can yield thecategories withinwhichchoices are made. I do not deny the importanceof binaryoperations. Even this book is organizedon them, as willbe seen presently. Never-theless, I doubt that they and correlative operations exhaust the cognitivecom-petence of human beings-a matter I return to in chapter 3.

25

t2.

13.

& WM r ' .

l d i




pure. Andwithoutcategories they cannot propose theories and con-struct disciplines.

Classificatoryschemes systematicallyrelating categories are alsoparadigms constructed by operativepractices and observers' portray-als. Followingthe lead of Robert K.Mertonand Thlcottc. Parsons,I wouldcall them codificatoryparadigms.la They stand between puz-

zle paradigms on the one hand and disciplinaryand operative para-

digms on the other. c. wrightMillsderisivelycalled Parsons'con-struction,,grandtheory" (1959b: 25-49), thus anticipatingthe fallof all such efforts fromdisciplinaryfavor. Recently,however, interest

I in ,,grand theories" has revived(Skinner1985). Foucault's workisheld as an example, despite evidence that he wished only to expose,

, or possibly invent (Megill1985:234-236),unacknowledgedopera-Ì tive paradigms. AnthonyGiddens and Jürgen Habermas afford otheri examples of consequence for the workat hand.

Grandlyconceived, these undertakingsare not theories - certainlynot paradigm theories orientingdisciplines,for they stand athwartthe current array of social science disciplines.Whilesome of themresemble the ,,great theories" of a predisciplinaryera, they tend tobe codificatoryparadigms. Theyare devised for operative paradignisniore encompassing than those of contemporarysocial science disci-

r ì pünes. Consequently they undercutexistingdisciplines and theiri i proto-theories. Grandtheories so-called do not reject the possibility

14. Merton (1968:64-"12) andthrough him Parsons (1978:352-353) used "paradigm"from the midl950s in reference to codifyingSociologicalscholarship. 'As con-strued here, codificationis the orderlyand compact arrangementof fruitfulpro-cedures of inquiryand the substantive findingsthat result fromtheir use" (p. 69).Note that Merton was not concerned withsociology'sproto-theory.Instead,.theory,' is shorthand for the what and how of p'szzle solutions.In practice

Mertonand Parsons both tended to codifylelated sets of puzzle solutions in ataxonomic scheme, which thenbecame the paradigm. Perhaps the best illustra-tion is Parsons'fourfold "paradigm"of functionalrequirements for any socialsystem: ,.any social system may be analyzed in terms of four logicallyindepen-dent functionalrequirements, whichwe formulateas adoptation,goal-attainment'integration,arrd lotent pattern maintenance" (1967].260).The firstclearly relatesto economy, the second to polity,the third to personality and the fourth to cul-ture (pp. 259-263).How they may be said to be "logicallyindependent" is notso clear.

lntroduction

of a disciplinaryreorientation; indeed this is one reason for theirre-ôelt--ep-p-è-afa_rigëànd ênt"husiasllg reççption. Muchat odds withtheethos of normalscience, the arrivalof grand theories speaks to thegrowingmalaise withinexistingdisciplines.

Grand theories are codificatoryparadigms that cannot be ignored.I have rummaged througha number of them, not just for scraps ofsupport, but witha larger ambition.I wogldhave mJ çodificaÍoryparadigm jointhe others n wh4.t,for laçkqfap.ythingbetlef, w--e-c4ll"soôial ihèoiÍ"As social theorygains coherence, it willsubstitutefor discreditêddisciplinaryparadigms. Ifdisciplinesare to endure,they willdepend on paradigmatic claims that lesser operativepara-digms can be distinguished withoutoverridingtheoretical signifi-cance attaching to their distinctiveness'

The reconstructionof InternationalRelations requires that thedisciplinebe stripped of its current pretensions. If this is taken asabandonment of InternationalRelations (the disciplineas it is) andthe possibilityof internationaltheory(theorypeculiar to Interna'tionalRelations), then I agree. I do not agree that it means giv-ing up on internationalrelations as well.Rather it honors their im-

portance and thus theirplace in the operative paradigm of politicalsociety. More than other matters of politics,internationalrelationsare the subject of this book only because I have thought more aboutthem. Such is the legacy of my discipline.

PLANOF THEBOOK

Mostbooks, even when they are as relentlessly abstract as this one,tella story, more or less coherently,in accord witha plan which theauthor may or may not divulge.There are exceptions, perhaps, suchas LudwigWittgenstein'sPhilosophicalInvestigations(1968)' to

whichchapter I attends, or works in the currentlyfashionable de-constructivemode of criticism.Modernistfictionis either deliber-ately unplannedor, I thinkmore often, guilefullyplanned to dis-orient thereader. This bookis merelymodern(I define the terms"modern"and "modernist"on p. 23,4).It stands resolutely in the tra-ditionof fe?lo._1S-g-p9lllltio,n1"I? .h1s do-4i1119Iwç*ç+tho.ughtfor several cèntúiiêi.Íhe plan is to take the reader througha seriesof steps, each of whichleads ineluctably-orso I try topersuade

27

.1

l d i




the reader-to the next. In theend, and ifI have succeeded, the readerwillaccept my argument rather than retreat along the many stepsso arduously taken.

I do this twice.To come to the same conclusiontwice is doubtlessmore persuasive than one time throughthe steps, but probably lessthan twiceas persuasive. Not only dodecliningmarginalreturns

prompt an end after two forced marches' Estheticconsiderationsc o me i nto p lay.*fhis b g,g. k ..h el a bi4ply*faruggt*.ll*jXq*nu"*l ""teqç

lntroduction

rules are and what they do, whichis to enable or effectuate rule. PartTwo tells what rule is and how it works,which is through the mediumof rules. Because ruleg g-q-gtolgr-gü9"$lç,-e4d*Lulç"1g19.*4ú$,itfof fg.uplhatôtra*úlir'-ç.e*-púúe{"e4ç.trer1;[email protected] -ee-c-hother. Onô migtrtsuppose that the oppositionof rules and rule re-péais the recurrent oppositionin social science scholarshipbetween

micro-and macrolevelphenomena. The power and importance of

this oppositioncan hardlybe denied. Nevertheless, Parts One andTwo are not organized around the micro-macrooppositionand its tmany transformations,beçAUrq bç-çAt$tUç ivisÍ-pg füg[.,t--{9fend/inchapterremptrasirestttecpniinu-oú,"ç-g=a"jeü1u1t-"-g-ú-nslçJo-ian-d'macrofevel. p[.e-nomena.Neithel has gaus4t or tempo r4-1. pf imgey. IMy constructionof rules and rule constantly shuttles between macro-and micro-level considerations,always in hopes of fixingattentionon what wouldbe a mere point of transformationifI stayed firston one side of the oppositionand then on the other.

AfterI make my constructivistcase in chapter l, I develop amicrolevel understandingof what rules are in chapter 2, but go tothe macrolevel by consideringwhat they do. Chapter 3 asks how in-dividualpeople knowhow to use rules, but concludes by asking howco4p_-e1g-Iìçg.W-rJh-r_u çS,.çqq,stjtutesculture, whichis certainlya macro-level concern.Chapter4 assays "the problemof order,"which ismacrolevel onthe face of it, but does so from the longestablishedperspective of individualsand theirdiscretionary response o ryles.

Múóhrhé'sãrüê can be sdid ôf Pari rwo. ôhãi,tëi"S ïèãiJ *iïiittreplglgPpli"g __o_{-?-lt3j.çhy,"which is a transformationof the problemof òider, but nota shiftfrom the macro- to the microlevel.Again,however, microlevelconcerns come to the fore as I describe the de-clineof a norr4atively5 ú conceptlo_n o,f 4n4rylry-in [99ç-r-n-goliti-cal thought and its replacement withan -e-mp-h1ç-|q--o-.a.glilitarianideas and finallysocial choice theory. Chapter 6 is devoted centrally

to rule, but always in the context of rules. Chapter 7 turns to rulein worldpolitics,but always from the pointof viewof skillfulindi-viduals. The finalchapter connects individuals'choices, through in-terests, to resources and their exploitation.The pointis not to substi-tute a new opposition-individualand nature-forthe oppositionof individualand society. Rather it is to correct any impression, such"as chapter I may have created and subsequent chapters strengthened,| *

that social construction proceeds withoutreference to material con- | :I

29

9g9 .glgg-q9.*gF-n*çnte-rv"poesgil*r;rhesvmmetrvofpartsisrõ-eãí,ãã-Ïl-[Ëe'ariángernentof chaptêrí. In the familiarlanguage

',

of Structuralism(recall footnote l3),each of the fourchapters inPart TW-ois 4 1pn9fo-14g gr-ql*o"legllbç-lo-Uq-qhaptcrs,in PartOne, the parts themselves being transformationsof each other.rsBecause the firstchapter in Part two is a transformationof the lastchapter in Part One, they together constitute a hinge connectingthetwo parts of the book and allowingthem to be turned back on' ortoward, each other. The firstand last chapters are also transforma-tions of each other, together constitutinga clasp' The book closesby comingaround on itself,ending where it began. Chapters 2 and6 and chapters 3 and 7 are also transformations of each other. Theirarrangement propels the text forwardrather than tyingit together'

Ifall this seems artfulor contrived (itdoes as I write aboutit),then I can only reply that all bookswhichtella story use such ploys,but they do so generally unself-consciously.Myown stronglyinter-disciplinaryinterests foster awareness of these matters. More to thepoint, I suppose, they have robbed me of the illusion thatbooks areanylhi g otlerlbg}-11 _tgl"g9.llll99li9l-s:.êrtth at foll owsa care fulplán cãn õnlydo a better job of persuasion, or so I believe.

Part One is entitled "Rules,"Part Two "Rule."Part One tells what

Indeed, all known structuÍes-frommathematical groups to kinshipsys-tems - are, withoutexception, systems of transformation'But transforma-tion need not be a temporal process: I + I "make" 2; 3 "followshard on"2; clearly, the "making"and "following"here meant are not temporal pro-cesses. On the other hand, transformation can be a temporal process: get-ting married"takes time,"Were it not for the idea of transformation,struc-turès wouldlose allexplanatory import, since they wouldcollapse into staticforms(Piaget 1970: ll-12).

15.

ffiffiir i.i & r

l d R l i S i lTh lntroduction 31




ditions and consequences. Thus is chapter 8 brought back to chapterl, after many peregrinationsbetween rules and rule, individualandsociety, in the name of social construction.

The oppositionof rules and rule lends itselfto a differentinter-pretation. A significantproportionof the literaturedevoted to rulesreflects the centrist affinitiesof its authors. Because liberalismis at

the center of theÌJy'estern

experience over thelast three hundred

years, centrismmeans moderatelyconservative or ameliorativepre-dilectionsto be served by rules, withina world constitutedon liberalassumptions. By contrast,a significantproportionof the literaturedevoted to rule reflects ideologicaland temperamental extremism onthe part of its authors. Both the Marxistparadigm and the paradigmof rule stand at the margins of the Western experience, because thecenter belongs to liberalism.Those who recognize the operative significance of either of these paradigms must also stand at the margins,whether in anger or resignation.

I possess (a wordI choose for its ironiceffect) a background,train-ing, and privilegedposition in liberalsociety. The concern withrulesmakes sense to me. I must also confess an attraction to a Nietzscheanview of rule (and thus of rules: read the quotationfromFoucaultintroducingPart Two) and to the I-eft'spositionon exploitation(chapter 8). Again, my constru€tivistpositionallowsme -o'neg-otiatebetween temperamental and ideologicalpolaritieswithputhàüng todeclare a lastingallegiance. The cost is a certain detachment, asmanifest in a logoëentric stance (elaborated in chapter l) and a ten-denry toward irony(defined in chapter 4, footnote2l)' Identifyingthe pervasiveness of asymmetric and exploitivesocial relations is notto condone this situation.It does not preclude a personal, liberalcommitmentto making one's immediatecircumstances less this way,nor an attitude of worldweariness so much favored by advantaged,alienated intellectuals. Constructivismtolerates all this and more'

Someone glancingthrough the book's table of contents mightdiscern an entirelydifferentopposition.Part One is a general treat-ment of social relations;Part Two narrows the focus to internationalrelations. There is some meritto this conclusion. ChapterI barelymentions international relationsas such. Chapter 2 does examine in-ternational legal theory as particularlyrevealingthe limits ofprevail-ing legal theory,ifonly to set the stage fora viewof rules not atall dependent on legal theory. The alternativeview startswithlan-

lntroduction

guage, whichis, needless to say, a general social phenomenon. Chap-ter 3 is also developed in the most general terms, beginningas it doeswithcognitionand ending withbroad generalizations about culturaldifferences.Internationalrelations commandan importantplace inchapter 4, although this chapter begins and ends in general terms.

Part Two is more attentiveto the specificsof internationalrela-tions, but notexclusivelyso. Chapter 5 considers anarchy in Westernpoliticalthought withoutsupposing that internationalrelationsrep-resent the only or even an appropriate instance of anarchy. Chapter 6attempts to show the presence of rule in allsocial relations, includinginternationalrelations as a usually exempted case. Rule in contem-porary internationalrelations is the subject of chapter 7. Nevertheless,the discussion undercuts any firmdistinctionbetween relations amongstates, as internationalrelationsare conventionallyunderstood, andother activitiesundertaken inthe circumstances of modernity.Finally,chapter 8 relates the choice of means and ends to the material condi-tions of human existence, withinternationalrelations an appositeillustration.

In examining oppositionsnot central to the book'ssymmetry, I

providebriefdescriptions(twiceactually)of each chapter. Any fur-ther descriptionis unlikelyto help the reader much unless it is moredetailed, in whichcase it willrepeat the exposition undertaken ineach chapter. I do begin each chapter witha sketch of themes tocome. Again, toavoid repetition, I offerno conclusion,either to thechapters, or to the book as a whole.Instead, I append a SynopticTâble to record the three categoriesof rules and rule I allude to, andall the correspondences to them I discuss in the course of the book.

31

: e' .ffi



::

Ê.t'?t*:f;r'

.Í{s4,**''Qr'ú,FL5{$'l:

PART .I : RULES

What, in short, we wish to do is dispense with'things'.To 'depresentify'them. . . . To substitute for the enig-matic treasure of 'things'anteriorto discourse, the regu-lar formationof objects that emerge only in discourse.To define these objects withoutreference to the ground,the

foundationof íhíngs, but by relatingthem to the

body of rules that enable them to formas objects of adiscourse and thus constitute the conditionsof theirhis-toricalappearance.

MichelFoucaultThe Archeologyof Knowledge

(1972: 47-48,emphasis in original)

1 " ÌitrI



CONSTRUCTIVISM

Language-Iwant to say-is a refinement, im Anfangwardie Tht

('in the beginning was the deed').LudwigWlttgensteln

Q976: 420; compare 1972; pan 402)

One must begin somewhere. Perhaps there is no beginning,and thesearch willlead in circles. Most InternationalRelations scholarshave not begun far enough back or, switchingmetaphors, gone deepenough to say. Instead they share in the commonjudgment of socialscientists that one begins on the ground, withdata (Glaser and Strauss1967: l), Alreadydug into the groundare foundations,,,,founda-tip-ll-o_l.lingyvledge'-truths that are certain because of theircausésrather than because of the arguments given for them . . .', (Rorty1979: 157; see generally pp. 155-164; Connollyt9B6:[6-126).Thesefoundationsare ancientand durable. They were laid in Classical

Greece, and they are used today to erect conceptual frameworksandconstructtheories.If this isthe language of construction,constructivism it is not;

constructivismgoes further. The ground itselfis but the rubbleofconstruction. Tiuths as we take them to be are inextricablefromthearguments offered for them. One may begin withfacts, ,,things', asthey are, thereby takingfor granted the argument for their facticity.One may begin withwords, ideas, arguments, taking forgranted the

rrffi il . ri È &d i

Part 1: Rules 376 Constructivism



Part 1: Rules

facts to which theyrefer. Constructivismbegins withdeeds. Deedsdone, acts taken, words spoken-These are âll ihàtïà'ôïs are.

Social scientists freelyassume that they buildon firmground andstrong foundations because these are deeded to them by theirdisci-plines. Social theory, which I take to be that loose array of codifica-tory paradigms sprouting in the debrisof failed proto-theoriesanddecrepit disciplines,necessarily challenges these assumptions. Con-sequently social theoristscannot avoid the question of where onebegins. I see my owneffortto reconstruct InternationalRelationsas a c_gntrib-U gl_ o__lg-c,ie_1.l_bgqJy.As such it too must attend to thesubject of beginnings,whichis a philosophicalquestion.

IfI begin this chapter witha philosophicalquestion, moving onto social theory has its pitfalls,as my recourse to Wittgenstein's.workon rules willshow I conclude the chapter by associating my-

J, self witha codificatoryparadigm called structurationtheory. Ruleslíare central to this scheme, but less has been said about them thanïï is needed fora social theory that begins where I begin.

INTHE BEGINNING

I begin withGoethe's aphorism, whichfor Wittgenstein seemed to express a philosophicalposition:In the beginningwas the deed.l Iflcall this positionconstructivism.In simplest terms, people und socie-

, riI ties construct,or constitute,each other. Inasmuchas I take thet I t"tar "construct"and "constitute"to be synonymous,I could justas wellcall thepositiontheir use reflects constitutivismbut for theevident awkwardness of the term.2

l"Andnot just for Vy'ittgenstein. "Marx,Nietzsche, Wittgensteinand Heidegger:they are the heirs of Faust. . . . Each of them in his own way takes as his startingpointFaust's firstprinciple, 'Im Anfangwar die Tàt,'but each interprets and de-velops it differently"(Redner 1982:, 52; see furtherpp. 4L-7'l).

2. "Constructivism,"as I use the term here, bears onlya distant affinityto construc-tivismas an importantmovement in Soviet art after the October Revolution.So-viet constructivistssaw art as necessarily socialand their approach as "the com-munist expression of materialstructures." They inveighed against"the speculativeaesthetic activity ofart," and they directed theirattention to technicalpÍocessesand workingmaterials (Lodder1973, quotingAlekseiGan, "theoretician of theFirst WorkingCroup oI Constluctivists"pp. 237-2381,

376 Constructivism

As a philosophicalposition,constructivism isby no means minealone. It has a considerable followingin contemporary philosophyand social theory,and it comes in variationsand degrees. Amongphilosophers Nelson Goodman is a constructivistperhaps to the fur-thest degree. In Jerome Bruner's apt summary of Goodman's posi-tion, "no one'world'ismore real than others. None is ontologicallyprivilegedas the unique real world"(1986: 96). Goodman's concernis not merely the worldas social reality. 1,

The many stuffs-matter,energy, waves, phenomena-thatworldsare made of are made along withthe worlds.But madefrom what? Not fromnothing,after all,butfromother worlds.Worldmakingas we know it always starts fromworldsalreadyon hand; the making isthe remaking(1978: 6, emphasis in .

original).

Goodman's positionis nominalist;he has called himselfa con-structivenominalist(198a): 50-53). Iong unfashionable,nomi-

nalism holdsthat things exist only insofar as they are named assuch. The world iswhat we take it to be. l,ong ascendant is theantithesis Ìo ttris position,realism(Goodman has also called him-self an "irrealist"),which holdsthat lhq -wo__rtde4_i-sl_gigd-e-pendento_f ogry_etvgqppd the things withinit awaitour naming.The riseof science licensed realism but, fromG. W. teibniz,did notpre-vent realistsfromcontemplatingthe existence of "possible worlds"-worlds that do not, as far as we know,reallyexist, but whichwouldifanything in this worldhappens other than it does. Davidkwishas recently (1986) pointed out how manyphilosophicalproblems are made more tractable simply bygranting the "pluralityof worlds."I-ewis'positiondoes not grant existential standingtoplural

worlds.Myposition,

and Goodman's, as I understand it,does.Goodman's constructivenominalismis perhaps not quite as

radical as some passages fromhis work(such as the one I quoted)might suggest. He has never denied the existence of some inde-pendent phenomenal world. Hehas asserted that we cAn UçypI J

know all the features of that worldindependent of discourse about jit. Even ifsome features of the real worldare independent, we can-

i

tI,ì

;'iií,, :*' :KfS+ . 'iW ..

398 Part 1: Rules Constructivism



8

not, in our discourse dependency, know whichones they are (Good-man 1984: 41). We construct worldswe know in a worldwe do not.3

Nor is Goodman's positionwantingof antecedents. Not kibniz,but René Descartes and ImmanuelKantare his philosophical pro-genitors. While constructivismaccepts the Cartesian dualityof mindand matter, the distinctivefeature of this positionis its Kantianpedigree: It "began when Kant exchanged the structure oftheworldfor the structure of the mind, . . . ." (Goodman1978: x, comparePutnam l98l:60-64).Yet it claims too much to say, withBruner,that Kant"fullydeveloped"constructivism(1986: 96). Indeed, Kant'smost famous use of the term "constitutive"refers to logicallyneces-sitated relations of givens, expressed in quantities, and not the con-struction of worlds through"analogiesof experience." "The generalprincipleof the analogies is: Allappearances are, as regards theirexistence, subject a priorito rules determiningtheir relation to oneanother in one time"(Kant1933: 208). Kant'sterm for those rulesis "regulative."aMore justly,John Rawls (1980) foundKant's moraltheory to be constructivist,though in a weaker sense.5

Nevertheless, Kant's influenceon later versions of constructivism

is considerable. More than anyone else Kantpropelled Philosophyto-ward its "epistemologicalturn,"which,in codifyingthe Cartesiandualism of mindand world,gave philosophers primaryresponsibilityfor the formerand left the latter to social theorists. The "linguisticturn"of twentieth-centuryPhilosophyeffectuated a rapprochementof sorts between Philosophyand social theory.ó This was manifested

Some realists are not far fromthis position.I have in mindHilaryPutnam's "in-ternal" realism (1981: 49-74) and GeorgeLakoff's"experiential"realism (1987:260-268). NotePutnam's remark that "Nelson Goodman and I have detected aconvergence in our views, . . ." (1981:xii)."Itstands quite otherwisewiththose principleswhich seek to bring the existence

of appearances under rules a priori.For since existence cannot be constructed,the principlescan apply only to the relations of existence and can yieldonlyregulative principles"(1933: 210, emphasis in original)."Kantian constructivismholds that moral objectivityis to be understood in termsof a suitablyconstrued socialpointof view that allcan constÍuct"(Rawls,1980:51e).Jerrold L. Aronson(1984: 260) gave creditfor the term "epistemologicalturn"to Robert Paul Wolff(1963). Richard Rorty(1967) used "linguisticturn"in col-lectinga wide range of valuable material appearingin the preceding thirty-fiveyears.

in an unending burst of interest in cognition,"the architecturiof thehuman mind-brain"(Goldman1986: l),but the result was a kindof epistemologicalimperialism.Throughthe mediumof language,mindsubordinated world.The triumphof epistemologyresonateswiththe Greco-Christian presentiment so powerfullyexpressed inthe NewTestament of the Bible:In the beginning was the word.

My dictionarysays that "logos," the word, is "the rationalprinci-ple that governs and develops the universe,"and "the divinewordor reason incarnate in Jesus Christ"(Random House 1967: 843). Thetriumphof epistemology findsthe "rationalprinciple"a permanenthome in the mind, and in so doing satisfies several presumptions,namely, that humans as language users are uniquely affiliated withthe divine,that cognitiveactivityis pulledtoward reason, that themind finds,or makes, the order in the world.Given Western cul-ture's penchant forword-worlddualismand, under Kantianaus-pices, grant of priorityto the former,Goodman's constructivism

1

breaches commonsense realism-thebelief that there is one realIworld"outthere"-witha perverse plausibility.

Constructivismalso challenges empiricistand realist assumptions

of workingscience.T Constructivistphilosophersof science likeBasC. van Fraasen (1981) are given to argue, in RichardN. Boyd's words(1984:52), that "the worldthat scientists study,in some robust sense,must be defined or constituted or'constructed'fromthe theoreticaltraditionin whichthe scientific communityin question works."Thissounds as radical as some of Goodman's rhetoric.Yet we can takeit to mean that the worldscience knows is in degree a social con-$ruq i-q$Al.ttrougtrme.ttroas-are-'ttreorv-aèpenae-ú;ïandìliéôivismind-made,neither theories, methods, nor data are simplymade upin, or by, the mind.This brand of constructivismdoes not deny theexistence of phenomena (van Fraasen wouldsave them-"phenomenaare saved when theyare exhibited as fragments of a larger unity").Instead it acknowledges "thg limitqgf_gÈ_q_e-1_v_4tion,rrhichare not

in-ì

capacitating but also are not negligible"(van Fraasen 1984:256). 'We should notbe surprised that ThomasS. Kuhn is seen as a con-

7. Empiricistsand realists are themselves divided over the status of nonobservableentities as terms in scientific theories. I found Richard N. Boyd (1984) of par-ticularhelp in clarifyingempiricist, realist,and constructivistpositionscurrentlydebated by philosophers of science.

3.

5.

iffiir -'

40 Part 1: Rules Constructivism 41



structivistof this genre. The discussionof paradigms to be foundin the introductionto this book,whichaspires to honor the senseof Kuhn'swork whileextending it, points to a psç14- -ty mSde contentto all knowledge, jncluding.s-c,i_,e-gtifi-c_ n,o.yledge-, withoutrepudiat-

-il_g_ -t5p.gt_eriat"f9_e i v--lq.ylti_ghkngw-l,e_dgg1ç-lates. Thus the propor-tion ofsocial and material content to knowledge varies in differentdomains of knowledge. The differentproportionsand the differentways their interaction plays out are the verybasis for the prolifera-tionof paradigms across the realmof human knowledge andtheirsuccession through time.

The constructivismI prefer follows alongthese lines. It does notdraw a sharp distinctionbetween materialand socialrealities-thematerial andthe socialcontaminate each other, but variably-andit pçp*nS -eçU ço,y9{91g4 y-tg qither the material 9I th9- social bydefiningthe other out of existence. It -does f-ipd.goqiallymade con-tent da-mina-nl-iUand fo: th-ç. indi.v-i{pa-twilloutdqnyingthe inde-pendenl l 4ugl"r-ealityof individualsas materially.situated bio-logicalbeings. To say that people and societies construct each otheris not to implythat this is done whollyout of mind, as Goodman

wouldseem to have suggested.,' Constructivismmarks a place to begin, howeverprovisionally.I Poststructuralism qffçfs--a- -m.qfç, ladiçalpçritiqn.Allgrounds aregroundl.tíattlounAutioísip..iout.For Jacques Derrida,no posi-tion is radical enough be,c_aupg rljsqp-osltion. "Every stance that Der-rida articulateshas its'pro'and'anti'aspects;every position that headopts is immediatelyrendered nugatory" (Megill1985:266).Underthe circumstance, never begin, always withhold orsubvert, and say,as Derridahas said, that what one does say is always prefatorytowhat cannot be said (pp.27l-272).

Derrida cannotbegin withoutadoptinga logocentricstance, apositionfromwhichto begin. Just this stance hobbles Western phi-losophyfromits Greek origins(Derrida1976: 10-18,30-44). InDerrida'suse, the term "logocentrism"is difficultto specify straight-forwardly,for any such specificationwouldbe an enactment oflogocentrism.Nevertheless, I quote Richard K. Ashley's interpreta-tion both for being faithfulto Derrida'smeaning (as ifone couldsay this withoutseriouslybreaching Derrida's intent,whatever thatmightbe) and for relevance to InternationalRelations. The "logo-centric disposition"is

Constructivism

the expectation that all practice must secure recognitionandpower by appe,elto_ -o,tn-e,idçl_ ç_e _ç-"-o,gqg-io-gqness,principleofinterpretation,el,n'e-ce.g,g41ypubjectivity-some central andoriginarypremise necessary to the makingand interpretationof history-whichis itselfregarded as unproblematic,extra-historicaland, helce, in need of no criticalaccounting. This

trueand

central subjectõfhiítoiiôál-nãirativeof-course hasno one necessary form.It mightbe identifiedwiththe posses-sive individual,the rationalstate, the national community,thescientificman, the consciousness of the proletariat, the fallofthe family,the femininevoice, the general will,immanent im-peratives of mankind,the West, structuralism'sKantian"con-sciousness withouta knowingsubject," the universalpragmaticsof Habermas's "ideal speech situation,"God, king,phallus, orwomb. Vy'hat matters is that thissubject, this viewpoint,thisprincipleof interpretation and practice is conceived as existingin itself,as a foundaJion or originof history's making, not asa contingent effectof politicalpractice withinhistory(1988:93-94).

I believe that pp-ststructuralistsare substantiallycorrect in empha-sizing thelogocentriccontent of the many dualities longdominatingWelte-.r,4 lhought.On the one side are mind,subject, consciousness,rationality,standingoutsidehistoryor havingthe word. On theother are matter, object, not knowingor understanding, being caughtin history or having fallenfromgrace. I wouldeither abandon mostof these dual constructions or render them so differentlyas to,€x-pose, or even nullify,the deference demanded by difference.(HereI play witha well-knowntheme of Derrida's, helpfullypresented byNorris1982: 24-32, 46-48.)

Furthermore,I believe that the constructivismI offerin these

pages successfully overcomes these dualities by treatingpeople andsociety as each the product of the other's construction. Readers mayfindthis reminiscent of the Hegelian solution to the dualityof thesisand antithesis in the dialecticalmovement called synthesis. Post-structuralistsare no more content with"the 'ternary rhythm'ofHegelianphilosophy"than theyare withthe characteristic dualitiesof Western thought(Megill1985: 273, quotingfroman as yet un-translated text of Derrida's).Instead, "slouchingonto the scene

41

Iü 1 -&*: *iffi*

4342 Part í: Rules Constructivism



42 :

comes the Derridean four,"as AllanMegillhas rather colorfullyputit, "a disreputableupsetting four, one that absolutely refuses to be-have. The possibilityof a fourthmovement of the dialecticdestroysthe whole dialecticmachine. . ' . The fourthmovement is the de-constructivemovement"(pp.273-274: see also Nelson 1983: 183-184on the "sophisticcounter-traditionof four-thinking").

Throughoutthis book I locate instances of a recurring threefold

divisionof whatever social constructionI am alludingto at thatmoment. Eithçr Iha-ve -invç$p-dth -s- pattpr4 n pn obqe..ss-iye u h41dlvoUginal.-açto,f 9g-o,c.çn $9m, o1-i resultq f1om .q9.g1ç g-9-49$|p-t9p-ertvof social construction.ObviouslyI prefer to thinkI have stumbledon the latter; poststructuralists (and who else?) willthinkthis isatransparent rationalizationof a logocentricdrive. Whatever thecase,my penchant for threes places me as far from the countertraditionof "four-thinking"as it does fromthe West's dominant traditionofbinary thinking.

I do not wish to implythat people do not construct and then de-pend on dualities. Our dominanttraditionis thê bësíbósiible evi-dence of the extent to which theydo. ObviouslyI do too, and I doso expressly in thiswork.Nor do I wish to implythat poststructuralistshave nothingapposite to say to a constructivist. On the contrary, IfindMichelFoucault'sgenealogical inquiriestellingreconstructionsô-i úhat I úiúôôil iègimês of rúle, Fclucaut hilÌiself'the endlesslvrepeated play of dominations."(1977: 150; for an especially conciseand effectivediscussion, see Connolly1983: 231-238).

Whatcannot be reconciled withconstructivismis deconstruction,at least when that practice is carried very lar. If it may be said that"Foucaultdeconstructs the modern subject,"it is no different to say:"Heconstructs genealogies of modernformationswhichengenderthe subject, . ." (Connolly1983: 234). Comparethis withDerrida:"Thevery conceptof constitutionitselfmust be deconstructed" (Der-

rida quoted in TiânìiÏàtoÍ"sPiefãee;1'976: 1i). Mygoâl is recqlstruc-tion. With thatgoal comes logocentrisrn.The logocentrismI concede is this:T 9 391_.o-fggnstruction, the

co-constitutionof people and society, mak-çs history. As such, it is"the theme and central subject of historicalnarrative. . ." (repeatingAshley's words, 1988: 93). Even though I conceive of this "viewpoint"as "the foundationor originof history's making,"social construc-tion is nevertheless "a contingent effect of politicalpractices within

history"(pp. 93-94). I can have it bothways because I do not acceptAshley'stotalizingduality-thatwe are either outside historyor withinit. We are alúàys withinour constructións, even as we Choosè ìostand apart fromthem, condemn them, reconstruct them.

Deconstruction privilegeswords in a war on words. It is logocen-tricin its own narrowway. The importance then of Goethe's apho-rism, Inthe beginningwas the deed, is that it denies priorityto eitherthe wordor the world (compare Redner 1982: 56-58, 67-75). A"deed" is intelligibleonly as jointlya social construction and naturalevent, produced by mindyet phenomenalin its own right.What isrevolutionaryabout such a positionis that it turns philosophybackto ontology,thereby enabling arapprochement of philosophyandsocial theory thatprivileges neither at the expense of the other (com-pare Aronson1984).At least in the English-speakingworld,I feelsafe in saying, this "ontologicalturn"(my term) ismore Wittgen-stein's doing thananyone else's.

WITTGENSTEIN'S PLACE

Wittgensteinhas had an enormous influenceon Philosophyand so-cial theory, precisely because he is seen at the junctureof the two.It wouldbe difficult to findany recent writerwhose prestige is sohigh,especially in relation to (perhaps because of) a bodyof workso slender, unsystematic, andgnomicin character. This may even bethe secret of Wittgenstein's success. His texts, morethan most, de-mand that the reader do the workof supplyingmeaning to the words

,'i'hêsees. Myreading of Wittgensteindeparts fromthat of many so-'eiàl theorists, though less from thatof some philosophers.Everyone agrees that early in his career Wittgensteinauthored the

most rigorousexpositionof language as a vehicle for representing real-ityever put forward (1961).This was the culmination

ofa centuries-

long philosophical programin support of the logocentric worldview:Language affordsus sufficientdistance fromthe worldthat we canrepresent the worldas it is, includingour place in it, through language.Wittgensteinrepudiated that programin his later work,whichcan beseen as a guerrillacampaign against his earlier work. ThatWittgen-stein did not attack his own system systematicallyfollows fromhis rec-ognitionthat systematic exposition - a coherent representation of an

ffi& r:iffi*i :

Constructivism 4544 Part 1: Rules



I

Here the arrayof "conventions"are not patterns of lifewhichdifferentiatehuman beings fromone another, but thoseexigencies of conduct and feeling whichall humans share.Wittgenstein'sdiscovery, or rediscovery, is of the depth ofconvention in human life;a discovery whichinsists not onlyon the conventionalityof human society but, we couldsay, on the conventionalityof human nature itself(1979:

il1).What is most strikingabout this interpretationis the rhetorical{skillwithwhichit endeavors to affirm thatWittgensteinwas abrilliantlyoriginal thinkerwhile acknowledgingthat his social ideasare quite ordinary.First there is his discovery,then, as an aside,rediscovery and again, finally,a discovery. What was this "discov-ery"?-thatin the beginning-,before society, are some fundamen-tal traits_co_q .qr-g11-1lggryhgar.e human. In the beginningwas na-ture, "hum?.r.ruatur-e." Wittgenstein's often-quotedallusionsto "thenatural historyof human beings" (1968:415; compare par. 25) wouldseem to support thisinterpretation,as would Wittgenstein'sinterestin the relationof what is normalto what isnatural (Cavell 1979:

llr-l2s).That there is sqçh 4.,lhiqgq9 h_upa,n nature is among the most oon-

ventiona-l of ideas about the human condition,at least in my culturaltradition,l9-Co_993l11c-"3;it is. It has had its vogue in recent decades-in the formof Jean Piaget's invariant stages of cognitiveand moraldevelopment in children (see further chapter 3), Claude kvi-Strauss'suniversals of opposition and transformationin human thoughtandculture, Noam Chomsky's ideas about innate syntactical competence.In greater or lesser degree the inspiraiionfoithismôvement, broadlydescribed as structuralism,is the iniiSie"nçé-that cognitionhas its

"U1-lóeifdTij"[ç]üre,:ïnetëp ndêiiï-ol s o ôìëtie s aiid thçir c o nve n-tiõ;;,-o niri'éièimpiirieabí Éneu àeé,

-õnóè-ïhê ]âf ïèf i S s triilpedo f it s

social content. (See Gardner l98lforan accessible and sensible in-troductionto the structuralistmovement.)Whilestructuralismisone pronounced twistin this century's linguisticturn, its premisesare anything but constructivist.Instead, poststructuralistrepudiationof structuralism'sabsorption withwhat may be innate in the humanmindhas taken a constructivistline, almost as a dialecticalnecessity, I

allegedlycoherent reality-isthe problem.Yet Wittgenstein'scam-paign was not merely one of random assaults. Ifa particular concep-tionof language supported the prevailingworldview,then an alterna-tive view- for Wittgenstein,what language is, is a matter of how peo-ple use it-wouldprovidethe key to discreditingthat worldview.

As a whole,social theorists see the later Wittgenstein as a self-conscious constructivistwhodethroned words for deeds. I do not.

I see him as someone whose turn fromepistemology, to,.91 o.'fogy\registered in his life-longpreoccupation withlanguàge. By dislodg-'ing a particularconception of language on philosophicalgrounds,Wittgensteinmade constructivisma plausibleproject for social theory.Doingso did not make Wittgensteina social theoristhimself.

To the extent that Wittgensteinrevealed an interest in social theory,it wouldseem to have been confined to the familiarthesis that human-itygives rise to custom and institutions'These in turn formthe back-drop against whichhuman activitytranspires. Such a viewpermittedWittgensteinto investigate what individualsdo withlanguage in so-ciallygiven circumstances. In rWittgenstein'swords "the speaking oflanguage is part of an activity,or of a form oflife"(1968: par. 23; simi-

larly,"to imagine a language means to imagine a formof life"par. l9).Forms of lifeare produced by many speakers in agreement. Theconventions and institutionsgiving"form"to "life"more specificallymake lifesocial. Childrenlearn language and are sociallyformed atthe same time. In Wittgenstein'swords, they "are brought up to per-form these actions, to use these words as they do so, and to reactin this way to the words of others" (1968: par. 6, his emphasis). Fromthe individual'spoint of view, formsare firmenough to orienthercognitiveactivity, or"language games," whichare countless in num-ber and variety (1968: par. 23). Wittgenstein'spoint of view is con-sistently the individual'spoint of view.

On this reading, V/ittgenstein'ssocial theory is a rather naive con-ventionalism, to whichDavid Humehad long before given classicexpression (more on this in chapter 5). There is an alternativeinter-pretation, however, associated withStanley Cavell (1979: 86-lll)andHanna FenichelPitkin(1972 132-139;.e1 quote Cavell:

8. Though not publisheduntil1979, Cavell's workappeared in 196l as his doctoraldissertation, in whichformPitkinused it extensively.

"i*ffiú ' Ë*- 1

Part 1: Rules 476 Constructivism



and thus to a radicaldegree. Ifnothingis innate, then everythingis p,tgcariolls. (Fish 1980: 215-216).The term "decÔnstruction"saysas much.e

f- Howhas Wittgenstein figured in this sequence? Not at all.Whethert his social theory is conventionalistor naturalist, it is in any event exigu-ous and pedestrian. More tothe point, it is nol constructivist.Atbest,Wittgenstein's insistence on "the multiplicity oflanguage games" (his

listof examples is perhaps the single most quoted passage fromhiswork;1968: par.23) helps to offset the logocentricdesire to findcogni-tiveuniversals in recurrent cultural tendencies-apropensitywhichWittgensteinas read by Cavell does nothing todispel.

I want tomake a last pointon this subject. The structuralistsmaybe right in thatthe beginning must be some version of the word,some innate propertyof mind whichorients cognitionand relates

_ to culture throughlanguage competence and use. I return to thispossibilityin chapter 3 and there hold toan agnostic viewof the sub-ject. To do so is to accept that constructivismlimits whatone canprofess to know aboutsuch matters. Myownpsychoculturalpen-chant for logocentrism,rationalizedas detachment and mediated by

irony, induces an ünrealizable wishtô begin withaphilosophical

grounding for constructivism,as a matter óf social theory, which ispriorto, or outside. of, t-he constitutionof historyand society.

Wittgenstein is no help here-no one can help. So I offer a construc-tivism witha false beginning: In the beginningwas the deed. The questforphilosophic groundingcan lead to a logocentricdetachment fromthe ground of social experienceand, in any event, finds onlylimits.Perhaps I should call thepositionI take here bounded, not grounded,constructivism.Nevertheless it is constrúctivist.Human-beings, withwhateverequipment nature and/or society provides,construct society,anOìõóiëtiis"iiicliiËëdsãbleto the áctualization of whatever humanbeings'iìáyiiiiáiurâÌly"be; society coístructs human'bèì,ngs out of theraw materialsof nature, whether inner nature or, less problemati-cally, the oúter nature of their materialcircumstances.

9. Phenomenology alsoemphasizes that social constitutionis always, and only,aproduct of intersubjective accommodation,whichis inevitablysubject to disrup-tionand failure.HaroldGarfinckel's famous experiments in "breaching"providevividdemonstration of the fragilityof social meaning. For a sensitive introduc-tion toSchutz's and Carfinckel'swork alongthese lines, see Heritage (1984)'

What then is Wittgenstein'scontribution toconstructivismas so-cial theory, beyond an aphoristicand, as I put it, false beginning?Judging fromthe vast literatureinvokingthe later Wittgenstein, itmust be his concern for language in use, so explicitlyrevisinghisearlier paradigmatic formulationof language as representation. Inswitching from the "picturetheory"of language to "language games,"Wittgensteindiscovered, no, rediscovered Qtace Cavell) theplace ofrules in language and, if language be a matter of use (use is a socialmatter, after all), in society. If Imay say, V/ittgensteininsisted onthe intimacyof logos and nomos withoutestablishingall the con-nections. Atbest he pointed to a vague "familyresemblance" be-tween them in his use of the term "rule."ro

In keeping withhis position on language as a matter of use, Wittgen-stein sought to convey thesense of the term "rule"by examining itsuse.His illustrationsare characteristically rulesused to play games (hence"language games"; see 1968: par. 53-54), although it is never quite clearwhat agame mightbe. There are twopossibilities.One, a game is a sys-tem of logicallyrelated symbols- a language having no social mean-ing in itself.Whether people playthe gamq or use its language, is inci-

dental. Two, agame

must have a language or, to say the same thing, alqgic,but it is not a game untilpeople play it. In both instances, rulestell us how to play a game. In the firstinstance, thçy "govern"the game.Nottóúse*voittro"rules alters the game and c;ìffii;ãAhãmul-tiplicityof games. In the second instance, rulesguide play.Not to use arule sacrifices guidance but neither the factof pËíiiorthe game itself.

Philosophers tend, I think, tosee Wittgenstein's rulesas govern-ing games of language and logic. Such games do not depend on theirplay; play depends on them. "WhenI obey a rule, I do not choose.I obey the rule blindly"n(1968: par. 219, emphasis in original).Onthis view, however,games, and thus their rules, are necessarily pub-lic.Wittgenstein is clear that there can be no such thingas a private

10. The term "familyresemblance" is Wittgenstein's (1968: par. 67).It is one of hismost famous, and useful, formulations(Recall introduction, footnote l2).

I l. Wittgensteinaccepted the possibilityof free play, for example, "playingaimlesslywitha ball . . ." (1968: par. 83). The rule here is that rules associated withanyknowngame to be played witha ballare suspended. Anyplayer doingas shewishes wouldstillbe following thatrule and doing so blindly.Free play dependson a game withthat one rule.

#Ë

t

itc[ *.jt ;,

Ë."&i::\l.1r "Éf.' 'I;; i,. {.: ìf

Ì'*L:*T. .àâ 5,#t

,Ë'i.i&i'f, l

lit' I

F

* íffi i:. ïÍl

498 Part 1: Rules Constructivism



theory in his workdisregard the distinctionbetween publicrules gorr-erning]4nguagg. and social rules guiding use as a matter of course.Instead theywant to move from the propositionthat language is rule-governed (whichit is whether representing realityor being "a partof an activity")to the proposition that everything human beings do, 'everythingsocial, is rule-governed. Peter Winch methodicallyspelledout the latterpositionin The Idea of a SociolScience and Its Rela'

tion to Philosophy(1958).Because Winchprovided so much moreto workwiththan Wittgenstein, this workhas been the subject ofa number of careful critiques(forexample: Flathman1972: 17-33,Bernstein 1978:63-84, Bhaskar1979:169-195,Bloor1983: 168-181).I suspect that some of these critiques are motivated bya protectiveconcern for Wittgenstein'sreputation.Others have found Winchauseful stand-infor the elusive master.

In any case, Winch'sbold statement "that all behaviour whichis meaningful(therefore all specificallyhuman behaviour) is ipsofacto rule-governed"(1958: 52) commands attention. Winch's projectwas to demonstrate a decisive differencebetween the realms of naturalcause and thus natural science, and human intentionand thus social ,

science.Yet Roy Bhaskarhas

argued that "the rule-followingpara- \

digmpresupposes the category of causality"(1979:186, emphasis in I

original).I think this iscorrect. It is difficultto sustain the claimthat causalityand intentionare primary, mutuallyexclusivesourcesof reality, no less than the inference drawntherefromthat naturaland human sciences are inviolablydistinctspheres.

V/inchmay have meant that rules govern,not just meaning, butbehavior directly;rules are causes. On this construction,however,Winchhas succeeded in keeping cause and intentionseparate bymaking people automatons. Whatever theyintend, they cause noth-

ïi.ï,"*iïï,i.,iÏ:lïï;:fflJ:i iïï'ffïï:ïy,,".",i:ïïH,'l\ Ioverned behavior. No behavior can be otherwise.Without clarify-ing anythingfurtherabout rules,Winchcannot have said anythingabout behavior, whether linguisticor social.

Winchremarked that "Wittgenstein'saccount of what it is to fol-lowa rule is, for obvious reasons, givenprincipallywithan eye toelucidating the nature of language" (1958: 45). Winchneeded to ex-tend that account to all intentionalactivityin order to defeatMichaelOakeshott's position (as Winchsaw it, 1958: 57, his emphasis) "thatmost human bchaviourcan be adequately described in terms of the

language. That rules are publicdoes not make them directlysocial,any more than does theirexistence depend on "regularuse" or,,cus-tom"r2(Wittgenstein 1968: par. l9g).Rules govern language whichpeople then use for social purposes.

Those of wittgenstein'sinterpreters who want to finda social

l2' wittgenstein'sargument about the impossibilityof private language has prompteda hot debate among philosophers.

On one side, Saul KripketfóSZlhà, u.J*ãthat wittgensteinpointed to the radicallyskepticar üew that words or-symbols-inaruled relationcan have no stable meaning, even to oneself, unless zupphJ bfcommunityagreement. Kripkeherd this to be akin to Hume's,.skepticatproutemi'about the impossibilityof inferringcause. Hume's ..skepticatsorutión"to ihisprob-lem was convention- we substituteconventionfor cause to make realitycoherent(pp' 67-69,92-r0r)-I am not sure that Hume's conventionalismis his solutionto the problem of cause except incidentaily,but rather it was his sorution to theproblem of howpeople, already constituted as such, construct societies in whichregularityand predictabilityare achieved. In other words, I thinkKripkehas con_fused Hume the philosopher withHume the social theorist.

Türningto the other side of the debate, Kdpke's critics have rejected, I thinkdecisively,the contentionthat wittgensteinhad proposed a skeptical problemakinto Hume's. They go on to conclude that wittgensteincouldnot have intendedKripke'sskeptical solution.This is not so cleai. whileHume may not have de_

vised his view of conventionto cope withthe probremof cause, wittgensteinwasan unreliableconsumer of Hume's social theory and couldwellhuu. p..ruppor.ãit for his position on the matter of folrowingruies and the impossiuilítvor p.iuatelanguage. Consider the alternative:

Hence followinga rule is an activity,a praxis. It is a misinterpretationto take.Praxis,here to signifya soiialpractice. . . . The pointìs zol toestablish that language necessarily invoivesa community.. . , but thai'words are deeds.' . . . Nothingin tLisdiscussion involvesun' *n.,,niin'"nito a multiplicityof agents. Allthe emphasis is on the regulaiity, the multi_ple occasions, of action . . . lBakerand Hacker, Dsq, ú;tn.ii.*púarirj.The most glaring feature of [Wittgensteinl9óg: para. lgS_2}2listhat thewords'custom,"practice' and'use' are never qualifiedwith,sociâr'or,com-munity'-and .social custom./practice, is nítpleonastrc. Surely Wittgen_tein would have inserted these qualifyingadjËctives ifhe really rnoni iomaintain a social conceptionof rule_follõwin;,. . . .Wittgenstein do;r;;'c-ustom'and 'practice'to suggest the idea of ãultiplicity,-butit i,

" -uiti-licityof instances of rule-followingnot of persois who folÌowthe rules(McGinn1984: 78; his emphasis).

If these critics are right, then rules for wittgensteincan have no social meaningat all' This strikesme as a perversery narrow construction of what witrgensteiímust have meant. But if Kripke's"community view"is right, then wittiensteinhad a taken-for-grantedsociar theorythat providedrurcs witha taken-forì'grantedsocial context.

i1' .t*ìiW

50 Part 1: Rules 51

Ì.i:

rlo

#lr

Constructivism



lrxí',ilitj Bhaskar's version,"a rule normally tellsus what formsof action

are possible (ifit is constitutive) orpermissible(ifit is regulotive) . .;'(1979: 184, his emphasis). FollowingWittgenstein, Winchtook rulesto be constitutiveand then had them do service in contexts whererules must be regulative.Bhaskar was undoubtedly rightin his con-clusion,given the distinction uponwhichit rests.

Yet the distinctionbetween constitutive rules and regulativerules

is itselfuntenable, at least fromthe pointof viewI am proposinghere. In the social reality that people construct (and constructs peg-iile),what'peopletake to be possible and what society makes per--missible depend onvantage point,one's relation topractice, and notpractice itself. Ascategories, the possible and the permissible findno'iupportin Kant. Hisconcern was to discriminatebetween strictlylogical relations, whichas a category are ruled by constitutiveprin-ciples, and existential relations ruled byregulativeprinciples'

The rest ofthe sentence I just quoted fromBhaskar reads: "it[re-ferringto'a rule']does not normallytellus how to carry on." Thisis exactlywrong. Rufçs do indeed tell us how to carry on, and theygo about it in three distinctways, to be elaborated in the next chap-ter. They do not tellus everything we would liketo knowas we carryon. No human creationcould dothat. In other words, rules cannotprovideclosure for the purposes of carryingon because rules are notthe sufficientagency whereby intentionsbecome equivalent to causes.IfWinch tended to suppose otherwise in order to give the realmsof intentionand cause separate but equalstanding, thusto advancehis projectof keeping the naturaland social sciences apart, we arenot obliged to do the same. We can easily enough construe rules asan important,perhaps even constitutivelydecisive agency for therealizationof human intentionsand thereby an indispensablepartof what humanbeings need to take intoaccount to be able to "carryon" in a socially constructed world.

Contemporary discussion of the Kantiandistinctionbetween con-

stitutionand regulationstems froman importantessay of Rawls'(1955), whichnonetheless does not use the terms "constitution"and"regulation."Instead Rawls identified twoconcepts of rules, one a"s.ummaryview"of rules and the other a view in which"rules-arepiçtured as defininga practice" (1955: 24). The formerrefers to gen-'eral rules or scientific laws which,existentially speaking,can neverbe more than "generalizationsfromexperience" (p. 24). The latter,

notion of habit oÍ custom and that neither the notion of rule northat of reflectiveness is essential to it."winchsubstituted ,,rule', for"habit"to make his point here and, by doing so, supported the propo_sitionthat the social realm of intentionalitystood apart fromnaturalcause, to which"mindless"habitand custom could easily be assimi-lated. winchaccomplished the limitedobjectiveof exposing oake-shott for overreaching withhabit as explanation for everythúg,butat the cost of overreaching

withhis alternative, whichis rulè.Furthermore, winchfailed to see that for wittgensteincustom iscentral to the natural historyof humanity. others have noted a num-ber of conservative influences and tendencies in wittgenstein's work(Bloor1983: 160-181, Flathman1986: 159, 169; bur see pirkin1972:328-340, fora contraryview).we can hardlybe surprised to findwittgensteinadopting a viewcomparable to oakeshott's well-knownconservatism. In the circumstance, and somewhat ironically,winch'srebuttal of oakeshott exposes wittgenstein's ingenuous social theoryas well. Inasmuch as oakeshott elsewhere developed an important so-cial theory dedicated to showing howhuman practices, whichin-clude rules and habits, sort themselves into two fundamental typesof human association (1975),oakeshott is less a victimof winch'sdemonstrationthan wittgenstein(Bloorl9g3:169-lil)and, becauseof his reliance on Wittgenstein, Winchhimself.

what winch lacked was any way to ask specificquestions aboutrules that are not just rules governinglanguage. Take Bhaskar's listof questions winchnever considered: "(a) what explains the rulesthemselves?; (b)what explains the agent's rule-followingon any par_ticularoccasion?; and (c) what explains the acquisitionof rui.ruythe social individualin the firstplace?" (1979: lg5). Each of thesequestions can be asked differentty:(a) who makes the rules and howdo the makers benefit fromdoing so? (b) whydo people followruleswithoutconsideringwhomakes them and how they and others areaffected by doing so? (c) Howis a rule orientation(,,the acquisition

of rule")related to reflection,habit,cognitivedevelopment? Muchof Part one is addressed to these questions. For the moment though,I reformulatethem to take Bhaskar's importantargument a stepfurther.

Bhaskar accused winchof not distinguishingbetween constitutiverules and regulativerules. This time-honored distinctiongoes backto Kant,as we saw above, and has flourishedin recent decades. In

rffil :iffiK&l :r

52 Part 1: Rules 53

g

illt.iiÌ:;,L

Constructivism



practice rules, are both constitutiveand regulative(pp.25,30).I thinkthat Rawls was clarifyingthe waywe use the word"rule"to refer to bothcause and intention.we have separate concepts of rule for each realm.Inasmuch as we can stand back fromthe web of intentionalactivityconstituting the social and see causal patterns, we use both conceptsfor a sociallyconstructedworld.This, however,dp ef not change thef4ct thpl alt rules in a spciallyconstructed realityare relatêrlìô/iractice.

Notjust Bhaskar, but others distinguishing'betweencbnstitutionand regulation(forexample, Searle 1969: 33-42,Flathman 1972:

77-81)have muddied these waters considerablyby insistingon thedistinctionas one of types.t3 I repeat: Rules are both constitutiveandregulative. Rawls'associationof practice and a concept of rules hav-ing to do withintentions is very much to the point.practices are thecontent of carrying on. when human beings take rules into accountin order to carryon, they often do so at the level of self-consciousreflection.They always do so at the levelof"practicalconsciousness",as AnthonyGiddens would have it (1979: 53-59; 1982: 30-32; l9g4:4l-45)."The knowledgeabilityinvolvedin practicalconsciousnessconforms generally to the Wittgensteinnotionof ,knowinga rule,or'knowinghow to go on"'(1982:3l).

STRUCTURATION

That philosophers are, at best, adventitious social theorists wouldseem to limittheirhelp in constructing a constructivistpositionfor

13' Rawls himselfmay have slipped here: "some rules willfitone conception, somerules the other, . . ." (1955:29). Such a position is defensible only insofaras rulesare marked for functionalspecialization.Thus legalphilosopher H. L.A.Hart(1961: 77-96) typed all rules either as primaryor secondary, the formerbeingregulativeand the latteÍ constitutiveas a matter of functionalspecialization.InearÌier work (1974:22-35), I drew a distinctionbetween "interactiverules,' and"institutiverules," the formerreguÌativein functionand the latter constitutive.That rules are necessarily constitutiveand regulative,at least on the constructiv-ist view,does not preclude discriminationamong rules by reference to their in-tended functionalspecialization.Institutionsare of course the conceptualmarkerfor such instances of specialization. consequentlyit is perfectlylegitimatetoidentifysecondary or institutiverules as a conceptuallyestablished nexus of ruleswithoutrequiringthat they be rules of a distinctivecategory. For more on therelation of institutionto constitution,and their relation to categories of rute, seechapters 2 and 4.

{.ctÍl

*.*.

the purpose of social theory.Yet most social theoristsare no helpeither. Even if they have constructivistinclinations,they do not de-velop their position systematically-theydo not begin early enough.I make this generalization for the worldof English language scholar-ship, but even here there are some exceptions.

One is the phenomenological concern withthe constitutionofeveryday life.This concern substantially originatedwithEdmund

Husserl and his difficultnotionof "I*benswel/,life-world."The knowledge of the objective-scientificworldis "grounded"in the self-evidence of the life-world.The latter is pregiven tothe scientificworker,or the workingcommunity,as ground;yet as th€y buildupon this, what is builtis something different.Ifwe cease being immersed in our scientificthinking,we be-come aware that we scientists are, after all,human beings andas such among the components of the life-worldwhichalwaysexists for us, ever pregiven;and thus all of science is pulled,along withus, into the merely"subjective-relative"life-world(1970: 130-131,quoted in Bernstein1978: 129:' see generallyBernstein's excellent discussion,pp. 126-135).

Husserl's impacton English language social theory has been limitedboth by the legendary obscurityof his writing(compare 1970: xxi-xxiion the translator's problems)and because of the seeming para-dox of his conjoined interest in subjectivityand transcendental phi-losophy. In Husserl's philosophy, the term "transcendental" refersnot to Kant's a prioricategories of experience (chapter 3, footnotes3, 14) but to "I-myself'(1970:98)."Thewhole transcendental setof problems circlesaround the relationof this [I-myselfl,my "I". . .

and my conscious lifeto the world ofwhich I am conscious"(p. 98,emphasis in translation).The relationitselfcomes from"directex-perience of the long-felt but constantlyconcealed dimensions of the

'transcender"'(p. 100, his emphasis). Whatever direct experiencemay be, social it is not.The phenomenologicalappreciationof everyday lifegained its ac-

cess to the English-speakingworld throughAlfredSchutz. RichardJ. Bernstein suggested two reasons for this (1978:135-136). Schutz'sinterests centered less on subjective states and intentions thanon theconstruction of an intersubjectiveworld orsociety. In developing hisinterests, Schutz, whohad emigratedfromGermany to the United

t:ffi

54 Part 1: RulesT#.ã&.

Constructivism 55



#Ë

Ë$iïí

FÌ

I

WhileBerger and Luckmann broached some of Bernstein's ques-tions, "at best they made some importantpreliminarydistinctions,rather than developingan adequate conceptual scheme" (Bernstein1978:255 n. 49). Because any unqualifiedreference to "reality"pa-pers over the tension between the constitutionof meaning and ofsociety, it tolerates a bias in favor of one over the other. Ifonlybytheir omissions, Berger and Luckmannfavored the constitutionofmeaning. Yet Berger and Luckmann'ssketchy presentation can hardlybe blamed for the extent to which a usefulphrase has become acliché, anoverworkedexcuse to say nothingfurther.

Giddens is another exceptionto the general propositionthat so-cial theorists withconstructivistinclinationshave failedto defendihiòpositionmëthÕdically.No less exceptionalis the sophisticationoflGiddenst soôiãt"theoryand the care withwhichhe has placed itin the context of social theory'smajor traditions.TWo such tradi-tions are fundamental for Giddens. One is posit'ivist,the other inter:p*Lç ,r"-v-g;the firstrepresented by structuralismand functionalism,thesecond by hermeneutics, "the art of textual interpretation"(Dall-mayr and McCarthy1977:285;see pp. 285-365 for a useful introduc-

tion),and phenomenology. The second also includes followersofWittgenstein(Giddens 1982: 3l-32,1984: 2l-23).In Giddens' map of social theory, these two traditionsare dia-

metricallyopposed in crucial respects. The firsttakes a "naturalisticstandpoint"and is "inclinedtoward objectivism"(1984: l). Conse-

Jquently, it finds nofundamental differencebetween natural and so- i -cial science. As the very terms "functionalism"and "structuralism"lsuggest, this traditionemphasizes "the pre-eminence of the sociaLwholeover its individualparts (i.e., its constituentactors, humansubjects)" (p. l). By contrast, the second traditionfixeson the hu-man subject.

Subjectivityis the preconstituted centre of the experience of cul-ture and history and as óuch provides the basic foundations ofthe socialor human sciences. Outside the realm of subjectiveexperience, and alien to it, lies the materialworld,governedby impersonal relationsof cause and effect. .. . If interpretativesociologies are founded, as it were, upon an imperialismof thesubject, functionalismand structuralismpropose an imperialismof the social object (pp. l-2).

isi

states in the 1930s, drew on pragmatist themes in Americanphi-losophyto support his phenomenology.I wouldadd what Bernsteinmade clear, but not in the contextof phenomenology's reception:schutz downplayed Husserl's transcendental claimsand subjectivistpreoccupations(p. l4l,but see pp. 158-159 on schutz's ,,ambivalentattitudetoward Husserl's project of a definitivetranscendental phi-losophy and phenomenology").

on inspection,Schutz's phenomenology,forwhichBernstein'scharacterizationsuffices better than any I might provide(197g:135-

156; see also Giddens1976: 27-33, Shapiro lggl:100_107), showssome cracks in its foundation(this is Bernstein,s metaphor; see pp.156-167). They are but vérsions of one problem. constiiution"urii",henomenologicalfreighton two tracks: the constitutionof subjec-tive meaning and the constitutionof society. A constructivistap-proach presumably treats meaning and society as co-constituted.Here I quote Bernstein because I agree withhim so completely:

stillthere are crucialambiguities. Is our primaryconcern thea priorimodes in whichany transcendental ego constitutes ameaningfulworld?Are we dearing withthe modes of constitu-tionby whichany wide-awakeindividualin the everyday worldgives meaning to this world? Arewe concerned withthe wayswhereby the groupor class withinwhichan individualfunt_tions influencesthe specificschemes of interpretation,formsof typification,and systems of relevance of his biologicallydetermined situation?(1978: 160-16l)

Bernstein went on to say that ,,an adequate phenomenologymustdeal withallthese questions,'(197g:16l, his emphasisy. tndeãá, I tryto deal withthem, one way or another, throughout this book. schutzand his successors have not. Either they have performed detailed in-vestigations of the co-constitutionof meaning and society while

. steadfastly refusingto acknowledge Bernstein's evidentlyimportanti questions. Here I have HaroldGarfinckel'sethnomethodoiogy inmind (196J Heritage 1984). or the co-consriturionof meaninjândsociety is collapsed into the nevertheless useful phrase, ,,the s=ocialconstruction of reality"(I use it on occasion in these pages), whichPeter L.Berger and Thomas Luckmannpopularized in-ttreirtgozbookof that title.

a

56 Part 1: Rules Constructivism 57



Giddens' constructionof the situationin social theorybears lit-tle resemblance to the situationtypicallypresented in discussionsof theoryin InternationalRelations and, for that matter, politicalScience. Theory in InternationalRelationswould seem to be domi-nated by a differentpolarity(compare Singer 1961, ÌWendt 1987a:340-349). Onepositiontakes an objectiviststance but emphasizesthe preeminence of the individual.It does so by attributingto the

individualan abilityto objectivizeher circumstances as a series of1 choices to whichshe responds rationally.She always chooses the al-ternative that, to the best of her (generallydeeply flawed)knowl-edge, willsecure the outcomeshe prefersJa The other positionalsotakes an objectiviststance but places the social wholeover individu-als. It is indeed Giddens'firsttradition,represented by structuralismand functionalism.InternationalRelations simplyhas no name foçor experience with,Giddens' second tradition.

It would seem that Giddens has collapsed two sets of polarities, one-epistemologicaland the other ontological.The objectivist-subjectivistpolarityis epistemological,the individualist-collectivistpolarityon-tological.Quite properlyGiddens feltthat the usual practice is toidentifyonly the firstpolarity

Q98a: \.But in identifying

the secondas well,he failed to keep it separate fromthe first.Each is an inde-pendent ground for serious disagreement among social theorists. Toacknowledgethis allows the constructionof a four-cellmatrixofgeneral possibilitiesfor social theory.

Giddens' workshows ample awareness of poststructuralistandsocial choiceorientations.He has been willingto draw frombothwithoutacknowledgingeither as having the foundationalpropertiesof hermeneutics and phenomenology or functionalismand struc-turalism.This is a mistake. Allthose social theorists who turn to

I 4. Thisposition is occupied by scholars who are otherwise opposed on most substan-tive and methodologicalissues. On one side are those drawing from the largelyaxiomatized theoryof social choice, in which rationalactoÍs act to secure pre-ferred outcomes under externallyfixedconstraints. On the other side are those

, drawingfroman experimentaltraditionthat identifiesdistortions in perception,i limitsto knowledge,and internal impedimentsto action, and attributes themtoj the complexitiesof the human mind.The firsttakes individualrationalityas a

given and proceeds deductively;the second starts withbehavior more or less ap-proximatingthe requiÌementsof rationalityand proceeds inductively.Respectivedisciplinaryallegiances are obvious (see also Hogarth and Reder l98Z).

FIGURE1.1

SOCIALTHEORIES:GENERALPOSSIBILITIES

EPISTEMOLOGICALSubjectivist Objectivist

ONTOLOGICAL

Individual

Collective

hermeneutics,phenomenology social choice

poststructuralism functionalismstructuralism

cognitivePsychologyor liberalEconomicsfor the model of theoryto apply to society at large are effectivelydismissed. In the case ofInternationalRelations, this means chieflythose who are concernedwithdecision-making.

Poststructuralismpresents a more difficultsituation. Insofaras de-

construction prevails, all foundations are repudiated. Insofaras ge-nealogy prevails,histories result - at Foucault's instance, histories ofmadness, medical care, incarceration,sexuality. One mightcall themhistories of collectivelymanifest subjectiveexperience. Such historiesas these do not exist as yet for internationalrelations,althoughworkundertaken by KarlW. Deutsch and associates on the history of na-tionalidentityand state formationin the NorthAtlanticatea (1957)comes closest. Curiously,Giddens'work on the historyof violence inthe makingof the nationalstates of Europe (19s5) is more convention-allyfunctionalist,despite Foucault's influence on substantive matters.

Giddens undulysimplifiedthe situationin social theory by present-ing it as two grand traditionsin opposition.He did so to "put an

end to each of these empire-buildingendeavours" (1984:2).Iwouldheartilyendorse this position.IfI am right though to replace Gid-dens'single polarity withtwo independent polarities, one epistemo-logicaland the other ontological,in order to produce four "imperial"possibilities,I should also note that the job of ending competition

among them is all the harder.Giddens has proposed his owntheory to bridgesubjectivist in-

ê ffi.1 ììffiL

58 Part 1: Rulesl

59

a

$ÈÍft

ü

Constructivism



dividualismand objectivistcollectivism,as I wouldcall hispolarpositions.In my reconstruction of the situation,Giddens' theorymust operate on twoaxes - epistemologicaland ontological- in or-der to bridgefourpositions.To put the matter somewhat differently,Giddens has refused to positionhimself in an existing theory tradi-tion. Instead he wouldoperate exclusivelyin the domain of thè réia-tions of positions. To the extent that specifyinga theory r"éaïï tooccupy a position,then he placed his theory above any of thoseupon whose relations it depends so that he coulddraw fromthemas he saw fit.

Giddens has named his theory "t re lhgoryof sÍruçJu,ration, (1979:69-73; l98l:26-29; 1982:7-ll;1984: 1-40).

The basic domain of study of the social sciences, accordingtothe theory of structuration,is neither the experience of the in-dividualactor, nor the existence of any formof social totality,but social practicep gqdered across space and time. Human so-cial activities,likesome reproducingitems inilã-türe,are recur-sive. That is to say, they are not broughtinto being by socialactors but continuallyrecreated by themvia the very meanswhereby they express themselves as actors. In and throughtheir activitiesagents reproduce the conditionsthat make theseactivities possible (1984: 2).

So described, Giddens' project is to develop what I would callcon-structivistsocial thegry. "Inthe theory of structuration,I argue thatneither subject (human agent) nor object (,society'orsocial institu-tions)should be regarded as having primacy.Each is constituted inand throughrecurrent ptoctices"rs(1982: 8; his emphasis).

Does this theory builda four-waybridge across existing traditionsof social theory? The question is moreeasily asked than answered,because Giddens required of himselfonly a two-waybridge between

15. The term "structuration"is itself a problematicchoice for Giddens. It wouldseem to suggest that the emphasis is on processes relating to structures as fixedpoints of reference and thus a tilttoward the objectivistpole. yet Giddens endedthe passage just quoted by claiming forhimselfa .,hermeneutic startingpoint . . ."(1984: 3). Giddens'trearmentof structure, as difficultas it is distinctive,is in_tended to prevent such a tilt."structuresexist paradigmatically,as any abstract

a .:--1 I .

üiléi#,fii''ï

human agent and socialobject. Nonetheless, an inventoryof someof his centralpropositions supports an affirm4tlv.e.answer.To startwiththe upperJeft cell of the-matrixpresented in figure l-1,Gid-dens has accepted a propositiondear to many who are interpretivelyoriented (but not all;see I. Cohen 198'7:293-295).Rules make sociallifeintelligibleto those participatingin it. To paraphrase Giddens(1984: l-2),human beings cannot survive on geneticallycoded pro-

grams. They need cognitive skills.Rules permit them the requisiteknowledgeabilityfor survival,whichsimultaneouslyprovides theirliveswithsubjectivemeaning. Soçlgl:p,ality-i.q"1-h.e- -result'

Türningto the upper-rightcell, Giddens has insisted that humanbeings are compe,tqnt agents' They know what theyare doing whenthey followrulés -theychoose to followa rule or not depending ontheir assessment of the consequences of either choice.

Practical consciousness consists of knowingthe rules and thetactics whereby dailysocial life is constitutedand reconstitutedacross time and space. Social actors can be wrong some of thetime about what these rules and tactics mightbe. . . . But if thereis any continuityto social lifeat all,most actors must be rightmost of the time; thatis to say, they knowwhat they are doing,and they successfullycommunicatetheir knowledge (198a: 90).

Social choice theoristswouldaccept Giddens' demonstration thatmost su-ch knowledgeis not articulatedas such by agents (pp. 41-9Z)jCiOAenswouldagree withsocial choice theorists that an ob-server can specifysystematicallythe rules and conditionsof actionsuch that any agent may be said to have acted "rationally."

The lower-leftcell in figurel-1provides a home for a propositionconspicuouslyassociated withFoucault. It is to be found through-out Giddens'recentwork(1979: 88-101, l98l:49-63, 1984: 14-16,

set of differences, temporallypresent only in their instantiation,in the constitut-ing moment of social systems" (19'Ì9:65); structures themselves can have onlya "virtualexistence"(p. ó3). It followsthen that structure cannot occupy fixedpoints of reference and have consequences' I detect a retreat in Giddens' mostrecent workfrom a conception of structure as a "virtualorder of differences"(p. 64), withits debt to Derrida's preoccupation withdiffërance (pp. 33-38), infavor ofa concretized rendition,to be examined belowThis gain in intellieibilitynecessarily risks objectivizing "structure"and thus "structuration"'

,1i\

i ffil :ìffiffiú

Part 1: Rules60 Constructivism 61



256-262, 1985a:7-11). Human agents author rules and deploy re-sources in accordance withthose rules so as to secure and ensconceadvantages over other agents. Their differentialsuccess produces

, asymmetries in the abilityof agents to controlthe actions of other' agents in time and space as wellas the possibilitythat disadvantagedbut competent agents can subvertor reverse such asymmetries.

For all his reservations about functionalismand structuralism,Ciddens has also affirmedthe proposition,belonging in the lower-rightcell, that social lifeexhibitscoherence. Not onlydo humanagents produce social life,chárâcíéristically'rule-oriented,rationalbehavior reproduces it withsuch consistency that it takes on ob-jective properties. Social systems, and the asymmetries they entail,are accepted as real (1984: 331-332). Theactions ofparticularagentsare generally unlikelyto affect decisivelythe continuingproductionof a coherent social reality.Agents knowthis. They live in social re-ality,whichexists for them in its facticity.,, One furtherpropositionis necessary to secure Giddens' bridge-

y' work.Materialconditions matter. The relation of rules to resourcespresupposes at least some control over material conditions;practicalconsciousness takes

intoâóóóunt

material conditionsãd wà[ as so-ciallyconstructed rules. The formerlimitsor enables controlthroughthe latter depending on circumstances made intelligibleby takingrules and resources intoconsideration.

None of the four traditionsto be bridged requires or proscribesthe propositionthat materialconditionsmatter. It does leak intotheir most influentialformulationswhen rules, agents, powerorstructures are granted content or achieve historicity.It is littleacknowl-edged in hermeneutics and phenomenology, withtheir tendencytoward solipsism.It is relegated to a background condition inmostpoststructuralist and functionalisthistories, and it fallsbefore thecontentless formulationsof some structuralists.The propositi_onthat material conditionsmatter intrudes on socialchoice theoryhardlyat all.Foï Giddens, however, the propositionthat materialconditionsmatter is imperative.It anchors his four-waybridge in nature andhistory,not just as Wittgenstein's taken-for-grantedbackround re-ality,but as circumstances-immediate,intelligible,but not of ourown choosing-inwhichhuman agents make history.Here of courseI have paraphrased KarlMarx's "celebrated and oft-quotedphrase"

(quotingGiddens 1984: xxi)fromThe EighteenthBrumaireof LouisBonaparte (1954b: l0) to the effect that people make historybut not"undercircumstances chosen by themselves, . . ." Giddens went sofar as to describe his major statement of his position(1984: xxi)as

"an extended reflection"on this remark of Marx's. Indeed, Giddens Ihas committedmuch of his attention to the reformulationof histori-i

cal materialism(1981, 1985a) to keep the theoryof structurationi

fromfloatingoff its moorings.Clearly the theory of structurationis notable in its propositionalscope. But does the theorylock its diverse concerns together suffi-cientlythat Giddens can make higher order statements not restrictedto one or another propositional domains represented by the separatetraditionsof social theory? Can Giddens' propositionalstructurebear the weightof his claimsfor it?Giddens' oìvn approachto thissort of question starts by replacingdualities necessary to the stand-ing divisionsof social theory-subject,object;agent, structure-withwhat he has called a dualityof structure, but which he has ex-plicated as a dualityof structures and of systems.

