new economic geography and tax competition in the prc: a firm-level data analysis with policy...
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ADB EconomicsWorking Paper Series
New Economic Geography and TaxCompetition in the PRC: A Firm-LevelData Analysis with Policy Implications
Minsoo Lee
No. 297 | January 2012
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ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 297
New Economic Geography and Tax
Competition in the PRC: A Firm-Level
Data Analysis with Policy Implications
Minsoo Lee
January 2012
Minsoo ee is enior conomist in the Macroeconomics and inance esearch ivision, conomics and
esearch epartment, Asian evelopment Bank. he author accepts responsibility for any errors in thepaper.
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Asian evelopment Bank
AB Avenue, Mandaluyong City
1550 Metro Manila, hilippines
www.adb.org/economics
2012 by Asian evelopment Bankanuary 2012
155-5252
ublication tock o. 124550
he views expressed in this paper
are those of the authors) and do not
QHFHVVDULO\UHHFWWKHYLHZVRUSROLFLHV
of the Asian evelopment Bank.
he AB conomics orking aper eries is a forum for stimulating discussion and
eliciting feedback on ongoing and recently completed research and policy studies
undertaken by the Asian evelopment Bank AB) staff, consultants, or resource
persons. he series deals with key economic and development problems, particularly
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methodological issues relating to project/program economic analysis, and statistical data
and measurement. he series aims to enhance the knowledge on Asias development
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availability of statistical data and development indicators for monitoring development
effectiveness.
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journals or chapters in books. he series is maintained by the conomics and esearch
epartment.
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Contents
Abstract v
. ntroduction 1
. heory and nstitutional Background
. Models and Methodology 5
A. ax Competition Model 5
B. Conditional ogit Model
. ata 8
. mpirical esults 9
A. &-ntensive irms and ifferent ype of xporters 9
B. eterogeneity in rigin of nvestment unds 12
C. rocessing raders versus ormal raders 15
. olicy mplications 18
. Conclusion 20
eferences 21
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Abstract
uring 2000200, nearly 4,0005,000 new foreign and domestic enterprises
entered the export industry of the eoples epublic of China C) yearly,
with geographic concentration along the coastal areas. his paper empirically
analyzes the spatial determinants of new entrants by applying traditional
comparative advantage analysis, new economic geography of agglomeration
WKHRU\DQGWD[FRPSHWLWLRQWKHRU\E\UHVRXUFHRZPRGHO7KHKHWHURJHQHLW\RI
UPRZQHUVKLSDQGWUDGHW\SHHQKDQFHVWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRILQYHVWPHQWORFDWLRQ
decisions. rocessing traders differ substantially from nonprocessing traders
in response to changes in wage cost, level of development in infrastructure,DQGSUR[LPLW\WRWKH3DFLFFRDVW7KHSUHVHQFHRIIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGHQWHUSULVHV
FUHDWHVDEHDFRQHIIHFWRQVXEVHTXHQWIRUHLJQDQGGRPHVWLFLQYHVWRUV7KH
SDSHUDOVRQGVWKDWDJJORPHUDWLRQSOD\VDJUHDWHUUROHIRULQYHVWRUVVSHFLDOL]LQJ
in the processing goods trade and highly skill-intensive or research and
GHYHORSPHQWLQWHQVLYHSURGXFWLRQ%HQHWVIURPUHGXFWLRQLQWKHYDOXHDGGHG
tax rate and corporate income tax rate play an evident role for foreign investors
and ong ong, China and aipei,China investors in processing trade sector.
he Cs policy makers intend to transform the internationalization process
through attraction of foreign investment toward localization by reducing the
processing good trading portion and by increasing the supply of domestically
produced intermediate inputs for their exports. As the C moves up the high-value supply chain, expands its domestic market, and exports skill-intensive
goods, processing goods traders may consider new locations or business
models.
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I. Introduction
ver since the eoples epublic of China C) opened up its economic door to the
rest of the world in the late 190s, two economic aspects have been the center of
discussion by many academics, researchers, and policy makers in the world. hey are
the Cs inward foreign direct investment ) and its exports. hose two issues were
reemphasized when the C joined the orld rade rganization in 2001.
ach year, during 2000200, nearly 4,0005,000 new foreign and domestic enterprises
entered into the Cs export industry with geographic concentration along the coastal
areas. he heterogeneity of new enterprises in ownership is apparent. n the nation as a
ZKROHGXULQJIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGUPVDFFRXQWIRU+RQJRQJKLQDDQG
RU7DLSHLKLQDLQYHVWHGHQWHUSULVHVDQGKLQHVHSULYDWHFRPSDQLHV7KH
QXPEHURISURFHVVLQJJRRGVH[SRUWHUVDPRQJQHZHQWUDQWVVWDQGDWDSSUR[LPDWHO\
3URFHVVLQJJRRGVH[SRUWYDOXHLQWKH3FRQVWLWXWHVDERXWRIWRWDOH[SRUWVLQ
DQGKDVVWHDGLO\GHFOLQHGIURPIURPWR
raditional comparative advantage analysis is based on a level of regional development
VXFKDVLQIUDVWUXFWXUHLQKLJKZD\VUDLOZD\VDQGZDWHUZD\VSURGXFWLRQFRVWVDEXQGDQFH
RILQSXWVODERUODZVhukouKRXVHKROGUHJLVWUDWLRQV\VWHPHGXFDWLRQOHYHOKXPDQ
FDSLWDOZDJHOHYHOWUDQVSRUWDWLRQFRVWVSUR[LPLW\WRWKHFRDVWDFFHVVWRUDZDQG
LQWHUPHGLDWHPDWHULDOVDQGSURGXFWLRQFRVWV7KHQHZHFRQRPLFJHRJUDSK\WKHRU\RI
DJJORPHUDWLRQSURYLGHVVLJQLFDQWH[SODQDWRU\SRZHUWRWKHSUHVHQFHRIVLPLODUUPV
VXSSOLHUUPVRUFRQVXPHUVLQDSDUWLFXODUUHJLRQZKLFKFDXVHVWKLVORFDWLRQWREHFRPH
more attractive to future investors.
ocal government policy makers in the C strategically determine their tax rates
to attract new foreign investments to their region for additional tax revenue and new
HPSOR\PHQWZKLFKFDQEHGHVFULEHGE\WKHWD[FRPSHWLWLRQZLWKUHVRXUFHRZPRGHO
olicy makers provide preferential tax treatment and/or lower regulatory burdens and
often implement special policies such as special economic zones and hi-tech zones.
here are a number of policy variables, such as capturing overall levels of tax andregulatory burdens or special policies, designed to attract foreign investors.
his paper discusses the Cs inward and exports by raising the topic of the spatial
determinants of new foreign- and domestic-invested enterprises that enter the export
LQGXVWU\([SODQDWRU\IDFWRUVRIVSDWLDOGHWHUPLQDQWVRI'LGHQWLHGLQWKLVSDSHUDUH
categorized according to three economic theories traditional comparative advantage
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analysis, new economic geography of agglomeration effects, and tax competition theory
E\UHVRXUFHRZPRGHO
his paper provides rich empirical results by mapping and merging two separate data
VRXUFHVLQGXVWU\GDWDDWWKHUPOHYHOIURPWKH3VQGXVWULDO(QWHUSULVHV'DWDEDVHSURYLGHGE\WKHDWLRQDO%XUHDXRI6WDWLVWLFVDQGUPOHYHOH[SRUWLPSRUWGDWDIURPWKH
xport/mport atabase provided by the C Customs). n particular, new enterprises
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7DLSHLKLQDLQYHVWHGKLQHVHSULYDWHRZQHGDQGVWDWHRZQHGDQGDUHGLVWLQJXLVKHG
EHWZHHQUPVVSHFLDOL]LQJLQSURFHVVLQJWUDGHDQGQRUPDOWUDGHRGULN$PLW\DQG
UHXQGXUWKHUPRUHWKHSDSHUVHSDUDWHVUPVDFFRUGLQJWRWKHHGXFDWLRQOHYHO
RIWKHLUHPSOR\HHVDQGSUR[\UHVHDUFKDFWLYLW\E\VHOHFWLQJUPVWKDWHPSOR\ZRUNHUV
ZLWKSRVWJUDGXDWHTXDOLFDWLRQV7KLVSDSHUVKRZVWKDWWKHVHVXEVDPSOHVGLVSOD\
economically meaningful differences.
