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  • 7/27/2019 New Economic Geography and Tax Competition in the PRC: A Firm-Level Data Analysis with Policy Implications

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    ADB EconomicsWorking Paper Series

    New Economic Geography and TaxCompetition in the PRC: A Firm-LevelData Analysis with Policy Implications

    Minsoo Lee

    No. 297 | January 2012

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    ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 297

    New Economic Geography and Tax

    Competition in the PRC: A Firm-Level

    Data Analysis with Policy Implications

    Minsoo Lee

    January 2012

    Minsoo ee is enior conomist in the Macroeconomics and inance esearch ivision, conomics and

    esearch epartment, Asian evelopment Bank. he author accepts responsibility for any errors in thepaper.

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    Asian evelopment Bank

    AB Avenue, Mandaluyong City

    1550 Metro Manila, hilippines

    www.adb.org/economics

    2012 by Asian evelopment Bankanuary 2012

    155-5252

    ublication tock o. 124550

    he views expressed in this paper

    are those of the authors) and do not

    QHFHVVDULO\UHHFWWKHYLHZVRUSROLFLHV

    of the Asian evelopment Bank.

    he AB conomics orking aper eries is a forum for stimulating discussion and

    eliciting feedback on ongoing and recently completed research and policy studies

    undertaken by the Asian evelopment Bank AB) staff, consultants, or resource

    persons. he series deals with key economic and development problems, particularly

    WKRVHIDFLQJWKH$VLDDQG3DFLFUHJLRQDVZHOODVFRQFHSWXDODQDO\WLFDORU

    methodological issues relating to project/program economic analysis, and statistical data

    and measurement. he series aims to enhance the knowledge on Asias development

    DQGSROLF\FKDOOHQJHVVWUHQJWKHQDQDO\WLFDOULJRUDQGTXDOLW\RI$'%VFRXQWU\SDUWQHUVKLS

    VWUDWHJLHVDQGLWVVXEUHJLRQDODQGFRXQWU\RSHUDWLRQVDQGLPSURYHWKHTXDOLW\DQG

    availability of statistical data and development indicators for monitoring development

    effectiveness.

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    ZKRVHWLWOHVFRXOGVXEVHTXHQWO\EHUHYLVHGIRUSXEOLFDWLRQDVDUWLFOHVLQSURIHVVLRQDO

    journals or chapters in books. he series is maintained by the conomics and esearch

    epartment.

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    Contents

    Abstract v

    . ntroduction 1

    . heory and nstitutional Background

    . Models and Methodology 5

    A. ax Competition Model 5

    B. Conditional ogit Model

    . ata 8

    . mpirical esults 9

    A. &-ntensive irms and ifferent ype of xporters 9

    B. eterogeneity in rigin of nvestment unds 12

    C. rocessing raders versus ormal raders 15

    . olicy mplications 18

    . Conclusion 20

    eferences 21

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    Abstract

    uring 2000200, nearly 4,0005,000 new foreign and domestic enterprises

    entered the export industry of the eoples epublic of China C) yearly,

    with geographic concentration along the coastal areas. his paper empirically

    analyzes the spatial determinants of new entrants by applying traditional

    comparative advantage analysis, new economic geography of agglomeration

    WKHRU\DQGWD[FRPSHWLWLRQWKHRU\E\UHVRXUFHRZPRGHO7KHKHWHURJHQHLW\RI

    UPRZQHUVKLSDQGWUDGHW\SHHQKDQFHVWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRILQYHVWPHQWORFDWLRQ

    decisions. rocessing traders differ substantially from nonprocessing traders

    in response to changes in wage cost, level of development in infrastructure,DQGSUR[LPLW\WRWKH3DFLFFRDVW7KHSUHVHQFHRIIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGHQWHUSULVHV

    FUHDWHVDEHDFRQHIIHFWRQVXEVHTXHQWIRUHLJQDQGGRPHVWLFLQYHVWRUV7KH

    SDSHUDOVRQGVWKDWDJJORPHUDWLRQSOD\VDJUHDWHUUROHIRULQYHVWRUVVSHFLDOL]LQJ

    in the processing goods trade and highly skill-intensive or research and

    GHYHORSPHQWLQWHQVLYHSURGXFWLRQ%HQHWVIURPUHGXFWLRQLQWKHYDOXHDGGHG

    tax rate and corporate income tax rate play an evident role for foreign investors

    and ong ong, China and aipei,China investors in processing trade sector.

    he Cs policy makers intend to transform the internationalization process

    through attraction of foreign investment toward localization by reducing the

    processing good trading portion and by increasing the supply of domestically

    produced intermediate inputs for their exports. As the C moves up the high-value supply chain, expands its domestic market, and exports skill-intensive

    goods, processing goods traders may consider new locations or business

    models.

