new political movements and governance in latin america
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New Political Movements andGovernance in Latin AmericaHarry E. Vanden aa Department of Government and InternationalAffairs , University of South Florida , Tampa ,Florida , USAPublished online: 07 Aug 2006.
To cite this article: Harry E. Vanden (2004) New Political Movements andGovernance in Latin America, International Journal of Public Administration,27:13-14, 1129-1149, DOI: 10.1081/PAD-200039893
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONVol. 27, Nos. 13 & 14, pp. 1129–1149, 2004
DOI: 10.1081/PAD-200039893 0190-0692 (Print); 1532-4265 (Online)Copyright © 2004 by Taylor & Francis Inc.
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International Journal of Public Administration2713 & 14Taylor & FrancisTaylor and Francis 325 Chestnut StreetPhiladelphiaPA191060190-06921532-4265LPADTaylor & Francis Inc.3989310.1081/PAD-2000398932004133VandenNew Political Movements New Political Movements and Governance in Latin America
Harry E. Vanden*
Department of Government and International Affairs, University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida, USA
ABSTRACT
This article argues that traditional governance in Latin America is incrisis. Globalization and IMF-advocated neoliberal economic policyhave left the masses behind, despite the growth of democracy.Traditional governing structures often cannot respond to popular needs,and they are being challenged by a series of new, highly politicized socialmovements like the indigenous and peasant movements in Bolivia,popular assemblies in Argentina, and the Landless Movement in Brazil.In the process, new forms of popular mobilization and participatorydecision making are challenging entrenched authoritarian attitudes andpractices and making way for new political-bureaucratic structures and anew political culture.
*Correspondence: Harry E. Vanden, Department of Government and Inter-national Affairs, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, 33620, USA; E-mail:[email protected]
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INTRODUCTION
In Latin America, democracy and effective government have evolvedslowly. All too often, traditional forms of democracy and citizen partici-pation do not seem to have served the people. The mechanisms that weredesigned to transmit the popular will to the decision makers so that theycould govern in accordance with popular desires and needs have been weakhistorically. From the eighties on, the process of US-inspired democrati-zation and economic neoliberalism[1] were offered as the preferred way toremedy these weaknesses, if not as the only alternative to follow. Neoliberal-ism (in the context of a democratized government ) was pushed by interna-tional financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF),and by the US government. The acceptance of these doctrines was sold asa prerequisite for a golden age for democracy and economic development pat-terned on the US, and, as such, was being held out to Latin America andmuch of the rest of the world as the model to follow.
Yet, as the linked models of democratization and neoliberal economicshave taken hold throughout the hemisphere, their suitability as a form ofgovernance and a viable economic system is being called into question. Sta-tistics from the World Bank indicate that economic performance was disas-trous in 2002, with negative growth of 1.1%.[2] Indeed, country after countryis in crisis. Popular uprisings, aborted presidential terms, economic chaos,attempted coups d’état and the continued impoverishment of the masses ifnot segments of the middle classes are the order of the day. This in turncalls into question the legitimacy of the government and its ability to govern.Many believe that this crisis results in large part from the failure of the eco-nomic policies that are being advocated by the World Bank, InternationalMonetary Fund and the US government. Several publications, such as theEconomist, go on to note a resultant change in Latin American politics,but initially saw it as a resurgent populism or simply a turn to the left.[3] Webelieve the change is far greater. The progression of events suggests thatthere is a realignment that is much more profound and that may well repre-sent a sea change in politics in the region.
Ever since the Caracazo in 1989, there have been different forms ofpopular protest against austerity measures and elements of the conserva-tive economic policies that came to be called neoliberalism in Latin America.These have been manifest in diverse forms: the Zapatista rebellion in Mexicoin 1994; the neopopulist Movimiento V República led by Hugo Chávez inVenezuela from the late 1990s on; the national indigenous movement ledby the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE)in Ecuador and the growth of its related party, Pachakutik, the Move-ment of Landless Rural Laborers (MST) in Brazil; the Neighborhood
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New Political Movements 1131
Assemblies (Asambleas de Barrios) and other protest organizations inArgentina; and the Coca Growers’ Federation and its linked politicalmovement, MAS, in Bolivia. The election of Lucio Gutíerrez and theemergence of his New Country Movement in Ecuador, and the election ofLula and the strength of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in Brazil canalso be seen as part of a strong popular reaction to neoliberal policiesadvocated by the IMF and other international financial institutions and afurther indication of a movement away from traditional politics and anauthoritarian political culture to new forms of popular democratic partici-pation. It also suggests an alternative model of governance to that beingadvocated by US-inspired proponents of democratization.
Though not always well or precisely articulated, new demands arebeing registered. They have not, however, always been addressed to thepolitical system per se, but to society more generally since there have beengrowing questions about the system’s relevance and legitimacy. Nor hasthe populace in most nations looked to armed struggles and revolutionarymovements to remedy their problems (Colombia is the significant exceptionhere). Something different is being sought. Different groups are lookingfor new political and administrative structures that allow for, if notencourage, their participation. Civil society is becoming the new locus ofconflict and contention. Specific segments of the population are seekingforms of political–administrative organization that they can call theirown. There is a search for new structures that can respond to the per-ceived—and not always clearly articulated—demands being formulatedfrom below by the popular sectors.