RUHLJQLQYHVWHGSURFHVVLQJWUDGHUPVSXWPRUHZHLJKWRQSUR[LPLW\WRWKH3DFLFFRVWand increase in average wages than normal traders do, and the presence of foreign-
invested enterprises creates a beacon effect in agglomeration to all other types of export
enterprises. nvestors from ong ong, China and aipei,China are the most inclined
WRDJJORPHUDWHZLWKFRPSDQLHVWKDWDUHDOVRIURP+RQJRQJKLQDDQG7DLSHLKLQD
DQGWHQGWROHDVWRFNWRJHWKHUZLWKIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGUPVDQGVWDWHRZQHGHQWHUSULVHV
3ULYDWHKLQHVHLQYHVWRUVDUHJUHDWO\LQXHQFHGE\WKHSUHVHQFHRIVWDWHRZQHG
LQFXPEHQWUPV
alue-added tax rate that is strategically determined by local government policy makers
LQXHQFHVWKHORFDWLRQFKRLFHRIIRUHLJQLQYHVWRUVRUHLJQLQYHVWHGSURFHVVLQJJRRGV
WUDGHUVDUHSDUWLFXODUO\VHQVLWLYHWRWKLVSUDFWLFHDQGKLQHVHSULYDWHLQYHVWHGUPVDUHthe least sensitive.
he method of the analysis in this paper suggests useful information for policy makers
and market entrants. Marginal effects and predicted changes are calculated, induced
either by a certain percent change in each explanatory variable in the empirical
DQDO\VLVLQXHQFLQJWD[UDWHVDQGODERUFRVWVRUE\LQGXFLQJPDUNHWHQWU\E\SLRQHHULQJ
LQFXPEHQWUPVRQVXEVHTXHQWPDUNHWHQWUDQWVLQYDULRXVVXEJURXSVVRPHRIZKLFK
PD\EHSDUWLFXODUO\GHVLUDEOHWRSROLF\PDNHULQWHQWLRQVRQDFTXLULQJQHZWHFKQRORJ\IURP
foreign-invested enterprises via technology and management knowledge spillover effects
in their province.
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II. Theory and Institutional Background
he new economic geography theory in the international trade theory framework
introduced by rugman 1991) may be the most relevant to the spatial determinants of
'QPRQRSROLVWLFPDUNHWVWUXFWXUHVHFRQRPLHVRIVFDOHSXVKPDQXIDFWXULQJUPVto locate in the region with larger demand while minimizing transportation costs. he
HFRQRPLFUHJLRQVZLWKWKHPRVWSURGXFWLRQEHFRPHPRUHSURWDEOHDQGDWWUDFWHYHQ
PRUHSURGXFWLRQDFWLYLWLHV7KHJHRJUDSKLFFKRLFHRIH[SRUWLQJUPVLVEDVHGRQWKH
DJJORPHUDWLRQDVVRFLDWHGZLWKVLPLODULQGXVWU\W\SHVRILQFXPEHQWUPVDQGLQWHUDFWLRQRI
economies of scale with transportation costs proximity to coast). eographic production-
FRQFHQWUDWLRQORZHUVWKHSUREDELOLW\RIODERUVKRUWDJHVQFXPEHQWUPVFDQVSLOORYHU
informational, technology, and knowledge externally.
he Cs dynamic policy changes seem to follow Alfred Marshalls concept regarding
industry localization internationalization toward localization or processing trades to
QRUPDOWUDGHVRQFHQWUDWLRQRIIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGUPVLQDORFDWLRQJHQHUDWHVODERU
PDUNHWVIRUDVSHFLFLQGXVWU\RFDOODERUPDUNHWVVXSSO\ORZVNLOOHGODERUDQGIRUHLJQ
SURFHVVLQJWUDGHUVLPSRUWVRSKLVWLFDWHGLQSXWVKRZHYHUORFDOSURGXFHUVZLOOUHSODFH
intermediate imports and instead start producing sophisticated inputs in the near future.
$JJORPHUDWHGIRUHLJQUPVZLOO EHQHWIURPLQIRUPDWLRQDQGNQRZOHGJHVSLOORYHUVZKLOH
GRPHVWLFUPVFDQEHQHWIURPWHFKQRORJ\DQGSRVVLEOHNQRZOHGJHVSLOORYHUVIURP
foreign-invested enterprises.
DUOWRQVDUWLFOHDQH[FHSWLRQDOO\VLJQLFDQWSDSHUFRQFHUQLQJHFRQRPLF
JHRJUDSK\HPSKDVL]HVORFDWLRQDQGHPSOR\PHQWRIQHZUPVXWLOL]LQJDQHFRQRPHWULF
model with discrete and continuous endogenous variables. Carlton concludes that taxes
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Amiti and avorcik 2008) analyze new economic geography of agglomeration effects in
C. hey use aggregated provincial-level data to generate measures of intermediate
goods and consumer market access using recent Chinese inputoutput tables. Access
WRVXSSOLHUVDQGPDUNHWVLVWKHPRVWLQXHQWLDOVSDWLDOGHWHUPLQDQWVRIDUPVORFDWLRQ
choice. u and wen 2005), however, contend that there is no evidence of strong
agglomeration from foreign investors in the C but conclude that comparative
DGYDQWDJHDQGJRYHUQPHQWSROLF\DUHPRUHLQXHQWLDOIDFWRUVIRUDUPVVSDWLDOGHFLVLRQ
DVH[SODQDWLRQVRIWKHHPHUJLQJSDWWHUQRIUPORFDWLRQVYHUVHDVKLQHVHLQYHVWRUV
located along the coast show sensitivity to policy and cost differentials compared to
C investors. n inland provinces, on the other hand, there seems to be no difference
between the two groups of investors. Boermans et al. 2009) use factor analysis with
aggregated data and emphasize the major role of institutions, labor costs, and market
access.
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A seminal paper by ead and ies 199) formulates a theoretical monopolistic
competitive model of self-reinforcing . he paper explains that open door policies
made inward on a large scale to the C feasible and their empirical results,
comprised of 91 foreign ventures that entered between 1984 and 1991 in 54 cities,
LOOXVWUDWHFRQVLGHUDEOHDJJORPHUDWLRQHIIHFWVWKDWPDJQLHGWKHDGYDQWDJHFRQIHUUHGE\the privileged status of some cities such as special economic zones and high-tech zones.
arallel literature explores decisions in particular industries in the C by investors from
different countries. akasugi 2005) demonstrates that location choice of apanese
HOHFWURQLFVDIOLDWHVLQWKH3PDLQO\GHSHQGRQWKHOHYHORIKXPDQUHVRXUFHVKDQJ
and ark 2005) use data for orean investors in the C, indicating an importance
of network externality. Belderbos and Carree 2002) examine apanese manufacturers
ORFDWLRQVLQWKH3DQGVKRZVLJQLFDQWHFRQRPLFJHRJUDSK\RIDJJORPHUDWLRQ
HIIHFWVKHQVHPSLULFDODQDO\VLVRQ7DLSHLKLQDVJUHHQHOGLQYHVWPHQWLQ
WKH3HPSOR\HGDQHVWHGORJLWPRGHOZLWKUPOHYHOGDWDZKLFKLQGLFDWHGWKDWWKH
DJJORPHUDWLRQHIIHFWIURPWKHLQFXPEHQWUPVKDVEHFRPHPRUHDSSDUHQWRYHUWLPHEXWits relative strength varies across sectors.
([SODQDWRU\YDULDEOHVLGHQWLHGE\WKHDERYHPHQWLRQHGVWXGLHVW\SLFDOO\IDOOLQWRWKUHH
FDWHJRULHVPHDVXUHVRIDUHJLRQDOOHYHORIGHYHORSPHQW+XDQGZHQQHZ
economic geography theories Amiti and avorcik 2008) of agglomeration effects with the
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UHJLRQPDNLQJDORFDWLRQPRUHDWWUDFWLYHWRIXWXUHLQYHVWRUVDQGSROLF\YDULDEOHVFDSWXULQJ
overall levels of tax and regulatory burden or special policies designed to attract foreign
investors ead and ies 199).
Many studies in new economic geography analysis have omitted some obviousJRYHUQPHQWSROLF\YDULDEOHVDPHDVXUHRIDUPVWD[EXUGHQRURWKHUSUHIHUHQWLDO
treatment variables.