The dualityof structures takes "rules and resources" to be "orga-

nized aspropeltj-e,s

9fsocial systems." The dualityof systems takes

"reproduced rélations between actors or collectivities"to be "orga-nized as regular social practices" (1984: 25). Structures lack subjectand are "outof time and place . . . ." Systgms depend on "the situ-ated activitiesof human agents" but-have no place, in their ownterms, for rules and resources. The problem is connectingthe transi'"iformationof relati,onseffectuated through rules and resources withthe reproductionõf ielátionías regular social practices. The solu- '

tion ig'ttructuration,ndefinedas the i'[c]onditionsgoverning the con- '

tinuit]-or-transmütationof structures, and therefore the reproduc- 'tionof social systems" (P. 25).Everythinghinges on those governing conditions.Whatare they?

Giddens couldhave been mciËïõïïhcoming.s*'ühispoint. I think'however, the answer lies in the propositionthat "the structuralproper-ties of social systems are both mediumand outc_o-me.ofthe practicesthey recursiveiy organize" (p.25). Ìhi;iíhisaèiilitiònof the "du-alityof structure," whichis actuallya double-duality,for it spansthe duality ofstructures, understood by reference to the transforma-tion ofrelations, and of systems, understood by reference to repro-duced relations.

,ffii; iffi til

Part 1: Rules 63i,f;l62 Constructivism



Vy'hat unites these twodualitiesis recursion, the propensityofknowledgeableagents to refer to their oilnïiôìtr"rr;puitand an-ticipatedactions in decidinghow to act: Theyengage in "reflex-ive self-regulation"(Giddens 1979:78; see generally pp.73-81). Gid-dens used the term "organized"as a hinge for both the dualitiesof structures and of systems. In characterizing what I have calledthe double-dualityupon whichstructuration depends, Giddens took

this hinge and added to it the property of being recursive.Organiza-tionpresupposes recursion and therefore cannot be its medium.Onlyrules can.

Giddens defined rules"as techniquesor generalizable proce-dures applied to the enactment,/reproductionof social practices"(1984: 2l).Furthermore, "allrules are inherently transformational"(p. l7). Rules are fundamentalboth to structures and to systemsand, by virtueof their "generalizable" character,lend recursionto the dualitiesof structures and of systems. It wouldfollowfromhis treatment that rules must always be constitutive (that is, trans-formative)g_19-,rçSUlptlve(thar is, reproducrivè;.Ciaaens has quireexplicitly,and correctly,said just this (1979: 66). In short, rulesenable Giddens to traverse each of his dualities.He should havedeleted all reference to organizationin this context,however, be-çause that termpresupposes rules, structures, and systems alreadyjn place. If recursion is the key con_çeptually, then rulesare the keyfoperationally.' Whether Giddens' propositionalstructure can carrythe load hehas assigned to it evidentlydepends on the answer to a furtherques-tion. Has Giddens a sufficientlywell-developedconception of ruleto carry the theoryof structuration? I thinknot. Hisinclinationisto return to the verydistinctionwhichhis an-{ any constructi,v_is-tso-cial theory must repudiate- the distinctionbetween constilutiveand

): regulativetyiies of rules. Consider Giddens'response to the charge(Callinicos1985) of being "stronglyinfluencedby Wittgenstein,sPhilosophicalInvestigationsin my 'fondness' for the notion of ,rule,'whichis true" (1985b:169).

I do not regard social practices as "rule-governed,"or as "groundedin rules"; neither do I holdthat courses of actioncan be ,,de-terminedby rules." In speaking about structure as rules (forget-

#üiltr.ü',ï'#i;

t;#Ë

*d

tingfor the moment aboutresources) I mean to get at twoelements recursivelyinvolvedin all social practices: codes ofmeaning or significationand normative sanctions (1985b: 169;see also 1984: 19-20).

Giddens put distance between his theory and Winch's interpreta- jtionofV/ittgensteinby reverting to the conventionalview that rules ífunctionrecursively in either of twoways: by constitutingmeaning /or imposing costs on conduct contraryto what theircontent indi-fcates. Giddens was undoubtedlyrightto distance himself fromWinch.,iWhileI do not findhis readingof Wittgenstein to be persuasive-Wittgensteinsaw rules as "aspects of praxis"(1984:21), the last termhaving a specificallysocial meaning*Ldoagree that thisposition,even if it is not Wittgenstein's, is the necessary starting point for aconstructivistsocial theory. The problemcomes fromthe dualityofsignificationand sanction,which slipstoo easily intoan unwar-ranted discriminationbetween constitutionand regulation.

Giddens forgotabout resources "forthe moment." Yet his discus-sion of resources points to somethinghe never achieved in address-ing rules as such. This is the possibilityof identifyingcategories ofrules. In Giddens' system of definitions,rules make structures,and iresources make them "structures of domination"(1984:258). Gid- I

dens has consistentlydividedresources into two iypes-allocative) Iand authoritative(1979: 100-101, l98l:47, 1984; 258-262, 1985a: 7 -:---"'8, 13-14). These terms are all toofamiliar,inasmuch as they conJventionallydistinguish marketand directedeconomies, and regret-tably, to the extent they resonate withthe dualityof constitutiveandregulativerules.r6On examination,his listof allocativeresources-material features of the environment,means of material production,and artifacts of production- identifies thetypes of material condi-tions implicatedin the social construction of reality. His parallel listof authoritativeresources-organizationof social space-time, or-

16. Allresources must be subject to allocationif they are to fitthe meaning of theterm. Allocationmay appear to be lacking authorship,as in a market, but thisignores the authorityof rules constitutingand regulating themarket such thatthe allocationof resources is neither uniformnor random.Chapters 2,6, and8 consider the related illusionsof authorless rules and unruledallocation.

)

, .,tl

$' ,i

# ê:r iffi üïW*-

Part 1: Rules64 Constructivism 65



ganizationof human beings in mutualassociation, and organizationof lifechances-actually describes categories of rulesJT

,,, Because rules are necessary for materialconditions to be identi-f I fiea as such for social purposes, and rules cannot organize human'\ endeavor unless they are somehow relatedto materialconditions,

both lists have to do withrtles und resources. Yet analyticallytheirI discriminationis useful. Rules are the socialcomponent, resources

{ the materialcomponent in allhuman endeavor. Giddens argued that?sources are not fixed;"theyformthe media and the expandablecharacter of power . . . " (1984: 258). This is not put well.Resourcesare nothinguntilmobilizedthrough rules, rules are nothinguntilmatched to resources to effectuate rule.rs

Giddens has providedus witha scheme forcategorizingrules thatis the more persuasive because it is related to discriminantmaterialconditions,even ifthose conditionsare constituted as differentcate-gories through the application ofrules. In the next chapter, I presenta scheme for sorting rules whichalso has three categories. I believemy categories, for whicha different rationaleis provided, correspondto Giddens' resource,/rules categories. I woulddescribe Giddens'three categories as follows:(l)The category ofexistenceand the con-stitution/regulationof its meaning in coordinationof space andtime. (2) The category qf materialcontroland the constitution,/regu-lationof modalitiesof control.(3) The category of discretionaryendeavor, agreement, and exchange, coupled to the constitution,/regulationof agency and opportunity.- If rules are needed to allocate resources, and rules constitutearesource themselves because of the "authoritative"way they consti-tute and regulate other resources, the theory of structurationmain-tains its constructivistpremises and stillhonors the proposition thatgnaterial conditions matter.Criticismto the effect thatGiddens can-not have it both ways (Callinicos1985) misses the mark. Giddensnever professed to be the usual sort of historicalmaterialist.It is true

that "his is a remarkablyeconomic conceptionof practice"(p. 140),

17. Theselistsofresourcesareabridgedfromsomewhatlongerdefinitionspresentedin tabular formby Giddens (1984: 258) but use only his words.

1 8. Giddens appears not to have used the term "rule,"as opposed to "rules,"until quiterecently.Dominationis a conditionof control; ruleis a stable form of control(1985a: 9). See chapter 6 below for an extended discussion of rule and related terms.

ifby that is meant that rules and resources substitute fornature andhistory-Giddens'projectis precisely to show that nature and historyare not some objective realityupon which humanbçings act-. AJ bestthese are misleading labels for the rules and resgurces human bèiÍigsconstituteby their actions, even as they are constituted,and thçiractions regulated,by rules and resources.

I offera rather differentcriticismof Giddens' theory in these

pages. Giddens could strengthen hisconstructivismby clarifyingtherelationof resources to rules in the three categories of human ac-tivityhe has identifiedexclusively(and wrongly)in terms of resources.To do so Giddens would have to pay a great deal more attention torules than he has so far. Or, to put the matter somewhat differently,Giddens wouldhave to leave the congenialdomainmarked out byWittgensteinin order to give rules the content they need for construc-tivistpurposes. To identifycategories of rules is to find their con-tent, not inany specificsense, rule by rule, but in the characteristicways in which humanbeings, in constitutingthemselves as such,relate materialconditionsto the conditionsof rule that mark allsocieties.

: 5&Èd lffii. .

Lawand Language 67



POSITIVISM

aU oligg -ll1_ll._e_p_i _qg11r9l-o-Cyunderlies science and almost everything1

else associated withmodernity. P, ositiyisr-11-"is*l[_n*ame.DisciplinaryIparadigms aspiring to science are positivist;this is as true for legal Iscience as the social sciences. Indeed the prevailingparadigm con-

|

stitutingLawas a disciplineis generally knownas positivism.To iminimizeconfusionI willcall thisparadigm "I*galPositivism,"itsproto-theory"legal positivism"or "positivistlegal theory,"and thephilosophicalstance behind themboth "positivism."

H. L.A.Hart is widelyacknowledged as kgaÌ Positivism'sablestcontemporaryexponent. His reconstructionof positivistlegal theory,no less than earlierversions, depends on "the simple contention thatit_$ lrrnq_,lqjlSg_a__q9939 Atyl$llrl _4 -19yIgproauceor satisfy cer-tairyleqr?r,rds9,fporallly"(1961: 181-182;see generally pp. 181-189)'Thisone contentionencodes the constitutivehistoryof LrgalPositivism,ühich"*"tgedtwocenturies ago as an answer to the thenprevailingparadigmof Natural Láw.

For naturalists,rules obtained in social relations derivefromcir-I Icumstances whichare necessary, inalterable- given in or by nature - I

and available to us throughreflection,revelation or moral aware-ness, as privilegedknowledge.Thus there can be no differencebe-tween what rules should say and what they do say, just as there isno difference between what we should do and must do. Rules arelaws or not rules at all. As withany paradigm, this one suppliespuzzles: rWhydo reasonable, moralpeople d ;ae19ç.on what naturedecrees? Whodecides? Mustwe followrules we thinkare unreason-able or immoral?What is nature's remedy for disregard of its rules?

Naturalists solved theirpuzzles withever more ingenuity,but lessand less credibility,as p-oj;lllivlsmand the scientificalilqdeovertookV{gtery thought.kgal Positivism stipulateda differentset of con-nections for nature, morality,and rules relatingto human conduct.Nature exists as a matter of fact. Rules exist onlybecause peoplemake them up and then accordthem factlçity,Thele is no law but"positivelaw." Althoughthe distinctionbetween nature and conven-tion goes back to the Sophists and the alignmentof justicewithnature to Plato (Manley1980: 25-28), positivismdraws the line dif-ferently. lt assigns moralityto the realmof convention and not of

LAWANDLANGUAGE

In presenting the case for a constructivistviewof realityas neces-sarily,but not exclusively,social, I tried to bring outthe importanceof rules for any such view. When I turned to social theôry compat-ible withconstructivism,AnthonyGiddens'workbeing exemplary,I triedagain to show the central positionof rules. I determined, how-ever, that neither Philosophers followingLudwigWittgenstein norGiddens as a social theoristhave said enough about rules as suchfor us to grasp fullythe ways in whichrules make realitysocial.

Í*-Onemust lookelsewhere. Two possibilitiescome to mind.One is[aq whichis a disciplineconstitutedon the premise that certainlrules-rulesof law-systematicallylinkindividualhuman conductland society. People make rules, rulesmake society, society's rulesN make people conduct themselves in specified ways. On examination,{however,I findthat legal theory islimitedby a narrow conceptionÌ of what rules are and do, and recent effortsto escape this straight-jacket have been confused.

t

terms, are a second possibility.A very fewof them have had an in-terest in rules and their properties. Inasmuch as they tend to avoidtheoryand take society as given, their contribution,though it goesbeyond legaltheory's, is also limited.I make an exception for speechact theory, whichyields an inclusiveset of catègoriès into whichallrules can be sóìted. Ìhesë categories identifythree, and only three,distinctways in whichrules are jointlyconstitutive and regulative.

tiâÈ

&

$r.'rli;,4i

Í'ffii i 1ffi

68 Part 1: Rules Lawand Language 69



nature. Rules reflect moralconsiderations (forSophists, opinions)that human beings willoften enough construe as moral imperativesand cast as law.

Evidentlykgal Positivismdepends on a momentous shift in moralphilosophy. Immanuel Kantwas its herald.In the English-speakingworldit triumphedwithutilitari14lf.T.-:l,glepl.Bentham,a pioneerI-egal Positivist andutilitarian,recommended a particularmoral

principle-his"utilityprinciple"(quoted below, p. 194)-on groundsof its favorable consequences instead of its beingprivilegedknowl-edge. Alternativeprinciplesare similarlyframed; arguments are overconsequences. Utilitarianismpermits a pluralityof moral possibili-ties -smoral relativismits criticsequate withthe denial of morality.

To thinkthat moralconsiderations and socialrules can never bemore than the facts they are suggests an ontologicalshiftas muchas a shiftin epistemology and ethics.Nature has its laws, likegravityand the inevitabilityof death, but theireffect-the fact that theybind us-presents itselfto us as a matterof fact. A fallingobject,a death: Each is a fact. Every fact, to qualifyas such, must be adiscrete, identifiableitem,a positivity.If the things humanbeingsdo, likethe thingsthat happen

tothem, are facts, then these too

must be positivities.To call them"things"says no less.rThe propo_sition that reality,nalgr4l4gd-s,ogial, is populated_with

positivitiesis positivism'sontologicalcorrelate and science's method-ologicalimbèráfiè. lnsofar ai itmúst 6e imposed on reality, thepro-cedure for doingso is to break downthat realityinto discrete anddistinguishableentities, each the same as some, but not all,of theothers. Implicitin positivistideas of concept formationand per-fected by David Hume,this conventionalizingprocedure disguisesits constitutivecharacter by alleging to discover reality'snatural,positive constituents. Both naturaland social realityappear to benatural byhaving been socially constructedthe same way.

I return to the Humean procedure of conventionalizingreality inchapter 5. It is an ambiguous legacy for law and the social sciences,where objectivistepistemology andits moral implicationsare taken

l. "The firstand most fundamental ruleis: Considersocial facts as /ftings."So saidEmile Durkheim inhis pioneering positivistrendition of The Rules of Sociologïcal Method(1964:14, his emphasis).

for granted in the name of science, yet individualistontology(recall-ing Giddens'categories, as developed in the preceding chapter) is thesubject of much contention.Along withthe rest of the social sciences,Lawas constituted by kgalPositivismhas tgffinSfJ*lEdbetween in-dividualistand collectivist ontologicalpositions. In this they showtheir commonaffiliationto liberalism

Individualhuman beings are (conventionalizedas) agents - inde-

pendent, goal-oriented,and resourceful.At the same time theyaremoralagents. They decide what they shalldo, and they reflectonwhat theyshoulddo. Each operationas a positivitybears on theothers in the same way natural positivitiesare related. Yet the resultmakes some kind ofcollectivesense-it works as a whole.Positivistlegal theory has those same agents ask, what laws do we want? lrgalpractice lets them decide what laws they shall have. Again the resultis an operativewhole. I wouldcall it an especially cogent operativeparadigm; generallyit is called a legal order.

Beginning withBentham,kgal Positivists have taken rules as hav-ing a consistent and immediately identifiableJinguistic form,thato f a co ry. qelg_ollgpgritilg_ 1919 Le.I9(Bentham I 94 8 : 3 3 0- 3 3 6).

In theirparadigm, then, rules always saywhat they do. They requirebehaviorindicatedin the contentof imperative statements.Suchrules transparently convey the wishes of those who issue them.

Note, however, that not all imperativestatements are rules. "Bringme a glass of milk"is g1r tnpglg 1u_"{e _e- l_entwhichI honor "asa rule,"but I do so, in good üiititarian-iã;hiõii,on ãï:ise$y-cãsëbasis. John Austinidentifiedseveral species of command and re-strictedattention to those having general applicability.2They are theones forwhichthe importantquestion is raised, do I have a standingobligation,independent of my utilitariancalculations in each in-stance, to honor them? The general positionof Legal Positivistsisthat I do indeed have an obligationto honor at least some suchrules. To the extent that obligationis positive (not metaphysical),those rules are legal,

Nowwe have a clear viewof what positivistlegal theoryhopes

2. He improperly concludedthat allsuch commands issue froma determinate law-giver or sovereign (J. Austin1954: 18-24,133-135).See also Hart's reconstructionof Austin'sposition(1961: l8-76).

: r | ç,'.




to explain: the basis for a specificallylegal obligation.The theorytakes us beyond the rule, and what it says, to the legal order.Theexistence of the legal orderexplains both the obligationattachingto that rule and the propensity for utilitariancalculators to followit. The order has twodefiningproperties. One is the competence toissue legal rules, and the other is the capacityto secure compliancewiththem. Inasmuch as I may wellhave the capacityto ensure that

you willbring me a glass of milkifI demand it, the distinctivepropertyof a legal order must be the firstone.Here positivistlegal theory encounters a puzzle. Ifan order is

legal, it must be so because the rules constitutingit are legal. Yetsuch rules can only be legâl ifa priorlegal order produces them. Theresult must be an infiniteregress, which can be stopped onlyby in-troducinga primáii'agieéy91r1gt tqglningprocess in.4 +gtlgnalstate of nature (social contract or Hume's conventions).The alter-native is to argue that ultimatelythe legal character of the rule comesfromthe fact that it is complied with.Said otherwise, complianceprecedes oblig{ignrll9{g_fggrtlrgrybvgivingi.iíèÌôttrélartér.3 Ãnysuch solutionwouldseem to substitute circularityfor regress: That

rules workmakes them law, thatlaws

arelegal makes them work.

kgal Positivism'sproto-theoryexplains nothing. By stipulatingthat legal rules must be properly authorized and generally compliedwith-validand effective (or efficacious),in Hans Kelsen's words(1945: 39-42,1952: 412-415)-theproto-theoryconstitutes Lawasa scholarlyenterprise. It also tells those whose vocation is the posi-tive law what rules count as such. Consider Austin's declarationthat

le]verypositivelaw, or every law simply andstrictlyso called,is set by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body of persons,to a member or members of the independentpoliticalsocietywherein that person or body is sovereign or supreme. Or (chang-

3. The clearest example is Hans_Kelsenls. Poslgpte of the "basic norm of interna-tional law"-"Thçstale,s ought to bçhav.g.aS,. hçy çustAmarily,h-avebçha-vçd"(1952: 4I7-418)-thebasis forwhichis that people do in fact behave this way'Allother legal rules derive theirobligatorycharacter from thisone because,Kelsen argued, the international legal order validates all otherlegal orders. Kelsen,who wroteextensivelyin German and English,was Legal Positivism'sleadingvoice in the first halfof this century.

ing the expression) it is set by a monarch, or sovereign number,to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author(1954: 132).

One need merely inspectthe set of social relations to whichgivenrules pertain. Whenever relations of sovereign and subject are pres-ent, then these rules are legal and theset of relations a legal order.Austin's formulaorients the stipulatedrelation between obligationand compliance to theneeds of practice, but onlyon the assumptionthat detecting the locus of sovereignty or the evidence of subjectionis never problematic.

For practitioners of legal craft and scholars alike,the coherenceof their endeavors comes froma narrow constructionof what isproperlylegal. Countedout are rules that seem to be lawbecausean evidentlylegailvãütúõiitêd vóice ;áys iõ'bufare routineiydisre-garded. Sô aiè iülèì-ïliâtóânnot be iràôëô"ïô any-õüôfãüïtiõïbutare routinely honored.A simple procedure fordeterminingthe posi-tive law is an advantage, not a problem,for those who use it, anda tightand tidyconceptionof Law noless an advantage for scholars,

so long as they all stick to the hard core of law. Ambiguous in-stances, in which legal pedigrees are irregularor compliance epi-sodic, need be consideredonlyifpractitionerswant something toargue withand scholars to puzzle over.

As a kgal Positiviststrays farther fromthe hard core of law, moreserious problemsarise.In a sogQ-t--glyj1g1ryle.ll .ti S-tLal_.'_o-f-i1tl-e_r-ry-tiqual rçlaÍio-n-s--o-r.-th-e-Lela.ti9*n*s,pf.a p"rçlitçratç-pç-qplg*úJ$"djf.f"icultto_\gglLybâtr_if*lt",yrlg*lgtignsofauthorityarepresent.Ambiguityrosters ãn aãimiruì'irceriãïntyas ïô-ïhãt iíïegãï'ând, as we shallsee, even raises the possibilitythat legality isa relative condition.The challenge offered by a puzzlingclass of rules - for example, arethe rules pertainingto international relations legalor not?-hasprompted

numerous unconvincingaccommodations

inpositivist

legal theory. Thepossibilitythat legalityis not whatit seems to beposes a far greater challenge to legal theory.It calls intoquestionthe ontologicalpresumption that rules at least in the hard core oflaw are positivitiesof a kindand thus the paradigmatic claim thatlaw is a distinctivephenomenon-an operative paradigm-worthyof its owndiscipline.

$tii$i,{

tI*:í.i

ãlg.6rg

Í1t

ït,:

,*, ffii .x&#ffii ..




THELIMITSOF LEGALTHEORY

kgal Positivism,likeso many of the paradigms constitutingsocialscience disciplines, has come to an impasse. Its proto-theory cannotexplainanythingabout law and at the same time refers only to cer-tain stipulated propertiesof law. The solutionmust be a revamping

of legal theory so that it achieves explanatorycapacity withoutsacri-ficinglaw's distinctiveness.If such a revampingis possible, the dis-ciplinewouldundergo reconstructionand a proper paradigmtheorycould eventuate.

None of this is new. As importantmovements earlier in thiscen-tury, sociologicaljurisprudence and legal realismwere both predi-cated on this lineof thought. Orthodoxkgal Positivists restrictedefforts to broaden the theoreticaldomainof law. Theyclearly sawthat saving legal positivismfrom regress or circularityraised thepossibilitythat noth_ing,$qtìnc_tiv9lytçsglJgú{,b,e left.If legalpositivistswere obstinate, then their challengers wereingenuous inthinkingthat they couldpropose a better theory of law and stillhaveit be about law. Perhaps what they wanted cannotbe constructed.

In the quest for bigger, better theory, sociologicaljurisprudenceand legal realism turned to the positivismholdingsway in the socialsciences. Anthropologistsand Sociologistsreciprocated withan abid-ing interest in all those positivitiesto which lawis conceivablyrele-vant. These developments could nothelp but influenceinternationallegal theory, itselfa longstanding but problematic branch of posi-tivistlegal theory. Given theconventionalviewof international rela-tions and the assumptions of legal positivism,the very term"inter-nationallaw" is a virtualoxymoron. In the last thirtyyears scholarsdisproportionatelyfromthe UnitedStates have drawn freely fromthe social sciences to rid themselves of theirmost intractableand em-barrassing problem:The subject of theirconcern and the theory pur-

portingto account for its existence bear no plausible relation to eachother. Ifthe solution is a theory aboutlaw yet not of law - a theoryrejecting Law'snarrowconstructionof law-so be it. They wouldbe social scientists.

At the extreme, those international legal scholars identifying withthe socialsciences were content to establish regularitiesin interna-tionalconduct and explain theiroccurrence by reference to "psycho-

logicalpressures" (Kratochwil1984: 350). Obligationdisappeared asan inconvenient conceptor was transmuted into"shared expecta-tions" and communitypolicies.a A less extreme view found rules per-forming differentfunctions for theirusers and, in a logicalleap, forthe "system" as a surviving,ordered entity.sWithinthis general posi-tion, diversityreigned. Inasmuch as all rules were seen as takingthesame general form, independent of their function,recourse to par-

ticularrules toldnothing abouttheir particularfunctions. It seemedin other words that rules did not say what they did. Only theob-server could say, and observers had no agreed method for sortingout the functionalor systemic meaning of what they saw.

Alltoo understandably functionalistswere inclinedto retain thelegal positivistnotionof lawas a manifestation of the relationofsovereign and subject by seeing coercion andcontrolas one func-tionalcategory of law. This leftall otherfunctionalpossibilitiestobe grouped into a single, loosely defined categorycalled the com-munications function(Coplin1965). Thus the standard, though notinvariable,functionalarrangement was a dichotomy. Rules eithercontrolbehavior or communicateintentions and perceptions. Rulesin the latter category are at the edge of laq but what is determina-tive for legal standingis their function.

In either functionalcategory, workingrules are necessary to thesystem's survival,whether theyappear to work,or are apparent atall, tosystem participants. Those rules whichdo not seem to be im-perative to participants, but whichare nonetheless a system impera-tive,appear indeterminateas to theirindividual obligation.Such in-determinacymay even spillover into the hard core of rules that areimperativefor participants.Thisis because, practicallyspeaking,the system does not fallwhen any given participantignores a com-mand and coercive instrumentalitiesare not available to assure com-pliance. Indeed enforcementis oftenan illusion,though perhaps anecessary one.

4. These are concepts favored by theNew Haven schoolof configurativejurispru-dence. For a representative sample of work to be found in thistradition,see Mc-Dougal andReisman (1981).On the New Haven school'sclaims to science, seeYoung (1972).

5. See preeminentlyRichard A. Falk (1971).Falk took his positionas intermediatebetween Kelsenianpositivismand the New Havenschool.

È:

t:Í

$

l:rífr*iI'{;

ï't;

I

iiffis :. .ffi:

[']ï

Part 1: Rules Lawand Language 7574



The highpointfor functionalismin internationallegal theorycame, I believe, in 1974, when Gidon Gottliebtook the two cate-gories of functionalpossibilitiesand restored the first toits historicposition as a sufficientcharacterization,or model,of law - and con-structed the second intoan alternativemodel of law (197 a: 363-364).The acceptance model, as he called the latter, is not then just acharacterization of the functionsof some rules (especially those of

doubtfullegality).It is acharacterization ofthe functionofalllegalrules, whichis to secure acceptance of their content.In developingthe acceptance model, Gottliebstarted withpoli-

cies. These are general statements of wish or intent, the content ofwhichothers are encouraged to accept. Sometimes acceptance isachieved by suggesting the likelihoodof coercion.Nevertheless,"willingnessto limitone's discretion,"whichacceptance connotes,implies a principledcontent (1974: 373). lrgal rules are necessarilythose policiesthat are both principledenough to secure willingac-ceptance and specific enoughto provideguidance. In thisview, rulesdo not have tp say what they do,for this (again) is always the same.Their specif"rc,principledcontent communicatesplausible expecta-tions that they willbe followed.

Likeits alternatives, the acceptance modelpurports to explainhow legalrules work.The explanationforcompliance is not le-gal obligation,however; it is a behavioralpropensity, namely, "theresolve to make principledand consistentdecisions wherever pos-sible . . ." (1968: 369; see also pp. 373-374).Despite appearances,Gottliebwas not makingan empirical assertion about human con-duct. Regularities arenot the point. Instead he inferredthe pro-pensity to followrules from"reasoningprocedures"and the "logicof choice"6(pp. 374-376). Irgal reasoning is onlypossible whenrules provide "a 'marked degree' of firmness of guidance," in turnrequiring"specificityin language . . ." (1974: 371). Howspecific?Gottliebhad no way to say. Indeed he made a virtueof not be-

ing able to do so. "Here again there looms a vast undemarcated ter-rain between the legal and the political- but the more specifictheguidance in a system becomes, the more specific the norms, the pol-

6. The latter phrase is actually the title of Cottlieb'sbook (1968) in whichhis argu-ment and philosophicalrationale are systematicallyprcsented.

icygoals and theirapplication, the more'legal'thissystem becomes"(1974: 37t-372).

Gottlieb'smuch-cited essay made functionalcategories intelligi-ble in the language of law. Hiseffortto replace an authoritymodelwithan acceptance model also gave a theoretical warrant to the no-tion that rules on the soft margins of law are law, even if these rulescannot be shown to have become legal througha specificvalidatingor

"legalizing"process. In the functionalistview, legal indetermi-

nacy is a system trait,and it suffuses down, so to speak, to the par-ticularsof situations where rules are always relevant but rarelydeter-minative.In Gottlieb'sreformulation,legal indeterminacyfollowsfromthe relationof rules to reasoning and the use of language.

Given the extraordinarygrowthof internationalactors, agreementsand practices of certain legal standing, especially in internationaleconomic relations,positivistpractitionersof legal craft happilyem-braced the notionof soft law. Accountsof such law are everywhere(forexample: Carreau and others 1977, Seidl-Hohenveldern1979).Theorists committedto legal positivismhave responded withsharphostilityby provingthat legal indeterminacycould not be reconciledwith theirtheory of obligation(Bothe 1980, Weil1983). Needless tosay, Gottliebhad intended this very conclusion.Thus was achieveda stalemate. I*galpositivistsinsisted in theory on a narrowconstruc-tion of law and how it worksbut fellinto a broader one in the prac-tice of legal craft. For hispart, Gottliebinsisted in theory onabroader viewof the rules that matter, but failed to explainwhy somerules matter more than others.

Whatever the accomplishmentsof scientificallyinclinedinterna-tional legal scholarship,its vogue has clearly passed in the last fewyears. Throughoutthe socialsciences, the positivistproject has fal-tered as paradigmatic limitsare reached. Meanwhile,doublsab,gutthqonlologice p,Le4lsg gf_{ytt--c,tig,ttql 9.a_13-q.no*Ig__1,9_c9n1_lyrJt-Ìoseof"popitiv ç_tçpiqtemq]ogy.f,4vgqome to the fore. In a curiouslypar-

alleldevelopment, the reemergence of .na pg4ljs- *ld-e.g -",1U--t ç3-fgìof, nch clbl -k-inc*h-4.s-ha-d"."a.g-qç,e S1.ig-Ì9491-o-g_P9jltg,51glb1l-. hesci_elllfig1 l p*otl "r-o_r_1gv-çrd-id,.

Consider the stormy response (forexample,M.Cohen 1984) toRonald Dworkin(1977)when he attacked legal positivismby con-tending that certain rules-he called them legal principles-arein-controvertiblyweightierthan others. Yet legal principlesare integral

"/

. tlliir' l : àiW ' *

776 Part 1: Rules

f

Lawand Language

li l h h h i



to the hard coreof lawand indispensable to legal order. Dworkinsaw in legalpositivisma defect of such proportionsthat onlyaparadigm-challengingsolutionwoulddo. Indicatively hissolutionwas a naturalist one.7 The positivistmoment, in allits realizations,may wellbe passing.

Even a cursory search of the current literature leaves the impres-sion that international legal theoryis directionless. Nevertheless,postpositivistcurrents in Philosophy andthe social sciences haveprompted at least twq sclrgpp__tg_ú{l9qe9poli y l prgmises,,asI dohere. They are DavidKennedy andFriedrich Kratochwil,whoseotherwise verydifferent efforts(1980, 1983) focus on discourse in-stead of rules. Such a focus allowsthem to conèentraiãôn íhe ubesto ivhìôtilãú is püt withouthaving to settle the question,whichrulesare legal?

For Kennedy,l*yir llç_4_- ggpe-{lle_go1fliciresolution insettingsgiven over to adversarial discourse. (1980: 386) If the process is suc-cessful, it results in "principleddecision-making,"and outcomestend to have probativevalue in subsequent iterations of the processin similarsettings. These outcomes are legal rules. ClearlyKennedy'simplicitmodel for the use of law isa courtor tribunal.Yet the prin-

pnlea decision-makingand the invocationof earlierprincipleddeci-$ions in reaching newones are activities which takeplace in a widerÌarietyof settings. Some of them, like publicassemblies and bureaux,abe intentionallynot adversarial.Are principleddecisions taken insuch settings legal rules? Kennedy cannothave said, even iftheques-tionhad occurred to him.

For Kratochwil,the commonelement in the use of law is persua-siq n in çtrSU {nttury.ffi p g_l.|r-1e po lrfion i spossible" (1983: a3). Rules are persuasive to the extent they provideinítrurneiúal€uidangggtrgr9 9c_ -gl9l?. --cg_lllidg-1qtions.Wecanin-fer from this that rules are legal whenthey are both specific and prin-cipled, as Gottlieb insisted, but not just because these properties are

7. "ïhkingrights seriously"(the titleof his 1977 book) propelledDworkinin anaturalist direction.His current conceptionof "law as integrity"initiates a solu-tionconstitutinga thirdway between Natural Law and lcgal Positivism (19861l"l6-275),though more closelyallied withthe former thanthe latter (p. 263). Thiscombined with Dworkin'scurrent emphasis on interpÍetation suggests an affinitywithconstruõtivism(pp. 45-80).

present. Legalityis a propertybestowed on rules throughrhetoric,or practical réasoniná, bypèoplè whõ"are-prdïëííiõnãllï"tïâïiiêd-inputtingspecific,principledrules to persuasive use. Drawing analo-gies, invokingprecedents, justifyingclaims, andweighingalterna-tives are among the familiarways they do so. That persuasion worksis what we mean when wesay the lawworks.

KiãtoôfiüïlïotèaiÌiâtrhetòricdepends on the audience. Althoughthe model audience is that charged withhearing the pleas of adver-saries, he identifiedthe existence of another and intimateda third.Identifiedas an audience are those charged withthe evaluationofpersuasion at the "technical level"(his quotationmarks), meaningbureaucrats (Kratochwil1983: 43). He tendedto minimizetheir rele-vance to law (contrary to what his strictures on specificityimply)butnot their importance for a stable order. Onlyintimatedto exist asan audience is the aware publicwhich hears the rhetoricof persua-sion qn mattèrs ôfhigtrprincipie.While Kratochwil's attachmenttospecificitywouldseem to deny legal qualityto rules invokedin thisarena, he was content to discount them because, as rhetoric,theyinhibitaccommodation,whichfroma principledpointof view is theonly justificationforpersuasion.

LikeKennedy, Kratochwilsettled too easily on adversarialarenas asparadigmatic for the use of legal rules.Then he equáted dhe style bfpérsúâsion Èiirtïôïlârtô this arena-at once specificand principled-withdefiningconditions for the legalityof rules. Other arenas, withtheir modalities of reasoning withrules, are eliminated fromcon-sideration,and rules used in those arenas disqualifiedas legal. Never-theless, Kratochwil'sshi-f1in-emp.h4piqt-o disgourqgpd hiq exptiç-a1tion of prallig3l.J9._q9_9ni1e in publig settings and" {-91p-u-b-Ji.c*ptl-t-p--o-qesas the distinctivefeature of law make a notable extension of Gott-lieb's groun-db_re*ingreconstructio n of 1974.

Kratochwilalso extended the flaws in Gottlieb'sinitiatives.Prin-ciples and rules of high specificityare treated as analyticallysepar-

able, then conflated inorder to create a uniformlyoperativemodel

of law. Such a model ignores the diverse characteristics of rules rang-ing fror4_p_ri,nc_ip_ ç.slqpry 9-dllle-s_tb4yqk ?nd look like law, eventhough

"onuè"iio"trõtas ttrai iúey arJ nói. Atièãst cot tTléb ãcÏnòw I -

edged them. Kratochwil'svery effortto improve onGottlieb requiredthat he not. Nor didKennedy for similarreasons.

Kennedyand Kratochwilput rules in the context of their use in

tÍ;il

IlÍÌ

,{1

Ì,

tilí,

{

iih'õ$.

'l&

* trffiir .ffi\l

798 Part 1: Rules

d I d i h lif d h lf dli i f

Lawand Language

d d lk b i li d i d

.;l

;



discourse. In doingso, they liftedthe self-imposedlimitsof legalpositivisttheory. Nevertheless, they wronglyand unnecessarily dis-counted discourse about principles and procedures-they failedtosee such drSç-qUfsç4q_,tqulylegal. On thebasis of these independentefforts, coming to thesame unwarranted conclusion,I am convincedthat systematic treatment of rules and theirproperties is indispens-able to any legal theory seeking to overcome positivistlimits,includ-ing postpositivisttheories centered on discourse.s

PERFORMATIVELANGUAGE

;pver since Austin,positivistlegal theorydefines "rule"as a specialf fase of command. In Hart's reformulation,rules are "standing orders"f{1961:73). Howeverdefined, theirexistence is stipulate{r.Schol4lsfiinfluencedby the social sciences ignore rulesfor theireffects, which1 are the regyÌa-{riesõrõbídüctthey sõreligir_"niffidõjjúi:es.Ãõ*"i i just demônst?ãïèd,'Kèhnedy aira'KiáiôcüüiïÍixãïËtrtof rules in

lpursuitof their uses. There is a common thread.Tàken for granted

i'is what must be investigated: that rules themselves are a matter of'

i language.The situationis quite the opposite in contemporary Philosophy.

Thke MaxBlack's influentialanalysis of rules (1962:95-139).

There seems to be a particularlyintimateconnection between jaruleandthesetofwordsbywhichtheruleisstated.Therela-tion between the word and its statement in words isnot some-thingexternalandcontingent,asisthecaseintherelationbe-tween anything and its verbaldesignation: the ruleis, in someway, constitutedby its formulation.The same can be said,however, about a verdict,a promise, a command. . . .

It does not follow,however, that a promise must be formu-

8. Norwould Kratochwildisagree. He has long evinced an interest in rules (1978:45-66) and his current unpublishedwork(forthcoming)elaborates a conceptionof rules complementary tohis position on rhetoric. Inasmuchas I choose to startwithrules, myown discussion of rhetoricis deferred untilchapter 4.

lated in words. We can and do talkabout impliedpromises andpromises that nobody has made or even thoughtabout. So itis prima facie not absurd to inquire into the possibilityof im-plicitrules (rules that nobody has formulated)- or rules thatperhaps never willbe stated (p. 100, Black's emphasis).

Rules are statements, or at least they must be capable of statement.Given the controversyover "private language" discussed in chapter I(footnotel2),prudence suggests adding the requirement that rulesnot stated must lend themselves to publicstatement. Blackthen iderí-1tifiedtwo aspects of any "rule-formulation":(i)a description of a]class of actions, possiblyrestricted to actions performed by a desig-inated class of persons; and (ii)an indicationwhether that class o{actions is required, forbidden,or allowed"(1962: 108). , I fn the way rules are stated they assist their users - those whose ac-tions are described-in drawinginferences as to how theyshouldact. For Black, rules are an "indication."In the same vein' Wittgen-stein called rules "sign posts," GilbertRyle "inference-tickets,"andGottlieb"inferencewarrants"(Gottlieb1968: 33-34;see generallyGottlieb'suseful discussion, pp. 33-42). As we see in Black's list

of indicatedinstructions,the emphasis on guidance broadens theAustinianimperative to include thatwhichis permittedas wellasthat which is requiredor forbidden-apointnot lost on Hart in re-furbishinglegal positivism(1961:26-43).

The kindsof inferences one mightdraw-Imust, mustnot; may,need not; should, should not-broadlysuggest senses in which theword"rule"is used. Black identifiedthree such "senses" (his term)to be foundin ordinilï-ïãguage (1962:109-ll5).These are rules inlthe sense of regulations, by whichhe meant imperativerules or stand- | iing orders, rules in the sense of instructions or directions,and rules I v

in the sense of precepts. The differencebetween rules like these and Ja fourth sense of rule-rulesin the sense of principles,likerules of

logic,laws of nature and statisticalregularities - is that in the lattercase "the use of imperativelanguage or 'modal' words ('shall,' 'must,''may,' and the like) is clearlyunfitting"(p. ll3).Only rules in thefirstthree senses are social rules. As such they must be capable ofperformance. They "mustbe about a kindof thingthat human be-ings can do" (p. 107, his emphasis).

Improperly,I think,Blackheld that rules offeringinstruction-

&çt,'rÌl

#*fl,tt,ü:x,}úËffi,ril

li i lffiffii1

8180 Part 1: Rules

d h h

Lawand Language

d t i d th l ' t t it id i l if i h



rules indicatinghow to achieve an end-"have neither authors norhistories"(1962: ll0).Certainlythis is true of rules in the fourthsense. Statements always have authors, and any rule, in whateversense, must be stated or statable. Bú instructionsare social, evenif they state conditionsnot subject to human cõniõT. Thiíis becausepeople stillhave discretion as to whether, under such conditions,

I some end is worth achieving. Tàke one of Black's examples: "Donot

I plant tomatoes untilafter the firstfrost"(p. ll0).People decide on

I the action indicated, or not, and bear the consequences. The ruleregisters a long history of such decisions and thus has llrlumerúleauthors. People never decide when the firstfrost willbe, even iftheyfoimüatea statistical regularityand predicta likelyoccurrence'

Althoughsocial rules necessarily have authors and histories, neitherneed to be knownfor rules to workas such. In the example just

J given, one wouldnormallycall the rule "customary," thereby acknowl-i edging a long history,but denyingany knowledge of it. In the Aus-I tinianvieq the author's wishor will(typicallya single author-

whoever or whatever is sovereign) is contained in whatthe rule statesand conveyed in the imperativeformof its statement, so that noth-ing furtherneed be said about the author. In Black's broadened view

of rules, which accepts a wider range of inferences, authors'inten-tions are stillcontained and conveyed in the way rules are stated.e

In both instances we know, orcan surmise, all we need to know-what the rule is about and what ourrelation to it is - fromthe rulealone. This is straightforwardenough in the Austinianinstance,because a rule can have onlyone function,whichis to convey animperative.Butwhat of the broader view,whichsuggests, at leastto me, that rules perform different but related functions? The prob-lem is knowingwhen a rule commands a particularresponse to itscontent or merely commendsit.

Modalauxiliariesdo not tellenough. They are notoriouslyvari-able even withinlanguages. Recourse to the contextof a given rule's

use helps resolve these ambiguities,but introduces others. Context

9. Relianceon "conduit"metaphors - words for containingand conveying- pervades

conceptual language about language (Lakoffand Johnson 1980: 10-13).lnevitablysuch metaphors also dominate conceptual language about rules.

tends to invade the rule's contenteven as it aids in clarifyingtherule's function,and the rule begins to lose its distinctivepositioninofferingguidance. Carriedvery far in the search for what a rule"really"says, recourse to context tends to support eithera radicallyobjectivistpositionthat rules are nothingmore than regularitiesofconduct, unrelated to authors'intentions,or an equally radicalsub-jectivistposition that there are only authors'intentionsand thusrules of unique contentfor everything thathappens. Both positioü/have the effectof denying rulesa social character. J

To solve the problem of knowinga rule's function,one must takea step that Black was unwilling to.He feltthat the several senses ofrule are pointson a "continuumof cases" (1962:.123). The neededstep is to consider these senses as discrete because they are inde-pendent functionalcategories. One knows a rule's functionby identi-fyingits sense. Conversely one knows a rule's sense by identifyingits function.

Here again the trickis to avoid regress or circularity.ObviouslVIthe functionof rules in an "instructionsense" is to instruct-senseand functionare strictlyco-constitutive.So we must look foraddi-tionalgrounds for constituting Black's three senses of social rule as

independent functionalcategories. Vy'e also want to knowifBlacksomehowoverlookeda sense of rule. Thepoint is to establish-insofaras anythingconstructed is ever established in this sense-that Black'sthree senses of social rule are the onlypossible ones, indeed that theyare inclusivefunctionalcategories.

I believe that some fairlyrecent developments in the philosophyof language provide independent support for the three functionalcategories I attribute toBlack.I have in mindthe theory of speechacts, the relevance of whichis immediatelveiideíllïwezutiïtiiute"spëãfr ãis-t'-fóithe "authciff'ôf iïiéïiëôèttiüg"aIidcuísiõn*ïhetheory(moiàËiõËèïtï,'ft ïs ã ôodifïóâtõÍypâïâdigm) systematicallyrelatesspeakers' (authors')intentionsto linguistic activity.Hearers make

(correct) inferences as to speakers'intentions by noting the illocu-tionaryforce as wellas propositional content of (well-formed)utter-ances. Illocutionaryforce refers to the part of speech constitutinglan action of social consequence. By fixing"the communicativefunc- |tionof content uttered"(Habermas 1979:34; see furtherpp. 59-6 , Jit turns words into deeds.

:r Sìsiì iiffi i ...ffi

Part 1: Rules

I T i k property of l ll d illocutionaryforce is

832 Lawand Language

d f i l i f l i i ti f l



I To invokesome property of language called illocutionaryforce islindeed to leave behind thelongstanding view,on whichpositivismidepends, that the (only)functionof language is to represent reality.Í the distin.tiveclaimôf the thèõryof speèch acts id thât language

7lì is Uottrrepresentative and performative. People use words to repre-I sent deeds and they can use words, and words alone,to performiaeeds. Clearlythe theory of speech acts comportswiththe construc-I tivistpremises of this bookand warrants anyemphasis on socialI rules, and not just publicrules of language, in the constitutionof', reality.ì J. L. Austinwas first torecognize the performative aspect of lan-/eu"S. forwhat it is (19ó3). He and other Philosophers working inithe ordinarylanguage traditionwere attracted to particularcasesland not the general features of language use.ro OnlywithJohn Searlej(tq0q)did considerationof speech acts locate itself in a codificatorylparadigm.Searle's starting point is both familiarand, for our pur-] poses, appropriate. "speakinga language is engaging in a (highly1 complex)rule-governedform of behavior"tt11969: l2). Searle broughtï-speech acts to the door of social theory.

To my knowledge, onlyone social theorist, Jürgen Habermas,

has grasped the importanceof speech act theory and explored its im-plicationswithany care. In his view, "the illocutionarylexicon is,as it were, the sectional plane in whichlanguage and institutionalorder of society interpenetrate" (1984: 321). Myeffortsparallel Haber-mas' in a number of respects, but also depart from his, just as our ob-jectives in developing speech act theory diverge.WhileI hope to

Because Austinwas against Philosophy as then constituted, I am tempted to callhim a philosopher,not Philosopher. His procedure was to select cases of ordinarylanguage use that are exemplary in their complexity.Disciplinaryparadigmstreatexemplars (examples of a theory at work)and puzzles (problemsfor a theoryto

address) as necessarily different.Austindisregarded theoryand saw all worthyexamples as puzzling. See as an example his famous expositionon excuses (1964)and their relationto accidents, mistakes and the like.Not everyone approaches speech acts this way. An alternative uses intentionalistsemantics to simplifythe analysis of speech acts by eliminatingrules. It succeedsby (I wouldsay, suffers from)definingrules in a naively limitedway (Bach andHarnish 1979).

ground functionalcategories of rules in certain properties of language,he has sought a theoryof uncoerced communicativecompetence.r2

We need now to locate illocutionaryacts in the scheme of speechacts firstworked outby Austinand orienting allsubsequent discus-sions (a second Austinian tradition,though I willnot call it that toavoid confusion). Habermas has provideda helpfulsummary (1984:288-289):

Throughlocutionaryacts the speaker expresses states of af-fairs;hesáííiom-etliiiiË.ThïoìãËl76õaiïonaryãcts-iheípêãkerperfprmsanactio-n-ip-sry1q_e_soggthr1g.TïiãilioCutionaryroleestablishes the modeof a sentence . . . employedas a state-ment, promise,command, avowal, or the like. Understandardconditions, the mode is expressed by means of a performativeverb in the firstperson present; the action meaning can be seenparticularlyin the fact that "hereby" can be added to the illocu-tionarycomponent of the speech act: "Ihereby promise you(command you,confess to you) that [propositionalcontent -state of affairsl."Finally, throughperlocutionaryactsthe speakerproduces an effect upon th_e_hearer. By carryingout a speech

he brings aboutsomething in the world.Thus the threeactsthat Austindistinguishes canbe characterized in the followingcatch-phrases: to say something, to act in saying something,to bringabout something throughacting in saying something.

By followingrules on formingsentences, any speaker makes it pos-sible for any hearer to knowwhat the formerintends. Observe thatrules for establishingillocutionaryforce, by enablinga sentence totake the form,I hereby act by using some rule-specifiedwordforaction,produce sentences that are themselves in the formof rules.That is to say, these sentences require or permitan inference abouttheir speakers' intentions.Though all rules have an illocutionary

12. Habermas has argued that such a theoÍy, based on the "paradigmof linguisticphilosophy"which is replacing therepresentationalviewof language, wouldre-verse the centuriesJong growthof instrumentalreason as the sine qua non ofrationalityand constitute what I would callan operative paradigm for society(1984: 386-399.)

l0

::lffi í ffiÌr

85i*Ëi'i;

Ili

84 Part 1: Rules

I it i t t th t ll d d ith ill ti

Lawand Language

f of R th th i I h b th t



i1Í

ï i:

tI component, it is not truethat all sentences endowed with illocution-I ary force are rules. Atbest we can say that they are rule-candidates.I Whether such rule-candidatesbecome rules depends on their re-

ception. Ifthehearer understands the intentions ofthe speaker, andso indicates withan affirmative,then she "accepts a speech act offerand grounds an agreement: this agreement concerns the content ofthe utterance on the one hand, and on the other hand, certainguarantees immanent to speech acts and certain obligationsrelevantto the sequel of interaction"(Habermas 1984: 296, emphasis onoriginal).Habermas considered this, as do I, "a weak normativebond . . ." (p. 304; see also 1979: 62-63).Though weak,it is never-theless decisive in givingspeech acts withan illocutionarycompo-nent the functionas wellas the formof a rule. To say that norma-tivelyis weak means it is immanent in the speech act and, therefore,

.- confinedto the speaker and hearer.h One mightobject that normativitythus conferredis insufficient'*toestablish a rule because the latter must refer to a "class of actions"

(Black 1962: 108, as quoted above), whicha single interaction is not.The objectionneed not present Habermas withdifficulty,becausehe called theresult of the interactiona "norm,"whichmay be in-dividualand thús not a iüie (èómpàre chapter 4, footnote 2).In mycase, to avoid troubleI should say that normativityis confined tothe initiatinginteractionof speaker and hearer and all subsequentintéractionïìfiat üheÍãccepïãíEilongiìigtô"fhèclasi õf iritêractionsfoiúÌiiõï"ffieïiinitiaìins]ntèractìõiíis éxêinptâïÍ.Péfhaps this iswhat Habermas meant by "the sequel of interaction."

Such weak normativityexplains how instructionscan be rules. IfI hereby state that Xcounts as Y, and you accept this statement asoperative between us,withoutqualifications (which,ifoffered, Imay accept in turn), then that 9 a e qer_rl_.fUlg --g'llf-1$gls, |*9jç"çlivesitgal_ 9-n__g.p_r9p_9lb_e relation9f X o Y We can always agree tochange a rule; others can join in ilieâdièement; it may become gen-

erallyaccepted. Were such to happen, through the playof additionalspeech acts withcomplementaryillocutionaryforce, we speak of aconventionemerging. Conventionsare no less weak normativelyspeaking than the original agreement-normativityis immanent ineach complementaryspeech act - but it is widerbecause more speak-ers and hearers are involved.

Conventionsonce established in this fashion begin to substitute

...i. j.

for new sets of agreements. Rather than saying, I hereby state thatX counts as Y, I am inclined tosay, it is the convention that X countsas Y, don't you agree? EventuallyI feel no obligationto seek youragreement; I merely invoke the convention.We may say that conven-tions have become institutionalizedand, in this process, acquire ad-ditlonaÍïo;riiãiiïiat;lhatlíìË'eysenerate expectations not depen-dent on fresh agreement. Institutionalizedconventions are not moreruleJikefor being normativelystronger. They are merely morevisi-ble and harder to ignore. Because they are normativelystrongeç itis more difficultto change the content of the instructioncontainedin the convention, but it is not impossible.

A special case of rules in the instructionsense has X count as Y,where Y is a value. These are principles,though notin Black'ssenseof the term. Considerthe statement, nice guys, as a rule, finishlast.Ifbeing a nice person or finishinglast is asserted to have a value,good or bad, the instruction isnot merely to avoidfinishinglast,don't be nice. The fullreading is: Success is better than niceness, sodon't be nice and avoid finishinglast.

Institutionalizationexpedites the assignment of value to andthroughrules offeringinstruction. Thatprinciplestend to be well-institutionalizedhelps to explainthe impression that they standapart fromother instructionsin their normative power. Neverthe-less, their ruleness, on which any normativityhinges, begins in speech."The moral of this is chastening, even disturbing: institutionsare nomore than the (temporary)effects of speech act agreements, andthey are as fragileas the decision,always capable of being revoked,to abide by them."I would add to this acute observation by StanleyFish (1980:213) that institutionalizationand valuationserve to in-hibitcasual revocation (compare pp. 318-321).

For convenience I have proceeded withjustone sense ofrule, rulesthat instruct. Ibelieve they constitute a functionalcategory ofrules,whichI willhereinaftercall instruction-rules.Some writershave

denied that instructions and conventionsare rules at all (forexam-ple, Bach and Harnish1979: 108-110,120-127). Others, like Haber-mas, have acknowledged their normativitybut not their regulativecharacter (1979:54-55,1984: 303-305). Such denials recall the forceddistinctionbetween constitutiveand regulative rules.A constructiv-ist always sees this distinctionas arbitraryand unhelpful.Nothingin speech act theorysupports it. The preceding remarks show that

iï::1

,*.Ë,Èrsat

JÌi:,ì

t:i

ïi

j#tíËs*dS

$ïã*,-4

*t-M'#ffiffi.*trïÏ

.iffi ãffiïo'

Part 1: Rules

when assertive speech acts are successful (their reception confirmed

876 Lawand Language

of speech acts: assertives directives commissives expressives and



when assertive speech acts are successful (their reception confirmed,withnormativityattaching), theyproduce rules, however fragiletheir constitution andtenuous their normativity.\When any suchrule becomes a convention,constitutionof the rule by speech actsaccepting its status as a rule begins to supplant its constitutionbythe repetitionof speech acts withcomplementarypropositionalcon-

1 tent. Then the rule is normativelystronger, its regulativecharacter

Isupporting its independent constitution,and conversely. The changein conditionis signified bya change in nomenclature:constitutionbecomes institution.

Allsocial rules, and not just instruction-rules,are necessarily andsimultaneouslyconstitutive and regulative.If in producing instruction-rules assertive speech acts account for both their constitutiveandregulative character, at least in the last instance, one might wonderifall speech acts have this effect, or only those makingassertions.Here we should recall that speech acts make language performative.By makingan assertion, one does something social,at least ifone'sutterance meets witha response-any response. Yet makingasser-tions can hardly exhaust the range of possible speech acts, any morethan all social rulesgive instructions.

It wouldseem to follow thatspeech acts other than those assertingsome state of affairs(in Habermas' terms, having other illocution-ary roles) can produce rules by endowing utteranceswithconsti-tutive and regulative consequences. It does not follow thata//speechacts can produce rules. This would depend on the verbs chosen andthe effects their utterance is intended to secure. To knowwhat speechacts other than assertives are rule candidates, we need a list of verbsused in linguisticallyeffected social performances or, better, a schemeclassifying them into categories of speech acts.

BeginningwithJ. L. Austin(1963: 150-162), Philosophers havelisted verbs to be found in performativeutterances and groupedthem into what they took tobe distinctivecategories. Because these

performances are social, the categories are implicitlyfunctional.Thus is explained the credibilityand influenceof the scheme Searleintroduced (1979) for classifyingspeech acts. He got the categoriesright,at least as far as his audience is concerned. Searle's schemeis the keystone in the doorway throughwhich the theoryof speechacts can proceed to be social theory. And, forthe purposes of socialtheory, it is a manageable scheme. Searle offered fivecategories

of speech acts: assertives, directives,commissives, expressives, anddeclarations.

Assertives, as we have already seen, are speech acts stating a be-lief,coupled of course to the speaker's wishor intentionthat thehearer accept this belief.Neither intends the regulativeconsequencestheiracts jointlyproduce.Representative verbs used in assertivespeech acts are: state, affirm,report, characterize, attribute,insist,dissent. V/hileinstruction-rulesobviously issue fromassertives, Blackconfused matters a bitby suggestingthat directionsand instructionsare synonymsfor rules in an instruction-sense.Because directionsso understood do not issue fromdirectivespeech acts, which is Searle'snext category, it is better to avoid using the term "directions"at all(recall introduction,footnote4).

Directivespeech acts also present the hearer witha speaker's in-tention as to some act the speaker wouldliketo have performed.Typical directiveverbs are: ask, command, demand, permit, caution.Even though all dirçctives arenot imperative, imperativesare themodel case for rules seen as commands. Nevertheless, the intentofall directives and not just imperatives is to place a regulative burdenon hearers. It is this feature of directivespeech acts which leads us

to think,though mistakenly, that the rules they give rise to are particu-larlyor even uniquely regulative. Thus Black'srules in a regulation-sense correspond to directivesinclusively.Successful requests andcommands have the same kind,though not the same degree, ofregulative effect. Put otherwise, illocutionaryforce variesfromverbto verb, even when the perlocutionarysubject remains the same.

Here again Black's choiceof terms confuses matters. Allspeechacts producing rules must have some kindof regulativeeffect, be-cause all rules are regulative. Ifall rules are "regulations,"then thoseproduced by directivespeech acts need a name of their own. I willcall them "directive-rules."

Commissives reveal the speaker's intention ofbeing committedto

a stated Cóúise oíãatìón: ïit-proúi5êãÍd oTÍèfáfê úsúât êÍamlÍes.For a hearer to accept any speaker's offeror promise constitutes acommitment onthe speaker's part. The term "commitment"itselfsuggests the deliberate creationof a normativebond far strongerthan the bond immanent insuccessful assertions. Directiveand com-missive speech acts are intended to have the same effect,whichisto get the perlocutionarysubject to do something. They differon

,.

u

fliÊ

-ìì'

:;li{a

*{fiï

:'.itl{i irti iffil. ' *Ì:

88 Part í: Rules

the identityofthat subject-anotherperson or one's self-and thus

Lawand Language

case To start with Black identifiedtwo senses for precepts one refer-

89

4r



the identityofthat subject-anotherperson or one s self-and thuson the locus of obligation.Commitments made to others are rule-candidates. Commitmentsaccepted by others providerules for thosemakingsuch commitments.

Whethercommitments toone's self can also produce rules is a dif-ficultquestion.r3 One can say interchangeably,I have promised my-self to go to church every week, and, I make it a rule to do so. Isthis private commitmenta rule unless it is followedby a public state-ment, the latterbeing theproximate source of normativity?To theextent that rules need not be stated to be considered as such, I takeit as sufficient thatthe commitment iscapable of publicstatementand the person making the cómmitúènt #ôüianixshiik frommak-ing it publicly.Wishingto keep the commitmentprivate suggests in-sincerity aboutbeing committed and withholds normativeconse-quences. Ifone accepts promises to one's self, then it is indeed (indeed) a rule for that person because it is constitutiveand regulativeat one and the same time.

Mostwriterseither ignore rulesarising fromcommitmentsorrelegate them to the categoryof directive-rules.Perhaps this is be-cause they tend to see rules as either constitutiveor regulative,theformerofferingguidance and the latter requiringcompliance. Yetacknowledgementof a thirdcategory is implicitin the language ofrightsand duties. To state a duty-Itis myduty to go to churchevery week - is a way of saying, I promised (myparents, the preacheçmyself) to go to church every week. Tostate a right-Itis my rightto go to church - can be restated, somebody promisedme that I cango to church. Mypromises confer dutieson me that are simultane-ously rights others claim I have conferredon them. The same holdsfor others'promises as they affect me.Commitment-rules,as I willcall them here, always distributeconsequences this way.

One mightassume that the commitment-rules arethe same asBlack's rules in the sense of precepts. This turnsout notquite the

13. Jon Elster has called the act of bindingoneself a "precommitment"(1919: 36-ÍÌÍ):f fiídthii á pCculiarcoinage because it suggests an act prior to commitment.Indeed Elster's elaborate discussion centers on strategic concerns,whichneces-sarily require the presence of others. It is to these others that the prioract servesas instruction or direction(p. 38). Commitmentsas such are of negligibleinterestin Elster's discussion.

case. To start with,Black identifiedtwo senses for precepts, one referring to prudential rules, the second to moral rules(1962: lll).Blackthoughtthat prudentialrules are plausibly regarded as instructionsof the sort in whichvalues are asserted. These are what I have calledprinciples.Moralrules he held to be differentbecause we cannotchoose not to have them not applied to ourselves (pp. ll1-ll2).Thisis unconvincing.One may be exempt fromsuch a rule at great socialcost, but then the rule is an instruction-ruleor directive-rule.

WhatBlack was groping for is revealed in his two illustrationsofprecepts. "Itis a good rule to pay one's debts promptly,"and 'Agood rule is: to put charity ahead ofjustice"(1962: lll).In the first,a prudentialrule, havinga debt bespeaks of having made a commit-ment to-pãÍ it, áritlthe rule has to do withkeeping promises. Thesecond, a moral rule, is clearlycontestable (and hardly the exampleBlack thou$hííï ïs ôf tiütefrorn'úhïchèiémptioncannot be had)'but its point is (I think)that if someone has failed ona promise,we should be forgivingor understanding rather than act on an in-dependent rule that tells us what in justice we can do about this kindof conduct. Both illustrationsare about commitmentsand thusabout the category of speech acts calledcommissives. The rulesthemselves happen to be principles that people assert in circumstancesproduced by cornmitment-rulesand their breach. Blackpresupposedcommitment-rulesin tryingto get at the sense of precepts. In theprocess, he wronglyimputedthe former'sdistinctivenessto the latter.

The correspondence between assertive, directive,and commissivespeech acts and Black's functionalcategories of rule (once they havebeen renamed and the thirdreconstructed) suggests that Searle's tworemainingcategories of speech acts-expressives and declarations-do not produce rules. This a brief examination of each confirms.Moreprecisely, it confirmsthat speech acts in neither category canproduce rules on their own.

Expressives serve to convey an emotion or attitude towarda state

of affairs. Illustrativeare apologies and congratulations. They arenot rule-candidates because their reception is sufficientfrom thespeaker's point of viewto fulfillher intentionsin having made thestatement. IfI say, I hereby apologize to you, and you accept, noth-ing furtherneed transpire between us for the reason of my havingapologized. Uponacceptance, the speech act has completelyper-formed the action intended - it has no extended perlocutionaryef-

4rr

l:fi;

,f,

fr$'

it

1ffi l r

Lawand Language

ing me a right tothe money. The core of my claim,whateverform

9190 Part 1: Rules

fects To the extentthat expressives become courtesies they acquire



g g y y ,I offerit in, is that I was promised money. I may even have madethe promise to myself,thereby committingmyselfto getting themoney. In this case, I do not promise in advance what I willdo tosecure it; that depends on what you do on hearing my claim.

The contingentcharacter of the promise in thisinstance is an in-vitationfor strategic interaction(defined in chapter 6, footnote l4).As Habermas wouldsay, it is not understanding-oriented. It is success-

oriented, and it deliberatelymanipulatesperlocutionarypossibilitiesto shift the directionof illocutionaryforce from the speaker to thehearer-you willend up being committedto (at least somethingof)what I have promised myself.The hearer normallyresponds withacounter-claim.The process of interactingover these claims is a par-ticularlyfertileone fornew rules in the formof agreed outcomes(see Kratochwil1983: 17-21; 1984: 691-697). Such rules stem fromjolgLc_q_5nlni-sly_e_l--weboth promise. . . . If they are jointcommis-sive deciáãiìõ;d;ïë iËóúldcall thern contractsJ4 Underhighlyin-stitutionalizedcircumstances, in whichknownlegal rules are invokedin supportof claims, we have the adversarial setting and reasonedargument Kennedyand Kratochwilfindemblematic of the legal situa-

tion. Note, however, that claimsof other sorts are no less appropri-ate for legal consideration.I suggest that no legallyrelevant use of the term "claim"falls out-

side the categories offered by speech act theory, and alluses fitoneor another category or compound categories in complexsystems ofuse. Behindall such uses stands an original,or initiatingspeech act,which is a commissive. Comparably,assertives and directives initiatethe makingof rules. No otherspeech acts can. That this is so leadsme to a final,rule-aspiring assertion of my own:Starting withas-sertives, directives, and commissive speech acts' we have an inclusiveclassificatoryscheme for all social rules.

A question remains. As noted, Searle's scheme is implicitlyfunc-

tional.It sortsspeech acts by reference to speaker's intentions,mean-

ing the purposes they serve speakers. Now, howdo we know that he

14. MichaelHancher (1979) pursued a similarline of reasoning but saw contractsand other cooperativespeech acts as hybridsof the generic categories rather thandeclarations.

fects. To the extentthat expressives become courtesies, they acquireregulative characterby parasiticassociations withother kinds ofspeech acts.

Declarationswouldappear not even to require acceptance to havecompletelyperformed the speaker's intentions. To say, I hereby de-clare that you are fired, does not require acknowledgment to be suc-cessful, at least as Searle saw it. Declarations are thus regulativeina more immediatesense than other speech acts. Actually,as my

il-lustrationshows, insufficient informationhas been provided (Com-pare Hancher 1979). Can the speaker fire the hearer because she hasthe authorityto do so? Ifso, rules exist stating such, and these rulesgive the speech act its regulative effect. Ifnot, then the act of firingthe hearer becomes regulativeonly when the speaker assents. Theformercase is a directivespeech act involvinga highdegree of in-stitutionalization.The latter case is an assertive speech act and noth-ing more.Othercommon examples - I hereby declare you married,I hereby declarewar-suggest that the former case is usuallytheoperative onefor declarations,and they should be seen achieving il-lucutionaryforce andperformative sufficienry,not throughperlo-cutionaryeffects, but by parasitic association with institutionalizedrules. Iffiringsomeone is directive, then declaring war isassertive,and bidding at an auctioncommissive.Declarativeformsexist forthose categories of speech acts withrule potential.

Stated differently, allrules are either assertives of the form,I statethat X counts as Y, or directives of the form,I state that X person(should, must, may)do Y, or commissives of the form,I state thatI (can, will,should) do Y. Whileeach is a distinctivecategory, allthree play on each other in the production of rules. People make as-sertions about others'promises,respond to assertives withdirectivesand so on. lrtme illustratewiththe word"claim,"whichI used afew pages ago.

Tàke the statement, I hereby claim thatit is my money.Depending

on the context, such a statement mighthave an assertive meaning:Thismoney counts as mine. To add, because my uncle's willsays so,is to tryan assertive declaration.A second possibilityhas a directivemeaning: I request that I be allowedto have what is mine.To add,because I am king, is to make a directive declaration (or to entertaina delusion). Note that boththe assertives and directives conveyed bythe word"claim"depend on the existence of a priorcommissive giv-

Í$iT*.s'1:tl+

Ì, ii

..ffi.ì ..*fffi.

92 Part 1: Rules

has fixedon fundamental categories of human linguisticactivity?

93ii

:1,;t$ít$l? i

Lawand Language

properties (whichdoes not include imperatives)or are normatively



g g yHabermas observed that Searle's is "a clear and intuitivelyevidentclassification. . .." (1984: 320). On this I quite agree, but it is stillless than the complete answer we need. Happily,Searle identifiedan ontologicalprincipleunderlying hisscheme. Not so happily,Ithinkhis categories of being are improperlyworkedout and thusresult in what Searle himselfcalled an "inelegantsolution. . ." 11979:l5l.

Searle held that speech acts involvethe fitbetween words a speakeruses to have her intentions realized and the world,or state ofaffairs,the speaker refers to. He then argued that assertives as a class intendto fitwords to world;conversely, directivesfit the worldto the speak-er's words by intendinghearers to act on and thus change the world.In the case of commissives, Searle also saw the speaker tryingto fitthe worldto words, as withdirectives,by committingherself to doingwhat is required, rather than having someone else do it. Searle wantedto show that directives and commissives "are reallymembers of thesame category," but found no good reason to make either one a sub-ject of the other (1979: l4).

Habermas approached the problem somewhat differently.Heargued, withSearle, that assertives attempt to fitwords to world.Hethen detached "mere imperatives" fromother directiveswhichhecalled "normativelyauthorized . . ." (1984: 324). His treatment ofcommissives argues in effect that mere promises fitthe worldtowords. But, in so doing, "the speaker binds }:riswillin the sense ofnormativeobligation;. . ." (1984: 324). I read Habermas to meanthat the normativityimmanent in commissives reverses their appar-ent fitto the world.On his assessment they are words-to-worldinfit.Thus Habermas reoriented Searle's tripartitescheme to label im-peratives and, we might infer,promises to oneself,as effortsatchanging theworldthroughspeech acts, whileassertives and mostdirectivesand commissives are efforts at theconverse. For Haber-mas, the

latter conditionis

the road to intersubjective recognitionof the legitimaryof states of affairsand intentions.Habermas has altered Searle's ontologicalprincipleforhis own

normativepurposes. Directionof fitmatters-words-to-worldisdesirable and the other way is not, at least for individualspeech acts.Onlywhen the world-to-wordsfit is a product of legitimate (words-to-world)exchanges is it desirable. Those speech acts that have regulative

?,i'l{ inoffensive(assertives) have the rightdirectionof fit.Discriminating

between imperatives and other directivessubstitutes degree of institu-tionalization(what else can normative authorizationbe?) for theoriginalontologicalprinciple.

We must return to the question of directionof fitontologicallyunderstood, and ask ifSearle has chosen his words correctly. Somewords fitthe worldwithoutbeing fitto it, or having theworldfitto them. I thinkthis is generally true of assertives. They either reflectan existingwords-to-worldfitor propose a new oneJ5 They do notendeavor to change an existingarrangement. AgainstHabermas, Ido agree withSearle that directives as a class fit the world towords.Thke as an example, I request that you fixthe stairs. The state ofaffairs here is a problem withthe stairs. Your actions,prompted bymy request, willcorrect the problem. Mywords (set in trainactionsthat) change the world.

Against Searle's position, I believe commissives as a class fitwordsto the world.Ïb commitoneself is to project a desired state of affairsand bringit to bear on oneself. Considermy saying, I promise thatI willfixthe stairs. I commitmyselfto a state of affairs in which

the stairs are no longer a problem.Myactions, promptedby my com-mitment,willbe directed towardrealizationof that anticipated stateof affairs. Mycommitmentwillthen be discharged. Mywords-making a commitment- are fitto a state of affairs- withthe stairsfixed,my commitmentis discharged-as a wayof changing theworldas it is-thestairs are broken,need fixing.The "worldas itis" is not the "worldas a state of affairs"indicated in a commissivespeech act.r6

Searle saw expressives as having no directionof fitbecause "the truth of thepropositionexpressed in an expressive is presupposed" (L9'79: 16). Better to say,

no fitat all, because nothingis being related to anythingelse. He also saw declara-

tions as havinga two-wayfitbecause an "extra-linguisticinstitution"is requiredfor illocutionaryforce (pp, 18-19). Institutionalization,though prior, is hardlyextraJinguistic,and the connectionto directionof fitis obscure (Habermas1984: 324-325).Directionof fitmay be cast in terms of an anticipated state of affairs.I requestthat you fixthe stairs, couldmean, I want the stairsfixed.Willyou undertaketo fixthem? This is a two-step speech act. I fit the world intomy words(tÍyto

16.

.ffii .

94 Part 1: Rules

IfI am rightin this reconstructionof the ways in whichwords andfi f l f

Lawand Language

Moreneed be said about individualconduct, and particularly

95

ffilsüífl#



worldsfit,ontologicalcategories match functionalcategories ofspeech acts and rules. Reassuring as this is, it is in one crucialrespecta bogus accomplishment. Searle's ontologicalprinciple, in any version,relies on positivismand a representational viewof language. The term"fit"presupposes the independence of positivities,in this instancewords and úôild,ãboüf whiõfi-liüéìiïiónsõffilãieËiriãasïèã:Ã Cõn-struitiViSfViêïderiiës-that worldand words are independent; it sees

them as mutually ôón'StìtütiÍe.ffcatesõiìesõfË,elnsã,iôÏ1-rgúfitlcaltvconstitütóil,thën thét mâí 6e i-ai<ÍiõÏãïüóCialoiigins.

As I observe at the beginningof chapter l, the search forground-ing may lead in circles.What then isreassuring about the corres-pondence of functionaland ontologicalcategories, when one findsthat each set does indeed lead to the other? Theanswer, at least forme, is the accggg_lgjgn of congruent categories. No one set is everfundamental, "trânaõãnêniãl,ttõiprimâiÍ.We mis(use) such termswhen we findwhat we are lookingfor inthe next place we lookhard.I findthat there are three categories of words-to-worldfit.I stylemy effortsas going"deeper"or back towarda putative"beginning."Each new set is more "fundamental"than the last.