A broad segment of the population (from the lower and middleclasses) has begun to mobilize and seek new and different politicalinvolvement and responses in parties, governmental structures, and socialmovements. They want something that works for them. Indeed, theincreasing promotion of democracy and democratization tells them thattheir voices should be heard and that the political system should somehowrespond to them. When it is unclear how, if at all, their votes count andwhether the political class is responding to their hue and cry, manybecome disillusioned and angry. Similarly, the return to democracy afterauthoritarian military rule or the strengthening of democratic govern-mental institutions during intense democratization convince broad sectorsof the population to expect better, cleaner, more efficient, and hopefullyless corrupt government. In this respect, the political culture is beginningto change. If nothing else, elections are not expected to be fraught withfraud, and the resultant governments are expected to be a bit moreresponsive and a little less corrupt. Similarly, the populace is generallybecoming less tolerant of some of the traditional vices in Latin American
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politics: corruption, ineffective rule, nonsubstantive political discourse(politiqueo), and unresponsive and inefficient government bureaucracies.
Historic Context
Since the colonization by the Spanish and Portuguese in the early six-teenth century, Latin America has been governed by top-down political-administrative systems controlled by or heavily linked to outside powers.Politics and administration have most often been characterized by per-sonal favoritism (personalismo) and clientelism (clientelismo), authoritariandecision making, inefficiency, and often outright corruption, with a fewexceptions (such as Costa Rica in recent times). Political leaders some-times have become more closely tied to outside powers and their modelsof development than to the needs and wants of their own people. Thus, themasses have been most frequently marginalized from the decision-makingprocess and the related allocation of political power and economicresources.[4]
Political participation at the national level was quite limited at thetime of independence. Mass political movements failed, while those led bythe less popularly oriented members of the creole elite like Iturbide inMexico succeeded and set the stage for the elitist politics of the nineteenthand much of the twentieth centuries. The franchise—and concomitantpolitical participation—were gradually widened during this period. Thisin turn challenged the political elite to seek mechanisms to incorporate (ifnot manipulate) ever wider segments of the population. This eventuallyled to the emergence of mass-based parties, reformist and revolutionaryparties, and populism as a means of incorporating the general publicinto a national project led by a political elite. Some reformist parties likeLiberación Nacional in Costa Rica and Acción Democrática in Venezuelawere able to bring about economic and political structural change and toincorporate wide sectors of the population into national society andcompetitive two-party-dominant political systems. A few populistprojects like Peronism in Argentina were also able to achieve significanteconomic redistribution, break the oligarchy’s economic domination, andincorporate the working class and segments of the middle class into a one-party-dominant system, albeit under the somewhat demagogic leadershipof Juan and Evita Perón.
Attempts to enfranchise the masses and gain a greater degree ofautonomy from outside economic and political domination led to variousrevolutionary activities: Mexico (1910) and Cuba (1959), and shorter-livedexperiments in Bolivia (1952) and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua (1979). A
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similar attempt for autonomy from external influences and implementationof socialism was led by Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973, but aborted bya violent, US-backed military coup led by August Pinochet on September 11,1973. Attempts at change in Guatemala in the early fifties had also beenmet with a CIA-sponsored coup in 1954, and lesser attempts at reform inthe Dominican Republic in 1965 were met by a Marine occupation.
As suggested by the interventions in Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs Invasionin Cuba, the landing of Marines in the Dominican Republic, and the US-backed coup in Chile, external influences in Latin America have beenconsistent and powerful. This is equally evident in the economic area,where Latin America was inserted into the world economy as a supplier ofcheap raw materials and cheap labor. As a result, the region was relegatedto the economic periphery and its economic, political, and institutionaldevelopment was stunted. Modernization theorists blamed undevelopedinternal structures and deficient political culture, while many LatinAmericans related the problems to external economic exploitation andoutside intervention. Dependency analysis offered an alternative explana-tion for underdevelopment that attempts to induce Latin Americans togain greater control over their economic if not political destinies.
Dependency Theory allowed Latin American problems to be assignedto unequal economic interchanges and resource extraction from theperiphery by developed nations at the center of the international eco-nomic system. This encouraged autonomous nationalist developmentand led to adoption of policies of economic nationalism, strongnational planning, and a stronger focus on import substitution indus-trialization and the stimulation of nontraditional exports. It did not,however, lead to the most careful examination of the internal marginal-ization of the general public from economic and political power, or ofthe administrative problems and inefficiencies in most Latin Americanstates. Many already bloated and inefficient state bureaucracies wereactually expanded in response to the need to use the state to stimulatenational industrialization and development and because of patronagepressure and the need to create employment. These development–administrative strategies were sustained from the sixties into the eight-ies. Some states, like Peru under the Nasserite military regime of JuanVelasco Alvarado, even (unsuccessfully) tried administrative reform toincrease the effectiveness of the state and make it more capable todirect economic development.[5]
The validity of these development strategies was called into questionby events in the 1980s. On the one hand, economic development in theregion was generally so slow that the eighties were referred to as the lostdecade. On the other hand, the ascendance of conservative governments in
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Great Britain (Thatcher) and the United States (Reagan) gave increasingpolitical support to economic policies based on classical free market eco-nomic liberalism. Dubbed neoliberalism in Latin America, it was soon tobe strongly advocated by the US government and international financialinstitutions like the World Bank and the IMF. This was first translatedinto policies of structural adjustment. After the demise of the Socialiststates in Eastern Europe, more comprehensive policy changes alongneoliberal lines were strongly advocated by the Washington Consensus(of AID, the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Develop-ment Bank). Loans and financial aid were increasingly made condi-tional on the implementation of neoliberal policies like privatization,reducing social services, downsizing government, removing tariff walls,and facilitating inflows and outflows of foreign investment. Althoughempirical evidence proving the superiority of these policies was scant atbest, any deficiencies in the model were easily overcome by selling suchpolicies as the only alternative that could achieve development and inte-grate countries into the rapidly globalizing international economy.Regimes felt increasing pressure to accept these policies even thoughdomestic opposition to their implementation began to increase signifi-cantly. Such policies did little to engender economic democracy or toempower the masses, and significantly undermined traditional pro-cesses of governance.