Cheng and wan 2000) divide tax reduction in the C into four levels as to provincial
VFRSHZLWKWKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDWWD[UHGXFWLRQLVWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWIDFWRURI'LQRZ
here have been a large number of government regulations on tax reductions at the
central and local government level since 1984. hese tax breaks and tax reduction
SROLFLHVKDYHPDLQO\WZRWDUJHWV7KHUVWLVFRUSRUDWLRQLQFRPHWD[HJXODWLRQVLQWKH
VRIIHUFRUSRUDWLRQLQFRPHWD[UDWHIRUIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGFRPSDQLHVLQYDULRXV
HFRQRPLFDQGWHFKQRORJ\GHYHORSPHQW]RQHVFRUSRUDWLRQLQFRPHWD[UDWHIRU
FRPSDQLHVLQFRDVWDOHFRQRPLFRSHQ]RQHVZLWKH[SRUWVFRQVWLWXWLQJPRUHWKDQRIWRWDORXWSXWRUDQH[HPSWLRQLQFRUSRUDWLRQLQFRPHWD[LQWKHUVW\HDUVRILWVRSHQLQJ
and reduction by half of income tax in the following 5 years. he second is value-added
tax, which is the main resource of tax revenue. here are regulations offering various
UDWHVRIYDOXHDGGHGWD[UDWHVIRUUPVLQWKHSURFHVVLQJLQGXVWU\DGPLWWHGE\ORFDO
authority. alue-added tax revenue in the C is shared by central and local government
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ZLWKUDWLRVRIDQGUHVSHFWLYHO\7KHUHLVDOVRVDOHVWD[DQGDQDGGLWLRQDO
accounting item including sales tax, property tax, goods and services tax, resource tax,
land value increment tax, urban maintenance and construction tax, and surcharge for
education and local education expenses.
ew legislation in 1994 made local governments more independent units motivated to
PD[LPL]HWKHLUSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFEHQHWVDVWKH\FRPSHWHWRDWWUDFWJUDQWVDQG
valuable factors to their regions ian and oland 1998). his competition among local
DXWKRULWLHVEHFRPHVDIRFXVRIWKHRUHWLFDOZRUNRZLQJWKUHHOLWHUDWXUHVWD[FRPSHWLWLRQ
literature, welfare competition literature, and spillover effects literature.
ith little power on the legislation of taxation, local governments in the C practice
tax break policies in order to reduce tax for grants, expand tax-favored zones such as
economic and technological development zones or high-tech industrial zones, or lower
VWDQGDUGVRIWD[EUHDNTXDOLFDWLRQVIRUFRUSRUDWLRQVZKLFKPDNHVWD[FRPSHWLWLRQQR
longer observable or measurable by tax rates announced in legislative documents. axreduction by local governments should be conducted mostly by using tax break policies,
which vary over regions and industries.
he most important motivation for tax reduction is to attract , and this is mentioned
in a multitude of research papers. Brueckner 2002) illustrates this tax competition
SKHQRPHQRQE\WKHUHVRXUFHRZPRGHO:LOVRQVVXUYH\SDSHUSURYLGHVDZLGH
range of ideas about the tax competition model.
III. Models and Methodology
A. Tax Competition Model
ocal governments levy taxes on a mobile tax base foreign and domestic investments)
by choosing their tax rates strategically with particular attention to other local government
WD[UDWHV7D[FRPSHWLWLRQPRGHOVDUHPRVWO\ZLWKLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRIWKHUHVRXUFHRZ
model summarized by Brueckner 2002) in the review of government interaction. his
model is followed by this paper, which uses an empirical model according to tax reaction
function. he general form of tax reaction function can be generated from various tax
competition theoretical models, as shown in the seminal work by Brueckner and aavedra2001).
ach local government chooses its tax rate tjand considers the amount of foreign
investments resource) within its borders. istribution of foreign investments in provinces
depends on tWKHUHIRUHjth local government decision on tax rate is indirectly affected by
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tj vector ofts for the n-1 other local governments). he local governmentjs objective
function is
V t s X j j j, ;( ) ,
where sjLVDQDPRXQWRILQRZRIIRUHLJQLQYHVWPHQWLQWRjth province andXj is the vector
of provincejs characteristics. istribution ofsj is affected by t.
s H t t X j j j j= ( ), ;
7KHUHIRUHWKHUHGXFHGIRUPRIWKHUHVRXUFHRZPRGHOFDQEHGHULYHGDV
V t H t t X X V t t X j j j j j j j j, , ; ; , ; ( )( ) ( )
rovincejVRSWLPDOWD[UDWHDVDUHDFWLRQIXQFWLRQIURPWKHUVWRUGHUFRQGLWLRQWDNHVWKH
form of
t R t X j j j= ( ) ; .
B. Conditional Logit Model
n connection with the comparative advantage theory and new economic geography of
DJJORPHUDWLRQDQDO\VLVWKLVVWXG\DGRSWVWKHPRGLHGDGGLWLYHUDQGRPXWLOLW\PRGHOE\
VXEVWLWXWLQJH[SHFWHGSURWV3 for utility . uppose an investor ichose one province
amongjDOWHUQDWLYHVWKHQH[SHFWHGSURWVIRUDQLQYHVWRUiof choosing alternativej
y ji =( )
is given by
E V V CA NEG t ij ij ij ij ij j ij ( ) = + = ( ) +H H, , ,
where Vij LVWKHGHWHUPLQLVWLFSDUWRIH[SHFWHGSURWVDQGHij represents a random
part Mcadden 194). it can be expected that investors choose one province among
j J= 1, , so as to maximize ij . he probability of choosing any one alternative j isHTXLYDOHQWWRWKDWWKHDOWHUQDWLYH\LHOGVJUHDWHUH[SHFWHGSURWVWKDQDOORWKHUDOWHUQDWLYH
choices
p y j k j V V k jij i ij ik ik ij ij ik = = = = Pr Pr , Pr , H H
n order to solve for these choice probabilities, an appropriate joint distribution of the
UDQGRPSDUWVPXVWEHVSHFLHGFDGGHQSURYHVWKDWWKHIROORZLQJH[SUHVVLRQ
F G e ei iJ
i iJH H HH
11, , exp , , ( ) = ( )( )
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is the cumulative distribution function of a multivariate extreme value distribution for any
function GWKDWLVQRQQHJDWLYHKRPRJHQHRXVRIGHJUHHRQHDQGIXOOOVDQXPEHURI
additional regularity conditions Mcadden 198). ifferent choices ofG yield different
models. he choice probabilities can be calculated given that the random parts of
H[SHFWHGSURWVDUHGLVWULEXWHGDFFRUGLQJWRIXQFWLRQ FMcadden 198)
p y j i j F V V V Vij i j J = = =( ) = + +(Pr : , , ,investor s choice H H H1 2 1 ))
= ( )
+
+ + +
d
e G e e e G e eV V V V VJ
H
H H H H H H
11 2 1 1, , , exp ,
VV V Ve dJ2 1, , +
+
( )( ) H H,
ZKHUHWKHVXEVFULSWVWRDQG*GHQRWHWKHUVWGHULYDWLYH6LQFH*LVKRPRJHQHRXVRI
degree 1, its derivative 1 is homogeneous of degree zero. herefore
p y j e G e e e e e G e e eij i j V V V V V V VJ j J= =( ) = ( ) Pr , , , exp , , ,H H1 2 1 2 (( )( )
+
dH
=( )( )
eG e e e
G e e e
V
V V V
V V V
j
J
J
11 2
1 2
, , ,
, , ,
,, , , .j J{ }1
Assume that the errors Hj are iidwith eibull distribution, then
p y je
e e eij i
V
V V V
ij
i i iJ
= =
( )=
+ + +Pr
1 2
6LQFHDOORIDOWHUQDWLYHVSHFLFH[SODQDWRU\YDULDEOHVYDU\DFURVVDOWHUQDWLYHVFRQGLWLRQDO
logit model is most suitable for this case.
p y jCA NEG t
CA NE ij i
CA ij NEG ij t ij
CA ik NEG
= =( ) =+ +( )
+Pr
exp
exp
E E E
E E GG tik t ik k
J+( )= E1
he standard maximum likelihood estimation can be used if the choice probabilities
DERYHDUHFRUUHFWO\VSHFLHG6LQFHWKHPRGHOLVQRQOLQHDULQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHHVWLPDWHGFRHIFLHQWVLVQRWVWUDLJKWIRUZDUG7RJDXJHWKHPDJQLWXGHRIHVWLPDWHGHIIHFWVWKH
marginal effects of changes in explanatory variables on choice probabilities have to be
FDOFXODWHG%\PXOWLSO\LQJZLWKWKHFRHIFLHQWHVWLPDWHDQGGLYLGLQJE\WKHSUREDELOLW\
these marginal effects can be converted into elasticities. Cameron and rivedi 2005)
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illustrate that the closed form expression of the marginal effects in the conditional logit
model is
= ( )
p
x p i pij
ik
ij ijk ik E,
wherei
ijk is an indicator variable that for an investor i takes on the value 1
LINDQGRWKHUZLVHWLVFOHDUIURPWKHDERYHIRUPXODWKDWWKLVGHQLWLRQLPSOLHV
WKDWIRUH[DPSOHDSRVLWLYHUHJUHVVLRQFRHIFLHQWPHDQVWKDWDPDUJLQDOLQFUHDVHLQWKH
covariatexik will lead to a rise in the predicted probability of option k being chosen, but
to a fall in the predicted probability of any other option being chosen.