I woulddo better to say that I choose to go in one direction,byrelatingwords and worlds,speech and rules, before goingin an-other. kgal theory, withwhich I begin this chapter, takes that otherpath, by relatingrules to law and order.I take a morecircuitousroute, because I think legal theory ignores language and fails to con-nect individualconduct and social rulesadequately. Speech actssupply the connection, but not sufficiently.

have you do something like fixthe stairs) by having you fityour words to theworld(make a commitmentas to a state of affairs I prefer).But I do not needto make my request contingent on your willingnessto commityourself,though

Imay

do so to enhanceprospects

for theperlocutionary

effects I desire. I cansimplyorder you to fixthe stairs, withoutconceÍn for your willingnessto becommitted, andyoumay do so independently of any such commitment.The differ-ences between requests so understood and other directives maybe what Haber-mas had in mind in arguing that simple imperatives are distinguishablefromnormativelyauthorized directives.The latter are commissives, not directives,forthe purpose of establishing directionof fit,whichHabermas wronglysaw astheir normativizingtrait.

:

about howpeople learn what rules are and when to followthem.This is the subject of the next chapter, as is culture, by which I meanthe general pattern is individuals'conduct.If legal theory fails toconnect individualconduct and socialrules, it does no better withrules in use and social arrangements-"the problemof order," aschapter 4 is entitled.In that chapter, I conclude witha discussionof rhetoric,but not as conduct withinarenas preconceived as legal.Instead figurativespeech shares withrules in the construction of so-cial arrangements, not least the ones we dignifyas legal'

m{#,

,*i'iï " ' : '.tffilíll-

Cognition,Judgment, Culture 97

and knowing,not just in the sense of acquiringpropositional knowl-d b t l i d k i ghow to se that knowledge includ



COGNITION,JUDGMENTOCULTURE

Categories of performativelanguage and rules matchmodes ofreasoning. I support this assertion by furtherconsideration of the

question of "directionof fit,"introduced in the preceding chapter,and by a constructivistdemonstrationthat modes of reasoning arisefromlongstandinghuman practices situated in generally presentmaterial circumstances. I argue more particularlythat "ancestral in-stitutions,"and not logic orgenes, make modes of reasoning whatthey are. Reasoning takes practice; cognitionis conductJ

A constructivistinterpretationof reasoning extends to learning

l. I understand "cognition"to refer broadlyto mindfulbehavior-behaviorde-pendent on "higherbrain function."This inclusive conceptionof cognitionisalso preferred in the transdisciplinarymovement, known as the cognitivesci-

ences, which"seeks to develop mental processes and representations that arebiologicallyfounded, logicallyjustifiable,psychologically real, andcapable ofbeing programmed on a computer"(Gardner 1981: 265)' I take this strikinglypositivisrobjectivistprogram to be valuable withinthe limits ofits physicalistassumptions. rühether all activitiesof mindcan finallybe reduced to binaryopera-tions, the metaphorical equation of mindand computer so simplifieswhat goes

on in and among minds that it illsuits the constructivistview of cognitionasconduct, See further footnotes 14 and 15 below.

edge, but learning and knowinghow to use that knowledge, includ-ing knowledge of rules. I call this learninghow to exercise judgment,and in effect I endorse HaroldGarfinckel'sview that people are not"judgmentaldopes" (1967: 68; see also Heritage 1984: 110-ll5).In-stead they learn as childrenhow to exercise judgmentin successive,well-definedstages of individualsocial and physical growth-thestages, or levels, of "moraldevelopment"respectively described by

Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg.In my constructivistrenditionof theirwork,I associate a firststage withthe acquisitionof knowl-edge about, and competence in using' instruction-rules,a secondstage withdirective-rules,and a third stage withcommitment-rules.

Categories of rules in use are subject both to practice and con-sciousness, as Piaget pointed out. consciousness is the internal dimen-sion of support for rules, which,in each category, also have a charac-teristic external dimension of support. These ensembles of supportfor each category of rule along withthe rules that people have in-ternalizedand use in practice, constituteculture. Culturesmix rules,sorted by category, and the correlativemodalities of support thoserules elicit,in differentproportions. Althoughany culture's mix is

subject to change, no necessary or preferred developmentalsequence

is implied.As culturerelates to categories of rules, so gender relatesto categories of reasoning. The chapterconcludes withremarks onthis proposition.

COGNITIVEUNIVERSALS

whether given categories of human conduct are fundamental is anunanswerable question' A differentquestion-whetherany suchcategories are universal-maynot be. "(Jniversal"in this contextdescribes any distinguishableattributèor activitycommon to hu-manityor, more particularly,common to all competenthuman beings,wherever and in whatevercircumstances they are found. "Compe-tence" refers to a level of cognitivedevelopmentachieved by mostadult members of the species. obviouslyindividualsmay not be ableto do somethingmost other adults can do-speak, for example, yetotherwise they are competent-say, to care for themselves'

i .' * iriffi:. ' '

98 Part 1: Rules

Language, includingperformativelanguage, is a human universal.It diffi l h h h f


whether spatiallyor temporally.Directivesrelate wholes to parts,d commissi e parts to wholes In the latter twocases temporality



It is difficultto imagine that the three categories of speech acts-assertive, directive, andcommissive-and the correlativecategoriesof rules, whichI identifyin the precedingchapter, are not. Never-theless, their universality isnot to be taken for granted. The Yimasof New Guinea are said to have onlyninety verbs in their language,just one of them performative-tosay.2 Howeversurprising this is,I consider it likelythat the Yimas put that one verb to service inother than assertive speech acts. The sentence, I say that you,or I(should, must, will)leave, can have directiveor commissive force fthe Yimaspossess any notionof temporality. They mustif they arecapable of reasoning.

On empiricalgrounds, there is littledoubt that reasoning, likelanguage, is universal. Indeed the capacityto reason is a standardcriterionfor cognitivecompetence. Two categories of reasoning arewidelyacknowledged-deductiveand inductivereasoning. C. S. Peirceintroduced a thirdcategory, abduction, only a century ago (Buchler1955: 150-156,Habermas l97l:ll3-139,Eco and Sebeok 1983). Ifind itno less plausiblya universal category(compare Sebeok 1983).I am also satisfiedthat these three categories are inclusive. Tosee

why this should be so, let us revert to the question of "directionoffit"of categories of speech acts.The point of a speech act is to have an effecton some state of

affairs.In the case of assertives, one state of affairs is held to countforanother. Withdirectives, theintent is to altersome circumscribedpart of an initial,larger state of affairs.V/ithcommissives, the in-tent is to take a circumscribedstate of affairs andhave it alter aresulting, larger state of affairs.Assertives relate wholesto wholes,

2. I quote an account of a lunch-time conversation atthe Universityof California'sBerkeleycampus.

People were skeptical. Ninetyverb stems? . . . You couldn't say "she wantedhim toleave but she didn'tsay anything". . . . You could onlysay, "she toldhim to leave" but you couldn't say that either, because there is no indirectquotationin Yimas, and onlya single verb to describe lbetter to say, per-formlspeech acts. "What's the speech act verb?" A hush fellacross the room. People shook their heads and exhaled slowly."That's in-credible.""ldon't believe it" (Rose 1984: 133-134).

and commissive parts to wholes. In the latter twocases, temporalityis presupposed-these speech acts lead fromone state of affairs,inwholeor part, to the next, in part or whole.3

So understood, speech acts are instances of applied reasoning. Toproceed froma whole to its parts is what one normallydescribes asdeductive reasoning. To proceed fromparts to whole isinductive.Peirce's abduction is a matter of leaping fromone whole to another

withouthaving to proceed down to the parts and up to the nextwhole.These three categories exhaust the possible ways wholes andparts can be related, for part-to-partrelations, in which noconnec-tion to a wholeis presumed, are then whole-to-wholerelations.

Deductionhas the longest recognitionas a distinctiveformofreasoning because it appears to be so conclusive:Awhole can onlybe its parts, and parts must relate to each other in determinateways,or they are not parts at all. Tàke A, B, and C as symbols expressingratios of parts to a whole.IfA equals B, but B does not equal Cin some defined respect (definedfor the whole),then Acannot equalC in that same respect. Notice,however, if the whole is indetermi-nate and thus possiblyvariable, A mightequal C. Inductionrarely

gets creditforhaving the same logicalrigoras deductionbecausethe contents of the whole cannotbe knownor fixedin advance.Mostproblematicalof all is abduction, since the content of wholes,leftas such, are indeterminatelydifferent.If the wholes are rendereddeterminate, then theyare but parts of a knownwhole(consisting

3. The presurnptionof temporalitybrings to mind ImmanuelKant's famous dìscus-sion of "the analogies of experience" (1933:208-238)."The three modes of timearc duration, succession, and coexistence. There will,therefore, be three rules ofall relations ofappearances in time,and these rules willbe priorto allexperience,and indeed make it possible" (p. 209: emphasis in original).Relations of timeviewed dynamically("dynamicalrelations") yield"inherence,consequence, andcomposition"(p. 236). Kant's proofs for the three analogies, formulated as prin-ciples, are flawedand inconsistent (Wolff1969: 238-292) Furthermore, perman-ence is not a relationof time at all (p.246), although it is perhaps a relationofspace in time. The parallels between the three categories of directionalityandKant's three categories of (space and) time relations can hardly be coincidental.Thus the problem is not withKant's categories but his effortto prove that theyalone are necessary and sufficientfor experience and, as such, fundamental.

lr . ffi t"

100 Part 1: Rules

of those twoparts) to which they are determinatelyrelated. Other-wise the relationof wholes is a matter of conjecture


that mightbe called an inductiveinstitution.Likeother institu-tions (warfare the law and so on) it has a relativelyfixed



wise the relationof wholes is a matter of conjecture.Ifabduction is the last category of reasoning to gain recognition

as such, it is onlybecause conjecture is so inconclusive.Vy'hen con-jecture is harnessed to other modes of reasoning, we dignifyit as thecreative part of the theory enterprise. Morethan that, it is centralto any such enterprise, which is generally modeled as parts to whole(induction),whole to (simpler)whole,whole to parts (deduction),the determinate relation of the latter set of parts clarifyingthe am-biguous relationof the initiatingset of parts. Conjecture in theabsence of such supporting activitiesis always open to challenge andcounter-conjecture, unless of course it has become accepted on faith.KarlPopper's warning (1968: 40-42) that theories are never verifi-able is sophisticatedacknowledgmentthat conjecture retains its in-conclusivecharacter even where it is supported by other modes ofreasoning (althoughhe disallowedinduction).

Deduction,induction,and abductionare human practices, ap-parently universal,antedating theirabstract characterizationas dis-tinctiverealms of cognitiveactivity.Are they natural, in the senseof being geneticallymandated or physicallynecessitated? The case

of deduction misleads here. That the brain, as a physico-chemicalsystem, undoubtedly uses the same kindof onloff,either,/or opera-tions that characterize deduction does not make it necessary for thebrain, cognitivelyspeaking, to use, prefer, or even be able to usethose same operations in the absence of practice. Whether naturepresupposes us to reason as we do, reasoning itself is a social matter.

The case of inductionbetter suits an examinationof this proposi-tion. Ifdeduction seems to be compelledby nature (accessible na-ture seems never to violatethe laws of deductive logic),the same can-not be said for induction.We choose to proceed inductivelybecausewe have learned that it helps in our endeavors. Indeed inductionisa way of talkingabout the cumulativeeffect of our experiences. Ourendeavors and experiences are less decreed by nature than madewhat they are by society.

Max Blackhas elaborated on much the same pointin this strikingpassage:

It is, therefore, not fancifulto conceive of all adulthuman be-ings as participatingin a complexsystem of ways of learning

tions (warfare, the law, and so on), it has a relativelyfixed,though not immutable structuretransmitted fromone genera-tion to the next and crystallizedin the formof prohibitionsand licenses, maxims of conduct, and informalprecepts of per-formance. Likeother institutions,the inductiveinstitutionre-quires that its participants have mastered a system of distinc-tive concepts having both descriptiveand normativeaspects

(1970: 86-87).I cannot see that deduction is any less an institution.We engage

in it because it works for us, even ifwe feel that nature leaves us nochoice. At the other extreme, conjecture, as the wordsuggests, isnever compelled,always spontaneous. Yet it too is an institution.Assuch, conjecture stabilizesas reasoning warranted for the results itgets. Withpractice we change the rules and alter results.

Blackargued that "we cannot regard inductiveinference as some-thing merely'given,'asa natural fact,likethe MilkyWay, that wouldbe absurd to criticize.To understand inductionis necessarily to ac-cept its authority"(p. 89). Black'spoint is telling.Even ifwe regarddeduction as "given,"that we understand how to do it, just as weknowhow to proceed inductivelyand conjecturally,means accept-ing "itsauthority."The "it"in question is an institution:Whetherdeductive, inductive,abductive, its authorityis social.

Authority,as Blackused the term, refers to the history of norma-tivityauthors have succeeded in bestowing onrules. That individualauthors are unknown and a detailed history beyond recovery makesthem no less potent normatively.To the contrary, universal,anony-mous authorship contributesto their authority.4 This does not mean,howeveç that we cannot plausiblyreconstruct,at least in broad

4. Blackobserved that his "linguisticapproach" to induction"maybe usefully com-pared withHume's viewof inductionas a habit orcustom" (p. 89). I thinkthiscomparison is apt, and it suggests that Blackwas indeed wrong,as I assert inthe precedingchapter (pp. 122-123), to claim that instruction-rules have neitherauthors nor histories. Notonly is the instruction,Do notplant tomatoes untilthe firstfrost, a conventionproduced by many unknown authors,their assertionsto this effect, at least before institutionalizationof the convention, are born oftheir common participationin the institution of induction:Each determinedtheappropriatetimeof plantinginductively,See also chapter l, footnote 12'

1 ff .l.1 rl

102 Part 1: Rules

outline, the historyof institutions, theauthorityand relevance ofwhichare such that we treat them as cognitiveuniversals

Cognition,Judgment, Gulture 103

Under the circumstances, it is no great surprise that staffplanningi ilit i ti th t milit r personnel toda rarely fightbut



whichare such that we treat them as cognitiveuniversals.Ifwe recall that people reason in particularways because it helps

them in theirendeavors, then we mightask what kindsof endeavorsare likelyto be promoted by the threekindsof reasoning we knowvirtuallyeveryone engages in. These doings must be recurrent in thehuman experience, and we may guess that they are repeatedly dis-covered, widelydiffused, or both.Not everyone must participate inthese endeavors directly,but everyone is likely tobe aware of themand their importacross their own socialunit.Apart from the kindof reasoning theypromote, they are subject to articulation,generali-zation, institutionalization-theyare ruledconstructions of deeds.

Blackgave a clue to one constellationof practices meeting all theseconditions: the institution ofwarfare. Warriorsmay be said to proceedpreferentiallyfromthe whole to theparts, that is, deductively. Givena situation, they proceed to break it down, to analyzeit, so as to be ableto recommend or pursue promising lines of attack. The metaphor "at-tack" reveals the definitionof the situation.There existboth an adver-sary and an objective, the objective beingto defeat, even destroy, theadversary. Note also that thismetaphor is unembarrassedly military.

Even if there is no actual adversary - no one to beat - one is imagined.We attack problems;we assault nature. This we recognize as the lan-guage of science, in whichthe adversary is whatever we define as un-knownor intractable. (On the metaphorical complex,"argument iswar," see Lakoffand Johnson 1980: 4-6.)

The conjunction ofanalytico-deductive methods,escalating effortsto exercise control over nature, the developmentof machines to assistand substitute for human labor, the employmentof human labor in so-cial machines modeledon analytic practices (what we call the divisionof labor)-thisconjunctionis but the contemporary realizationofwarfare,beyond actual warfare,as an institution.It refinesandamplifies theway warriors thinkso successfully that it captures theway many of us thinkabout the waywe think-onlythe rational-instrumentalpattern of thought, of speaking, is "rational."s

5. Made famous byHerbertMarcuse (19ú), this is one of the FrankfurtSchool'smajor themes (Held1980: 65-70),

is a militaryinvention,that militarypersonnel today rarely fightbutare found in the front rank of "modernizers"in new countries,6thatthe term "military-industrialcomplex"has a potency far beyond itsdescriptive utility.Nor is it surprisingthat organizational function-aries of all sorts occupy ranks, enforce discipline,and talk as if theywere fighting.Organizational functionaries, and not the renegadesand mercenaries romanticizedon film,are the paradigmcase of war-riors in our time.

The second constellation of practices meeting all the conditionsnecessary to be plausiblyimplicatedin'the historyof the ways wereason has to do withhunting- huntingfor food, in the firstin-stance. Huntingstands in marked contrastto attacking, whichis theprime metaphor for those who proceed from the whole toparts. Hunt-ing describes those who reverse this procedure and go fromparts towhole. Theyhunt forclues, diagnose a condition,put together dis-crete signs to forma concrete mental picture (compareGinsburg 1983).Abstracted as reasoning, this is induction.

Not toconfuse the violence incidental tohunting withthe violentdismemberment of an attack, we should recall that the simple so-

cieties in whichsuch doings are paramount are usually called "huntingand gathering" societies. Gathering a material of any sort to suit ahuman need is always a matter of hunting forevidence of the availa-bilityof whatever is needed. The practices of hunting and gatheringsuit many circumstances that human beings encounter as they ex-pand the range of socially consequential activities.

Registeringclues about the natural behavior of plants and ani-mals fosters conjectures about the possibilityof fruitfulinterventionand attempts at simulation,withagriculture and husbandry the re-sult. The neolithic revolutionwas after alla revolutionin, or more ac-curately, to productionto meet material needs.T Farmers are systematicgatherers; no longerdo they need to "hunt"as they once did, al-

6. See Tlimberger(1978)on "MilitaryBureaucrats and Developmentin Japan, Tür-key, Egypt andPeru," as this book is subtitled.

7. Jürgen Habermas (1979: 135-l5l)has dated the firstmode of productionfrombefore the neolithic revolutionbecause of the cooperativeimplicationsof hunt-ing in bands. He did note the controversyon this issue, includingthe argumentthat hunting,unlikefarming,is appropriativerather than productive.

i ffiì .i'l# ffiül

104 Part 1: Rules

though they stillmust look forclues - clues about incipientweather,diseased plants and animals replenishmentof the soil andso on


reasoning are those of priests. Our general image of priests is that, toprotect and disseminate the central beliefs of a society they repeat the



diseased plants and animals, replenishmentof the soil andso on.Perhaps the distinctive methodof the hunter is clearest for those

who deal withmaladies, human and otherwise. Diagnosinga condi-tion is the sine qua non of medicine. It is customary to dignifymedicine as a science, but doing so promotes a methodologicalcon-fusion.s Physicians do not depend in the firstinstance on scientificmethod. Afterhunting for symptoms in an individual,the physicianattempts to match those symptoms againstavailablemodel sets ofsymptoms, canonicallydescribed as diseases. The best fit is conjec-tured as the patient's disease, withprocedures recommended on thebasis of past experience withother patients similarlydiagnosed.eFailureof the patient to respond means furtherhuntingfor symp-toms, evaluationof changes in the patient's condition,sorting throughother possible models for fit,and the rest. Science dramaticallyex-pedites this process but cannot replace diagnosis as the key tomedicineJo

The third constellation of practices implicatedin the historyof

8. The more so because the "low"sciences, likealchemy, were historicallyallied tomedicine andthe interpretation of signs; "high"Galilean science discreditedtheformeras science. Deduction was coupled to experiment and induction,as theimpliedmethod of the lowsciences and medicine, had to wait forHume formethodological validation(Hacking1975).

9. Atfirstglance, MichelFoucault's arresting discussionof the "observinggaze,,in medicalpractice (1973) illsuits my emphasis on diagnosis as a matter of hunt-ing forclues. Foucault described this activity invisual terms (the chapter begin-ning on p. 107 is entitled"Seeing and Knowing),whileI take it as aural in thefirstinstance: In makinga diagnosis, the physicianmust listen and, insofar asother clues become availableto the other senses, integrate all the evidence. Fou-cault knew this."Inthe clinician'scatalogue, the purityof the gaze is bound upwitha certain silence that enables him to listen. Theprolixdiscourses of systemsmust be interrupted:Alltheory is always silent or vanishes at the patient's bed-

side'. . ." (p. l0Z footnote deleted). Foucault's concern, no less than mine, iswith"Signs and Cases" (ritleof the preceding chapter, pp. 88-10ó),signs to be"read,"whether experienced aurally, visually,or by other senses, cases to be re-called. For Foucaultthe birthof the clinic inthe late eighteenth century imposed"the sovereignty of the gaze," by making medicinea regime of science, of cata-logues and systems. "The clinicwas probably the firstattempt to ordera scienceon the exercise and decisions of the gaze" p. 89,

10. In this, medicineresembles bricolage, an activitymade famous by Claude Lrvi-Strauss (19ó6: 16-36),for which there is no exact equivalent termin English. ,â

protect and disseminate the central beliefs of a society, they repeat thesame limitedrepertory of beliefsendlessly, elaborating on them, some-times extravagantly,amplifyingthem forall tohear, but rarelyalter-ing them. Ceremonytraps beliefand sanctificationensures their time-lessness. To offset thisfamiliarconstructionof priestlyskill,we mustconsider the practice of priests in simple, egalitariansettings, in whichwe consistentlyfind divinationand conjuration preeminent.rrPriestsare indeed byoriginspecialists in conjecture,association, illumination.Their talkestablishes meaning and verifies the significanceof whatgoes on in the world.Repeated invocationand ritualizationlendscredibilityto their conjectures by obscuring their associative origins.r2

In the secular circumstances of our own day, psychotherapists sub-stitute for priests. Even more do teachers. Likepriests, teachers experi-ence the tension between the associative freedom of conjecture and theconstrainingeffects of inculcatingbeliefs. Notice thatprofessors likeme normallyfeel obligatedto cloak theirconjectures in the gúarded lan-guage of hypothesis, buttressthem by invokingearlier authorities ortheapparatus of science and analyticprocedure, or excuse them as the hum-ble opinionof private persons. Notice also that such accompaniments

to conjectureare credulouslyaccepted or ignored, and our conjecturesaccorded extraordinary stature. Some of us become all-purpose publiccommentators or advisors to officials.Others are busy sellingintellec-tual fashions or promptingmildlysubversive thoughts in young minds.

'bricoleur'is adept at performinga large number of diverse tasks, but unlike theengineer, he does not subordinate each of them to the availabilityof raw materi-als and tools conceived and procured for the purpose of the project." Instead thebricoleurcollects and Íetains material andtools for "potentialuse. . . on theprinciplethat'they may come in handy"'(pp.17-18). Indicatively,"the engineerworksby means of concepts and the 'bricoleur'bymeans of signs" (p. 20).

I 1 . On the magical,creative aspects of the human experience in hunting andgather-ing societies, and the incidenceof shamanism, see for example Eliade (1978: 16-

28). Durkheim'swell-known separationof religionand magic, the former beingcollectiveand system-functional by creating group solidarity,the latter being clien-telistic andtransitory, may explain thefunctionalistemphasis on ceremony andconsequent disregard of the creative side of priestlybehavior (1915: 42-47).

12. Atwhich timewe may speak oí religion:"(l)a system of symbolswhich acts to(2) establish powerful,pervasive, and long-lastingmoods and motivationsin menby (3) formulatingconcepts of a general order of existence and (4) clothing theseconceptions withsuch an aura of factuality that(5) the moods and motivationssecm uniquelyrcalistis"(Ceertz 1973: 90, onphasis deletcd).

'ffi ffi i



108 Part 1: Rules

identified,linked together as a meta-institution.perhaps the clearestexpression is to be found in classical Indicsocialarrangements,

Cognition,Judgment, Culture

effects of tripartitethinkingand speaking on what they do. In a con-stitutiveview, thinkingand speaking begin in deeds: What they do

f f

109



g ,myth,and religion.From the earliest time fromwhich there is evi-dence, we find three main castes, respectively consistingof priests, war-riors,and cultivators, witheveryone else being out-castes. Throughoutthe classical literature of India;the pantheon of the gods mirroredand, we may suppose, supported this arrangement.

The same threefold division(withartisans joiningcultivators) is

repeated endlessly in the evidence fromIndo-Iranian,Greek, Latin,Germanic, Norse, and Celticparts of the ancient world(pp. l7-lg).To give but one obviousexample, the three orders of European so-ciety reproduce the threefolddivisionorganizingIndia's castes (Duby1980), withoutany substantial directconnection between the twosets of practices. Europeans did nothave to learn fromIndia whatthey already did for themselves.r3

Yet, as the passage I just quoted indicates, not all people have ac-corded such significanceto the three ancestral institutionsof con-jurationand ceremony, combat, and clue-finding.They do not shapeand sort their practices in categories of three. This should not betaken to mean that they cannot reason the way Indo-Europeansdo,

or that their rules are not of three kinds. It means that they donot characterize what they do competently the same way I would.Characterizationis constitution,however, so I am obligatedto saysomethingambiguouslyunhelpful,such as: They make less of theirancestral institutionsthan we do.

Myeffortsto construct a people's practices in the categories thatworkas a template formy mind,but not theirs, impose my cate-gories upon them. Indo-Europeanpeoples have pressed over theplanet, always imposing themselves and their practices on others.Perhaps the clarityand efficiencyof their tripartiteideology helpsto account formilleniaof successful expansion. In any event, it isno longer the case that any substantial group of people is spared the

I 3. Thus Europeans rarelyranked these three institutions and their adepts as Indiansdid. In European agrarian societies, warriors typicallysubordinated priests, ap-propriatedtheir services, and secured "religiousauthentication"of the institu-tionof kingship(Bendix1978:22). Chapter 8, below, attends to questions of rankand ranking.

gdifferentlybecause of us become ways of thinkingand speakingcloser to our own.

Constitutingpractices in categories (even perception takes prac-tice) is not just universal, it is fundamental. Immanuel Kantmadethis case by reasoning back fromthe materialsof experience as wellas it can be made.ra In the last decade, Gerard M.Edelman has

developed a theory that makes categorizationfundamental to higherbrain function-cognitionin the broadestsense-in the same way thatbinary operations are fundamentalto the brain as a physico-chemicalsystem in receiptof sensory information(1987; note how-ever that, "at the levelof concepts, categorization is carried outneither by rigorous, nor by logical,nor by universalcriteria"(p.246;see also Lakoff1987;t'

Ifcategorization is fundamental,no set of categories is' Binarism-

14. OfcourseKantcouldnotescapetheeffectsofsocialconstitutiononhisdescrip-tion and defense of a priorirelations. This is conspicuously illustrated inhis treat-ment of the thirdanalogy of experience, the principleof community(Gemein-

schaÍt\. "The wordcommunityis in the German language ambiguous' It maymean either communioor commercium.We here employ it in the latter sense'as signifyinga dynamicalcommunity,withoutwhicheven local community(corz-munio spatií)could never be empiricallyknown"(Kant1933: 235). It is difficultto imagine a word more redolent of social associations than commercium.EvenifKant's relations ofand in time constitute fundamentalcategories, his construc-tion of them is necessarily contingent,local, andarguable.

15. I offer Israel Rosenberg's convenientsummary of Edelman's work'Duringem-bryonic development human brain cells are organized intoan enormous numberof "neuronal groups.""Groups are arranged in 'maps'that 'speak'back and forthto each other so as to cÍeate differentcategories of things and events" (Rosenfield1986: 25).

This suggests that memory is not an exact repetitionof an image of eventsin one's brain,but a recategorization. Recategorizationsoccur when the

connections between the neuronal groups in differentmaps are tempor-arilystrengthened. Recategorizationof objects or events depends upon- motionas wellas upon sensation, and it is a skillacquired in the courseof experience. rWe recollect informationin differentmaps interacting indifferentways from those of our initialencounter withthe informationand it leads to its recategorization'We do not simply store images or bitsbut become more richlyendowed with the copacity to calegorize in con-nected ways (p. 27; emphasis in original).

't':ffi .i i

110 Part 1: Rules

the universal resort to paired categories-is a cognitive universal.The existence of rules is predicated on it, because rules always offer

h i i h f ll h


this as "non-propositionallearning how."r6I would callit learninghow to exercise judgment.

E id tl l i g h to rules is cognitivelymore complex



a choice, either to followthem or not.The tripartitecategorizationthat I dwellon in these pages may be universalin origin.It has be-come universal, or nearly so, in the human practices of today. If thesecategories are universal in practice, they must be cognitiveuniver-sals, apart fromany one of the institutionswhichthey shape andin whichthey are conveyed.

COMPEIENCEWITHRULES

Psychologistsand sociologistslong shared, and most stillshare, asimple, plausibleaccount of how people become competent in usingrules. This account is positivistand, more particularly,behaviorist.People learn, and then knowwhat rules require of them by notingthe consequences of their actions. Regularitiesare the key. Ifa re-peated action secures the same response on every occasion, then theregularitythus manifested bespeaks

of a rule that the agent haslearned-learned to complywith,whether she can articulate its con-tent. In a word,she has internalized the rule.Her behavior is rule-governed, as that phrase is commonly, and loosely, used.

Obviouslythe problemwiththis account is that some humanbehavioris the result of informedjudgment, based on the con-text of relevant rules and of the consequences of choosing to fol-lowsome, all, or none of them. Such conduct wouldseem to over-ride the simple mechanism of an automatic response to a situationgoverned by an internalizedrule. As Blackhas pointedout, eventhis "stark choice between blind,unconscious mastery ('rule-coveredbehavior'or the even more primitiveoutcome of ,conditioning')andself-consciousadherence to explicitlyformulated principles(,rule-invokingbehavior')"undulysimplifiesthe range of responses torules. "Between these extremes, we have been able to discern typesof intelligentand skillfulperformance (,rule-accepting'and ,rule-guided'behavior),. . )' (1970:55, seegenerallypp. 4l-56).Undoubt_edly people learn, and know,what rules require of them, Beyondthat they learn, and know, how to use rules. Jeff Coulterdescribed

Evidentlylearning how to use rules is cognitivelymore complexand demanding than learningwhat rules say. It is equally evident thatchildrenbecome competent both in knowingthe rules and exercisingjudgment in theiruse as they grow physicallyand socially. Given thefundamental human propensity to categorize, incrementalchangesin a particulardirection(growth)are seen as movement through

stages. Insofar as childreninternalizerules by learningfrom the con-

sequences of not knowingthem, stages register gains in knowledge-not just gains in memorybut gains in the capacity to generalize fromspecificexperiences and categorize them aptly. Insofar as childrenlearn how to use rules, stages register the emergence of new capa-bilitiesto overridepropositionallearning and substitutemore skill-fulperformances.

That cognitivedevelopment proceeds in stages is not a matter ofcontroversy.What we mightmean by "stage" is. In the instance oflearningwhat rules say, stages are observers' benchmarks in thegrowth of children's mastery of the propositionalcontent of rules.In the instance of learninghowto use rules, stages represent suc-cessive transformationsin children's cognitiveorganization.Com-

16. He did so in the contextof arguing that the behaviorist account of learning con-strues the mind as a computer(Coulter 1983: 57-60).This is a programmingmeta-phor in his terms, whichconveys what I have been callingthe binaryviewofcognition.

The programmingmetaphor for acculturationin humans is precisely a meta-phoì bicawe much of the learning whichit construes as programming-with-rulesis, in fact, n on -propositionallearning ftow.Of course, there is

. a great deal of learning-thatcharacteristicof early socialization(givenariõh enough basis in language-acquisitionon the part of the learner), andsome of úis propositional learningis indeed the learning of discursivestatements about conduct,categorical declaratives,proverbs, principlesand rules of various sorts'However, for those accomplishmentsof the

- child for whichthe programming metaphorhas been so literallyconstruedin modern cognitivismand philosophyof psychology,there is very littleactual rulelearning goingon at all (p. 59' his emphases)'

see also Johnson (1987) on the connection between "nonpropositionalmeaningand metaphorical structures . . ." (pp. l-40'quotingp' 5).

'ffii' ';.,

112 Part 1: Rules

petence means to have passed througha necessary and invariantse-quence of stages.

F i i i h iti b


structuralprinciple-orprimary mental operation,whichhuman be-ings are not just competent, but geneticallymandated, to perform'

Piaget's structuralismprovides a concise way of summarizing



Froma constructivistperspective, these positions can be recon-ciled. Childrengrow in competence to deal withsocially constitutedreality.That reality is not just a collectionof rules, but a variety ofpractices, all of which sortinto three categories. It would notbe sur-prisingifchildren developed competence in each inclusivecategory-category of speech act, rules, and reasoning-at a differenttime in

theircognitivedevelopment, which is ineluctiblyassociated withtheir physicaland social development.If this is so (and I thinkitis), then stages of growthwould appear to the observer as necessaryand invariant in theirrelation.Yet the stages are stillnothingotherthan benchmarks in the acquisitionof particularcategories of com-petence, whichchildrenuniversallyachieve in the same sequence.No logicof stages is needed for stages always appear in the same order.

These matters are brought tothe fore in the study of "moralde-velopment"in children.Jean Piaget (1932) initiatedstudy of theemergence of judgment as an aspect of cognitivedevelopment. Morerecently LawrenceKohlberghas been the dominantfigure.In hisfirstpublishedwork,Kohlbergidentifiedtwo opposed positions on

stages of moraldevelpment. They are seen as either "successiveac-

quisitionsor internalizationsof culturalmoral concepts," or "struc-tures emerging from the interaction of the childwithhis socialen-vironment,rather than directlyreflectingexternal structuresgivenby the child's culture"(1963: 30). Kohlberghimselfundeviatinglyadhered to the second position,callingit constructivist.

Both the label and inspiration forKohlberg'spositioncome fromPiaget (Kohlberg1984: 301).Notwithstanding,Kohlberg'sworkisnot really constructivist.He has always maintained that moralde-velopmentproceeds "stepwise through an invariant sequence" (1963:31). This sequence has an "innerlogic":"laterstages not onlyre-ploce, but also transformearlier stages" (1984: 246, emphasis inoriginal).

Kohlberg's movefroman invariantsequence to an inner logictrades constructivismfor structuralism.This is Piaget's ambiguouslegacy, forhe was an exponent of both (1970).Structuralist modelsassociated withPiaget, Claude Levi-Strauss, and Noam Chomskydepend on invariant transformationrules for endogenous changesin state and behind them a postulate of binarismas the fundarnental

Piaget s structuralismprovides a concise way of summarizingstages of development, because constructions are structures, even ifthey are not generated by a structural principle.Kohlbergneed nothave accepted the structuralist explanation for the relation of struc-tures to have profitedfromstructuralistdescription.Even Piagetshowed littleinterest in structuralist logicwhen he came to describ-

ing stages as structures. iTo Kohlberg'scredit, his own descriptive effortsprompted him to

look for a constructivistrelease fromthe undue rigidityof a pre-sumed inner logic of development.The issue for Kohlbergis posedby evidence that most people failto achieve what he has identifiedas a last (sixth) stage of moraldevelopment.That some people doachieve this stage is due to their powers of constructionand thefavoredcircumstances of their socialreality. Because Kohlbergde-scribed the contentof a sixth stage in terms of personal autonomyand principledconduct (Black'srule-invokingbehavior), he turnedin his constructivistquest to the moraltraditionof Kantand con-temporary Kantians likeJohn Rawls and Jürgen HabermastT (1984:217-224,300-304).Nevertheless, all that Kohlbergcan have gainedby this is support forconstructionof the last stage, which,his criticshave advised, is nothing more than support for his liberalsentiments(Reid and Yanarella 1980, Shweder 1982).

There is an alternativewhich,were Kohlbergto have adopted it,wouldsubstitutea constructivistrenditionof invariantstages inmoral development for a problematicinner logic.Ironicallyit meansreturning to Piaget's pioneeringworkon the subject (1932), one ele-ment of which-rules-isconspicuously absent fromKohlberg'scharacterization of the stages of development.For Piaget the con-

17. Kohlberg'srecourse to Habermas and his ambitious program of "reconstructive

science" (19?9, 1984) may seem a bit quixotic,given that Habermas, despite Kan-tian sympathies, has been a leading criticof liberalvalues to whichKohlbergwascommitted(1981:227-230).Furthermore, Habermas' program is not construc-tivistin any sense that helps Kohlberg- in effectit rejects categoÍies of represen-tation imposed by systematic science in favor of the clarificationof categoriesalready informingordinarylanguage, therebyemancipating the everyday worldby restoring its capacity to represent itself(Alford1985).

r ff r :

114 Part 1: Rules

structivist, rulesmediate the interactionbetween a childand herenvironment. 'Allmoralityconsists of a system of rules, and theessence of all moralityis to be sought for in the respect that the in-


ample, that the individual's"socialperspective" at levelIIIis "prior-to-society"(Kohlberg1984: 177).

None of this means that Kohlberg was wrong to have organized



essence of all moralityis to be sought for in the respect that the in-dividualacquires for these rules."(Piaget 1932: ll).

Piaget distinguishedbetween the practice of rules and conscious-ness of rules, and identifiedfourstages of development in practiceand three stages of development in consciousness. The firststage ofrule practice he decided was "ofa purelymotorand individualchar-acter," and can be

dispensed withbecause the rules in question arenot "trulycollective rules"(Piaget 1932: 16, his emphasis). Certainlythis is the case withinfants, and Piaget was correct not to inferrulesfrommere behavioralregularities. Thereafterstages of rule con-sciousness parallel,but lag somewhat behind, stages of rulepractice.

Kohlbergstarted withsix stages of moral development,none ofthem defined by reference to rules. Soon, however, he and his as-sociates had organized invariantstages into three levels (Kohlberg1981: 16-17, Kohlbergand Gilliganl97l:1066-1068, Tapp and Kohl-berg l97l:68-70). In his canonical statement of 1976, Kohlbergrec-ommended thinkingof levels "as different types of relationshipsbe-tween the self and society's rules and expectations" (1984: 173, hisemphasis). The three levels, I, II,and III,are rather unhelpfullyla-beled preconventional,conventional,and postconventional,a con-ventionapparentlybeing an external rule that an individualhas suc-cessfully internalized.The preconventional levelof developmentfindsrules external to the self, and the postconventionallevel findsthe individualhaving "differentiatedhis or her self fromthe rulesand expectations of others and define[d]his or her values in termsof self-chosen principles"(p. 173).

Observe that Kohlbergrecovered the rule element at great cost tohis claimto a constructivistposition;the firsttwo levels reproducethe conventional internalizationscheme of his adversaries, and thethirdlevel extends it by showing that internalizedrules can be thrownback to the external worldand then replaced withnew rules (self-

chosen principles)that are internallycreated. Ifconstructivismmeans,as I thinkit must, that the individualactively participates in the con-structionof her own social reality,then choices are never just in-ternallycreated, any more than they are just internalized.Construc-tivistswant to overcome the dualismof self and worldby denyingpriorityto either. Yet I get a differentimpressionin reading, for ex-

None of this means that Kohlberg was wrong to have organizedstages into levels. His doing so brings rules back into the picture,thoughhardlyto good effect.It also raises a question-twoques-tionsactually: Does it bringPiaget back into the picture and, if so,what is the exact relation of Kohlberg'sstages to Piaget's? Were bothmen employingthe same inner logic,then their stages should also

be the same. Yet Piaget had three stages of practice, ifwe forget thenonsocial, premoral firststage, and, inasmuch as Kohlbergignoredconsciousness of rules altogether,the latter's sixstages double thatnumber. Kohlberg's interpretationof this inconsistencyis itselfin-consistent. A chart Kohlbergpublished in 1969 shows his firsttwostages aligned withPiaget's firsttwo,his third and fourthwithoutcounterpart in Piaget's sequence, and his fifthand sixth stages alignedwithPiaget's last stage (1984: 45). A decade later he remarked inpassing that from the beginninghe had added fourth, fifth,andsixth stages to Piaget's originalthree (1979: viii).

The inconsistencydisappears ifwe thinkof Kohlberg as havingstretched Piaget's third stage to include the last four stages in thesequence of six. This is plausible onlyifwe attribute to Piaget athoroughgoing indifferenceto moraldevelopmentin children afterthe age of thirteenor so, presumably because their cognitivedevelop-ment is substantiallycomplete by then. Kohlbergwould then be cor-rect in his argument that Kohlbergianeducators could speed upmoral development after that age (Kohlbergl98l:55-59).It alsofollows thatany movement that does occur in the second half of achild'sdevelopmenthas no explanation. Kohlberg's description ofdevelopmentas proceeding throughinvariantstages after the half-way point is just that: a description.

Introducingrules as the mediumconnecting childrenand their en-vironmentis a necessary step in a constructivistinterpretationofmoraldevelopment. V/ithout asecond step, the result is stillun-

satisfactory because Piaget's and Kohlberg'sdescriptionsof the de-v-elopmentalsequence come out in differentplaces. The problem istheir jointacceptance of the view, whichserves the internalizationposition well enough, that rules constitute a passive and transparentmediumbetween people and environment.Consequentlynothing inthe environment is systematicallydifferentiatedfordevelopmental

:i:ffiìi r. 1

116 Part 1: Rules

purposes, and moral development can only be driven by an hypothe-sized inner logicof geneticallysupplied cognitive transformations.

Rules are not simplypassive conduits of the contents of an en-


sciousness. Here again the firststage is not oriented to authority.In-deed Piaget found the contrary:"The childmore or less pleaseshimselfin the application of the rules"(Piaget 1932: 49) What then

ãt;



Rules are not simplypassive conduits of the contents of an en-vironment.They performconstitutiveand regulativetasks, as re-vealed in the speech acts they employ.A necessary second step fora constructivist interpretationof moral development requires the in-troductionof categories of rules in relationto Piaget's stages andKohlberg'slevels. Onlythen can theirdescriptions of an invariant

developmental sequence be reconciled, whileavoiding the gratuitouspostulationof an inner logicof development.Onlythen is it pos-sible to understand the construction of judgment,and the possibleconstructions of judgment.

When children are between the age of three to five years, Piagetdiscovered that they cannot playgames without followingrules.These are instruction-ruleswhichhelp the childplay "inan individu-alistic manner withmaterial that is social"(Piaget 1932: 271).Thisis the firststage of rule practice that can properly be called moral,and, even then, Piaget called it "the stage of egocentrism" (Piaget1932: 26, his emphasis). Kohlberg also found thepreconventionallevel marked by egocentric behavior anda "concrete individual"perspective (Kohlberg1984: 177). Nevertheless, he asserted that theobject of egocentric behavioris to avoid punishment.The childis "rule-obeying"(Tapp and Kohlbergl97l:69, their emphasis).Such behavior impliesrules issued and enforced by others, whicharedirective-rulesand not instructions. EvidentlyPiaget and Kohlbergwere talkingabout different kindsof rules at level I.

Anexample willshed some lighton the difference. The instruc-tion, Don't touch the stove, need not be accompanied by threatsofpunishment to become a rule practiced by the young child.Thatchild stilllearns fromdiverse experienceswhyinstructions ought tobe followed.Faced witha directive(directive speech act or directive-rule), the childtreats its content as an instructionand responds ac-cordingly.Indeed all rules are external to the childat that early age

(See also Piaget 1932;42, fn. l).That this is so led Kohlbergto con-flate two different rulepractices at the firstlevel, because that iswhat parents often do intheir rule practice toward young children.

Piaget did notmake this mistake, because he was not interestedin the proximateoriginof the rules, but only in theiruse by children.Punishment is not a consideration.As withpractice, so withcon-

himselfin the application of the rules (Piaget 1932: 49). What then,as Piaget himselfasked, is the role of the adult authority?For thechild,it simply"affirmsa continuous communion between the egoand the 'Worldof the Elderor Adult,. . ." Ifpunishment is not aconsideration in rule practice at level I, it is because consciousnessat that levelassigns no place or meaning to punishment as adults

understand it.Piaget's characterizationof the practice of rules at levelIIem-phasizes goal-orientedbehavior withinbounds set by commonrules.Thus activityis fullysocial, for it involvescomparing performanceswithcompetitors playingby the same rules. Cooperationis insured bythe existence of rules, which tendto be seen as inviolateor sacred(a matter ofconsciousness) and which have been completely internal-ized-everyone knows them byheart (Piaget 1932: 45-46r. HenceKohlberg's designationof rules at this level as conventionalseemsright, butnot the inference that compliance withrules is assuredbecause they are internalized.I read just such an inference in thestatement that "at the conventional level (II)'a rule-maintainingperspective prevails. The main concern is lawand order. . . '" (Tbppand Kohlbergl97l:69, their emphasis).

Childrenwillbreak rules and then deny or justifytheir actions.Otherchildren willrespond to violationsand their justificationbycallingon authority.Askingolder childrenor adults to evaluate trans-gressions, clarifyrules, and punish malfeasants shows the emergenceof an understandingof authorityas a social matter and not just amatter of adult whimsy. The conventionalattitude fosters an ap-preciation of directive-rules.Because they are also internalized,be-havioralso tends to be conventional,that is, consistentwithwhatthe rule requires. Unconventionalbehavior, though infrequent,meetswitha publicoutcryand the invocationof authority.Punishmentis brought into the picture because it is part of the received culturalapparatus of authority(ifit is - in some cultures it may be very littlepresent). Fear of punishment is an entailment of the disposition ofauthorities to punish; that fear be a deterrent does not require it bespecificallya fear of punishment. Ratherit is fear of having to dealwitha publicsituation of alleged violationand justification,not tomention disruptionof whatever activityis at hand. To see fear more

,,i1ïltr,i1rij'i{

diÃ

*

$ffi;sË

$l

ilr&i l '

í18 Iart 1: Rules

narrowlyin terms of punishment is to see the worldof childrenonlythroughadult eyes.

At level IIchildren also learn to act authoritatively, that is, issue

.'{#{

I

:


"rule-makingperspective,"then vitiatedthe point by having rulesmade rationally,"ex nihilo,"out of nothing(1971:69-70, their em-phasis) To be fullyconscious of the implicationsof making society



to act authoritatively, that is, issuedirective-rules,specifyconditionsof applicabilityand, ifdisregarded,act accordingly.Piaget noted that to resolve the contradictionbe_tween creating a new rule and thinkingit sacred and timeless, thechild imagines"thathe has merely rediscovered a rule that was al-ready in existence" (Piaget 1932: 48). Wieldingauthority is consonantwitha conventional

attitude.The result is indeed consciousness ofbeing a "member-of-society,"in Kohlberg,swords (19g4: 177), and,not just in the passive sense of responding to rules.

Kohlberg's descriptionof moral conduct at level IIIcomportsnicelywithPiaget's fourth stage of rule practice, dominated by ,,in-terest in rules themselves," and his thirdstage of consciousness, inwhich"there are no more crises of opinion,but only breaches in pro-cedure" (Piaget 1932: 41, 57). Self-consciousness about negotiatingrules, accepting innovations,and bowingto reasonably expressedpublicopinionpresupposes knowingthat some rules specifycondi-tions under whichone commits oneself on the understanding thatother people, whether adults or children, are making commitmentstoo.

Of all rules, commitment-rulesare the most difficultto practicebecause they require a correlative consciousness about the socialmeaning of such practices. Obviouslysome people may not easilysolve the chicken-and-egg dilemma impliedhere. Howdoes one getthe requisite consciousness withoutrelevant practice; why wouldonerisk rule practice in the absence of rule consciousness? The para-digm forthis situation is the Prisoner's Dilemma(discussed in chap-ter 8), which offers conditions under whichcommitment-rulesmaybe practiced to mutual advantage onlyifpartners imputean ap-propriaterule-consciousness to each other.

It is no wonder then that Kohlbergand his colleagues have hadsome empiricaldifficultieswithA and B stages of level III(stages

5 and 6) (Kohlberg1984:270-74).Stage 6 cannot be extricatedfromstage 5 because practices and consciousness are interdependent.Kohlberg's levelIIIsocial perspective shouldbe maker-of-society,not prior-to-society.Tapp and Kohlbergcame closer by callingit the

;.d.'']ì

trÍ

it&

ffr,#flf'

*tr#ffi$iHpô.-#itqtr.SÈìfllf

wfftafdrlì.;'

i

phasis). To be fullyconscious of the implicationsof g yby makingcommitments, not rules as such, is to be constructivist.Gone is the autonomous individual- she is an artifactof lower levelsof rule experience.

Ateach level, Kohlberg'sA and B stages correspond closely toPiaget's divisionbetween practice and consciousness. Thus stages 1,

3, and 5 are levels of development in the practice of rules; levels2,

4, and 6 are lagginglevels of consciousness about rule practices.Kohlberg is therefore almost rightin saying that the "second stageis a more advanced and organized formof the general perspectiveat each major level"(Kohlberg1984: 173). Stage B appears to bemore advanced because it requires organization,but second-orderactivitycan also be seen as secondary- cleaning things up' so to speak.

Stage 6 (level IIIB)wouldseem to require more than organization.It calls foran abilityto thinkabstractly. Yet childrenwho reach theneeded cognitivelevel do so years before Kohlberg found them achiev-ing stage 6 consciousness. Moregenerally Kohlberg's stages comelater in children's lives than do Piaget's. This age gap must relate todifferentsubstantive fociof structurallyparallelschemes. Piagetfocused on rules as used by children;Kohlbergon situationshy-pothesized by adults (see furtherDamon1977:36-46\.The absenceof rule-talkin his adult-to-childsettings temporallyshifts the wholepattern of developmentas it is discerned empirically.

Kohlberg's version of the developmentalsequence holds up lesswell to inspection than does Piaget's. By resorting to the languageof internalizationto define his levels, Kohlberghas made a series ofcategory mistakes, such as puttingconsciousness of authorityat thewrong level. kvels are not just degrees to which rules have become in-ternalized. Instead they are levels ofpracticeand consciousness aboutcategories of rules that are successively more complexin theircognitivedemands. Practice and consciousness taken together yield judgment'

We do not simplylearn to respond to instruction-,directive-,and com-mitment-rules,having learned to recognize them in successive stages

of development.We judge them differently,once we have learnedhow to, and respond accordinglY.

rffiìi i: ,;

120 Part 1: Rules

CUTTURALDIFFERENCES

The conventionalbelief that onlyperformativelydirectiverulesi


fulsanction: Or they willdo it to you, and what would it be likenotto be able to trustanybody? Ofcourse this rule is capable of beingconverted into a directive(Or we willbeat you up) or an instruction



The conventionalbelief that onlyperformativelydirectiverules arereally rules stems, I think, fromthe presumption that rules countas such onlywhen their propositional content is rejected or resisted,and they must therefore be imposed.on this view, rules are effectivebecause they are enforced, or at least the possibilityof theirenforce-ment is seen as real by those to whomthese rules are directed. Be-cause directive-rulesare so obviouslyimposed and resisted, theyalone require a continuous,external structure of support in the formof sanctions. Sanctions figuredecisively in positivistthought sinceBentham (1948:24-28:see also chapter 5). Except for allowingaplace for inducements,or positive sanctions, nothinghas chanledin this view.rs

Nevertheless, I findit undulyrestrictive. Both instruction-rulesand commitment-rulesmust also have some external dimension.Noless, or more, than do directive-rules,can these rules be supposedto incurrejection or resistance and require imposition.In thè caseof instruction-rules,includingthe special case of principles,I wouldargue that the external structure parallelto enforcement involvesdenigration,mockery,

and ostracism. Ifan instruction-rulehas amaterial component-anexample being, Don,ttouch the stove_torespond withan "I told you so" after the childhas burned herselfis a simple, and sufficient,applicationof the external structure. Ifthe ruleis strictlya social construction-anexample being, Don'teat withyour hands - the response is likelyto be something like:peo-ple willlaugh at you. To resort to punishment (or bribery) is to haveconverted the instructionintoa directive,and thus to have augmentedor substituted bases for securing compliance.This means that thechildwilladd fear (or greed) to embarrassment and humiliation.

In the case of a commitment-rule,the external element parallel toenforcement is the structure of rights and duties, or reciprocities,uponwhichnotions likeperson, or property, depend. Thus a commitment_rule saying, Dont snitch on your friends, is accompanied by a power_

18. "The sanction is positivewhen it enhances values for the actor to whom it hasbeen applied,negative when it deprives himof values" (Lassweiland Kapran1950: 48-49, their emphasis).

converted into a directive(Or we willbeat you up) or an instruction(Or you willlose your friends).Given thedifficultyof acquiringa"correct"consciousness of the connection between an exteriorre-ality(a worldof trust, forexample) and the practice of specificcommitment-rules(don't snitch), we may expect that commitment-rules willtypicallybe converted to instructions anddirectives, with

their respective external domainsbeing brought to bear. Yet no rulenecessarily loses its originalcharacter by being treated as a ruleof a different sortforpurposes of social convenience or effectiveinternalization.

A proper constructivistviewof rules, once they have been sortedinto the three categories advanced here, wouldacknowledge thelikelihood thatinstruction-,directive-,and commitment-rules arelikelyto be combinedin differentproportions in historicallydistinctculturalexperiences. Rules in all three categories and associatedlevels of practice and consciousness are doubtless present in allcul'tures, though in differentmixes. Culturesin whichelaborate andhighly ritualizedinstructions,along withmuch show andpageantry,

formthe basis

ofstable social arrangements exemplifiedby classical

Indicsocieties, as CliffordGeertz (1980) has persuasively demon-strated. A characteristic internalizedresponse in these cultures iswhat Geertz calls "stage-fright"(1973: 400-403),which I take to bea highlyevolved anticipationof the consequences of the failure toperforminstructions-afeelingwe in the cultureof the West shareonlywhen on stage.

That culture whichhas the greatest proportionof commitment-rules in its mixmay be our own liberalworld.Some of these rulesconstitute the structureof rightsand dutiesdefiningour cherishedindividuality.That whichmakes us individuals-"possessiveindi-viduals" inthe specific liberalsense (see also chapter 5) - also createsin us a sense of responsibility,guiltover performance failures,andrage at others' willfuldisregard of such rules and imperfectcon-sciousness that society depends on them.

Cultures witha substantial proportionof directive-rulesincludeour own, with itspoliceand penal apparatus, its prevailing legaltheory, its childrearingpractices, and its analytic and reductive ten-dencies. The techniques of securing compliance to directive-rulesare

;,rs$sti$l:i:

;ãë.r*'.

$

tfitrt$;$

w.ll

.iffi: . .tffi

122 Part 1: Rules

all too wellknownto us, not to mentionthe response they elicit(whichis, crudely, fear and greed) and the propensityof human be_ings to internalizeboth these rules and the consequences of theirvio-


muchof the distinction,fostered by the internalizationthesis, be'tween external and internalizedrules.

No differentlya guiltculture, in which commitment-rules,a sense



g t ese u es and the consequences of theirviolation in an abstract and retrievableform.

What the proportionof directive-and commitment-rulesmightbe in Western culture is a difficultempiricalquestion, and whetherwe have seen a long-runshift inthe latter's favor is an ideologicallyexplosive issue, the more so because of the progressive substitution

of supervision for punishment. The correlativeincrease in publicspec-tacles and policies as theater also suggests a shifttoward instruction-rules and theirculturalconcomitants. Technologicallyenabled pos_sibilitiesof combiningdirective-and instruction-rulesfor controlpurposes may be sufficientlypotent to threaten the long-term balancebetween directive-and commitment-rules,and fulfillprophecies of adystopic future (Onuf1984). Or the counter-tendency towa rd,embour-geoisement accompanyingglobalcapitalistgrowthmay strengthenthe commissivecultureof liberalism(Kahnand others 1976).

Others mightdoubt whether a long-termincrease in commitment_rules, at the expense of instruction-and directive-rules, is warranted.They see in liberalculture and its structure of complianceuntowarddistributiveconsequences, an exceptionallyelusive false

conscious-ness about who'sin controlbecause of its depersonalized emphasison rightsand duties, and dire effects on the psychic well-beingofits primarybeneficiaries-effectsin the formof misdirectedanger,anxiety, and guilt.

On examination we findthat rules in all three categories makestable social arrangements possible by privilegingsome people overothers. we also findthat they do so in characteristicallydifferentways and that cultures vary substantially in how they deal withthemix and who ends up withwhat kindof privilege.To speak in termsthat RuthBenedictmade famous (1946: 222-22i),a shame cultureis one in which the proportionof instruction-rulesis relativelyhigh.Alsoconspicuous are public,even theatrical, responses to questions

of competence, comportment,and compliance (rites of passage,ceremonialobservances, elaborate courtesies, confessions, and dis_plays of remorse). The holders of privilegetend to be elders, priests,and those upon whomhonorificsare bestowed. To define shame asa response to havingviolated an external rule,as Benedict did (p.223),and then hang a whole culturalcomplexon such a thread asks too

No differentlya gu tculture, in ,of responsibilityand concern over performance failures (one's ownand others'), and the privilegingof merchants and propertyownersimpliesa gÍeat deal more than wouldguiltas a response to internal-ized rules (again Benedict,p. 223). To the extent that a guiltculture,like thatof the West, creates a conspicuous publicplace for rights,

the pointis not just that such rules need not be internalized,but thatthe response to their violationis indignationand the mobilizationof publicsentiment, just as we wouldexpect in a shame culture.Con-versely, to the extent that a shame culture, like thatof Shi'ism,placessuch principles as the identityof self and communityat its center,these principlesare so completelyinternalizedthat martyrdomdoesnot demand an audience.

Notonly does the shame/guiltdistinctionundulysimplifythe rela-tion of rules to cultures,it falsely portrays the worldas having onlytwotypes of cultures. The thirdpossibilityconsists in cultures of fear anddread, in which we finddirective-rules,calculatingconduct, fear ofmistakes, andthe privilegingof warriorsand those who are brazen or

wily(lions and foxes, in NiccolòMachiavelli'svocabulary).Because

our own highlyinstrumental, analyticculture depends on the internali-zationofdirective-rules and a calculatingresponse' we minimizetheextent that ours is as much, ormore, a cultureof fear as it is of guilt.\ü/e do not thinkwe are afraidof punishment because we spend somuch timeavoidingit; we do not findour prudence remarkablebe-cause much of it is discharged in an organizational environmentinwhich punishments and rewards are depersonalized and palpable fearsare transmuted intoa generalized performanceanxiety'

That every culture displays rules in all three categories, though indifferentproportions,does not deny the possibilityof developmen-tal tendencies in any real culture.Developmentcan onlymean achange in the mix.As an acknowledged liberal, Kohlbergobviouslypreferred any development toward the ideal typeof culture consist-ing of commitment-rules,responsibility,and guilt,and the privileg-ing of property.A Confucian philosopher mightwellprefer the idealtype of culture consistingof principles, honor, and shame, and theprivilegingof the old and wise. Behavioristsas philosophers no lessthan organization theorists can be seen to prefer directive-rulesdis-

i,ilË

w.

ïïâi$,Èr

#Ë,$;.ãì,a1t:r$:

&

tffiw.&

ff*. s.ffir

124 Part 1: Rules

guised as objectives, efficiency andcalculation,and the privilegingof the instrumentallyskilledleEach is more aware of the limitationsof the others' idealculture than of her own, but we are entitled(to


erty rights, in this example-otherarrangements and culturalconse-quences than those that Geertz foundso prominent in Bali,withitsinstruction-rulesand theatrical display, are not ruled out.The main-



o cu tu e than of e own, but we are entitled(use the language of commissives) to faultthem all for theirpurity.

The alternativeis to prefer a balance in the proportionof rules bycategory and associated cultural propensities. Were the term "pluralist"not already appropriatedby people likeKohlberg,who prefer amultiplicityof rights (as they see it)or tyrannyof property (as theircriticssay), it might suit this alternative.Albeitunconsciously, mostof us prefer the rule mix thatprivileges us or that we are comfortablewithbecause it is ours. The best case I can make for the last alterna-tive is that it fairlydescribes my own culture, whichindeed privilegesme. It wouldalso seem to ensure a degree of culturaldiversitythatmost of us who value it unduly attributeto the culturalcomplexofrights, responsibilities,and materialachievement.

These exceedingly sketchy remarksabout culturedo not make theparticularmaterial circumstances in whichthe members of a socialunit findthemselves "immaterial"for theirculture.Even ifsuch cir-cumstances significantly affectproductive activities-intensivericecultivationin Bali,forexample-and tendeven to exclude certainsocial arrangements-commitment-rulesconstitutingexclusive prop-

19. B. F. Skinner is exemplary(1971).In Verbal Behavior (1957), Skinner's preoccu-pation withdirectives prompted him to intÍoduce the term "mand"for the "mne-monic valuederived froma'command,"demand,"countermand,'and so on. . . . A'mand,' then may be defined as a verbal operant in whichthe response is rein-forced by a characteristicconsequence and is therefore under the functionalcon-trol of relevant conditions of deprivationand aversive stimulation"(p. 35). Skin-ner also invented the term term carries the mnemonic suggestion ofbehavior which'makescontact with'thephysical world"(p. 8l). Despite this ap-parent acknowledgementof language's representational function,Skinnerre-sisted the temptation "to say that in a tact the response'refers to,"mentions,"an-nounces,' 'talks about,' 'names,' 'denotes,' or 'describes' its stimulus."In assertingstates of affairs, tacts functiononly to reinforce behavior (pp. 83-90),whichmakes them nothingmore than directives.The sanctions for tacts are positive,for rnands negative. In his singlemindedcommitmentto behaviorism, even inmatters of language, Skinner rejected the long-prevailingrepresentational viewof language and, by providingnothing in its place, implieda radical materialistpositiondenyingthe existence of knowledge.There are onlybehavior, depriva.tion, and reinforcement.

p y,tenance of waterworksforpurposes of irrigationcould have resultedin the directive-rulecomplex of "hydraulicsocieties" (Wittfogel1957,whichconsiders Balia "well-integratedhydraulic order,"p. 53; seeGeertz 1980: 45-46, against this view)or the interdependence oftasks in an Owenite communityself-consciously founded on a social

contractof mutual aid and responsibility.I wouldsay the same for gender. The categories of man and womanobviouslydepend on what one might calla material condition,namely,that women alone have the capacity to bear and nurse children.Thisdifferentiatingconditionpromotes a near universal tendency to asso-ciate other activitieswith"mothering"and assign them to women.Gender is substantiallya social construction,and gender differen-tiationan instruction-rule,or principle,as to who is responsible formothering,not just as reproduction,but as social practice.

"Maternalpractice," to borrowSara Ruddick's useful phrase, iscaring forchildrenand, by extension, the household, the infirm,theincompetent, the needy, the world.It is "the workof 'worldprotec'

tion,worldpreservation, worldrepair. . .'" (Ruddick1983a: 217'

quotingAdrienne Rich;Ruddick's emphases). Maternalpractice isalso a way of thinkingabout the world.For Ruddick'it is "maternalthinking"(l9S3a) and "preservative love"(1983b);forCarol Gilligan(1982) and Nel Noddings(1984), it is simply "caring."

Evidentlygender assignment disposes men and women to reasondifferentlyand, when theyreason about rules, withconsequences wesee as ethicallyfreighted. Gilligan'sworksupports the conclusionthat, at least in liberal culture,boys learn to use deductive reasoningwhen faced with moraldilemmas, whilegirls rely oninductive reason-ing2o (1982: 24-63).InRuddick'sformulation,men think"warfully,"or, more abstractly,they are given to abstraction (1983b: 249-252).

20. Gilliganused Kohlberg'sscheme for the moral developmentof children and themoral dilemmas he devised for ratingthe development of particular children.Shefound that Kohlberg'spredilectionfor deductive reasoning resulted in girlsbeingrated behind boys because they reason differentlyand not because they differ inrule competence. In studyingadolescent women, Gilligansketched a counterpartscheme to Kohlberg'soriented to inductivereasoning (1982: ó4-105).

t: l ffi

126 Part 1: Rules

Women thinkconcretely. Maternalthinking,,respects complexity,connection, particularity,and ambiguity',(p. 249; see also Gilligan1982: l0land Noddings1984: 36-37).

h l f cognitive THEPROBLEM



In this lineof feministthought,,,cognitivestyle"(Ruddick l9g3b:249) yields correlativeethical styles, respectivelyfor men and women,austere judgment and (withapologies to Geertz) thickprescription.Accordingto Gilligan,the formeremphasizes rights,the latter re-sponsibilities.This they do when moraldilemmas involveconflicts

over commitment-rules-themoral dilemmasGilligan,for example,took forgranted. Ifinstruction-rulesare at stake, an analyticcogni-tivestyle wouldemphasize clarityand directness; a concrete, inte-grative style wouldemphasize empathy. When Ruddickcharged menwithdisregard for "the details of suffering"(1983b:250), directive-rules figurein the equation. Yet ifwomen are sensitive to details,abstraction fosters an appreciation of the magnitude of suffering.

Perhaps we may summarize women's concerns as,,an ethic of care',and men's "a principledconceptionof justice", as Gilligandid (19g2:30). Nevertheless, I hesitate to say that the former is always to be pre-ferred to the latter. Nor does a particularcognitivestyle necessarilylead in a directionI findethicallyattractive.Abstraction can lead toabsolutismand arrogance, concreteness to triüalityand smugness. Fur-thermore, abductive thinkingis a third cognitive style not to be foundin these discussions (I suppose, because abduction is so generally un-derestimated and because it poorlycorrelates withgender). Abductionis associative, instead ofanalyticor integrative. It support an ethic ofaffect, of honorand pity.Acknowledgmentof abductionand its con-sequences is a useful antidote to binarism and social polarization.

Obviouslymany factors intrude when people choose differentcategories of reasoning to deal withmoraldilemmas. Gender con-tributesone such factor. So does culture and its distinctivemixofrules and thus of moral dilemmas. Materialconditionsplay theirpart. Childrenmust be cared for;caring is a consequence. peoplecan killeach other; waris a consequence. Ifcultures mixrules,

differentiatedby category, in differentproportions, people, differen-tiated by gender, culture,lifecircumstances, and materialconditions,resort to categories of reasoning in differentand ever changing pro-portions.That the Balinese favorinstruction-rules,or men abstrac-tion,are generalizationsadmittingto significantindividualvaria-tion, and not categorical statements.

THEPROBLEMOF ORDER

Cultureprovides support for rules. In the culture of the West, theprominence of directive-ruleshas inspired in politicaland legaltheory a preoccupationwithenforcement as the external dimensionof support for rules. (The abundance of commitment-rulesmatchesa preoccupation withobligation,which,as this culture's preferredabstractionfor the support of such rules, does not discriminateclearlybetween internal and externaldimensions of support.) Orderbreaks down in the absence of rules that are effectivebecause theyare enforced. ïillcottParsons called this "the problemof order,"concern for whichhe dated from Thomas Hobbes (althoughHobbesused the term "order"and its cognates infrequently).Parsons re-jected Hobbes'contractariansolutionand ignored hissuccessors,emphasizing instead the internaldimension of support for rules'For this, he drew on EmileDurkheirn,but not, as he should have,on MaxWeber.

Had Parsons fullyappreciated the Sociologyof Law initiatedby

Durkheimand Weber, not to mentionthe traditionof thought heascribed to Hobbes, he wouldhave realized that all rules, whether Ibearing instructions,directives or commitments,depend for theiref- [fectiveness on internalization,as the last chapter concludes, and on Isuch external features of rules and their support as formality andIinstitutionalization.The presence of such features are criteriaof I

j$i.

# .'n i

128 Part 1: Rules

\legality.Orders are legal in the degree that their rules are effectively;'supported. V/hether the internationalorder is indeeda legal one isj a subtle question. That "internationalregimes,"as well-supported

l l l l i l h h l

The ProblemoÍ Order

Hobbesian problemand its solution receded in importanceafterHobbes. One must remember that the social contract is not itselfthesolution to the Hobbesian problem, but instead the means to a solu-

129



rule complexes, are legal is a conclusion that helps to sort out the\-'-e--'maúy and diverse regimes constitutingperhaps the bulkof inter-I nationalrelations.

For the better part of this discussion, I accept the problemoforder as asserted, because those assertions rule our thbught. I do

so onlyprovisionally.I conclude the chapter withthe claim that in-vokingthe problemof order is a rhetorical strategy which,by meta-phoricallyassociating order, nature, andsocial arrangements, servesto disguise another problem, no less "real"(once we understand theconstruction of reality)than the problem of order. This is the prob-lem of privilege:Byconstitutingcondilio4ç9f gule, rules always{strib,ulqprivilegõlãÍidáiways"nreferentially*

LAWANDORDER

Hobbes posed the problemof order in its definitiveform,as Parsonsreminded socialscientists in his landmarkreconstruction of socialtheory produced by the generation precedinghis own (1937:89-94).Autonomous agents, as utilitymaximizers,clash in their pursuitofscarce values, withdire results. Parsons correctlymaintained that"Hobbes' system of social theory is almost a pure case of utilitarian-ism" (p. 90) - almost pure, because Hobbes's statement of the prob-lem of order is consistent withutilitarianpremises, but his socialcontract solutionis not. Nordid Parsons find Hobbes'solutionper-suasive (1937:93). Furthermore,John Lockeweakened Hobbes'utilitarianrenditionof the human situationwitha "moreor lesswishfulpostulation of the natural identity ofinterests," thereby mak-ing the idea of socialcontract more plausible but "minimizingthe

importance of the problemof order" (pp. 96-97).Parsons appears to have thought that the problemwentunad-dressed untilVilfredoPareto, Durkheim,and Weber-the primesub-jects of his study-lay the foundationsfor the disciplineof Soci-ologythen emergingwithParsons'codificatory assistance (compareintroduction, footnotel4).Yet Parsons was wrongto thinkthat the

'.'. 'i:irxdr: '

tion,whichis of course the kviathan. UtilitarianslikeDavidHume,1Jeremy Bentham, James Mill,and John Austinprogressivelysaw the \social contractas an unneeded artificeand transformed the Levia-

J

than from a too easily caricatured despot to a legal order. The Inckean Itradition,which findslimits tocalculation in the play of rights and J

duties, points in the same direction:the ruleof law, as our liberal-|constitutional rhetoric wouldhave it. Parsons neglected both thepractical successes and theoretical sophistication whichthe originalsolutionsubsequently achieved because he had a differentsolution,one he attributedto Durkheimmore than anyone else.r

As related by Parsons, Durkheim'ssolutionto the problemoforder was to emphasize the internalizationof norms-"theyenterdirectlyinto the constitutionof the actors' ends themselves" (1937:382; see generally pp.378-390). I want to pause here to consider Par- .

sons'word choices. In the preceding chapter, I referred to the in-ternalizationof the propositionalcontent of rules. Durkheimwroteof "rules"(règles), whether in reference to method or conduct. lnassessing Durkheim's solutionto the problemof ordeç Parsonsobserved that "itopens the door toa new conceptionof the relationof the individual,and hence of constraint, to the normative rule",(p. 382). Throughout hisdiscussion of Durkheim,Parsons often I

substituted "norm"for"rule."2 I

2.

Perhaps it wouldbe better to say that Parsons collapsed the Hobbesian solutionas it had developed into the concept of authority,which he famouslybut incor-rectlyused to translate Weber's "Herrschaft,"or rule. The latteÍ term comes froman altogether different intellectual tradition, in which nothingresembling Hobbes'sproblem is to be found.SymptomaticallyParsons all but ignored the matterofauthority in the workI examine here, notwithstandinghis attention to WebeÍ(1937: 500-697).See chapter 6 for a detailed discussionof Herrschaft.One mightargue the terms are interchangeable.Weber appeaÍs to have thoughtthey were. He used both, though favoring"norm"throughott konomy and So-ciety(1968). Nevertheless, German scholarship shows a decided preference for"rule"(Regel) in the instance of rules of language or method (LudwigWittgen-stein being an example) and for "norm"(Norm')in the instance of rules of law(Hans Kelsen anexample).I should also note that I do not findKelsen's reasonsfor preferring"norm"to "rule"very convincing.The first is that the term "rules"is too inclusivc,referringas it does to 'rlaws of nature (in the sense of physics)"

/

l.