One country that did not follow the dictates of the Washington Con-sensus was Cuba. The Cuban revolution challenged external US controland traditional elitist rule. Yet, it left little space for the development ofautonomous social movements, though it did respond to the needs of themasses and developed mechanism of poder popular (popular power),which did foment limited active participation at the neighborhood andlocal level. The widespread rebellion against Anastacio Somoza inNicaragua helped to make it possible for the Sandinista-led revolution totake power and for the FSLN-led government to begin an economic,social, and political restructuring of the Nicaraguan nation. Indeed, thestrength and relative autonomy of many of the mass organizations inNicaragua in the early eighties was significant, and helped to show thatnew organizational structures and political movements that supportedthem could radically change the way power was exercised in Latin America.[6]
Likewise, the strength and dynamism of neighborhood- and community-based movements that began to flower all over Latin America in theeighties (even under repressive military regimes) redefined the parametersof political activism and suggested new repertoires of action for emergingsocial and political movements. Though nascent, they also represented theseeds of a new political culture that would emphasize genuine democratic
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governance, popular involvement in decision making, and popular participa-tion generally. This model was particularly strong in popular organizationsthat grew out of the participatory new ideology and practice of the sixtiesrepresented in the multitude of Christian Base Communities (Commu-nidades Eclesiaticas de Base) that were spawned in the heyday of LiberationTheology in the seventies and eighties.
As the 1990s progressed, dissatisfaction with traditional politicalleaders, traditional political parties, and unresponsive administrativeinstitutions became more widespread, as did a growing trend to doubtthe legitimacy of the political system itself. Traditional personalismo, cli-entelismo, corruption, and personal, class, and group avarice becamesubjects of ridicule and anger, if not rage. The effects of neoliberalismand continued racism amidst ever-stronger calls for racial equality beganto be felt. They were cast against the background of corruption and cli-entelism and increasing calls for a return to more effective democracyand honest government.
This experience suggests that when economic policies do not workand political dissatisfaction grows, governmental institutions themselvesare questioned and the system begins to loose legitimacy. However, evenbefore revolutionary movements are spawned and mass protests develop,political participation may fall off and voter turnout in elections may bedrastically reduced. Indeed, we believe growing abstention rates suggest ageneral dissatisfaction with the political systems. For instance, in Venezuela,the abstention rate for local elections had reached 55.8% in 1992, the yearof the first coup attempt.[7] In the 1995 election in Peru, only 58% of thepotential voters went to the polls.[8] In elections in Argentina in 2001,some 41% of the voters abstained, or cast annulled or blank ballots.”[9]
The 1998 national elections in Brazil saw a similar phenomena, with40.1% of the electorate abstaining, or casting blank or annulled ballots.[10]
In the Mexican presidential election of 2000, the abstention rate alone was36%.[11] This strongly suggests that a substantial segment of the popula-tion no longer believed that the systems of governance that the electoralprocesses had produced were adequate. There seemed little point to elec-toral participation if the elected officials did not respond to the needs ofthe electorate or to the decisions made at the polls.
Finally, the growing popular resentment of the political class, thefailures of economic policies to address the needs of all the public, theinefficiencies and corruption of administrative institutions, and thedistance of the governance processes from the majority of the people acti-vated new social and political movements noticeable in many countries inthe region. Three cases are presented here where in this profound changehas taken root.
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THE NATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND THE BOLIVIAN CRISIS
In October of 2003, US-educated Bolivian President GonzaloSánchez de Losada was forced out of office by massive displays of popularpower by social movements, community organizations, unions, and students.A staunch advocate of the globalization and neoliberal policies prescribedby international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank,he was also symbolic of the upper-class, Western-oriented political elitethat had governed Latin America, unchallenged, since the Spanish con-quest in the early 1500s. His tormentors were equally symbolic of thosewhom the political class had long ruled and repressed. They were smallfarmers, indigenous peoples, miners, workers, students, and intellectualswho dared to challenge the status quo. Historically, the political elitesgoverned according to an established pattern of rule and governance inthe region that was more authoritarian than democratic. This patterneven included revolutionary regimes like Cuba and Nicaragua, which thatclaimed to rule for the masses and encouraged some popular rule at thelocal level and in mass organizations (in the case of Nicaragua).[12] Rarely,however, did they allow the masses to rule or to decide policy on theirown at the national level. Throughout Latin America, people of popularextraction and of color have been few in the rarified halls of nationalgovernment. Further, if it could be said that if some popular institutionsof decision making such as the community or town council are informal,participatory, and even consensual, virtually all governmental decisionmaking outside of these has been characterized by its legalistic formality,authoritarianism, and institutional verticality.
It was all the more amazing, then, that the departure of Sánchez deLosada was effected by “los de abajo”—those on the bottom.[13] He hadbeen forced from office by those who had most often been powerless inBolivian history. The groups that converged on the Bolivian capital of LaPaz and other large cities were predominantly lower-class miners andagricultural workers and peasants; people who were mostly indigenousand the poor generally. Theirs was a struggle that had been going at leastsince the indigenous and peasant uprising led by Tupac Amaru in the1780s. However, this time it was coordinated, effective, and most impor-tantly, successful. Long before such national mobilization occurred, localcommunities often formed their own organizations to fight some aspect ofcolonial rule, exploitation or, more recently, globalization that wasimpacting them at the most local level. This reaction can, for instance, beseen in the strong grassroots movement against the privatization of thepublic water supply in the mostly indigenous community of Cochabamba,
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Bolivia, in 2000. There, the Coordinating Committee to Defend Waterand Life (Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida), remainedlocally rooted.[14] Yet—unlike previous local actions—this struggle wasalways framed in an international and national context. The protesterschampioned their cause through the internet and sent delegations to inter-national meetings like the World Social Forums in Porto Alegre, Brazil.