IV. Data
hree major data sources are utilized for empirical analysis. he ational Bureau of
6WDWLVWLFVSURYLGHVDQQXDOUPOHYHOLQGXVWU\GDWDVHWVKLQHVHQGXVWULDO(QWHUSULVHV
'DWDEDVHFRQWDLQLQJLQIRUPDWLRQRQDOOUPVRSHUDWLQJLQPDQXIDFWXULQJVHFWRUVZKRVH
DQQXDOUHYHQXHLVJUHDWHUWKDQPLOOLRQ\XDQ$QH[WHQVLYHDUUD\RIUPOHYHOYDULDEOHV
LVLQFOXGHGLQWKLVGDWDVHWVXFKDVDUPVRZQHUVKLSFRPSRVLWLRQRIHPSOR\PHQW
FRUSRUDWHLQFRPHWD[DPRXQWYDOXHDGGHGWD[DPRXQWUPVORFDWLRQHWFQGXVWU\GDWD
in 2004 contains the established date of each company. ew economic geography of
DJJORPHUDWLRQHIIHFWVLQRWKHUZRUGVDQLQXHQFHRIWKHSUHVHQFHRIVLPLODUUPVLQ
FHUWDLQORFDWLRQVRQQHZHQWUDQWVORFDWLRQGHFLVLRQVFDQEHWHVWHGE\SURSHUO\GHQLQJ
DQLQFXPEHQF\$OOH[SRUWLQJUPVWKDWHQWHUHGWKHPDUNHWSULRUWRZLOOEHFRXQWHG
as incumbents from the perspective of a new market entrant in 2004. ncumbency
statistics are constructed at the 4-digit armonized ystem )-code level associated
ZLWKWKHRZQHUVKLSRIUPVIRUHLJQLQYHVWHG+RQJRQJKLQD7DLSHLKLQD+7RZQHG
VWDWHRZQHGDQGKLQHVHSULYDWHRZQHG7KHRZQHUVKLSVWDWXVLVGHQHGDVDPDRULW\
share of capital.
he eoples epublic of China Customs records monthly export/import data at the
transaction level, including sector information in the form of 8-digit -codes, among
other variables like unit value, type of enterprises, commodity code, etc. his study maps/
merges ndustry data and Customs data by matching the company names, and then theVXEVDPSOHRIH[SRUWLQJUPVIURPWKHPHUJHGGDWDVHWDUHUHVHUYHGIRUWKHDQDO\VLV
(DFKUPVH[SRUWWUDQVDFWLRQGRFXPHQWHGLQWKHH[SRUWLPSRUWGDWDVHWKHOSVWRLGHQWLI\
LWVPDLQHOGRIEXVLQHVVHVWDEOLVKLQJLWVVHFWRULGHQWLW\7KHGLVDJJUHJDWLRQOHYHOLV
at 4-digit -codes and all exports of products in the same 4-digit -code group are
WUHDWHGDVHTXLYDOHQW
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7KH>3HRSOHVHSXEOLFRI@KLQDXVWRPV6WDWLVWLFVFODVVLHVHYHU\WUDQVDFWLRQRIRZ
of goods based on two trade types processing and normal trade. rocessing trade
insinuates a low-value added step in the supply chain of a sophisticated product. igh-
technology intermediate imports are assembled by low-skilled local workers to produce
VRSKLVWLFDWHGQDOH[SRUWJRRGVPDLQO\VKLSSHGWRDGYDQFHGHFRQRPLHVHYHUWKHOHVVthe assembling work performed by local workers contributes limited prospects of skill
upgrading or technology/knowledge spillover for the C to move up the high value
supply chain, expand its domestic market, and export skill-intensive goods. odrik 200)
points out that the behavior of processing traders is therefore both of scholarly interest
and relevant for policy makers.
$GLIFXOWFKDOOHQJHLVWRFRQVWUXFWDPHDVXUHRIDFFHVVWR LQWHUPHGLDWHJRRGVXSSOLHUV
due to the lack of reliable information. evertheless, processing traders yield useful
insights on this aspect. rocessing traders are largely autonomous from local intermediate
JRRGVSURGXFHUVRWKHUWKDQODERUWKHUHIRUHRQHFDQVXFFHVVIXOO\DEVWUDFWIURPWKHLVVXH
of access to intermediate goods suppliers by analyzing processing traders separatelyfrom nonprocessing traders. ormal traders might have generated a strong network of
intermediate goods suppliers, since incumbent enterprises presumably made location
their consideration in choosing intermediate goods suppliers.
heAnnual Statistical Yearbook of [the Peoples Republic of] China contains extensive
control variables at the province level. A range of variables at the province level is
collected to model comparative advantage analysis of a market entrants location choices.
QDGGLWLRQDURXJKGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQDSURYLQFHVPDLQFLWLHVDQGWKH3DFLFFRDVWLV
measured.
V. Empirical Results
A. R&D-Intensive Firms and Diferent Type o Exporters
irms in the high-skill-intensive production industry that employ workers with postgraduate
GHJUHHVDUHXVHGDVDSUR[\IRU'LQWHQVLYHUPDFWLYLW\ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWHFKQRORJ\
knowledge upgrading and spillovers.
RGHOLQ7DEOHSURYLGHVWKHEDVHOLQHVSHFLFDWLRQFRPSULVLQJWKHZKROHVDPSOHVDQGRGHOH[KLELWVUHVXOWVIRU'LQWHQVLYHUPV$VRSSRVHGWRWKHRYHUDOO
HQWHUSULVHV'LQWHQVLYHUPVSXWPRUHYDOXHRQWKHFROOHJHJUDGXDWHSRSXODWLRQDQG
DUHVHQVLWLYHWRERWKYDOXHDGGHGDQGFRUSRUDWHWD[UDWHVQFXPEHQW'LQWHQVLYHUPV
attract new, similar types of companies through the agglomeration effect.
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Table 1: Conditional Logit Model: All Firms and R&D Intensive Firms
Variables
Model (1): All Firms Model (2): R&D-Intensive Firms
Estimates Marginal
Efects
Std. dev. Predicted
Change*
Estimates Marginal
Efects
Std. dev. Predicted
Change*
wage_manuacturing 0.00 0.00 3016 3.02 0.00 0.00 3008 3.61[22.617] [27.590] [7.283] [8.512]
GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 4910 1.47 0.00 0.00 4777 0.96[21.764] [16.826] [5.012] [4.656]
waterway 6.53 0.50 0.07 3.57 6.15 0.79 0.07 5.65[51.405] [38.069] [20.745] [22.473]
highway 0.97 0.07 0.21 1.56 1.30 0.17 0.21 3.52[9.630] [9.076] [5.398] [5.063]
high school pop 7.78 0.60 0.04 2.6 8.35 1.08 0.04 4.66[12.188] [15.387] [6.547] [8.074]
college pop 0.59 0.05 0.03 0.15 7.55 0.97 0.03 3.26[0.677] [0.666] [4.789] [5.859]
proximity 0.00 0.00 686 18.93 0.00 0.00 686 18.11[57.455] [41.952] [17.935] [21.379]
value added tax rate 1.18 0.09 0.07 0.62 0.73 0.10 0.07 0.65[4.784] [4.939] [1.508] [1.533]corp income tax rate 1.65 0.13 0.02 0.29 3.77 0.49 0.02 1.1
[3.202] [3.175] [3.395] [3.295]incumbent frms 0.01 0.00 65 3.58 0.01 0.00 51 5.22
[62.528] [31.150] [26.089] [16.116]Sample size 495673 89217LL 41282 7988Chi2 33203 4868Pseudo R2 0.29 0.23
* Predicted changes (in %) induced by a 1 standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable.Note: Figures in the square bracket are z-statistics.Source: Author's calculations.
RGHOVDQG LQ7DEOHVKRZDQDO\VHVIURPWKHKHWHURJHQHLW\RIUPVLQWKHLU
trade type, according to whether they predominantly focus on processing trade or normal
trade. rocessing trade has been at the center of debates about the sophistication level
of the Cs exports odrik 200, ang and ei 2008). rocessing trade is largely
dependent on a limited range of local inputs, mainly labor. rocessing traders import
sophisticated intermediate goods, and only assembly and related low value-added
production processing take place locally. herefore, processing traders are relatively less
dependent on intermediate goods supplier networks, while they are particularly sensitive
to factors like labor costs, value added tax rate, regional development in infrastructure,
DQGSUR[LPLW\WRWKH3DFLFFRDVW
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Table 2: Conditional Logit Model: Processing Traders versus Normal Traders
Variables Model (3): Processing Traders Model (4): Normal Traders
Estimates Marginal
Efects
Std. dev. Predicted
Change*
Estimates Marginal
Efects
Std. dev. Predicted
Change*
wage_manuacturing 0.00 0.00 3015 2.11 0.00 0.00 3016 2.71[5.329] [5.820] [24.052] [24.794]
GDP per capita 0 0 4963 2.98 0 0 4886 0.98[17.388] [15.144] [13.511] [10.665]
waterway 4.99 0.56 0.07 3.96 7.55 0.40 0.07 2.87[19.295] [23.580] [50.721] [26.129]
highway 3.78 0.42 0.21 8.88 0.12 0.01 0.21 0.13[18.170] [15.932] [1.030] [1.027]
high school pop 3.82 0.43 0.04 1.84 12.08 0.64 0.04 2.8[3.043] [2.897] [16.203] [21.596]
college pop 33.63 3.75 0.03 12.52 10.09 0.54 0.03 1.81[17.142] [12.808] [10.476] [14.975]
proximity 0.00 0.00 686 30.32 0.00 0.00 686 13.17[26.313] [55.907] [51.245] [27.258]
value added tax rate 3.61 0.40 0.07 2.76 0.67 0.04 0.07 0.24[7.601] [7.883] [2.261] [2.317]
corp income tax rate 2.32 0.26 0.02 0.58 1.23 0.07 0.02 0.15[2.418] [2.395] [1.981] [1.968]
incumbent frms 0.01 0.00 75 4.44 0.01 0.00 60 2.36[28.221] [25.095] [50.676] [21.206]
Sample size 154008 341665LL 11207 29534Chi2 13531 20752Pseudo R2 0.38 0.26
* Predicted changes (in %) induced by a 1 standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable.Note: Figures in the square bracket are z-statistics.Source: Author's calculations.