130 Part 1: Rules

Yet there is a method to Parsons' choice of terms. When he, orDurkheim,had constraints in mind,the term "rule"is preferred.When the subject is some "sentimentattributable to one or more ac-tors that something is an d in itself"(1937:75) th * "i

The ProblemoÍ Order 131

already internal-tobe found in oneself and others. In effeçtPar: I

sons reversed the presumptionthat externally manifestpropositionalcontent is internalized. Forhim, internallymanifest content ìïïi=>

f



tors that something is an end in itself"(1937:75), then*norm"isthe proper term. The firstis the external, the second the internalized

manifestationof prescribed propositionalcontent.Because Durk-I treimsaw these as twinaspects of the same phenomenon, "norma-I Fve rule"is an appropriateterm forparsons' use, withtrf"*ãfrãIU

I nóffi*ïfiTerchangeableshorthand versions.Í In the remainder of Parsons' 1937 book, we findthe terms,,norm',hnd especially"normative"frequently, the term "rule"rarely. Hisinextmajorwork(1951)repeats this pattern. Some descriptivelyori-ented passages make reference to "rules"(e.g., pp. 270-271).Forconceptual purposes. thoueh. rules becom. :t*:r1|gtg:9j- .gheúot"(p. 38), whichare nothinjotï.-*ïfrã1ffiãexpectations of others.

r One's expectationsof oneself ("roleexpectations", p. 38; Parsons,quotation marks) come from"internalization ofthe standard" (p. 38)."Normativeorder," normativeorientation"(pp. 11-12), and "norma-tive pattern system" (pp.27l-273)are synonyms for the ,,expectation

,system" of self and others.j I see in all this a decided tendency on Parsons'part to favor the{,internalizedaspect of rules over their external aspect. Durkheim's,1"solution"was to see constraint and conformityas complementaryfinexplainingorder. Parsons acknowledged this (1937: 365, 403). Butwhen Parsons developed the Durkheimiansolutionsystematically,his concern was whypeople conformwhen they are not actively forcedto. Reducing everythingto expectations imputes primacy to what is

(1945: 37). Obviouslyrules in this sense are differentfromother rules, all ofwhich,because they have authors and histories, are "normative." Notice,how-ever, that "lawsof nature" are differentfrom allhuman laws (legal rules) injustthe same waÍyet Kelsen failed to propose that we also abandon the term ,.laws"

to Physicists. Kelsen's second reason for preferring"norms"is that rules mustalways be general, referring to "a wholeclass of similarevents'(p. 38, compareBlack1962: 108), whilesome norms refer to specificindividualsand situationsand yet are clearlylegal. Noticethough that if the circumstances specified by anysuch norm were to be repeated, howeverunlikelythis may be, then that normwouldapply in thisinstance also. Otherwiseit is difficultto see what is ,,norma-tive"about the putative norm.

ternalized as expectations of others.I am not suggesting that Parsons' reversal is wrong-headed..,pnI

the contrary, internalizationand externalizationshould be seen4s \ '.two phases of a single process.3 Myreservation is this:No less than Ithose who posit internalizationof externally manifestcontent, Par-

sons treated rules as a transparent mediumand allbehavior as gov-erned by the content of rules. The result isnot just that the agentis rendered passive and conflictsamong agents minimized,to repeat fwell-known(and well-deserved) criticismsof Parsons (Coser 1956: i20-23, Mills1959b: 25-44,Gouldner1970: 199-245; compare Alex-I

ander's "revisionist"assessment, 1983b, quotingp. 5). More impor-jtantly, society itselfdisappears. In its place is the "socialsystem," i

which is a brief formethodological collectivism masqueradin,u, o ldescription of social reality. Parsons believed that with Durkheim'sIhelp he had saved positivismfrom the excesses of utilitarianindividu-alism. Perhaps Durkheim'sbalanced treatmentof constraintana

I

conformityachieved this goal, but Parsons erred in the other direc- \tion.For all his talk ofaction

- "TheActionFrame of Reference

andj

the General Theoryof Action"(1951: titleof chapter I)-nothing)happens.

3. Weber tookexactly this position:

The'adjustment'which arises from the habituationto an action causesconduct that in the beginning constituted plainhabit later to be experi-enced as binding;then, with the awareness of the diffusionof such con-duct among a pluralityof individuals,it comes to be incorporatedas "con-sensus" intopeople's semi- or whollyconscious "expectations"as to themeaningfullycorresponding conduct of others (Weber 1968: 754).

In constructivistterms, neither phase should be seen as having temporal(or causal)priority.In view of Parsons's careful study of Weber,it is surprisingthat he gavecredit onlyto Durkheimfor seeing internalizationas necessary to the solutionof the problemof order. Perhaps Weber's emphatic attachmentto positivistlegaltheorydistracted Parsons. Thus in the passage just quoted, Weber went on tosay: "Finallythese 'consensual understandings' acquire the guaranty of coerciveenforcement bywhichthey are distinguished frommere 'conventions'."Yet, Iargue bclow. Parsons took thc sarne positiondcspite himself.

i we '' '

132 Part 1: Rules

That nothing happens in Parsons' system (meaning his system ofideas and the social system, which are the same) is nicely illustratedby the way he handled the phenomenon of institutionalization.GivenParsons'emphasis propositional t t which b i gi

The ProblemoÍ Ordêr 133

being the usual sort of directive-rulebacked by coercion. Hedid usethe term "sanction,"which is of course an integralpart of the utili-tarian formulafor law. In the instance of contractrules, however,

i t b (1933 D k



Parsons'emphasis on propositionalcontent which,upon beingin-ternalized, explainsconformityand yields order, he was bound toacknowledge theregularitiesof conduct thus manifest. Externalizedas behavior, content affects othersthroughexpectations. In its ex-ternalized form,such behavior is subject to institutionalization.

For Parsons, "a value-orientationstandard"is institutionalizedwhen two conditionsare fulfilled.

In the firstplace, by virtueof internalizationof the standard,uniformity withit tends to be of personal, expressive and/orinstrumentalsignificance to ego lthe selfl. Inthe second place,the structuringof reactions of alter lother]to ego's actionassanctions is a functionof his conformity withthe standard(1951: 38).

These twoconditions tell us nothing,for they mustalready obtainifpropositionalcontent is to be construed as a value-orientationstandârd, as Parsons specified.

Parqns explained that institutionalizationis marked by "the ful-fillmentpf. . . need dispositionsand a condition of'optimizing'thereaction$ of other significantactors, . . ." (1951: 38). But when aresomeoryé's needs fulfilledand others'reactions optimized?That nogeneral answer is possible warrants Parsons' assertion that "institu-tionalizationof a set of role expectations and of corresponding sanc-tions is clearlya matter of degree" (p. 39). More than this, however,institutionalizationmust, as a matter of degree, vary frompersonto person. By Parsons'reckoning, institutionalization cannotbe asocial phenomenon at all.

It mightbe said in Parsons'defense that he brought thesysteminto the realm of the social byincludingsanctions as wellas expecta-

tions inthe abstract formulationsI have just quoted. Sanctions, andthe expectations that they willbe applied, couldsupply the systemwithan external anddynamicelement. These formulations recapitu-late Parsons' earlier discussion of Durkheim's solution to the prob-lem of order, which Durkheimin turn had lodged in a discussionof rules of contract. For Durkheimsuch rules were legal despite not

r,:il;11:.- :r'r4i:t.l .iffi

sanctions were not "repressive"but "restitutive"(1933: 69). Durk-heim's contract rules are, in my vocabulary,commitment-rules, whichhave theirown distinctiveexternal dimensionof support, as I arguein the preceding chapter.

Parsons misinterpreted Durkheimon this point because of the

way he, Parsons, defined sanctions. "Whatare expectations to egoare sanctions to alter and vice"(1951: 40, his emphasis). Parsons hasgone back to the pointwhere nothing reallyhappens, because expec-tations are everything. Nominallyexternal,sanctions so definedhave no institutionalcharacter or social reality.This is obviouslyun-tenable. Parsons, sensing as much, defended himselfby holdingthatthe "intention"of the sanction "to influencethe behavior of theother, or to 'reward'his conformityand to 'punish'his deviance,"was not a criterionof his concept of sanction (p. 40). Butpunish-ment and rewardare its content, as his longsubsequent discussionof "DeviantBehaviorand the Mechanisms of SocialControl"(titleofchapter VII,pp. 249-3ll)makes evident.Even approval and dis-approval are but instances of reward and punishment (p. 422; com-pare chapter 3, footnote 19, on B. F. Skinner).

Parsons escaped fromhis empty definitionof sanction by adopt-ing,albeit unconsciously, the legal positivistdefinitionof the term,and not Durkheirn's differentiatedconception.Thus a commendableeffortto reach beyond the utilitariansolutionto the problemoforder led Parsons to reject that solution whilesuccumbing to oneof its mostconspicuous flaws:If rules are more than internalized Ipropositionalcontent, thenthey must be directive-rulesbacked by {coercive sanctions (rewards and punishment).a J

For Parsons there is an unbridgeable dividebetween the socialsystem as a collectiverepresentation of internalizedcontent, explain-ing nothingbecause nothing happens, and a panoply of institutions(an institutionbeing "a higher order unit of social structure which

4. At least Parsons avoided the tendency in legal positivismto define such sanctionsexclusivelyin terms of punishment.As terms like"repressive sanction" and "coer-' cive enforcement" indicate,Durkheim andWcbcrdid not.

134 Part 1: Rules

is of strategic significancefor the social system in question,"l95l:39), the unexplained presence of which is the only available explana-tion forregularitiesof conduct.5 Institutionalization,but not Par-sons'conception of it nd the differentiationof r les

The ProblemoÍ Ordêr

laws promoteorderlyexchange among individualsby spelling outconditions for exchange and consequences for theirnonfulfillment.Weber also proposed two categories of lawParsons evinced far lessi t t i W b ' k l th i D kh i ' d h f il d

135



sons'conception of it, and the differentiationof ways rules are sup-ported, such as we see in Durkheim'sconception of sanction, butnot in Parsons', together constitute a bridgeacross the divide.

Parsons expressly rejected Durkheim'sdistinctionbetween repres-sive and restitutivesanctions, yielding"twotypes of law"and "two

types of society" (1937:318). Accordingto Parsons, this distinctionis an artifactof Durkheim'searly schematic work,which gave wayto the developmentof the idea of "collectiveconscience," initiallythought by Durkheim to undé:rüe repressive law,but laterrecognizedby himto underlie the divisionof laborand restitutionas well.Par-sons saw in Durkheim'sshifta clear repudiationof utilitarianin-dividualismand a warrantfor his own program of methodologicalcollectivism.I see no evidence myselfthat Durkheimthought theless of his workon law just because his interests changed. Parsonssimplyunderestimated that workby seeing it only in reference to theproblemof order and an allegedlycollectivistsolution.

Durkheimdifferentiatedlaw into two categories by reference towhat laws in each category do in society and how they do it. Inone,laws promote orderlyindividualbehavior by threateningto constrainindividualswhose behaviorwarrants this response. In the other,

5. Indicatively, Parsons'illustrationsof institutions-property,marriage, parent-hood-are legal institutions,by whichI mean that some of their central rulesare legal. The institutionof the law wouldseem to have been presupposed. Wesee the same problemwithPaul Bohannan's otherwise useful concept of "doubleinstitutionalization," whichdistinguishescustom from law.

Allsocial institutionsare marked by"customs" and these "customs" ex-hibitmost of the stigmata cited byany definition oflaw. But there is onesalient difference.Whereas custom continues to inhere in, and only in,those institutions whichit governs (and whichin turngovern it), law is

specificallyrecreated, by agents of society, in a narrow and recognizablecontext-that is, in the context of institutionsthat are legal in characterand, to some degree at least, discrete from all others (1967: 45).

The reader willrecognize this as another of legal positivism'sconspicuousflaws:The theory stipulates whatit endeavors to explain, namely,the existence of legalorder.

interest in Weber's workon law than in Durkheim's,and so he failedeven to recognize Weber's contribution.One category, understandablyenough, is the same as Durkheim'srepressive law and the one cate-goryadmitted in positivistlegal theory.The second acknowledgesthe legal character of the pronouncementsof high dignitaries(hon-

oratiores; Weber1968:. 648-649, 784-802),even when noparticularactor is subject to constraint. These pronouncementsare of course fprinciples,whichI define in chapter 2 as instruction-rules in whichisome value is articulated. Theypromote general conformityof be- \haviorby reference to shared values. This isdone by example, byappeal and, ifnecessary, discrimination. Discriminatingagainst non- \conforming individualsor groups is onlypart of the external dimen- |sion of support for principle.Yet it is the part most resemblinga Isanction as Durkheim,Weber, and utilitarianpositivistshave under-stood that term.

It should nowbe clear that together Durkheimand Weber differ-/entiated legal rules into the three categories of rules I ascertain inlchapter 2. Weber's "abstract legal concepts" (1968: 799) are instruction-

|rules, lawsin the usual sense of criminallaw are directive-rules,and therules of Durkheim's "cooperativelaw"(1933: 127) arc commitment- |rules. Obviously notall rules are legal rules.Certain conditions mustJbe fulfilled.The point of the Sociologyof law developed by Durk-heimand Weber is to describe those conditions in general and com-parative ternls. I have examined their workon law elsewhere (1982b:3l-39).Here I wish to summarize it as a set of propositions whichDurkheimand Vy'eber either state or imply. From these propositionsI willdraw some more general conclusions.

First,principlesare legal when they are enunciated bydignitariesof sufficientlyhigh station and on occasions of such solemnity thattheirprincipledcontent cannot be impugned withoutalso impugn-ing the source and circumstances of theirenunciation.Weber im-plied that legalityis indistinguishablefromthe sanctity of principles,sanctity resultingfromthe independence, integrity,and prestige ofthose responsible forannouncing or more typicallyaffirmingprin-ciples. Second, positivistlegal theory, to whichboth DurkheimandWeber subscribed in the instance of directive-rules,assumes a clear 1

,J

'' i: r i ffir

136 Part 1: Rules

pointdemarcating those rules to be considered legal. Rules are legalwhen theyare effective,which inturn depends on their enforcement.Weber furtherrequired that such enforcement be in the hands of anautonomous staff Third commitment-rulescouldonlybe consid-


are successful, or performativelysufficient,withoutdepending onhearers'assent to implicatehearers in their normativity. Mostsuchspeech acts assume the characteristicsof declarations because theyconformto perlocutionary requirements stipulatedby speech acts of



autonomous staff. Third,commitment-rulescouldonlybe consid-ered legal whentheir applicationresults in fairand thus generallyaccepted consequences. Durkheimsaw this result in the availabilityof established means of recourse to address complaints and remedydefects. He impliedthe existence of impartialadministration forthis

purpose.- Generalizing, legalityis a functionof the degree to which(l) rulesiare formallystated, (2) their external dimensionof support is institu-Itionalized,and (3) the personnel responsible for formalizingand in-stitutionallysupporting rules are specifically andformallyassignedthese tasks, for which theyare often also specificallytrained. Thoughrelated in complexways, these three criteriaare separable. The ex-

' tent to which each is fulfilledin the instance of a particularrule may,but need not, coincide.Such incongruitiesare especially evident inwhat we might call(at least for the moment) the internationalorderand raise the vexingquestion, Is that order a legal one? kt me takeeach criterionof legality inturn, to see if this question is answerable.

Formalitycan be given a functional interpretation. The formal'statement of principlesgives them weight-themore formaltheweightier. Thisproperty enables people to rank and choose amonglarge numbers of sometimes incompatible rules.6 The formalstate-

, ment of directive-rulesmakes them more abstract, often bycastingthem in the passive voice.This is likelyto produce a detached re-sponse-one as impersonal as the rule-whicheases the burden ofmakingthe rule work onto those whom it directs. Finallythe formalstatement of an ensemble of commitment-rulesrequires their com-pilation,withconflictsresolved and gaps filled,so as to provideroutineaccess to what wouldotherwisebe a confusing andincon-sistent mass of rules.

Performative speech formalizesrules. Those rulesthat are legal

in functiontake the formof declarative speech acts, i.e., those that

6. On the weightiness of principles, see Ronald Dworkin(1977: 22-28), althoughhe saw Íhis property as barring themfrombeing rules, thus too narrowly defined.

conformto perlocutionary requirements stipulatedby speech acts ofthe same character. Said otherwise, thespeech act, I declare war, ac-quires its performativesufficiencybecause some other declaration(a constitution,for example)specifies as one of its perlocutionaryeffects that I may do so. Regress takes us to rules that are declara-

tions because they are stated withthat specificintention inmind-They are intended to be rules withthe specific perlocutionary effectof authorizingpersons to performcertain speech acts whichwillthen be declarationson performance.And they are guaranteed suc-cess as speech acts because assent is either formallyaccorded priorto their declarative statement (e.g., vote, signature) or can be in-ferred fromcircumstances (custom).

Mostdeclarations have their source as law in other declarations.Those that have no such source are self-referential,in the sense thatthey referback only to theirown authorshipfor legal standing. Thisexplains the differencebetween rules based on precedent and thosebased on custom, as wellas between contracts and treaties. As they \develop, legalorders do away withself-referential declarations.In I,this connection,however,principlespresent a special case. Self- 1

referentialassertive declarfrõfríiiõéiìïï in ËighlydéïèÌcipedõ-rclers,but they are not easily assimilated into the usual positivistconcep-tion oflaw (as Ronald Dworkindemonstrated, 1977: 14-45).But lawthey are, whatever damage this does to the positivistconception ofa properlylegal order.

Readers may observe a parallel in this discussionto H. L. A.Hart'sfamous distinctionbetween primaryand secondary rules (1961:77-120; regress implies the possibilityof tertiaryrules, Kratochwil1983: 25-27).lL$gtllqlanguage, self-referential declarationsaresecondary rules_ 1çcognizing thç lçe4kh4l4c1gr-_o_fprimaryrules-ilrêbulkof rul-es qpecifyingconduct-. Ifthe order is wiïÌiõütseô-

ondary rules, then, accordingto Hart, it is not genuinelylegal, andprimaryrules are necessarily self-referential declarations.I mightnot want to call an order "constitutional"in the usual sense ifmostor all of its rules are self-referential.Allthe same, those rules arelegal if they are performativelysufficient, thatis, invokingthem is

JI

,l

r:ffiii

138 Part 1: Rules

a successfully performed speech act independent of hearers'recep-tion. If rules in an order are legal, howcan the legal order not belegal? To the degree that rules are legal, it followsthen that the orderis legal to the same degree.


duct warranting the promised response.8 Finallycommitment-rulesfindsupport in the issuance of opinionsand interpretationsas totheir scope and application.Role occupants responsible for issuingthese instructions are presumably personallydisinterested in the con-

139



is legal to the same degree.Consider the internationalorder. Hart's willingness tocallit legal

on grounds of similarityto constitutionalorders (1961:208-231) ispersuasive only ifone accepts the doctrine of a hierarchy of sourcesof internationallaw, which leaves littleroom for self-referential dec-

larations.(On sources doctrine,see Onuf 1982b: 8-27.)Yet, ifonedoes accept this doctrine,the internationalorder has an abundanceof rules of doubtfullegality,for they lack a source in law. Better tosay that the internationalorder is legal to a degree that it wouldnot be if it were to resemble a constitutionalorder.

The degree to which rules are formalized is one criterionof theirlegality.A second criterion,rarely completelydissociated from thefirst,is the degree to whichthe external dimensionof support forrules is institutionalized.There are two features of interest in the in-stitutionalizationof support. IhgJ[*i for rules arealso rules, alyglq"d.gfiVed-fromthree categories, of speech ?cjj.Thesecond feature of these supports aË ruÏèitïiinstructionsis that theyspecify roles, the occupants of which act in support of legal rules.T

For the most part, these acts are speech acts./ Tâking principles first,their support typicallytakes the formoflexhortation.This is clearest when a system of rules attains thefor-lmalityassociated withreligion(see chapter 3, footnote12.) Exhorta-'tionsare directive speech acts, whichbecome institutionaliãffiãi?neïlijïnïtïorrsand imprecãtiõãt-.ôfËiëõçupãntqpertormfisiituiËi-,õâï*âqfiqQHru[ëilfiiËs1ffi?tittypically accompãriyiúãiieêffiüëllieechacts takes the formof a threat. At least when the wordts used transitively,a threat is a contingent promise expressed in acommissive speech act. Role occupants are capable of keeping thesepromises, withrecognition thattheir willingness to do so deters con-

7. I use the term "role"narrowly forpositions in a society whichhave fullyand for-mallystated qualificationsand duties. I do not mean all conceivablesocial posi-tions, or "'points of articulation'betweenactors and structures." (Giddens 1979:117, quotingParsons; see generallypp. ll5-120for a critiqueof the broad, Par-sonsian viewof role.)

p y p ysequences of their acts-They are impartialthird parties. (On im-partialityand its relation to "third-partylaw," see Franck1968.)Cumulativelythese acts become institutionalizedas procedural guide-lines and collationsof precedents.

Roles supportingformalrules are found in religions, asI

havealready suggested, in gangs and clubs whichhave enforcers, andin systems of third-partydispute settlement. Are these legal orders? Iam inclinedto thinkthey are. Such doubts as are raised I wouldattrib-ute to the likelihoodthat formalizationof rules has not (or does notappear to have) proceeded apace with institutionalizationof support-ing rules. Thus a "folk"religionmay wellhave well-institutionalizedsupport for rules which isnonetheless difficult(at least for an out-sider) to ascertain. Because the outsider in question almost certainlycomes froma culture in which formalizationis closely and undulyassociated withliteracy and record-keeping, theformalityof orallytransmitted rulesgoes unrecognized andtheir legalitydenied, not-withstandingan evidentlyhigh levelof institutionalizedsupport forthose rules.e

No such difficultyarises in the case of internationalrelations.Manyrules are writtendown - in treaties, treatises, proceedings oftribunals,codificatorytexts-anddescribed in such writingsas legalor binding.Instead international relationsproduce relativelyfew

8. Thomas C. Schelling'srnemorable discussionof threats and promises identifiesone difference between them. "The difference isthat a promise is costly whenit succeeds, and a threat is costly when it fails"(1960: l'17). This is, however, nota difference in what threats and promises do, but what their content is. Threatsmightbe defined as commissive speech acts the peÍlocutionarycontent of whichconsists of deprivations andnot rewards. As promised states of affairs, rewards

and deprivations both incurcosts, but only if the promise must be kept.9. Recognition is hampered by a bafflingfeature of unwritten,customary rules oflaw. They arevaguelygeneral in statement but specific in application,withre-peated applicationnever making theverbal statement of the rule more specific:"the law returns,as it were, fromits brief excursioninto detail and reverts to itsnormal conditionof generality."(Hamnett1975: ll;see also Comaroffand Rob-' erts l98l:70-84,231-240,Ceertz 1983:2O7-214)

f3

Í

ì s " ïrffi

140 Part 1: Rules

rules institutionalizingsupport for formal rules oriented to conduct.In effect, roles are relegated to the veryagents whose conduct is atstake. The result is calleda "self-help"system (Kelsen1952: 14-17,ïircker1917: 3-15').


she fails for culturalreasons to recognize the formalityof power-conferringrules. Or the outsider may doubt the legalityof the orderbecause its officersviolate the rules of some other, allegedly encom-passing legal orderwiththeir acts. Such a view ispersuasive, how-

l if h i i i j t

141



)Doubts that such a system constitutes a legal order are hardly un-

expected. Scholars nonetheless convinced that an international legalorder does exist have an ingenious response. They claim the agentsin question are "double-functionaries"-Theyact simultaneously,

and more orless self-consciously,on behalf of the legal order known

as the state and the internationallegal order.In so doing, theycanbe expected to minimize theconflictincipientin theirdual respon-sibilitiesloIt wouldnot do to dismiss this response as nothingmorethan clever semantics, but I must save its defense untillater.f Rules specifyingroles in supportof formalrules are themselvesJsusceptible to formalizationand institutionalsupport from yet otherjrules. FollowingHart,I wouldcall rules so formalized"power-tconferringrules"or, more simply,"powers"(1962:32-43).They con-stitutesupportingroles legally,endowingacts thus prescribed-exhortations, promises, opinions- withthe force of law. Occupantsof such roles are officers-"officersof the law." Furthermore,per-sonnel so empo,wered are likely tobe trained, oftenrigorously,in theperformance of their legal dutiesJt

The presence of officers, as understood here, is the third criterionof legality.Ifit is met, any uncertainty leftby the application of theother twocriteria-formalityand institutionalizedsupport of rules -is likely tobe dispelledfor the participants in that order. Thus "or-ganized" religions,criminalsyndicates, and systems of third-partydispute settlement are readilyacknowledged as legal orders becausetheirofficers, be they priests, capi or judges, speak withinthe orderwiththe force of law.r2 Again,the outsider may be skeptical because

10. This is the well-knownconcept of dédoublementfonctionnel"offered by Georges

Scelle and extended by MyresS. McDougal.For criticaldiscussion, see Nardin(1983: 162 n. 14,206-207\.11. Devotees of old cowboy movieswillrecognize a posse deputized to apprehend

an "outlaw"as an exceptionalinstance demanded by the unsettled circumstancesof the frontier.

12. Weber defined"organization(Verband)"as "a social relationship" inwhich"regu-

ever, onlyifone holds that agents may participate in just one legalorder at a time,or that all legal orders are nested, so that rules ofone are granted legality by therules of a "higher"order.

Evidently,even after all three criteriaof rules in an order havebeen met, it is possible to object that the order isnot a legal one.Thisobjection followsfromAustin's identificationof law withthe command of a sovereign (see chapter 2, footnote 2).We maydispatch the legal positivist'sdemand that rules must be directive(commands), and stillbe leftwithsovereignty asa condition thatmust obtain for the order if its rules are to be considered legal.For legal positivists,a finaltest of a legal order is the possession

"tiiJïlÏÍtlï;n

o€ï?rvëreignlyiequiresthat a formauyco n necteJset of rules operates eiõïüSïüelyin some manifold ofspace and time.The state is that rule set and its materialcorrelates - the resourcesof territory andpopulation.Froman individual'sperspective, asovereign legal order excludes participationin any other legal order

in the same place and at the same time. Competingorders are legalonlyif the sovereign legal order makes them so by incorporatingthem into itself.For a given space-time manifold,there can be onelegal order, but never more than one.

For legal positivists,and no less so forpoliticalrealists, sove-reigntyis indivisible.(Morgenthau1967: 312-317) Yet the exclu-sive sway of a sovereign legal order requires the strenuous and unre-mittingapplicationof directive-rulesand coercive sanctions. Theresult is the state, rendered abstractly as"a monopolyof orga-nized violenc e" (p. 487; see also Claude 1962: 222-242). Sovereignty,

lations are enforced by specific individuals:a chief and, possibly, an administra-tive staff, whichnormallyalso has representativepowers. The incumbencyof apolicy-making positionor participationin the functions of a staff constitute 'ex-ecutivepowers' (Regierungsgewalten)" (1968:48).Even ifwe drop Weber's em-phasis on directive-rulesand their enforcement,the presence of officers remainsthe definingcharacteristic of "organized"social relations.

t,

t'

142 Part 1: Rules

directive-rulesand the state-Each necessitates the other in a tight,unbroken circle.r3

I Sovereignty is not a conditionthat just happens to rule sets. In-I stead it is an ideal that is never reached, in a worldwhere each step

ff ibl i


acknowledgementof whichwouldbe tantamountto a conferralofsovereignty, at least in legal positivistterms.

\ü/e findmuch the same situation in international relations.States'officersare persuaded that many rules outside of the legal order ofh h l l l Th i f l k l d

143



i toward the ideal takes effortand costs resources, possibly in increas-I ing increments, to prevent ever smaller amounts of unwanted be-ìf havior (Young 1979: 122-124).Formalizationof the rule set pro-I motes the fiction ofsovereignty,rather than the independence of the

forder;but the ideal of a self-encapsulated set of rules, ordered by

, principle,abstractly rendered and exhaustivelyexplicated is,again,I the moredifficultto achieve as it is approached. Practically speak-

ing,officersof legal orders must be satisfied withsomething lessthan sovereignty.

1 -- State sovereignty can, but does not automatically,prevent religions,

\ criminalsyndicates, or systems of dispute settlementto be foundI withinthe space-time manifoldof the state frombeing legal. In-1 deed, states' officersprotect the fictionof state sovereigntyby grant-I ing formallegal autonomy toreligions, orlabor unions,forexample,I by i.r"orporatingthem into the legal order of the state. Criminalsyn-t dicates cannot bq treated this way, because these rule sets, likethatof the state, center on strenuously applieddirective-rules,formal

13. There is nothing logicallynecessary about this circle,however. One can imaginea legal order in whichsovereignty is approximated by strenuous indoctrinationand exhaustive discussion. Either could prove to be mateÍiallyless expensive thansystematic coercion.An example of the formermightbe the Chinese "preceptoralsystem" under Mao. 'Apreceptoral systern is a system of social controlthroughhighlyunilateralgovernmental persuasionaddressed.. . to an entire popula-tion"(Lindblom197'1:. 55, see generally pp. 55-59).Anexample of the lattermight be the endless discussion of group differences by theKalihari'sKung San."Conflictswithinthe group are resolved by talking,sometimes half or allof thenight, for nights, weeks on end." MelvinKonner, whose words these are, wenton to observe: 'Aftertwo years withthe San, I came to think ofthe Pleistoceneepoch of human history. . . as one interminable marathonencounter group"(1982: 7). The legalpositivist penchantfordirective-rulesis partlya cultural bias,given the large proportionof directive-rulesin Western practice and partlyanappreciation of the problemof securing a legal order from external threats toits independence. Absence of such threats lessens the pressure on officers of thelegal order to develop coercivecapabilities thatcan be deployed withinthe orderat littleadditionalcost.

lt. j 'l ltr

the state are nonetheless legal. Theygiveformalacknowledgementand institutionalsupport to a number of limited,more or less coher-ent rule sets constituting and regulatingparticularlydense, complexpatches of internationalrelations. Each isa legal order in itsown Iright,no less than, say, a religionorganized withinand tolerated by

{the state is, and often more so. Current scholarly fashioncalls these ilegal orders"internationalregimes," andI turn to them presently.IFinally,states'ófficersevèn regard the fullset of rules constitutineInternational relations-conventionallytaken to mean all relationsof states-as a legal order. This they do despite the incoherence of /lthis rule set and the logical inconsistency that results for legal posi- ''

tivism.As a test for an order's legality,sovereignty is honored in thebreach.

When I am unsure of the legal implicationsof some endeavor oÍ'mine, I rarely trouble myself withthe subtle question of sovereignty.I do seek the advice of someone who knows moreabout the relevantrules than I do (DAmato1984: 5-55). Were I a duly trainedand em-

powered officerof the law, I would do thesame. The help I needis providedby lawyers-agroup trained in the law skilledwiththematerials and tools of the law, and entitled, sometimes empowered,to render adviceon the law. Lawyers may settle the skeptical out-sider's question about sovereignty. (It is, after all,not my question.)This,however, is the lesser part of what they do. They answer myquestion about the legalityof particularrules. Theydo the same ininstitutionallyfixedways forany number of individualswith similarquestions. Myactivitiespresuppose what lawyers wouldhave diffi-cultyestablishingto the satisfactionof a legal positivist:The rulesin question, and the many correlative institutionalizedpracticesthey, as lawyers, engage in and attend to, constitute thelegal order.

Ordinarilythe activitiesof lawyersand of officers are highly com-plementary. These activities togethermake the legal order what itis, and they cannot bedissociated. Here again the internationalorder is anomalous, but less so than it seems. Lawyers,trained torecognize as law the many rulesof high formality ininternational

144 Part'l:Rules

relations, are as abundant as agents acting solelyon behalfof theinternational legal order (much less officersempowered to do so) arescarce. Not onlyhave these lawyersestablished, more or less suc-cessfully, the legal character of a substantial proportionof inter-national relations'rules they functionas advisers to the double


Who decides what "a given area" is? Scholars typicallytake "given"to mean "objectivelygiven,"as in objectivelyavailable to anyonewho cares to look.This isof course the baldest kindof positivism,which,contrary to Kratochwiland Ruggie's claim(1986: 764), denies

i t'6a- - t f ií é übjèC i i "A 'i âi â

145



national relations rules,they functionas advisers to the doublefunctionaries whostand in as the order's institutionalizedsupport.

The legaladviser serves her client, the double functionary,andtheinternationallegal order,throughher advice on what the order de-mands of her client.She too is a double-functionary,whose commit-ment to law and the idea of legal order tends to offset the inevitablepa-rochialismof the officershe advises. It is the complementarityof theiractivities thatlends credibilityto the argument that officerscan act onbehalf of two (or more) orders. If rules are legal in the internationalor-der to the degree that lawyerssay so and other agree (compare Onuf1982b: 66-73), that order is a legal one to the degree that legal advisersand their clients actas if it is (compare Onuf1979:265).

REGIMES

tìphe international legal order is a set of rules, the coherence of which

perives frompractices associated withthe formalityand institution-plizedsupport of rules in any legal order. Aboveall, the interna-ftionallegal order is a lawyerlyconstruction.Lawyers give the rule'set whatever coherence it possesses. Those less expansive but morecohersnt sets_,of rules to be found througiióut internãtionalrelations -international regimes, as noted above - owe their character, meaningtheir scope and coherence, to the fact that they are confined to "agiven area of internationalrelations."At least, this is what the nowstandard definitiontells us.ra

14. "Regimes can be defined as sets of implicitor explicitprinciples, norms, rulesand decision-makingprocedures, around which actors'expectations converge ina given area ofinternationalrelations" (Krasner 1982: 185).Some scholars haveemphasized the sets of rules, others convergent expectations(Haggard and Sim-mons 1987: 493-495). The former are illserved by the uselesslyimprecise defini-tions offered forprinciple,norm, rule and decision-makingprocedure. The latterare stuck, likeParsons and his social system,withnotional regimes in whichnoth-ing happens.

regimes any t 6a- t of iítérsübjèCtivity."As Súch; ïr'iüâirântstheresponseÌhat ieËïniés-arewhat thôse people whose activities constitutethem think they aré. In effect, regime role occupants give the regimethe scópè ánd òoherence that scholars see as an objection condition.

One vérsioï õfiÌiiíieiÈonséï"EinsfB. Haas'condern foi"the

waysactors order their knowledgeand apply knowledgein the constructionof regimes" (1980: 375). Haas focused on occupants more than roles.By virtueof trainingand professional orientation,the individualsfill-ing such roles impose coherence on theiractivities-cognitionprecedesconstitution (1980, 1982; compare Haggard and Simmons1987: 509-513, on [hé "cognitiÌipt"viewof regimes). Myinclinationruns in the

I

otherdirection.Roles_io_metUSL*bSçgUfgryg Ìlçg419_ruledconstruc-tions. The rulesthemselv.es come fromactivities,not just of the re-glmellry]ê ogqy,pafus, but_1s wellòf scholars, lawyers,oifi..r,of legalorders q,ervgd by ihè ficlionof ionèrèignty, and the many and diverseindividuals,beyond those whose rolesI just named, who are associated

least in my terms, as a legal order in itsown right.Internationallaw-yers have long acknowledged the existence of internationalregimes,but account for their legalityby mere incorporationinto the interna-tional legal order. InternationalRelations scholars, whodiscoveredinternationalregimes only recentlyand withoutmuch awareness oflawyers'concerns,have assiduously avoidedcallingthem legal.Botli-;groups miss the central featureof regimes: They are sets of rules, fa substantial numberof which(especially those givingthe regime fits scope and coherence) are legal rules. Both groups miss this point\because of their jointattachment tolegal positivism,whichaccords ior denies legalityto rules by the set and not rule by rule. j

As more or less self-contained rulesets, international regimes mixi nìiffiiiïõã-,iiïreciïüê:,d;ia óõmÍiïïrinn"ffiK:&õrËïii *jóffir

lrtir'ì 1..ffi"i

146 Part 1: Rules

ferent proportions.As noted, many of the rules in a regime willbesufficientlyformaland institutionallywell-supportedto be calledlaw. Again,the ratioof formalto informalrules willvary fromregime to regime, as willthe distributionof formalinstruction-,di i d i l Cl l i d not f llinto t

The Problemof Order 147

1969), to expedite the process of decolonizationthen underway. TheUnitedNations Special Committee on Colonialismhas issued a streamof directive-rules, manyof them singling outUnitedNations membersnot conformingto the principleof decolonization.Because thesedi ti l d t b i di id li d d kl d h



directive-,and commitment-rules.Clearly regimes donot fallinto cate-gories, as rules do. Nonetheless, they can be typed, perhaps crudely,by comparingthem to ideal typesof regimes, defined by referenceto the prominenceof instruction-,directive-,and commitment-rulesin their consritution.Thislínót simbit à-qüaìfiiãiivèúèasure ofthe distributionof formalrules. Rather it involvesa judgment aboutthe necessarily small number of rules providingall other regimerules, formaland informal,witha pointof reference, and therebygranting the regime its identityas a coherent rule set. Usually theserules willbe self-referentialdeclarations, or secondary rules in Hart'ssense, though obviouslythey are any regime's primary rules, or "con-stitution,"in the usual sense of these terms.

- r As a type, regimes in which formalinstruction-rulesare primaryI wouldcall llmonitoryregimes.tt They are constitutedaround afsmallnumber of principleswhich have achieved a high level of for-f mafitythrough enunciationin plenaryforums.Regime principleslare suppotted through agreatdeal of conventional, indeed ritualized,

Íexhortation.These admonitionsseldom receive the institutionalsup-I port n...ttary for directive-rulesto become laws. In the absence off a formal,directive apparatusto supervise conduct, the monitoryj now reminds regime participants that theirconduct is being moni-i tored, however informally. Thatthe bulkof regime rules are informali makes it difficulteven to be sure that a regime exists,and they areI rarelydiscussed as such in the literature.rsI rct me offer some examples of monitoryinternationalregimes.

One is the regime organizedunder General Assembly Resolution1514(XV),"Declarationon the Grantingof Independence to ColonialCountriesand Peoples' (1960), and its many iterations(Bleicher

15. In earlier work(1982b: 78), I called regimes of this type "management regimes,"withinternationalresource regimes in mind as examples. Later Peterson and I(1984: 332) called this type "tutelaryregimes,"with the UnitedNations'humanrights regime the subject of our attention.Bothlmanagement"and "tutelage,"I now think,are regime activitiestoo narrowlyassociated withthe specific ex-amples then under consideration.

directive-rulestend to be individualizedand weaklysupported, theyhave never achieved legal standing. When resisted, the committee hasresorted to fact-finding,and produced detailed reports,thereby addingcredibilityto its charges against specific regimeparticipants.

These tactics sacrificethe abstractiongenerallynecessary fordirective-rules to become legal in favorof an increase in the externalsupport fora legal principle.By namingnames and documentingpractices, the committee supports theprincipleby embarrassing non-conformingmembers and even subjecting themto a hintof ostra-cism. Consider thecommittee'srecent preoccupationwiththe statusof Puerto Rico(Franck1985: 195-204). The angry reaction in theUnitedStates suggests that no regime participantis completely im-mune to the committee's endeavors.

A second example of a monitoryregime is the one constituted onthe principlethat Apartherd is such an egregious offense to humanitythat its practice anywhere cannot be condoned. Because the Repub-licof South Africais alone in practicingApartheidin flagrantdis-regard for the principle, the UnitedNations membershiphas dedicateditself to supportingthat principle,at firstwithresolutionsdeploringSouth Africa'sconduct and appealing fora change of policies,andthen witha general and abstract rule-a rule of law-directinganyregime to òèáse óoúplicityin the practiceof Apalthëd16Insofaras

Insofar as thesç regimes are alÌ constituted to elicit conformity toprinciple,]they can do so only by combiningformalexhortation and informalsupervision. IBut for the informalityof directive-rulessupportingprinciples,I wouldhave ]called these regimes "supervisory."AlternativelyI mighthave called them "disci-plinary"but formy extensive use of this term inan unrelated context (Introduc-i

tion). Both possibilities,and my thoughts on this typeof regime, owe to Michel r

loucault's Disciplineand Punish (1979). *116, Of particularconsequence for the emergence of this general rule is General As- 1

sembly Resolution 1904 (XVIII),"UnitedNations Declarationon the Elimina-ltion ofAllForms of Racial Discrimination"(1963), Article5 of whichdirecrs: I'An end shall be put withoutdelay to governmentaland other public policiesof tracial segregation and especiallypolicies of aportheid,as wellas all formsof ïracialdiscriminationand separation resulting fromsuch policies." )

':áti :J# i.1.. 1 lffi".

148 Part 1: Rules

this efforthas succeeded in legal terms (I think ithas; see also Hen-kin 1979: 126, l'18), SouthAfricacannot claimto be excluded, byits own choice,fromparticipationin the regime. Eventhe progres-sive ostracism of South Africa,effected by expulsion fromotherregimes supports the legal principleagainst Apartheidwithoutad


the ensemble of regimes authorized by the state and constitutingitsgovernment.rT

Executiveregimes linkedas a state's government individuallyex-hibita marked degree of coherence in the formof governmentalministriesand g i What t b bj ti l i f



regimes, supports the legal principleagainst Apartheidwithoutad-versely affecting thegeneral directive-rulethat no officerfor anylegal order may practiceApartheid.

Other, perhaps more typicalexamples of monitory internationalregimes can be found in the area of resource conservation anduse. Thus the internationalwhalingregime is organized aroundthe principleof rn'axlúumsudtáinable yieid in harvèitingwhales(Birnie1985: lõ8-170):Thè principle'ssuôcess debènds on thè adop-tionby regime participants of an annual quota (reduced to zero in1985), which is then supervised by the InternationalWhaling Com-mission as a permanent fact-findingapparatus. Failure of the re-gime to guarantee the principleof sustaining whale populations has

:prompted some private groups to interferewithwhaling operationsof some regime partiCipaúts (Day 1987). Whether this means abroadeningof the regime to includedirecìive-rules of extreme infor-mality orthe disappearance of the regime,as incoherence sets in,remains to be seen.

ministriesand agencies. What seem to be objectivelygiven areas ofinternationalrelations for whichregimes can be identifiedcorres-pond to the areas of responsibilitytypicallydemarcating govern-mental ministries.Comparablydemarcated internationalregimes arenevertheless endowed withfewifany of the directive-rules

appli-cable to the states'officers participatingin the regime. Instead manyinternationalregimes have been endowed withorganizations resembl-ing ministries;wiihinúhiúdiièCtivéìúlêsapply tô theoiganiZatiòn'sofficers.Thìõ-ènã6leí-theôigânizationto carfyout responsibilitiesassigned to it under the regime's instruction-rulesand especiallycommitment-rules,as we shall see presently. \,

There are instances, however, in whichstates'officers agree to givea tightlycircumscribed area of international relationsa set of formaldirective-rules,affecting thèmselves, lodged in a matrixof rules of-feringconsiderable institutionalsupport.Such is the case withtheEuropean Communityand the parallel system for deep seabed min-ing in the Lan_gfthe Sea Convention.In both cases, the institutionalsupportprovided fordirective-rulesis complicated to the point ofambiguity.The practical implicationsof dividedsovereignty couldhardlymake it otherwise. Theconceptual problem raised by divid-ing the indivisibleis more readilysolved by constructing a new cate-gory for regimes of this character:They are supranational (Haas 1968:32-s9).

Collectivesecurity is also an attempt to builda system of support,or legal regime, around a few directive-rules(see generallyClaude1962:.94-204).In this case, however, the practicaland conceptual

17. In my earlier workwithPeterson (1984: 332), we referred to regimes organizedaround directive-rulesas "governrnentalregimes." I now prefer to thinkof themas executive regimes so as to note what such regimes empower

officers to do, namely,carry out or "execute" commitments institutionallysupporting formaldirective-rules. The term"governmentalregime"describes what a regime is, not whatitdoes, but confusingly,because the term "government"may be used interchange-ably with regime to mean the officersof a sovereign legal order, or comprehen-sivelyto mean the largest possible set of regimes withina legal order.

Despite the tendency for directive-rulesto seep intornonitgSl_regimes whichhav.c-p.tqrlen to be we.Akand ineffectivesystems ofìiffiê iüiìii-aiïunlikelyro acquire a mean-ifigfuldegree of formalityand institutionalsupport.Were this tobappen, and furthermorethese rules substitutefor principlesinefining aregime's activities,then we could say that the regime

'frad changed to a new type. Indeed, \rye may say in the exceptional'case of Apartheidthat the emergence of a formaldirective-ruleagainst Apartheidconstitutes a second, minimallydeveloped re-gime workingin parallelwiththe monitoryregime against Apar-theid. In general, however, we wouldexpect few internationalre-gimes to be constituted on formaldirective-rules,and for the same

reason that criminalsyndicates are denied legal standing: Regimes, dependent on formaldirective-rulesfor their identity-executive. regimes, wemightcall them-threaten thefiction thatstates aloneI are sovereign legal orders.If these regimes.do not threaten the fic-tion ofsovereignty, it is because they have been incorporatedÍìIí

' '-- """'*-'--'J'

I

\,r IIt

ffi1 ffi iiffi

15150 Part 1: Rules

problemof sovereignty cannot be finessed, disguised, or ignored,because of the area of internationalrelations to which the directive-rules in question apply. Collective securitywouldsmuggle the Hobbes-ian solutionto the problemof order into the disorderly worldofstates Tiue to Hobbes a collective securitysystem precludes self


positivistlegal theory. Bentham's ruleson how to prevent mischiefwithmischief distinguishthe idea of punishment frompunishmentitself:"Itis the idea only .. . that reallyacts on the mind, . . ."(1948: l7l-203,quoting p.193). The rules center on the principleofproportionalityDeterr e nce i ncrgSses as prerr gltivemischief 9 ?



states. Tiue to Hobbes, a collective securitysystem precludes self-referentialdirective declarations. Insteadsome executive body,itselfconstituted by a commissivedeclarationof the highest formality(in-deed a social contract)decides on specific directive-rules.No onecan anticipate whose conduct is subject to decision. That dependson how participants,knowingthe consequences all have promisedeach other, decide to conduct themselves. Furthermore, every par-ticipantmust be committedto the supportof such decisions. Ex-

1 perience indicates that these commitmentsare more likelyto beI honored if they are supported in turn by detailedinstruction-rules.[fnus is explained the fifty-yearquest in the kague of Nations and'the United Nationsfor a workabledefinitionof aggression (Ferenczt97s).

The more thoroughgoing thesystem of support for collectivese-curity,the more closely it resembles a sovereign legal order. If thestate is Hobbes'solutionto the problemof order, the same solu-tion,when applied to the relationsof states, wouldyielda state above

states. Obviouslythis challenges the practical need for states as col-lectivesecurity systems in theirown right. Thisoutcome states'of-ficers cannot affordand willnot permit,no matterhow ingeniousand sincere theirefforts to become collectivelysecure.

Collectivesecurity demands the formalizationof rules if itis tofulfillits promise, whetherwithinor among states. This is a paradoxof competing formalizations.It disappears ifconditions allowan in-ternationalregime's directive-rulesto workeven when, or preciselybecause, they lack formality.The system of mutual nuclear deter-rence is a case in point. Officersof the two states possessing abun-dant nucleararsenals and deliverycapabilities-thesuperpowers asthey are commonlyknown-haveissued the same directiveto each

other. Theyare directed not to engage in a number of more or lessclearlyspecified activities. Should eitherdo so, a devastating re-sponse is promised.Each side, knowingitself deterred, presumes theother is also.

The language of deterrence, whichdominates all strategic con-siderations between these two states, is of course the language of

proportionality.Deterr-e-nce i-ncrgSses as.prerr-gltivemischief,9r ?nc:ttqll,-b.gqo.mgsgreí m,org-jj19a"fll-a1idea, -w-h-iç_ltrs a trait enhançedby increased formalityand institutionalsupport. In an ideal legaloìõei,-ïãúltionshavê-beèn'pèifèctèd ánd therefore need never beused-Knowingthe inevitableconsequences, no one wouldbe fool-ish enough to bringabout their employment. (Compare Schelling1960: 9: 'A theory of deterrence would be, in effect, a theory of theskillfulnonuse of militaryforces," his emphasis.) This ideal hasnever been achieved in practice, except (so far) in the mutual in-security system operated byofficersofthe superpowers. In this systemboth sides have refrained from formalizingthe directive-rulesso ef-fectively deterringthem. This is legalpositivismstood on its head,and it raises suspicion that formalizationcould introduce flaws intowhat has proved to be a perfect system of deterrence.

This suspicion is widelyshared (but not universally; see Falk 198t. ìEven the effort to formalizea principle-theprincipleof no-firstIuse of nuclear weapons - to serve as an umbrella for the reciprocal Idirective-rulesissued by officersofthe superpowers, has been resistedúJ(Beres 1980:217-220).The principleitselfis onlyhalfstated, for itcannot affirmwhat must be accepted, namely, that the retaliatoryuse of nuclear weapons is essential to the system of deterrence. Ob-viouslythis first,falteringstep toward formalizationof the rules inthis system of deterrence is no great threat to itsstability.Yet other,more problematicefforts are not difficult toimagine.

SlS-t-l'.S::t'iq.4utualinsecuritvï: :1"'"1"":.:113:":.:t,t"*:i,,i:1ïJ

18. Nevertheless the principle is acknowledged in strategic doctrine as a "limit"(Schelling 1960: 257-266)or "threshold"(Kahn 1965: 94-l0l).

Ifeverybodybelieves, and expect everybody else to believe, that thingsgetmore dangerous when the firstnuclear weapon goes off,whatever hisbe-lief is based on he is going to be reluctant to authorize nuclearweapons,willexpect the other side to bc reluctant, and in the event nuclear weaponsare uscd willbe expcctant about rapid escalation in a way that could makeescalation more likely(Schelling196ó: 158).

ffi iffit ffir

Part 1: Rules

l:g,to1relrri*rjsdou.b_t.ulOpryls_lg 2).That its direcrive-rutesareI lqq inrormalto be considered legal suggests that it is not a regimeFLitrown right.Insofaras officersfor the superpowers have come'to recognize that changes in nuclearcapabilitiescould upset thei tyrt.*(recognitionabetted by such influóntialanalyses as Schelling


regime frominnumerable commercial treaties, grch containingaol. Yet forìõm:

\Rlicated'rèâsôns;'offfeerïõf me Udïted SraïeSìhõsõãn insritutionalapproach in which formalprinciplesand collectivepecuniary com-

itments support a core of directive rulessubstitutes for what o ld

152 153



y ( g by such influóntialanalyses as Schellingand Halperin196l: 49-61), they have devised an increasinglyelaboratelegal regime to control such changes - a nuclear arms control regime.Thus rules assuring the integrityof the mutual insecuritysystem aresubject to a degree of formalizationnot considered appropriate for

i the rules constitutingthat system.i collectivesecurity and mutualinsecuritysystems represent ex-tremes on a continuumof rule sets in whichdirective-rulesfigureprominèntli-coileóíivesèëüiiiyrequires such formalirytrrat iibe-comes indistinguishablefromone of the key regimes constitutingthe state, while the mutual insecuritysystem is so lackingin formality

;that one has difficultyconsideringit â regime at all. In between arefregpeg tlgllggg"a fewdirective-rutes in a larger.rile-üË;ïïfr-| 33J i n9 1 ryctio n- ãrid bo mmrïmem-rut'e*C.Cèitfrnft t Ìig$O $Í indü_flgiiiexemilg-isün"ïeeírfrëiõiíiiïtfiCtaaeftëflwóriãúar ir, *frg1[ïs said to prõvide officersóf ihe üìiiïëaSiates withthe meanJofj controllingtlre world€coÍÌomy.re*-- '

, Inasmuch as the UnitedStaìes held a dominating positionin thelworldeconomy (accountingfornearlyhalfof the world'sGross Na-tionalProduct in 1950; Russett 1965: l2l),and in particularwas itschief creditor, it could have used informaldirective-rulesto controlcredit flowsand thus worldtrade, all the time espousing the princi_ple of free trade. It could even have constructed a minimalfree trade

" -*#@s$**i*',r/.--" - '^ '" *'

19. whether one or several regimes were constructed for this purpose is arguable.Many scholars identifyregimes for each of three well-organizedinstitutions,theceneral Agreement on Thriffsand rlade (successor to the failedInternationalTlade organization),InternationalMonetaryFund and InternationalBank forReconstructionand Developmentand its affiliates. I view these three institutionsas linked in a larger ensemble of rules,

rnanyof

lbfl1informal,which

neverthe-less exhibit rhe coherence of a singre, o**..rtlngiüì-*ëÌartniworrdeconomy. ".

fÈe emergence in recent years of other institutiãns,includingprivate banks, ás u

indispensable regime elements supports the latter view. There is no reason whytregimes cannot be nested withinregimes (Aggarwal.lgg5:32), and no one need Ifallprey to the legal positivistpresumptionthat nesting confers legalityon nested Iegimes.

itments support a core of directive-rulessubstitutes for what would

'$therwisehave been an informalrule set, and indeed had been an

lnformalrule set duringan earlier period of Britishascendancy(compare Ruggie 1982, whose explicationof this isunrivaled.)'i

Even as offiCèrsof thdunitèclStãtëi-floundtheiistate facingrela-

"

tive decline, the regime continued to operate. Its dense networkof,rsupporting rules permitted the issuance of new directive-rules,most,qprominentlyin 1971, adapting the regime to changing circumstances.2olThe conditionsthat officersof the InternationalMonetaryFund Ioften impose when makingloans amplytestifyto continuingre[- |ance on directive-rules.(On "conditionality,',see Dell1981, Guitián\981; Kenen 1986.) These rules are augmented withdetailed instruc-tions and are formallystated and accepted even before they areembedded in loanagreements - jointcommissivedeclarations osten-siblyfreelydecided upon by both parties under formalregime rules.

Finally,and briefly,let me consider internationalregimes organ-ized around a primaryset of commitment-rules.Especially in recentpractice, these rules are likelyto take the formof a multilateraltreaty (self-referentialcommissivedeclaration).Such treaties fre-quently state principles,whichthen set these treaties apart fromthemany other agreements officersmake on behalf of states and under-score the centralplace of treaties in the constitutionof regimes.These same treaties also constitute periodicforums for regime par- |ticipants to assess, revise, and extend their formalcommitments,ar Iwellas permanent bureaux to assist participantsin carryingout {those commitments.Regime officerswhose roles are constituted forthis purpose direct a great deal of theirattention to the elaborationof detailed instructions. Finallysuch treaties may constitute forums

20. The persistence of this one regimebeyond the conditions enabling its constitu-tion spurred recent scholarlyattentionto regimes. The literature is voluminous,but see especially Robert O. Keohane's development (1980, 1982, 1984), and Dun-can Snidal's criticalassessment (l98Jb),of the.,thcory of hegemonicstability."Chapter ó treat$ the mislcading use of thc tcrm,.hegemony,'in this context.

iii,4.:i: I, j

154 Part 1: Rules

to hear complaintsabout the interpretationsand performance ofcommitments.

{.. fflermuch deliberation,I have decided to carl regimesof this type| "administrativeregimes."2rone mightwonder about this choice ãfI terms in the instance of an internationalregime minimallyconstituted

d


RHETORICANDPRIVILEGE

In the Hobbesian traditionthe problem of order is the problem ofachieving and maintainingorder There is nothing problematicabout

155



I yaround some commitment-rules, such as the "long-established régime"on the privilegesand immunitiesof diplomats (Internationalcourtof Justice 1980:777). Althoughthe legal rules of this regime, clearlystating reciprocal commitments, were formed into multilateraltreatiesonlyrecently(1961 and 1963) and even now have no bureau to pro-vide them administrativesupport, the regime is administered, foi themost part, quite successfully. The regime's officersare also officersof the legal orders whichare regime participants.Diplomatsandtheir legal advisers are double-functionaries.Because the profes-sional position of diplomats depends on the effective administrationof commitments made on theirbehalf, they are more than willingto assume this responsibility.

3" Most internationalregimes of the administrativetype are not sof modestly constituted. Instead they feature bureaux witha decidedï *l9."nwto expand and, in so doing,acquire the internalsupportj of directive-rules. They become bureaucracies. we need looknó?ur-" ther than

the united Nations'system of specialized agencies and theGeneral Assembly'ssubsidiary bodies forexamples of administra-tive regimes prone to expansion. Administrativegrowthis a hall-mark of modernityin social relations generally. Endless growth threat-ens any administrative regime witheutrophy. The many administrativeregimes operating above, among, across, withinand around states,includingprominentlythose of the united Nations, are a distinctivefeature of modernityand, as they collectivelyreach the point ofeutrophy, the hallmarkof the worldto come.

21. EarlierI had calÌed them "regulatoryregimes" (onuf l9g2b: 77-7g, onuf andPeterson 1984:332),because the codificationof entitlements and detailed sup-porting instructionstypicalof such regimes produces sets of rules commonlycalledregulations. In that all 4rles regulate, I now prefer a term describingthe regime'sfunction,which is to provide administrative support for carryingout commitments.This includes administrationunder sponsorship of executive officersthat theymay carry out their commitments in support of directive_rules.

achieving and maintainingorder. There is nothing problematicaboutorder as such. Indeed, order is taken as an objectivecondition,thestable arrangement of phenomena such as is achieved in nature. Itbears recalling that the Greek wordfor order, ,,cosmos," is no lessthe term for nature in the largest sense (compare

Hayek 1973: 36_46). Yet "order"is not a strict, literal representation of the conditionof the universe as apprehended by human beings who,after all,observe a great deal of instabilityand disarrangement in what theyare capable of apprehending.They could just as wellrepresent whatthey see withanother Greek word, ,,chaos.',

Those of us whose conception of order is influencedby Creekthought - whichis to say, anyone using the term - use it onlyfigura_tively,wishfullyperhaps, to represent what is at best imperfectlyachieved and never sustained. When we speak of order, we choosea fictionto believe in. "Order"is a metaphor, a figureof speech, adisguise. It is constitutedby performativespeech and constitutespropositionalcontent for such speech. one asserts that "order"standsfoç or counts as, the way the worldis, can be, should be, willbe.The assertion that order represents something else is also a misrepre-sentation, because the fitbetween the one and the other is imperfect.If indeed the fitis perfect, then it is pointless: a tautology. The pointis clearer ifwe return again to the question of directionof fitbe-tween speech acts and the worldas states of affairs.

Note that "world"is also a metaphor, (mis)representing proposi-tional content, which consists of words, as an objective condition.Fitmust refer to the relationbetween sets of words, not words and "real-ity."The fitbetween words describing a state of affairs and the wordsused to describe a second state of affairs logicallyhas to be direction-less. The whole thing represented by X counts as (stands for, is equiva-

lent to) the whole thing represented by y. Because X and y are likelyto differin specificityor complexity,we may resist saying, y counts asX, even if this is the pointof the assertion. The directionless fitof as-sertives is always recognizable as a metaphoricalconstruction.

lf the fitis world-to-words,we could also say that part of a state

rr ill iìï'ãffiií

156 Part 1: Rules

of affairs can change the whole- You are a part of a state of affairsand I direct you to change it and yourselfthrough your actions. Thisrelationof part to whole isa metonymicalconstruction. Finally,astate of affairs as a whole can have an impacton parts: I commitmyself, a part, to the creation of a desired state of affairs;I want


those subject to synecdoche as a rhetoricalstrategy. IfI may speakparadoxically,all figuresofspeech extend the fictionoftheirrealityto social construction.Insofaras any figureof speech is persuasive-itpersuades us to see what we hear-it shifts whatever is undergoingconstruction into the realm of what the speaker guesses is already



my actions to be a part of what it becomes. This is a synecdochalconstruction.

Metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche are the three basic figuresof speech known to rhetoric. Theyexhaust the possible relations ofparts and wholes: whole-to-whole whichis the same as part-to-part,for the parts are then operatingas wholes, whole-to-part,and part-to-whole(White1973:31-36). Threecategories of speech acts neces-sarilyresult in three categories of rhetoricalstrategies.22

Metaphors are representational, yet they misrepresent. They al-ways want us to construe somethingin doubt as partakingof therealityof something that we are confident about.23 In the same way,reductioneffectuated through metonymyas a rhetoricalstrategydoes not make the parts more "real,"fundamental,or essential,though this is how theyappear. Integrationdoes not yielda wholegreater than the sum of the parts, though thisis the convictionof

22. Since Aristotle, ironyhas been held to be the fourth basic figure of speech, useof which is said to distance the speaker fromthe subject of speech (White1973:36-38). As such, it wouldseem to be an expressive speech act, and not basic,inasmuch as a number of speaker's stances toward the subjectcan be imagined,and stated expressively, probablyin parasitic association withother categoriesof speech acts. In the structuralist tradition,metaphor and metonymyare takento be the primary figures of speech, standing in opposition.Synecdoche and ironyare disregarded (Jakobson and Hallel97l:90-96, kviStrauss L966:204-208,224-228).By contrast, poststructuralists privilegeirony, but do so ironically,intheh acts of deconstruction (Nelson 1983: 184;see also chapter l).

23. Symptomaticallythis positionresembles, but also departs from, thattaken byJohn Searle (1979:76-103), whose discussion of speech acts and states of affairspÍompts my own. Searle held that metaphors cannot be "comparisons"(the usualview;see Johnson 1987: ó6-68),because the introductionof difference,on whichthe metaphor depends for meaning, is incompatible withthe presumptionof simi-larityunderlying comparison.Searle posited the model assertive as a literalrepre-sentation of the worldand thus strictlya matter of comparison. Anysuch com-parison can be restated metaphorically,in figurativeterms, so that the assertive,as spoken, differs fromwhat the speakers means the hearer to understand. Searlewas therefore obligedto put metaphors in a special class of indirect speech acts.

tiï

y"real"to the hearer. When humanbeings speak performatively,wealso speak figuratively,thereby shieldingourselves and others fromthe provisionalnature of ourassertions, directivesand commitments.That performativespeech is also figurativespeech means that theongoing(re)constructionof realityis rarely distinguishablefromtheknown,felt, lived-in worldwe "really"inhabit.

To assert that order is a problem is to propose that the speakerthinks,and the hearer accepts, that order is a natural conditionwhichis both desirable and achievable as a social condition.Figura-tively"real,"the naturalconditionof order isdifferentfrom,butstillsubject to comparison with,an implied,necessarily figurativerepresentation of a state of affairs we mightcall "disorder"or "anar-chy"(but not "chaos",which wouldbe incomparablydifferent).Thepresumptionthat the two conditionsare similarenough to be mean-ingfullycompared, but differentenough to be worthcomparing isfixed by the metaphor "problem,"whichsuggests that the compari-

son can lead to a solution,also figurativelyunderstood - for Hobbes,the tcviàthãn and, for Pàisòns, the interndizationof expectations.The formeris a metonymical movebecause it reduces a whole,

"the problem,"or disorder, into a part, the kviathan,whichchangesthe whole fromdisorder to something that more closelyresembles

Compare this withmy position,whichclearlyimpliesthat metaphors are nota special class of speech acts, because assertives are always metaphorical con-structions. (See Johnson 1987: 68-71 and220 n. 18 on "the strong constitutiveviewof metaphor.")Ifwe reject Searle's claim thatassertives can literallyrepre-sent the world,as if the words constituting theirpropositionalcontent werea per-fectly transparent medium, thenhis positioncollapses intomine. Searle was rightto think that assertives, as speech acts, always presume similarityand metaphorsalways manipulate differences.Yet similaritynecessarily impliesdifference, orthere wouldbe nothing tocompare. By asserting that X is similarenough to Yto countas Y, in order to mark (exaggerate, minimize)the difference betweenX and Y, the speaker represents X and Y conventionally(nonliterally)and thenexpects the hearer to accept it as literal(literallywhat the speaker means), thuscreating a provisional,ncgotiated realitybctwcen them.

.r *Sï :ffis: :lffik i

158 Part 1: Rules

an order. Indicatively,the kviathandoes this withdirective-rules.By contrast, Parsons' solutionis a synecdochal movebecause ittakes the problem of disorder as a failureof parts (individuals)tofunctionproperly as a whole. Internalizationof expectations, inso-far as it succeeds, integrates parts into a whole, or order, which is then

l i ll h A i d l


as the invariableor even the usual case. I have an alternative.I cansubstitute a term like"privjlçge''fóì)"order":The problem of orderbecomes the problem of ffwilege.Yet even thiímetaphõïicatmõveloSêS ïtS ïõicdâgãinSt the "ieality'.''of order understoodas Parsons,among so many others, hàd wantedus to understand it.

d h I ld

I.I , l.j-r.{:i,



ontologicallymore real than the parts. Again,indicatively,Parsons'workis replete withterms like"integration"and of course "system,"all ofwhichdeny the need for, or efficacyof, active direction.

In keeping withmy assertion that social constructionproceeds

withaid fromthree categories of figurativelanguage, I propose athird solution tothe problem of order, which is (need I say?) depen-dent on a metaphoricalmove. This solution tothe problemof ordersubstitutes a different metaphor forcomparisonwiththe state of af-fairscònsiitútìngthe problem.The ineÌaphôi-:-'õidèi''süCgéStô astablq s-õõïâ,1,à_rt1n_ iemelt c 9 pn-aryp I e to s g a e alrang gm€nt s o f thephysical world,or nature. Notice that order then is a two-part meta-phor. Order is cp_mpgfç-d__1-o*.e. StallC artAn€çinenlwhich isin turncomparedÌonature. Mymetaphor is also constructed in twoparts:Order is a stable arrangement, and such arrangements are stable notbecausè t'Ííefreíéú61ê-nãiüiè;whiôhií âtso itaUÍe, but because theybenefit those whose arrangements they are.

Thè probiéú ttreriisnot to make social arrangements more stable,for they "really"are stable (my metaphor makes them so). Insteadthe problem is to find-og _W_tìJ_l_lì9Je{e,ltrblq,Tlrisis the same as

{ski4g,,glto_b=engfitllfo:n*erygi*"ret of *t""gj* To speakof a "problem"problematizeswhatever is asserted. Mymetaphori-cal move fromorder to arrangement shifts the normative weightin-vested in the term "problem"away fromstabilityand toward the fac-ticityof "arrangements" as having been arranged.2a

Mostpeople do not see arrangements as a problem,unless onegoes on to suggest collusion orconspiracy, whichI do not, at least

24. Friedrichvon Hayek understood exactly theideological irnplicationsof this choiceof metaphors, but he felt that "authoritarians"had already succeeded in interpret-ing order as "a deliberate arrangement by somebody,"thus making the concept"unpopularamong friendsof liberty. . ." (1973: 36,,his emphasis). He then soughtto rescue the concept of orderfromthis fate by restoring its metaphoricalassocia-tion withnature.

Under the circumstances, I woulddo wellnot to use the term"order"at all. To the extent that I can count onothers thinkingofarrangements as having been arranged (once I point this out), thenit suffices to speak of "socialarrangements" insteadof ordeç and"legalarrangements" insteadof legal order. Orders are institutional-ized; arrangements are instituted (compare Polanyi,Arensberg,andPearson 1971). Because I do not thinkthis move suffices entirely,Iwillfreelyspeak of privilegein such a way as to problematizeit. Therhetoricalpotencyof "order"warrants this strategy, withresults nomore deceptive than any metaphor, any assertion, secures.

Michael Oakeshottpreferred arrangement to order in his well-knowndefini-tion of politics:"PolitigqI lk9 to be the qc1ivi11'-913-ç11d-in-g to th_egen-eral ar-rangements of a set of people whomchance or choice have brought together"(1962: ll2).OakeshoÍìrs ionservâtism hadhimchoosé';attendíng'ìó"ãiiânge-ments," because "the arrangements whichare enjoyed alwaysfar exceed thosewhichare recognized to stand in need of attention, . . ." (p. ll2).Normativeconcerns aside, I quite concur withOakeshott's empiricaljudgment and find theidea that arrangements are attended to fullyconsistent withthe positionthatarrangements are arrangcd. I also take this definitionto support the one I offerabovc in the introduction.

:" 1. *]

PART 2= RULE



'L,i lït,L:i t' ffi

Rules are empty in themselves, violentand unfinal-ized; theyare impersonal and can be bent to any pur-pose. The successes of historybelong to those who arecapable of seizing these rules . . .

MichelFoucaultLanguage, Counter-MemorY,

Practice (1977a: l5l)

THEPRESUMPTIONOF ANARCHY



...| ris&ïii :..

OF ANARCHY

Howany collectionof self-interested agents might be capable of co-egi éni-ê-iSõiiê of the central substantive questions for social scienceparadigms in the positivistontologicalmode. As the problemof in-dividualismversus collectivism,it is the one procedural problemJhey all share. For there to be a problem, one must grant its terms.hgents are free; cooperativeundertakings are calculated, and theybre difficult.These are the terms of liberalism.

I begin this chapter witha discussion of liberalism,in whichIargue that internationalrelations considered as a conditionof an-archy, a virtualstate of nature, is liberalism'sparadigmcase. Currentscholarship tends to viewdomestic societies as havingprogressivelysolved the problem of order by developingas states, while interna-tional relations persists in anarchy. I take a contraryuiew, nametll]that internationalrelationswas never a matter of anarchy, any molg-Jthan domestic societies could have been.

Thomas Hobbes notwithstanding,social and politicalthoughtduringhis timedrew no sharp distinctionbetween the state and the

164 Part 2: Rule

state of nature. Soçial relations;.includin g_ int_egqçlonalrelations,co-9 d. and 9ia gitp-t-+-v--e-uj9,g+."-"gf-b,çfurg-r'uled-arglc.lg-'erts*vi.-tue, rights,and manneis describe importanrfeatìËòãiarrange_ments lackirigcentral aúthorityand thus formally;;r.hi..Ã;;"-turyafter Flobbes, poÌitteâl-theÒïist5õèÈan to substituteutilityforvirtue,law for rights and conventionsfor manners The result

The Presumption oÍ Anarchy

The individualis free inasmuch as he is the proprietorof hisperson and capacities. The human essence is freedomfromdependence on the willof others, and freedom is a functionof possession. Society has a lotof free individualsrelated toeach other as proprietors of their own capacities and of whatth h i d b th i (1962

165



forvirtue,law for rights,and conventionsfor manners. The result, was to empty anarchy of content and give it today's entirelynega_| ;tivesense: formally,the absence of the centralauthorityof the state;I lsubstantively, the absence of guidance providedby virtue,rights,\' and manners.

LIBERALISM

In J. G. A.Pocock's Virtue,Commerce and History,we findthatliberalismis "a tormented yet oddlytriumphantentity . . ." (19g5:38). The term "entity"suggests an operative paradigm, contributingto whichis a lineof thought-socialand politicalthought in thàliberaltradition(recall introduction).Liberalthought attempts to ac-count for importantfeatures of liberalismas an ensemble of prac-tices. Yet clearly

for Pocock,,,tormented,'

and,,triumphanti'

arewords to describe the lineof thought rather more than the ensembleof practices. Thus the sentence quoted goes on to say that liberalismhas been

denounced by naturalists as insufficientlynaturaland by his_toricistsas insufficientlyhistorical,vindicated by some of itsdefenders on grounds robustly independent of either nature orhistory,yet accorded by all three - in consequence of their cen_tralizingconcern withit - a place in history a good deal morecentral (I shall argue) than it has in fact occupied (pocock1985: 38).

Whateverelse it has become, liberalismis a judgmentabout hu_man nature and its social consequences. C. B. Mcpherson has pro_vided what is by nowthe standard account of liberalismro õon-sidered (part of whichI also quote in the introduction,footnotel0):

they have acquired by their exercise (1962: 3).

Liberalismas "possessive individualism"is an altogether apt phrasefor this minimalaccount. Pococktook issue, not withthe accountas such, but withMcpherson's having attributed it to Thomas Hobbesand John locke. Instead Pocock dated its origins acenturyafterLocke's workhad appeared (1985:59-71, l2l-123).Nevertheless,Hobbes'and Locke's construction of the individualas free agent isessential to liberalthought. On thisMcpherson was right.[ocke',made an additional,all too familiarassumption, namely, that thepursuit by many individualsof their self-interestis fundamentally j

harmonious. WhileHobbes did not grant this assumption, he and i

Iocke made quite another assumption, one that Pocock wouldasso-ciate withnaturalism.Other assumptions that liberalismhas accumu-lated along the way are historicist,as Pocock noted, or convention-alist, as I willdescribe Pocock's "robustlyindependent"grounds for

vindicatingliberalism.These additionalassumptions tormented liberal thought,ifI un-derstand Pocock here, by complicatingit, but in doing so they madeits triumphpossible. Practice found self-interested individualsco- :operating, and not just incidentally,to providesuch general interestsas justice and security. Liberal thoughthas had to account for thesecomplicatingfeatures of liberalpractice. It did so by addingauxil-liaryassumptions qualifyingthe centralbeliefof possessive indi-vidualism and thus protecting it fromserious challenge on groundsof practice. The tormentingof liberalthought contributedto thetriumphof liberalismas an operative paradigm.t

Liberalthought is not, and never was, a simple statement of the

l. The reader may recognize in this formulationthe influenceof ImreLakatos' ac-count of the growthof scientificknowledge;I did not untila reader of an earlierversion pointedit out to me (Lakatos l97B 47-51). Lakatos divided..researchprogrammes"into a "hard core" of unchallcngeablcassumptions and a .,pÍotec-

i vffi1Ïi. ììmri

Part 2: Rule

social implicationsof possessive individualism,notwithstandingoc-casional, sometimesbrillianteffortsto make it so (forexample,Nozick1974). InternationalRelationsconstitutes the onlysubstan-tial exception to thisgeneralization.Instead InternationalRelationsis dominated by the presumptionof anarchy.2 Thus KennethA. OyeintroducedWorldPolitics'recentsymposiumissue on "cooperation

166 The Presumption oÍ Anarchy '|-67

At the time liberalismemerged, internationalrelations were not an-archical,ifwe mean by that a primalworldof possessive sovereigns.Instead internationalrelationshave always constituteda Rolitical*\society, by whichI mean any social arrangementlimitingconduct Iand distributingprivilege(see furtherchapter 6). Noticethat the "presence of politicsdoes not deny the possibility or even pervasive



introducedWorldPolitics recentsymposiumissue on cooperationunder anarchy"withthis forcefuldeclaration:"Nationsdwell inperpetual anarchy, for no central authorityimposes limitson the pur-suit of sovereign interests" (1985b:l).