Further, the protestors were aware not only of the internationaldimensions of their struggle and of its globalized causes, but were equallyaware of the possibilities of international links with similar struggles andthe international antiglobalization movement generally. This awareness,and their electronic and personal links to other movements in Bolivia andoutside, later facilitated their integration into the broad national coalitionthat set forth a national agenda through support for Evo Morales and hisMAS Party in the 2002 presidential election. Awareness and extensivenetworking with other new social movements allowed this and other localor regional movements to become part of a nearly unstoppable nationalmobilization that, as will be explained in the following, toppled theSánchez de Lozada government. By linking the local effects of the neolib-eral privatization of the water supply in Cochabamba to global policiesand national politics, they linked their struggle to a growing regional andinternational consensus and to a national movement with concrete,achievable objectives.
The intensity of the politicization of the social movement in Boliviawas demonstrated by the massive protests and the popular mobilizationthat rocked the nation in 2003. The Union of Bolivian Rural Workers andits leader, Felipe Quispe, were quickly joined by those who grew the cocaleaves, which the Sánchez de Lozada government was eradicating underthe direction of the US government. The eradication policy had beenresisted vigorously by the Cocaleros (Coca Growers) of the now famousCoca Growers Federation and its indigenous leader, Evo Morales (whohad finished barely a percentage point behind President Gonzalo Sánchezde Lozada in the 2002 elections). Other groups, like the CochabambaCoordinating Committee to Defend Water and Life, also joined.
An ongoing economic crisis and a crisis in traditional politics com-bined with strong US pressure to open Bolivian markets and virtuallyeliminate the centuries-old cultivation of coca leaves to stimulate a publicuprising at the local, community level and to heed the calls of the socialmovements for action. The precipitating event was a US-backed plan tosell Bolivian natural gas through a Chilean port that landlocked Boliviahad lost to its southnern neighbor in the ill-fated War of the Pacific(1879–1881). The disastrous failure of the neoliberal model that PresidentSánchez Lozada had so strongly advocated added to the widely shared
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perception that this new trade deal was but one more ruse to extractwealth from the nation and leave the indigenous masses even more pov-erty ridden and totally subject to the influence of outside forces.[15] Histor-ically, most peasant and indigenous uprisings and even many strikes bythe tin miners had been characterized by their local nature and lack oflinkages to national movements and international conditions. As sug-gested by comments from the protesters themselves, this uprising againstSánchez de Lozada and his policies was quite different. The voices of thepeople could be heard in the growing demonstrations: “He has governedthe country for the benefit of the gringos and the multinational companiesand the Chileans, not for the Bolivian people.”[16] “Globalization is justanother name for submission and domination. We’ve had to live with thathere for 500 years and now we want to be our own masters.”[17]
The Union of Rural Workers and the Cocaleros were soon joined byother social movements, urban unions, and students as they mobilized inmassive demonstrations in La Paz and other cities. The governmentfutilely tried to repress the demonstrators, causing the loss of 80 lives.This enraged the opposition even more and increased the president’s iso-lation. Bolivian miners and others across the country also joined the pro-tests and decided to march on the capital. As his political backersdropped away in the face of the mass mobilization, Sánchez de Losadawas forced to resign and leave the country.
This represented a sea change in politics. “The emergence of newpolitical and alternative movements despite their scant participation in[traditional] political life marks the start of a new way of conductingpolitics which responds to the legitimate demands of the marginalizedmajorities.”[18] The new social movements in Bolivia had been able totake politics out of the presidential palace and halls of congress, wherethe traditional political class dominated, into a different space: thevillages, neighborhoods, rural highways, and popular councils that theycould control. They had taken the initiative themselves and had beenable to forge a broad, national coalition that cemented the president’sdownfall and established the viability of their social movements. UnlikeEcuador in 2000 and in the Bolivian revolution of 1952, they had done sowithout seizing power themselves, but had demonstrated just how effec-tively they could use and mobilize massive political power on a nationalscale. They had done so from below, through a broad coalition of socialmovements with strong identities and deep, democratic ties to their con-stituencies. They had initiated a form of participatory governance thatwould radically alter decision-making practices in their Andean nationand suggest that government must indeed serve the people if it was toendure.
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POPULAR MOBILIZATION IN ARGENTINA
The strength of the reaction to neoliberal policies and the loss of con-fidence in traditional institutions of governance and their susceptibility tooutside pressure, corruption, and personal/corporate/small-group appro-priation of public resources can be seen clearly in Argentina. There,popular mobilizations, street demonstrations, strikes, and Popular orNeighborhood Assemblies shook the political system and the politicalclass to the core at the end of 2001. The decision-making processes werereminiscent of the Paris Commune of 1871 and the participatory democracyof the 1960s. The popular mobilizations and attempts to govern throughassemblies convened in neighborhoods and central locations in BuenosAires and other cities throughout the country marked a radical departurefrom traditional politics. In late 2001 and early 2002, these mobilizations,together with the falling legitimacy of the economic and political system,occasioned the resignation of elected president Fernando de la Rúa andthe rapid replacement of three other appointed presidents (the vice presidenthad already resigned).