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    I. Introduction

    ver since the eoples epublic of China C) opened up its economic door to the

    rest of the world in the late 190s, two economic aspects have been the center of

    discussion by many academics, researchers, and policy makers in the world. hey are

    the Cs inward foreign direct investment ) and its exports. hose two issues were

    reemphasized when the C joined the orld rade rganization in 2001.

    ach year, during 2000200, nearly 4,0005,000 new foreign and domestic enterprises

    entered into the Cs export industry with geographic concentration along the coastal

    areas. he heterogeneity of new enterprises in ownership is apparent. n the nation as a

    ZKROHGXULQJIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGUPVDFFRXQWIRU+RQJRQJKLQDDQG

    RU7DLSHLKLQDLQYHVWHGHQWHUSULVHVDQGKLQHVHSULYDWHFRPSDQLHV7KH

    QXPEHURISURFHVVLQJJRRGVH[SRUWHUVDPRQJQHZHQWUDQWVVWDQGDWDSSUR[LPDWHO\

    3URFHVVLQJJRRGVH[SRUWYDOXHLQWKH3FRQVWLWXWHVDERXWRIWRWDOH[SRUWVLQ

    DQGKDVVWHDGLO\GHFOLQHGIURPIURPWR

    raditional comparative advantage analysis is based on a level of regional development

    VXFKDVLQIUDVWUXFWXUHLQKLJKZD\VUDLOZD\VDQGZDWHUZD\VSURGXFWLRQFRVWVDEXQGDQFH

    RILQSXWVODERUODZVhukouKRXVHKROGUHJLVWUDWLRQV\VWHPHGXFDWLRQOHYHOKXPDQ

    FDSLWDOZDJHOHYHOWUDQVSRUWDWLRQFRVWVSUR[LPLW\WRWKHFRDVWDFFHVVWRUDZDQG

    LQWHUPHGLDWHPDWHULDOVDQGSURGXFWLRQFRVWV7KHQHZHFRQRPLFJHRJUDSK\WKHRU\RI

    DJJORPHUDWLRQSURYLGHVVLJQLFDQWH[SODQDWRU\SRZHUWRWKHSUHVHQFHRIVLPLODUUPV

    VXSSOLHUUPVRUFRQVXPHUVLQDSDUWLFXODUUHJLRQZKLFKFDXVHVWKLVORFDWLRQWREHFRPH

    more attractive to future investors.

    ocal government policy makers in the C strategically determine their tax rates

    to attract new foreign investments to their region for additional tax revenue and new

    HPSOR\PHQWZKLFKFDQEHGHVFULEHGE\WKHWD[FRPSHWLWLRQZLWKUHVRXUFHRZPRGHO

    olicy makers provide preferential tax treatment and/or lower regulatory burdens and

    often implement special policies such as special economic zones and hi-tech zones.

    here are a number of policy variables, such as capturing overall levels of tax andregulatory burdens or special policies, designed to attract foreign investors.

    his paper discusses the Cs inward and exports by raising the topic of the spatial

    determinants of new foreign- and domestic-invested enterprises that enter the export

    LQGXVWU\([SODQDWRU\IDFWRUVRIVSDWLDOGHWHUPLQDQWVRI'LGHQWLHGLQWKLVSDSHUDUH

    categorized according to three economic theories traditional comparative advantage

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    analysis, new economic geography of agglomeration effects, and tax competition theory

    E\UHVRXUFHRZPRGHO

    his paper provides rich empirical results by mapping and merging two separate data

    VRXUFHVLQGXVWU\GDWDDWWKHUPOHYHOIURPWKH3VQGXVWULDO(QWHUSULVHV'DWDEDVHSURYLGHGE\WKHDWLRQDO%XUHDXRI6WDWLVWLFVDQGUPOHYHOH[SRUWLPSRUWGDWDIURPWKH