/ States are granted just those properties that liberalismgrants toI individuals.The presumptionof anarchy need not be strippedof ad-I ditionalassumptions and practices, for it is the bare-bones accountI of society as "a lotof free individuals.. . ." Everythingthat has beenadded on to that account in the name of liberalismis thought to dif-ferentiate domestic politicalsociety fromthe circumstances of inter-national life,whichare said therefore to constitute ageneralizedstate of war. Hobbes reigns, not simplyas author of liberalismbutguarantor of an uncontaminatedrenditionof itin the formof inter-nationalrelations as a state of nature. The presumption of anarchynecessitates the problematique withwhichOye and his colleagues

J.'-have concerned themselves: The presence of cooperation isindeed

\ a problemfor theory when the conditions makingcooperationpossi-\ ble have been defined away.The problem withthis characterization-onein which liberalism

"[and anarchy start offpretty much the same but take different paths,Iiberalismdeveloping withinstates and anarchy prevented fromdo-ing so by the existence of many states - comes at the startingpoint.

tive belt"of auxilliaryhypotheses. Lakatos also indentifiedprogressive or degen-erative "problemshifts,"depending on whether added material enables a theoryto make more powerfulpredictions.Shifts in liberalthought are degenerative in-sofar as the model for that thought is theorywithpredictivecapability.If themodel is an adequate account of liberalpractice, itselfshifting, thenshifts inliberalthought are progressive.2. I owe this phrase to HaywardR. Alker,Jr., who used it as a title fora paperwhich, along withone by RichardK.Ashley, prompted my thoughts on anarchyand its career. Later versions of theirpapers, and another version of this chapter,are to be found in Alkerand Ashley (forthcoming).

presence of politicsdoes not deny the possibility,or even pervasive-ness, of individuallypossessive conduct, onlythe presumption thatsuch conductsufficientlyconstitutes society.

Politicalthought fromNiccolòMachiavellito the end of the eigh-teenth century developed liberaltenets withoutpresuming interna-tional anarchy. Onlygradually has the imageof internationalrela-tions as state of nature come to dominatethinking,and we now readMachiavelli,Hobbes, and their successors accordingly.If interna-tionalrelationshave changed less than the image we hold,what haschanged far more is the contrast between internationalrelationsanddomestic politicalsocieties. While thismay be a reason to enrichliberalthoughtwithadditionalassumptions and qualifications,asindeed has been the case, it hardly justifiesthe judgmentthat inter-nationalrelations no longer, or never did, constitute a politicalsociety.

This is not to say that internationalrelations are never anarchic.They often are. Mypoint is different:The inc-id_ep_ce_"gfSnarchy -i9

nollhs ggrytejls_4_c-9,n-d-fti-o-ngf anafchy, that is,-án- alsenóe of rule.For all the exceptions, the largepattern of internationalrelaiionóisone of asymmetricand involuntaryrelations among ostensiblyfreeand equal actors. Toquote Oran Young:

Virtuallyeverythingcapable of being allocatedamong mem-bers of the internationalpolityis distributedin a highlyin-egalitarian fashion. This is true whether the valueat stake ispopulation, natural resources, wealth, power, or prestige. Thus,the level of between-unit inequalities in this politicalsystemrivalsthe levelof within-unitinequalities (1978: 244).

If this isa tenable empirical judgment,it does no good to rescueanarchy fromexceptional instances,because exceptions are the rule.To put it the other way around, social arrangements need not pos-sess sovereignty or any other formalfeature of the state, much lessa high degree of centralizationin enforcement capacities,to qualify

i .ïffiii

Part 2: Rule

as politicalsocieties. Internationalrelations are by no means a spe-cial case. Rather, the state is the special case, one to have becomeparadigmatic for politicalsociety onlyrecently.

lost are conceptions of politicalsociety predating the state as thedominantsocial reality. Domesticpoliticalsociety in Europe of theseventeenth and eighteenth centuries was hardlyabsolutist labels

168 The Presumption oÍ Anarchy

VIRTUES,RIGHTS,MANNERS

The quotationof Pocock whichlaunches this chapter occurs in anessay entitled "Virtues,Rights, and Manners:AModelfor Histori-ans of Political Thought"(1981:353-368 1985: 37-50) Muchof

169



seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was hardlyabsolutist,labelsnotwithstanding-theterm "absolutist"refers more to the ascendancyof the king in court society than to the state as centralizedcoercivemachinery (Elias1982).Hobbes' descriptionof the lrviathanwas

no less heuristicallyintended.than was his unforgettable descriptionof the state of nature. For politicalphilosophers of that time,state\, and anarchy were limitingconditions of politicalsociety, rules and- \, rulers the norm. Only in the nineteenth centurydid politicalphi-,/ i| losophy begin to equate the centralizationof politicsin the state

t1 withthe centralityof the state forpolitics.It.wouldappçar that.anAr-ghy wasnever a primalcondition.Pure

r liberal theory was no more suità6lCfòï understanding internationalrelationsin the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries than it is today.Conceptions of politicalsociety have always countenanced interna-tionalrelations. It is these conceptions that had to be tormented -by eliminatingfeatures integral to them-before anarchy could tri-

umph as the dominantconception of internationalrelations. Thusthe historicalsequence is quite different fromliberalism'striumph.The latter prevailed, as thought and practice, by becoming morecomplex.The formerprevailedby becoming more simplifiedandthus ever more sharplycontrasted withthe latter.

For expository reasons, I present these complex conceptualde-velopments as proceeding in two distinctstages, respectivelythe sub-jects of this chapter's remainingsections. In practice the last halfofthe eighteenth century is whenalmost everythinghappened. Tiadi-tionalconceptions bf politicalsociety reached their zenith, and atthe very same timecame philosophicalinitiatives whichduly re-sulted in the eclipse of these conceptions. It is also the period of the"great transformation"(Polanyi 1957). The idea of a naturallyself-regulatingmarket tookhold, and industrialcapitalismdecisivelyaltered the social relations of all those whose productive activitieswere affected. The paradoxical liberalpractice of self-consciouslyreconstructingsociety whileespousing the eternal veritiesof Politi-cal Economy had begun in earnest.

ans of Political Thought(1981:353-368, 1985: 37-50). Muchofwhat I have to say about the presumption of anarchy in interna-tional relations isadapted fromthis essay and indeed is contained,in a remarkably compressed form, inits title.RelocatingPocock's"modelforhistorians of politicalthought" tothe provinceof inter-national thought allowsme to propose a renditionof anarchy's careerover several centuries. This renditionis consistent \ryithmy presump-tion that politicalsociety, however muchor littlecentralized, andnot possessive individualism,however enriched, explainsthe com-plexitiesof internationalrelations.

The words "virtues,""rights,"and "manners" synopsize three dis-tinctivetraditionsof thinkingabout politicalsociety beforethe riseof the state in anythingresembling its current form.Virtue is the par-ticularconcern of Machiavelliand is integralto his conception ofthe viverecivile-notjust "a way of lifegiven over to civiccon.cerns . . . ," but "a broadly based civicconstitution"(Pocock 1975:

56-57; see furtherpp. 49-80, Pitkin1984: 80-105).By nomeansdoes virtueand its expression inthe viverecivilepreempt individual-ism, although in Machiavelliit is a passionate rather morethanpossessive individualism.To repeat Machiavelli'sown, oftenquoted '

words, "human appetites are insatiable, for by nature we are so con-stituted that there is nothingthat we cannot long for . . .'3 (1950a:355). For Machiavelli, virtueregulates conduct drivenby our longings.

Machiavelli'scommentators show littleagreement on how to ren-

3. Compare, however, this famouspassage fromThe Prince: "The desire to acquire[acquisitareJis trulya very natural and common thing;and whenever men whocan, do so, they are praised and not condemned;but when they cannot and wantto do just the same, herein lies the mistake and thecondemnation" (Musa 1964:23). Indicativelythe context for this assertion is the conquest of territory, forthediscussion of whichMachiavelli consistentlyused the word "acquisition"and itscognates. Possession wouldtherefore seem to be the appropriate expression ofprincelyappetite. Other individuals wouldexpress their appetites according tothe possibilitiesof their situations.

:ffi Ìïi i.ffir



172 Part 2: Rule

ning, whichdisciplineconserves and directs.s Ifdisciplineis present,then so must ardor be as well,yieldingthe firsttype of army. If"disciplinedvalor"is not available,then the second type inevitablydegenerates into the third.Clearly, for Machiavelli,disciplineis in-dispensable to virtue,even ifvalor is the more evidentpropertyofvirtueas a modelof conduct.

The Presumption oÍ Anarchy 173

vicious transformationsof the firstthree (1950a: 212-216). The threevirtuousarrangements are principality,aristocracy, and democracy("populare"),their inversionstyranny,oligarchy, and anarchy ("/i-cenza"). Nowone mightthink that democracy and its counterpartwouldbe headlèss and thus unruled,the more so because Machia-velli defineddemoCracy nèÈativély,as th"e absence fromrule of "a

(



Observe that this is, in Sheldon Wolin'swords, "a timeless model"-"Machiavellidrew theconclusion that the example of republicanRome provided later ages witha timeless model on whichto base

politicalactions and institutions"(1960: 215). Republics,empires,principalitiesare all subject to a worldofcontingency. IfrepublicanRome is the source of Machiavelli'smodel of conduct, it is becauseRome is "the exemplar of accidental perfection" (Mansfield1979:35). Unlikethe timeless model of conduct that virtue,in all its con-notations, describes, social arrangements are but "particularmo-ments": "To affirmthe Republic,then, was to break up the timelesscontinuityof the hierarchicuniverse into particularmoments. . . ."(Pocock1975: 54;see also Wolin1960: 214-217).

Instead of a timeless, hierarchicaluniverse, Machiavelliposited acommon historicalorigin forall social arrangements, the subsequentvariationsamong which"are due to chance" (1950a: 212).

For in the beginningof the world,when its inhabitants are few,they livedfora time scattered likebeasts. Then, withthe multi-plicationof their offspring,they drewtogether and, in orderto be better able to defend themselves, began to lookabout fora man stronger and more courageous than the rest, made himtheir head [capoJ, and obeyed him (p. 212).

Evidentlya hierarchicaloriginsubstitutes for timeless hierarchy.Does this mean tha( every historicalsocial arrangement musthavea head which others obey? On this Machiavelliwas ambiguousbut,I think,not deliberately.FollowingPolybius (Machiavelli1950b: 7-13, Mansfield1979:35-41), he sorted socialarrangements into six

categories (in Italian,ragioni,"reasons"), three virtuousand three

5. "Inthe beginning"has a double meaning here. Machiavelliheld that ardor dimin-ished withage (1950a: 355) as wellas in battle. Inasmuchas armies consist mostlyof youth, we may presume that armies willalways be ardent in the beginning.

fewpôwerfulmen [potentiJ"or a prince (p. 2J4). Yet Machiavelli'scúoicè of iúetaphor sugge$s instead that popular rule swells thehead, so that it includes the multitude,and rules itself.ó

That suCh a situation is unlikelyto persist should come as no sur-prise. Nor should its transformationinto anarchy, in which,"aseveryone did what he liked,all sorts of outrages were committed"@. 21{,.Polybius calledthis situation"mobrule"("turbae poten-lalrC')(Machiavelli1950b: 8). Machiavelliwouldseem to have deniedthat anarchy is any manner of rule, because no one acts as if thereare any rules. Under thecircurnstance, anarchy "had to be got ridof somehow," and some other arrangement is soon adopted (Machia-velli1950a: 214). Indeed, no particulararrangement is ever stable.Barringinterference froma neighborduringa periodic"state ofcommotion","a commonwealth[viverecivileJmightgo on foreverpassing throughgovernmentaltransitions"(p, 214),

I conclude that forMachiavellithe viverecivileis politicalsociety

in general, thât pâiticülar politicalsocieties are everywhere found,that all suôh arlangements vary frommoment to moment in theirparticularrelations of rulers and ruled, that rules mediate all sorcialielationsand that no one-prince, warrior,member of the popu-lãõè, mèrnbéi of 't mob - ôâì éount on an externallyfixed, formalset of rule-s to Euid-e conduct. Where there are such rules and whenthey codifyvirtue,they are to be obeyed. Machiavelli'ssupportof

6. The metaphorical associationof ruler withthe head impliesa metonymicalrela-tion of the head to the body of people, or the bodypolitic'Because the headdirects the body, we use the part figurativelyfor the whole.The head of a govern-ment stands in forthe government, whichstands in for the state, whichstands

in forthe country. Thus we speak of "Gorbachev," say, when we mean a placeand its people. When we speak instead of "Russia,"it is to subvert the metonymi-cal sequence that includesa particularstate, in this instance, the SovietUnion.Insofaras the head swells to include thebody of people, one couldsay that themetonymical rclationis converted intoa grotesque metaphor-The body is allhcad, the head all body. On such figures of specch, see chapter 4, above'

. f &&i :4 ffiË +ffii

174 Part 2: Rule

law is realenough: Even when we fightit is by law ("conle leggf,)as wellas withforce(Musa 1964: 145).When laws are absent orabused, then there are less formalrules for conduct. These rules de-finevirtueand demand disciplinein circumstances where others'behavior maybe excessive or reckless. Machiavellianticipated Tal-cott Parsons' preoccupation withthe internalizationof normative

( h ) l h h M hi lli' d l f d

The Presumption oÍ Anarchy175

Whilewe tend to consider Machiavelli'smaximsas merelyprudential-he commended them onlybecause they work-wemustnot forget that he saw them as embodyingvirtue,albeit the austerevirtueof the warrior.Failure tohonor them is thus a sign of corrup-tion, which Machiavelliheld to be the problem of politicalsociety:"howeasily men are corrupted. . ." (Machiavelli1950a: 315). Rulerí1

ibl t just b th imprudent but b j



content (chapter 4), although Machiavelli'smodel of conduct is oneof civic activism,Parsons' one of passive acceptance.T

Politicalsociety in general consists of many politicalsocieties, a

plenitude of rulers. Sometimes politicalsociety, likepoliticalsocieties,approximates a democracy or degenerates intoanarchy (perhaps "ex-plodes" is the better term).Sometimes it takes on the semblance ofhead and body, as withRome and "its less powerfulneighbors" (aphrase Machiavelliused to make the general point;Musa 1964: l5).

i'' Certainlypoliticalsociety in general is never free fromcommotion.i Nor is it ever free from rules. These rules do not prescribe punish-Lments and remedies; they advise as to consequences.

Machiavellisaw that his missionwas to counter the ignoranceofrulers by spellingout the consequences when rules are ignored. Todo this,he wrote rulebooks containing detailedinstructions to ac-companya few maxims,or weightyprinciples, fromwhich the con-tent of virtueis to be derived. In these books we do not findMachia-vellidrawinga firmlinebetween politicalsocieties, where at mostmoments ruler-ruledrelations are firmand clear, and politicalso-ciety, in whichmany rulers mustcontend witheach other under themurkiestof circumstances. These respective situations provide dif-ferent contexts for Machiavelli'smaxims- contexts whichhe care-fullypresented. There is no pattern in these offerings,however,because he did not wish to implythat the two sets of relations aredifferentexcept in the degree to whichrelations are stable and formal

, rules available.In other wordsMachiavellinever supposed that in-\\ ternationalrelations are a permanently anarchical situation, or in-'\deed a permanent conditionof any kind.

7. "In the anatomy of early Romanvirtuegiven in the Discorsi, Machiavelliseemsto depict it as builton militarydisciplineand civic.religion,as if these were thesocializingprocesses throughwhich men learned to be social animals"(Pocock1975:201-202).

are corruptible,not just because they are imprudent,but becausejrules givinginstructions depend on virtuousrulers to work, thatis, i

to be reliableguides to the world in which rulersfind themselves. In\the absence of virtue, rulers read instructions to mean that anything,they can get away withis permitted, imprudenceis rewarded and the :

delicate balance of relations- the viverecivrle-is sacrificed to avariceand aggrandizement.

Civicvirtuesall relate to one overarchingprinciple.In its pure,timeless and naturalform, it is the principlethat one should do noharm. In a worldof contingencyand uncertainty, the principleofno harm translates into a number of maxims, two of whichI taketo be especially revealinC. Tbe firstis the maximthat one mustrespond to injury-harmdone by another to oneself (see notably1950a:442-444). Nòt onlydoes failureto respond to any injurycon-done others'excesses, it is likely toinduce a later actof vengeance,itselfexcessive and probablydisastrous.

Beyond these prudentialconsiderations, however, responding tó-tinjuryis necessitated because injuryis not just material harm, but ,i

also a violationof a rule whichspecifies the limitsof harm-doing.

in some situation.EWere the injuryin question not redressed, therule as wellas the injuredparty suffers. Not only is injuriouscon-duct rule-relevant,but transgressions of such rules, which Machiavellitook tobe commonplace,constitute the prevailingpattern of rela-tions among individuals.Harm meets withharm, the pattern dulyconstituting the rule definingthe occasion of harm and the occasionfor a harmfulresponse.

Often the pattern of relations is unclear, or no rule isavailable.

8. In the situation Machiavelliused to illustratethe maximthat injuriesmust beredressed, the Gauls alleged, and the Romans denied, an injury ofthe former bythe latter. Atcontention was Rome's violationof theius gentium, "the unwrittenlaw which thcRomans and other latin people recognized as binding in theirdeal-

:ififfiï :r

176 Part 2: Rule

Here Machiavelli'ssecond maxim comes to bear. Tlris-is the call..forprop,q$ionality.,inhatmful conduct:"Ithas been said by a wiseman that ifone is to hold a state by violentmeans, the force em_nlgvedshould be proportionateto the resistance offered"(Machia-velli1950a: 529). Perhaps the wise man was Aristotre,although Har-vey c' Mansfield'Jr., thought Machiavellimeant trimsetilpze:380). The context is definitelyruler-ruledrelations yet the maxim


to raison dëtat,e neither is it quite as benign as the term ,,civichu-manism,"much the vogue in current scholarship, mightsuggest(Hulliung1983: 8-30). Pocock's monumental book,The Machia;vellianMoment(1975)places Machiavelli'swork in the context ofemergent humanism,withoutpaintingMachiavelli,the ardent repub:lican, a humanist too. Nevertheless pocock lent himself to criticismb f i h



380). The context is definitelyruler-ruledrelations. yet the maximis general. The relationsbetween autonomous individuals,incr"àingrulers, profitjust as much fromconsideration of the requirementìof proportionality.That such requirements

falr intoa pattËrn is whatmakes likelythe presence of a rule, howeverinformar.proportional-ityand specific rules defininginjuryand appropriate respónse standin reciprocalsupport. Together they constitute an ,,economy of vio_lence," to use Wolin'sstrikinglyapt phrase (1960:220_224).As suchthey defeat any conceptionof Machiavelri'sworldas ..ray expedi-ent or whollyaggressive.

Nowhere in Machiaveilido we finda Florentineversion of themaxim"anythinggoes," or even of the maxim,,whatever works,,,unless we add as a provisothat unprincipledor unrulyconduct usu_allydoesn't work.IfMachiavelli'sthoughtvery littleresembles thefamiliarinterpretationof Machiavellismas unswervingdedication

ings withone another and sometimes withforeignstates" (walker's note, Machia-velli1950b:139). walker's translationof "jus gentium,"as Machiavelliused it(Machiavelli1950a: 443), is "raw of nations." This is misreading inrut",", ii ,ug-gests the existence of somethingresembling internationaÌ raw, even if jus gentiuir

was "one of several convenient sources of authorityand material"for internationarlaw as it emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (corbettl95l:7; seegenerally p. 3-38).

Roman jurisprudence, which so illuminedother fields of law, paid onlythe most fleeting attention to dealings withindependent politicaicommuni-ties. The great juristicliterature is ã product of the impèriatperiod when,apart fromwars with.,barbarians" on remote frontiers,Rome was con_cerned exclusiverywithsubordinate communities.For these, trrouÀr,irr"vmight be allowed to retain theirown legal orders for domestic ãffairqRome's law-givingauthoritywas finar. The conditionsdemanding a oistin;isystem of norms to govern the intercourse of equal states did not ;"iJb.ii.

Nor, as far as Machiavelliwas concerned, did these conditionsexist in his own time.

by referringto the Machiavelliantraditionas one of civichuman-,ism. I thinkit better callçdthe traditionof civicactivism.I also,thinkPitkingòt th"Machiave[iI read as *.rr-ur.*-u,tã,i."'ïìthree sentences.

Indeed, inthe viverecivilemightandrightare interrelated, forlaw and justice are themselves partly resources of power;andconversely, a purelyabstract ,,right"that serves no communityneeds and can muster no communitysupport is politicallyin_effectualand wrong.Because we are simultaneousrydisiinctand connected, politicsalways simultaneously concerns thedistributionof costs and benefits among competitors,and thenature and directionof their shared community,both ,,whogets what, when, why"and ,,whowe are." Everylaw or policyallocates, advantaging some and disadvantaging others; buievery lawor policyaffects their shared common lifeand theprinciplesforwhichthey stand (19g4: 300).

If these had been my sentences, I wouldnot have used the words"right"and "might."When pitkinwrote them, she surely was think_ingof Machiavelli'sfamous remark that ,,there are two ways offighting:one withthe law, the other withforce . . ." (Musa 1964:145), whichshe invokedelsewhere in her book, and whichI allude

9. Raison d'état can only be a persuasive interpretationof Machiaveili'smessagewhen hs.-slalg s,th.e 4qçlçiyÊ,e4q-s.çglrgrnÂlJltlryrqÌg$-_locusof poÌirics.This is theHegelian srate of FriedrichMeinecke:'.The state is"an õiãániô õinòture whosefullpowercan onlybe maintained by alrowingit in some way to continue grow-ing; and raison d'état indicates both the path and the goar for such a growth,,(1957:1). Howlittlethis resembles Machiaveili'sindividualistway of túnking.see also Friedrich Kratochwil'sdemonstration (19g2) that raison d'état acquiráits contemporary sense of "unbridtedself-interest as'the essence of politics,,onlyafter 1870. Quotationis fromp. 22.

. #.#.à ,:- ,',t :. i

178 Part 2: Rule

to above. While"might"and "force"are no doubt interchangeableterms for the Italian "forza,""le leggi"is unproblematically"thelaw," meaning specificformalrules, and not some general categoryof rights thatare natural tohumanityor central to social arrangements.

The term "right"suggests instead the second traditionto whichPocock pointed, which is indeed the "rights"tradition,and it is notMachiavelli's Rather it is the traditionof thought inwhich Hobbes

The Presumption oÍ Anarchy

which in due course became formalized,even stylized, byHobbes,Locle,and theirsuccellols? as the social contract. A rightis a claimas to the possession or use of things whichothers acknowledge inexchange foracknowledgementof their claims. Acknowledgmentsare exchanged - reciprocallyaccepted - as promises indiüdualsmakeabout theirown future conduct. The basic princlqlgin lhe Lg-lt_t.s.1J3-di l iC h ll b k t "J d t i i d ith

179



Machiavelli s.Rather it is the traditionof thought inwhich Hobbesand locke are located. Pocockhimselfdisplayed a certain impa-tience withthe tradition of thinkingabout politicalsociety in terms

of the play of individualrights and duties because he detected a pro-pensity among historians of politicalthought bothclassicallyandagain since Mcpherson to adopt a "law-centeredparadigm."In itsdevotion to rights, such an orientationeffectivelyexcludes considera-tionof such other basic features of politicalsociety as virtues andmanners (Pocock 1985: 37). Furthermore, Pocockargued that writ-ing "the historyof politicalthought in law-centered terms .. . islargelyequivalent to writingit as the historyof liberalism"(p. 46).For Pocock, thisis "a serious distortionof history"(p. 47, footnot-ing a paper of his ownentitled"The Mythof John Locke andtheObsession withLiberalism").

NotwithstandingPocock's resistance to the rights tradition,hehas offered an exceptionallyhelpfulrecapitulationof its originsanddistinctivecharacter by juxtaposingit withthe Machiavelliancon-cern forvirtue.The Machiavelliantraditionof civicactivismfoundits inspirationin the Roman Republic,the rights traditionin theRoman Empire;virtuepertains to politics,rights to commerce.Rightsare generalized as rules, and they rule relations to things."Socialfirstand politicalafter, the civiland common law defineindividualsas possessors by investing themwith rightand propertyin things,and ultimately(as in l,ocke) in themselves" (p. 45). Pocock has hereconceded the issue of Locke's, and liberalism's,subsequent impor-tance. Nevertheless, his point is that the rights traditionantedatesearly capitalismand liberalthought by centuries. As such it alsoantedates efforts to.naturalizerights in order to render them time-less, inalienable,and constitutiveof popular sovereignty and thencethe state.

To the extentthat the rightstraditionreduces society to posses-sion, it needs to explain self-rule thropghthe agency of rights. Therights traditionalways contained withinitselfsuch an explanation,

dittqrl_iCt_hat_pfgmiqes shall be kcpt. "Just conduct is in accord withpromises given"(Brennan and Buchanan 1985: 100;see generallypp. 100-1ll).Inasmuch as promises willnot always, and sometimes

cannot, be kept, rules emerge in response to these failures.Consider in these terms Hobbes'treatmentof rightsand dutiesin the l-eviathan(Part I, chapters 14, 15; Hobbes l9ó8: 189-217),which he presented as natural.The firstlaw of nature states "a pre-cept, or generall rule ofReason, that every man ought to endeavourPeace, as farre as he has hope of obtainingit; and when he cannotobtain it, thot he may seek, and use, all helps, and advanlages ofWarre"(p. 190, his emphasis). Thisof course is the Machiavellianprincipleof doing no harmbut having no choice but to do so, asa matterof self defense, in a contingent worldof harm-doers (pp.188-189).

Hobbes' second law of nature is a procedural necessity, given his"

scheme: It makes the principleof no harm except in self defense analienable right fromthe individual'spointof view. Individualsarethereforecapable of entering intobindingagreements, or contracts.In Hobbes'words,

. . . all Contract is mutuall translation,or change of Right;and therefore he that promisethonely, because he hath alreadyreceived the benefit for whichhe promiseth,is to be understoodas ifhe understood the Rightshould passe: for unlesse he hadbeen content to have his words so understood, the other wouldnot have performed his Part first.And for thatcause, in buy-ing, and selling, and otheracts of Contract,a Promise is equiva-lent to a Covenant; and thereforeobligatory(1968: 194-195).

Hobbes'thirdnatural lawfollows from thisexposition:"That men",,.performe their Covenants made: withoutwhichCovenants are in ,'vain,and but Emptywords, and the Rightof all men to all thingsremaining, wee are stillin a conditionof Warre"(pp. 201-202).

Hobbes of course was sufficientlypersuaded that people would

ffil t't rll

Part 2: Rule

. , not keep their promises that he proposed the state as a solution toi ì ttre problemof politicalsociety. In this Hobbes anticipated the direc-

tion liberals have always turned when confronted by the human pro-pensity not to be principled,or even prudent.No differentlythancorruptionin the civictradition,bad faithin the rights traditionun-dermines the integrityof politicalsociety. It also contributes to thecentralizationof rule even if it is rationalized self rule the an

180 The Presumption oÍ Anarchy

doxical,and doubly so, being at once ancient and contemporary,theaccretive evidence of what people want and, by virtueof havingbecome law, a constraint on what they(the crownincluded)are freeto do.

These paradoxes disappear ifcustom is codified,fora willfulchoice, or exercise of sovereignty, replaces a paradoxicallybindingbut sourceless set of rules Pocockfoundthe origins of the concept

181



centralizationof rule, even if it is rationalized as self-rule,as the an-tidote to corruption,this timenot of people but of the rules peopleneed formutual promising to work.

Machiavelli andHobbes both accepted the depende[ceoftol,ilj-cai-societyon rules and rule-drient;dbehavioi. rvracnlaueili*àsdiìihclinéd tóiífêrrutes'f.rom.Brom.ising;'becãüSè'-Éeople,"whoarea contemptiblelot,"do not hold promises in high regard (Musa1964: 145).Hisone exception is revealing: Forcedpromises need notbe kept (Machiavelli1950a: 574). They represent an injurythat canbe redressed, appropriatelyand proportionally,by breaking a promise.A differentprincipleprevails.

f Pocock identifieda third traditionof thinkingabout politicalso-i cietybefore the emergence of the modern state, connoted by theLword"manners."Inasmuch as Pocock's particularconcern in the es-

say I am using as a template was the eighteenth century,his exemplar

for a politicalsocietygrounded

in manners is Burke(Pocock

1985:48-50).No other termwouldbe as apt in characterizing Burke's posi-tion, which Pocockdescribed in a differentessay (published in thesame volume)as holding"that commerce is dependent on manners,and not the other way around; a civilizedsociety is the prerequisiteofexchange relations,and the latter cannotcreate the former"(p. 199).Certainlypoliticaleconomists like Adam Smithhad this relation theother way around and, in Pocock's estimate, so did David HumeandEdward Gibbon, althoughhe elsewhere showed an inclinationto in-clude both in this tradition(pp. l0l,148).

In his firstbook, The Ancient Constitutionund the Feudsl LawPocock concentrated hisattention onan earlier periodin Englandand the Continent,rpughly1500-1700, in whichthere emerged asharp debate over crown prerogatives and the freedoms of people.The latter were protected by the "ancientconstitution,"whichwasnothingother than custom, "by its nature unwrittenlaw, of usagesof the folkinterpreted through the mouths ofjudges, . . . always im-memorial and always up-to-date" (1957:15).So seen, custom is para-

but sourceless set of rules. Pocockfoundthe origins of the conceptof sovereignty in this debate. Curiously this result paves the way forthe emergence of the state as we have come to know it without

definitivelymaking the crownthe winnerof the debate. Popularsovereignty is an exercise of the willof the people, no less an alterna-tive to the sway of custom than the unchallengeable positionof thecrown.

Pocock's language for the tormentingof liberalism is equally ap-plicablehere. The ancient constitutionas a matter of custom isnaturalized by both sides in the debate. Thus the divineright toruleand the rightof revolutionare equallyposed as timeless alternativesto custom, the distinctiveifparadoxical feature of whichis its ex-pression of the fullness of time. Therightstraditionprovided theframeof reference for the commonlaw once it had been seen ascustomary lawpredating even the feudal right to property.

When customary law is not naturalized,we

findinstead

that itis

historicized.This is how Pococksaw Burke's relationto "thegreattradition ofcommon-lawthought,and in particularthose men whohad conceived the lawof Englandas custom and custom as per-petual adaptation" (1957:243). Manners arenothing otherthancustoms seen in their historicalrichness. To the extentcustoms aredivorced fromlaw and rights in this conception, they are imbuedwith the mysterious capacityto refine thepeople whose activitiesproduce them: They yield civilizationand the rules associated withthe traditionof civic activism.By veeringaway fromthe rights tradi-tion, Burke, and Gibboneven more, verged on makingmannersvirtuous.

Pocock seems inclinedto view the mannerstraditionas caught be-tween the poles represented by virtues andrights.One reason forthis, I think,is that he did not establish a principlethat woulddefinethis tradition inits own right.Such a principleis implicit,however,in the conservative politicsassociated withBurke.In a contingentworld itrecommends continuityand consistency. These precepts de-

#ff1 i'

182 Part 2: Rule

rive froma universal injunctioncomparable to the twoprinciples,do no harm and keep promises, whichunderly the traditionsorgan-ized around virtuesand rights. This is the principle,tell the truth.Ifpeople act in an unprincipledwãi'ãiidciffêir-enoughfiiiríit'pru-dent to lie,the cumulativeeffect of their actions, manifestas customor manners, does not lie. Thus a politicalsociety foundedon customor manners rests on an ethical foundationand elicitsconduct in the


politicalsociety. He has named it the principleof integrityand used /,/words like"consistency"and "coherence"in describingit. /'t'

In identifyingthree traditionsof accounting forpoliticalsociety,Pocockdoes not seem to have employed a particular conceptualscheme or even a distinctivedisciplinary orientation.His workre-veals an informalthough highlyaccomplished taxonomist,who hap-pens to ha e notable fondness for tripartiteformulations rrBeyond



or manners rests on an ethical foundationand elicitsconduct in theformof consistency withwhatcustomor manners expect. As withpoliticalsociety based on virtues,or rights,unethical conduct-inthis instance, conductbased on the presumption that one knowsmore than the accumulated wisdomof the ages-willundermine thefoundations of such a politicalsociety.

Allthree traditionshave in common a basis in principle.They allpecôgntze that politicalsociety iiia world-ôfcontingencydepends

/on maximsthat translate these principles into the language of pru-/ dence. They also recognize that a willingness to honor such maxims,

whêthër for reasons of piudênce or elhicàtawareness (themselvesconrrerging),obviates the n-eed for "organi2ationalapparatus associ-ated with the state. The three principlesfundamentalto the three tra-diiiônsòf põiiticalsociety are well-knownto classical philosophy.As FriedrichKratochwilhas adumbrated in recent work(forthcom-ing, chapter IV),they are especially clearlyand forcefullypresentedas natural laws by Samuel Pufendorflo

As faras I know, no one has connected these principles to thethree traditionsof politicalsociety, which,but forPocock, are alsounrecognizedfor what they are. Consider AlisdairMaclntyre,s in-fluentialbut misguided alternative (1981). A classical moral tradi-tion of virtuehas fallento a modern conception of "ru,le_.S,"indis-tinguishablyrules of reason and rules of law (pp. 49-50, 143, Zl4-216). Even Pocock did notconnect the traditionofgroundingpoli-ticalsociety in manners to an ethical standpoint.Amongcontem-porary writerswhose workI know,onlyRo-naldDworkin(1986)seems to have grasped the centralityof the principleof truth-tellingas it fitsthe contingent (he wouldsay, interpretive)circumstances of

10. Pufendorfexpounded the principles, do no harm, keep promises, and tell thett:{h,in De Jure Naturae et Gentium, BookIII,Chap. I; Book III,Chap. IV-VIII;Book IYChap. I-II(Pufendorf 1934:313-329,319-523).

I pens to have a notable fondness for tripartiteformulations.rrBeyondPocock's sense of the record, what grounds do we have foracceptingthis formulation?The identificationof ethicalprinciplesunderlyingthe three traditions supports their plausibilitywithout,howeveç pro-vidingany additionalgrounds for construing the listas complete.Indeed Hobbes, Pufendorf,and the likeexpound many otherprin-ciples of conduct,which Itake perhaps too summarilyto derive fromthe three basic principles.Nevertheless, I am confidentthat Po-cock's formulation, orsomethingquite like it, is the rightone, thatit exhaustively lists theprimarycategories of politicalpractice in anysociety, and that these categories are mixed or even fused in practicebut fullyindependent and mutuallyexclusive in conceptual terms.

Anyonewho has read the firstpart of this bookcan anticipate

iJ.::fiï:",.ï-,ï#mlHï::,,,T,ï;ï::ry;ï:,;:ïï::::3f;lare correlates of the three categ-ories of speech agls q$ -qbgs of r-ulesI identifyin chapter 2.IfI may summarize briefly,speech acts aresocial performances, that is, they ryg $ qçct s,o.cial consequençes.Such acts take the generic form,I [verb such as declare, demand,promiselthat [propositionalcontent].Because people respond tothem withtheirown performances,not always spoken, the patternof speech acts and related performances constitute those practicesthat make the material conditionsand artifactsof human experi-ence meaningful.Morespecifically,the pattern of speech acts en-dorvs practices wlthnolm_41iyity;they give rise to rules which,insynopsizing that pattern, fixpreferences and expectations and shapethe futureagainst the past.

Speech acts fallinto three categories for constitutivepurposes-

ll. Some examples: time, institutions,action;politics,language, time; providence,fortunc,virtue;court, country,standing army. Once reordered, the last two atleast arc variations of the triad, virtues, ri8hts andmanners.

iffi 1ffi



186Part 2: Rule

The pointis not that Humeoriginated a traditionof analysis, butthat he invented an analytical procedure indispensable to this tradi-tion.Perenniallyreinvented in the spirit butmostly in ignoranceof

1 Hume, this procedure disaggregates society intoa congeries of situa-ì $ions, all of 1_hgm social in the same way-theyh_ave twoactors re-\ {Rondin8to each other, whether constructivelyói destructively,inI otherwise largelyfixedcircumstances. Whilewe tend to focus on the


the results are. kt me illustrateby examiningone of Hume's mostimportantassertions. lnA Tleatise of HumanNature, he stated that"conventionsare not of the nature of a promise; for even promisesthemselves . . . arise fromhuman conventions"(Aiken1968: 59, em-phasis in original;see furtherpp. 82-90). This isof course a directchallenge to the central premise of the law-centeredparadigm,whichfounds society in a generalized promise.The problem comes in ex-



g ydisaggregation effected bythis procedure, no doubt because it is en-tirelycharacteristicof the positivistworldviewHumedid so much

to foster, I think itsother aspect is at least as important.Hume's procedure conventionalizes a particularsocial situation bytaking it out of time withoutmaking it timeless. Once conventional-ized, that situationcan be generalized.Notice that mere positivities-individualsand events-cannot be subjected to generalization,andthus to the operation of theory, until they have been conventional-ized. Hume helped to lay the ground forpositivesocial theory, suchas practiced today, and staked out the single most powerfulconven-tionalizationto be found in such theory, the convention that two-party interactions are socially generative.

Beyondbeing a major source of positivism,Humerepresents athird type of tormentforanarchy. Pocock identifiedhistoricistandnaturalisttormentsof liberalismas responses, grounded in tradi-tionalconceptions of politicalsociety, to the stark simplicityof asociety of possessive individuals.The thirdresponse is conventional-ist. Althoughit too is rooted in a traditionof politicalsociety, itseffect isdifferent.Rather than encrusting a simple accountof hu-man behavior withqualificationsso that it worksas a theory ofpoliticalsociety, Hume's conventionalismeliminates politicalso-ciety as such and thus the need fora theoryof such. In the placeof politicalsociety is the aggregate of conventions enablingpoliqics,economy and whateverelse is social. For our purposes, the conven-tionalistresponse to the existence of anarchy is to see it as just an-other collectionof conventions, mostlythe result of two-party inter-actions themselves framedby conventionswroughtthe same way.

Unlike historicismand naturalism, conventionalismtorments anarchyby pruningand shaping, by domesticating one conception of politicalsociety, thereby renderingit in the terms of PoliticalEconomy.

The analyticattractionsof conventionalism are undeniable. Never-theless, the more conscientious its practice, the more unsatisfactory

ft1 ú'r':rl rffi ï Ì f'ffiii ffi

y g p pplainingthe ease and speed withwhichpeople come to agreementonce conventionshave created language, economy,and the other

features of society. Contemporarystudents of anarchy followHumein detailinga gradual, uncertain interaction, the result of whichiscooperation. Likenedto a contract, such cooperation represents afinal,reciprocal promise that can only have come about through,and as a conclusion to, prolonged interaction(Hardin 1982: 155-230). Each instance of cooperation must be a conventionin its ownright.

I do not believe that Hume intended anysuch conclusion.Afterall, language providesus withan understanding that we can makepromises and expect consequences fromhaving doneso. ln TheGenealogy of Morals,FriedrichNietzsche (1969:57) wrote that wehave a "right"to make promises and argued a thoroughlyHumeancase that this accomplishment, arduously produced in prehistory,"presupposes as a preparatory task that one firstmakes men to acertain degree necessary, uniform,likeamong like, regular, and con-sequently calculable" (1969: 58-59, emphasis in original).Once allthis is accomplished, and codifiedin language, making promises tocooperate is easy.

Contemporarystudies of two-partyinteractiontypicallybeginyrlh Ìoqgy 9 must c4lcu,l4tg,-i_ got_ {Ìtb.9 4_?t\, llglj_*ljlth,e sha-dow of the future,"an uncertain future of conflictand cooperation(Oye1985b: 12-18). Hume, andNietzscheafter him,started withcalculators who readilypromise because, transactioncosts aside,promises defer costs to theirmaker into the future- untilthe occa-sion stipulatedfor theirfulfillment.As promises come due, we may

infer thatcalculatorsconsider strategies for breaking them to avoidconsequences they incurredby promising.More often thannot,prudence advises against these strategies. In short, the difficultyisnot inmakingpromises, and thus in engaging in cooperation, butin breaking them. It is the past, and not the future,casting its sha- tl

188 Part2: Rule

dow. Theconventionof promising works for anarchy by making itunnecessary for new conventions to emerge in every instance inwhich two "sovereign individuals,"to use Nietzsche's words have todeal witheach other.

Hume's groundingof politicalsociety in conventionsaffordsusa firstcause explanation of how societygot started. No less abstractthan a social contractexplanation, I nevertheless findit more per-

f

The PresumptionoÍAnarchy 189

been indirectand deleterious forany conceptionof anarchy as politi-cal society.

Kant's influenceon international thoughtcomes more particu-larly fromhis moralphilosophy. In the MetaphysicalFoundationsof Morals, Kantdistinguished between two human situations. Thefirstis the situationof an autonomous andrationalbeing. This issomeone whose freedom to act is in no sense contingentand can

ill (F i d i h



suasive (compare Onuf1982b: 29-31).Italso shows how particularpractices and institutionscan get started and stay withus. T:ç_-dgIL.

ger comes "in conventionaliziqg,interactions characteristico f politi-cal society as if they alonemake.anarchy".work"Conventionalizedinteractions explain theemergence of conventionsand, conventions -not convertiona.l.ized.interactions-explain,at Ieast in the .Humeanview, whypôÌitlcatsoeiety.existp;1Foï'Humeanarchy is a politiealsociety, rich in ëÕnventíons, fullof cooperative endeavors, weflableto providea suitableenvironmenüïor peace, prosperity, and individualaccompli"$pe_nt.In one of his essays, Humewent so far as to say"Thatnothingíí more favorableto the rise of politeness and learn-ing, than o number of neighboring and independent states, connectingtogether by commerceand policy"(1963: 120, emphasis in original).

Clearly Humestayed wellwithinthe traditionof viewingpoliticalisociety, grounded i4 4agng1 , AS qUpp_q1_tip-C*4,Coqd_Anddq_raplg an-

;archyinEurope. Yet his workon disaggregating society and conven- I

tionalizingsocial situationscontributedto the defeat ofhispreferred iconception of anarchy. That conception gained expression in some :rather modest observations about internationalrelations - observa-tions withlittledirecteffecton subsequent internationalthought.The effect of Hume's analytical procedures, and the philosophicalstance behind them, have been far greater and, in the way indicated,thoroughlydeleterious for any conceptionof internationalrelationsas a workingexample of politicalsociety.

UnlikeFfume, Kant seems to have thought that internationalrela-tions, at least in his own time, hadserious but remediable deficien-cies. Eternal Pesce offers what Kant thought were appropriate reme-dies, so that anarchicalEuropewould indeed be a flourishingpoliticalsociety.As withHume, his suggestions were rather modest incomparison to his philosophical inquiries and have had littledirecteffect on internationalthought.Instead Kant's philosophical inqui-ries, like Hume's,have had the greater effect, although they too have

therefore effectuate whatever shewills(Friedrich1949: 154-l9l).Kant posited an "objectiveprinciple"or "commandof reason" which

constitutes the imperativeguide formoral conduct in this situation.Thisof course is the famous categoricalimperative:"Actas if themaxim of your actionwere to become by your willa general law ofnoture"(pp. 160, l7l,emphasis in original).The alternative situa-tion is one not of autonomy but of heteronomy. Here the individualfaces a worldof contingency andthus of uncertaintywithrespectto the consequences of any willfulaction.The categorical impera-tive acknowledgesthat thisis the real situation facing anyindividual,which is whyit formulates animperativein the language of condi-tionality-'Actas if . . . ." Morallyspeaking, we can do no better.

Now I read Kant to have said that autonomyis the frame of refer-ence to investigate morality, but thatsocial realitydoes not allowforsuch autonomy(see also chapter 6). This does not mean that themoralconduct is impossible in the worldof contingency,onlythat"[m]oralconcepts cannot be obtained by abstractionfromany em-piricaland hence merely contingentknowledge"(Friedrich1949:159). Though conceptuallymotivated, Kant'stypologyof "rules ofskill,counsels of prudence, oÍ commands or laws of morality"(pp.164-165, emphasis in original)nevertheless appears to exclude pru-dential maximsfromthe realm of the moral. Manywritershave sub-sequently tended to view prudential maximsas concerned only withself-interestand therefore necessarily lacking in moralcharacter. Agood recent example relevant to the discussion of anarchy is CharlesR. Beitz(1979: 15-27).

I thinkthis argument is Kantian-itdraws its inspirationfrom

Kant-withoutbeing Kant's. To start with,prudentialmaxims likeMachiavelli'sare not, in any limitingsense, directed only tothe pro-motionof self-interest. No Machiavellianneed reject Kant's distinc-tive conditionsyieldingautonomyand heteronomy. AMachiavellianwould treat social situations inthe latter terms and offermaxims for

.'t#." :. *:r t

190 Part 2: Rule

guidance in the face of a bewilderingrange of possible actions anindividualmight take. I wouldsay that much of Machiavelli'sadviceto the princewarns against the conceitof autonomy. In sum, aMachiavellianwouldhave no principledobjections to Kant's cate-goricalimperative,only practicalones.

Kant himselfgave a practical application ofhis moral positioninan appendix to EternalPeace (Friedrich1949: 457-476). Oneper-

h i i "I i i l

The PresumptionoÍ

Anarchy

canism and recognitionof the chastening effectof publicityon thosewho wouldbe immoderate or corrupt.

The Kantian legacy is the divisionof politicalsociety into themoralrealm associated withpubliclaw in the liberalstate, and theprudential(read: amoral) realm of anarchy (read: war). Is this whatKant intended? A carefulconsideration of his moral philosophyfinds Kant havingset up the antinomyof freedom and contingency

l d f bli hi h b ibl d f

191



spicuous sentence summarizes that position: "Ican imagine a moralpolitician-thatis, a man whoemploys principlesof political pru-

dence in such a way that they can coexistwithmorals - but Icannotimaginea politicalmoralist, who would concocta system of moralssuch as the advantage of statesmen may findconvenient"(p. 459,emphasis in original).He then presented three maxims-seizewhatyou want and justifyit later, declare that your misdeeds are not yourfault,divideand rule-whichhe proposed would workto the advan-tage of those using them onlyif they were kept secret (pp. 462-463).From this followsa practical formulation ofthe categorical impera-tive. In my paraphrasing: 'Actas if the maxim of your actions mustalways be announced to the widest possible public" (Friedrich1949:470). A Machiavellianwould be inclined tooffer a less stringent form-ulation: Actas if it may not be possible to keep either youractionsor your reasons for them secret. Thiscounsel of prudence would re-sult in heightened secrecy only for those who have no sense of what,in the Machiavelliantradition,civicvirtue requires.

Fot Kantpublic-law-isthe way fg-lttrvartsegre-ry-. Hence the "tran-scendental formulaof publiclaw:Allactions whichrelate to therightof other men are contrary torightand law, the maximof whichdoes not permitpublicity"'(Friedrich1970: 470). AMachiavellianwoulddoubtless not be satisfied withany such formula. Itseffectis to accord moralpossibilityonlyto politicalsociety which isalsoa legal arrangement. The pointof Eternal Peace is precisely to sug-gest the necessary elements of such an arrangement in the formof

I a very short list ofuniversal principles.The clear implicationis thatldçSpilethe existence of internationallaw, the anarchy qf EU.fqpefeU

\short of the requireménts of a constitutionalsociety, in which puh-[icityexpeditedby lawinsures moral conduct.AMachiavellianwouldi-wonder whetherconstitutions are quite so decisive in fostering thisoutcome but surely wouldsupportKant's commitmentto republi-

merely asa device for establishing the best possible groundsformoralconduct in a worldof contingency.Aconsideration of his prac-

tical applicationof thatphilosophyto politicalsociety finds himhav-ing used the precept of publicityto approximatethe categoricalim-perative.Only the last step in Kant's reasoning lends support to thedivisionof politicalsociety into two realms, one constitutionalandthe other prudential.

Kant is frequentlyviewedas having been a cosmopolitanmoralist.Thkingissúê wiih-HèdleyBüllòri-thispoiht, SiànleyHoffmannlo-cated Kantin the "rights"traditionJ2CertainlyKant's vaunted cos-mopolitanismpales beside Hume's, consisting as it does in a call forgood neighborliness under conditionsof world law(Friedrich1949:446-448\. Yet we can go most of the way withKant and retain a con-ception-ofpoliticalsociety not so very differentfromHume's oreven Machiavelli's.I cannot see any way in which Kant's laststep-frompublicityto publiclaw-isa necessary one. The absence of aconstitutionsurely affects anarchy, perhaps adversely, but hardlymakes it impossible.Nordoes the absence of a constitutionmakemoral conductimpossible, in Kant'sown terms, even when that con-duct is based on prudence. Yet the Kantianlegacy suggests otherwise.

Kantwrote EternalPeace in 1795 and died in 1804. Ifhis work

12. Following MichaelWalzer, Hoffmanncalled it "the legalist paradigm"(1986:186;see also Gallie1978: 20-24 on Kantas "legalizer").Bullheld that Kant authoreda "universalisttradition"of understanding internationalrelations. "The Kantianor universalistview of internationalmoralityis that . . . there are moral impera-

tives in the field of internationalrelations

linitingthe action of states, but these

imperatives enjoin notcoexistence and co-operation among states but rather theoverthrowof the system of states and its replacement bya cosmopolitansociety"(1978: 26; see also Beitz 1979i l8l-183).For an interpretationof Kant contraryto Bull's, andmuch closer to my own,see Waltz 1959: 162-ló5'

T,s

$

,${1

4IË

l

n*ffiif ' ::

192 Part 2: Rule

is a bridge to the nineteenth century, even more is this so of Bentham's.Thus Bentham shared withKanta great interest in the power ofpublicitywhichthe former socialized, and conventionalized,as pub-licopinion.MichelFoucault observed in his fascinating conversa-tionabout Bentham's "Panopticon"proposal that ,,almost all of theeighteenth century reformerscreditedopinion withconsiderablepotential force"(1980:16l).Foucaultwenton to say: ,,For them,opinionwas likea spontaneous reactualization of the i l


For Bentham publicopinionhas nothingto do withrights andduties, much less a social contract. Anysuch conclusion followsinthe law-centered paradigm, of whichGrotius, Hobbesthe naturalistand locke are exemplars, but not Bentham. We should not be mis- -]led by Bentham's lifelonginterest in law. Byconventionalizinglaw ,

as dependent on sanctions, Benthamremoved it fromthe realmofrightsand promising.tWhileBentham is invariablydescribed as a I

l l iti i t(i di i i i



opinionwas likea spontaneous reactualization of the social con-tract."Howevermuch this may have been so of others, includingKant, I thinkit misses the. point

ofBentham,s preoccupation

withpublicopinionand puts him in the wrongcentury.Bentham intimatedthat publicopinionwas indispensable to the r

functioningof internationallaw (Hinsley1963: 8l-91,Janis l9g4: i

408-412). His leading disciple,James Mill,was explicitabout the con-nection (Mill1967: 8-9). Bentham's procedure was rigorouslycon-ventionalizing.To start he proposed that humanityis ,,under thegovernance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure,, (1948: l,emphasis in original).Considered generically, ,,pleasure and painare capable of givingbindingforce to any lawor rule of conduct,whichmay all of them be termed sanctions"(p. 24, emphasis inoriginal).One consequence of this procedure is to have convention-alized law as a system of rules backed by sanctions. Havingdoneso, Bentham needed to findan internationalequivalentto the coer-cive apparatus of the state. P,ublic opinioqprovided content to thesanction internationallawneeded to qualifyas law.

The Panopticon is anìnleniòüS sencrAd-fo;'ïhóunôbtrusivesuper-visionof people and their activities in a confined institutionalset-ting (compare chapter 4, footnotel5).Detached supervisionwouldsupplant direct applications of violenceto secure compliancewithanother's will,expressed abstractly in the formof rules (Bentham1962). Sanctions are therefore depersonalized in social practice aswellas conventionalizedin theory (compare Ashley1983: 521-527).The nineteenthcentury theory of the state followsinexorablyin thislogic.The state is a legal order and a potential monopoly of the use

of force (recallchapter 4), conceptuallyunifiedaround the idea ofsanction and practicallygriented to supervision,the effectiveness ofwhichvirtuallyprecludes the need to activatethe potentialmonopolyavailable to the state.

legal positivist(incontradistinctionto naturalists), the crucial posi- Ition of sanctions in Bentham's system makes hima Machiavelliani

inthissense:Hethoughtthatpoliticalsocietyisultimatelydepen-dent on relations of super- and subordinationwhich,though coer- i

cive, are mitigated. In Machiavelli'scase, considerations of virtueaswellas prudence mitigatesuch relations. In Bentham's case deper-sonalized but omnipresentsupervision does so. Machiavelli,svirtuesare warriorvirtues;Bentham's sanctions manifest technical ration-ality,as the FrankfurtSchool has taught us to say. What they havein common is this: Proportionalitycontributes equally to a prudentruler's success and a sanction's effectiveness (Bentham 1948: 178-188).

The differencebetween them is that Machiavelli'sviewof politicalsociety, though founded on coercively maintained hierarchicalrela-tions, does not necessitate the state as its only tenableform. Bentham'sviewof politicalsociety does just this, at least to a considerablygreater degree. Bentham did nothimselfthinkso. As we saw, he heldthat publicopinionconstitutedan effectivesanctionfor interna-tional law and made a legal arrangement of the politicalsociety ofEuropean internationalrelations.

Bentham's follower,John Austin,held the contrary. Internationallawdid not exist because the onlyavailable sanction was ,,generalopinion"(Austin1954: l4l).Mostnineteenth century internationalreformersextolledworldpublicopinionas internationallaw's sanc-tioningelement whilesimultaneouslyadvocating the creation of glo-bal institutionswithgenuine enforcement capabilities(Hinsley1963:92-ll3;Onufand Onuf1985: 3l-33).Events of our centuryhaveeroded faith in the efficacyof worldpublicopinionand interna-tional law, not to mentionhope in the possibilityof meaningfulreform.Internationallaw ishomologous to domestic law but, inas-much as internationallaw possesses no meaningfulsanction, notanalogous. Anarchyin the contemporary sense prevails.

:i. &$ri .,t.ìr.:i: '$:



POLITICALSOCIETY(withFrank F. Klink)

PoliticalSociety197

Weber identifiedthree types of rule, which indeed fail inspectionas pure types. V/e reformulate Weber's types as categories and relatethem to the categories of rules I develop in chapter 2. These threecategories of rules and rule may usefullybe construed as puzzleparadigms. They are the only three solutions people have to the prac-ticalproblemof arranging socialrelations.

The firstpuzzle paradigm of rule, "hegemony,"is clearly identi-fiable in Weber's rule throughcharisma Thesecond is "hi h "



Beforethe rise of disciplines,social and politicalthinkers inthe liberaltraditionconcerned themselves withpoliticalsociety comprehen-sively understood, as I did inthe preceding chapter. Frank F. Klinkand I turn now to the contemporary situation,in whichthe term"politicalsociety" is rarelyused to comprehend all those socialar-ranfemenfsìn úhïchfìoliticsare présênt. Insteâd wê findan opposi-tion between authorityand anarchy. Indeed this oppositionservesto constitute PoliticalScience and InternationalRelations as disci-plines. Between them everythingpoliticalwouldseem to be accountedfor.

V/e reject this disciplinary division oflabor. Not onlydoes it equatethe absence of central authority withunmitigated conduct.It adoptsa definitionof authority,wronglyattributedto MaxWeber, whichequates the stabilityof social arrangements withtheir acceptabilityto 4llparties. The result narrows therange of politicalpossibilitiesto just two: thestate or a state of nature. Hobbes' paradigmatic ar-chitecture reigns at the expense of the traditionof discourse aboutpoliticalsociety and even at Hobbes' expense as a rights theorist.

Because the Hobbesian opposition has acquiredparadigmaticsignificance, its rejection mustbe accompanied by an alternativealso capable of paradigmatic treatment. Machiavelliwas too unsys-tematic, and far too subtle, to be the direct source. German social

thought fromG. W. F. Hegel to Weber provides the needed treatmentof politicalsociety, undegstood as relationsof super- and subordina-tion- relations maintained throughrules and obtaining inrule. Wecall thisthe Herrschoftparadigm, or the paradigm of politicalso-ciety, whichwe offernext.

fiable in Weber's rule throughcharisma. Thesecond is "hierarchy,"which isthe paradigm of rule Weber most thoroughlydeveloped.

The thirdpuzzle paradigm of rule isimplicitin bourgeois practicesbut disguised in the liberalassumption that agents are autonomousand their rights and duties symmetrical.Weber failed to see thecomplexof relations so conceived as constituting a distinct and per-sistent pattern of rule and privilege.One measure of the extent towhich this typeof rule goes unnoticed is the lack of a conventionalname for it. We findan appropriate one,however, in ImmanuelKant's moralphilosophy.It is "heteronomy,"whichstands in opposi-tion to autonomy.

Given the view that politicalsociety includes those relations con-ventionallydescribed as anarchical, international relations are neces-sarilyrelationsof super- and subordination.Heteronomous rela-tions characterize situationsof exchange among apparent equals,includingthose in which agents gauge their actions in anticipationof the actionsof others doing thesame. Allsuch situations so per-vade internationalrelations that heteronomy is the background con-ditionof rule against whichepisodes of hegemony and hierarchyareset. When hegemonialand hierarchical relationsare mutuallysupport-ing, as is the case withsuperpower-dominatedspheres of influencetoday, such episodes may be extended for considerable periods of time.

HERRSCHAFT

In the disciplinesof PoliticalScience and InternationalRelations,the Hobbesian oppositionbetween the state and the state of natureis rendered as authorityin oppositionto anarchy. Hobbes appearsnot to have used the term "anarchy," 'Authority"is a differentmat-ter. In Hobbes'words:". . . the rightof doingany Actionis called

l. ri iffi$Ài 'i m

198Part 2: Rule

AUTHORITY.So that by Authority,is always understood a Rightof doing any act: and done by Authority,done by Commission,orLicence from himwhose right it is" (1968: 218, Hobbes'emphasis).Authorityis conferred onactors by authors, the latter havingauthorityonlyin the sense of being authorizedto act.

Hobbes' conceptionof authorityas authorization follows fromhis preoccupationwithrights. (See furtherPitkin1967: 14-37, lNÍc-Neilly1968: 214 222 Hampton1986: ll4-129 Kavka1986: 387

PoliticalSociety

reads: "Domination('authority')",witha footnoteby Guenther Roth,one of the translators, thatAutoritiitwas an "alternativecolloquialterm for Herrschaft"(Weber 1968: 212, 299). The second timeWeberused the term "authority"was in the phrase, "dieHerrschaftkraftAutoritiit"("dominationby virtueof authority"in the English text)(ÌWeber 19'76: 542; 1968: 943; this is unchanged fromthe originaltranslationof Shils and Rheinstein, Rheinstein 1954:324).Weber im-mediately clarifiedhis meaning parenthetically:"power to command

199



Neilly1968: 214-222,Hampton1986: ll4-129,Kavka1986: 387-391.) Today, at least in the disciplines constitutedon the Hobbesian

opposition, the term"authority"is used quite differently.It is con-ventionallyunderstood as a relation,not a right.This relationhastwo elements: the use of power and the acceptance of its use byothers. Authorityis the legitimate exercise of power.r Hobbes alsostressed the "use of. . . Power and Strength" (1968: 227), but with-out concern for acceptance, which,in the usual circumstances ofpower's exercise, is indeed unlikely.2

A further convention attributes this now conventional view toWeber. Thus HarryEckstein observed:"Theterm ['authority']isused most widelyas Weber meant it"(1973:1153). Yet in the Germantext ofkonomyand Society-Weber'smature statement of politi-cal sociology-heused the term"authority"(Autoriti)t)only threetimes (as best we can tell).The firsttime it appears parentheticallyand in quotation marks, directlyafter Weber used the German word"Herrschaft"(V/eber1976: 122). The standard English translation

1 . DavidEaston: 'Authorityis a special power relationshipbased on the expectationthat ifA sends a message to B- whichmay be caÌled a wish, suggestion, regula-tion, law, command, order orthe like-Bwilladopt it as the premise of his ownbehavior. . . . the major source for lauthority]roles resides in the prevalence ofthe conviction oftheir legitimacy"(1965:20'l-208).HaroldD. Lasswell andAbra-ham Kaplan: 'Authorityis . . . the accepted and legitimatepossession of power. . . .

Thus ascription of authorityalways involves reference to peÍsons accepting it assuch" (1950:133).

2. Considerthe complete sentence fromwhichwe just quoted: "Forby this Authori-

tie given him[the one Person] by every particularman in the Common-Wealth,he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred onhim, thatby terrorthereof, he is inabled to foìme the willsof them all, toPeace at home, and mutuallayd against theirenemies abroad" (1968: 22'l-228).The conferralof so much powerinspires terror, not a sense of legitimacy.See, however, Walker (1987: 73-74\fora rather differentHobbes.

mediately clarifiedhis meaning parenthetically: power to commandand duty to obey" (Weber 1968: 943). The third time occurs in thesame paragraph, in quotationmarks and withoutalteration

ofthe

meaning just established.The term "Herrschaft"occurs dozens, possibly hundreds, of times

in the originaltext of konomyand Society. As we have seen, thestandard English translationrenders "Herrschaft"as domination,but not exclusivelyor systematically.It also uses "authority"onnumerous occasions (forexample, 1968: 213) as wellas "dominance"and "dominancy"(forexample, pp.225,942;dominancy was Rhein-stein's choice, retained in the standard translation), and"system ofdomination"(p.214').Such variabilityin rendering a word in transla-tion wouldsuggest any one of three possibilities:(l)That wordisused inconsistently throughoutthe workundergoing translation. (2)It has an unstable meaning in the originallanguage. (3) The languageintowhich it is being translated does not have a precise counterpartfor the concept conveyed by that particularword.

V/e thinkit wouldbe useful to examine each of these possibilitiesin turn. The firstis suggested by the fact that TàlcottC. Parsons,in an early translation of Econ o my and Society, rendered .FIerrsc haftas "imperativecontrol"in some contexts and as "authority''inothers3(Weber 1947 152-153). Parsons knew that at least some of the timeWeber was writingabout a situation abstractly understood as co-ercive and thus, in Parsons' translation,a matter of "imperativecontrol."Parsons had a specific theoretical interest in legitimacy.Inasmuch as Weber was engaged in a systematic exposition of thehistoricalcircumstances under whichsuch controltends to be ac-

3. Later in the same text and withoutexplanation, Parsons used "imperativecoor-dination"interchangeablywith"imperativecontrol"(Weber 1947: pp.324-327).Neithcrversion is adequate or has.survived as an accepted translation.

rL'rl l ::&ffi;* t iffiffi

200 Part 2: Rule

cepted, he frequentlyused the term ,,Herrschaft"in keeping withParsons'conception of authorityas the legitimateexercise of power.On these occasions, Parsons translated "IIerrschaft"as ,,authority."In other words,Parsons introducedetymologicalinconsistenciesintoWeber's text to suit hisown programmatic needs. Weber's En-glish language readers couldnot help findingin him a parsonsianpreoccupationwithconsensus and system support (Compare Cohen,Hazelrigg, and Pope 1975).

PoliticalSociety

a famous setpiece of just a few pages (Hegel1952: l4O-150).Mostcommentaries refer to it as definingrelations of master to slave (forexample: Plamenatz1963: 153-159,188-192, Shklar 1976: 57-95,Balbus 1983: ll-21).aThe language of slavery suggests dominationin the extreme. Yet Hegel argued that ,,slaves" learn fromtheir work,while"masters"do not, for the latter do not work.Whatdo slaveslearn? Hegel's interpretationis often admired-slavesbecome self-conscious-but it is equallypossible to see it retrograde they

201



gg p )Weber's other translators,and many commentators, have empha-

sized Weber's interest in the coercive structure of relations of con-trol.ReinholdBendixremarked that Weber*wouldhave been criti-cal of any translation that tended to obscure ,the threat of force'inall relations between superiors and subordinates,, (1962 482). In hisintroductionto the standard Englishtranslationof Economy andSociety, Roth echoed this languag e in callingHerrschaft ,,a structvÍeof superordinationand subordination sustained by a varietyof mo-tives and means of enforcement"(lVeber 1968: XC).MorerecentlySociologistshave come to realize that inconsistencies in translatingHerrschaft say less about Weber than they do about contendingschools of thought in Sociology.Consensus theoristsfollowpar-sons' lead; conflicttheorists read Weber to contrary effect. Theterms "authority"and "domination"crystallizetheir differences(Wrong1980: 36-38, Alexander1983a: 82, 173-11-4).'Weber's use of the term "Herschaft"poses a ,,genuine paradox"for social theory - "submissionto legitimateauthorityis voluntaryandyet at the same time is experienced as mandatory or compulsory . . .,'(Wrong 1980: 39). If inconsistencies of translation reflecta paradoxembedded in the term "HerrschoÍt,"then weshould turn to thesecond of our possible reasons for these inconsistencies, namely,that the term does not have a stable meaning in German. Becauseof our limitedlinguisticcompetence, we are at risk to go beyond theusual observationthat lfenschafthas a concrete meaning-itrefersto the positionof the feudal lord (Roth in Weber 1968: XCIV,62,Alexander1983a: 172)-as wellas the abstract meaning at conten-

tion in Weber's work.Note, however, that Hegel also used the termin a generalizingway in The Phenomenology of Mind,as did KarlMarxand FriedrichEngèls in The German ldeologyand MarxinThe Eighteenth Brumaireof LouisBonaparte.

Hegel juxtaposed the term "Herrschaít"with,,Knechtschaft,in

conscious-but it is equallypossible to see it as retrograde-theylearn their place, they become stoical (Kelly1978: 47-50).

Self-consciousness constitutes the paradox disclosed by Weber'suse of the term "Herrschaft" The impositionof controlfosters re-flectionon its need less by those who impose it than those uponwhomit is imposed. The latter have no other claimto dignity.Ifdominationyields authority,the paradox is pointed up by pushingHegel's formulationto the extreme of the relationof master andslave. Nevertheless Hegel just couldas wellhave had lordand serfin mind(they are the concrete referents in German, afterall) or hadsimplywanted to formulatethe relationship,and its paradoxicalim-plications,in general terms.

Marxand Engels were evidentlyinspiredby Hegel,sdiscussion ofservitude and self-consciousness to accept its structure but alter itsfunctionalinterpretation. By generalizing relations

of control inthelanguage of class and substantiating the meaning of workin materialconditions, Marxand Engels turned Hegel upside down by makingconsciousness a trait ofthe "masters."This trait is at once collectiveand detached fromthe materialconditionsof work.That the im-positionof controlis acceptable is an idea acceptable only to themasters, who must impute it to theirsubordinates. The paradox dis-appears. "Domination"is the only wordthat adequately describesthe oppressive and exploitiverelationshipbetween them.

Dominationsubsequently became a powerfulnormativeas wellas conceptual device for Marxistsfocusing on the position Marxand

4. Yet the two widelyavailabletranslations speak of lordor master and bondsman(Hegel l93l:228-240, Hegel 1977: lll-l19)and render Herrschaft and Knecht-scáqlr as lordshipand bondage or servitude.Ceorge ArmstÍongKelly(197g:30n.2) held that Hegel assigned "no particular nuance of significanceto the synonyms'slavery,''bondagc,' and'servitudc."'

i r ì t i Íffir ..ffi

202 Part 2: Rule

Engels developed in the earlyyears of their association. It happensthat the Englishtranslationof the famous passage in The GermanIdeology on workand consciousness speaks not of domination,butof rule, therulingclass, and rulingideas (Marxand Engels 1964:67). Theverb "to rule" in the German originalis "herrschen," and"rule"as a noun is "Herrschaft" (Marxand Engels 1978a: 46).Marx'sThe EighteenthBrumaireof Louis Bonapartedates fromthesame period In the standard translationwe find"domination"on

PoliticalSociety

of claims to be made about it, which shouldbe seen in paradigmaticterms.

We come now to thethirdpossible reason for the variabletransla-tion of Herrschaft,which isthat the term has no reallyadequatecounterpart in English.If the meanin g of Herrschaft is fixedthroughits paradigmatic functionin German social thought,we should ex-pect to finda stable counterpart to the extent that English speakersorient themselves withinthe same or a comparable paradigm. There

203



same period.In the standard translationwe find domination onseveral occasions and "rule"on one (Marx1954b: l0l,105, lll;107). In every instance, however, the originalGerman is"Herrschaft"(Marxand Engels 1978b: 194, 197,202; 199).

FromHegel to Weber we have an unbrokenetymologicaltradi-tion, inwhichHerrschaftis a master concept lending coherence toGerman socialthoughtfor a century.5 It posits the permanence ofasymmetry,and not the elective asymmetry of authorityrelations,as the centralproblematic of social reality. Therecurrent pu'zzle tobe solved is, then, what makes asymmetrypermanent? Marxcouldgo on to his examinationof the system of capital only afterhe andEngels had proposed one such solution.(Capitaloffers a secondsolution;we describe both below.)

The centralityof Herrschaftin German social thoughtalso helpsto explain the growingrecognitionthat Weber extended ratherthan opposed Marx'sproject.As Jeffrey Alexanderput it, "Weberbecame important,therefore,not as an alternativeto Marxbutas a theoretical means of supplyingMarxistsociologywitha morecomplex andinterdependentmodel"(1983a: 133). The term"Herr-schaft"is pointof departure and frame of reference in Hegel, Marx,and Weber. The very stabilityof its meaning allows a succession

5. Indeed it extends back to G. W. kibniz,whose fivelevels of "naturalsociety"include that of Herrand Knecht, conceptualizedin terms of rule. See tribniz,"On Natural Law"in Riley(1972: 77-79). ln introducing thispassage, PatrickRileycommented that it "shows, perhaps more clearlythan any other, how much

some of his politicalviews remained medieval,how muchforce the ideas of hier-archy and natural subordination had forhim. It relates kibnizto some of hisGerman predecessors-particularlyAlthusius-andmakes clear the gap thatseparates him from,e.g., the great English theoristsof the seventeenth century"(p. 77). See also Holz(1968)on the strikingparallelsbetween kibniz'sformula-tion and Hegel's.

p p gis a semblance of such a paradigm in recent decades, especially inthe

UnitedStates. We are thinking ofC. Wright Mills'groundbreaking

workon The Power Elite (1959a), the debate on democratic elitism(Bachrach 1971), WilliamDomhoff'squery, Who Rules America?(1967), and even discussions of the "military-industrialcomplex"and "nationalsecurityelite"(forexample, Barnet1973). The influ-ence of German social thought on this bodyof workis extensive butindiscriminate.Marxand Weber are names to be invoked,even iconsto be admired, but rarelyare their puzzles acknowledged, their solu-tions deployed.

Nor is the structural sense of Herrschaftto be found.Some pro-tean elite infests institutions-governmentsat every level, corpora-tions and financialcenters, higher education-and uses its "power"to serve its own interest and betray the masses, whose interests manysuch institutionsare presumed to serve. "Rulingclass" is then aeuphemism or epithet and "domination"a term withdiffuse culturaland psychologicalconnotations,especially after the belated but rous-ing reception accordedHerbert Marcuse's work inthe United States.IfRobert Michels,Gaetano Mosca, and VilfredoPareto are invokedno differently,less is lost in translation,for the neo-Machiavellianschool used terms like"elite"so variably thatthey never achievedparadigmatic significancein the original.The empiricalstrain andtherapeutic spiritin America social thoughtcome in radical as wellas reformisthues. Lackinga paradigm to stabilize it, however, nativeradicalismis easily untracked, whether byparanoia and conspiracytheories or euphoria and utopianplans. The structurecomes from

somewhere.It wouldseem then that the term"Herrschaft"is difficultto trans-late because it is paradigmaticallyalien to Englishspeakers, who areleft to choose between the disciplinaryparadigms respectivelyassoci-ated withthe terms "anarchy"and "authority."Yet "Herrschaft"can

iW'l i :ffii:

204 Part 2: Rule

be providedwithan adequate translation- one that honors its para-digmaticsense in German and permits the reconstitutionof theparadigm in English languagescholarship. This disciplinarypara-digm wouldfinallyaddress the operativeparadigm of politicalsocietywithoutdenying either the social realityof liberalismor succumbingto the paradigmatic requirements of the term "authority."The termis "rule."We are hardly the first to suggest it-recallthe translationof The German ldeology.It has also found itsadherents in regard

PoliticalSociety

ter 2 generally).Rules mediate Weber's paradox of rule-theyarewhat isaccepted but seen as imposed.

Mommsen had hisfingeron the key by accepting the ruler-ruledrelation, butlost it when he rejected rules as the linkbetween rulerand ruled.Bendix andRoth also grasped the key by defining//err-schaft in terms of superordination and subordination. The Germanequivalents areÜberordnungand (Jnterordnung. Ordnungmeans"order"or "arrangement" in German. It also means "rules"in the

205



to Weber. Roth and Bendixboth argued for"domination"(WeberI 968 : LXXXIX,62n.; Bendix1962: 290-297). Yet they each referredto rulersand the ruled in relations of domination.Roth also em-ployedthe term "rulership"(Weber 1968: XCIII).Carl J. Friedrich(1963: 182) and more recentlyStewart Clegg (1975:56-66) equatedHerrschaftwithrule.

Yet others have explicitlyrejected this equation.Wolfgang Momm-sen accepted ruler and ruled,but not rule. "Fora long time we[evidentlyreferringto himself]thought'rule'to be the best term, asit does not quite carry the somewhat austere connotationof theword 'domination'.Yet it is also too narroq coveringonly the activityof governing. . . ." \1974:72). For A.P. D'Entreves, the "properequivalent"of Herrschaft"isneither 'rule' nor 'imperativecontrol';it is'power',power in its strict legal sense, in the sense in whichwespeak of 'power-conferringrules', or say that publicofficialshave'powers'. The emphasis is on legality"(1967: ll).