In early 2002, a declared antineoliberal Peronist president, EduardoDuhalde, was voted into office by the Argentine Congress. The unre-solved economic crisis, default on the foreign debt, and Duhalde’s per-ceived need to make some concession to the IMF, other internationalfinancial institutions, and US policy, kept the population angry andmobilized. Demonstrations and protests continued through 2003 as theArgentine nation grouped to find a political force capable of ending thecrisis. There was so little confidence in traditional parties or politicians thatone could frequently hear a popular refrain among many Argentinians—que se vayan todos! Throw them all out! Both the economic and politicalsystem were loosing their legitimacy, with many of the nations’ problemsbeing blamed on the IMF and neoliberal policies and a corrupt andincompetent political class that was ever more isolated from the commonpeople. Parallel structures of governance were developing in neighbor-hoods, factories taken over by the workers and meeting halls where themultitude of organizations and social movements convened their partici-patory assemblies. The situation remained chaotic in 2003 as a wide arrayof candidates competed in a new presidential election amid continueddemonstrations, strikes, and economic uncertainty. The different newsocial movements were united in their anger with economic conditions,political leadership, and the lack of governance. They were, however,unable to put together a national coalition that coalesced into a nationalpolitical movement or favored one political candidate. Ironically, formerPresident Carlos Menem was seen by some as a stabilizing force amid the
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chaos, and he managed to finish first in the first round of voting. How-ever, as the second round developed and the popular, antiglobalizationforces united against him, his comeback faltered as the millions protestingeconomic and political failures remembered his identification with neolib-eral policies. Ultimately, his showing was so low in the polls that he pulledout of the second round before the vote could be taken. The winner bydefault was the left-wing Peronist candidate, Néstor Kirchner, who hadbeen much more critical of IMF recommendations and neoliberal policiesand seemed to respond to the demands made by the highly politicized,mobilized social movements that had toppled previous governments.
As suggested by the Argentine case, electoral alternatives were oftenquite limited. This, in turn, led to even greater delegitimization of tradi-tional politics. Further, even progressive parties like the PT, or Workersparty, in Brazil were not always fully trusted by new political movementslike the MST (Movement of the Landless Rural Workers in Brazil). Newdemands were registered, not always addressed to the political system perse, but to society more generally since there were growing questions aboutthe system’s relevance and legitimacy. Neither armed struggle nor tradi-tional political institutions were employed. Different groups were lookingfor new political structures that allowed for and even encouraged theirparticipation. They sought their own forms of political organization.This, in turn, engendered a political regrouping.
The nature of the massive protests that have continued to rockBuenos Aires and other Argentine cities and that deposed Bolivian Pres-ident Sánchez de Lozada in October of 2003 suggest the political seachange that is sweeping across Latin America. Although these newmovements have many new characteristics, they are also a recent andvociferous manifestation of the specter of popular, participatory gover-nance and mass popular mobilization against the governing elite thathas haunted Latin America since colonial times. In the last few years, agreat many of the masses—and some of the middle class—seem to be hitby a feeling that the much-touted return to democracy, celebration ofcivil society, and incorporation in the globalization process has leftthem marginalized economically if not politically as well. The reactionsin Argentina, Mexico, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, and Venezuela arestrong and significant and, in varying ways, make one wonder if indeedthe political project is working for the common people. It is also quitepossible that it is the democratization and celebration of civil societythat allow—some would say encourage—the political mobilization thatis manifest in the widespread emergence of new social and politicalmovements and the deepening of democracy into more radical andparticipatory forms.
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NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT IN BRAZIL : THE MST
The radically different nature of these new social movements and thenew politics can perhaps best be seen in the largest of the new socialmovements in Latin America: the MST, or Movement of the LandlessRural Workers in Brazil. Their ranks exceed four hundred thousand, andon one occasion they were able to mobilize one hundred thousand peoplefor a march on Brasilia. Their views are well articulated. In a draft documenton the “Fundamental Principles for the Social and Economic Transfor-mation of Rural Brazil,” they note that “the political unity of the Braziliandominant classes under Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration(1994–2002) has consolidated the implementation of neoliberalism [in Brazil],”and that these neoliberal policies led to the increased concentration of landand wealth in the hands of the few and the impoverishment of Braziliansociety. The document goes on to say that “Popular movements must chal-lenge this neoliberal conceptualization of our economy and society.”[19]
In a pamphlet titled “Brazil Needs a Popular Project,” the organiza-tion calls for popular mobilizations, noting that “All the changes in thehistory of humanity only happened when the people were mobilized,” andthat in Brazil, “all the social and political changes that happened werewon when the people mobilized and struggled.” [20] Their political cultureand decision-making processes break from the authoritarian tradition. Itis “a rural political movement advocating the fundamental transforma-tion of the structures of power via grassroots collective mobilization.” [21]
The movement has been heavily influenced by Liberation Theology andthe participatory democratic culture that is generated by the use andstudy of Paulo Freire’ approach to self-taught, critical education.[22]
The MST itself was formed as a response to long-standing economic,social, and political conditions in Brazil. Currently Brazil is one of the tenlargest economies in the world. Yet, land, wealth, and power have beenallocated in very unequal ways since the conquest in the early 1500s. Landhas remained highly concentrated, and as late as 1996, one percent of thelandowners (who owned farms of over 1,000 hectares) owned 45% of theland. [23] Conversely, as of 2001, there were some 4.5 million landless ruralworkers in Brazil. Wealth has remained equally concentrated. In 2001, theBrazilian Institute of Government Statistics reported that the upper 10%of the population averaged an income that was nineteen times greaterthan the lowest 40%.[24]
The plantation agriculture that dominated the colonial period andthe early republic became the standard for Brazilian society. The wealthyfew owned the land, reaped the profits, and decided the political destinyof the many. Slavery was the institution that provided most of the labor
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on the early plantation system and thus set the nature of the relationshipbetween the wealthy, landowning elite and the disenfranchised toilingmasses who labored in the fields. Land has stayed in relatively few handsin Brazil, and the agricultural laborers continued to be poorly paid andpoorly treated. Further, after the commercialization and mechanizationof agriculture that began in the 1970s, much of the existing rural laborforce was no longer needed. As this process continued, not only wererural laborers let go, sharecroppers were expelled from the land they hadfarmed and small farmers lost their land to larger family or commercialestates. This resulted in growing rural unemployment and the growth ofrural landless families. Many were forced to migrate to the cities to swellthe numbers of the urban poor while others opted for the government-sponsored Amazon Colonization program, whereby they were trans-ported to the Amazon region to cut down the rainforest and begin tocultivate the land. Few found decent jobs in the city, and the poor soil ofthe former rainforest would allow for little sustained agriculture.