Comparing results between processing traders and normal traders supports intuition.
rom the regression results, there is indeed a difference in agglomerative effects. A new
processing trader tends to select a location where other processing traders are operating.
n fact, the predicted response to a 1 standard deviation increase in the number of
LQFXPEHQWVLQWHUPVRIFKRLFHSUREDELOLWLHVLVLQWKHFDVHRISURFHVVLQJWUDGHUV
URXJKO\SHUFHQWDJHSRLQWVDERYHWKHUHVSRQVHRIQRUPDOWUDGHUVRUPDO
WUDGHUVLQWKHLUORFDWLRQFKRLFHVDUHXQOLNHO\LQXHQFHGE\DUHGXFWLRQLQHLWKHUYDOXH
added tax rate or corporate income tax rate while processing traders seriously consider
WKHEHQHWIURPYDOXHDGGHGWD[UDWHUHGXFWLRQ7KHVDPHKROGVIRUSURFHVVLQJWUDGHUV
sensitivity to distance from the coast. A 1 standard deviation increase in the distance
IURPWKH3DFLFFRDVWLVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKDPRUHWKDQUHGXFWLRQLQFKRLFHSUREDELOLW\ZKHUHDVWKHUHGXFWLRQIRUQRQSURFHVVLQJWUDGLQJUPVLVDERXW
he obtained results for the infrastructure variables show that there is a large effect
of well-developed road infrastructure on the location decisions of processing traders.
$VWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQULVH LQURDGVSHUDUHDUDLVHVWKHFKRLFHSUREDELOLW\E\
ZKHUHDVWKHHIIHFWLVLQVLJQLFDQWIRUQRUPDOWUDGHUVZKLFKFRQIRUPVWRH[SHFWDWLRQVWKDW
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processing traders are particularly sensitive to transportation costs, and complements
WKHODUJHFRHIFLHQWHVWLPDWHIRUWKHGLVWDQFHIURPWKHFRDVW$WWKHVDPHWLPHKRZHYHU
a comparable estimate is obtained for the waterway density of a provincea rise in
waterway density has an effect of roughly the same magnitude for both processing and
normal traders.
verall, it is noticeable that the model seems to do a better job at predicting the choices
RIORZYDOXHDGGHGSURFHVVLQJUPVGLVSOD\LQJDPXFKEHWWHURYHUDOOPRGHOWZLWKD
SVHXGRVTXDUHGRIFRPSDUHGWRRWKHUVDPSOHV+LJKYDOXHDGGHGUPVPLJKWEH
more dependent on highly specialized input factors say, college graduates of a certain
subject, or intellectual property rights), and therefore their choice propensities may yield
predictions less accurate by broad provincial level aggregate variables.
B. Heterogeneity in Origin o Investment Funds
n order to shed more light on the heterogeneous agglomerative processes in the CsH[SRUWLQGXVWU\WKHLQFXPEHQWUPVDUHGLYLGHGE\WKHLURZQHUVKLSRULJLQIRUHLJQLQYHVWHG
+RQJRQJKLQD7DLSHLKLQDLQYHVWHG+7VWDWHRZQHG67DQGKLQHVH
SULYDWHRZQHG3LQFXPEHQWUPVXUWKHUDQDO\VLVZLWKIRXUVXEJURXSHGLQYHVWRUV
EDVHGRQWKHLURZQHUVKLSDOORZVRQHWRH[DPLQHZKLFKUPVOLNHO\SOD\DVLJQLFDQW
DJJORPHUDWLYHOHDGLQJUROHIRUVXEVHTXHQWUPVLQWKHVDPHRZQHUVKLSRULJLQDQG
different origin to their location decision. or example, foreign investors might follow other
IRUHLJQUPVRUWKHSUHVHQFHRIVWDWHRZQHGUPVPLJKWVKRZDVWURQJDJJORPHUDWLYH
effect to Chinese private investors.
able introduces separate incumbent counts depending on investor origin. or the
IRUHLJQLQYHVWHGVDPSOHZDJHDQGSUR[LPLW\YDULDEOHVDUHWKHPRVWLQXHQWLDOIDFWRUVWRQHZHQWUDQWVIROORZHGE\OHYHORILQIUDVWUXFWXUHGHYHORSPHQW%HQHWVIURP
the reduction in value added tax rate are also taken critically by foreign investors while
an incentive from corporative income tax provided by local policy makers is considered
somewhat to a lesser extent.
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Table 3: Conditional Logit Model: Foreign Firms and Hong Kong, China/Taipei,China
Firms
Variables Model (5): Foreign-Owned Model (6): Hong Kong, China/
Taipei,China-Owned
Estimates MarginalEfects
Std. dev. PredictedChange*
Estimates MarginalEfects
Std. dev. PredictedChange*
wage_manuacturing 0.00 0.00 3037 3.34 0.00 0.00 3005 9.02[21.608] [15.832] [13.435] [9.835]
GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 5057 1.01 0.00 0.00 4833 2.9[13.481] [8.602] [13.783] [11.800]
waterway 7.17 0.31 0.07 2.2 7.38 0.97 0.07 6.88[26.881] [16.281] [22.978] [21.786]
highway 1.57 0.07 0.21 1.43 0.31 0.04 0.21 0.84[8.261] [6.643] [1.165] [1.168]
high school pop 11.17 0.48 0.04 2.09 7.15 0.94 0.04 4.05[8.853] [11.842] [5.398] [4.836]
college pop 9.71 0.42 0.03 1.41 50.36 6.61 0.03 22[6.216] [9.015] [20.445] [13.251]
proximity 0.00 0.00 686 14.61 0.00 0.00 686 34.02[32.301] [15.715] [20.999] [53.876]
value added tax rate 3.06 0.13 0.07 0.9 1.41 0.19 0.07 1.27[6.565] [6.864] [1.925] [1.946]
corp income tax rate 2.87 0.12 0.02 0.28 3.99 0.52 0.02 1.18[3.662] [3.751] [2.138] [2.153]
Incumbent_CP 0.01 0.00 26 0.66 0.00 0.00 27 0.97[14.244] [9.124] [5.345] [5.115]
Incumbent_ST 0.02 0.00 3 0.29 0.00 0.00 3 0.07[4.038] [3.878] [0.374] [0.374]
Incumbent_HT 0.00 0.00 33 0.12 0.01 0.00 35 2.36[1.990] [1.859] [13.869] [13.375]
Incumbent_FN 0.02 0.00 20 1.82 0.01 0.00 21 1.74[26.019] [10.406] [7.192] [6.955]
Sample size 143392 126650LL 11410 8330Chi2 10652 12901Pseudo R2 0.32 0.44
* Predicted changes (in %) induced by a 1 standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable.Note: Figures in the square bracket are z-statistics.Source: Author's calculations.
$OOIRXU+6OHYHO LQFXPEHQWVWDWLVWLFVDUHVLJQLFDQWDQGWKHODUJHVWDJJORPHUDWLRQ
HIIHFWLVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKIRUHLJQRZQHGLQFXPEHQWUPV7ZHQW\DGGLWLRQDOIRUHLJQRZQHG
LQFXPEHQWVLQDSURYLQFHZRXOGLQFUHDVHWKHFKRLFHSUREDELOLW\E\DERXWDQGWKH
HIIHFWRIKLQHVHSULYDWHUPVLVFRPSDUDEOH+RZHYHUWKHDJJORPHUDWLRQHIIHFWRI+7
LQYHVWHGUPVLVQHJDWLYHLQRWKHUZRUGVIRUHLJQLQYHVWRUVDUHOHVVOLNHO\WRFKRRVHD
location where -invested companies are operating. ew foreign investors seem to
consider enterprises from ong ong, China and aipei,China as competitors while they
LQWHUSUHWWKHSUHVHQFHRIRWKHUIRUHLJQUPVDVSRWHQWLDOFRUSRUDWLYHEXVLQHVVSDUWQHUVRU
WKH\UHFRJQL]HWKHYDOXDEOHH[SHULHQFHRILQFXPEHQWIRUHLJQUPVRSHUDWLQJLQDVLPLODU
industry sector in the C.