    xport/mport atabase provided by the C Customs). n particular, new enterprises

    DUHFDWHJRUL]HGEDVHGRQWKHLURZQHUVKLSIRUHLJQLQYHVWHG+RQJRQJKLQDDQGRU

    7DLSHLKLQDLQYHVWHGKLQHVHSULYDWHRZQHGDQGVWDWHRZQHGDQGDUHGLVWLQJXLVKHG

    EHWZHHQUPVVSHFLDOL]LQJLQSURFHVVLQJWUDGHDQGQRUPDOWUDGHRGULN$PLW\DQG

    UHXQGXUWKHUPRUHWKHSDSHUVHSDUDWHVUPVDFFRUGLQJWRWKHHGXFDWLRQOHYHO

    RIWKHLUHPSOR\HHVDQGSUR[\UHVHDUFKDFWLYLW\E\VHOHFWLQJUPVWKDWHPSOR\ZRUNHUV

    ZLWKSRVWJUDGXDWHTXDOLFDWLRQV7KLVSDSHUVKRZVWKDWWKHVHVXEVDPSOHVGLVSOD\

    economically meaningful differences.

    RUHLJQLQYHVWHGSURFHVVLQJWUDGHUPVSXWPRUHZHLJKWRQSUR[LPLW\WRWKH3DFLFFRVWand increase in average wages than normal traders do, and the presence of foreign-

    invested enterprises creates a beacon effect in agglomeration to all other types of export

    enterprises. nvestors from ong ong, China and aipei,China are the most inclined

    WRDJJORPHUDWHZLWKFRPSDQLHVWKDWDUHDOVRIURP+RQJRQJKLQDDQG7DLSHLKLQD

    DQGWHQGWROHDVWRFNWRJHWKHUZLWKIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGUPVDQGVWDWHRZQHGHQWHUSULVHV

    3ULYDWHKLQHVHLQYHVWRUVDUHJUHDWO\LQXHQFHGE\WKHSUHVHQFHRIVWDWHRZQHG

    LQFXPEHQWUPV

    alue-added tax rate that is strategically determined by local government policy makers

    LQXHQFHVWKHORFDWLRQFKRLFHRIIRUHLJQLQYHVWRUVRUHLJQLQYHVWHGSURFHVVLQJJRRGV

    WUDGHUVDUHSDUWLFXODUO\VHQVLWLYHWRWKLVSUDFWLFHDQGKLQHVHSULYDWHLQYHVWHGUPVDUHthe least sensitive.

    he method of the analysis in this paper suggests useful information for policy makers

    and market entrants. Marginal effects and predicted changes are calculated, induced

    either by a certain percent change in each explanatory variable in the empirical

    DQDO\VLVLQXHQFLQJWD[UDWHVDQGODERUFRVWVRUE\LQGXFLQJPDUNHWHQWU\E\SLRQHHULQJ

    LQFXPEHQWUPVRQVXEVHTXHQWPDUNHWHQWUDQWVLQYDULRXVVXEJURXSVVRPHRIZKLFK

    PD\EHSDUWLFXODUO\GHVLUDEOHWRSROLF\PDNHULQWHQWLRQVRQDFTXLULQJQHZWHFKQRORJ\IURP

    foreign-invested enterprises via technology and management knowledge spillover effects

    in their province.

    2 | ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 297

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    II. Theory and Institutional Background

    he new economic geography theory in the international trade theory framework

    introduced by rugman 1991) may be the most relevant to the spatial determinants of

    'QPRQRSROLVWLFPDUNHWVWUXFWXUHVHFRQRPLHVRIVFDOHSXVKPDQXIDFWXULQJUPVto locate in the region with larger demand while minimizing transportation costs. he

    HFRQRPLFUHJLRQVZLWKWKHPRVWSURGXFWLRQEHFRPHPRUHSURWDEOHDQGDWWUDFWHYHQ

    PRUHSURGXFWLRQDFWLYLWLHV7KHJHRJUDSKLFFKRLFHRIH[SRUWLQJUPVLVEDVHGRQWKH

    DJJORPHUDWLRQDVVRFLDWHGZLWKVLPLODULQGXVWU\W\SHVRILQFXPEHQWUPVDQGLQWHUDFWLRQRI

    economies of scale with transportation costs proximity to coast). eographic production-

    FRQFHQWUDWLRQORZHUVWKHSUREDELOLW\RIODERUVKRUWDJHVQFXPEHQWUPVFDQVSLOORYHU

    informational, technology, and knowledge externally.

    he Cs dynamic policy changes seem to follow Alfred Marshalls concept regarding

    industry localization internationalization toward localization or processing trades to

    QRUPDOWUDGHVRQFHQWUDWLRQRIIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGUPVLQDORFDWLRQJHQHUDWHVODERU

    PDUNHWVIRUDVSHFLFLQGXVWU\RFDOODERUPDUNHWVVXSSO\ORZVNLOOHGODERUDQGIRUHLJQ

    SURFHVVLQJWUDGHUVLPSRUWVRSKLVWLFDWHGLQSXWVKRZHYHUORFDOSURGXFHUVZLOOUHSODFH

    intermediate imports and instead start producing sophisticated inputs in the near future.