As conditions deteriorated, the landless realized that they were fight-ing for their very existence as a group and as such, they were the authorsof their own destiny. As one analyst observed, it is possible to classifythem as did Eric Hobsbaum, in the context of the nineteenth-centuryworking class, as one of the groups that came to have a conviction that itssocial salvation was in its own hands. “The landless become social sub-jects to the extent that they constituted a collectivity that brings withit . . . the struggle to guarantee its own social existence as workers on theland.” [25] The origins of the organization harken back to the bitter strug-gle to survive under the agricultural policies implemented by the militarygovernment. The landless in the southern Brazilian state of Rio Grandedo Sul began to organize to demand land. Other landless people soonpicked up their cry in the neighboring states of Paraná and Santa Catarina.These were the beginning of the MST.[26] They built on a long tradition ofrural resistance and rebellion that extends back to the establishments ofpalenquesor large inland settlements of runaway slaves and to the famousrebellion by the poor rural peasants of Canudos in the 1890s. In morerecent times, it included the famous Peasant Leagues of Brazil’s impover-ished Northeast in the 1950s and early 1960s, and the Grass Wars in RioGrande do Sul and the southern states in the 1970s.[27]
When the MST was founded in southern Brazil in 1984 as a responseto rural poverty and lack of access to land, wealth, and power, similarconditions existed in many states in Brazil. Indeed, there were landlessworkers and peasants throughout the nation. The MST soon spread fromRio Grande do Sul and Paraná in the South to states like Pernambuco inthe Northeast and Pará in the Amazon region. It rapidly became a
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national organization with coordinated policies and strong local partici-patory organization and decision making, and frequent state and nationalmeetings based on direct representation.[28] By 2001 there were activeMST organizations in 23 of the 26 states.[29]
This type of national organization had not been the case with theZapatista movement in Mexico, in that case, because conditions and iden-tity were much more locally rooted. Yet, in both cases traditional politicsand traditional political parties had proven unable and unwilling toaddress the deteriorating economic conditions of the marginalized groupswho were suffering the negative effects of economic globalization. Theirresponse consisted of grassroots organization and the development of anew repertoire of actions that broke with old forms of political activity.Developing organization and group actions began to tie individual mem-bers together in a strongly forged group identity.[30] They were sometimesassisted in this task by progressive organizations concerned with eco-nomic and social justice.
In the case of Brazil and the Landless, this assistance came from theLutheran church and especially the Pastoral Land Commission of theCatholic Church. Although these organizations helped the Landless asdid some segments of the Workers Party (PT), the organization never lostits autonomy. It was decided from the onset that this was to be an organ-ization for the Landless Workers that would be run by the LandlessWorkers for their benefit as they defined it. Options were discussed anddecisions taken in popular assemblies at every level. The process led todirect actions such as takeovers of parts of large estates and public lands,the construction of black-plastic-covered encampments along the side ofthe road to call attention to their demands for land, and marches and con-frontations when necessary. The MST even occupied the family farm ofthen-President Fernando Enrique Cardoso in 2002 to draw attention tohis landowning interests and the consequent bias they attributed to him.They were at times brutally repressed, assassinated, and imprisoned, butthey persevered, forcing land distribution to their members and others with-out land. Their ability to mobilize as many as 12,000 people for a single landtakeover or 100,000 for a national march suggested just how strong theirorganizational abilities were and how well they could communicate andcoordinate at the national level. They also created a great deal of nationalsupport and helped to create a national consensus that there was a nationalproblem with land distribution and that substantial reform was necessary.[31]
The Landless were well attuned to the international globalizationstruggle and considered themselves part of it, helping to organize and par-ticipating in the World Social Forums in Porto Alegre and sending theirrepresentatives to demonstrations and protests throughout the world.[32]
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They were one of the new type of internationally connected social organi-zations that met together in places like Seattle, Prague, and Geneva aswell as the World Socal Forum in Porto Alegre, Brasil, in 2001, 2002, and2003. The MST and similar organizations are part of a developing globalbacklash against economic globalization.[33] Struggles that were once localand isolated are now international and linked. The news media and grow-ing international communications links, especially electronic mail, greatlyfacilitated the globalization of struggle and the globalization of awarenessof local struggles, and, with that awareness, support for and solidaritywith them. This, together with dramatic actions like massive land take-overs by the MST also generated considerable support at the nationallevel and helped to define what might have been considered a local prob-lem as a national problem that required national level attention andresources to remedy it.