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Table 4: Conditional Logit Model: Chinese Private Firms
Variables Model (7): Chinese Private Firms
Estimates Marginal
Efects
Std. dev. Predicted
Change*
wage_manuacturing 0.00 0.00 3009 3.01[11.434] [14.028]
GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 4874 1.95[13.114] [10.252]
waterway 3.38 0.31 0.07 2.23[14.531] [17.384]
highway 0.56 0.05 0.21 1.08[3.507] [3.391]
high school pop 7.64 0.71 0.04 3.07[7.324] [9.234]
college pop 0.65 0.06 0.03 0.2[0.498] [0.508]
proximity 0.00 0.00 686 16.33[31.890] [23.249]
value added tax rate 0.26 0.02 0.07 0.16[0.713] [0.719]corp income tax rate 1.69 0.16 0.02 0.35
[2.044] [2.006]Incumbent_CP 0.02 0.00 26 4.06
[43.597] [16.823]Incumbent_ST 0.05 0.01 3 1.44
[11.628] [10.001]Incumbent_HT 0.00 0.00 26 0.35
[3.235] [3.389]Incumbent_FN 0.01 0.00 15 1.79
[13.416] [9.910]Sample size 208699LL 17378
Chi2 14018Pseudo R2 0.29
* Predicted changes (in %) induced by a 1 standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable.Note: Figures in the square bracket are z-statistics.Source: Author's calculations.
n Model ), investors show a preference in their entry decision for a province with a
large high school graduate population, but a strong restriction for a province with a large
college graduate population. Most of investors in the C mainly seek low-skilled
laborers while some foreign investors may need intermediate-level managers with college
degrees. he obtained result for the wage variable, however, is somewhat puzzling with a
positive sign. n one hand, provincial individual income level greatly affects the locationGHFLVLRQVRILQYHVWRUVIURP+RQJRQJKLQDDQG7DLSHLKLQD%HQHWVIURPWKH
reduction in both value-added tax rate and corporate income tax rate are taken intensely
by investors from ong ong, China and aipei,China.
he results also reveal a much stronger pattern of the agglomeration effect to foreign-
invested companies and enterprises from ong ong, China and aipei,China while the
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FRHIFLHQWIRUVWDWHRZQHGLQFXPEHQWVLVLQVLJQLFDQWLPSO\LQJWKDWWKHSUHVHQFHRIVWDWH
owned enterprises hardly provides investors from ong ong, China and aipei,China
ZLWKPXFKLQXHQFHLQWKHLUORFDWLRQFKRLFH
n contrast, Cs ) seem to behave similarly as foreign-invested companies in locationdecision choice associated with infrastructure-related variables but somewhat differently
toward tax incentives. Most domestically invested exporters are normal traders about
FRQVLGHULQJFRUSRUDWHLQFRPHWD[UDWHPRUHVHULRXVO\WKDQYDOXHDGGHGWD[
7KHDJJORPHUDWLRQHIIHFWDVVRFLDWHGZLWKIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGUPVLVVLPLODUWRWKDWIRUWKH
IRUHLJQRZQHGVXEVDPSOHDQGWKHHIIHFWRI3VLVWKHPRVWVLJQLFDQWZKLOH+7
LQFXPEHQWVKDYHDQHJOLJLEOHHIIHFW+RZHYHUWKHSUHVHQFHRIVWDWHRZQHGUPVKDVD
sizable effect on the co-location of Cs.
n summary, using results from Models 5) to ), it can be observed that the presence
RIIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGH[SRUWHUVKDVDVLJQLFDQWEHDFRQHIIHFWZLWKWKHVWURQJHVWOHDGLQJUROHLQDJJORPHUDWLRQIRUQHZLQYHVWRUVFRPLQJIURPWKH3+RQJRQJKLQD
7DLSHLKLQDDQGIRUHLJQFRXQWULHVLQWKH3VH[SRUWLQGXVWU\RUHRYHUSULYDWHO\
LQYHVWHGKLQHVHHQWHUSULVHVVKRZVRPHWHQGHQF\IRUFRORFDWLRQZLWKVLJQLFDQW
DJJORPHUDWLYHLQXHQFHH[HUWHGE\RWKHUKLQHVHSULYDWHRZQHGLQFXPEHQWUPV
C. Processing Traders versus Normal Traders
he last empirical results provide comparison analysis between processing traders and
normal traders in different ownership origins. he subsamples in each investment origin
are further split into processing traders and normal traders. rom Models 8A and 8B) in
able 5, foreign investors in the processing and normal trade sectors behave analogouslyin location choice with respect to infrastructure and proximity to the coast but the absolute
PDJQLWXGHRIHDFKHOHPHQWLVPRUHVLJQLFDQWZLWKLQYHVWRUVLQWKHSURFHVVLQJJRRGV
trade sector than those in the normal goods trade sector. As expected, processing traders
are more sensitive to an incentive in the form of value added tax reduction than from
corporate income tax reduction. oreign investors in both the processing trade sector and
normal trade sector show a tendency to agglomerate with incumbent foreign companies.
n particular, the latter likely cluster together with privately-owned Chinese incumbents
while the former shows the opposite.
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Table 5: Conditional Logit Model: Processing Traders versus Normal Traders
(oreign-owned rms)
Variables
Model (8): Foreign-Owned
A: Processing Traders B: Normal Traders
Estimates Marginal
Efects
Std.
dev.
Predicted
Change*
Estimates Marginal
Efects
Std.
dev.
Predicted
Change*
wage_manuacturing 0.00 0.00 3024 3.93 0.00 0.00 3048 2.74[12.959] [11.644] [17.333] [10.857]
GDP per capita 0 0 5030 2.01 0 0 5080 0.51[13.267] [7.353] [6.016] [4.571]
waterway 5.91 0.33 0.07 2.34 8.88 0.28 0.07 2[14.255] [12.345] [24.640] [10.653]
highway 2.32 0.13 0.21 2.72 1.01 0.03 0.21 0.68[7.732] [5.643] [4.052] [3.588]
high school pop 4.81 0.27 0.04 1.15 16.07 0.51 0.04 2.21[2.335] [2.745] [9.897] [10.730]
college pop 8.34 0.46 0.03 1.55 21.07 0.67 0.03 2.25[2.966] [2.374] [10.824] [13.712]
proximity 0.01 0.00 685.8 21.19 0.01 0.00 686 10.01[21.402] [12.132] [23.885] [10.588]
value added tax rate 4.66 0.26 0.07 1.77 2.15 0.07 0.07 0.47[6.841] [6.874] [3.252] [3.426]
corp income tax rate 3.26 0.18 0.02 0.41 4.16 0.13 0.02 0.3[2.544] [2.631] [4.089] [4.005]
Incumbent_CP 0.00 0.00 26 0.02 0.01 0.00 26 0.73[0.126] [0.126] [16.979] [7.414]
Incumbent_ST 0.01 0.00 3 0.17 0.03 0.00 3 0.33[1.152] [1.145] [5.016] [4.362]
Incumbent_HT 0.00 0.00 36 0.15 0.00 0.00 30 0.11[1.373] [1.290] [1.685] [1.550]
Incumbent_FN 0.02 0.00 22 2.78 0.02 0.00 18 1.04[19.780] [8.179] [14.849] [6.570]
Sample size 65309 78083LL 4903 6331Chi2 5436 5567Pseudo R2 0.36 0.31
* Predicted changes (in %) induced by a 1 standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable.Note: Figures in the square bracket are z-statistics.Source: Author's calculations.
Models 9A and 9B) exhibit the results for investors from ong ong, China and
aipei,China in processing and normal trade sectors able ). nvestors in the processing
WUDGHVHFWRUDUHVHQVLWLYHWRYDOXHDGGHGWD[UDWHZKLOHWKHFRHIFLHQWRIFRUSRUDWH
LQFRPHWD[UDWHLVLQVLJQLFDQW6XUSULVLQJO\LQYHVWRUVIURP+RQJRQJKLQDDQG7DLSHLKLQDLQWKHQRUPDOWUDGHVHFWRUDUHQRWLQXHQFHGE\DQ\WD[LQFHQWLYHQYHVWRUV
from ong ong, China and aipei,China in the processing and normal trade sectors
seem to agglomerate with incumbent foreign-invested and -invested companies.
nvestors in the normal trade sector show a tendency to choose a province with
incumbent Chinese privately invested companies while investors in the processing trade
VHFWRUDUHXQOLNHO\WRRFNWRJHWKHUZLWKSULYDWHO\RZQHGKLQHVHLQFXPEHQWV
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Table 6: Conditional Logit Model: Processing Traders versus Normal Traders
(Hong Kong, China/Taipei,China rms)
Variables
Model (9): Hong Kong, China/Taipei,China-Owned
A: Processing Traders B: Normal Traders
Estimates Marginal
Efects
Std.
dev.