    $JJORPHUDWHGIRUHLJQUPVZLOO EHQHWIURPLQIRUPDWLRQDQGNQRZOHGJHVSLOORYHUVZKLOH

    GRPHVWLFUPVFDQEHQHWIURPWHFKQRORJ\DQGSRVVLEOHNQRZOHGJHVSLOORYHUVIURP

    foreign-invested enterprises.

    DUOWRQVDUWLFOHDQH[FHSWLRQDOO\VLJQLFDQWSDSHUFRQFHUQLQJHFRQRPLF

    JHRJUDSK\HPSKDVL]HVORFDWLRQDQGHPSOR\PHQWRIQHZUPVXWLOL]LQJDQHFRQRPHWULF

    model with discrete and continuous endogenous variables. Carlton concludes that taxes

    DQGVWDWHLQFHQWLYHSURJUDPVGRQRWDIIHFWDUPVGHFLVLRQ

    Amiti and avorcik 2008) analyze new economic geography of agglomeration effects in

    C. hey use aggregated provincial-level data to generate measures of intermediate

    goods and consumer market access using recent Chinese inputoutput tables. Access

    WRVXSSOLHUVDQGPDUNHWVLVWKHPRVWLQXHQWLDOVSDWLDOGHWHUPLQDQWVRIDUPVORFDWLRQ

    choice. u and wen 2005), however, contend that there is no evidence of strong

    agglomeration from foreign investors in the C but conclude that comparative

    DGYDQWDJHDQGJRYHUQPHQWSROLF\DUHPRUHLQXHQWLDOIDFWRUVIRUDUPVVSDWLDOGHFLVLRQ

    DVH[SODQDWLRQVRIWKHHPHUJLQJSDWWHUQRIUPORFDWLRQVYHUVHDVKLQHVHLQYHVWRUV

    located along the coast show sensitivity to policy and cost differentials compared to

    C investors. n inland provinces, on the other hand, there seems to be no difference

    between the two groups of investors. Boermans et al. 2009) use factor analysis with

    aggregated data and emphasize the major role of institutions, labor costs, and market

    access.

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    A seminal paper by ead and ies 199) formulates a theoretical monopolistic

    competitive model of self-reinforcing . he paper explains that open door policies

    made inward on a large scale to the C feasible and their empirical results,

    comprised of 91 foreign ventures that entered between 1984 and 1991 in 54 cities,

    LOOXVWUDWHFRQVLGHUDEOHDJJORPHUDWLRQHIIHFWVWKDWPDJQLHGWKHDGYDQWDJHFRQIHUUHGE\the privileged status of some cities such as special economic zones and high-tech zones.

    arallel literature explores decisions in particular industries in the C by investors from

    different countries. akasugi 2005) demonstrates that location choice of apanese

    HOHFWURQLFVDIOLDWHVLQWKH3PDLQO\GHSHQGRQWKHOHYHORIKXPDQUHVRXUFHVKDQJ

    and ark 2005) use data for orean investors in the C, indicating an importance

    of network externality. Belderbos and Carree 2002) examine apanese manufacturers

    ORFDWLRQVLQWKH3DQGVKRZVLJQLFDQWHFRQRPLFJHRJUDSK\RIDJJORPHUDWLRQ

    HIIHFWVKHQVHPSLULFDODQDO\VLVRQ7DLSHLKLQDVJUHHQHOGLQYHVWPHQWLQ

    WKH3HPSOR\HGDQHVWHGORJLWPRGHOZLWKUPOHYHOGDWDZKLFKLQGLFDWHGWKDWWKH

    DJJORPHUDWLRQHIIHFWIURPWKHLQFXPEHQWUPVKDVEHFRPHPRUHDSSDUHQWRYHUWLPHEXWits relative strength varies across sectors.