The interaction between the MST and the Workers Party (PT) is alsoinstructive. Although relations between the two organizations are gener-ally excellent at the local level, with overlapping affiliations, the nationalleaderships have remained separate and not always as cordial. The MSThas maintained a militant line with regard to the need to take over unusedland and assert its agenda, whereas much of the PT leadership has wantedto be more conciliatory. Thus, the Landless backed and supported Lula(Luiz Inácio “Lula”da Silva) and the Workers Party in most local cam-paigns and in the national campaign for the presidency. In this way theyhelped to achieve significant regime change in Brazil, where Lula waselected with 61.27% of the vote in the second round of voting in 2002.Indeed, realizing the PT’s historic challenge to neoliberal policies and elit-ist rule, the Landless turned out heavily in the election to join some 80%of the registered voters who participated in the voting in both rounds.[34]
However, once the election was over, the Landless did not press to be partof the government. Rather, they continued to press the government for acomprehensive land reform program and redistribution of the land andthe wealth. There would be no return to politics as usual. The PT wouldpress its “0 Hunger” program and other social and economic initiatives,and the MST would press the PT government for the structural reforms(e.g., comprehensive agrarian reform) that it considered necessary.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
This analysis of recent popular political movements in Bolivia,Argentina, Brazil, and other Latin American countries suggests that newsocial movements with profound implications for governance are underway.
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These movements are widely supported, highly politicized, and have cometo represent a clear response to the neoliberal economic policies that arebeing foisted on Latin American nations by international financialinstitutions and the US government (the Washington Consensus). Thisnew form of popular protest is also a clear response to the traditional defi-ciencies that have characterized Latin American government: lack ofaccountability, corrupt and ineffective administrative institutions, author-itarianism, and nonparticipatory forms of decision making.
The participatory assemblies of the new movements are changing politi-cal culture and practice at the community level. They are employing partici-patory, strongly democratic practices in their ranks. A particularly interestingexample is the participatory budgeting process that the PT has implementedin cities it controls such as Porto Alegre in Rio Grande do Sul.[35] A series ofopen meeting are held throughout the cities to define priorities and allocatebudgetary resources. This serves as the basis for the municipal budget. Theseprocesses serve as models of new participatory forms of governance that canand do respond to popular needs and that incorporate the masses in decisionmaking and policy implementation in government.
As the region democratizes, there is even greater discussion of theemergence of a new(er) political class. The growing consensus is that theruling elites of Latin America and their political enterprise are leavingbehind the great majorities of the people and, effectively, further marginal-izing specific groups within those majorities, economically and politically.These groups include indigenous people in southern Mexico and Ecuador,rural laborers and the poor in Brazil, the rural peasants and indigenouspeople in Bolivia, those who live in the slums and who have been left out ofthe diffusion of oil wealth in Venezuela, as well as large segments of thelower and middle classes in Argentina. Indicators of the growing malaiseare many. One is the growing abstention rates in elections. A second is theabandonment of traditional political parties for new, more amorphous, adhoc parties. Third, with the upsurge of more new political social move-ments, the number of national strikes, demonstrations, and protests hasincreased, as they did across Argentina at the end of 2001 and the beginningof 2002, and then across Bolivia in 2002 and 2003.
The current political mobilizations also seem different in many ways:First, they have relied on communication technology and easy, low-costaccess to the Internet. Such efforts reaped success when combined withhigher levels of literacy, greater political freedom under the democratiza-tion process,[36] and free exchange of ideas. Second, as a result, a new waveof highly political social movements developed with effective organizations,decision-making practices, and strategies capable of articulating popularneeds in new ways. This has been influenced by ideas of grassroots
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democracy, popular participation, and even elements of LiberationTheology and Christian Base Community organization. Likewise, there isa growing belief that racial, gender, and economic inequality should notexist and that systems that perpetuate such inequality need to be changed.Third, unlike radical revolutionary movements of the last few decades,these new movements do not employ or advocate radical, revolutionaryrestructuring of the state through violent revolution. Rather, their pri-mary focus is to contest power by working through civil society to pushfor modification of the existing political system and bureaucratic prac-tices, and push it to the limits to achieve needed and necessary change andrestructuring. Although there have been some exceptions, such as the initialZapatista uprising of early January, 1994, and CONAIE’s very brief par-ticipation in a junta that held the Ecuadorian Congress building overnightin January of 2000, these were short-lived. Both movements quicklymoved from trying to insert themselves as the regional or national rulers tonegotiating power with existing national political elites (while at the sametime trying to change the composition of the national political class).[37]
As indicated above, these social movements have become bulwarks inthe resistance to neoliberal policies advocated by the Washington Consen-sus and have aggressively resisted the implementation of these policies.Their growth and persistence have generated new methods of actions thatinclude national mobilizations so massive that they can topple governmentsor force them to change their policies. They have left the traditional partiesfar behind as they forge new political fronts and create a nonauthoritarian,participatory political culture. Using existing political space to maximumeffect, these movements are strengthening participatory practices and radi-cally changing the nature of governance in Latin America. All this is donefrom below, through a broad coalition of social movements with strongidentities and deep, democratic ties to their constituencies. In the process,they have initiated forms of participatory governance that will radicallyalter decision-making practices in their nations and force governments andtheir bureaucracies to change such that they can genuinely serve popularneeds. Further, as these new movements struggle to achieve their objectives,they add to the pressure to reorient administrative institutions toward moreaccountable, transparent, ethical, and effective performance.