Mommsenand D'Entreves rejected "rule"as the best term totranslate Herrschaftfordiametricallyopposed reasons; the formerbecause rule is too legalistica term, the latter because it is insuffi-cientlyso. Both are wrong.They have implicitlytaken "rule"tomean "legal rule" inthe narrowAustiniansense of formaland en-forceable rules. Mommsenobjected to the idea that relationsofruler and ruled depend on formallyvalid rules, D'Entreves to theidea that rules always enforce ruler-ruledrelations. Althoughtheterm "rule"includes rules that are formallyvalid and enforced,it does not have to exclude rules formallyconferringbenefits in-

stead of creating enforceableobligations, or informalbut coerciverules effectuating imperativecontrol.Rules need be formaland in-stitutionallysupported to qualifyas law (as chapter 4 demonstrates).As rules, they need only bÈ generalizable statements yieldingexpec-tations about warranted(requiredor permitted) conduct (see chap-

gspatial or serial sense of ordering matters. Englishis littledifferent,as

inorders,

ordinal, coordination;indeed we use

"rules"the same

way: rulesof thumb,methodological rules, andso on. In doing sowe acknowledge that rules always standin some discerniblearrange-ment. German social thought goes further:the expectations thatrules engender are alwaysdifferential,and arrangements of rulesmust always be one of super- and subordination.That such struc-tures of rules are foundational,and not proximate and expedient,is deeply troubling toEnglish speakers, whose viewof rules derivesfrom the formalsymmetryof rights and duties under the commonlaw - a formalsymmetry nesting the elective asymmetry of authorityrelations.

In the firstdecade of the century, Georg Simmel elaboratedthethesis that "domination"as a "formof interaction" ispreciselyamatter of super- and subordination6 (1971:96-120). We have nottreated Simmel's ideas extensively because of his marginalplace inthe HerrschsÍtparadigm. Yet his Kantianinterest in forms ledhimto view super- and subordination geometrically:"itis onlygeometrythat determines what the spatialityof things in space really is"(Sim-mel l97l:27).Even ifsocial geometry is insufficientuntilsuppliedwithcontent, one nevertheless begins not inspace, but withspatial-ityand thus rules. It is the Kantian legacy whichundergirds the Ger-man conceptionof order, and rule no differently,as an arrangementof rules.

6. Simmel (1908:134) spoke onlyof "Herrschsucál,"rendered in the English textas "will-to-dominate"and "desire fordomination"(Simmel l97l:96). "Passionfor rule"wouldbe more accurate. Simmelused "Auíoritiit"for authority(forex-ample, t908: 136-137),as indeed had Marx inThe Eighteenth Brumaireof LouisBonaparle (Marxand Engels l978br196, 198).

*ffi*:i ìffi lm

206 Part 2: Rule

HEGEMONY,HIERARCHNHETERONOMY

Weber is justlyfamous forproposingthat there are three ideal typesof rule (DieTlpen der Herrschaft,as chapter IIIof EconomyandSocietyis entitled).For Weber ideal types are "mentalconstructs,"but not just an observer's, as I note in the introduction(footnotell).Ideal types of rule represent recurrent practical solutions to the

bl f h h l

PoliticalSociety

we wouldhave to know the classificatoryscheme withinwhichcate-gories are co-defined (compare Lakoff1987: 366';. rJy'eber failed toprovideany such classificatoryscheme. Consequently Weber had torelyon his vast historicalknowledge to support his convictionthatonly three pure types were possible. Manycommentators producedifferentlists, no less supported by history and no better supportedconceptually.T

Is there a way to developa set of puzzle paradigms of rule thatb l ibl ff d h ibiliti d b

207



problem of howhuman beings use rules and rule to arrange theiraffairs, recognized as such by the verypeople who use them. V/eberconnected the observer's mental constructs- the types as he abstractlyposited them - withthe ensembles of practices, supportingattitudes,and material conditions.The coherence of each ensemble promptedhim to identifythe type as recurring through a broad range of humanexperience (Shils and Finch1949: 94-97; see also Hekman 1983).

Weber presented the three types of rule in terms of the beliefsthat sustain them. These are "grounds"for mle (til/eber1968: 215).Each type relates the characteristicsof that type to the distinctivegrounds under whichit is accepted, the firstbeing rational, calculat-ing grounds, the second traditionalgrounds and the third charismaticgrounds. Weber held that the acceptance of rule on rational groundscorresponds to rule by an administrativestaff (pp. 217-226).Ruleaccepted on grounds of traditioncorresponds to rule by those tradi-tionallyaccorded personal loyaltyand the rightto rule (pp.226-241). Finallyrule accepted on grounds of charisma corresponds to ruleby someone withextraordinarypowers of personality(pp.24l-254).

Noticethat these correspondences differlogically.The firstre-lates two independent sets of conditions: rationalbeliefs and ad-ministrativeskills.The second defines the two sets of conditions in-terchangeably by reference to tradition.The thirdsimply infersoneset of conditions(personal traits) fromanother (beliefs about theextraordinary character of these traits). rWeber's scheme is concep-tuallyflawed.It has one completely articulatedtype of rule andresponse to it, a second type in whichrule and response are col-

lapsed throughco-definition,and a thirdin whichthe response torule isfullyarticulatedand the properties of rule only implied.Weber called his idealtypes "pure"(1968: 215). Purityof type can

be judged, however, onifif types correspond to categories. Other-wise their mutualindependence cannot be established. Furthermore,

t'

can be plausiblyofferedas the pure possibilitiescountenanced bythe paradigm Weber workedwithin?We thinkso. If it is remem-bered that the Herrschaftparadigm locates rulerand ruled in anarrangement of rules, then Weber's nexus of rule and response torule mustalso be mediated byrules. Weber knew this. The firsttypeof rule (by administrativestaff) depends on impersonal orders, orlaw in the usual sense. The second type of rule (by traditionallead-ers) depends on orders that are paradoxicallypersonal but not original.Byexercisingdiscretionand staying withinthe bounds of what tradi-tionalpractice permits (precedent), the ruler gains discretion. Thcthirdtype of rule (bya charismaticfigure)depends on oracularpronouncements, each of which isrevelatory and thus completelyoriginai.

Weber mightbe seen as implicitlydeployinga classificatory scheme

for rules in whichtwo sets of traits (traditional/originaland per-sonal/impersonal) are variously combined.Were he to have done soexplicitly,there would be four possible combinations,or categoriesof rules. Instead Weber was content to introduce two poorlydifferen-tiated and variablydecisive criteria fordiscriminatingrule types.Be-ing impersonal is decisive for the firsttype, beingtraditionaland,as a secondary matter, personal for the second type, and being originalfor the third.

WhileWeber's scheme is clearlyinadequate, we do not proposeto reconstruct it. (But see Onuf1982b:31-33.)Weber never madea case for either of his criteria.Suggested by sundry historicalex-periences, they are imputed to rules because they suit the character-

istics of rulers and responses to theirrule. As an alternative,we

can

7. Thus Friedrich (1963: 180-t98)identifiedfourteen types of rule whichhe culledfromWestcrn politicalthought from Aristotlcto Weber.

208 Part 2: Rule

relate Weber's three types of rule to the classificatoryscheme to befound in chapter 2, in whichthree categories of rules are offered.Or, reversing the procedure, we can ask, do assertive-, directive-, andcommitment-rulesrespectively yield three categories of rule corres-pondingto Weber's three types?

Of Weber's three types of rule, the firstuses directive-rules,asdoes the second much of the time. The third type uses assertives, asindeed does the second some of the time. WhatWeber described asthe "routinizationof charisma" (1968:246 254) yieldsan g

PoliticalSociety 209

ever, render the term'rule'scientificallyuseless" (1968: 943, "domina-tion"in that text ). Yet Weber himself was the one to have unneces-sarilybroadened the definition.

Weber's exposition of three puzzle paradigms of rule has struckmany writerswithits apparently tight logicalstructure, its "meticu-lous symmetry"(Mommsen 1974:72). Meticulousperhaps, but mis-taken in conception.We have endeavored to offera variationofVy'eber's set that honors twoof his paradigms, dissolves one as a

i d d hi df i lW b hi lf



the routinizationof charisma (1968:246-254) yieldsan arrange-ment in whichrules asserting statuses occupy a significantplace. V/ecan now see that, whiletraditionalrule is anythingbut a pure type,the other twoparadigms-administrativeand charismaticrule-accord a dominantpositionto directive- andassertive-rules respec-tively. Obviouslythe social realityof rule mixes types, asWeberdemonstrated withhis discussion of the manyvariations in the pat-tern of traditionalrule - gerontocracy, patriarchy, patrimonialruleand estate rule (pp. 231-241).

Weber granted virtuallyno attention at all to commitment-rulesinhis presentation of the puzzle paradigms of rule. Yet he was amplyaware of their importance. Muchof his extended discussion of lawin Economyand Society (chapter VIII)concerns commitment-rules.Weber concluded that commitment-rulesdid not contribute toruleas an asymmetricarrangement, but to the "decentralizationof rule"("DeTentraliTationder Henschaft,"1976:542),something he thoughtcould be said to describe "the whole system of modern private law"(1968:9a4. That system of course is the basis of contract,credit,and thus the entire apparatus of capitalism.

Weber excused himself from constructingúe complo<of commitment-rules into a paradigm of rule fora peculiarreason. Obviouslyallsorts of people have rightsto rule some aspect of the activitiesofothers, even those generallyholdingsway over them. Weber thensubtly changed the terms of the argument by observingthat some-one could often be said to have a "ruling"("beherrschend," quola-tionmarks in the original,1976:542)position in "the social relations

ofthe drawing roomas wellas

inthe

market, fromthe

rostrumofa lecture-hallas fromthe command post of a regiment, . . ." (1968:943). What is unconvincingabout this shiftis that rulingis no longera matter of commitment-rules,but of transitorysocial arrangements.As Weber correctlynoted: "Such a broader definitionwould,how-

mixed case, and constructs a thirdfrommaterialWeber himselfpro-vided. Thisthirdparadigm addresses the most puzzling aspect ofrule, its"decentralization"throughrules creating rightsand duties.That Weber failedto recognize it as a puzzle paradigmno doubtreflects a paradigmatic presumptionthat asymmetries in ruler-ruledrelations are typicallyreinforcingrather than cross-cutting. The morecomplexpattern of commitment-ruleshides the asymmetries betterand deceives the systematizing observer,even one as learned, and asmeticulous, as Vy'eber.

Like V/ebetscholars today are generally quitecapable of recogniz-ing rulein the formof instructionand directive-rules.This is abun-dantlyevidentfrom theconstant recourse in our own and allieddisciplines to twowords describing these respective arrangements ofrule: hegemony and hierarchy.The lack of a comparable term forthe arrangement of commitment-rules toproduce rule is evidence ofthe continuing anonymityof that paradigm of rule. We supplyaterm for it, however, to be able to conduct anexamination of allthree puzzle paradigms of rule.The wordwe have chosen is "heter-onomy,"whichfromKant on, has meant the opposite of autonomy.s

Hegemonyrefers to the promulgationand manipulationof prin-ciples and instructions by whichsuperordinate actors monopolizemeaning whichis then passively absorbed by subordinate actors.These activities constitutea stable arrangement of rule because theruled are rendered incapable of comprehending their subordinate

8. The Random House Dictionaryof lhe English language(1967:

667)defines

heteronomyas "the condition ofbeing under the rule or domination ofanother."The Greek roots "-archy,""-cracy"and "-nomy"all suggest a conditionof rule,but only"-nomy"conveys the notionof rule as an arrangement. The Latin root"-mony"is too generalized-it refers to a condition orresult. Friedrichused theneologism "heterocracy" in passing as an antonymfor "autocracy"(1963:196-197).

ri - ï ' &t.

210 Part 2: Rule

role. They cannot formulate alternativeprograms of action becausethey are inculcatedwiththe self-serving ideologyof the rulers whomonopolizethe productionand dissemination of statements throughwhichmeaning is constituted.

Weber suggested that hegemonial rulers tendto be charismaticand their rules revelatory.This is misleading,however, because oftenthese rules are in the aiç and charisma attaches to personalitiesin-volved intheir circulationand not rulers in any directsense. A betterformulationis the famous pronouncement of Marxand E g l in

PoliticalSociety

hegemony. Muchof the confusionstems fromGramsci'sexpandedconceptualizationofthe state (the "integralstate"), whichhe definedin terms of rule through coercion(alternatively"command,""dirëctdomination,"or "dictatorship")as wellas though "spontaneous con-sent" (Gramscil97l:12, 170,239,263').

AlthoughGramsci situatedhegemonywithinan expanded concep-tion ofthe state, that he contrasted coercionwithconsent and dis-cussed the latter interms of ideology(1971: 12, l8l-182)makes clearhis concern for hegemony's distinctivefeatures Given prevailingrela

211



formulationis the famous pronouncement of Marxand Engels inThe Germon ldeology:"The ideas of the rulingclass are in everyepoch the rulingideas: . . ." (Marxand Engels 196467). AlthoughMarxand Engels thus identifiedthe çentral feature of hegemonialrule, their formulationillsuits a materialistconception of historythat finds all ideas, and all consciousness, "directlyinterwovenwiththe material activityand material intercourse of men - the languageof real life"(p. 42).

Apparentlythe content of human consciousness is determined byone's place in historicallyspecificsocial relationsof production.Were this so, ideas wouldvary withclass position,and stable condi-tions of rule could not depend on the successful internalizationofrulingclass ideology.Marx intimatedas much (forexample, 1954b:101-116;but see Abercrombie,Hill,and Türner, 1980). A fullyde-

veloped positionwouldhave to account for competing ideologiesand their relative impact on differentclasses. Why, and under whatconditions,does exposure to rulingclass ideologyoverwhelmthematerially meaningfulexperience of a subordinate class? NothingMarxwrote tells the answer.

Creditfor developingthe hegemonial puzzle solutionshould goinstead to AntonioGramsci,even though he never providedastraightforwarddefinitionof "hegemony." This has led to somedisagreement among Marxistscholars as to what Gramsci had inmind. Forexample, NicosPoulantzas (1978: 157-159)and GcirenTherborn (1980:157-158) argued that forGramsci hegemony meantboth "political"domination(rule through directive-rules)and ideo-

logicaldomination(rule

through assertive-rules). Nevertheless,bothPoulantzas and Therborn joinedother contemporary Marxists(forexample, Miliband1969: 180; Abercrombie,Hill,and Türner 1980:12; Sassoon 1983: 201) in focusing on the notion of ideologicaldominationas Gramsci's principalcontribution tothe understanding of

his concern for hegemony's distinctivefeatures. Given prevailingrela-tions of production,the superordinateclass attains and secures itsposition by successfullyrepresenting its class interests as the generalinterests of society as a whole. Conditionsof rule are stable becausethe rulingclass actuallyconstitutes socialrealitythrough its ide-ology, thereby limitingthe capacity of the subordinate class to imaginealternatives that could threaten the rulingposition of the superordi-nate class (pp.12,181,238-239).Instead, the ruled accept their subor-dinate positionas natural and inevitable.

Hierarchy isthe paradigm of rule mostclosely associated withWeber because, as an arrangementof directive-rules,it is instantlyrecognizableas bureaucracy. The relations of bureaux, or offices,formthe typicalpattern of super- and subordination,but always inranks, such that each officeis both subordinate to the one(s) above

it and superordinate to the ones below. There being typicallyfewerofficesin any rank than in the rank immediatelybeneath it, theremust also be a top rank witha single officeand chief officer.Thatofficehas formalresponsibilityfor allthe activities undertakeninthe ranks below,because such activitiesare guided by directive-rulesdescending fromhigher ranks.Iogicallyspeaking, ifonlya higherofficercan issue a directiveto a lowerone, then the validityof anydirectiveis ultimatelytraceable to the directiveof a chief, responsi-ble officer.The visualizationof this arrangement of ranks linked bydirectives isthe familiarpyramidof organization charts.

We can surmise that Weber had in mindthe militarychain of com-mand so much in evidence in the Germany of his time (Rudolphand

Rudolph 1979:218).Itsformalcharacterization,however, owes muchto the viewof lawas a system of commands (directives),each ofwhich is validby reference to the one higher, untila primaryvalidat-ing source of commands is reached. rü/hileEnglishspeakers arelikelyto associate this viewof law withHans Kelsen, he is merely

lrl toffi,



n4 Part 2: Rule

and anarchy in their relations anticipated. Cooperation is unlikely,its incidence an explanatory problem(Oye 1985a). Given the so-cial realityof heteronomy, however, actors thinkingthemselves tobe autonomous prudentlyendeavor to reduce their risks and mini-mize uncertainty. The "best means" to this end is to exchange com-mitmentsabout futureconduct.Even as we insiston our ,,right,"as autonomous actors, to make promises freely, we find that theyare not so freelybroken. Our promises rule us by takingthe formof commitment-rules.

PoliticalSociety A5

sion for feudal society. The conditionalnature of feudal propertyrights led Weber to characterize feudal society in what we wouldcallheteronomous terms. In so doing he contradiçtedhis own judgmentthat decentralized rule is not rule at all. "Fullydeveloped feudalismis the most extreme type of systematically decentralizeddomina-tion"(1968: 1079).

Altogether differentwas "the age of the capitalistbourgeoisie,"in which "contractand specifiedindividual rights"(1968: 1070) re-sult in exclusive private propertyand by extension (Ruggie 1986



of commitment rules.Commitment-rulesformalizepromises as duties. Corresponding

to duties are rights to whatever has been promised. Of interest hereare propertyrights,whichformalizeconsequences of promises madewithreference to use of or access to the means of productionandexchange. Ifwe consider the staggeringlyasymmetrical consequencesfor differentactors of acquiringproperty rightsand contractualobligations,and the appearance of equality among actors by virtueof the reciprocaland thus formallysymmetricalarrangement of allcontractualrelations,we confront the real paradox of heteronomousrule:Rules positing autonomy in relations ensure the asymmetryofthose relations.

Weber connected "a cosmos of rightsand duties"to the condi-tions of rule foundin \Vestern feudalism(Weber 1968: 1079-10g5).

Relations between lordsand vassals were "contractualand subjectto renewal, but at the same time inheritableaccording to establishednorms . . ." (p. 1082). Thus feudal society was characterized by con-ditionalprivate propertyin the sphere of production. Controlof pro-ductive propertyby lordscarried withit explicitsocial obligationsto other, lesser lords and eventuallyto serfs on the manor. This, ac-cording to Weber, "turnedfeudalism intoan approximationof theRechtstaat [constitutionalgovernment]"(p. 1082).

Feudal society lackeda principleof exclusion withrespect to prop-erty rights.Social relationsamong lords and between lords and serfsformed a chain of rightsand obligationswhichprovidedsocial cohe-

142) or Harsanyi's question, "Ifyou disregarded your ownpersonal interests,what kindof society, withwhat kindof moral code, would you like to livein?"(1983:243)as effortsto recoveÍ a Kantian moral positionin the face of a heter-onomous social reality.

sult in exclusive private propertyand, by extension (Ruggie 1986:142-143),

sovereignty andterritorialityas

defining traitsof anarchyin internationalrelationsJr Bycontrasting feudalismand capitalism,Weber implied thata change in property rights yieldsa liberalsys-tem of interaction among individualswho are autonomous withrespect to each other. They are constrained onlyby the aggregate out-comes of their interaction.V/e believe this positionneeds to be re-versed: Conditionalproperty rights permit a system of rule, but notof a heteronomous nature, whileexclusive property rightsalways im-plyheteronomy. Weber made two errors. One liesin fostering theimpressionthat the creation of feudal property rights depended onauthentic exchange relations between feudal actors. The second isa failure to recognize that the exclusive character of modern bour-geois propertyrights implies asymmetrical relationsbetween hold-ers of specific, exchangeable propertyrights.

The issue is not whether conditionalfeudalpropertyrights are

ll. The historical relationof exclusive propeÍtyrightsto liberalismand the rise ofcapitalismis a matter ofcontroversy. C. B. Mcpherson'sinfluentialinterpretation(19ó2)linksexclusiveproperty to the possessive individualistand finds this con-ception centralto such seventeenth-century figuresas Hobbes and John locke.(Recallch. 5,) Against thisinterpretation,J. G. A.Pocock has argued that thecrucial distinctionis between real and mobileproperty. The emergence of publiccredit, a stock market and financialspeculation engendered a change of con-sciousness, around 1700, that we associate withliberalism(1985: 108-ll0).In thisview Locke'spositionon property was rooted inthe traditionof contingentrights

and duties central to the "ancientconstitution," thatis, the customary law of Brirain (Pocock 1957), and evident in the modern common law. To put the differencebetween locke and later liberalism anotherway, liberalexchange relationspermitrcal propertS the right to which need not be exclusive, while liberal relationsofproductionrcqulrc mobilepropcrty,which tends by its nature to be exclusivelyhcld: "What one owned was promises, , . ." (Pocockl9E5:ll3).

i# ff i:*ffi.i ffi

216 Part 2: Rule

associated withrule, but ratherwhether feudal rule is heteronomous.Recall that the Kantian conception of heteronomycan be construedto mean more than nonautonomous, conditionalaction. Kantianheteronomy obscures the absence of autonomy. It is in this strongerKantian sense of heteronomy that the characterizationof feudal so-cietyas heteronomous becomes misplaced. Weber was sufficientlypreoccupied with the contractualrelations of lords, themselves asym-metric, that he underplayed the primary, materiallygrounded set ofrelations in feudalism-therelations of lordand serf r2

PoliticalSociety

specific capitalist withwhom they willenter into exchange relationsand even to organize themselves forcollective bargaining.

The coercive characterof bourgeois propertyrights is exposedonlyat the level of society as a whole. Fromthis vantage point wecan see that workers have littlechoice but to enter into exchange rela-tions withsome capitalist.At the level of individualexperience theworker's right to choose divertsattentionfrom the practical neces-sityof entering into such exchanges at all. Thefeudal relationbe-tween lord and serf embodies no such mystificationof the nature

217



in feudalism therelations of lordand serf.r2Serfs exchanged the productsof their laborwiththe manoral

lord, who in turn provided security for the serfs. Feudalpropertyrightsfacilitateda monopolyof coercive means in the hands of thenobility.The constant threat of warfare fixedthe pattern of feudalrelations (Anderson: 140-142). Real or alleged, serfs, need forphysi-cal security compelledthem to enter into exchange agreements withlocal landlords on the latters'terms.Nevertheless the coercive char-acter of the exchange, and the directive-rulessubstantiating it, hidbehind the formalityof lord-serfrelationsbased upon exchange andreciprocity.Weber himselfacknowledged the militaryoriginsof feu-dal relations of production(1968: l07j-1078).He also noted thatrelations among lords bear the marks of routinized charisma b. 1070).Indeed feudalismis a hierarchicalformof rule that can be depictedas a flat-toppedpyramid: By cultivatingthe illusionof collegiality,hegemony substitutes for the higher ranks of hierarchy.

To viewcontingentfeudal relationsas heteronomous projectsmodern bourgeois exchange onto the feudal situation. Exchanges be-tween capitalistsand workers take place because bourgeois propertyrights assign capitalistsa monopoly on society,s productivepropertyand, therefore, upon the workers, means of physical and psychicsustenance. In order to gain access to the means oftheirsustenance,workersmust enter into exchange relations withcapitalists.In capi-talist societies, however, the massivelyasymmetrical character ofthis exchange, and of the contentof propertyrights behindit, isobscured by the fact that workers are generally free to choose the

12. He did not ignore the latter set of relations entirely:"The fullfief is always arent'producingcomplexof rightswhose ownershipcan and should maintainalord in a manner appropriate to his style of life"(p. 1072, emphasis in original).

tween lord and serf embodies no such mystificationof the natureof the exchange, because serfs lack thesocial mobilityof workerswho have an exclusive right tosell their labor. Instead feudal rela-tions of rule are directlypersonified in the relevant actors,leavingno doubt as to who filledsuperordinate and subordinate roles. More-over, noble "obligations"are not benefits owed serfsin return forservices rendered to the lord. Rather theyare costs lords impose onthemselves to assure a reproducible supplyof labor. In late feudal-ism lords eliminatedthese obligationsbecause contracting fordirectlabor services proved to be cheaper (Dobb,1963: 54-58; Anderson,1978: 197-208).

IfWeber's firsterror was to confuse contingentfeudal relationswithheteronomous rule, hissecond was to confuse unconditionalpropertyrights withgeneralizedautonomy. We have already seen

that exclusive propertyrightseffectively concentrateproductive prop-erty in the hands of a few owners,whilethe many workers who owntheirown abilityto performuseful labormust compete to sell theirservices. Owners always have alternatives;workersface the practicalproblemof survivalin the absence of a wage contract. In short,asymmetricalconsequences of commissivelydefined relations, com-bined withthe illusionof independence for all parties to these rela-tions, produce the conditionsof rule in which rulers simply cannotbe identifiedby discovering the authors of rules. The ruledjoin therulers as authors and audience; rules rule theirjointproceedings.This isheteronomy'sparadigmaticallydistinctivefeature.

This approachto the wage contract is central to MarxistPolitical

Economy, with Marx'sconcept of commodityFetishism(Marx1954a:76-87) providingits foundation.The exchange of commodities(in-cludinglabor power) in the marketpresupposes exclusivepropertyrights (capitalistsocial relationsof production in Marxistdiscourse)which render the products of human laborfullyalienable.Not only

rffii. .ffii 3

218 Part 2: Rule

are these social relations of productionstable and asymmetric.Thecommodificationbóth of labor and of the products of labor ensurestheir "mysticalcharacter" (p. 76), makingthem exclusivelysocial,recognizable onlyby reference to their value in exchange for othersuch commodities.By capturingsocial reality,exchange value sup-plants materiallygrounded social relations, renders all people equalin their anonymityand nullifiesthe concept of asymmetry. FullyrealizedcommodityFetishismis a radicalsolutionto the problemof rule. Its extrapolationfrom the specificcharacter of exclusiveprop-

PoliticalSociety

ing theonlyalternativesas hierarchicalrule and the state of nature.Byusing the model of prebourgeoispropertyrightsand exchangerelations to domesticate anarchy, liberal thinkerscould definetheirproblematicas balancing and containingsuch hierarchyas was in-dispensable to the provisionof publicgoods likesecurity. (See alsofootnote 16).

Because bourgeois hegemonialrule portrays the capitalistsystemof exploitiverelations of productionas serving the common good,it may appear to be identicalto heteronomous rule. \Whilehegemony

219



p p of exclusivep perty rightsmakes it a heteronomous solution.

Arguablyliberalsocial thought is itselfa response to Fetishism,"the despotism of speculative fantasy," brought on by the emergenceof capital markets(Pocock 1985: ll2).In pocock's judgment,ram-pant speculation raised fears about ,,the hysteria, not the cold ra-tionality,of economic man. . . . Systems of rationalegoism weredevised less to legitimizeand explain whathe was doing than to of-fer hima means of controllinghis own impulses" (p. ll3).Never-theless, liberal thought has always been blindto heteronomous rule,at least in part because of its origins in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain.Throughoutthis era contingent rights and duties werenot merelycommon law, they were a linguisticallyfixedstate of mind.Whilefeudal rights were disappearing, they were not succeeded-indeed not fora long time-byexclusive rights reflectinga bourgeoisconception of productionand exchange. Instead we findan ,,im-perfect"and stillcontingent formof prebourgeois private propertyin whichproducers both owned and workedtheir own means of pro-duction. Thatlaborpower was not a commoditysuited the circum-stances of familyfarmingand artisanal production typicatof Britainduringthis time.

In the absence of commodifiedlabor power the ,,petty bourgeois,'property rights of independent producers seemed to avoid the asym-metricallycoercive implicationsof exclusiveproperty rights. There-fore paradigmaticportrayals of social interaction between indepen-dent producers in the sphere of exchange were not taken to implyan abstractionfromheteronomous property

relations.Instead ofconstitutingapuzzle solution to the problemof rule, they lent them-selves to the viewthat rulewas not the problem.Such a viewmaythus be construed as support for the paradigm of anarchy. Hobbeshad already providedthe frameworkfor this developmentby posit-

it may appear to be identicalto heteronomous rule. hegemonyand heteronomy can be interdependent and reinforcingpractices(hegemonylegitimizesheteronomy; heteronomy provides the materialbasis forhegemony), the two are analyticallydistinct. Heteronomousrule is secured throughcommitment-ruleswhichmassively restrictthe material opportunitiesof subordinates, who are endowed, alongwith theirfew remainingopportunities, withthe properties of com-modities.What heteronomy makes possible is all that is conceivable,By securing rule throughassertive-rules, hegemony operatcscon-versely. What hegemony makes conceivable is all that is possible'

RULES OFTHEGAME

The term "hegemony"is widelyused in contemporary InternationalRelations.Neorealists likeSteven Krasner (1976: 321-322, 1982: 30,1985: l0-13)Robert O. Keohane (1980: 132, 1984: 32-38)and RobertGilpin(1981: 29, 116, 144-210, 1987 65-80),and world-systemicistImmanuelWallerstein (1984 4-7, 37 -46, 132-145)all treat the strong-est state in internationalrelations as "hegemon." None of them creditHaroldD. Lasswell andAbraham Kaplan,who nevertheless definedhegemony (in1950) as "supremacy withina controlarea," which, inthe instance of worldpolitics,"is a sphere of influencewhen controlis not accompanied by authority.Ahegemonic state is a maior power;its satellites are the states withinits sphere of influence"(p.257, their

emphasis; for Lasswelland Kaplan'sdefinitionof authority, seefootnote 1).Implicitin thisview is the equation of strength and coercivecapa-

bilities.Thus it wouldseem to be a hierarchicalview, the moreso,at least forneorealists, because the strongest state secures its privi-

r* .ffi

220 Part 2: Rule

leged positionby institutinginternational regimes (executiveregimes,in the language of chapter 4), instead of rulingdirectly. Nevertúeless,this is a special case ofhierarchy, rarely achieved, because the rankingstate must have a "commanding"lead over the next in the chain. He-gemonythus understood is that instance of hierarchyin which thepositionof the ranking state is so overwhelmingthat it can dispensewiththe chain of command and cast directive-rules in a benign-form(as mere suggestions), and stillhave its rule effectuated (compare Bull1977:215) trhe result resembles Gramscian hegemony. Because the

PoliticalSociety

ternational relations. KennethN. Waltz (1979: 114-116) explicitlyplaced anarchy and hierarchyin opposition, theformerdescribinginternational relations, thelatter government. Steven L. Speigel'sdepictionof international relations as"an internationalpeckingorder"(1972:3) and Stanley Hoffmann's identificationof a multi-plicityof "functionalhierarchies" (1978:117) suggest conceptionscloser to the one we prefer, but for their presumption that asym-metricarrangements are either transitoryor offsetting,and there-forenot indicativeof conditionsof rule.

221



I

i

g yleader in such instances is also likelyto practice hegemony, the pres-ence of hierarchy is all the more difficultto discern.

Amongcontemporary scholars, Robert W. Cox (19g3, 19g6:217_230, 1987:7-9, 129-2lg)has most clearly departed fromthe usualviewand identifiedhegemony as a distinctiveconditionof interna-tionalrelations not dependent on the particularsof hierarchical posi-tion(but see 1987: 144). Thus cox and Gilpinboth describ"à th.Pax Britannicaand Pax Americana of the nineteenth and twentiethcenturies as hegemonial,but gave differentreasons. For Cox (19g6:223), "a prevalent collectiveimage of worldorder"was necessary.For Gilpin(1981: 116), "imperialcontrol"sufficed.

kss often used than "hegemony"in contemporary InternationalRelations is the term "hierarchy,"and even less often is it elaborated.

There are exceptions, however. MortonA.Kaplan (1957: 4g_50)characterized one of six possible internationalsystems as hierarchi-cal, but appeared to have in mind arrangements of such formalitythat they are tantamount to governmentand thus precluded for in-

I 3. HedleyBullheld that "unilateral exploitationof preponderance takes three forms,which I shall call'dominance','primacy'and'hegemony'."The first.,ischaracter-ized by the habitual use of force by a great power against the lesser states compris-ing its hinterland,and by habitual disregard of the universalnorms of inter;tatebehavior that conferrightsof sovereignty, equality and independence on thesestates." The second, primacy, "is achieved withoutany resort to force, and withno more than the ordinarydegree of disregard for norms. . . ." The last, hegemony,describes the situation inwhich"there is a resort to force and the threat of force,but this is not habitual and uninhibitedbut occasional and reluctant" (l 977: zl4-215). see also charles F. Doran's operationaldistinctionbetween empire and hege-mony. "Empire is a matter of direct institutionalcontror. . . . Hegemony tends tocreate vassal states or internationalpolitical'courtiers'ofthe surrounding enti,ties in a rather apparent heirarchiclsrd perpetuated fashion; . . ." (1971:16).

forenot indicativeof conditionsof rule.OnlyJohan Galtung appears to have considered hierarchya dur-

able feature of formallyanarchic social relations, internationalrela-tions being a primeexample (1970: ll9-120).He represented whathe called "feudalinteractionstructures" (1970: ll5, l97l:89) as di-rectivelymaintained in the pyramidalformof an idealized hierarchy.Galtung held out the possibilityof partial"defeudalization,"whichalways proceeds fromthe top down (1970: 123-124).This may beseen as substituting collegialityfor chain of command; we see it assubstitutinghegemony for hierarchy. We too see this substitutionlikely only atthe top ranks of the chain of command,at whichdirect, personal socializationof an elite corpsof commanders ispractical.

When, on rare occasion, International Relations scholarsexpresslyresist the presumptionof anarchy, their recourse is to some more orless clearly understoodnotion of hegemony or hierarchy. More likely,whatever terms are used, hegemony and hierarchyare conflated as,for example, "orders of leadership"based on "an ordering principleor authority"(Modelski1983: l2l).Heteronomy is unnamed, un-acknowledged, unimagined.Yet heteronomy in an internationalcon-text has been subject to theoretical developmentunawares. It is in-timated in discussions of "asymmetric interdependence"(Keohaneand Nye 1977: ll-19,1987:728-730)and "unequal exchange" (see, forexample, Emmanuel 1972). Thus Galtung's concern forunequal ex-change between states situated at differentlevels of a center-peripheryhierarchy (metaphors confuse here) accords descriptiveprimacy to

heteronomous rule, but conceptual primacyto hierarchy (as we showjust above). Galtung needed to have discriminatedamong categoriesof rules to have clarifiedthe mutuallysupporting character of hege-monial,hierarchical, and heteronomousrule.

Even more strikingas a theoretical developmentof heteronomy

l;d.-lY"r- dffi:'ì i

222 Part 2: Rule

is AlbertO. Hirschman'sdemonstration that states' officersdelib-erately construct trading situations that become more valuable totheir tradingpartners than to their own states. The consequent asym-metries in opportunitycosts of foregoingthese trade relationsallowthe officersconstructing the situationto controltheircounterpartsby threateningto withdrawfromthe relationship (1980:17-52). Be-cause Hirschmancalled this exercise of controlan ,,influenceef-fect," it mightseem that the relation is one mediated by a directive-rule-The other side is influenced by the possibilityof deprivation


This sequence of choices anticipatingothers' choices in infiniteregress is knownfromgame theory as strategic interactionJ4Evenwhen an established pattern is clear, strategic interactionmakes itimpossibleto knowspecificoutcomes. As a result even a disadvan-taged playercan "win"against a privileged partnerin any given ex-change, depending on the particularchoices both make in the faceof uncertainty. In short, when heteronomous relations are also stra-tegicallyinteractive, theyfoster gambling. By this we mean that partiesknowingthemselves to be disadvantaged nevertheless make choices

b h ibili f h dd I



pto behave as directed.

The term"influence"is misleading.It is the ,.effect"of the situ-ation that is determinative. The trading partner is more affectedthan the initiatingstate is, and this is true whether the latter'sof-ficers intended this outcome, or wouldwish to use the situationfor the purposes of exercisingcontrol.Once both sides have chosento trade, asymmetricopportunitycosts, and not subsequent choicesby either one, rule the situationin favor of the partner withloweropportunitycosts. People choose exchanges more advantageous toothers than themselves in these circumstances not because they areentrapped, as Hirschmanposited, but because they valuea losingdeal over none.

The term "opportunitycosts" bears examination.In principle,

the opportunityto make choices is symmetricallyavailable to allpossible parties to an exchange. In practice, exercising the oppor-tunityto choose costs some partners more than it costs others, asmeasured by the relativecurtailmentof futureopportunitiesto en-gage in exchange. One class of exchanges is ruledby the existenceof, or agreement on, a rate of exchange, or price. Failure to dis-tributecosts at some rate can only mean that one or the other part-ner declines the opportunityto exchange. The cost to both of anyconsummated exchange is always known in advance. A second classof exchange necessitates exercising the opportunityto choose with-out knowingthe cost in advance. Introducinga lotteryhas this ef-fect. The same effect isachieved when partners have a varietyofresponses to choose

frombut do not knowin advance how any ofthese choices willbe received. In such situationspartners are obligedto guess outcomes dependent on the other's guess about her part-ner's guess, and so on.

ruled by the possibilityof accruing rewards against the odds. Instrategic interactioneveryone participatingtakes risks, but asym-metrically. The moredisadvantageous the situationis to one part-ner, the greater must be its tolerance of riskJ5 Gambling is one wayto overcome the disadvantage of asymmetrical opportunitycosts,but never a promisingone.

Frank Klinkhas elsewhere (1987) generalized Hirschman's influ-ence effect in internationaltrade to a formaltheoryof heterono-mous rule ininternationalrelations. He has done so fromsocial choicetheoreticassumptions. Anotheryoungscholar, AlexanderWendt(1987b), has also begun to erect a general theoryof heteronomousrule, in his case, using "structuration"as a framework.Nevertheless,both Klinkand Wendt have focused on North-Southrelations inthe

contemporary world,I thinkprobablyfor topicaland ideologicalreasons, and because exchange asymmetries are so pronounced inthese relations.

I wouldnot be so restrictive.(The shift to the singular indicatesthat Klinkshould not be held responsible for the rest of this discus-

14. 'lA.ninteresting feature of many games . . . is its revolvinglogic: what thefirstplayershould do depends on what the second playerdoes, but what the second playershould do depends on what the firstplayer does. But what the firstplayer shoulddo depends on what the second player does, and so on, forever" (Axelrod1970: 16)'

I 5. This is not "riskacceptance" in the usual sense: As between equal expected utili-ties (utilityof outcomes x probabilityof occurrence), the choicefavorsa larger out-come at a lowerprobabilityof achievingit. Heteronomous relationsmean asym-metricoutcome utilities,whether these outcomes are expected oÍ set by rate. Com-pare Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1981: 33-36), who included both kindsof risk inhis definition ofrisk taking.

' ËffiÌ'

224 Part 2: Rule

sion.) Thecumulative effectof relativelymodest disparities in op-portunitycosts yieldsheteronomy among states evidently freeandequal in their multiple,independentlychosen relations. States maybe classed together as members of the economicallyadvanced core,forexample, and, oninspection, foundto exhibitheteronomous rela-tions theiragents resist acknowledging,both because asymmetriesare disguised by the appearanceof free choice and discounted in thename of hegemonial harmonyJ6I should also note that heteronomyin internationalrelations is hardlyrestricted to states as exchange

hi h b i h h f l


allowsthem the luxuryof studying heteronomywithoutacknowledg-ing it-bothwhat it is and what they do.

The relevance of game theory tosocial choice fostersan apprecia-tionof "rulesof the game," a phrase that is unavoidable in discus-sions of game theoryJT Because relations between the UnitedStatesand the SovietUnion in our own time are so readily characterizedin the language of games, the phrase "rules of the game" has inevi-tablycrept into discourse on the subject. Tlpicalis this remarkofOran Young's:"Thetwo superpowers over the course of timedemon-



partners. This is perhaps most obvious withthe movement of capitalbecause of its scale and historicallyprivate character (Lipson1985).

Moregenerally,all those relations for which PoliticalEconomyis a suitable disciplinaryparadigm are heteronomous. Ifwe recallthat the theory of social choice, as I describe it in the introduction,worksbest not by assuming anarchy, as many scholars adopting thisparadigm do, but by exploring thedisjunctionbetween the formalappearance of autonomy and the social reality of super- and subor-dination,then the problem of PoliticalEconomy's indefensiblebound-aries can be solved. PoliticalEconomy is limitedto the study ofheteronomy, but heteronomy isnot limited tothe market. Nor, forthe same reason, is the study of heteronomynecessarily limitedto"endstates, or outcomes, emergent frombehavior withinrules" and

not "the rules themselves" (Brennan and Buchanan 1985: xii).Socialchoice theorists have generally imposed this limitationon themselves,withJames M.Buchanan a conspicuous exception.That they do so

16. Insofar as an especially favoredstate (or any ostensibly free agent) providesgoods for its own benefit whichnecessarily also benefit others (collectiveor pub-licgoods), asymmetries benefit those others (free riders)because exchange itselfis precluded. DuncanSnidal called this hegemony as benevolent leadership (1985b:588; see further 585-590);I would call it a special case of heteronomy in whichthe favored state's access to benefits overrules the choice of denying those bene-fits to others. Nothingprevents the state providingthe good from taxing otherbeneficiaries, a response whichSnidalcalled hegemonyas coerciveleadershipand I wouldcall hierarchy. Theconnection between collectivegoods, inverted heter-onomy, and hierarchy describes the state as an inventionof possessive individual-ists. "Hobbes'argumentis, in fact, identicalin its method, the theoretical prob-lem it identifies,and even the nature of the conclusion, with the modern theoryof collectivegoods; . . ." (Orbelland Rutherford1974: 5021. compare pp. 437-438, below).

strated a tacitpropensity to elaborate at least minimalproceduralrules to regulate the most serious dangers to the internationalsystemarising fromtheircontinuing competition"(1968a: 52). Young'sem-phasis on procedure is matched by HedleyBull'srecitation of rulesby status (an ambiguous term), includingthose having the status"simplyof operating procedures or 'rules of the game"' (1977:54see almost wordforwordin Keal 1986: 134).

Procedure, as used here, wouldseem to refer to rules subject tominimalformalization-theyare "unspoken rules" (Keal 1983),no less easily "read" for being tacit (Onuf1975: 1052).Itwouldalsosuggest that these rules are constitutedby reciprocal promises ofrestraint in the way these states "operate," promises that wouldberepudiated before being acknowledged.Commitment-rules in turnconstituteand regulate the asymmetric spheres of influencethathave emerged as one of the most notablefeatures of contemporaryinternationalrelations. (On spheres of influence, see Keal 1983, Al-mond 1986, Keal1986; on the UnitedStates and the Soviet Unionas asymmetricempires, see Liska1967.) That these spheres of influ-ence are asymmetric is hardly surprising,given the heteronomous re-lations between the superpowers. In effect, each sphere of influenceis defined by the influenceeffect the other superpower is capable ofachievingin their heteronomous relations.

17. Illustratively:"The concept of'game' has associated with it the concepts of'rules,"players,"moves,"strategies,'and'payoff.'. . . In any game

thereare

somethings under the controlof the players and other things that are not under theircontrol.The things not underthe control of the players are the rules of the game"(Kaplan 1957: 170-l7l;,another example is Buchanan and Tbllock1962: 325-326; on rules of the game considered more expansivcly,see Onuf 1974: 20-35,Kratochwil1978: 23-661.

ïffiàì '.r' - ff . :t t



WORLDPOLITICS

World Politics 229

symbols they use, constitutes muchof what they do and the waysthey do it. Lasswellwas a positivist,not a constructivist.

To make Lasswell's behavioralismconstructivist,I offer three re-lated propositions. People can become skilled in performative talk,as withany other activity.They garner influence by doingso. Eachof Lasswell's three categories of doing willbe manifest in such talk.I develop these propositions firstby setting them against the prevail-ing viewof worldpolitics,which is shown to miss the fullrange ofpoliticallyrelevant ways of doing, and second by setting them inthehi i l f d i i h h



i

I

Where there is human society, we findpolitics.PoliticalScience not-withstanding,politicscannot be equated withrelationsof authority,as the preceding chapter shows. NowI turn to Harold D.Lasswell,perhaps the greatest of PoliticalScientists but, at least in his concep-tion of politics,rather a deviant one. Lasswell held that politics-what I define in the introductionas the importantbusiness of anysociety-mustconcern the distributionof influence andrewards insociety. Influentialsget most of what they want byskillfulmanipula-tion of symbols,controlover material values, and use of violence.Elites, organized intoskillgroups, get what theyget by doingwhat

they do in three categories of behavior-the same three categoriesto be found throughout thisbook.Politics, in thisviewof Lasswell's, arenot confined to the states

and the relationsof states. People alwaysbehave politically.Forhumanityas a whole,worldpoliticsresult. Lasswell's interestinwhatpeople do ranges from the behaviorof the individual(he wasa founderof politicalbehavioralism, with its positivistand methodo-logical individualistcommitments)to the largest movements of hu-manity.The most momentous of these movements is that many-sided transformationof the agrarian societies of Europe into theworldwe knowtoday. Modernitydescribes this world,moderniza-tion the manifoldchanges givingrise to it.

Lasswell's behavioralism has one significantlimitation.Despitehis interest in symbols andtheir use, Lasswellviewed language asa transparent medium:Language is nothingmore than its content,which elites can change to suit themselves. Of course elites changethe content of symbols.Yet how theytalk,in conjunctionwiththe

historicalcontext of modernization,which isunderstood as refer-ring to deep changes in the ways we do what we do. Voices havechanged.

Characteristic premodern activitiesresult in the emergence of skill-ful talk,at firstsupporting but finally,though never fully,substitut-ing for those earlier activities. Constellations of professional skillsare subject to modernizationwiththe rise of the state in the last halfmillenium.Practices identified withthe rise of organizationswithinand among states in the last centuryor so have meant the opera-tionalascendancy of one way of talking forpolitics,although politi-cal modernityis never fullydissociated from any of the three modern-ized professional skillsconstellations.

SKILLS

In the introductionI defineas politicalwhatever the members ofa socialunit decide is importantfor their unit.This is implicitlyadistributiveviewof politics(Young 1968b: 65-78). Thecriterionofimportancemust be taken to mean: whatevermightbe importantenough that its distributionis contested. Undoubtedly the distribu-tive viewof politicsreceived its mostpowerfuland succinct expres-sion in Lasswell's justlyfamous book title, Politics:llhoGets lV'hat,lllhen,How(1958)J Lasswelltold us that "the study of politicsis

the study of influenceand the influential,"the influentialbeingthose "whoget the mostof what there is to get" (p. 13). Lasswell

l. First published in 1936. The t958 edirionhas I postscripr by Lasswell.

*ffil ' i i. ir ffit

230 Part 2: Rule

was concerned to show how theinfluentialget and stay that way andwhat rewards accrue to themas a consequence. Thus his assessmentof who gets what is really a matterof who does what.

What influentialsdo is to exercise control over the means by whichwe-people in general-invent, produce,exchange, and maintainwhatever we value. In short, their value-oriented activitiesdispropor-tionately affect ours. Correctlyunderstood, thisviewof politicsdif-ferentiates "us" and "them"onlyin degree. Allof us affect the value-oriented activitiesof others all the time.Lasswell's use of the term" " l in important additional that t bl d

WorldPolitics

Where there are politics,there is, for Lasswell,,,a body politic"(a term credited to Thomas Hobbes), or ,.politicallyorganized so-ciety"(Lasswell and Kaplan1950: 186). When the bodypoliticun-contestedly occupies a given territoryand thus is sovereign, it is astate (pp. 177-185).States have governments, government being theformaldimensionof rule, that is, rule that accords witha ,,politicalformula"(a term taken fromMosca;Lasswelland Kaplan1950: 126;see generallypp. 126-133). Lasswellshowed littleinterest in territoryand sovereignty as such. Evidentlywhat influentialsdo is not con-finedto t t d th i l ti W ld liti

231



"most"smuggles in an important additionalsense that a stable andsubstantial disproportionof influenceand rewards is necessary towhat we callpolitics."The few whoget the most of any value arethe élite; . . ." (1965a:3, his emphasis). Acknowledgedsources forthis refinementof the term "politics"includethe Neo-Machiavellianschool of Robert Michels,Gaetano Mosca, and VilfredoPareto.Thus we findPareto approvinglyquoted: "'every people is governedby a chosen element in the population';what is said, in effect,is thatevery people is ruled by-rulers"(Lasswell and Kaplan1950:.202).

Lasswell's positionsuggests strongly that élites rule by their choice,not the people's. Anglo-Americanpoliticalthought inthe liberal tra-ditiontakes a differentposition.People choose rulers theway theychoose goods in a market. Or at least they should be able to. Demo-

craticprocedures, constitutionalsafeguards, liberal ideology,thebalancing of sectional interests are held to prevent the politicalequiva-lent of market failure. The result is pluralism.Sorted by their inter-ests intocompeting groups, the many rule (Bentley1967: 447-459,Tiumanl95l:45-65).Or conceding somethingto Lasswell's posi-tion, perhaps polyarchywillresult: rule bya fewwho are neverthe-less controlled bythe many (Dahland Lindblom1963: 272-323;compare Bentley 1967: 298-320).2

2. The proposition that pluralismand stable politicalelites are compatible ina formof rule knownas polyarchyconstitutes the version of democratic theory ascendantin PoliticalScience in the UnitedStates after WorldWar II. (See notablyDahl1956, 1961, and Bachrach 196'7, l97lfor criticism.)Lasswell's repeated invocationof pluralismduring this timemay be interpreted as movement away from the posi-tion he had earlier taken that influentials mostlyget what they want. Alterna-tivelyit may reflect the absorptionof his earlierposition into the democratictheory of the time.

finedto states and their relations. Worldpoliticsare not to be con-fused withinternationalrelationsnarrowlyconceived. Instead Lass-welldefined worldpoliticsin reference to ,,the shape and compositionof the value patterns of mankindas a whole', (1965a: 3).

Lasswell'sworld is the planet and its people-the wholeworld,weare inclinedto say. Today indeed, "worldpoliticsencompasses thewhole world,"but historicallyit did not, even though ,,it is largerthan any juridicallydefined politicalunit."Immanuel rvVallerstein,whose words I quote here (1974: l5), defined worldsby referenceto"theirself-containmentas an economic-materialentity . . ." (p. 230).Whether the wholeworldtoday isan economic-materialentitybe-cause of the divisionof labor imposed by capitalism,this definitionseems too restrictive.

Worlds are inclusivesocial constructions which are also materialentities. Everyworldis a whole world.Anysuch worldis definedby the reach of its influentials;it is the worldthey knowbecause itis the worldof their deeds. Worldpoliticsis the term I use for thepoliticsof those influentialswhose reach extended once to most ofEurope and now to the wholeworld.The worldwe knowis an in-clusive social unit of planetary proportions-a worldof states, theworldof humanity.

Scholars in InternationalRelations have generally taken the worldthey study, a worldof states, to be one of diffusedinfluence. Thisthey elevate into the distributiveprincipleof anarchy-ruleby noone. As chapter 5 makes cleat I take the presumption of anarchy

to be mistaken. Ifone starts withstates as the,,who"

of worldpoli-tics and war as the "how,"then anarchy-now taken to mean, ruleby no one state-is a formallycorrect inference.Lasswell did not.He started withthose individualswho are, for any levelof politics,the influentials.So must we. IfInternationalRelations presumes an

.iffiïìl i..ffi

I

232 Part 2: Rule

anarchical worldof states, I say we should turn to a worldof in-fluentialswhose activities couldconceivablyconstitute a polyarchy(Brown1974 186-190)but, lackingliberalsupports withinthe protec-tive confinesof a state, are not likely to.Rule by the few-hegemony,hierarchy, heteronomy-is likely.

Lasswell was a central figurein what came to be called the be-havioralmovement in the study of politics.3Behavioralismstartswithpeople, not artifacts or abstractions, likegovernment,law andthe state.4 Behavioralismin InternationalRelations has stronglytended to concern itselfwithhow states' leaders process informa

WorldPolitics 233

withinthose "integratedpatterns of practice,"including,,distinctivepractices of decision making,"whichfunctionon behalfof states,that is to say, governments (Lasswelland Kaplan1950: l7j,l92;seegenerallychapter 8 of that book, entitled,,Functions,').The ,,deci-sion process" withingovernments can also be sorted into functions(always seven in number for Lasswell) (1963: 93-105). The operativeword here is "function,"whichIasswellleftundefined. Functionalanalysis, also called structural-functionalism,was contemporane-ouslyascendant in Sociologyand Social Anthropology,but Lass-well's "functional l i " diff f th f b



tended to concern itselfwithhow states leaders process informa-tion, deal withdissonance, formimages and, in general, internalizetheir situation.(For this kindof behavioralismat its best and mostsystematic, see Jervis 1976.) The passive viewof behavior is com-plementary to the viewof internationalrelations as something thatstates, not people, do.5 People's perceptions and states'doings areantisepticallyconnected through "decision-making,"a term convey-ing the sense that people do not decide on a course of action somuch as have their mindsmade up for them.6

Lasswell'spoliticalbehavioralismis an active version: Behaviorisdoing. Lasswellcertainlyrecognized that most such doings occur

3. On the rise of behavioralismin the late 1920s, Lasswell's role, and the largerso-cial and intellectualcontext, see Crick(1960).

4. As Lasswellput it in his systematic workwithphilosopher AbrahamKaplan, ascience of politics"finds its subject matter in interpersonal relations, not abstractedinstitutions or organizations;. . ." (1950; xxiv). Butnote a tendency towarddeper-sonalization, as when they spoke of "formulatingthe subject matter of politicsin terms of a certain class of evenÍs (including'subjective'events), rather thantimeless institutions orpoliticalpatterns" (p. xiv, emphasis in original).See alsothe extended discussion in Lasswell (1960:240-267). Onthe philosophicalunder-pinnings of the move to events, see Eulau (1968).A brief,veryhelpful introduc-tion tobehavioralism,much influenced by Lasswell(p. vii),is Eulau (1963).

5. Complementarityis assured by accepting thedivisionof scholarlylabor J' DavidSinger (1961) made famous. Behavioralists studywhat goes on withinstates; therest what goes on between them. Robert Jervis, forexample, began with"Percep-

tion and the Levelof Analysis Problem"(titleof chapter l, 1976: 13-31).6. Only the bureaucÍaticpoliticsapproach to decision-makingavoids passivity,andit stands outside the behavioraltradition(Allisonl97l).Note also that the studyof events, likethat of decision-making,is a passive form of behavioralism, the"event flow"bypassing decision-makingand the levelof analysis problemandsuitinginstead "a systems concept that the substance of internationalrelationsis a flowof interaction"(McClelland197ó: 108, 107).

well s functionalanalysis" differsfromthe formerbecauseof itsnon-systemic orientation.Lasswell did notthinkthat systems have

functions:no teleology is implied.TFunctionalanalysis is merely a procedural addendum to Lasswell's

behavioralism-itallowedhimto order the contextual richness ofbehavior as doing throughwhat he called a configurativemethod.sThus Lasswell's behavioralismacknowledges the state and accordsoperational priorityto government. Yet it requires neither a concep-tual divisionof behavior (withinstates and among states) nor resortto the study of individualgovernmentaldecisions as the way acrossthis divide.What influentialsdo resists encapsulation.

How then do influentialsget, and keep, what they want? As Lass-wellsaw it, they do so three ways-..bymanipulatingsymbols, con-trollingsupplies, and applyingviolence,,(1965a: 3). These are skills.Individualsproficientin them constitute ,,skillgroups,', whichcom-pete or collude as they can to distribute rewards in ways that alwaysworkto the advantage of those groups.e Influentialsalso adopt prac-

7. Just such teleology has inspiredendless criticismof structural-functionalism,much of it citingHempel (1959). IfHeinzEulau (19ó8) was correcr that Lass_well's move to events allowed him to use the concept of ..emergent properties"to solve the level of analysis problem, he too may be criticizedfor implyingthatsystems are purposive.

8. Lasswell's assertion that the "configurativemethod of politicalanalysis consistsin the use of concepts of development and equilibriuffi,. . .,, again does not

implya structuÍal-functionalistview,because these concepts are treated, not assystem properties, but as devices for assessing,,changes toward whichor awayfromwhichevents are moving"(1965a: 4, emphasis in original).

9. (Lasswell1965a: 3-20) Lasswelldid not actually usc the term ,,skiltgroup"in the1936 edition, although it is to be found in rhe posrscriptto the lgj8edition(p, 196).The tcrm appcars in passln3 ln t,asswcll(1965a: 85, 203) and Lasswelland Kaplan (19501 65),

rffi tffi liffii:

234 Part 2: Rule

tices that institutionalizeand legitimatetheir advantageous posi-tion,but thisis less a specialityof any one group than a prerequisitefor group survival.

Lasswell was inclined to see skillin violenceas declining in Westernlife,other skillsincreasing. There is a differentway to describe thistrend. Timehas seen a dramatic tendenry towardskill specialization.Violence itselfhas become a highlyspecialized skill,no longer re-sembling the near-brigandage of the feudal lords. Notonlyhas thetwentieth century seen "a renewed wave of specialists in violenceasworldcrises continue"(Lasswell1958: 96 [Postscript]) Skillin vio-

World Politics 235

Frankfurttraditionis modernist politicaltheory.rrThe same may besaid forpoststructuralism, as evidenced by MichelFoucault'spreoc-cupation withthe emergence of specialized skillsin supervisionandtheir relationto disciplineand controlr2(1978, l97g).

Lasswelldid nothave a modernist sensibility. Forhim moderniza-tion is an inclusive process of social change which results in ,,a risinglevel of participationin all values" (1965b:293, emphasis deleted).Organizations increase the availabilityof values and foster participa-tion. Lasswell's configurativemethod centers on a pluralityof par-tiallyrelated changes Given this position and its premises it follows



worldcrises continue (Lasswell1958: 96 [Postscript]).Skillin vio-lence has become more especially a skillin supervision, that is, insystematizingthe militarytasks of garrisondutyand the watch.

Commonlythe meteoricrise of specialized skillsin technical,economic, and social spheres is identifiedwith"modernization."r0This is, however, a notoriouslyslippery term, referring to more orless everything that has happened in recent centuries to undercut thefixedinequalities of agrarian societies. By becoming specialized,skillsare just some of the many social constructionsundergoingmodernization.Manifoldmodernizationconstitutes modernity-the conditionof many thingsbecoming modern.

It is importantto distinguishmodernityand modernism.The lat-ter is usuallyunderstood as an artistic and literarymovement of the

late nineteenth and twentiethcenturies, in whichanxiety, alienation,and loss of identityare constant themes (Bradbury and McFarlane1976). Modernismis a culturalresponse to modernity. It is most fre-quently a specific response to the depersonalizing effects of organi-zations as instruments of social control.(The term "organization"is defined in chapter 4, footnote 12 of this book.)

The rise of organizationsover the last century is an especiallyvisi-ble featureof the longer-term tendency for skillsto specialize. Indeedit is the dominant feature of late modernity.The çffects of organiza-tions on people are manifestly political,and criticaltheory in the

10. AlthoughSociologistssince EmileDurkheimhave tended to refer to the processas one of differentiationinstead of specialization, the former termis taken tobe a structural attribute,chosen, one wouldguess, to "objectify"(double mean-ing intended)the functional-evolutionarymodel of social change long ascendantin sociology(compare Bendix1966-1967: 318-323).

tiallyrelated changes. Given this position and its premises, it followsthat progressive specialization makes it increasinglyunlikelythatone skillgroup can dominatedistributionby itself.The relativedeconcentration of influenceand its rewards does seem to be onesignificantconsequence of modernization.r3This in turn wouldseemto mean that the abilityto explain the need forone's skills, defendone's practices, justifyone's rewards, and implicateothers in one'sendeavors become commensurately important activities.Doingis evermore a matter of talking,whileengaging in violence,delivcringgoodsand the rest are ever less consequential in their own right.

Lasswell tended to see skillspecializationmerely as the prolifera-

I I . For an overview, see Held (1980).An importantdiscussion outside the Frankfurttradition,though characteristically misleadingin itsuse of the term .,modernity,',is Berman (1982).

12. I resist the term "postmodern"in this and related contexts. Its use to describecontemporary architecture,for example, improperlysuggests a reaction to mo-dernity.Rather, "postmodern"architecture is a reaction to modernismand a rever-sion to modernity. The term "postmodernist"wouldbe better, ,.modern in theRomantic manner"better yet. Only tothe extent that modernist reactions to mo-dernitycome ont as finde siècle fantasies or romanticized evocationsof pre-modern social life,and modernity itselfis denied, does the term ,,postmodern"seem appropriate. Postpositivist social theory, to whichI would have this workcontribute, must have modernityas its subject, ifcriticallyso. To call postpositiv-ists postmodern is therefore misleading.To call them modernist is safer, althougha poststructuralist,for example, mightwellcall the constructivistposition Iadopt here merely modern in itsextensive use of the constructions of modernity.On the ambiguous relationof poststructuralismto modernity, see Ingram (1987;77-78).

13. knski (1967:308-3t3) has estimated that the top 290 of the populationin tradi-tionalagrarian societics takes half the rewards, and in modern societies less thanhalf that.

;::Ì:.l:'1i2 :iiffihì t

236 Part 2: Rule

tion ofmore refined ways of doing what influentialsneeded to havedone. That Lasswelldid not fixon the risingquotientof talk ininfluence-relatedskillsis a deficiency in his active behavioralism'Talking is indeedactive, because, as I elaborate in chapter 2, mosttalk is "performative":The veryact of saying something (a speechact), of givingvoice, does what that act says it does. Words consti-tute deeds. Ifmodernitymeans more talking,it means more, notless, is being done.ta

ObviouslyI use the terms "talk"and "voice"in a generic way. Onemay speak and be heard One may use the writtenwordas the

WorldPolitics 237

POWERPOLITICS

In contemporary discourse, both publicand popular, the term,,powerpolitics"is virtuallysynonynÌouswith worldpolitics.Withminorqual-ifications,the same may be said of academic discourse. Indeed themovement in the UnitedStates after WorldWar IIto constitute In-ternationalRelations as a disciplinepresupposed the centralityofpower (anddifferentiated itselffrom PoliticalScience by affirmingthat authoritywas central to the latter).Lasswell too placed powerand influence,the former definedin terms of the latter, at the center



may speak, and be heard. One may use the writtenwordas themediumof talk, and one's words are seen. One may talk wordlessly,by example, through one's taste, by gestures, and be felt.Tâlkingengages all the senses, at least metaphorically. So does understand-ing whatis said and responding.Together these are sensorily diversebut inextricable activities-doingas social construction.

Conceivablythe ways we think-thecognitiveand ethical stylesI discuss in chapter 3 - materiallyrelate to our various senses. Seeingrelates to schematic representation, sequential reasoning and analy-sis. Hearing relates to orchestration, composition,harmony. Tâste,smell, and touch relate to evocation, memory, and association. (Idraw here on MarshallMcluhan's provocative argument along theselines, 1964.)'Yet the decisive effect on the way we thinkcomes fromthe media extendingour senses, and not the senses themselves' Visualacuity is not the point; alphabets are. Auditoryacuity is less im-portant than musicalexposure. Cinemaand televisionsubstitute"bodylanguage" and subliminalassociation for a world thatwe cantaste, smell, and touch. Skillin using media, by dominating the waywe think,allbut defines modernity.

14. In response to World War I and again duringWorld War II, I-asswell devoteda great deal of attention to propaganda and the manipulationof symboliccon-tent in language-but doing so reinforced his propensity to identifytalk withthoughtand skillin talk with"arrangingpropositions" (Lasswell and McDougal1960: ll9-127,quotingp. 124; firstpublished 1943).This passive analvtic stance

culminated in the methodological developmentof "contentanalysis," now oneof the preferred techniques of behavioralismoriented toperception (see Lasswelland others 1949).

of his general conception of politics.In the systematic exposition that I-asswellundertookwith AbrahamKaplan (1950),power is defined as a "specialcase of the exercise of in-fluence" (p,76), one in which influence is achieved through the use, orexpectation ofuse, of"relativelysevere sanctions" (p. 84). A sanctionis "conductin response to an act . . . that is expected to modifyfutureacts" (p. 48), meaning by reward or punishment,whether by praise orcensure, redistributionof goods and services, or the use of violence.(These are Lasswell and Kaplan'swords, rearranged slightly).Influenceis definedas "valuepositionand potential,"that is, place in the distri-butionofvalues (p. 60). The tendency in thisconceptual system is totreat influencepassively, poweractively;one has influence, uses power.

For Lasswell's active behavioralismto be internallyconsistent, how-ever, the term "influence"should be used actively, forconduct. Thenone would notneed to speak of power as conduct, thereby avoidingthemessiness of Lasswelland Kaplan's relative severitycriterion.The ef-fects of exercising influence are shifts in value position-effectsforwhichterms like"rewards", "privilege,"and "advantages" are sugges-tive. Insofaras the term "power"refers not toconduct and its effectsbut to the capabilitiesdeployed in conduct, then I thinkconfusion isreduced by using such terms as "capabilities"and "resources."In con-sideration of these and other conceptual ambiguities (see further Hart1976, Baldwin1979),Iavoid using the term "power"except in an ob-viouslymetaphorical way throughoutthis bookJ5

Compare Rosenau (1980a: 39, footnotedeleted):

How, then, to focus on both thé possession and interaction dimensionsoÍ"'power" withoutbeing driven by thc structurcof languagc to an over-

ri#.'

15"

'l '- ffi í *ffi :i

238 Part 2: Rule

Lasswell andKaplandefinedauthorityas "formalpower":"To saythat a person has authorityis to say not that he actually has powerbut that the politicalformulaassigns himpower, . . ." (1950: 133).Just above, I note that Lasswell and Kaplan took government to bethe formaldimensionof rule. One mightconclude then, that authorityis but another term for government.Lasswelland Kaplan had an ad-ditionalcriterionfor authority,however, as indicated in the rest ofthe sentence explainingthe term: "To say that a person has authorityis to say . . . that those who adhere to the formula expect him to havepower and regard his exercise of it as just and proper." Rule is therefore

WorldPolitics

hensive viewof politics,Realism leaves authority- legitimatepower -to PoliticalScience as the study of the state and reserves for itselfpower politicsas the study of politicsamong states. Furthermore,Realism associates power with militaryendeavors and diplomacy.InRaymond Aron's words: "Interstate relationsare expressed in and byspecific actions, thoseof . . . the diplomatand the soldief'(1973:6, his emphasis). Ifwar is an extension of diplomacy,as every Realistsince Karl Mariavon Clausewitzhas believed, no less is diplomacyan extension of the policyof dominatingdistributionthrough vio-lence.rTIn this view,those who are proficientin violence extend their

239



"effectivepower" (p.208); authorityis formalpowerwhich, byvir-tue of its acceptance (see chapter 6, footnote l), is also effective.Myinclinationis to say that rule is an effectiveexercise of influence-

effective in some measure because of a politicalformulawhichhelpsto make rule a routineand acceptable activity.In chapter 6, I dispensewith the term "authority"and here with"power."I thinkLasswell andKaplan could have too, because the term "rule,"which refers to the way"controlis distributedand exercised in a body politic"(p. 208) makesboth terms superfluous.Do worldpoliticsconstitute a body politic?Certainlyall the ingredientsare present: the exercise of influence,a po-liticalformula alleging theautonomyof states as the primary vehiclefor the exercise.of influence, andan acceptance of the pattern of influ-

ence and its rewards as consonant withthe formula's requirements.Lasswell's inclusiotrof authorityin the system of definitionshe andKaplan worked outnèither excludes worldpoliticsfrom the worldofpolitics,precludes rule from worldpolitics,nor supports the constitu-tivedifferentiationof PoliticalScience and InternationalRelations.

The viewof the worldconstitutingInternationalRelations ap-propriated for itself the title "Realism."16UnlikeLasswell's compre-

How, then, to focus on both the possession and interactiondimensionsof "power"withoutbeing driven bythe structure of language to an over-ridingpreoccupation with the formerdimension? . . . For years, I havesolved this conceptual problem by droppingthe word"power"from myanalyticvocabulary (thus the use here of quotation marks) replacingitwith the concept of capabilitieswhenever reference is madeto attributesor resources possessed and withverbs such as controlor influence when-ever the relationaldimension of "power"is subjected to analysis.

16. I use the upper case for Realism to distinguish it fromphilosophical realism, asdiscussed in chapter l, and not because it is the proto-theoryconstitutingInter-

influenceas they are capable, compoundingit through conquest andconsolidating it withLasswell's other techniques of control.In principlenothing impedes this process untilit reaches the largest

scale possible (theworldas knownat that moment).In practice anumberof such violentlyerected centers of peace emerge, each athreat to the others, all vyingceaselessly and indecisivelyfor influ-ence.rs In the logicof the kviathan, these centers are locallypeacefulbecause questions of influence have been forciblysettled. Theyarestates. Their leaders have both the opportunityto wrest influencefromtheircounterparts in other states and the obligationto preventthe latter fromdoing the same. For Realists, then, worldpoliticsisproperlyconceptualized as the struggle amongstates for the rewards

that come fromeither winningtests of violence (war)or convincingothers that such tests can only workto theirdisadvantage (diplomacy).To the extent that the late Hans Morgenthau is the definingpresence

behind contemporaryRealist thought,at least in the UnitedStates,

national Relations. Presently, I discuss Functionalismas an importantalternativeto Realism, there usingthe upper case to distinguishthis term from"functional-ism,"as generally used in Anthropologyand Sociology. (See just above and chap-ter l; I borrowthis convention fromHaas 1964:5.)

17. Lasswell and Kaplan treateddiplomacyquite differently.'A diplomatis a diplo-matist withformal status; . . . ." A diplomatist"specializesin power relations(ne-gotiation and agreement) withother groups, rather than the manipulationof sym-

bols, violence,or goods and services"(1950:193, their emphasis).18. This is now conventionallycalled the "security dilemma," so named by John H.Herz, and independentlyformulatedby him and Herbert Butterfield, withduecredit to Hobbcs, ln Herz (1959:231-243).For behavioralistand special choicelheoreticrenditions, scc respectivelyJervis (1976: 58-lt3;1978),

i:,,.:Í,:.,l: l::iW q

240 Part 2: Rule

this statement needs no qualification.(For decisive evidence of Mor-genthau's position, see Vasquez 1983: 38-47.)Notall Realists are thissingle-minded.Aronacknowledged the interplay of diplomaticstruc-tures, industrialexpansion and ideologicalmovements as criticalfeatures of the present world,whileE. H. Carr identifiedmilitarypower, economic power, and power over opinionas the primarymodalitiesof control.Yet both conÍirmedtheir standing as Realistsby granting primacyrespectivelyto diplomacyand power as violence(Aron1954: 159, 165; Carc 1964:102,145).

Just as Realists thematize the largest scale structure of influence

WorldPolitics

kindof skillspecializalion that Lasswellidentified,withoutskillsmodernizationspillingover into worldpolitics.As Realists see it,force can never lose its utility(Osgood and Tücker 1967)-the projectof modernization,so understood, guarantees as much.

We begin to see whythe state is the decisiveabstraction forReal-ists, for the position of any given state in worldpoliticsaccentuatesthe modernizationof influence-garneringskillswithinthat state,whilethe situationof every state being compelled to do the sameensures that worldpoliticscan never modernize. Indeed this situa-tioncompels the intensificatipnof violence forpoliticalpurposes.2r

241



as the struggleamong states, they thematize the distributiveclaimsof influentialson that scale as the pursuit by states of their self-interest. "The main signpost that helps politicalrealism through thelandscape of internationalpoliticsis the concept of interest defined interms of power"(Morgenthau 1967:-5).te Embedded in Morgenthau'sassertion that interest is defined in terms of power is the liberalcon-ception of interest as calculation. (Compare chapter 5, footnote3.)In effect, Morgenthauconcluded that, operationallyspeaking, whatmust always be calculated is powerposition.(Hedid not concludethat thisis easily done; see 1967 197-201.) Getting the most one canof what there is to get is a matter of calculatingwhat may be donewithone's resources for violence.

The Realist viewof worldpoliticshas the considerable virtueofconsistency and simplicity.By presupposing that politicsup to a cer-tain scale leads to the formationof states and the distributionof in-fluence and rewards therein, and beyond that leads to the intensecompetitionamong states, Realists can treat worldpoliticsas sub-stantiallyunaffected by politicsat other levels. The converse neednot be true. The exigenciesof worldpoliticsmay force states to be-come more centralized and efficientin organizinginfluenceanddistributingconsequences internally.2oWorldpoliticsputs pressureon the influentialwithinstates to modernize, that is, undertake the

Lasswell felt that the "distinctivemark"of the politicalpersonality is, in displac-ing private motives ontopublic objects, "the rationalizationof the displacementin terms of public interests" (1960:262).In summarizingconsiderablesupport for his positionCharles Tillystated: "Upto our own timedramatic increases in national budgets, national debts, numbers

19.

20.

.' r ;';L' t ïffi. ffil

Because the situationstates find themselves in never changes, butmodernizedmeans can get out of hand, some Realists worryaboutthe system of internationalrelations breaking downor blowingup,but they do not see it changing fromwithin itself.Consequentlytheimage of violence-laden politicsis not just leftover fromfeudal war-riorways and their formalizationin the absolutist state, nostalgi-cally defendedby Realists against the contemporary realityof politicsin a differentkey. In the Realist reckoning,the warriorcultureofworldpoliticshas made states, and domesticpolitics,what they aretoday, and, in turn, states make worldpoliticswhat they have alwaysbeen, and more so. "War made the state, and the state made war"(Tilly1965: 42).