    ([SODQDWRU\YDULDEOHVLGHQWLHGE\WKHDERYHPHQWLRQHGVWXGLHVW\SLFDOO\IDOOLQWRWKUHH

    FDWHJRULHVPHDVXUHVRIDUHJLRQDOOHYHORIGHYHORSPHQW+XDQGZHQQHZ

    economic geography theories Amiti and avorcik 2008) of agglomeration effects with the

    SUHVHQFHRIVLPLODUUPVLQWHUPHGLDWHJRRGVVXSSOLHUVDQGFRQVXPHUVLQDSDUWLFXODU

    UHJLRQPDNLQJDORFDWLRQPRUHDWWUDFWLYHWRIXWXUHLQYHVWRUVDQGSROLF\YDULDEOHVFDSWXULQJ

    overall levels of tax and regulatory burden or special policies designed to attract foreign

    investors ead and ies 199).

    Many studies in new economic geography analysis have omitted some obviousJRYHUQPHQWSROLF\YDULDEOHVDPHDVXUHRIDUPVWD[EXUGHQRURWKHUSUHIHUHQWLDO

    treatment variables.

    Cheng and wan 2000) divide tax reduction in the C into four levels as to provincial

    VFRSHZLWKWKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDWWD[UHGXFWLRQLVWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWIDFWRURI'LQRZ

    here have been a large number of government regulations on tax reductions at the

    central and local government level since 1984. hese tax breaks and tax reduction

    SROLFLHVKDYHPDLQO\WZRWDUJHWV7KHUVWLVFRUSRUDWLRQLQFRPHWD[HJXODWLRQVLQWKH

    VRIIHUFRUSRUDWLRQLQFRPHWD[UDWHIRUIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGFRPSDQLHVLQYDULRXV

    HFRQRPLFDQGWHFKQRORJ\GHYHORSPHQW]RQHVFRUSRUDWLRQLQFRPHWD[UDWHIRU

    FRPSDQLHVLQFRDVWDOHFRQRPLFRSHQ]RQHVZLWKH[SRUWVFRQVWLWXWLQJPRUHWKDQRIWRWDORXWSXWRUDQH[HPSWLRQLQFRUSRUDWLRQLQFRPHWD[LQWKHUVW\HDUVRILWVRSHQLQJ

    and reduction by half of income tax in the following 5 years. he second is value-added

    tax, which is the main resource of tax revenue. here are regulations offering various

    UDWHVRIYDOXHDGGHGWD[UDWHVIRUUPVLQWKHSURFHVVLQJLQGXVWU\DGPLWWHGE\ORFDO

    authority. alue-added tax revenue in the C is shared by central and local government

    4 | ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 297

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    ZLWKUDWLRVRIDQGUHVSHFWLYHO\7KHUHLVDOVRVDOHVWD[DQGDQDGGLWLRQDO

    accounting item including sales tax, property tax, goods and services tax, resource tax,

    land value increment tax, urban maintenance and construction tax, and surcharge for

    education and local education expenses.

    ew legislation in 1994 made local governments more independent units motivated to

    PD[LPL]HWKHLUSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFEHQHWVDVWKH\FRPSHWHWRDWWUDFWJUDQWVDQG

    valuable factors to their regions ian and oland 1998). his competition among local

    DXWKRULWLHVEHFRPHVDIRFXVRIWKHRUHWLFDOZRUNRZLQJWKUHHOLWHUDWXUHVWD[FRPSHWLWLRQ

    literature, welfare competition literature, and spillover effects literature.

    ith little power on the legislation of taxation, local governments in the C practice

    tax break policies in order to reduce tax for grants, expand tax-favored zones such as

    economic and technological development zones or high-tech industrial zones, or lower

    VWDQGDUGVRIWD[EUHDNTXDOLFDWLRQVIRUFRUSRUDWLRQVZKLFKPDNHVWD[FRPSHWLWLRQQR

    longer observable or measurable by tax rates announced in legislative documents. axreduction by local governments should be conducted mostly by using tax break policies,

    which vary over regions and industries.

    he most important motivation for tax reduction is to attract , and this is mentioned

    in a multitude of research papers. Brueckner 2002) illustrates this tax competition

    SKHQRPHQRQE\WKHUHVRXUFHRZPRGHO:LOVRQVVXUYH\SDSHUSURYLGHVDZLGH

    range of ideas about the tax competition model.