Predicted
Change*
Estimates Marginal
Efects
Std.
dev.
Predicted
Change*
wage_manuacturing 0.00 0.00 3005 16.23 0.00 0.00 3006 1.8[14.299] [16.707] [3.060] [2.722]
GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 4905 3.43 0.00 0.00 4760 1.9[11.095] [10.940] [7.963] [6.771]
waterway 7.68 0.92 0.07 6.53 8.70 0.86 0.07 6.13[13.934] [13.054] [20.842] [17.879]
highway 1.48 0.18 0.21 3.74 0.80 0.08 0.21 1.67[3.163] [3.194] [2.464] [2.427]
high school pop 15.99 1.91 0.04 8.25 1.19 0.12 0.04 0.51[7.984] [9.203] [0.662] [0.679]
college pop 92.16 11.03 0.03 36.72 19.91 1.97 0.03 6.57[22.706] [39.666] [6.314] [4.947]
proximity 0.00 0.00 686 29.08 0.00 0.00 686 29.84[10.869] [9.425] [18.864] [30.889]
value added tax rate 3.37 0.40 0.07 2.76 0.55 0.05 0.07 0.37[2.620] [2.652] [0.582] [0.586]
corp income tax rate 5.33 0.64 0.02 1.44 3.10 0.31 0.02 0.7[1.315] [1.286] [1.453] [1.470]
Incumbent_CP 0.01 0.00 27 2.19 0.01 0.00 28 1.4[5.460] [5.311] [9.438] [8.023]
Incumbent_ST 0.01 0.00 4 0.31 0.01 0.00 3 0.32[1.036] [1.036] [1.651] [1.639]
Incumbent_HT 0.01 0.00 37 3.17 0.00 0.00 34 0.87[11.846] [10.067] [4.893] [5.078]
Incumbent_FN 0.01 0.00 22 1.37 0.01 0.00 19 1.05[3.747] [3.673] [4.109] [3.920]
Sample size 63510 63140LL 3200 4698Chi2 8418 5346Pseudo R2 0.57 0.36
* Predicted changes (in %) induced by a 1 standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable.Note: Figures in the square bracket are z-statistics.Source: Author's calculations.
3ULYDWHO\RZQHGKLQHVHUPV$LQWKHSURFHVVLQJWUDGHVHFWRU7DEOHDUHTXLWH
sensitive to corporate tax incentives. nvestors in both the processing and normal trade
sectors reveal a strong agglomeration effect associated with all types of incumbents
except incumbents. or processing traders, foreign incumbents have the mostVLJQLFDQWDJJORPHUDWLRQHIIHFWZKLOHKLQHVHSULYDWHO\LQYHVWHGLQFXPEHQWVDJJORPHUDWH
normal traders of privately invested entrants 10B).
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Table 7: Conditional Logit Model: Processing Traders versus Normal Traders
(Chinese private rms)
Variables Model (10): Chinese Private Firms
A: Processing Traders B: Normal Traders
Estimates MarginalEfects
Std.dev.
PredictedChange*
Estimates MarginalEfects
Std.dev.
PredictedChange*
wage_manuacturing 0.00 0.00 3020 0.3 0.00 0.00 3008 3.01[0.319] [0.323] [11.603] [14.179]
GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 4928 4.93 0.00 0.00 4867 1.95[6.408] [5.999] [11.353] [8.907]
waterway 3.13 0.49 0.07 3.51 4.07 0.35 0.07 2.46[3.835] [3.343] [16.619] [17.984]
highway 1.93 0.30 0.21 6.38 0.46 0.04 0.21 0.82[3.629] [3.500] [2.736] [2.659]
high school pop 5.40 0.85 0.04 3.7 9.00 0.76 0.04 3.32[1.631] [1.546] [8.144] [10.635]
college pop 17.92 2.82 0.03 9.47 2.49 0.21 0.03 0.71[4.720] [3.975] [1.770] [1.918]
proximity 0.00 0 686 29.29 0.00 0 686 14.75[9.739] [15.956] [29.888] [20.469]
value added tax rate 0.79 0.12 0.07 0.85 0.22 0.02 0.07 0.13[0.774] [0.782] [0.576] [0.581]
corp income tax rate 5.97 0.94 0.02 2.12 1.39 0.12 0.02 0.27[2.686] [2.543] [1.565] [1.543]
Incumbent_CP 0.01 0.00 28 3.87 0.02 0.00 26 4.01[8.399] [7.353] [42.971] [15.156]
Incumbent_ST 0.05 0.01 4 3.19 0.05 0.00 3 1.3[4.570] [4.413] [10.784] [9.132]
Incumbent_HT 0.00 0.00 37 0.64 0.00 0.00 25 0.18[1.297] [1.263] [1.551] [1.597]
Incumbent_FN 0.02 0.00 21 7.47 0.01 0.00 14 1.29[11.235] [8.658] [9.700] [7.667]
Sample size 22489 186210LL 1808 15425Chi2 1636 12671Pseudo R2 0.31 0.29
* Predicted changes (in %) induced by a 1 standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable.Note: Figures in the square bracket are z-statistics.Source: Author's calculations.
VI. Policy Implications
or governors in the C whose most decisive achievements are judged by increasing
gross domestic product in the region, attracting new foreign and domestic direct
LQYHVWPHQWLVEHQHFLDOLQVSXUULQJHFRQRPLFJURZWKJHQHUDWLQJPRUHHPSOR\PHQW
expanding the tax base, and boosting resident income. ocal policy makers encourage
WHFKQRORJLFDOO\VRSKLVWLFDWHGUPVWRHQWHUWKHLUSURYLQFHIRUJUDGXDOLPSURYHPHQWRI
production technologies in related industries by means of technology and management
knowledge spillover. Correspondingly, policy makers prefer to train and produce a highly
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VNLOOLQWHQVLYHODERUIRUFHWKDWZLOOKHOSPHHWWKHGHPDQGIRUKLJKTXDOLW\REVDVKLJKO\
sophisticated, technology-based, and &-intensive foreign and domestic) enterprises
enter their province. herefore, provincial planners tend to pay particular attention to
WKHHIIHFWRIWKHLUSROLFLHVDQGDFWLRQVRQWKHEHKDYLRURIUPVWKDWDUHOLNHO\WRHQJDJH
LQ'DFWLYLW\UPVWKDWIRFXVRQKLJKTXDOLW\WHFKQRORJ\GHYHORSPHQWDQGUPVWKDWZLOOSURGXFHVRSKLVWLFDWHGQDOJRRGVLQWKHKLJKWHFKQRORJ\EDVHGLQGXVWU\7KHUHIRUH
they may want to attract foreign-invested enterprises with high technology, as the
knowledge and technology transfer induced by their market entry will clearly be welcome
externalities.
ome explanatory variables analyzed in the empirical section are explicitly and/
RULPSOLFLWO\FRQWUROOHGDQGLQXHQFHGE\SURYLQFLDOOHYHOSROLF\FKRLFHVQSDUWLFXODU
SROLF\PDNHUVZRXOGOLNHWRXQGHUVWDQGKRZYDULDWLRQVLQWKHLUORFDOSROLF\LQXHQFH
WKHPDUNHWHQWU\GHFLVLRQVRIFHUWDLQJURXSVRIUPVRUH[DPSOHKLJKZD\VSHUDUHD
and length of inland waterways are infrastructure-related policy variables that can be
LQXHQFHGE\EXLOGLQJPRUHKLJKZD\VPDNLQJPRUHULYHUVVXLWDEOHIRUFRPPHUFLDOWUDIFor constructing canals. An upgrade to the waterway and highway infrastructure in the
SURYLQFHLVSUHGLFWHGWRKDYHDVLJQLFDQWHIIHFWRQWKHHQWU\GHFLVLRQVRISURFHVVLQJ
goods traders see Model in able 2). A 1 standard deviation increase in waterways
DQGKLJKZD\VZLOOUDLVHFKRLFHSUREDELOLWLHVE\DERXWDQGUHVSHFWLYHO\7KHVKDUH
RIKLJKVFKRROJUDGXDWHVDQGFROOHJHJUDGXDWHVLQWKHSRSXODWLRQFRXOGEHLQXHQFHGE\
province-level policies aimed at encouraging higher education.