Howevermade, all states are legal arrangements-legalorders in

of governmentalemployees or any other indicatorof governmentalscale in Euro-pean countries have occurred almost exclusivelyas a consequence of prepara-tions for war"(1975:74). But for an alternativeview, in which "efficienttax col-lection,debt-funding and skilled, professionalmilitarymanagement kept peaceat home, and exported the uncertainties of organized violenceto the realm offoreignaffairs,"see McNeil(1982:79).Anthropologistspropose much the samealternatives indiscussing theorigins ofpremodern states (politicsin agrarianset-tings) (Service 1978).

21. Richard K. Ashley (1987: 413) has claimed that Realism "reliesupon a doublemove, a two-sided rhetoricalmaneuvre." One move is to insist that the state isa community, understood in"Western rationalistdiscourse . . . as a timeless and

universalidentity"(p. 413). The second move is to defer endlessly, on historicistgrounds, the realization of such a communityamong states (pp. 414-415). Theinterpretationofferedhere differs byfindingonly one move - the projectof mod-ernization,as Realists understand it-whichat once rationalizes arrangementswithinstates und guarantees the unchanging nuturc of relations among states.

242 Part 2: Rule

the usual nomenclature. Certaininfluentialsare designated in lawto act on behalf of the state; their ability to doso is guaranteed bygranting them a potential monopoly of violence (see also chapter 4.)In this view, the state is an enforced peace. As such it is the perfectedinstrument of the influential.Ityields them internalcontrolon thecheap and permitsthem the discretionaryuse of resources undertheircontrol in the worldcompetitionfor influenceand rewards.Realists invariably,if for the most part unreflectively,accept theplace of law-defined inlegal positivistterms as rules subject toenforcement-inmaking thestate what it is. So understood, lawis

WorldPolitics

Perhaps law defined in a particularway is irrelevantto worldpolitics,but lawyers are not. A Realist literature shows that they arenot. (See prominentlyCorbett1959, De Visscher 1968, Henkin1979,Boyle1985; fora tellingcase, see Chayes 1974.) Indeed they aremembers of the same skillsconstellation that warriorsand diplo-mats are, the very groups instrumental in the project of modernizingthe state to succeed in worldpolitics.Thisgroup of influentialsisskilled in getting what it wants by directingothers to act in certainways, explaining theconsequences of their failureto do so, and justi-fyingthe measures that may be taken to effectuate such directives.

243



instrumentalto the state but for that reason not an instrumentofthe state, at least in its relations withother states.Even in Realist terms,however, this view is defective.Lawyers,like

warriors,predate the modernizationof the state.22 Even ifwe accept(forthe moment) the argument that worldpoliticsresist moderniza-tion, lawyerscontinue to matter. Lawyersprovidearguments forandjustificationsof policies that threaten, use, or substitutefor violencein various combinations:It is they "whocan invent and elaboratethe language of justificationfor the exercise, or the denial of au-thority"zr(Lasswell1958: 107).

Vy'arriors,diplomats, and lawyers function forthe state, meaningforand as influentials, inthe adversarial settingthat the Realist viewof worldpoliticspresupposes. They engage in characteristicallyad-versarial activitiesas agents of states. The confusionarises whenlawyers speak of internationallaw as if it were an imperfectversionof the lawof the state, capable of improvement eventuating in a"worldrule of law"tantamount toa liberal worldstate (Larson 196l:3-9). The wishfulelement in this projectof "worldorder throughworld law"has deceived many realistsinto thinkingthat lawyerlyactivityis irrelevantto worldpoliticsand lawyers in general are vic-tims of illusion.

"Lawyers,trained in the canon, Roman and common law,were conspicuous inthe defense of the princes against the papacy and of the monarchs against the

nobility"(Lasswell1958: 107).This they can do in the instance of the state's domestic policies,as Lasswell sug-gested in the passage just quoted, or its foreign policies. In the latter instancethey are using their performance skills for purposes no differentthan those forwhich diplomatsuse theirs.

22.

23.

,ffi::: ì tl.W

Properly understood,diplomats and lawyers share withwarriorsthe same premodern professionalskill.It may be remembered thatLasswell identifiedthree such skillsensembles in general terms, re-spectively devotedto manipulatingsymbols, controllingsupplies,and applying violence.Lasswell emphasized the importanceof thefirstand gave passing attentionto a second.2a He understood theimportance of priestlyskill butsaw it as fadingwiththe seculariza-tion that accompanies the specialization of skillsin the modernstate. The recent resurgence of fundamentalist religionshould castdoubt on this proposition, though noton Lasswell'scontention thatpropaganda is the modernized versionof priestlyskill.Perhaps weshould say that modernizationhas not triumphedquite so decisively

as its beneficiaries are prone to declare. The nineteenth-centurydiscovery of the n4tionalidea and the psychologicalpower of na-tional identityhas of course given rise to the ideologyof the nation-state. At once symboland instrument of modernity, the nation-staterepresents a concordance-hardlythe firstbut possibly the consum-mate concordance-ofthe skillsof the priest and the warrior.

Worldpoliticsare stillthe terrainupon whichbeliefsystems aremost intenselycontested. No differently frompriests, today's propa-gandists, ideologues, teachers, and publicistsattempt to spellout themeaning and significanceof the humansituationin ways that in-

24. They are granted roughly equalattention in Lasswell (1958). In the rest of Lass-well'swork,symbol manipulationis an enduring preoccupation, whilethe flowof goods and services is ignored but for a chapter in Lasswell(1965a:107-124)and even thcre is discusscd in passive terms as a set of conditions andnot as aninstrumentof influence, suchas the phrasc "controllingsupplies" connotes.

244 Part 2: Rule

evitably affectthe distributionof influenceand rewards. In thislightwe can appreciate the quite recent inventionand diffusionof generalpublic education - It could onlyhappen in a worldof nation-states.Realists ignore this skillsconstellation because its politicaleffectsare subterranean, or discuss it in the most general terms as ideology.At least Lasswell understood its modern,instrumental character aspropaganda.

The last set of premodern skillgroups whose activitiesdecisively af-fect the distribution ofinfluence andrewards are merchants, manufac-turers, and financiers. Aswe shall also come to see, this group also in-

WorldPolitics

Realists depend on a viewof worldpoliticsthat effectivelydis-allows allbut one historicallysignificantskills constellation(andeven that one is onlypartiallyacknowledged).Realism has had itscritics.Mostof them have noticed Realism's narrow preoccupationwithpower politicsdefined byreference to the availabilityand useof organized violence.As an alternative, manysuch criticshave fo-cused on the complexityof worldpoliticsas a vast multiplicityofarenas, issues, and actors, mostof them far removed frommilitaryaffairs (Keohane and Nye1977, Mansbach and Vasquez l98l;Vas-quez 1983).

245



cludes physiciansand farmers, whomwe can provisionallyleave asidein assessing Realism andits limitationsfrom a Iasswellianpoint of view.Merchants, manufacturers, and financiersshare a concern for the pro-duction(whichLasswellignored)and distribution ofgoods. One mightthink that Realists would findthese activitiespower-related as activities,and not just as constituents of capabilities. Yet most of them have not.

There are reasons. A firmdistinctionbetween politicsand econom-ics contributes tothe constitutionofthree disciplines:PoliticalScience,Economics, andlnternalionalRelations. Theeffect is to codifythenineteenth-century liberalbelief that economics refers exclusivelytothe self-regulatingmarket.Even Keynesiangrounds for intervening ineconomies leave the core assumptions of market behavior untouched(Microeconomics)

and adjust for distortions,thoughinherent in

capi-talism,magnifiedby the scale of market activities(Macroeconomics).Underlying thisis an unwillingness togive capitalismits due-an un-willingness tobe explained atleast in part by the fact that IVIarxmadecapital and not the market thefocus of his workand, in so doing,made capitalisma dirtywordeven for its liberalbeneficiaries.

Ifwe put the politicsof abstractions like marketand capitalaside,we findthat merchants, manufacturers, andfinancierssignificantlyaffected thedistributionof influenceon a worldscale priorto therise of the modern state and continue todo so through the pervasiveagency of capitalism.Worldmovement of factors of production(ormovement lo, in the case of land and physical resources) has oftendwarfed state efforts at control and forces a distributivepattern thatstates can do no more than codify.Again,we find thatto the extentthat worldpoliticsis premodern, as Realists presume, then Realistshave underestimatedthe continuingimportanceof a major skillsconstellation, itselfsubject to modernizingtendencies withinstates.

In a kindof metaphoricalinversion, the term "arena," though sug-gesting an open space, is used to designate particulardensities ofcontacts among the officersof organizationswhose roles pertain tothe distributionof majorvalues. (I define "officer"and "role"inchapter 4.) The term "actor"refers to those hierarchies and networksof organizational functionarieswho find the ambitof theiractivi-ties specified by reference to what are usually called issues, Althoughthe term "issue" is presumably substantive rather than locational(unlike"arena"), it is conventionallyspatializedas the term "issue-area"-a,move that makes issues and arenas interchangeable.2r

Events of the last twentyyears have persuaded many Realists thatthey cannot ignore issue-areas, at least insofaras they serve to demar-

cate the worldeconomy into arenas withinwhich states contest dis-tributivequestions..One consequence is recognitionthat "hegemons"can use rules instead of militaryendeavors to reward themselvesdisproportionately. Anotheris rediscovery of economic statecraft,whichsome Realists had never forgotten (Hirschman 1980, Baldwin1985). Underlying bothof these developments is acknowledgementthat markets are not self-regulating(Polanyi1957) and capitalismnot just a Marxistconcern. Judging fromrecent majorworks (Kras-ner 1985, Gilpin1987), Realist attention to the worldeconomy hasrevitalizedthis line of thought, as neorealism.2ó

James N. Rosenau popularized the term "issue-area" in the mid-1960s; his majorstatements are reprinted in Rosenau (1980b: 153-168, 461-500).Neorealismis a term to be used withcircumspection,for it has also been appliedto Kenneth N. Waltz's reformulationof Realism in the language of Microeconom-ics, but withonly modest attention to the worldeconomy (1979; see generallyKeohane 198ó).

25.

26.

i "*-:{f,P: 'r- .

246 Part 2: Rule

Neorealismcontinues Realism's disdain for actors whichare notdefinedby their coercive capabilities, whatever the arena. In con-trast, Realism's critics treat issues/arenas and actors as interdepen-dent: The perceptionof some distributivematter as an issue securesan organizationalresponse; organizationalaffiliationmandates per-ceiving one's activitiesas referring to thatissue. Much less importantis whether actors are publicor private. Indeed, this distinctionbor-ders on the meaningless, for states as organizations are implicatedin most distributivematters, but cannotexclude other putativelypri-vate organizations fromalso being involved.

WorldPolitics

states, and by its viewof warriors and diplomats as intractablypre-modernin their practices.

Nevertheless, Functionalismdoes point to the globalconsequencesof late modernity,mediated through professionalexperts in organi-zationalemploy. Functionalism implies an insightthat students ofinternational lawcan take creditforclarifying:Skill-holderswhomatter forworldpoliticsare multiple-functionaries.They functionforparticularorganizations,the state and other organizationalcon-geries, and the global system whereby influentialsdistribute values,allat the same time (see chapter 4 for elaboration).

247



The dominantrealityin this view is not the state, but organiza-tions, of which thestate has become a complex example. The riseof organizationsis an especially notable feature of that late, decisivestage of modernityto have broughtwithit a vast alterationin theconduct and finallythe definitionof politics(Wolin1960). No longerare major distributivejudgments made of a piece, whether by vio-lence and demagoguery or through virtuouscivicpractices. Insteadthey are dividedup intoever more narrowlyconceived, task-orientedsegments of activitywhichspecifiedofficersare charged to under-take. Distributionand thus politicsin the classic mode disappearfrom view, but distributionproceeds apace. Politics are now describedby the interplayof arenas, issues, and actors, all organizationally

defined(indeed,

inter-defined).The versionof this argument appliedto the globallevel to haveachieved any real visibilityis called Functionalism(Mitrany1966;see Haas 1964 for a meticulouscritique and reformulation).BecauseFunctionalistsenthusiasticallyprojected the demise of politics,Morrgenthau, that most influentialof Realist thinkers,found them theworthiestof targets.2T CertainlyFunctionalismas it was originallyelucidated is flawed by its unwillingnessto see organizational activ-ityas intrinsicallypolitical,by its normativepreference for interna-tionalorganizations as opposed to organizations operatingwithin

27. Morgenthaucalled it "The Repudiationof Politics"(1946: chapter title, p. 4l). Hisattack centered on those who proposed to use science in solving socialproblems,but did notexclude liberalbelievers in the harmony of interests. Though the latterare the focus of Carr's critique(1964),they are not properlylumped togetherwiththose who woulddissect and solve problems-here styled Functionalists.

These skill-holders canbe warriorsand diplomats,but they canbe neitherof these alone. They mustalso be organizationalfunc-tionaries.They mayalso be propagandists or financiers,or they maybe members of occupational groups whose identityis more specifi-callymodernist - planners and managers of allsorts. The one thingthey all have in common is an organizationalaffiliationwhichmakestheir activities relevantto worldpolitics.2s

Aproper construction of Functionalismas recognitionof the im-portance of the rise of organizationwouldnevertheless acknowledgeRealisr4lscase for the persistence of politics.It wouldalso have toaccept the transformationof the state rather than argue its irrele-vance. It wouldallowfor the modernizationof those professionswhose services enabled states to emerge and engage in classical

worldpolitics.Finallyit wouldexplicatethe continuingutility ofpremodernprofessionalskillsin today's worldof organizational activity.WereFunctionalism seen in this light,then Realism couldno longer dis-miss Functionalismfor its avoidance of the eternal verities of influ-ence and its exercise. Instead, Realism could modernizeitself,so tospeak, in order to accommodate the impact of the rise of organiza-tions, within,among and beyond states, on the way global distribu-tivequestions are answered. These questions are no longer answeredas they oncewere.

28. Even professionalsnot employedto functionorganizationallyfindtheir profes-

sions increasingly organizedand given to governance.Politics intrudeon theiractivities,whether the converse is so (see Gilb1966).

,.*liLÉl i*ffi r'r

248 Part 2: Rule

VOICESOF MODERNITY

Realism has never reallyargued the primacyof guns over goods, orgood deeds. It has argued the primaryof those whose voicesspeakof war, the need for guns, the protection of goods, the absurdity ofabstractly good deeds in a worldof adversity. Realism cannot hearvoices that speak of believingor persuading, makingor trucking,much less growingand healing.A better versionof Realism wouldfindplaces for these voices, for they too are authentic expressions

WorldPolitics 249

peciallywell.Theirvery descriptionas "officers"and the impor-tance they attribute to rank and chain of command contributeto thisharmony. So does their training.Militaryofficersare socialized uni-formly inacademies and typicallyschooled in engineering, the prac-tice of whichhas been much affected by thediscoveries of scienceand analyticmethods. Militarypersonnel workwithmachines andthinkof the militaryas a machine. Eventhe forced inactivityofmilitarylife-actualfightingis an infrequentexperience formostofficers-leavesa good deal of timefor midcareer instructioninmodernmanagerial, planning,and analytictechniques.



of premodern professions whose influencecannot be denied in thedistributionof influence.For the most part, Functionalismadopts the language of tasks,

ofdoing things, butit is also reallyabout voices-voicesthat speakabout the issues and the routinesto be invoked to deal withthoseissues. Whatever else organizationalfunctionariesthinkthey do,they overwhelminglyspend theirprofessionallives speaking to eachother and committing theirwords to paper. Certainlytheir voices arelikelyto be confinedto matters other voices define for them as theirtasks, the things theyhave to do. Thus primacy goes to the recordof such voices,the writtenrecord-explanations,directives,com-mitments-whichmay be seen as the matrixof rules creating auniquelybounded organizational realitywithinwhicheach func-tionaryacts for the larger, often unrecognized purpose of distribut-ing influenceand its rewards.

The influenceof such influentialsis cumulativelydecisivebut in-dividuallyentrapped in the rule-complexcreated by others' words.Apparentlytoday's influentialshear, as they speak, in twosets ofvoices. One is the voice of their professions; the other the voiceofthe organizationalrule matrix.We can make no a priorijudgmentthat these voices necessarily clash withor complementeach other.Nor is it simplyan empiricalquestion. Each of the premodern skillgroups has a distinctivecharacter to its voice. Onlyone of thesevoices is also heard in organizational settings. In thatinstance thereis continuityand complementarity.Otherwise we may expect to findthe dissonance that is for many the emblemof modernityand sub-ject of modernism.

Amongpeople trained in soldierlyand diplomaticskills,militaryofficersharmonize their professionaland organizationalvoices es-

ffi*

By contrast, diplomatsarg notoriouslyunwillingto enhance theirskillsby learning these same techniques. They insist on the personaland informalnature of their skills,and they tend to display apre-modern sense of community through their highlyritualized interac-tions. Itmust also be remarked that diplomats are no longersolelyor even chieflyresponsible for relationsamong governments. Indeedtheir share of responsibilityhas declined in inverse relationto thegrowthof the bureaucratic apparatuswithin,among, and bcyondstates. In other words, diplomatshave retained theirpremodern in-tegritygt the expense of relevance.

Whytheywouldhave done so is an interestingquestion. By pro-fession diplomatsare less subject tohighly formalizeddisciplineandless compelledto adapt to machines and theiruse than soldiers are.They are also trained differently. Diplomatstend to see themselvesas broadlyeducated humanists andgeneralists. They also clingtothe fictionthat they represent the "sovereign,"as if sovereignty anylonger had the personal qualityonce attached to it. Allthis evidencesuggests that diplomatshave no professional creed except as Realismprovides (Hicksand others 1982). Yet Realism, as we have seen, fostersa belief that the practice of worldpoliticsmakes the modern statepossible by not becoming modernitself. Aswithpractice, so withthe practitioner:This the diplomatconcludes, but wrongly.Theworldof organizations that Realist diplomacymakes possible in-cludes the diplomatas officer.

Bybeing stubbornlypremodern, diplomatshear onlyone voice,

the voice we hear as Realism, and they are condemned to increasingirrelevance, along withtheircreed. l,awyers represent a differentsitua-tion.As already noted, theytoo are members of the skillsconstella-tion inwhich voice is modulated byan adversarialorientationand

250 Part 2: Rule

a reductive method of work.They take a given problem apart so asto identifythe point at whichan argument can be presented, orjustificationoffered,fora particulardispositionof that problem.Yet under pressure fromthe rise of organization, legal vocation hasshown a certain schizophrenia.

Introduceddeliberately for modernizingpurposes, the Napole-onicCode has of course decisivelyshaped Continentaltendencies.Here it wouldseem that the adversarial orientationof lawyeringhasbeen subordinated to the deductivemethod of discoveringdefiniteanswers to all legal questions in the code. The latter activity directly

h i i l l ll d h d i

WorldPolitics 251

legal paradigmin the Anglo-Americanworld, wellnamed IrgalPositivism,holds that the state exists for the utilitarianpurpose ofusing its organizationalrationalityand marshaling resources to securethe greatest good for society. Anglo-Americanlawyers acknowledgeboth a premodern creed of professionalpractices and the influenceof a disciplinewitha modernizing impulse.

There is undoubtedly a deep contradictionbetween the commonlawyer's affectionforcases, rights, and litigation,and the prevailingutilitarianpositivismand organizationally situated employmentofthe legalprofession. That contradictionmay be personalized forjunior

l h h liperhaps

h h k h di j



supports the organizationalcomplex called the state as it extends itsimpersonalrule to so many aspects of social lifepreviouslysuscepti-ble to adversarial definition.Even ifadministrationis an organiza-tionalalternative to adversarial confrontation,we must rememberthat the techniques involvedare merely a refinement of languagedeveloped in the firstinstance foradversarial purposes.

The contrast withthe Anglo-Americanexperience withlaw couldnot be much greatern The substantial decentralizationof legal judg-ment and its separation fromother activitiesof states are conjoinedwiththe strong dispositionin legal trainingboth to emphasize theimportanceof uniquelycomplex cases in shaping the contours oflaw and to promote an inductivemethod of discovery in which thefacts of any case, rather than the contentof a set code, representa startingpoint. To all this must be added a preoccupation withrights that are seen as somehow antecedent to lawand thus a limita-tion on administrativefiat.2e These traits make Anglo-Americanlegal trainingand practice obdurately adversarial as wellas hostileto the analyticaland organizationalactivitiesof the times.

Nevertheless, a significantand undoubtedlyincreasing propor-tion of lawyers, at least in the UnitedStates, enter publicservice orpursue careers in large, hierarchicalorganizations.30 The dominant

29. Richard E. Flathman (1976:44)took these rights as constructions of.,the liberalprinciple"as developed in "moraland legal practice." (On rights see also chapter

5.) The late modern career of the liberalstate has in fact seen a massive shiftfrom rights as limitson administrative fiat to administered entitlements. Theo-dore J. l,owihas argued that this portends ,,the end of liberalism,"as a well-knownbook of his is entitled (1979).

30. see Galanter (1982)on the differencebetween what he called ordinarylawyering

lawyers when they realize, withshock, the disjuncturebetween their trainingand their duties.3r People recoverfromsuchshocks usually, and theylearn whatthey have to. Perhaps what theylearn most readily,because it is implicit inso muchof their training,is that the specific job of most organizationally situatedlawyers isto provide justificationsforwhateverpractices their organizationsmay engage in or contemplate.

Justificationfollowsthe same workingprocedure as analysis. Onestarts witha given situation, breaks it intoas many parts as possible,and seizes on the part whichbest lends itselfto defense against apotentialadversary's assault. Or one codifies suchpractices to besure they are consistent withrelevant rulesand drafts relevant rulesin anticipationof what is organizationallyneeded. These are thetasks of lawyersgleaned fromlegal training,even if it has an adver-sarial orientation,and rewarded in organizational settings.

The generally justificatorytone of the modern lawyer's voicesup-ports the analyticmode of talkingemblematic of late modernityandconnects withthe historic roleof the lawyer in arguing for a client'sposition.Whether trained in civil orcommon law, the lawyerhasmade the transition to today's worldalmost as wellas the soldier andcertainlybetter than thediplomat.That internationallaw is not prop-erly law bylegal positivistcriteriais no bar to the justificatoryrole

and megaJawyering, thatis, working forspecific clients andworking inand forlarge organizations.

31. David Kennedy's interpretation is slightlydifferent:He finds the disjuncturebe-tween "power"and "administration"already evidentin training,and resolved in

. the lattcr's favor byemployment in a "dcpoliticizedprocedural order" (1985:3ó8-369).

.i* ili :: :' . 'ffi.r*

252 Part 2: Rule

of lawyers in worldpolitics,because the point is to identifyrulesauthorizingan organizational activity(normallythat of the state,but also of multinationalcorporations,for example) and not toshow that these rules are subject to enforcement.Recourse to suchjustifications,likediplomacy, isa peaceful means of-notalterna-tiveto-"attacking."

kt us norv turn to the other two skillsconstellationsand gaugethe effects of the rise of organizationon them and theirplace inworldpolitics.Lasswell saw the importanceof one constellation-priests and propagandists - both before and after the rise of organi-

ti d di ti f liti I ll' h i th i tld f f

WorldPolitics

subordinationof teachers, likepriests before them, to publicser-vice. Onlya few teachers, professors for the most part, escape thisdamper on free conjecture by definingthemselves as scholars, andeven they tend towardcircumspection.

Teachers and scholars are joinedin their skillsconstellationby avarietyof other people skilledin disseminating information.Amongthem are journalists,advertisers, even eccentric pamphleteers, play-wrights, andlyricistsfor popularmusic,allof whom weave conjec-ture into the stories they tell. The historicplace of entertainers infostering a common identityamong people remains, althoughit is

l ff t db i ti lrealities. Rather, the

il bili ff d i h ll k f

259



i

L

zations and repudiationof politics.I-asswell'semphasis on the priestlydutyof protecting and disseminatingthe central beliefsof any so-ciety tends, however, to misrepresent the distinctivefeatures of priestlytalk. AsI note in chapter 3, priests do more than safeguard suchbeliefs. Theirstories and explanationsprovideworldswithmeaningand significance.

Conjecture, whichwas the privilegeof priests, is perhaps the stuffof "primalpolitics":"ceremonyand symbolism . . . are not to beregarded as mere pretty trappings of power . . . " (Eckstein, 1982: 412).The subordination of priests intohierarchies and the appropriationof their services by warriors in agrarian societies, not least the earlymodern state, is perhaps the key to the eclipse of priestlyconjecture.Kingsmay retain priests forprivateprophecy, but kings need priestsmostlyfor public reinforcementof their primacy. Everywherethe in-stitution ofkingshiphas depended on "religiousauthentication,. . ."32This is not to say that skill inconjecturedisappeared in the warrior-worldof the early modern Vy'est, leaving priests merely as propagan-dists. Religiousrenegades frequentlyrecur.

Moreover, the teaching profession has always maintained its privi-lege to conjectureas a part of its skill inexplainingthe meaning ofconditionsand events in this world,thereby constitutingthe worldas it is known.Teachers perenniallydisplay the tension between theirskillin inculcationand theirskill atconjecture; they undoubtedlytransmit to their students an ambivalence whichis heightened by the

32. Bendix(1978:22)See generallyhis chapter 2 ("Sacred and Secular Foundarionsof Kingship');in thisunholyalliance, "expertsin esoteric knowledgealso havemuch secular influence . . :'(p.22).

ti

surely affectedby organizational availabilityofmass media fordisseminatingentertainment is one hallmarkof to-day's world.The use of spectacle to hide politicsand protect theprivilegedis too wellknownto require furthercomment.Propa-ganda is not simplysymbolmanipulationby a fewprofessionals. Itis more generally the management of spectacle.

Yet even this artfulsymbiosisof secular religionand technologi'callyenhanced controlover importantbusiness is pervaded by thcsmallconjectures, odd associations, and playof imaginationthatcannot be fullycontrolled.When today's secular priests guard thestanding arrangments of the state (a warrior's task),they can rarelydo so witha monopolyof priestlyskills.Norcan they do so withoutriskof conjectural contamination.Inasmuch as the worldis organ-ized so that no one hierarchyor bureaucraticnetworkmonopolizesinfluence and its rewards, competitionamong secular religionsmaystrengthen the hold of each on its own public,in reaction to thethreat offeredby the others, but it also offerseveryone a view toother spectacles, the enticement of selective borrowingand evenprivateroom for conjecture.

To studyworldpoliticsas if the activitiesof warriors,lawyers,and diplomatswere not entwined withthe activitiesof publicper-formers is to ignore the cognitivereality in which the holders of ad-versarialskillsare located. Alsoslighted is the specificinterplay ofsuch skillswithpriestlyskillsin conjecture and inculcationin organ-izing today'sdistributivesituation. Organizations may be refined ver-

sions of the adversarial skillsconstellation; priests and professorsmay hold outagainst organizationalencroachment.Yet the impera-tive of modernity has had an irrevocable impact onthe relation be-tween these two skillsconstellations.On the one hand, priests, pro-

.ffi. irËffi tr

254 Part 2: Rule

fessors, and publicistssacrifice conjecturefor inculcationin thename of analyticalrigor,professionaldiscipline,and organizationalnecessity. On the other, organizationalfunctionarieshave their mindsinvaded and their voices altered, howeversubtly, byfugitiveconjec-tures, cosmopolitanconceits, and even the imperfectlymediated,allegedly foolishtalk of the unskilled,excluded masses.

The other skillsconstellationto whichwe must attend is lessdistinctin its contemporary contoursthan the others. This maybe whyLasswellgranted it so littleattention. Indeed it is easierto talkabout the origins andpremodern character of the skillthanfindan appropriate umbrellaterm for the diverse collectionofprofessionals h d d thi kill f l g l di t ib ti

WorldPolitics

phasis comes fromthe practices of lawyersand judges. Lawyerssug-gest answers to distributivequestions favorable to theirclients, whilejudges decide between competinganswers by sortingthroughothersuch cases and matchingthem to the one at hand. The commonthread to allsuch claimshas to do withwhat promises and com-mitments are impliedin any set of conditionsat issue. A contractor titlemerelyformalizes whatis already at issue:who gets what asan implicationof who does what, and vice versa.

Questions of propertyand contract presuppose the existence ofexchange. Presumably silentbarter is possible, but the norm is ram-

t performative t lk ff and counter offer promise and acf i

255



i

professionals who depend on this skill forlarge scale distributivepurposes. The skillin question is one of hunting-as I observe inchapter 3, huntingfor clues, diagnosing a condition,takingcareof needs.

Huntingis not a verbalskill.Hunters and gatherers need no voiceexcept insofaras they wish to coordinate activities.Ofcourse hunt-ers talkabout whythey do, ifonly topass on their skills to others.Such talk is substantiallydevoted to spelling outthe implicationsofwhat they experience-hunters learn to "read" the signs they encounterby matchingensembles of particulars against other such ensembles,or "cases," they and other have encountered. Cases are preciselywhatphysicians talkabout and, as we saw above, common lawyersare also trained in this same diagnosticorientation(withconfusionattending, given the fact that lawyers tend not to practice what theyteach). Is there something to be learned fromthis peculiarityofAnglo-Americanculture?

The common lawarose independently of warriorsand their ac-tivities.It antedates controlover distributivequestions throughthecrown,and it rules day-to-day affairs on the assumptionof absence,or at least indifference,of those skilled in issuing and enforcingdi-rectives fromon high. Thecommonlaw provides answers to dis-tributivequestions by decidingwho has claim to what on the basisof occupancy, use, agreement, or performance.33The adversarial em-

33. The parallel developmentof ideas of property and sovereignty in the early mod-ern period suggests that a "common law"of property and contract underlies thestate system Realists take to be the creation of warriors(Ruggie 1986: l4l-148).

I

pant performative talk-offerand counter-offer, promise, and ac-ceptance, more or less formal,priorto the actual exchange. Whenno one haggles in a market, it is because performativetalk has beensuperseded by a generalized system of exchange in which prices areset (and marked) on thebasis of aggregate behavior, towhich marketparticipants contributein deciding whether or not to engage in anexchange at the set price. MostEconomists have become so preoc-cupied withthe special character of this generalized, self-regulatingsystem ("the"market)that they discount the verbal dimension ofexchange. Indeed theyhave abandoned it, at least in the English-speaking world,to lawyers.

Economistsare not members of the same skills constellationthatmothers, farmers, andphysicians are. The most influentialEcono-mists are teachers, members of a discipline.Those professionalswhose activitiesare devoted to the practicalnecessity of exchange(participatingin markets)belong withthose who nurture,growandheal. One can generalize about markets and failto noticewhat phe-nomena those markets exist to expedite - the exchange of goods andservices human beings have produced, whether through growing,making,or even learning that other people want to have or learnabout. Allsorts of skills in production- doing skills- take on an ad-ditionalverbal dimension when the need comes to distributewhatis produced.

When wealthis produced, it too raises distributivequestions. Tothe extent that re-investment in productiveactivityis a favored an-swer under conditionsof modernity,we must be referringto capital-ism as a productive-distributivecomplex. Inthis complexthe genera-tive interrelationof production,exchange, and wealth is mediatedby professionals, like financiers,whose skillsare precisely the verbal

ffi r :t..ff - ff i

256 Part 2: Rule

skillsof securing commitmentand promisingconsequences. Theyenter into contracts, buy andsell titles,and generally engage in theperformativetalk of exchange, talk thatis indistinguishablefromthe hagglingof premodern exchange. Paper and now electronicallykept records are extensions of this kindof talk,and capitalismandits agents could not survive withoutthem. The inventionof modernaccounting methodsis in this sense an organizationaladaptationand routinizationof a skillassociated withexchange and the recogni-tion ofwhat exchanges imply.

Dealing withthe implicationsof exchange is more generally a skill

of financiersand other skilledhandlers of capital for they must alfi d h l i li t d i h l b f d ti

WorldPolitics 257

Realists are wellon the way to remedyingtheir conspicuous ne-glect of the worldeconomy. Yettheir resistance to the idea thatinfluence-related skills have been modernized through organizationalaffiliationextends to the possibilitythat the same trajectory of mod-ernization has affected the nexus of material productiveactivityandexchange relations. Were they to see these twinconsequences of therise of organizations, they would then be able to see that organiza-tionalties permit,even require, historicallyseparate skillsto bejoined such that worldpoliticsand the worldeconomy are nowinextricable-thepeople doing theone are doing theother. What

they do is almost entirely' amatterof what they say to each otheri h f ti l f h i f i l kill



of financiersand other skilledhandlers of capital, for they must al-ways find themselves implicated in a whole web of productive ac-tivitiesand exchange relations: Capitalism almostseems to have alifeof its own. Alwaysand unpredictably changing,linkedto eco-nomic"growth,"capitalismcalls forthjust those organicmetaphorsthat financiershavp in common withmothers, farmers,physicians,and all those who depend on huntingskills.

The social connectionbetween capitalism as materiallyproduc-tive activityand exchange-related skillsnecessary fordistributionconstitutes a connection as wellbetween the materialworldof pro-duction and distributionand the politicalworldof the distributionof influenceand, through the latter, materialrewards. The symbioticrelationof business to government,no less than of state ministriesresponsible for planning productionto those effectuatingdistribu-tion,presents an organizationallymediated versionof the more basicrelationshipbetween those skilledin workingout the implicationsofinvestment, property, contract, and such on production and thosewho apply the same skills to distribution- and not just the distribu-tion or "marketing"of particularproducts, but the distributionofall kinds of socially consequential benefitsat the largest scale (seefurther Lindblom1977).

Merchants and princes were once distinguishableif interdepen-dent groups. So at a later time were financiersand prime ministers.Today their skillfulsuccessors cannot be so easily distinguished. Theminglingof analyticand diagnosticmethods, of justificatoryand

implicativelanguage, or directives andcommitments, fairlyrepre-sents the complexcharacter of the dual dependence on capitalismformaterialgrowthand a "healthyworldeconomy" andon organiza-tions to "keep the machine running."

they do is almost entirely amatterof what they say to each other,in the performativelanguage of their professional skills,over theorganizationalcircuits that tie them together.

As suggested earlieç the situationis no different forthose whoseskills in conjecture,persuasion, and explanation establish meaningand significance. Religionsand ideologies entwinewithpoliticsandeconomics at the largestscale. No longer is the "who"of worldpoli-tics a simplematter - a matter of findingthe rightcategory, theprince, the soldier. Nor is the "who"of the worldeconomy the mer-chant, the owner. Allthe relevant "who's"are officersof organiza-tions. Yet their organizational connectedness tells onlypart of thestory. The rest is told by their professional orientations, whicharedistinctivelypremodern in the workinglanguages they foster. Thosedistinctiverealms of performativetalkbetray alternative,equallyskillfulways of making social reality, includingthe realityof influ-ence and reward,workout advantageously.

r #1 'fii 1 ïïi :ì ii, ,,,:,rlìrffi1,,:

RATIONALITYANDRESOURCES

Rationalityand Resources 259

"at minimum,rationalitycomprises two ideas: consistenry and choiceof appropriate means to one's ends, whatever they maybe" (1982:371). To similar effectis John Harsanyi'sdefinition:'Ata common-sense level, in its simplest form,rationalitymeans choosing (whatis or at least what one thinks to be) the best means to achievingagiven end, goal, or objective"(1983:231, his emphasis).

Choices are deeds, and deeds choices. Rationalitydescribes animportantproperty of deeds: They always relate available meanstoidentifiableends. Because I start withdeeds, I start withrationality,so understood.I also note that means-ends definitionscomportwithmy earlier remarks on competence (chapter 3). Anyhuman in-dividualcapable of reasoning or using rules is also able to make con-



People are rational.They have ends and make choices accordingly.Rules bound situationsof choice by definingrreans and ends avail-able to choosers. In the face of diverse ends, we order preferences,which requires us to compare possible states of affairs.There are threegeneral possibilitiesyieldingthree generalized yet immediate endscommon to humanity,or interests. tü/iththe help of several majorwriters,I identifythese as standing, security, andwealth.

The reasons people givefor their conduct alsopoint to interestsso construed. People impute the same interests to collectivitiessuchas states, offering themas reasons of state or national interests. Isuggest that orientinginternationalrelations to security interests,asInternationalRelations scholars are prone to do, misses the impor-tance of standing and wealth as sources of conduct. Whatever in-terests individualspursue, for themselves or as agents of states, theydo so withnecessarily unequal access to resources and withconse-quences that are also necessarily unequal. I provide a criterionforthe presence of exploitationin differentsocial arrangements, and Iarriveat the unhappy conclusionthat the eliminationof one formof exploitationwillenhance some other.

COMPARISON

Few terms have engendered as much discussion withinthe socialsciences as has "rationality."Mostdefinitionsare unobjectionablein theirown terms. Thus Brian Barryand Russell Hardinstated that,

dividualcapable of reasoning or using rules is also able to make con-sistent choices appropriate to her ends. Anycompetent individualcan of course make mistakes andmisjudgments, butshe is also cap-able of recognizing themas such.r Ifrationalityso construed is tauto-logical ortrivial-everybodyis rationalbecause everybody is some-body-then this is not a problem, just a place to begin.2

l. Some mistakes and misjudgments aresystematic. They occur so prcdlctablylncertain situations(forexample, crises) that they effectivelyqualifythc substan-tivemeaning of rational conduct for these situations (Jervis 1976). This does notdefeat the possibilityof theory premised on the assumption of rationality,asFerguson and Mansbach have argued (1988: 146-160). It does require qualifica-tions and amendments to any such theory, thereby renderingit more complexand less tellingas a paradigm theory for PoliticalEconomy. Insofaras peoplecannot learn to make some "mistakes"they systematically domake, it suggeststhat the primaryterms of socialchoice theory, not people, are the problem. Be-cause the theory is a linguisticconstruction, its figures of speech may not capturethe cognitiveworldof perfectlyrationalpeople. For example, gambling is the"dominantmetaphor used to conceptualizerisky decision making. .. ." Do peo-ple thinkas if they are choosingbetween "riskygambles"when faced withuncer-tainty? (Einhornand Hogarth1987: 42; see generallytheir useful discussion).Ifpeople learn not to make mistakes in situations of uncertainty, as defined bysocial choicetheory, it is because they learn to employ themetaphor for thosesituations preferredby socialchoice theorists who are faced withthe expositorydemands of theorizing(see also chapter 3, footnote 16, on nonpropositionallearning.)

2. I believe thisconstructionof rationalityis saved from complete tautologybecausesome (l wouldsay, small)range of human behavior is strictlyreflexiveor instinc-tive. lnsofaras such behavior is not mediated cognitively(socially),and thus notsubject to choice, it is not rational.Such behavior maynonetheless be what anindividualwouldchoose, were she not at that moment exclusively subject to re-flexor instinct.Compare thissituationwiththat of nonhuman life(next footnote).

ffi- r'.í i.

260 Part 2: Rule

One mightobject that Barryand Hardin'sidentificationof thechooser as "one" and Harsanyi's passive constructionbeg the im-portant questions, who chooses? Mygloss on their definitionsmakesthe "who"to be a human individual.Machines can make choices,but onlyas skillfulextensions of human individuals.Nonhumanforms of life(amoeba, household pets, and so on) act as if they arerational(the way a human individualwouldchoose to in the samecircumstances),but they cannot be said to make choices the wayhumans do. This is because nonhuman lifelacks foresightand can-not countenance alternatives (Elster1979: 4-28).2Collectivities donot make choices; individualsdo as agents of collectivities.

"Collec-tive rationality"is a contestable euphemism inasmuchas the aggre-

Rationalityand Resources

ously one's rational choice under the circumstanceof multiplemeansand ends is complicatedby the problemof informationand thepossibilityof error. Furthermore,one must deal withuncertainty,whether arising froma poorlyunderstood material environmentorthe circumstances of other people's choices made in anticipationofone's own (that is, strategic interaction).a

Everyone who is competent acts rationallyin a worldof contin-gency. Herbert A. Simon has called this "bounded rationality"(1985:295-297).The term ismisleading. Rationalityas procedure is notbounded, any more than "satisficing"(another, even more famous

termof Simon's) substitutesformaximizingas a description of ra-tional conductPeople sensiblychoose alternatives suited t their cir

261



Collective rationality is a contestable euphemism, inasmuchas the aggre-gate of rationalchoices is rarely compatiblewithwhat is rationalfromthe collectivepoint of view. This isa crisp descriptionof oneimpedimentto collectiveaction, the explorationof whichthe theoryof social choicehas so powerfullyassisted.

One mightnote a modest differencebetween Barryand Hardin'sand Harsanyi'sdefinitionsof rationality.Both refer to "means,"butthe former to"ends," the latter to "end." Accordingto Harsanyi, tomove fromone end to many alternative ends implies a generalizedmodelof rationality."Thismodel is the preference model,underwhicha person acts rationallyifhe followsa transitiveand completeset of preferences among all his possible goals" (1983:232). Obvi-

3. Inapplyinggame theory to nonhuman life,Robert Axelrodhas identifiedin-dividuallyexercised "survivalstrategies" collectively resulting innatural selectionand evolution.The process of evolutiondepends on competition,as is customarilybelieved,and on cooperation, as Axelroddemonstrated (1984: 88-105):

It is encouraging to see that cooperation can get started, can thrivein avariegated environment, andcan pÍotect itselfonce established. But whatis most interesting is howlittlehad to be assumed abóut the individualsor the social settings to establish these results. The individualsdo not haveto be rational:the evolutionaryprocess allows the successful strategies tosurviveeven if the players do not know whyor how. Nordo the playershave to exchange messages or commitments. They do not need words,because their deeds speak for them (pp. 173-174).

Not onlyneed not these individualsbe rational,they cannot be, unless they arehuman. The terms "strategies", "players,"and "deeds" are strategicallychosenfor their expressive effect.

termof Simon s) substitutesformaximizingas a description of rational conduct.People sensiblychoose alternatives suited to their cir-cumstances. What isbounded, in various ways, is the situationinwhichchoices are made. V/hat bounds situations arerules.

In chapter l, I hold thatrules do not "govern"all that is social.People always have a choice, which is to followrules or not. Insteadrules govern the constructionof the situationwithinwhich choicesare made intelligible.The simplest situation is one in whicha singlerule constitutes the boundaries of choice. Either one followsthatrule or not. Mostsituations are bounded bya number of rules. Atchoice then is not just whether to followa rule, but which one, towhat extent and so on.

Rules establishinga market's boundaries are intended to hold inabeyance all other rules affectingchoice. It mightbe better to say:Held in abeyance are all otherrules of comparable formality.Peoplemaking marketchoices follow avarietyof informalinstructions(maxims like,qualityover quantity),directives(shop sales), and com-

4. Acknowledginga multiplicityof ends under conditions of uncertainty solves theproblem of "whether it is 'rational'to maximizepossible gain, minimizepossibleloss, possible regret, or satisfy still different criteria"(Kratochwil1987:312).Tomaximizegain and minimize loss withrespect to a given end are indeed alteÍna-tives ends, respectively to be maximized. Bothare rational choices, although onerisks moreto get more, the other riskingless to get less. Whichis preferred de-

pends on additionalfactors such as the propensityto accept risks, defer rewardsand other traitsconstituted by a history of rationalchoices. Procedurallyspeak-ing, whether gains are maximized,losses minimized,and so on does make a dif-ference to social choice theorists (see Frolichand Oppenheimer 1978: 49-65 foran accessible introduction),

ffii ;r.lili,#ii:.r. :i. ffi:

262 Part 2: Rule

mitments (my best goods formy best customers). The point of themarket is to construct a situation where individualscan make choiceswithgood informationand littlerisk among clear and limitedal-ternatives.This is precisely the consequence of a situationruled bythe single choice of whether to followa rule. In other words, a marketgeneralizes the simplest situation of choice, whichis paradigma-ticallyconstituted by a single relevant rule. The existence of informalrules that people bringwiththem to the market (and of course tomore complicatedsituations;compare Keohane 1984: 113-116, on"rulesof thumb")complicates the simple, generalized situationof

the market, but not to thepoint

thatEconomists are driven todespair.

Rules like marketsprovideopportunitiesfor individuals not to act


Allegeddifferences between Economists and Sociologists(Mitchell1969, Barry 1970)-theformerare mathematical and mechanical,the latter discursive and organismic, to use Barry'swords (p. 3)-derive fromdifferences in the respectiveoperative paradigms of themarketand modern society. The formerpresents people withsim-ple, exclusivelybounded situations,the latter withsituations com-plicated by multiple,overlapping rulesets. Nothingrequires an "or-ganismic"characterizationof the latter sort of situations; nothingrequires a mathematical characterizationof the former. Each char-acterizationis the more readilyundertaken for the situation to which

we are apt to findit applied.Ifone does avoid the organismic incharacterizingsituations for whichmodern society isparadigmatic



the market, but not to thatRules, like markets,provideopportunitiesfor individuals,not to actmore rationally,but to get better results frombeing as rationalasthey always are.

In the absence of a simplybounded situation,an individualmayface a multiplicityof converging and reinforcingrules such that nochoice appears, at least to the observer, to be freelymade. Tàke lifein a monastery. Rational individualsalways choose courses of actionconsistent withthe bulkof rules, because no other course of actionis available-Rulescover almost all contingencies.In such a situa-tion we may be forgiven for saying that rules govern. It is less for-givableto say unreservedly that this situationis the operativepara-digmof premodern social life.One such paradigm it is, the one \rye

often pickto hold in oppositionto the paradigmatic situationofmodernity.

For purposes of rationalchoice, the most salientfeatures of moder-nityare the manyintersecting boundariesderivingfromcompetingrule sets. In these situations, individuals mustchoose courses of ac-tion that cannot be readilychanged, often undercircumstances thatpresent no clear grounds for rational choice. Intersecting boundariesdefine roles and expectationssuch that individualsperceive them-selves paradoxicallyfree to choose among many alternatives butunable to make the most of choices available to them. The Soci-ologistis prompted to view this situationfromthe perspective ofmultiple rulesets, because this procedure seems likelyto tellthe

Sociologistmore about any individual's conduct thanthe individual,or her choices, can. There is a danger, however. The Sociologistrunsthe risk ofimputinga teleology tothe situation- all too easily oncethe situationis rendered descriptivelycoherent and calleda system.

we are apt to findit applied.Ifone does avoid the organismic incharacterizingsituations for whichmodern society isparadigmatic,one is leftwiththe discursive, not by default,or as a defect, but asan attemptat descriptiveadequacy.

Procedural differences are to be expected among disciplinarypara-digms. Theycan also be expected to persist, even when disciplinarianssee their operative paradigms overlapping. WhenEconomists (or,more properly, social choice theorists) andSociologistsargue overthe rationalityof peasants, for example, the debate dissipates oncethe polemics are past. No one seriously disputes Samuel L. Popkin'sclaim on behalfof PoliticalEconomythat peasants are rational(1979).Instead, the argument turns on the proper characterization of thevillageas the situation withinwhichthese rational people must con-duct themselves.

Ifvillagerscan readily disaggregate this situationintoseparatelybounded ones (household, market) withinwhichthey can makebeneficialchoices, they will.If they cannot, it is because of themultiplicityof converging rulesand material constraintswe identifywiththe premodern situation(Popkin1979:32-82).So long as gra-tuitous qualities are not imputedto the village-moral,romantic,teleological- then I, forallmy discursiveinclinations,can onlyagreewithPopkin's assertion that, "when the peasant takes intoaccountthe likelihoodof receivingthe preferred outcome on the basis of in-dividualactions, he willusuallyact in a self-interested manner"(p. 31, Popkin'semphasis). There is no need to qualifythis state-

ment: The peasant willalways act self-interestedly(and all actionmust be individual).Nor can I disagree that "the actions of individu-ally rationalpeasants in both market and nonmarketsituations donot aggregate to a 'rational'village"(p. 3l).So it is withthe rest of

' 1ffi::l *ã # tffiffireir

264 Part 2: Rule

the world. Finally,I agree withPopkin that, by using this approach,"we can discuss how and whygroups of individualsdecide to adoptsome set of norms whilerejecting others. . . . Under whatcondi-tions willindividualsconsider bendingor breaking norms?"(p. l8).And,of course, when do they not?5

What can I disagree with? Popkinclaimed to have constructed forhimselfa deductive frameworkwithinwhichto "recast the historicaland inductiverichness" of the Sociologists(p. 5). Yet the latteralsoworked withina frameworksusceptible to deductivepresentation.Popkinprovidedit (pp. 5-17). That presentation took the villageas

rule-governed,that is,blanketed

withrules

eliminating thepossi-

bilityof individualchoices. This is not, however, the operative para-


in chapter l.)The key to this extension is providedby the acknowl-edgement that individuals,in order to act rationally,must compare"utilities."

As Jeremy Bentham taught, utilityis the "propertyin any object,wherebyit tends to produce benefit . . . to the partywhose intentis considered: if that party be the communityin general, then thehappiness of the community:ifa particular individual,then the hap-piness of that individual"(1948, quoted in chapter 5.) Rationalin-dividualsalways prefer what benefits them. The problem is for anyindividualto develop a consistent set of preferences fromthe many

candidates. In other words, the move froma simple means-end con-ception of rationalityto the generalized preference model preferred



g ,that is, with e at g t ebilityof individualchoices. This is not, however, the operative pdigm of complexlybounded situations,definingmodernity and theSociologist's concern. Whether the villageis one or several sepa-rately bounded situations,Popkin found it disappearing intoa largerworld,a worldI wouldcharacterize Sociologically.Popkin's disci-plinarypredilections(the rule set "governing"his own scholarlyvil-lage) prevent him fromfollowingthe villagervery farinto modernity.

Ifrationalityhas to do withthe best choice of means to ends,"whateverthey maybe" (quoting Barry and Hardinagain), then themore means and ends there are, the more difficultit is forpeopleto act in a way that scholars can characterize mathematically andmechanically.Faced withcomplexity,people are inefficient.Theysettle for small portionsof many ends, or ends that can be readilyachieved, and so on. They mayeven findsatisfaction in inefficiency.We call conductirrational onlybecause we know too littleabout itto appreciate the ends it is directed to.

To pass over such situations on procedural groundsor defer theirconsiderationare rationalchoices for scholars withpositivistcom-mitments.There is another choice, whichalso starts with individualconduct but proceeds beyond to social constitution.Such a choicerequires an extension of methodologicalindividualism;not its rejec-tion.(Recall the discussionof epistemological andontologicalbridges

5. Barryconceded that "there wouldbe nothing logicallyinconsistent in combin-ing . . . an emphasis on norms witha theory in whichgoals are rationallypur-sued subject to constraints" (Barry 1970: l8l).Popkin found this combinationa useful one. ObviouslyI take it to be indispensable.

, o pception of rationalityto the generalized preference model preferredby Economists (Harsanyi1983 232) demands the comparison ofutilities.(Often they are "expected utilities";see footnote 4 and chap-ter 6, footnote 15.)

For Bentham, such comparisons are demanded for all membersof a collectivity,because the aggregate of individualpreferences con-stitutes "the happiness of the community."Bentham himself acknowl-edged the difficulty ofaggregating the necessarily subjectivelyde-fined preferences of many individuals(Arrow1983: 48). Economistssince VilfredoPareto have gone further:They proscribed interper-sonal comparison.Morepreciselythey rejected the possibilityofcardinalutilities,which in turn "rendered meaningless a sum-of-utilitiescriterion.Ifutilityfor an individualwas not even measur-able, one could hardly proceed to adding utilitiesfordifferentindi-viduals"(Arrow1983: 122; see generally 47-49, 103-105, 115-132).

Yet individualsobviouslydo make interpersonal comparisons.They compare their circumstances withthose of other people. Theirchoices must always be, as a matter of definition,between prefer-ences that are their own, notbetween their preferences and someoneelse's. People construct preferences fromcomparisons of states ofaffairs and then compare preferences forchoice. Because all suchstates of affairsare social by definition,they always involveotherindividualsand their attributes, preferences and choices. ,'Even theapparently simplest act of individualdecision involvesthe participa-

tion of a whole society" (Arrow1983: 63).Comparisonis at once a cognitiveand a social act. Cognitiondepends on reasoning and the possibilityof speech, even ifnothingis spoken. Comparison depends on abductive reasoning, assertion

rffi .:r:ifiiii

266 Part 2: Rule

(ifonly to one's self) and metaphor(compare chapter 4, footnote23.) What people compare are states of affairs that must alreadyhave been constructed to allow comparison.These I call the groundsof comparison. They maybe constructed to include oneself and ex-clude all others, to includeoneself and only one other, and to in-clude oneself witha number of others. These three possibilitiescon-stitute the groundsof comparisoninto three categories: internalcomparison (or, in the language of social choice, intrapersonalcom-parison), binary(or interpersonal)comparison,and globalcomparison.

How we undertake comparison is always the same. What we com-pare makes for the differentcategories of comparison. In the in-


welfare,which is relationallydeterminate. Anygain to either onemust come at the expense of the other.

The preferred situation for either chooser could well involvealoweraggregate of welfare for both. Because it is a relation of moreand less, and not an amount, which constitutes what is jointlyvalued,comparisonmay be ordinal.If the relation between choosers is stra-tegicallyinteractive,then the requirementof a relationallydetermi-nate whole is violated. In this instance, the situationfallswithinthecategory of internal comparison,unless either chooser guesses thatthe other may engage in binarycomparison. The effect isto make

the situation relationallydeterminate. Thesecond category can onlyhave two choosers for the purpose of comparison. Additionalpar-



ppare makes for the differentcategories of comparison. In thestance of internalcomparison, the "what"is any state of affairs inwhichother people's attributes,preferences, choices, and accomplish-ments count onlyas a resource for orobstacle to choice. A choosercompares alternativestates of affairs,one against the other, for op-timalfitto her preferences. She avers, I want as much as I can get.

Concretely, the chooser willprefer states of affairs that couldbenefit others even more than herself, eitherbecause that is herpreference, or because she is indifferentto the benefits (or costs) ac-cruing to others as a consequence of her choices. The formersitua-tion is a special case-"extended sympathy,"Economistswould say;extended self, I wouldsay-but a typicalone, given the socialcon-structionof selves. The latter situationdefines a category in whichthe part (an individualchooser's welfare)relates to the whole(thecollectivewelfare)indeterminately, from the point of viewof thepart (the individualand her preferences). That category includes thecase of internallymade choices on behalf of extended selves.

The second category of comparison,binarycomparison,takesthe "what"to be a state of affairs jointlyfaced by the chooser herselfand one other person makingchoices. The firstchooser construesthe preferences and choices of the other as incompatiblewithherown (whetherthe latter so construes the situation).The formerchooses among alternatives to achieve a state of affairs that gainsher the best possible positionrelativeto the other. Nowshe says: Iwant more,so the other has less. The chooser could prefer states ofaffairs thatbenefit (or cost) others than the one (possiblycollective)other she has chosen for purposes of comparison. In other words,she has constructed a whole, consistingof her welfare and theother's

y g y ytwo choosers for the p p of comparison. Additionalpticipantscan figurein the wholeeither by joining forces withthechooser, thus extendingthe choosing self, or by joining(or, moreproperly, by being seen as having joined)withthe other.

Likebinarycomparison, globalcomparison takesinto accountchoices and preferences other than the chooser's. Instead of oneselfand one other chooser of consequence, the "what"is a determinateset of choosers. (The term"globalcomparison" isFrohock's1987:103; see Mackay1980: 13-20, 6l-77,for a useful discussion of globalcomparison, illustratedby reference to multi-eventathletic competi-tions.)The problemnow is a practicalone. Howcan the choosercompare the resources, preferences, choices, and accomplishmentsof a number of others withher own? She has twochoices. She candisaggregate the whole into a series of pairs, consisting of herselfand each of the others. Or she can make use of a rankingsystem.The set, or whole, thenconsists of a series of positions occupyinga complete and transitive ordering:firstplace, second place . . .. lastplace. Furthermore,the places in such an ordering come with cardinalvalues (usuallyinverted: In an orderingof ten places, firsthas avalue of ten, last place a value of one). Onlynow can she say: I wantto be best.

Anyonecan construct some state of affairs intoa ranking system.Other people may not know they are being ranked. Moretypically,rankingschemes are publicconstructions.They maybe conventional

or the result of formalagreement. Then the whole is simultaneouslyrelationalfor everyone, although every change in pairs of relationsneed not affectall other relations. The people in firstand secondplace can switchpositions withoutaffecting the others, andso on.

ê # r 1 :ïiffi#3*:,l*.: u

268 Part 2: Rule

Cardinalitypermits easy comparison; formalitypermits the weight-ing of values assigned to places.

Rankingsystems of considerable formalityare regimes, as definedin chapter 4. The wholeis no longer simplyan aggregate of attri-butes, preferences, choices, or outcomes, but a whole definedassuch by rules, withinwhichresources are brought to beaç prefer-ences defined, choices made, and outcomes recorded. An autonomouswhole,so constructed, is related to, but separate from,the wishesor welfareof participants.The former whole, withits tractable prop-erties, substitutes for the latter, which is, fromthe point of viewof

any participant,intractable.The implicationsof choosingamong grounds of comparison are


In devising programs, many tournamentparticipantsassumedthat theiradversaries would be envious and binarycomparison thebest means to the stipulated end. Theywere proven wrong."Nice"strategies, whichaim for the best results whether one faces nice ornasty adversaries (programs predicated on internal and binary com-parison respectively), cameout on top. The top-ranked strategy(and, as it turned out, the simplest program submitted, aptlynamedTITFOR TAT)"never once scored better in a game than any otherplayer "(1984: ll2).

Axelrodevinced some surprise at the results of his tournament."Even expert strategists frompoliticalscience, sociology,econom-ics, psychology,and mathematics made systematic errors of being

269



p pp g g pnicely illustrated bythat most famous of games, the Prisoner's Di-lemma. Descriptionsof this game are so widelyavailable that Idispense withone here. (I recommend Robert Axelrod's straightfor-ward presentation, 1984:7-12.) Playingthe game once presents thetwo players witha situationof choice such that either player's in-ternal comparisonof possible states of affairstends to produce thesame rationalchoices that binarycomparisonwould.Thisresultcomes fromeach player considering the possibilitythat the otherplayer mightbe given to binarycomparison, ifonlybecause thatother takes such conduct as a possibilityfor the firstplayer. In otherwords, the mere possibilityof binarycomparison contaminates in-ternal comparison.

Because internalcomparison under conditionsof strategic inter-action is so often tantamount to binarycomparison, we can hardlywonder that players use binary comparison as a shortcut. In repeatedplays of the Prisoner's Dilemmagame, Axelrodfound players choos-ing binary comparisonagainst his advice ("Don'tbe envious,"1984:llO)-atendency promotedby players' knowledge of the game'scumulativescore. Consider the round-robintournamentAxelrodstaged. Avarietyof aficionados devised computer programs to playiterated Prisoner's Dilemmas(described pp.27-54).To win the tourna-ment, one had to have the highest score after one's programwasplayed against all others. The situationthus constructedgeneralizes

internal comparison(doingone's best playingagainst all comerswithoutconcern for how wellone is scoring against them) as a meansto an end. That end depends in turn on globalcomparison (one'srank among all players).

too competitivefor theirown good, not being forgivingenough, andbeing too pessimisticabout the responsiveness of the other side"(1984:40). Such errors couldhave been avoided. Participantsneedhave understood thatthe move fromisolated sequences of gamcs toa round-robintournament calledfora move frombinarycompari-son to internal comparisonas the appropriate activityforachievingthe end in question. In single plays of the game, the end is "winning"that play. In repeated plays, the end in question requires a globalcomparison of whatever is achieved throughinternalcomparison.

Axelrodmight just as wellhave defined the objectiveof the tourna-ment as a globalcomparisonof the times in whichplayers outscoredadversaries. Obviously binary comparisonsuits these circumstances.Results wouldalmost certainlyhave conformed to the expectationsof Axelrod's strategicallyinclinedparticipants. Axelrodwould havefoundhimselfaffirmingthe popular principle,nice guys finishlast.Comparisons are social constructions,made by rules. Whentherules change, so do grounds of comparison, choices, and results.

It should be evidentfrom thewayI have developed the threecategories of comparison that I believe theycorrespond to the threeuniversalcategories of speech aòts and rules, reasoning, figuresofspeech, and so on that I develop in the course of this book. Internalcomparisonmoves fromparts to whole, andbinarycomparisonfromwhole toparts. Global comparisonworkswithina wholesub-

stitutingfor another whole. Reversing the order of presentation toconformwiththat of earlier chapters, globalcomparison dependson assertion, abduction and association,metaphor (twiceactually:once forconstruction of relevant states of affairs and then again for

i:iill.úil . .1i ffii1 t*

270 Part 2: Rule

their comparison). Binarycomparison depends on direction,deduc-tion, and metonymyforconstruction of states of affairs. Finally,in-ternal comparison depends on commitment(to self and others; thisis the mechanism of extension), induction,and synecdoche.

MEANS,ENDS,ANDINTERESTS

People have diverse "ultimateends," "Forderungen",in MaxWeber'sGerman (1947: 185).

As I suggestabove,

the diversityof ends de-mands the orderingof preferences, which inturn fosters comparison


what that is valued for eminence; and consisteth in comparison. Forifall thingswere equally in [or available to] all men, nothingwouldbe prized"(1968: 134; compare Hume 1963: 8l-88).Giventhat it is"the nature of man" to compare attributesand accomplishments,

we findthree principalcauses of quarrell. FirstCompetition;Secondly, Diffidence;Thirdly,Glory.

The firstmaketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety;and the third for Reputation (Hobbes 1968: 185).

Hobbes assumed a model of binary comparisonand scarce ends-"ifany two men desire the same thing, whichneverthelesse they both

t j th b i " (p 184) H ld h

271



of states of affairs inthree categories. These three categories of com-parison constitute a determinate set of "immediateends," to borrowfromTàlcottC. Parsons, standing between rationallychosen meansand diverse ultimateends of rational individuals."Withinthe con-text of a given system of ultimateends, the immedioteends . . . aregiven as facts to the actor, . . . 'given'inthe sense that the postulateof rationalityinvolves the pursuitof them"(1937: 262-263, his em-phasis, footnote deleted). The firstcategory (after reordering), globalcomparison, "gives"people a concern for standing as an "immediateend" and engenders feelings of esteem and envy. The second, binarycomparison, gives them an awareness of threat and a concern forsecurityas an immediateend. The third, internalcomparison, givesrise to a concern for wealth, meaningthe acquisitionand posses-sion, not just of materialends, but of anythingvalued.6

There is nothing surprisingabout this short list of immediate ends.Thomas Hobbes, to use an illustriousexample, expresslyconnectedvalue to comparison. "Vertue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is some-

6. Parsons treated "wealth"and "power"as a determinateset of immediateends (ex-cept where ultimateends call for their repudiation),because they "emerge fromeconomic and politicallevels of analysis,..." (p. 262\.From thesocioculturallevelemerges "integration,"not as an immediate end of action but a conditionvariably present in allsocial systems. For consistency, Parsons should have iden-tifiedstanding as a thirdimmediate end-the one most easily identified atthesocioculturallevel of analysis and collectively manifest assystem integration.Systems witha single arena for global comparison wouldapproximate an idealtype of fullintegration;those withmany arenas would not(see pp. 263-264).

. sffili 't:,.1i:'

cannot enjoy, they becomeenemies, . . ." (p. 184). He could haveassumed otherwise. Theend of "gain,"as such, can result in com-petition,need not result in "invasion"and, I would argue, does notdepend on others' gains. Ifbinary comparison is employed, thensafety is the end, because larger gains by the other threaten one withthe possibilityof invasion or some other loss. Or, ifglobal compari-son is employed, then others' gains result in lowerstanding and re-duced esteem for the one gainingless.

HaroldLasswellprovidedanother short listof immediateends inthe firsttwo sentences of his remarkablebook, WorldPoliticsandPersonal Insecurity (1965a, firstpublished 1935). "Politicalanalysis

is the study of changes in the shape and compositionof the valuepatterns of society. Representative values are safety, income,anddeference" (p. 3). In later work,Lasswell settled on a listof eightvalues, organized into two groups, welfare valuesand deference values.The firstgroupconsists of well-being(healthand safety), wealth,skill,and enlightenment, the second of power, respect, rectitude, andaffection (see for example Lasswelland Kaplan 1950: 55-56). I findthis list muchless helpfulthan the earlier one. Welfare describes theconditionof any and all values having been realized in whateverdegree. Well-beinglumps together threats to people fromother peo-ple and fromthe rest of their environment(disease, natural disaster,and so on). Safety as originallyused wouldseem to refer only, or

at least mainly, to the former.The other welfarevalues of wealth,skill,and enlightenmentare ends defined by internalcomparison,or means to these or other ends. As for the deference values, I failto see how power, rectitude,and affection equal deference, although

272 Part 2: Rule

they, no less than wealth,skilland so on, may be means to deferenceas an end. Such values may be ends in themselves, in whichcase theybelong in the groupof values subject to internalcomparison.

Lasswell's later listconflates ultimateends and immediateendsvalued for their perceived relationto ultimateends. To the extentthat wealth, for example, as a means to deference becomes an endin itself,then it becomes an ultimatevalue unrelated to deference.The instabilityof instrumentaland ultimatevalues also accounts forthe complications I identifiedjust above in Hobbes' treatment ofgain. That means and ends are unstable hardly excuses theirconfla-tionforexpositional purposes.

Yet another example of immediateends sorted, at least implicitly,by criteria forcomparing states of affairs is Abraham H Maslow's


duction and self-constitutionof the human species,' (1971: 196).7Thisconception is not far removed fromMaslow's: ,,Either the in-terest presupposes a need (Bedürfnls)or it produces one" (p. 198,footnote citing Kantdeleted). Thereare three knowledge-constitutivehuman interests, corresponding to "three categories of processes ofinquiry."

The approach of the empirical-analyticsciences incorporatesa technicalcognitiveinterest; that of the historical-hermeneuticsciences incorporatesa practicalone; and the approach ofcriticallyoriented sciences incorporates the emancipatory cog-nitiveinterest. . . (p. 308, Habermas'emphasis).



by criteria forcomparing states of affairs, is Abraham H. Maslow sall too famous "hierarchyof basic needs" (1970:51; see pp. 35-58).These consist of physiologicalneeds, safety needs, belongingnessand love needs, esteem needs, and the need forself-actualization.Weshould immediatelysegregate physiologicalneeds from thislist.They are not cognitively driven,even if they may contribute to cog-nitivelydefined ends forhuman action. We should dothe same forthe alleged need for self-actualization. We mayeither locate self-actualizationwithsuch ends as the acquisitionof skilland enlighten-ment or dismiss it, along withthe hierarchicalarrangement of allsuch needs, as a parochiallyliberal constructionof the human re-

sponse to privilege.There remain three categories of needs, for which the terms "safety,""love,"and "esteem" provide summary descriptions.The firstandthirdare obviouslyrelated to binaryand global comparison respec-tively.The second is more difficultto interpret,I thinkbecauseMaslowassumed circumstances combining materialabundance andemotional deprivation. Asrationalconduct, love of wealth and theacquisitionof love betraya common originin the comparison ofwhat one would wantagainst what one considers herself as having.

The last example of immediateends implicitlycategorized ongrounds of comparison is to be found in Jürgen Habermas'concep-tionof "knowledge-constitutivehuman interests" (1971:308-315).Habermas used the term "interest"(interesse) in a Kantian sense(pp. l9l-213), notto be confused withthe usual sense of the termin English (Bernstein 1978: 192). "I term interest thebasic orienta-tions rooted in specific fundamental conditionsof the possible repro-

The description of the firstof these cognitiveinterests as ,,techni-cal,"and its association withanalysis and deduction(1971: 308),clearlymake it dependent on binary comparison. The second cogni-tive interest,described as practical and oriented to the ,,understand-ing of meaning," is "directed in its verystructure toward the attain-ment of possible consensus among actors. . . ." (p. 310). I interpretthis to mean that practical ends are those that are defined internallybycomparingpossible states of affairs. Inasmuch as individualchoices,made by reference to practicalinterests, relate to the good of thewhole indeterminately,then the problem for human knowledgein-

cludes "the achievement of a possible consensus." I find the de-scription of this"process of inquiry"as oriented to ,,the understand-ing of meaning" a ratificationof a hermeneutic slogan more thana clarificationof practical interest. The slogan illsuits historicism,which is nonetheless concerned to understand a whole indetermin-

7. This sentence ends, "namelyworkand interactron"(his emphasis). ElsewhereHa-bermas extended this formulatìon:"knowledge-constitutive intereststake formin the mediumof work, language and powel' (p.313, his emphasis again). Work"refersto ways in whichindividualscontroland manipulate their environmentinorder to survive and preserve themselves," Habermas meant.,communicative ac-tion"by "language,"or the exchange of information.I fail to see why it shouldnot include all enchanges, as the term "interaction"suggests. power refers to..powerof self-reflection"(p, 314, originalemphasized). We may inferthat power is notmerely internalto the self, however, bccause self-reflection.,releases the subjectfromdependence on hypostasized powers', (p, 310). Power is then power overminds, includingonc's own,

''i;ffitr :* r# r

274 Part 2: Rule

ately constituted frommany parts (ifnot indeterminatein principle,then practicallyso fromthe observer's point of view).

Habermas called the thirdof his cognitiveinterests emancipatorybecause it is the one he identifiedhis own work with.'A criticalsocialscience . . . is concerned . . . to determinewhen theoretical statementsgrasp invariantregularities of social action as such and when theyex-press ideologicallyfrozen relationsof dependence that can in princi-ple be transformed"(p. 310). This is an apt short descriptionof Haber-mas'objectives (at least at the time he wrote these words; onthe direc-tion ofHabermas work inthe last decade, see Ingram1987). It alsosuggests that Habermas confüsed his criticalprogram, as a means toa cognitiveinterest, with thatinterest as a description of an immediateend The term "emancipatory"describes the means and not the end


Throughoutthe discussion of grounds of comparison,I avoiddescribing the three categories of immediateends withthe term "in-terests," except, of course, in the particular,Kantiansense in whichHabermas used it. Yet much of that discussion immediatelybringsto mind interests in the commonplace sense, as having to do withwants (Barry1965:175-176,Kratochwil1982: 5-6). The term "want"suggests an immediacyof ends; Parsons, followingVilfredoPareto,equated immediate ends withinterests (1937:263). Even Habermaspresupposed a connectionbetween interests and wants. "Interest ex-presses a relationof the objectof interest to our facultyof desire"(1971: 198).

We know, howwer, that desires and interests do not constitute a sim-ple identity As FriedrichKratochwil b d " thinkof



end. The term "emancipatory"describes the means, and not the end.Instead, this interest is described by such ends as deference, es-

teem, or standing. As such, it is constitutedby globalcomparison.What is unclear about emancipationis whether it is a repudiation ofglobalcomparison(in favor of enlightenment,forexample, as an in-ternally constructed state of affairs) or a call foran improved under-standing, or acceptance, or globalcomparison, and a more effectivechoice of arena withinwhich to compare one's positionto others'.Habermas'interest in psychoanalysis and self-reflection(p. 310), notto mention"communicativecompetence", permitseither of theseoutcomes, even ifone mightnot want to use the word"emancipa-

tion" ineither instance.8

8, That Habermas has poorlyspecified the differencebetween practical and eman-cipatoryinterests is further evidenced by his presentation of two concepts of ra-tionality:cognitive-instrumentalrationalityand communicativerationality(1984:l0). The firstcategoryof rationalityrelates to the medium of work(footnote7),within whichtechnical cognitiveinterest takes form.The second is "based ulti-mately on the centralotperience of the unconstrained, unifying,consensus-bringingforce of argumentative speech, , . . ." (1984:l0). Argumentative speech clearlyrefers to the medium of interaction and language, withinwhich practical cogni-tive interest takes form,The achievement of communicativerationalityis "unify-ing"and "consensus-bringing"-endsthat are apparently practicaland eman-cipatory. In identifying"three complexes of rationality"in Weber's work,Haber-mas effectivelyacknowledgedthat communicativerationality diddouble duty.The three complexes are "cognitive-instrumentalrationality,""moral-practicalra-tionality,"and "aesthetic-practicalrationality"(pp. 237-2aD, Artisticexpressionmight then be the medium otherwisecalled "power,"whichparallels workandinteractionin givingform tocognitive interests,

ple identity.As FriedrichKratochwilobserved, "wecan thinkof casesin whichit makes sense to distinguishcarefullysomething wantedor desired-likesittingdown in a sno\rystormdue to exhaustion-fromthe interestinvolved-notdoingso because of the danger offreezing to death" (1982: 6). Something must be added to thisequa-tion.For Kratochwil,"reasons" are added: "a justificationthat goesbeyond the mere indicationof likesand dislikes"(p. 6, followingFlathman 1966).

On inspection,Kratochwil'sillustrationfailsto support such aconclusion.Someone facingdeath in a snowstorm would indeedwant to sit down.That person also wants to live. In comparing thetwo states of affairs(internalcomparison), I wouldchoose the lat-teç which we may then construeas my preference. Allthat must beadded to the equation of wants and interests to make sense of Kratoch-wil's illustrationis a multiplicityof ends, whicha generalized modelprovides. Reasons are then merely statements about preferences: Iam not going to sit down inthe snow because I prefer livingto resting.