    III. Models and Methodology

    A. Tax Competition Model

    ocal governments levy taxes on a mobile tax base foreign and domestic investments)

    by choosing their tax rates strategically with particular attention to other local government

    WD[UDWHV7D[FRPSHWLWLRQPRGHOVDUHPRVWO\ZLWKLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRIWKHUHVRXUFHRZ

    model summarized by Brueckner 2002) in the review of government interaction. his

    model is followed by this paper, which uses an empirical model according to tax reaction

    function. he general form of tax reaction function can be generated from various tax

    competition theoretical models, as shown in the seminal work by Brueckner and aavedra2001).

    ach local government chooses its tax rate tjand considers the amount of foreign

    investments resource) within its borders. istribution of foreign investments in provinces

    depends on tWKHUHIRUHjth local government decision on tax rate is indirectly affected by

    New Economic Geography and Tax Competition in the PRC: A Firm-Level Data Analysis with Policy Implications | 5

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    tj vector ofts for the n-1 other local governments). he local governmentjs objective

    function is

    V t s X j j j, ;( ) ,

    where sjLVDQDPRXQWRILQRZRIIRUHLJQLQYHVWPHQWLQWRjth province andXj is the vector

    of provincejs characteristics. istribution ofsj is affected by t.

    s H t t X j j j j= ( ), ;

    7KHUHIRUHWKHUHGXFHGIRUPRIWKHUHVRXUFHRZPRGHOFDQEHGHULYHGDV

    V t H t t X X V t t X j j j j j j j j, , ; ; , ; ( )( ) ( )

    rovincejVRSWLPDOWD[UDWHDVDUHDFWLRQIXQFWLRQIURPWKHUVWRUGHUFRQGLWLRQWDNHVWKH

    form of

    t R t X j j j= ( ) ; .

    B. Conditional Logit Model

    n connection with the comparative advantage theory and new economic geography of

    DJJORPHUDWLRQDQDO\VLVWKLVVWXG\DGRSWVWKHPRGLHGDGGLWLYHUDQGRPXWLOLW\PRGHOE\

    VXEVWLWXWLQJH[SHFWHGSURWV3 for utility . uppose an investor ichose one province

    amongjDOWHUQDWLYHVWKHQH[SHFWHGSURWVIRUDQLQYHVWRUiof choosing alternativej

    y ji =( )

    is given by

    E V V CA NEG t ij ij ij ij ij j ij ( ) = + = ( ) +H H, , ,

    where Vij LVWKHGHWHUPLQLVWLFSDUWRIH[SHFWHGSURWVDQGHij represents a random

    part Mcadden 194). it can be expected that investors choose one province among

    j J= 1, , so as to maximize ij . he probability of choosing any one alternative j isHTXLYDOHQWWRWKDWWKHDOWHUQDWLYH\LHOGVJUHDWHUH[SHFWHGSURWVWKDQDOORWKHUDOWHUQDWLYH

    choices

    p y j k j V V k jij i ij ik ik ij ij ik = = = = Pr Pr , Pr , H H

    n order to solve for these choice probabilities, an appropriate joint distribution of the

    UDQGRPSDUWVPXVWEHVSHFLHGFDGGHQSURYHVWKDWWKHIROORZLQJH[SUHVVLRQ

    F G e ei iJ

    i iJH H HH

    11, , exp , , ( ) = ( )( )

    6 | ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 297

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    is the cumulative distribution function of a multivariate extreme value distribution for any

    function GWKDWLVQRQQHJDWLYHKRPRJHQHRXVRIGHJUHHRQHDQGIXOOOVDQXPEHURI

    additional regularity conditions Mcadden 198). ifferent choices ofG yield different

    models. he choice probabilities can be calculated given that the random parts of

    H[SHFWHGSURWVDUHGLVWULEXWHGDFFRUGLQJWRIXQFWLRQ FMcadden 198)

    p y j i j F V V V Vij i j J = = =( ) = + +(Pr : , , ,investor s choice H H H1 2 1 ))

    = ( )

    +

    + + +

    d

    e G e e e G e eV V V V VJ

    H

    H H H H H H

    11 2 1 1, , , exp ,

    VV V Ve dJ2 1, , +

    +

    ( )( ) H H,

    ZKHUHWKHVXEVFULSWVWRDQG*GHQRWHWKHUVWGHULYDWLYH6LQFH*LVKRPRJHQHRXVRI

    degree 1, its derivative 1 is homogeneous of degree zero. herefore

    p y j e G e e e e e G e e eij i j V V V V V V VJ j J= =( ) = ( ) Pr , , , exp , , ,H H1 2 1 2 (( )( )