WZRXOGEHIHDVLEOHIRUSURYLQFLDOSODQQHUVWRQGWKHVSHFLFFRVWRIJHQHUDWLQJD
particular infrastructure upgradefor example, building additional highwaysand setting
it in relation to the expected effect. or example, suppose that 5,000 new enterprises
enter the Cs export industry every year, and an increase of the choice probabilityE\ZRXOGUHVXOWLQDQH[SHFWHGDGGLWLRQDOUPV7KHH[SHFWHGEHQHWVRIVXFK
DGGLWLRQDOLQYHVWPHQWFRXOGEHFRPSDUHGWRWKHFRVWRIVSHFLFSROLF\LQWHUYHQWLRQV
he average wage level in the manufacturing sector is related to policy in important
ZD\VWKHIRUPXODWLRQDQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIODERUODZVLQFOXVLYHRIWKHPLQLPXPZDJH
the restriction of domestic migrant workers for example, hukouV\VWHPDQGWKHVWDQFH
WDNHQE\SROLF\PDNHUVLQODERUGLVSXWHVDOOLQXHQFHWKHIDFWRUSULFHRIODERUVLQJWKH
Model 8A), a 1 standard deviation increase to the average wage in manufacturing sector
ZLOOUHGXFHFKRLFHSUREDELOLWLHVE\DERXWQHVWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQLV\XDQSHU
year, or 252 yuan per month. his is a sizable wage increase and its predicted effect is
relatively large. verall, investors seem sensitive to the average wage rate in a province.aking oxconn for example, the wage level for its low-skilled workers increased by
DQGWKHFRPSDQ\PRYHGLWVIDFWRU\IURP6KHQ]KHQLQ*XDQJGRQJSURYLQFHWR
Chengdu in ichuan province in 2011.
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HGXFWLRQLQWD[UDWHVSDUWLFXODUO\YDOXHDGGHGWD[EULQJVDVLJQLFDQWLQXHQFHWR
investors from foreign countries and ong ong, China/aipei,China in their location
choice. An interesting policy implication is given by Models 8) to 10). he agglomeration
effect of foreign-invested enterprises seems notably strong for foreign-invested processing
traders, - invested companies, and private Chinese investors in the processing tradeVHFWRU+RVWLQJIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGHQWHUSULVHVLQRQHORFDWLRQFRXOGDWWUDFWVXEVHTXHQW
LQYHVWRUVLQWKHVDPHORFDWLRQIWKHSURYLQFLDOJRYHUQPHQWWDUJHWVDVSHFLFLQGXVWU\WR
be developed, then our results suggest that it might kick-start this industry by hosting a
number of foreign-invested enterprises to locate in a particular location. he presence of
IRUHLJQLQYHVWHGLQFXPEHQWUPVZRXOGUDLVHWKHSUHGLFWHGSUREDELOLW\RIPDUNHWHQWU\
RIRWKHUIRUHLJQUPVLQWKHSURFHVVLQJH[SRUWLQGXVWU\E\DERXWDQGWKDWRISULYDWH
KLQHVHLQYHVWRUVE\URXJKO\7KH3VLQGXVWU\VWUXFWXUHLVVWLOOURRWHGLQORZ
VNLOOHGODERULQWHQVLYHPDQXIDFWXUHGJRRGVSURGXFWLRQDQGKLJKO\VRSKLVWLFDWHGQDOJRRGV
are mostly assembled by foreign-invested enterprises. olicy makers in the C need
WRQGZD\VWRDFKLHYHDVXEVWDQWLDOOHYHORIWHFKQRORJ\VSLOORYHUIURPIRUHLJQLQYHVWHG
enterprises operating in high-technology industry areas to local producers manufacturingLQWHUPHGLDWHJRRGV7HFKQRORJ\VSLOORYHUFDQEHDFTXLUHGWKURXJKLQWHUQDWLRQDOL]DWLRQRI
KRVWLQJIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGUPVSURGXFLQJKLJKVNLOOHGWHFKQRORJ\JRRGVDIWHUZKLFKORFDO
producers that obtained high-technology skills will be encouraged to gradually replace the
foreign-invested processing goods traders through internalization/localization in production
of sophisticated manufactured goods.
imilarly, the presence of state-owned enterprises in a certain industry will attract more
privately invested Chinese companies Models 10A and 10B) and foreign normal goods
traders Model 8B). hese increases only apply to the subpopulation of investors active in
WKLVSDUWLFXODUSURGXFWFODVVVRWKDWWKHQXPEHURIUPVWKDWFDQEHLQGXFHGWRHQWHULQ
this way may still be small. t suggests that a state-owned infant industry may still play aOLPLWHGOHDGLQJUROHWRGHYHORSVSHFLFWDUJHWLQGXVWULHV
VII. Conclusion
he most important result of this study is the proof of a basic concept that heterogeneity
LQUPRZQHUVKLSDQGWUDGHW\SHFDQHQKDQFHWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRILQYHVWPHQWORFDWLRQ
decisions in the C. rocessing traders differ substantially from nonprocessing traders
in response to changes in wage cost, level of development in infrastructure, and proximityWRWKH3DFLFFRDVW3UHVHQFHRIIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGHQWHUSULVHVFUHDWHVDEHDFRQHIIHFWRQ
VXEVHTXHQWIRUHLJQDQGGRPHVWLFLQYHVWRUV
7KHPRVWEDVLFFRQFOXVLRQIURPWKHHPSLULFDODQDO\VHVLVWKDWSUR[LPLW\WRWKH3DFLF
coast and new economic geography of agglomeration effect and the presence of
LQFXPEHQWUPVLQWKHVDPHSURGXFWFODVVDUHWKHVWURQJHVWGHWHUPLQDQWVRIDQLQYHVWRUV
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location choice in the Cs export industry. Agglomeration also plays a greater role
for investors specializing in processing goods trade and highly skill-intensive or &
intensive production. irms with a higher educated workforce agglomerate more than
others.
6LPLODUO\SURFHVVLQJWUDGHUPVGLVSOD\VWURQJHUDJJORPHUDWLYHEHKDYLRUWKDQ
nonprocessing traders. Moreover, processing traders are more sensitive to the wage
level and value proximity to the coast more. A wide range of industrial policies designed
WRDWWUDFWFOXVWHUVRIOHDGLQJUPVPD\EHXVWLDEOHRQWKHVHJURXQGV$PRQJLQYHVWRUV
of different origin, ong ong, China and aipei,China investors seem the least driven
by agglomeration. nvestors from ong ong, China and aipei,China, by contrast, tend
WRFRORFDWHZLWKRWKHUUPVIURPWKHVDPHUHJLRQZKLOHIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGUPVVHHPWR
EHQHJDWLYHO\LQXHQFHGE\WKHSUHVHQFHRI+RQJRQJKLQD7DLSHLKLQDLQFXPEHQWV
RUHLJQLQYHVWHGLQFXPEHQWUPVKDYHDYHU\ODUJHHIIHFWRQVXEVHTXHQWSULYDWHKLQHVH
investors in processing trade sector, and have a sizable effect on other foreign investors
and investors from ong ong, China and aipei,China.
%HQHWVIURPUHGXFWLRQLQYDOXHDGGHGWD[UDWHVDQGFRUSRUDWHLQFRPHWD[UDWHVSOD\
an evident role for foreign investors and investors in the processing trade sector.
owever, since 2008, a number of provinces started dismantling preferential labor
laws, export subsidies, favorable value-added tax rates, and corporate tax rates to low-
skill-intensive foreign enterprises including processing goods traders. olicy makers
have publicly stated their goal that the C will dynamically transform its comparative
advantage from low-skill-intensive to high-tech industry concentrated. olicy makers in
the C intend to transform the internationalization process through attraction of foreign
investment toward localization by reducing the processing good trading portion and by
increasing the supply of domestically produced intermediate inputs for their exports. Asthe C moves up to the high value supply chain, expands its domestic market, and
exports skill-intensive goods, processing goods traders might consider new places or new
business models.
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About the PaperMinsoo Lee analyzes the spatial determinants of new foreign and domestic enterprisesin the export industry of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) by applying new economicgeography of agglomeration theory, tax competition theory by resource flow model,and comparative advantage analysis. He finds that agglomeration plays a greaterrole for foreign investors specializing in the processing goods trade and highly skill-
intensive or research and development-intensive production, and that benefits fromreduction in the value added tax rate and corporate income tax rate play an evidentrole for foreign investors and Hong Kong, China and Taipei,China investors in theprocessing trade sector. As the PRC moves up the high-value supply chain and transformsthe internationalization process through attraction of foreign investment towardlocalization by reducing the processing goods trading portion and increasing thesupply of domestically produced intermediate inputs for their exports, processing goodstraders may consider new locations or business models.
About the Asian Development BankADBs vision is an Asia and Pacific region free of poverty. Its mission is to help its
developing member countries reduce poverty and improve the quality of life of theirpeople. Despite the regions many successes, it remains home to two-thirds of theworlds poor: 1.8 billion people who live on less than $2 a day, with 903 millionstruggling on less than $1.25 a day. ADB is committed to reducing poverty throughinclusive economic growth, environmentally sustainable growth, and regionalintegration.
Based in Manila, ADB is owned by 67 members, including 48 from the region. Itsmain instruments for helping its developing member countries are policy dialogue, loans,equity investments, guarantees, grants, and technical assistance.
Asian Development Bank6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City1550 Metro Manila, Philippineswww.adb.org/economicsISSN: 1655-5252Publication Stock No. WPS124550
January 2012
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