Kratochwilwas nevertheless rightin thinkingthat the equation ofwants or, I wouldadd, preferences and interests does not suffice.Others agree. Thus Lasswell in his systematic work withAbrahamKaplan defined "interest"as a í'pattern of demands and supportingexpectations"(1950: 23). Added to the equation of wants and inter-ests is the elementof actionable expectations, or opportunities:Awant is not an interest unless one can plausiblyact on it.Barry's formula is similar. 'As a firstapproximation let us say thata policyor action is in a man's interest if it increases his opportuni-ties to get what he wants" (1965: 176). Againthe added element in-

tÌJtitiiì *ffit ' : : &r. . :

276 Part 2: Rule

volves opportunities,which"assets" likewealth andpower afford.Because wealth andpower are also interests (here Barry relied on Par-sons; compare note 6), they"forma very useful guide to the amountand distribution ofwant-satisfaction. Evaluations interms of inter-est' (especially when this is reduced to money) are far more practi-cable than evaluations in terms of want-satisfaction"(p. 184). Hereagain is the distinctionbetween passions and interests, the latter ad-ding towants "an element of reflectionand calculation .. ." (Hirsch-man 1977: 33, quoted in chapter 5, footnote3). This isthe longascendant liberalviewof interest, whichParsons, Lasswell,and Kap-lan, and Barryhave affirmedand whichEconomists take as ground-ing theirconceptualapparatus. It would mean littleto speak of op-portunitycosts forexample ifpreferences were not formulatedby


rules, such as those constitutingcommon medialikemoney. Third,interests as general means,/immediate ends must relate to resourcesso as to create opportunitiesforaction. Thatinterests are general,framed by rules and related to resources specifies the meaning of theterm "asset." Vy'ealth and power are assets in Barry's judgmentbe-cause they are general, stable representations of what resources per-mit,given diverselyparticularmeans, ends, and circumstances.

To complete the picture,I wouldadd a fourthfeature to this liberalconception of interest. Habermas' cognitiveconcerns clearlypointto it, and Kratochwilstated it forthrightly.Interests are recognizable

tous as the reasons we give

for our conduct. Reasons speak to therelation between our taken-for-granted rationalityand the wantsthat in positionto ti f T t b i fl t light

277



portunitycosts, forexample, ifpreferences were not formulatedbyreference to"opportunitiesfor want-satisfaction,expressed in a com-mon mediumsuch as money, . . ." (Barry1965: 184, his emphasis).

Interests in this characteristicliberalconception have three featuresdifferentiating themfromwants. First, interests stand between thediverse array of particularmeans that one has on the one hand andthe equallydiverse array of particularwants, or ultimateends, onthe other.e Interests do so in circumstances that are also diverselyparticularized.It is tempting tothinkof interests as a medium, or con-duit,between particular means and ultimateends. Barry impliedthisby noting the advantages of a common medium forwant-satisfaction.

Nevertheless, money, as one such medium, isnot to be confusedwithan interest, likewealth or any asset that may be reckonedinmoney. (Norare resources media, as AnthonyGiddens thought;seechapter 1).

The second feature of a liberal conceptionof interest, then, is thatinterests are not media; ruled practices are. (Compare this chapter'sfootnotes Z 8.) Interests are means and ends-generalized meansand immediateends at the same time. V/hetherby adding, reducing,or integrating particulars,interests translate those particularsintocoherent and manageable general statements about means as ends.Interests so considered lend themselves to specificationthrough

9. "The etymologyof the word issuggestive in this respect. Interest derives,viaFrench, fromthe Latininteresse whichmeans in part "to be between"(Flathman1966: 16 n. 4, closely paraphrasing Hannah Pitkin'sdissertation;compare Pitkin1967:1571.

that we are in a positionto satisfy. Toreturn brieflyto myplightin a snowstorm:I want to sit down;I want to survive;I cannot doboth. The reasons I offer foreither choice express an interest. I can-not go on because my resources are depleted, and I mightas wellbe comfortableuntilI die. Or, I willpush on, because I am stillable,so that I can survive.In both instances, only internalcomparisoncontributedto my reasoning, withmy conclusions differingonlybecause of my resources. Myreasoning speaks to the implicationsof my choices in the circumstances facingme. Myinterest does notchange: I want the mostout of those circumstances.

We could just as easily findexamples in whichthe reasons offereddisclose different interests. If the example gives pride of place to bi-nary comparison, the reasons offered forchoices wouldbe justifica-tions (whichis what Kratochwilcalled-erroneously,I think-thereasons one mightarticulate fordecidingto push on in a snowstorm).Thus, when you and I have an altercation, I justifymy actions bynotingyour actions (you started it). If the example depends on glo-bal comparison, explanations accompany conduct.Such explana-tions clarifyone's choices (I cheated because I wanted a highergrade) or establish their significance(I reported you for cheatingbecause the others and I didn'tcheat). Howeverskillful,such talkis always present.

If there are three discerniblecategories of comparison invokedas

reasons for conduct, thenthere are, at the requisitelevel of gener-ality, onlythree interests. I presented them a few pages ago as cate-gories of immediate ends. ln that order of presentation, the firstcategory is the one I associate withglobal comparison and explana-

ffii *lliXr:



280 Part 2: Rule

Realists and ldealists (the latterbeing the former'sdismissive namefor all those who professed some interest or confidence in Func-tionalism,institutionalarrangements in internationalrelations andthe existence, however latent, of a harmonyof interests among states;compare chapter 7, footnote 27\.Forall their differences,Idealists pre-fer and wouldpromote internalcomparison, aninterest in wealth,and the choiceof means in whichmoney isa prominentmedium.Realists unite in their perception that binarycomparison is inevitablein a worldof states, security the dominant interest, and militaryendeavors the means. The measure of one's security is, perverselyenough, the manifestinsecurityof others.

One can hardly deny that bothgrounds of comparison are to befound inthe practice of most states'agents. The shift Wolfers and


agents, then powerdescribes militarycapabilityas a means andpredicts the outcome of its use. Measuring attributesof states ispointless even if it is possible, except to judge one's security. Themost effectivemeasure of security is war:The outcome of war de-termines to the satisfactionof both parties what is difficultto measure,namely, their reciprocal quotientsof security. Security is an assetthat can be acquired and retained only byexpendingother assets,likewealth, in war. Insofar as war is avoided because its outcomeis predictable, the measure of militarycapabilitiessubstitutes forwar as a mediumof measurement.

Global comparison turns"power"intoa common medium forthemeasurement of standing and disallows, sometimes radically,its useas a means to achieve other interests To make this point somewhat

281



found inthe practice of most states agents. The shift Wolfers andOsgood both identified, withunderstandable alarm,is not betweeninternaland binary comparison, but fromthose grounds of com-parison to globalcomparison'(inboth sense of the term "global";compare Hobsbawm 1987: 314-327). Throughoutmodernity, stateshave undoubtedlyhad an interest in standing. Nevertheless, the pre-sumption of equality among sovereigns militatedagainst a concernfor standing extending much beyond ceremonialmatters. So didsignificant limitson the resources available to sovereigns and infor-mationabout states, their resources, and the abilityof agents tomobilizesuch resources (Osgood 1957: 6l-87).

In the last century these limitshave disappeared, sovereignty asa personal trait having doneso long before.Sovereignequality hasbecome a juridicalpropertyof the state, definingparticipationina formal,determinate system of states and thus the conditionsneces-sary for globalcomparison.Mass media enable vast publics to watchthe system in action, as ifitwere a never-ending athletic event. Infor-mationon all kinds of attributes of states s widelyavailable, allow-ing states'agents and publics to engage in ceaseless comparison withany number of measures. Resources previouslyunderstood as pro-vidingthe means for security become measures of states' standing.Chiefamong these measures are land area, population,nationalwealth, industrialcapacity, technologicalachievements and, of course,

militarycapability.Ashift in the grounds of comparisonwouldchange the characterof what Realists have been accustomed to calling"power."Whenbinarycomparison and security dominatethe praiticeof states'

as a means to achieve other interests. To make this point somewhatdifferently,any resource or accomplishmentthat can be attributedto states generally, lends itselfto comparison andcan be measuredconveniently, is used to rank states. Their position and the measureddifferencebetween them in the standings are theirpower. So we un-derstand the term in athletic competitionsin which repeated gamesbetween pairs yielda cumulative index of all(teams of) players' stand-ing. So it is withstates under conditions whichsome Realists havefound toprevail in the last hundred years. The paradox in this situa-tion is that militarycapability,as a crucialmeasure of standing,should not be treated as an asset, to be expended in the pursuitofsome other interest likesecurity, because its depletionwilladverselyaffectone's standing. Even ifan expenditureof militarycapabilityenhanced one's securitywithrespect to an adversary because mili-tary engagement costs the latter even more than it costs oneself,one's standing wouldstillbe reduced in comparison to all those inthe system not makingsuch expenditures.

kt us grant for the moment that,as Wolfers and Osgood implied,globalcomparisonhas supplanted binarycomparisonin today'sworld.We wouldexpect a great deal of emphasis on militarycapabilities combinedwitha resistance to their use. Vy'e would furtherexpectthat global comparison is likely tobe less importantfor states withlow standingin militaryterms. Conversely, states at or near the top

of the standings are likely tobe wrapped up in questions of standingto a degree that suggests to those withlowstanding, or observerslikeWolfers and Osgood,a run-awaywillto power. To the extentthat measurements are uncertain or changes in standing unacknowl-

: : ' &#: :: :t

282 Part 2: Rule

edged (there being no independent scorekeeper), then agents andpublicsof adversely affected states may respond vengefully.Thestresses and demands of global comparison may even induce thoughtsof smashing the system.

Arguably,these generalizations fitthe worldwe know (Osgood1957: 88-ll9).German and Japanese revisionism earlierin the cen-turyare evidence not of an unleashed willto power but of standingsthat didnot change when they shouldhave. General war was a re-sponse to frustration,4Írd totalvictoryan effort torid the systemof its uncertainties. In the post-war standings, the positionof the

UnitedStates and the Soviet Unionconfirmtheparadox

ofpower

as ubiquitous measure and useless asset. Thelles. rp-ç1|v--e,ng ,s 9_{-lu:clear weapons çUstues that they providesecurityonly if thçy are not


withoutimmediate effects on wealthand security.Because the sys-tem of globalcomparison hasonlytwo places in the standings, itwouldeasily be confused with,or change into,a system of binarycomparison, were it not forthe diversityof resources and accomplish-ments subject to comparisonJtThe result is a climateof contest andspectacle-an unendingtournament, rounds of play in many arenas,all of us a captive audience.

For the two states, the advantage of this arrangement is the extentto whichit disguises theirheteronomous relationsand hierarchicallymaintained spheres of influence. Because the constant joustingen-gages the world's attention withoutaffecting the relativesecurityofthe two sides, agents of the United States and the SovietUnionknowbetter than to let the hegemonial system of multipleglobalcom-



clear weapons,çUstues that they providesecurityonly-if thçy are notused for security. Thus freed for use as a measure of standing, thesewèapons accumulate in stockpiles far larger than required by thelogicof deterrence. Much thesame may be said for conventionalmilitarycapabilities of the rankingstates. Measuring standing byreference to these capabilitiesprecludes using them faster than theycan be replenished, unless they are used to reduce the capabilityofthe primaryadversary. Yet the latter undertakingendangers thesystem upon whichglobalcomparison is predicated.

Is a worldof global comparison the best short descriptionof con-temporary international relations? Morgenthauthought so for inter-nationalrelations at any time.Other Realists wouldsay so for theworldtoday. "Those who callthemselves realists assume that, in thefinalanalysis, the actors in internationalarenas are status maxi-mizers"(Young 1986: ll8).Ifwe limitthe system of global compari-son to twostates, whichwould be the top two in a global system ofglobalcomparison, the Realist case is even stronger.

As willbe recalled fromchapter 6, I would characterize contem-poraryinternationalrelations as pervasively heteronomous. Heter-onomy impliesa dominance of internalcomparison,withasym-metries in the resources available to free choosers yieldinga stablepattern of asymmetric outcomes subject to hegemonial support.The UnitedStates and the Soviet Union maintaindirectivelyruled

spheres of influence,whichalso contributeto a stable pattern ofheteronomous relations between them. The UnitedStates and theSoviet Unionalso engage in a diverse set of comparisons and directresources towardchanging their relative positionin the standings

better than to let the hegemonial system of multipleglobalcomparisons slip into binarycomparison, in whichall wouldbe imperiled.Agents do not have to have thought allof this out.They need merelyto understand how welltheir interest in standing serves the statusquo, whichserves theirother interests.

EXPI./OITATION

People "exploit"resources available to them in pursuing immediateends. Because resources include people - oneself and others - rationalconduct necessarily involvesthe exploitationof people. Exploitationin this everyday sense unavoidably followsfromour physical indi-vidualityand human sociality.If there were no pattern to it, I wouldnot be concerned about exploitation.There is a pattern, however,a pattern of unequal consequences, whichdoes engage my moralsense.

I l. Scholars are confused. Afternoting that Realists see those engaged in interna-tional relations as "status maximizers,"Oran Young (1986: ll8)went on to saythat "a society composedof status maximizerswillresemble a Hobbesian stateof nature. Because gains for individualactors amount to losses forothers, themembers of the group willfind themselves in more or less pure conflict. .. ."Young has welldcscribeda system of security maximizers,givento binarycom-parison. The same confusion accounts for thc poor performanceof so many par-ticipante in Axelrod'sround.robin tournament,

284 Part 2: Rule

John Roemer's recent effortsto develop "a general theoryof ex-ploitation"begin, as they should,withinequality(1982, 1986; seeWright1985: 64-82 foran extension).

In virtuallyevery society or economÍthere is inequality.Yetnot allinequalityis viewedby a society as exploitativeor un-just. Certainly,however, the notion ofexploitation involvesin-equalityin some way. What formsof inequalitydoes a par-ticular society viewas exploitative,and what formsdoes it not?(Roemer 1985: 102)

Roemer's answer to his own question is both procedurally and norma-tivelya powerfulone. He proposed "that a group be conceived ofas exploitedif it has some conditionallyfeasible alternative under


activity.Resources are means to ends, constituted as such throughpeople's ruled practices. Resources must have a material reality,butthey never can be the raw materialsof nature, standing alone. Onlybecause of socially defineduse do such raw materials constituteresources, whichare also assets when they are constituted in refer-ence to immediateends, or interests. Assets relate to productiveac-tivityonlywhen the immediateend is wealth.When the immediateend is standing, assets are those resources lending themselves to alter-ing and measuring standing. When security is at stake, assets areresources devoted to makingothers insecure.

The problemwithcharacterizinghistoricalepochs as modes ofproduction-feudalism,capitalism, and so on-is that epochs alsoinvolvemodes of standing and security, complexlyrelated to the pro-



p yfeasiblewhich its members would be better off"b. 103, his emphasis). Roemerthen asked ifat least one group of individualswouldchoose to leavesocieties in which conditionsconstitute w[atwe generallycall feudal-ism, capitalism, and socialism,including thecontemporary statistversion of socialism.

One might ask, leave withwhat? Roemer produced three alterna-tives. A group leaves with"its private assets" or "withits per capitashare of society's alienable productiveassets," or finally"withitspercapita share of society's inalienableassets, once alienable assets aredistributedequally"(pp. 105, 109).Alienableassets are "means ofproduction, resources," inalienableones are "skills"(p. 109). Roemerconcluded that, under feudal conditions,rationalserfs would leavewith theirprivate assets (ifthey could, practicallyspeaking). Underconditions identifiedwithcapitalism,workerswould leave withpercapita shares of alienable assets. Under conditionsof socialism,those whoare relativelyunskilledwouldleave. These solutions arerarelypractical for individuals.Nevertheless, revolutionsdo the jobforexploited groups. "Each revolutioneliminates the inequalitiesassociated withits characteristicform ofproperty (the feudal bond,alienable means of production,finallyinalienableassets); the scopeof assets that are allowedto be private becomes progressively nar-rower as historyproceeds" (p. 109).

Roemer's definitionsare rigorously analyticalyet honor the Marx-ist concern for exploitationand its elimination.Nevertheless, I mustfault one of Roemer's assumptions, namely, that assets, however con-stituted in particularmodes of production, relate only to productive

g y, p y pductionof wealth. Duringeach such epoch, exploitationmay pro-ceed in relation to allthree interests and the assets used in their sup-port. Inequalityattendingone such interest may reinforce,leaveunaffected, orindeed workagainst inequalitiesfostered by other in-terests. The complexityof exploitationso conceived defeats any at-tempt touse Roemer's progressive criteria for identifyingand eliminat-ing layers of exploitation.Instead we need a criterionof exploitationthat can be uniformlyapplied to all the inequalities of all interestand asset patterns.

The criterionI propose is one I borrowfromliberalPoliticalEconomy. Exploitationdescribes any situation in which rationalin-dividualsaccrue rents in the process of realizing interests. "Rent isthat part of the payment to an ownerof a resource over and abovethat whichthose resources couldcommand in any alternativeuse.Rent is receiptin excess of opportunitycost" (Buchanan 1980: 3).A perfect market wouldhave no rents, but no market is ever perfect.The possibilityof rents is what drives entrepreneurs intotryingnewproductiveactivities.A market institutedto be self-regulating wouldalways lower rentsover time, thuspersuading participantsto findnew activitiespaying rent, howeverbriefly(pp. 6-7).When marketsare systematically impairedby ruledpractices, rents accrue to someat the expense of others. Institutingsuch rules, and reaping rewards,

is rent-seeking (as opposed to profit-seeking,which is responding tothe possibilityof rent in a well-institutedmarket; pp. 7-ll).Liberalstake rent-seeking to be exploitative;I wouldincludeprofit-seeking,as do Marxists.

286 Part 2: Rule

One mightsee in the criterionof rent as exploitation thesamelimitationsI identify withReoemer's progressive criteria:It wouldseem to refer exclusivelyto wealth and its production.Yet the verysimplicityof the rent-as-exploitationcriterionmeans easy applica-tion toother interests, insofar as they may be thought of as cal-culable assets. By myreckoning, rent-seekingis always exploitive,whether rent is themore costlyprovisionof standing, security,orwealth than an alternativeuse of someone's resources wouldprovidefor that individual.kt us turn brieflyto some epochs of interestto Roemer in order to try out this proposition.

Under feudalism, thedistributionof security produces social ar-rangements in whichrules assign standing to individualsat birth.One's standing determines whether one produces securityor goods


exploitation,"1982: 243-247, 1985: 109-ll0; compare Wright1985:7l) is precisely an acknowledgment of this kindof exploitation,which is so evident whensocialism isalleged to have remedied otherformsof exploitation.

Capitalismpresupposes collectivesecurity bought withminimallynecessary allocationof productiveassets. The productionand ex-change of wealth also allows the institutionof numerous rankingsystems and the assignment of standing therein. Finally,capitalismdepends on the institutionof proper markets for productive assets.Ifassets are taken to be "originalprivate endowments"(the phraseis Roemer's, 1985: 104; the notion is deeply embedded

inliberal

thought),then their aggregation and exchange forproductive pur-poses willbe exploitive,but only temporarily fromany beneficiary's



and the conditionsfor their exchange. That exchange is unequal,because serfs always pay rent for their security. Serfs never receiveenough securityto threaten the lords'securityand thus the latter'sability toextract rent. Unequal standing reinforcesthe asymmetryof exchange.

Roemer wouldproceed directlyto the capitalistepoch. I thinkthat logically and historicallywe should turn to conditionsof ex-ploitationassociated withthe state, the emergence of whichcoin-cides withthe declineof feudal arrangements in Europe. The statedecouples rules relating to standing from the provisionof security.

In principle,security is no longer produced as a privateasset subjectto exchange, but as a publicasset uniformlyavailable,withoutre-spect to standing orwealth.This is because security is not producedby those withstanding or wealth. Instead securityspecialists, actingas agents for all, assume that responsibility.

Institutingthe state as a collectivesecurity arrangement(recallchapter 4) may providesecurity more cheaplyfor those withstand-ing thanif they were to provide it for themselves. Certainly thisisthe case for those withwealthto protect, whichhelps to explain thealliance between the crown and bourgeoisie in European state forma-tion. People will findit cheaper to pay for collective securityandsuffer rent-seeking free riders, some of whommay shirk faircharges

on security because their otherassets are so low (compare chapter 6,footnote16). Far greater is the extortionof rent, realized as standingor wealth, by those responsible for producingsecurity. Roemer's con-cern withsocialist statism(whichhe misleadinglydescribed as "status

p y p y y yvantage point,because of the innovationsintroducedby marketcompetitors. Over time,the rise and fallof individualfortunes (theterm taken in a double sense) balance out, and the distributionofexploitationmay be seen as nonexploitive.

The troublewiththis prettypictureof liberaljustice is the pre-sumption that individualsare proprietors of birthrightendowments.Frombirthon, people participateunequally in social arrangmentsaffordingopportunities to select and develop skillsmaking good onnative capacities. That one is skilleddifferentlythan others meansthat one has differentaccess to resources than others have. In thisinstance, rent maybe conceptualized as the difference between nativeendowment and skillfulparticipationin productiveactivityandruled access to resources. Because these differencesare practicallyincalculable,rent is built intothe system of productiveactivity.Noone has to collectrents for rents to be paid. Capitalismdescribes theuse of productive assets to generate more such assets as a matter ofsystematic intent. The tremendous generative power of capitalism ac-celerates productiveactivity.It also accelerates the differentiationofskillsand of access to buried rentand other resources.

Roemer's distinctionbetween alienable and inalienable assets -resources and skills- followsfrom the liberalnotion of native endow-ments. In constructivist terms, all such distinctionsare misguided.

Redistributingwealth helps to correct exploitationfostered by dif-ferentialaccess to resources. This is the aim of socialism.Whateverthe rhetoric, rewards are never adequately used to equalize skills.In-stead socialismpromotes the unequal development of skillsin place

I

288 Part 2: Rule

of the differentiationof access to resources. In doing so, socialismalso promotes the substitutionof credentials for wealthas the lead-ing measure of standing.

What does this briefexcursion across modern history tellus?Whilemost premodern social arrangements use standing, no doubtexploitively,to constituteother assets and achieve other interests,feudalismmakes use of insecurity, supported by standing, for suchpurposes. Socialarrangements paradigmaticallyidentifiedwiththestate use the provisionof security to realize other interests. Organiza-tional means of exploitationgain a privilegedposition.Finally,social

arrangements identifiedwithproductiveactivityand markets for

assets are exploitivebecause the rules constitutingindividualsas par-ticipantsyieldrents to onlysome of them. Marxiststend to view

( h


providedirect support for many(but not all) of the members of thecosmopolitan class by employingthem as organizational function-aries. Other organizations, publicand private, withinand beyondthe state, do the same. States also compensate for the unequal accessto resources associated withcapitalismby adoptingsocialistor wel-faristpolicieswhich strengthen credentialed skill-holdersas a rent-receivingclass.

Capitalism is the source of the wealthused to support a perversesecurity system and a professionallycredentialed,organizationallyoriented class of rulers. Electronicallymediated, fullytransnationalcircuits of capital depend on the cover provided by the systems ofstanding and security. Capitalismalso depends on those systems forrectificationof its ownerratic tendencies. The strikingperiodicity

f h f

289



p y ydominationand exploitationas independent evils (Wright1986:ll6-ll7).Inmy view,rule is exploitive.If there are three categories ofrule, then thereare three formsof exploitation.If rule is inevitable- apositionI thinkfollowsfromthe logicof rules and rule-thensois exploitation.The mitigationof exploitationin one formcompelsor promotes its presence in some other form.

What then of capitalismand socialism?Neitherare systems ofrule, yet both contributeto exploitation.Capitalism'sgenerativepower, harnessed to the relentless extraction of resources fromtheearth (includingits people), produces enormous assets susceptibleto exploitivedistribution.Socialism wouldundo the exploitationag-gravated by capitalism withoutrepudiatingcapitalism's generative ef-fects. This feat requires the differentialsupport of skillsand the pro-liferationof organizations under the aegis of the state. Statism followsin train (Wright1985: 78-82, 1986: 120-123).

The concentration of certifiedskillsconstitutes a worldof twoclasses. One is a cosmopolitan rulingclass of those whose profes-sional credentials and highlyhoned skillssuit them to the demandsof complex organizationalenvironments.The dominatinginterestof this class is standing and its dominantactivitysupport of thestatus quo. The other class is everyone excluded fromthe first.Mostof its members are wretchedlypoor and unskilledpeople, no longer

even able to functioneffectivelyas peasants and workers.Capitalism pays rent to support these class arrangements. It alsofinances the state as securityprovider, the system of states a sourceof insecuritynecessitating perpetuation of the state. In turn,states

of material growthstems fromcapitalism'sneed to constitute newresources on exponentially largerscales through technologicalrevo-lutions(Onuf1984). In response we findorganizational interven-tion. Ifcapitalismcannot continue to renovate itself withtechnologi-cal revolutions-anopen question, in my opinion-thendeclines ingrowthwillbring furtherreinforcementof organizations enablingrule by cosmopolitan adepts(Seabold and Onuf l98l:32-36).

There is no solutionto the human realityof exploitation.Evenin the absence of a solution,we must call exploitationwhat it is, inall the ways that it is what it is.

. . . the difficulty-Imightsay-is not that of findingthe solutionbut rather of recognizingas the solutionsomethingthat looks as ifit were onlypreliminaryto it. . . . the solutionof the difficultyis adescription, ifwe give it the rightplace in ourconsiderations.Ifwedwellupon it, and do not try toget beyond it.

The difficultyhere is: to stop.Ludwig\ilittgenstein

(1967: par.3l4, p. 58e)

SYNOPTICTABLEF-aculties of Experience

The category ofexistence andthe constitutioÍr,/regulationof its meaning inspace and oftime

The category of materialcontrol and the constitution/regulation of modalitiesofcontrol(ch. I )

The category ofdiscretionaryendeavor,agreement and exchange

coupled to the constitution/regulationof agency andopportunity



Throughout this bookI sort a considerable mélange of sociallycon-structed phenomena into sets of categories, always three in number,always repeating the same relationsof properties. In chapter 3, I de-fend the propositionthat at least some sets of threes are universal,but I resist saying that any one set is demonstrably fundamental.Vy'ere there a fundamental set of properties preceding social construc-tion in all its manifestations, I could constructa table of corres-pondences, arrayed in three columns,one for each category, labeled

by reference to those properties. This is, after all,a standard logocen-tricprocedure. In the same fashion I could constitute separate col-umns for every occasion in which I discover these categories mani-festing themselves. Then I could fillin the emptycells of my table,and all wouldbe clear.

Allwould be clear, that is, except how I can stand outsideof thehuman experience as social constructionand offera set of coordi-nates that "explain"the recurrence of a consistent pattern for allofthat experience. Myconstructivistpreferences preclude the possibilitythat I, or any coordinates I mightdivine, stand outside socialconstruction.Everythingmust be locatedwithinthe cells of thetable. V/here thendoes the table come from?As an act of social con-

structionon my part, the table must have coordinates that rule itsconstruction,or indeed it would notbe the construction that it is.The practicaldifficultyis to findgood, helpfullabels forexternal,

independent criteriawhen nothingis demonstrably fundamental.

Paradiems ofExõõiããce

Assertive speech acts Directives (ch. 2) Commissives

lnstruction-rules Directive-rules (ch. 2) Com mitmen t- ru lou

Abductive reasoning Deduction (ch. 3) Induction

Conjuration Combat (ch. 3) Clue-finding

Shame Dread (ch. 3) Guilt

Monitoryregimes Executive regimes(ch. 4) Administrativeregimes

Metaphor Metonymy(ch. 4) Synecdoche

Manners Virtue(ch. 5) Rights

'Iellthe truth Dono harm (ch. 5) Keep promises

Hegemony Hierarchy(ch. 6) Heteronomy

Priests &professors Warriors&diplomats (ch. 7) Physicians &merchants

Explanation Justification(ch. ?,8) Implication

Global comparison Binarycomparison(ch. 8) lnternal comparison

Standing Security (ch. 8) Wealth

Touching Seeing Hearing

292 SynopticTable

Even ifhuman beings make their realitywithouthelp fromPlatonicessences, words on high or "magictriads"(Sebeok 1983: 2), thereis another possibility.Human beings share faculties- biologicallyin-dividualizedcapacities-allof whichare significantlyaffected bysocial construction and some of which lend themselves to universalpractices. Faculties likestereotopicvisionand bipedal locomotionmay together give rise to such universalpractices as movingin filesfrompoint to point,and thus to such materiallyrelevant but sociallyconstructed activitiesas calculatingthe shortest distance betweentwo points,makingPaths and so on.

Inchapter 7, I mention the possibilitythat three of our senses re-

late to the universal categories of reasoning. That there are fivesenses is, I think,a social construction,perhaps not universal. So

h f l i t h f h

SynopticTable

Howthen to describe the table's rows? I notice other people's ef-forts to characterize social reality'smany manifestations. LudwigWittgensteinwrote of "formsof life"(recallchapter 1). MichaelWal-zer borrowed fromBlaise Pascal the notionthat "personal qualitiesand social goods have their own spheres of operation"(1983: l9).MaxWeber, I find,was concerned with"the 'internaland lawfulautonomy' of the familial,religious,economic,political,aesthetic,erotic,and intellectual(scientific)lifeorders or spheres oflifeactivityand value, . . ." (Scaff 1987: 743). Robert V/.Cox identifiedtwelve"modes"of "social relations of production"(1987: ll-34),whichheviewedas "monads."QualifyingG. W. Iribniz'suse of the term,Cox saw it as a device to examine "distinctiveformsof social lifeso as to discern their characteristic dynamicsas though they de-

l d di t di i i i l i i l "( 405 ) Mi h l

293



is the assignment of greater or lesser importance to each of thesesenses. I suspect that three senses dominate in social practices uni-versally, these being touching, seeing, and hearing.Other sensesbecome auxillaryto these three, none of whichuniversallydomi-nates the other two. I also suspect the universal practice of grantingpriorityto touching,seeing, and hearing finds support in anotheraspect of our bodilyselves: We differentiate in and out withrespectto ourselves (Johnson 1981: 19-37, Lakoff1987:266-281).Our touchmarks the boundary between what is withinand outside of us; wesee out; we hear sounds comingin. To similareffectmay be ourbodilyexperience of the relationsof parts and whole:We touch, asone whole to another; we see froma whole (ourselves) to the worldin its many parts; we hear parts of the worldas an integral wholein our heads.

I suggest that oursensory experience of the worldand of our bodilyselves in that world,reinforcedby our appreciationof possible rela-tions of in and out, wholes and parts, yieldsa universal set of threecategories of reasoning, not to mention many other social practices.I call the three senses so reinforced"facultiesof experience." Theyare not the only facultiesof human experience, but I take them tobe a particularly importantset of such faculties' Because they arenot just a matter of touching, seeing, and hearing, as separate, un-

mediated physical capacities, but involvea systematic set of rela-tions, I do not wish to name the categories individually.They comeas a set, and they should be taken as such. This set of facultiesdif-ferentiates the columns of the synoptic table to follow.

veloped according to a distinctivesocial principle"(p. 405n.).MichaelOakeshott also wrote of modes, in his case, "modes of experience."(1933).He identifiedthree (historical,scientific, andpractical) anddecided on idealist grounds that they were not "faculties"(pp. 7l-73). Oakeshott's presentation of each mode in terms of whole-partrelations suggests otherwise to me-His three modes are my threefaculties (and in the same order; see, for example, his pp. 98, 182,260).

Words like"form,""sphere," and "mode"either codifyor callforthessentialist tendencies. Iocatingwhat is discrete and coherentin the wash of human activities mustalways risk this. I review the

risks and make appropriatedisclaimersand qualificationsin mydiscussion of operative paradigms in the introduction.With thesecaveats in mind,I propose to call the table's rows"paradigmsof ex-perience."Unlikefacultiesof experience, the paradigms of experi-ence do not constitute a determinateset. There are as many para-digms as people make and, in making,construe as made.



Alltheory,dear friend,is gray-The Goldentree of lifeis green.

Johann Wolfgang von GoetheFaust (1976: 97)

REFERENCES

[Bracketed informationlocates references in text, by chapter, unless other-wise indicated.l



Abercrombie,N., s. Hill,and B. S. Tìrrner(t9g0)The DominantldeotogyThesis. London:George Allenand Unwin.[6]

Aggarwal,V. K. (1985)Liberalprotectionism.Berkeleyand Los Angeles:Universityof Californiapress. [4]

Aiken,H. D., ed. (1968) f/a me's Moraland polüicalphilosophy. New york:Hafner PublishingCo. t5l

Alexander, J. C. 0982) TheoreticalLogicin Sociology,yol.2,The Anrino_mies of Classicol Thought: Marxand Durkheim.[Intro.](1983a) TheoreticarLogicin sociorogy, yor. 3, The Classicar Attempt

at Theorcticalsynthesis. Berkeley and los Angeles:universityof californiaPress. [4]

(1983b) Theoretical Logicin Sociology,yol.4,The Modern Recon_struction of clossicor rhought: Tarcott parsons. Berkeleyand I"os An-gelesl Universityof Californiapress. [4]

Alford,c. (1985)"Is Jürgen Habermas's Reconstructive science ReallvScience?" Theory and Society 14:321-340. l3l

Alker,H. R., Jr., and R. K.Ashley,eds. (forthcoming)AfterRealism. [5]Allison,C. (1971) The Essence o Decision, Boston:Little,Brown.[7]

Almond,c, A. (1986) "spheres of lnfluenceBehavior:A Literature Search

298 ReÍerences

and MethodologicalReflections,"145-167, DominontPowers and Subor-dinate States, ed. by J. F. Tiiska. Durham:Duke UniversityPress. [6]

Anderson, P. (1978) Passagas fromAntiquityto Feudolism. london:Verso. [6]

Aron,R. (1954) The Centuryof Total War. Boston:Beacon Press. [7]

(1973) Peace and War, abridged version trans. by R. HowardandA.B. Fox. GardenCity:Anchor Press. [7]

Aronson,J. L. (1984) A Reatist Philosophy of Science' London:Macmillan.[l]Arrow,K. J. (1933) CollectedPopers,Yol. l, Social Choice and Justice. Cam-

bridge,MA:

HarvardUniversityPress. [8]

Ashley,R. K. (1983) "TheEye of Power: The Politicsof WorldModeling,"InternationalOrganization, 37: 495-535. [5]

ReÍerences 299

-,ed. (1971)PoliticalElites in a Democracy. New york:Atherton

Press. [6, 7]

Baker, G. P., and P. M. S. Hacker (19g4) Skepticism, Rules and Longuoge.Oxford:BasilBlackwell.[l]

Balbus, I. D. (1983)Morxismand Dominatron.princeton:princetonuni-versity Press. [6]

Baldwin,D. A. (1979) "powerAnalysisand worldpolitics:New Tiends ver-sus Old Rndencies," Worldpolitics3l: 161_194. [7]

(1985) konomicstatecroft. princeton:princetonuniversitypress. [7]Barnet, R. J. (1973) Roots of Wan Baltimore:penguin Books. [6]Barry,B. (1965)PolüicalArgument. london:Routledge and Kegan paul. [g]



(1986)"The Poverty of Neorealism,'255-3W, in Neorealism andIts Critics,ed. by R. O. Keohane. NewYork: ColumbiaUniversityPress'

llntro.l(1987) "The Geopolitics of GeopoliticalSpace: Towarda Critical

Social Theoryof InternationalPolitics,"Alternatives12: 403-434. ÍIn-tro., 7l

(1988) "Geopolitics,Supplementary,Criticism:A Reply to Profes-sors Roy and Walker," Alternatives,13: 88-102. [l]

Austin,J. L. (1954) The Provinceof Jurísprudence Determinedand the Usesof the Study of Jurisprudence, withan Introductionby H. L. A. Hart.New York:NoondayPress. [2,5]

(1963) How to Do Things withWords' Cambridge, MA:HarvardUniversityPress. [2]

(1964) '1\ Plea for Excuses," 4l-63,in OrdinaryLanguage, ed. byV. C. Chappell. New York:Dover Publications.[2]

Axelrod.R. (1970)Conflictof Interest. Chicago:MarkhamPublishing.[6]

(1984) The Evolutionof Cooperation. NewYork:Basic Books. [8]

Bach, K., andR. M. Harnish (1979) LinguisticCommunicotionand Speech

Acts. Cambridge, MA:MITPress. [2]

Bachrach, P. (1967) The Theory of DemocmticElilism.Boston: Little,Brown.t7l

y, ( )PolüicalArgument. london:Routledge and Kegan paul. [g](1970) Sociologists,konomists and Democracy. Chicago: Univer_

sityof Chicago Press. [8]

Barry, 8., and R. Hardin(1982),,Epilogue,"367-3g6, in RationolMan andIrrationalsociety? ed,. by Barry and Hardin.BeverlyHills:sage publica-tions. [8]

Beitz,c. R. (1979) Politicalrheory and InternationalRelations. princeton:PrincetonUniversitypress. [5]

Bendix,R.

(1962)Maxweber: AnIntellectuqlportraít.Garden citv:An-chor Books.[3,6]

(1966-67) "Tiaditionand ModernityReconsidere d,,,, ComparativeStudies in Society and History, Vol. 9: 318-323. [7]

(1978)Kin4sor People. Berkeleyand L,os Angeles: UniversityofCaliforniaPress. [7]

Benedict, R. (1946) The chrysanrhemum ond thesword.Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.[3]

Bentham, J. (1948)The principles of Moralsand Legislation,withan Intro-duction by L. J. LaFleur. New york:Hafnerpress, reprintinged. of 1g23.[3,4,5,9]

-. (1962) "Panopticon:or the InspectionHouse," 3j -172, ìn TheWorks

of Jeremy Bentham, Vol. 4, ed. by J. Bowring,New york:Russell and' Russell. [5]

300 ReÍerences

Bentley,A. F. (1967)The Process of Government.Cambridge,MA:BelknapPress. First pubÌished 1908. [7]

Beres, L. R. (1980) Apocalypse. Chicago: Universityof ChicagoPress. [4]

Berger, P. L., and T. Luckmann (1967) The Social Construction of Reality.Garden City:Anchor Books. [l]

Berman, M. (1982) AtlThat Is SolidMeltsintoAir.New York: SimonandSchuster. [7]

Bernstein, R. J. (1978) The Restructuringof Social and PoliticalTheory'

Philadelphia:Universityof Pennsylvania Press.(Intro.,l,8l

Bhaskar, R. (1979)The Possibilityof Noturalism.AtlanticHighlands: Hu-manities Press. [ì

ReÍerences

Boyle,F. A. (1985)WorldPoliticsand InternationalInw. Durham:DukeUniversityPress. [7]

Bradbury, M.,and J. McFarlane,eds. (1976), ModernismIg90_1930. Ham-mondsworth:Penguin Books. [7]

Brennan, G., and J. M.Buchanan (1985),The Reason of Rutes. Cambridge:Cambridge Universitypress. [5,6]

Brown,s. (1974) New Forces in worldpolitics.washington: The BrookingsInstitution.[7]

Bruneç J. (1986) ActualMinds,possible Worlds, Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. [l]

Buchanan, J. M. (1980) "Rent Seeking and profitSeeking," 3-15, in Tbwarda Theoryof th R t S ki S i d B h

301



manities Press. [ìBirnie,P. (1985\ InternationalRegulation of Wholing,Vol. I' New York:

Oceana. [4]

Black, M. (1962\Modets and Metaphors. Ithaca: CornellUniversityPress'

Í2,41

(1970) Marginsof Precision lthaca: CornellUniversityPress. [3]

Bleicher, S.A. (1969) "The legal Significanceof Re-Citationof GeneralAssemblyResolutions,",4merican Journal of InternationalInw63: 444-478. l4l

Bloor,D. (1983) Witteenstein:ASocial Theory of Knowledge' New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress. [1]

Bohannan, P. (1967) "The DifferingRealms of Law,"43-56,in Law andWar-

fore, ed. by Bohannan. New York:Natural HistoryPress' [4]

Bonner, J. (1986) Politics, Economics and Welfore.Sussex: WheatsheafBooks. Untro.l

Bothe, M. (1980) "Lrgaland Non-kgalNorms-AMeaningfulDistinctionin International Relations?" Netherlands Year Book of InternationalLaw. Yol. ll:65-95. [2]

Boyd,R. N. (1984) "The Current Status of ScientificRealism," 4l-82, in Sci-entificRealism,ed. by J. Lrplin.Berkeleyand Los Angeles: Universityof CaliforniaPress. ill

a Theoryof the Rent Seeking Society, ed. by Buchanan and others. Col_lege Station: Texas A & Mpress. [8]

Buchanan, J. M., and G. ïüllock(1962) The Calculusof Consent. Ann Ar_bor: Universityof Michiganpress. [6]

Buchler, J., ed. (1955) PhilosophicalWritingsof peirce. New york:DoverPublications.[3]

Bueno de Mesquita, B. (1981)The War Ti,ap.Press. [6]

New Haven: Yale University

Bull,H. (1977)The Anarchicalsociety. Newyork:columbiauniversityPress. [5,6]

Callinicos,A. (1985)'AnthonyGiddens,,, Theory and Society t4: 133_166.[l]Carr, E. H. (1964) The TlventyYears'Crisis, Ig9-lg3g.Newyork:Harper

Torchbooks, reprinting2nd ed., 1946. l7lcarreau, D.' and others (1978) Droitinrernationaleéconomique. paris:

Librairiegénérale de droitet de jurisprudence.[2]

cavell,s' (1979)The claimof Reason. oxford:oxforduniversitypress. [l]chayes, A. (1974) The cuban Missilecrisls.Newyork:oxforduniversitv

Press. [7]Claude, I. L. Jr. (1962'1 Power and InlernationolRelations. New york:Ran_

dom House. [4,8]

302 ReÍerences

Clegg, S. (1975) Power Rule ond Domination.[,ondon:Routledge and Ke-gan Paul. [6]

Cohen, I. J. (1987) "structurationTheoryand SocialProxis,"273-308, inSocialTheoryTbday, ed. by A. Giddens and J. H. Türner. Stanford:Stan-ford UniversityPress. [1]

Cohen, J. L., E. Hazebigg, and W. Pope (1975) "De-ParsonizingWeber: ACritiqueof Parsons' Interpretation of Weber's Sociology,",4merican So-ciologicolReview40:229-241.Í61

Cohen, M. (1984) Ronald Dworkinand ContemporaryJurisprudence. To-

towa:Rowman andAllanheld.

[2]Cohen, R. (1981) InternationalPolitics.London:Longman.

ff d b ( 98 ) l d P Chi U i

ReÍerences 303

(1986) "SocialForces, States and WorldOrders: Beyond Interna_tional RelationsTheory,"204-254, in Neorearism and lts critics,ed. byR. O. Keohane.New york:ColumbiaUniversitypress. [6]

(1987) Production,power, and WorldOrder. New york:ColumbiaUniversityPress. [6, Synoptic Tàble]

crick,B. (1960) The Americanscience of potüics. Berkeleyand los Angeles:Universityof Californiapress. [7]

Dahl, R. A. (1956) A Preface to DemocraticTheory. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press. [7]

(1961) l4thoGoyerns? New Haven: yale Universitypress. [7]Dahl,R.4., and C. E. Lindblom(1963) politics,Economics,and Welfare.

New York:Harper Torchbooks [7]



Comaroff,J. L., and S. Roberts (1981)Rules and Processes. Chicago:Uni-versityof Chicago Press. [4]

Connolly, W. E. (1974) The krms of PoliticalDiscourse. kxington,MA:D. C. Heath. [Intro.]

(1983)The Tërms of PoliticalDiscourse,2nded., reprintinglst ed.witha new last chapter. Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress. [1]

(1987) Potitics andAmbiguily.Madison: Universityof WisconsinPress. []

Coplin,W. (1965) "InternationalLaw andAssumptions about the StateSystem." WorldPolitics17: 615-634.l2l

Corbett,P. E. (1951) Law andSociety in the Relationsof States. New York:Harcourt, Brace. [5]

(1959)Law in Diplomacy.Princeton:Princeton UniversityPress. [7]

Coser, L. (1956)The Functions of Sociat Conflict.NewYork: TheFreePress. [4]

Coulter, J. (1983) Rethinking CognitiveTheory. New York: St.Martin'sPress. [3]

Cox, R. W. (1983)"Gramsci,Hegemony, and InternationalRelations: AnEssay in Method,"Millennium:Journal of InternotionalStudies l2:. 162-175. [6]

New York:Harper Torchbooks. [7]

Dallmayr,F. D., and T, A.McCarthy, eds. (1977)Understandingand SocialInquiry.Notre Dame: Universityof Notre Dame press. [l]

Day, D. (1987) The Whale War. New york:Random House. [4]DAmato,A.0984) Jurisprudence. Dordrecht:MartinusNijhoffpublishers.

I4lDamon,w. (1977) The sociar wortdof the chitd. San Francisco: Jossey-

Bass. [3]

Dell,s. (1981)on BeingGrandmotherry:The Evolutionof IMFcondition-ality,Essays in InternationalFinance, No. 144, International Finance sec-tion, Department of Economics, princeton University.[4]

D'Entreves,A. P. (1967) The Notionof the state. oxford:clarendon press. [6]

Derrida, J. (1976) Of Grammatology,trans. by G. C. Spivak. Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Universitypress. [l]

Deutsch, K. w.,and others (1957) potüicatcommunityin the NorthAttan-tic Area. Princeton:PrincetonUniversitypress. [l]

De visscher, c. (19ó8) Theoryand Reolityin pubtic Internationar Law, re-

vised ed. trans. by P. E. corbett.princeton:

princeton universitypress. [7]Dobb, M. (1963) Studies in the Developmentof Copitalsrn.Newyork:In_

ternationalPublishers. [ó]

304 References

Domhoff,G. W. (1967) Who Rules America?EnglewoodCliffs:Prentice-Hall.[6]

Doran, C.F. (1971) The Politics of Assimilatior.Baltimore:The JohnsHopkinsPress. [6]

Duby, G. (1980)The Three Orders, trans. by A. Goldhammer. Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press. [3]

Durkheim,E. (1915) The Elementory Forms of ReligiousLife.l-andon:George Allenand Unwin.[3]

(1933)The Divisionof Labor in Society, trans. by G. Simpson' New

York:Macmillan.[4](1964) The Rules of SociologicalMethod, trans. by S. A' Solovav

and J. H. Mueller. [,ondon:Collier-Macmillan.First published 1938. [2]

References 305

Elias, N. (1982)Power and civitity,yor. 2, The civiliTingprocess, trans.by E. Jephcott. New york:pantheon Books. [5]

Elster, J. (1979) ulysses and the sirens. cambridge: cambridge universityPress. [8]

Emmanuel,A. (1972) Llnequar Exchange. New york:MonthlyReviewpress.t6ì

Eulau, H' (1963)The Behavioralpersuosion in polítics.New york:RandomHouse. [7ì

(1968) "The Maddening Methods of H.D. Lasswell,"Journal ofPolüics 30: 3-24. [71

Falk, R. A. (1971) "The Relevance of politicalcontext in the Nature andFunctioningof InternationalLaw:AnIntermediate view,"177-202, in

f



Dworkin,R. (1977) Taking Rights Seriousl . Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. [2,4]

(1986)Law'sEmpire.Cambridge, MA:HarvardUniversityPress'

Í2,51

Easton, D. (1953)The PoliticalSys/ern. New York:AlfredA. Knopf.[Intro.]

(1965)A Systems Analysisof PoliticalZry'.New York:John Wileyand Sons. [Intro.,6]

Eckstein,H. (1973) ,AuthorityPatterns: A Structural Basis for PoliticalIn-quiry,"AmericanPoliticalScience Review67: 1142-1163' [Intro.'6]

(1982)"The Idea of PoliticalDevelopment:From Dignityto Effi-ciency," WorldPolitics 34: 451-486. l7l

Eco, U., and T. A.Sebeok, eds. (1983) The Sign of Three. Bloomington:Indiana UniversityPress. [3]

Edelman, C. (1987)NeuralDarwinism.New York: Basic Books. [3]

Einhorn, H. J., and R. M.Hogarth (1987) "DecisionMakingunder Am-biguity,"4l-66, in RationalChoice, ed. by Hogarth and M'W. Reder.Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press. [8]

Eliade, M. (1978) A Historyof Religious ldeas, Yol. l, From the Stone Ageto the Eleusinian Mysteries, trans. by W R. Thask. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press. [3]

, , inThe Relevance of InternationalInw,ed. by K. Deutsch and S. Hoff_mann. Garden City:AnchorBooks [2,6]

(1985) "Towarda kgal Regime for NuclearWeapons,,, 453_4j2, inFalk,F. Kratochwiland S. H. Mendlovitz,eds., Internationallaw, yol.2, Studies on a Just World Orden Boulder:Westview press. [4]

Ferencz, B. B.(197 5) DefiningInternationalAggression. Dobbs Ferry: OceanaPublications.[4]

Ferguson, Y. H., and R. W. Mansbach (l9gg)The Elusiveeuest. Columbia:Universityof South Carolinapress. [Intro.,g]

Fish, S. (1980) 1s There a Tëxt in This Closs? Cambridge, MA:Harvard Uni_versity Press. [1,2]

Flathman, R. E. 0966) The pubticInterest. Newyork:John WileyandSons. [8]

(1972)PoliticalObligation.New york:Atheneum.[1](1976) The Prqctice of Rights.Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press. [7]

(1986) "Philosophy,politicalTheoryand practice,,, 145_|i,0, in Tia_dition,Interprerationand science, ed. by J. s. Nelson. Albany:state uni-versityof New Yorkpress. [l]

Foucault, M. (1972)The Archaeologyo/ Knowledge,trans. by A. M. Sheri- dan Smith. New York:pantheon Books. [ll

306 ReÍerences

(1973) The BirthoÍ the Clinic,Yol. l, AnIntroduction,trans. byA. M.Sheridan Smith.New York: Pantheon Books' [3]

(1917)Ianguage, Counter-Memory,Practice, ed' by D. F. Borchard,trans. by Borchard and S. Simon. Ithaca: CornellUniversityPress. [l'5]

(1978)Historyof Sexuality, trans. by R.Hurley.New York: Pan-theon Books. [7]

(1979) Disciplineand Punish, trans. by A. M.Sheridan Smith.NewYork: Vintage Books. [4,7]

(1980) Power/Knowledge,ed. by C. Gordon,four translators. New

York:Pantheon Books. [5]

Franck, T. M. (1968) The Structure of Impartiolity.New York: Macmillan.[4]

ReÍerences

(1978) Philosophersof peace and War. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress. [5]

Galtung, J. (1970) "Feudal Systems, Structural Violenceand The StructuralTheoryof Revolutions,"in Proceedings of the Internationalpeace Re-search AssociationThirdGeneral Conference, Vol. l: ll0-lgg.[6]

(1971)"StructuralTheoryof Imperialism,,'Journal of peace Re_search 8:81-117. [6]

Gardner, H. (1981) The Quest forMind,2nded. Chicago: UniversityofChicago Press. [Intro.,l,3]

Garfinckel,H. (1967)Studies in Ethnomethodotogy.EnglewoodCliffs:Prentice-Hall.[,3]

307



(1985) Nation against Nation. NewYork: OxfordUniversityPress. [4]

Franck,T., and E. Weisband (1971) Word Polltr'cs.New York: Oxford Univer-sity Press. [6]

Friedrich,C. J., ed. (1949) The Philosophyof Kant. NewYork: ModernLibrary.[5]

Friedrich,C. J. (1963\ Man and His Government. New York:McGraw-Hill.[6]

Frohock, F. M. (1979) "TheStructure of 'Politics',"American PoliticalSci-ence Review72:859-870. [Intro.]

(1987)Rational Association Syracuse: Syracuse UniversityPress.

IIntro.,8]

Frolich,N., and J. A. Oppenheimer (1978) ModernPoliticalkonomy.Prentice-Hall:EnglewoodCliffs.[8]

Gaddis, J. L. (1986) "The Long Peace: Elements of Stabilityin the PostwarInternationalSystem," InternationalSecuritylO: 99-142'16l

Galanter, M. (1982) "Mega-Lawand Mega-Lawyeringin the ContemporaryUnitedStates," 152-176,in The Sociologyof lhe Professions, ed. by R.Dingwalland P. Lrwis.New York:St. Martin's Press. [7]

Gallie,W. B. (1962) "EssentiallyContested Concepts," 12l-146, in The Im-portance of Innguage, ed. by M. Black' EnglewoodCliffs:Prentice-Hallllntro.l

Gauthier,D. (1986)Moralsby AgreemenLOxford:Clarendon press. [ólGeertz, C. (1973)The Interpretation of Cultures. Newyork;Basic Books. l3l

(1980)Negara. Princeton:PrincetonUniversitypress. l3l(1983) LocalKnowledge.New York: Basic Books. [4]

Giddens, A. (1976)NewRules of SociologicatMethod. New york:BasicBooks. []

(1979) Central Problems in Social Theory. Berkeleyand los Angeles:Universityof CaliforniaPress. [1,4ì

(1981) A Contemporary Critiqueof HistoricalMaterialism,yol. l,Powe4 Propertyand the Stote. Berkeley and tos Angeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress. [1]

(1982)Profilesand Critiquesin SociolTheory. Berkeleyand LosAngeles: Universityof CaliforniaPress. [l]

(1984)The Constitutionof Society. Berkeleyand Los Angeles: Uni-versityof CaliforniaPress. [l]

(1985a) A Contemporary Critiqueof HistoricalMaterialism,yol.2, The Nation-State and Violence.Berkeley and Los

Angeles:Universityof CaliforniaPress. [](1985b)"Marx'sCorrect Viewsof Everything,"Theoryand Society

14: 167-174. |l

308 ReÍerences

Gilb,C. L. (1966) Hidden Hierarchies. New York: Harper and Row' [7]

Gilligan,C. (1982) In a DifferentVoice. Cambtidge, MA:Harvard Univer-sity Press. [3]

Gilpin,R. (1981) War and Change in World Polilr'cs.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. [Intro.,6]

(1987) The Politicalkonomyof InternationalRelations'Prince-ton: PrincetonUniversityPress. [7]

Ginsburg, C. (1983)"Clues:Morelli,Freud and SherlockHolmes,"8l-ll8'inThe Sign of Three, ed. by U.Eco and T. Sebeok. Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress. [3]

Glaser, B. G., and A. L. Strauss (1967)The Discoveryof Grounded Theory'Chicago: AldinePublishingCo [1]

References 309

Haas, E. B. (1964) Beyond the Nation srale. stanford: Stanford UniversityPress. [7]

(1968) The UnitingofEurope. Stanford: Stanford Universitypress. [4](1980) "whycoilaborate? Issue Linkage and InternationalRegimes,,'

WorldPolitics 32: 357-405. l4l(1982) "words can Hurt you; or whosaid vy'hat to whom about

Regimes," InternotionalOrganizatíon,36: 207_243. l4lHabermas, J. (1971) Knowtedge and Human Interests, trans. by J. J. Shapiro.

Boston: Beacon press. [3,8]

(1979) Communicationand the Evolutionof Society, trans. by T.McCarthy.Boston: Beacon press. [2,31

l



Chicago: AldinePublishingCo. [1]

Goethe, J. W von (1976) Faust, Part I, trans. by R. Jarrell. New York: Far-rar, Straus and Giroux.

Goldman, A. I.(1986) 4p istemologyand CognitionCambridge,MA:Har-vard UniversityPress. [1]

Goodman, N. 0978) Ways of Worldmaking.lndianapolis: Hackett Publish-ing Co. []

(1984)Oí Mindand Other Matters.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. []

Gottlieb,G. (1963) The Logicof Choice' London:Allenand Unwin'[2]

(1974) "TheNature of InternationalLaw," 331-383' in The Futureof the Internationallzgal Order, Yol.4,ed. by C. Black andR' Falk'Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress. [2ì

Gouldner, A. W. (1970) The ComingCrisis of Western Sociologl'NewYork: Basic Books. [4]

Gramsci, A. (1971)selections From the Prison Notebooks. New York: Inter-national Publishers. [6]

Guitián,M. (1981) Fun d Conditionality,Pamphlet Series, No' 38. Washing-ton: InternationalMonetaryFund. [4]

Gutting,G. (1980) "Introduction," l-21, in Paradigms and Revolutions, ed'by Gutting.Notre Dame: Universityof Notre Dame Press. [Intro']

(1984) The Theoryof CommunicotiveAction,yol.l, Reason andthe Rationalizationof Society, trans. by T. McCarthy.Boston: BeaconPress. [2,8]

Hacking,I. (1975) The Emergence of probability.Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress. [3]

Haggard, S., and B' A. simmons (1987) "Theories of International Regimes,,,InternationalOrganization4l: 491-517.l4l

Hamnett, I. 0975) Chieftainshipand Legitimacy.London:RoutledgeandKegan Paul. [4]

Hampton,J. (1986) Hobbes and the social contract Tiadítion.cambridge:Cambridge Universitypress. [6]

Hancher, M. (1979) "The classificationof cooperative IllocutionaryActs,,,Innguoge in Society, Vol. 8: l-14 [2ì

Hardin,R' (1982)collectiveAction.Bartimore:Johns HopkinsuniversityPress. [5]

Harsanyi, J. c. (1983) "BasicMoralDecisions and Alternativeconcepts ofRationality,"Social Theory and practice, yol.9:231_244.[6,g]

Hart,H. L' A' (1961) The concept of l^ow.oxford:oxforduniversityPress. [2,4]

Hart, J. (1976) "Three Approachesto the Measurement of power in Interna-tionalRelations,"InternqtionolOrgonizalion30: 2g9_305. t7l



312 ReÍerences

Case concerningMilitaryand Paramilitary Activitiesin and against Ni-caragua (Nicaragua v. UnitedStates of America),InternationallzgalMaterials25: 1280-1289. 16l

Jervis, R. (1916)Perception and Misperceptionin WorldPolitics. Princeton:Princeton UniversityPress. [Intro.,7,8]

(1978)"Cooperation under the SecurityDilemma,"World Politics30: 167-214. í71

(1982) "SecurityRegimes,"In ternational Organization36: 357 -37 8.t4t

Johnson, M.(1987)The Body in the Mind.Chicago: Universityof ChicagoPress. [3,4,SynopticTable]

Johnson, M.,and G. t akoff (1980)Metaphors We LiveBy. Chicago: Univer-

ReÍerences

Kelsen, H. (1945)General Theory of Inwand the State, trans. by A.Wed-berg. Cambridge, MA:HarvardUniversitypress. [2,4]

(1952) Principlesof InternationorLaw. Newyork:Rinehart andCo. [2,41

Kenen, P. B' (1986) Financing Adjustmentand the InternationorMonetaryFund. Washington: The BrookingsInstitution.[4]

Kennedy, D. (1980) "Theses on International kgal Discourse," German yearBook of InternationalInw,yol.23:353_391. l2l

(1985) "Internationarrrgal Education,"HorvordInternationar InwJournal 26: 361-384.

[71Keohane, R. O. (1930) ,.The Theoryof Hegemonic Stabilityand Changesin InternationalEconomic Regimes, 1967-1977,. l3l_16i,in Change-in

the InternationolSystem, ed. by O R Holsti R M Siverson unã A

313



, , ( ) p y gsity of Chicago Press. [2,3,4]

Kahn, H. (1965) On Escalation. New York:Frederick A.Praeger. [4]

Kahn, H., and others (1976) The Next TlvoHundred Years. New York:Wil-liamF. Morrow.[3]

Kant,I. (1933) Critiqueof Pure Reason, ÍÍans. by N. Kemp Smith. London:Macmillanand Co. [,3]

Kaplan,M.A. (1957) System and Process in InternationalPolitics.NewYork: John Wileyand Sons. [6]

(1961) "Problems of Theory Buildingand Theory ConfirmationinInternationalPolitics,"WorldPolüics 13: 6-24. [Intro.]

Kavka,G. (1986) Hobbesian Moralond PoliticalTheory. Princeton: Prince-ton UniversityPress. [6]

Keal,P. (1983)Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance.l-ondon:Mac-millan.[6]

(1986) "On Influence and Spheres of Influence,"124-144, in Domi-nant Powers and SubordinateStates, ed. by J. F. Tiiska.Durham:Duke

UniversityPress. [6]Kelly,G. A. (1978) Hegel's Retreat fromEleusis. Princeton: PrincetonUni-

versityPress. [61

System, ed. by O. R. Holsti,R. M.Siverson,unã A.George. Boulder:Westviewpress. [4,6]

(1982)"The Demand florInternational Regimes,,, InternationalOrganization36: 325-355. [Intro.,4]

(1984) AfterHegemony- princeton:princeton universitypress.IIntro.,4,6,8]

Keohane, R. o., ed. (1986), Neorealismand lts critics. New york:corumbiaUniversityPress. IIntro.,7]

Keohane, R. O., and J. S. Nye (1977)power and Interdependence. Boston;Little,Brown.[6,7]

(1987) "Power a n d In te rdepe nde nce Revs ited, " Inte rna t io na r o rg a n i-zation 47:725-753.16l

Klink,F. F. (1987) 'Anarchy or Rule in InternationalRelations: The politicalEconomyof Heteronomous InternationalExchange,,' ph.D. Disserta_tion, The AmericanUniversity,Washington. [6]

Kohlberg,L. (1963) "The Developmentof children's orientations Towarda MoralOrder," Vita Humana 6: ll-33.[3]

(1979) Foreword,in Development in Judging MoralIssues, by J.

Rest. Minneapolis:Universityof Minnesota press. [3]

' MoralDevelopmentNew york:Harper and Row. [3]

314 ReÍerences

(1984)Essays in MoralDevelopment, YoI. 2, The Psychology ofMoralDevelopment. San Francisco: Harper and Row. [3]

Kohlberg,L., and C. Gilligan(1971)"The Adolescentas a Philosopher: TheDiscovery of the Self in a PostconventionalWorld,"Daedalus 100: l05l-1086. [3]

Konner, M. (1982) The Thngled Wing. NewYork: Holt,Rinehart andWin-ston. [4]

Krasner, S. D. (1976) "State Power and the Structureof InternationalTiade,"WorldPolitics28 3l'l-347.16l

(1982)"structuralCauses and Regime Consequences: Regimes as

InterveningVariables," InternationalOrganization36: 185-205. [4,6]

(1985) Structural Conflict.Berkeley and Los Angeles: UniversityofCaliforniaPress. [7]

ReÍerences

Kuhn,T. S. (1970a) The Structure of ScientificRevolutions,2nded., en-larged. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press. lst ed., 1962. [Intro.]

(1970b)"Reflectionson MyCritics."231-278, in Criticismand theGrowth of Knowledge,ed. by I. Lakatos and A.Musgrave. Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress. [Intro.]

Lakatos, I. (1978) The Methodologyof ScientificResearch programmes,Yol l, Philosophical Papers, ed. by J. Worralland G. Currie.Cambridge:

Cambridge UniversityPress. [5]

Lakoff,G. 0987) Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. Berkeley and losAngeles:Universityof CaliforniaPress. [Intro.,3,6,SynopticTàble]

Larson, A. (1961) Ll'henNationsDisagree. Baton Rouge: IouisianaStateUniversityPress. [7]

ll H P li i

315



Kratochwil,F. (1978) InternationolOrder and Foreign Pollcy.Boulder:Westview Press. [2,6]

Kratochwil,F. V. (l9Sl)The Humean Perspective in InternotionalRela-lions.Occasional Paper No. 9, WorldOrder Studies Program, CenterofInternationalStudies, Princeton University.[5]

(1982) "On the Notionof Interest in InternationalRelations,".Irler-national Organization 30: 1-30. [5,8]

(1983) "Is InternationalLaw 'Proper' Lavt?"ArchivfürRechts- undSozialphilosophie,YoL 69:. 13-46. Í2,41

(1984) "ThrasymmachosRevisited: On the Relevance of Norms forInternationalRelations,",/o urnol of InternationalAffiirs 37 : 343-3 56' l2l

(1987)"Rules,Norms, Values and the Limitsof 'Rationality',"Ar-chivfür Rechts- und Soziolphilosophie73: 301-329. [8]

(forthcoming)Rules, Norms,and Decisions.Cambridge:Cam-bridge UniversityPress. [2,5]

Kratochwil,F., and J. G. Ruggie (1986) "InternationalOrganization:A Stateof the Arton an Artof the State," InternotionalOrgonízation 40:753-776.

l4lKripke,S. A. (1982) Wittgensteinon Rules and Private Languoge. Cam-bridge, MA:HarvardUniversityPress. []

i

I

i

I

Lasswell,H. D. 0958) Politics:Who Gets What, When, How.Cleveland:World Publishing.[7]

(1960)Psychopathologyand Politics,new ed. withafterthoughts byauthor. New York:VikingPress. First published1930. [7]

(1963)"The Decision Process: Seven Categories of FunctionalAnaly-sis," 93-105, in Politics and Sociol Life,ed. by N. W. Polsby and others.Boston: HoughtonMifflin.[7]

(1965a) World Politicsand Personal Insecurity.New York:FreePress. [3,7,8]

(1965b) "The Policy Science of Development," WorldPoliticslii286-309. Ul

Lasswell,H. D., and others (1949) The Innguage of Politics.New York:G. W. Stewart. [7]

Lasswell, H. D., and A. Kaplan (1950) Power and Society. New Haven:YaleUniversityPress. [3,6,7,8]

Lasswell, H. D., and M. S. McDougal(1960)"lrgalEducation and PublicPolicy:Professional Tlainingin the Public Interest,"42-154, in Studies

inWorldPublic

Orden ed. by McDougaland others. NewHaven:yale

UniversityPress. [7]

lrnski,C. E. (1967) Rtwer and Privilege.New York:MccrawHill.[71

3Í6 ReÍerences

trvi-Strauss,C. (1966) The Savage Mind.Chícago:Universityof ChicagoPress. [Intro.,3,4]

Lewis,D. (1986) On the Pluralityof Worlds. Oxford:Basil Blackwell.[l]

Lindblom,C. E. (1977) Politics and Markets. New York:Basic Books. [4'7]

Lipson, C. (1985) StandingGuard. Berkeley and Los Angeles: UniversityofCaliforniaPress. [6]

Liska,G. (1966) "TheHeroic Decade and After:InternationalRelationsas

Events, Discipline,and Profession," SAISRevierry, 10, No. 4:5-11. [Intro.]

Liska, G. (1961) ImperialAmerica.Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins Press. [6]

LittletonC. (1982)The New Comparative Mythology.Berkeleyand l-osAngeles:Universityof CaliforniaPress' [3]

ReÍerences

Martines, L. (1980) Power and Imaginotion.NewYork:Vintage Books. [5]

Marx,K. (1954a) Capital,Vol. l. Moscow: Progress Publishers. [6]

(1954b)The Eighteenth Brumaireof Louis Napoleon,3rd reviseded. Moscow: Progress Publishers. [,6]

Marx,K., and F. Engels (1964) The German Ideology,3rdrev. ed. Moscow:Progress Publishers. [6]

(1978a, b) Werke, Vol. 3, 8. Berlin:DietzVerlag. [6]

Maslow,A.H.(1970) Motivationand Personolity,2nded,.New York:Harperand Row. [8]

McClelland,C. A. (1976) 'AnInside Appraisalof the WorldEvent Interac-tionSurvey," 105-111, in In Search of Global Patterns.ed. by J. N. Rose-nau. New York:Free Press. [7]

317



Ipdder, C.(1983)Russian Constructivisn. New Haven:Yale UniversityPress. []

Lowi, T.I. (1979) The End of Liberalism,2nded. New York:Norton.[7]

Machiavelli,N. (1950a, b) The Discourses of NiccolòMachiavelli,2vols.,trans., withIntroductionand Notes, by L. J. Walker. London:Routledgeand Kegan Paul. [5]

Maclntyre,A. (1981) AfterVirtue'Notre Dame: Universityof Notre Dame

Press.

Mackay, A. F. 0980),4 rrow's Theorem:The Paradox of Social Cftolce.NewHaven: Yale UniversityPress. [8]

Mandelbaum, M. (1971) History, Mon,and Reason. Baltimore:Johns Hop-kins Press. [Intro.]

Manley, L. (1980)Conventions, 1500-1750. Cambridge, MA:HarvardUniver-sity Press. [2]

Mansbach, R. W., and J. Vasquez (1981) In Search of Theory. New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress. [7]

Mansfield,H. C. Jr. (1979) Machiavelli'sNewModes

andOrders. Ithaca:

CornellUniversityPress. [5]

Marcuse, H. (1964) One Dimensional Man.Boston:Beacon Press. [3]

[ ]

McDougal,M.S., and W M.Reisman, eds. (1981) Internationallaw Es-says. Mineola:FoundationPress. [2]

McGinn,C. (1984)Skepticism, Rules and Innguages. Oxford:BasilBlack-well.ül

Mcluhan, M. (1964) Understanding Media. New York:McGraw-Hill.[7]

McNeil,W H. (1982)The Pursuit of Powen Chicago: Universityof ChicagoPress.

[7]McNeilly,F. S. (1968) The Anatomyof l-eviathan. Iondon:Macmillan.[6]

Mcpherson, C. B. (1962) The PoliticalTheoryof Possessive Individualism.Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress. [Intro.,5,6]

Megill,A. (1985) Prophets of Extremity.Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univer-sity of CaliforniaPress. [Intro.,l]

Meinecke, F. (1957) Machiavellism,trans. by D. Scott. NewHaven: YaleUniversityPress. [5]

Merton,R. K. (1968) Social Theoryand Sociol Structure,enlarged ed. NewYork: Free Press. [Intro.]

Miliband,R. (1969)The Stqte in Capitalist SocieÍy. NewYork:Basic Books. [6]

Mill,J, (1967) "Lawof Nations," in Essays on Governmenl,Jurisprudence,

318 ReÍerences

Libertyof the Press, and the l-aw of Notions.New York:Augustus M'KelleÍreproducing ed. of 1825. [5]

Mills,C. W. (1959a) The Power Elile.New York:OxfordUniversityPress' [6]

(1959b) The SociologicalImogination.New York: OxfordUniver-sity Press. [Intro.,4]

Mitchell,w. c. (1969),,The Shape of PoliticalTheory to come: FromPoliti-cal Sociologyto PoliticalEconomy," 10l-136,in Politicsand the SocialSciences, ed. by S. M.Lipset.New York:OxfordUniversityPress' [8]

Mitrany,D. (1966) A WorkíngPeace System. Chicago: Quadrangle Books' [7]

Modelski,G. (1983)"InngCycles of World l-eadership," 115-139' in Con-tending Approaches to World Systems Analysis,ed. by W R. Thompson'BeverlyHills:Sage Publications.[6]

ReÍerences 319

Noddings, N. (1984)Caring. Berkeley and Los Angeles:Universityof Cali-fornia Press. [3]

Norris,C. (1982)Deconstruction.I-ondon: Methuen.[Intro.]

Nozick, R.(1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia.NewYork:Basic Books. [5]

Oakeshott, M. (1933)Experience andlts Modes. Cambridge: CambridgetJniversityPress. [SynopticTable]

(1962)Rationalismin Politics.New York:Basic Books. [4]

(1975) On Human Conduct. Oxford:Clarendon Press. []Olson, W. C. (1972) "The Growthof a Discipline," 3-29, in The Aberystwyth

Papers, ed. by B. Porter. Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress. [Intro.]

Olson, W., and N. Onuf(1985) "The Growthof a Discipline:Reviewed," l-



Mommsen, W. J. (1974) The Age of Bureaucracy.New York:Harper andRow. [6]

Morgenthau, H. J. 0946) ScientificMan vs. Power Politics.Chicago:Uni-versity of Chicago Press. Untro.,7,8l

(1948)Potitics Among Nations, lst ed. New York:AlfredA' Knopf'IIntro.l

(1959)"The

Nature and Limitsof a Theory of InternationalPoli-tics,"15-28, in Theoretical Aspects of InternationalRelations, ed' by W'T. R. Fox. Notre Dame: Universityof Notre Dame Press. [Intro']

(1967)Politicsamong Nations, 4th ed. New York:AlfredA'Knopf'[Intro.,4,7]

Musa, M., ed. (1964)Machiavelli'sThe Prince, bilingualed. trans' by Musa'New York:St. Martin's.[5]

Nardin, N. (1983) Law,Moratityand the Relations of States. Princeton:PrincetonUniversitYPress' [4]

Nelson, J. S. (1983) "PoliticalTheory as PoliticalRhetoric,"169-240, inIVhatShould PoliticalTheory Be Now?ed. by Nelson. Albany:State

Universityof New YorkPress' [l'4]Nietzsche, F. (1969) On the Genealogy of Moralsand kce Homo, ttans'

by W. Kaufmannand R. J. Hollingdale.New York:Vintage Books' [5]

Olson, , . ( ) The p ,28, in InternationalRelations, ed. by S. Smith. Oxford:Basil Blackwell.IIntro.]

Onuf, N. G. (1974) Reprisals: Rituals,Rules, Rationales. Research Mono-graph No. 42, Center of InternationalStudies, Princeton University.[,6]

(1975) "Lawand Lawyersin InternationalCrises," InternotionalOrganization 29: 1035-1053. [6]

(1979)"InternationalLrgal Order as an ldea," American Journalof Internationol Law73:244-266. l4l

(1982a) "Comparative InternationalPolitics,"Yeor Book of WorldAffairs,Vol. 36:197-212. [Intro.]

(1982b) "GlobalLaw-Makingand kgal Thought,"l-81, in Law-Makingin the Global Community,ed. by N. G. Onuf.Durham: CarolinaAcademic Press. [4,5,6]

(1984) "Prometheus Prostrate," Futures, Vol. 16: 47-59. 13,81

Onuf, N. G., and P. S. Onuf (1985)'AmericanConstitutionalismand aLiberal WorldOrder," paper presented at AnnualMeeting of Organiza-tion of American Historians.[5]

Onuf, N.C., and V. S. Peterson (1984)"HumanRights froman Interna-tionalRegimes Perspective," Journol of InlernationalA|(fairs37: 329-342. l4l

nicholas greenwood onuf-world of our making_ rules and rule in social theory and international...

Documents