    +

    dH

    =( )( )

    eG e e e

    G e e e

    V

    V V V

    V V V

    j

    J

    J

    11 2

    1 2

    , , ,

    , , ,

    ,, , , .j J{ }1

    Assume that the errors Hj are iidwith eibull distribution, then

    p y je

    e e eij i

    V

    V V V

    ij

    i i iJ

    = =

    ( )=

    + + +Pr

    1 2

    6LQFHDOORIDOWHUQDWLYHVSHFLFH[SODQDWRU\YDULDEOHVYDU\DFURVVDOWHUQDWLYHVFRQGLWLRQDO

    logit model is most suitable for this case.

    p y jCA NEG t

    CA NE ij i

    CA ij NEG ij t ij

    CA ik NEG

    = =( ) =+ +( )

    +Pr

    exp

    exp

    E E E

    E E GG tik t ik k

    J+( )= E1

    he standard maximum likelihood estimation can be used if the choice probabilities

    DERYHDUHFRUUHFWO\VSHFLHG6LQFHWKHPRGHOLVQRQOLQHDULQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHHVWLPDWHGFRHIFLHQWVLVQRWVWUDLJKWIRUZDUG7RJDXJHWKHPDJQLWXGHRIHVWLPDWHGHIIHFWVWKH

    marginal effects of changes in explanatory variables on choice probabilities have to be

    FDOFXODWHG%\PXOWLSO\LQJZLWKWKHFRHIFLHQWHVWLPDWHDQGGLYLGLQJE\WKHSUREDELOLW\

    these marginal effects can be converted into elasticities. Cameron and rivedi 2005)

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    illustrate that the closed form expression of the marginal effects in the conditional logit

    model is

    = ( )

    p

    x p i pij

    ik

    ij ijk ik E,

    wherei

    ijk is an indicator variable that for an investor i takes on the value 1

    LINDQGRWKHUZLVHWLVFOHDUIURPWKHDERYHIRUPXODWKDWWKLVGHQLWLRQLPSOLHV

    WKDWIRUH[DPSOHDSRVLWLYHUHJUHVVLRQFRHIFLHQWPHDQVWKDWDPDUJLQDOLQFUHDVHLQWKH

    covariatexik will lead to a rise in the predicted probability of option k being chosen, but

    to a fall in the predicted probability of any other option being chosen.

    IV. Data

    hree major data sources are utilized for empirical analysis. he ational Bureau of

    6WDWLVWLFVSURYLGHVDQQXDOUPOHYHOLQGXVWU\GDWDVHWVKLQHVHQGXVWULDO(QWHUSULVHV

    'DWDEDVHFRQWDLQLQJLQIRUPDWLRQRQDOOUPVRSHUDWLQJLQPDQXIDFWXULQJVHFWRUVZKRVH

    DQQXDOUHYHQXHLVJUHDWHUWKDQPLOOLRQ\XDQ$QH[WHQVLYHDUUD\RIUPOHYHOYDULDEOHV

    LVLQFOXGHGLQWKLVGDWDVHWVXFKDVDUPVRZQHUVKLSFRPSRVLWLRQRIHPSOR\PHQW

    FRUSRUDWHLQFRPHWD[DPRXQWYDOXHDGGHGWD[DPRXQWUPVORFDWLRQHWFQGXVWU\GDWD

    in 2004 contains the established date of each company. ew economic geography of

    DJJORPHUDWLRQHIIHFWVLQRWKHUZRUGVDQLQXHQFHRIWKHSUHVHQFHRIVLPLODUUPVLQ

    FHUWDLQORFDWLRQVRQQHZHQWUDQWVORFDWLRQGHFLVLRQVFDQEHWHVWHGE\SURSHUO\GHQLQJ

    DQLQFXPEHQF\$OOH[SRUWLQJUPVWKDWHQWHUHGWKHPDUNHWSULRUWRZLOOEHFRXQWHG

    as incumbents from the perspective of a new market entrant in 2004. ncumbency

    statistics are constructed at the 4-digit armonized ystem )-code level associated

    ZLWKWKHRZQHUVKLSRIUPVIRUHLJQLQYHVWHG+RQJRQJKLQD7DLSHLKLQD+7RZQHG

    VWDWHRZQHGDQGKLQHVHSULYDWHRZQHG7KHRZQHUVKLSVWDWXVLVGHQHGDVDPDRULW\

    share of capital.

    he eoples epublic of China Customs records monthly export/import data at the

    transaction level, including sector information in the form of 8-digit -codes, among

    other variables like unit value, type of enterprises, commodity code, etc. his study maps/

    merges ndustry data and Customs data by matching the company names, and then theVXEVDPSOHRIH[SRUWLQJUPVIURPWKHPHUJHGGDWDVHWDUHUHVHUYHGIRUWKHDQDO\VLV