REFERENCES
1. Key components of neoliberalism include: reducing government sizeand spending; fiscal and monetary reform; deregulation; liberalizingcommerce through the reduction and eventual elimination of all tariff
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barriers and trade restrictions; opening up the national economy toforeign investment and allowing the free flow of capital; privatiza-tion of government-owned corporations, industries, agencies, andutilities; and eliminating the government subsidies for essential con-sumer goods.
2. Shifter, M. Latin America’s New Political Leaders: Walking on aWire. Current History 2003 (February) 102 (661).
3. Ibid, 51.4. See Vanden, H.E. and G. Prevost, Politics of Latin America, the
Power Game; Oxford University Press: New York and Oxford, 2002.5. The author worked in this reform effort in the National Institute of
Public Administration, Government of Peru, in the mid-1970s.6. See Vanden, H.E. and G. Prevost, Democracy and Socialism in
Sandinista Nicaragua; Lynne Rienner: Boulder, Co, 1993, esp. Chap-ter 3, on mass movements.
7. García Díez, F. The emergence of electoral reforms in contemporaryLatin America, 27th ECPR Point Sessions Workshops, DesigningInstitutions, Mannheime, 1999.
8. Center for Voting and Democracy. International Voter Turnout,1991-2000. The Center for Voting and Democracy: Takoma Park,MD, 2000. Retrieved from: fairvote.org (accessed August 29,2003).
9. Kaufman Purcell, S. Electoral lessons. América Economía. 2001(December 6), 40.
10. Banco de Dados Políticos das Américas. Brazil: Eleções Presidenci-ais de 1998. Retrieved from: georgetown.edu/pdba/Elecdata/Brazil/pres98.html (accessed April 19, 2002).
11. Instituto Federal Electoral, Elección de Presidente de los EstadosUnidos Mexicanos. Retrieved from: ife.org.mx (accessed April 9,2002).
12. See Vanden, H.E. and Prevost G., Democracy and Socialism in Sand-inista Nicaragua, op cit.
13. See the epic novel of the Mexican revolution, Los de Abajo, byMariano Azuela, published in English as The Underdogs; ModernLibrary: New York, 2002.
14. See Shultz, J. Bolivia: The Water War Widdens. NACLA, Report onthe Americas 2003, 36 (3), 34–37.
15. Rohter, L. Bolivia’s poor proclaim abiding distrust of globalization.New York Times 2003 October 17.
16. Remberto Clavijo cited in Rother, Bolivia’s poor, op cit.17. Nicanor Apaza cited in Anti-Trade Message Loud, Clear in Bolivia.
The Chicago Tribune 2003 October 17.
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18. Juan del Grando, Mayor of La Paz, Bolivia, greeting rise of newpolitical movement MAS and its leader, Coca Growers Federationhead Evo Morales. In Los Tiempos, July 2, 2002.
19. The Landless Rural Workers Movement (MST). Fundamentalprinciples for the social and economic transformation of ruralBrazil.” W. Robles, trans. Journal of Peasant Studies. 2001,28(2), 146–152.
20. O Brasil Precisa de um Projecto Popular. Secretariat of Popular Con-sultation of the MST: São Paulo, 2001.
21. Robles, W. The landless rural workers movement (MST) in Brazil.Journal of Peasant Studies 2001 28(2), 147.
22. Freire, P. The Pedagogy of the Oppressed; Continuum: New York,2000.
23. Petras, J. The rural landless workers movement. Z Magazine 2000(March), 32–36.
24. Brazilian Institute of Statistics, Statistical Report 2001, as cited from“Pais Termina Anos 90 Tão Desigual como Comenou.” Folha deSão Paulo April 5, 2001 in Lewis, T. Brazil: the struggle againstneoliberalism. International Socialist Review (June–July), 2001.
25. Caldart, R.S. Pedagogia do Movimiento dos Sem Terra; Vozes:Petrópolis, 1999, 25.
26. Stedile, J.P. and Bernardo Mançano Fernandes. Brava Gente: a Tra-jetória do MST e a luta pela Terra no Brasil; Fundacão PerseuAbramo: São Paulo, 1999.
27. Bastos, E.R. As Ligas Camponesas; Vozes: Petópolis, 1984.28. Bradford, S. and Rocha, J. Cutting the Wire; Latin American
Bureau: London, 2002.29. Fontes, G. (member of collective national leadership of MST). Inter-
view by author. São Paulo. September 17, 2003.30. These general processes are described in S. Tarrow in Power in
Movements, Social Movements and Contentious Politics. 2nd ed.Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1998.
31. It should, however, be noted that much of the press was not alwayssympathetic and condemned their land takeovers as illegal actions.The rural landowners also did all in their power to stop their actionsand discredit them in the public eye.
32. For more on the Social Forums see T. Teivainen, World SocialForum: What Should It Be When It Grows Up? Open Democracy,Free Thinking For the World. Retrieved from: www.Open Demo-cracy.net (accessed on October 31, 2003).
33. See R. Broad, Global Backlash, Citizen Initiatives for a Just WorldEconomy. Roman & Littlefield: Laham, MD, 2002.
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34. International Foundation for Election Surveys (IFES). Retrievedfrom: ifes.org/eguide/turnout2002.htm. (accessed March 24, 2003).
35. See Schneider, A., Budgets and Ballots in Brazil: ParticipatoryBudgeting from the City to the State; Institute of DevelopmentStudies, University of Sussex, 2002.
36. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report1999; Oxford University Press: New York and Oxford, 1999.
37. Collins, J.N. A sense of possibility, Ecuadors’s indigenous move-ment takes center stage,“ in” !Adelante! The New Rural Activism inthe Americas; NACLA, Report on the Americas. 2000 33 (5), 40–46.
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