    (DFKUPVH[SRUWWUDQVDFWLRQGRFXPHQWHGLQWKHH[SRUWLPSRUWGDWDVHWKHOSVWRLGHQWLI\

    LWVPDLQHOGRIEXVLQHVVHVWDEOLVKLQJLWVVHFWRULGHQWLW\7KHGLVDJJUHJDWLRQOHYHOLV

    at 4-digit -codes and all exports of products in the same 4-digit -code group are

    WUHDWHGDVHTXLYDOHQW

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    7KH>3HRSOHVHSXEOLFRI@KLQDXVWRPV6WDWLVWLFVFODVVLHVHYHU\WUDQVDFWLRQRIRZ

    of goods based on two trade types processing and normal trade. rocessing trade

    insinuates a low-value added step in the supply chain of a sophisticated product. igh-

    technology intermediate imports are assembled by low-skilled local workers to produce

    VRSKLVWLFDWHGQDOH[SRUWJRRGVPDLQO\VKLSSHGWRDGYDQFHGHFRQRPLHVHYHUWKHOHVVthe assembling work performed by local workers contributes limited prospects of skill

    upgrading or technology/knowledge spillover for the C to move up the high value

    supply chain, expand its domestic market, and export skill-intensive goods. odrik 200)

    points out that the behavior of processing traders is therefore both of scholarly interest

    and relevant for policy makers.

    $GLIFXOWFKDOOHQJHLVWRFRQVWUXFWDPHDVXUHRIDFFHVVWR LQWHUPHGLDWHJRRGVXSSOLHUV

    due to the lack of reliable information. evertheless, processing traders yield useful

    insights on this aspect. rocessing traders are largely autonomous from local intermediate

    JRRGVSURGXFHUVRWKHUWKDQODERUWKHUHIRUHRQHFDQVXFFHVVIXOO\DEVWUDFWIURPWKHLVVXH

    of access to intermediate goods suppliers by analyzing processing traders separatelyfrom nonprocessing traders. ormal traders might have generated a strong network of

    intermediate goods suppliers, since incumbent enterprises presumably made location

    their consideration in choosing intermediate goods suppliers.

    heAnnual Statistical Yearbook of [the Peoples Republic of] China contains extensive

    control variables at the province level. A range of variables at the province level is

    collected to model comparative advantage analysis of a market entrants location choices.

    QDGGLWLRQDURXJKGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQDSURYLQFHVPDLQFLWLHVDQGWKH3DFLFFRDVWLV

    measured.

    V. Empirical Results

    A. R&D-Intensive Firms and Diferent Type o Exporters

    irms in the high-skill-intensive production industry that employ workers with postgraduate

    GHJUHHVDUHXVHGDVDSUR[\IRU'LQWHQVLYHUPDFWLYLW\ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWHFKQRORJ\

    knowledge upgrading and spillovers.

    RGHOLQ7DEOHSURYLGHVWKHEDVHOLQHVSHFLFDWLRQFRPSULVLQJWKHZKROHVDPSOHVDQGRGHOH[KLELWVUHVXOWVIRU'LQWHQVLYHUPV$VRSSRVHGWRWKHRYHUDOO

    HQWHUSULVHV'LQWHQVLYHUPVSXWPRUHYDOXHRQWKHFROOHJHJUDGXDWHSRSXODWLRQDQG

    DUHVHQVLWLYHWRERWKYDOXHDGGHGDQGFRUSRUDWHWD[UDWHVQFXPEHQW'LQWHQVLYHUPV

    attract new, similar types of companies through the agglomeration effect.

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    Table 1: Conditional Logit Model: All Firms and R&D Intensive Firms

    Variables

    Model (1): All Firms Model (2): R&D-Intensive Firms

    Estimates Marginal

    Efects

    Std. dev. Predicted

    Change*

    Estimates Marginal

    Efects

    Std. dev. Predicted

    Change*

    wage_manuacturing 0.00 0.00 3016 3.02 0.00 0.00 3008 3.61[22.617] [27.590] [7.283] [8.512]

    GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 4910 1.47 0.00 0.00 4777 0.96[21.764] [16.826] [5.012] [4.656]

    waterway 6.53 0.50 0.07 3.57 6.15 0.79 0.07 5.65[51.405] [38.069] [20.745] [22.473]

    highway 0.97 0.07 0.21 1.56 1.30 0.17 0.21 3.52[9.630] [9.076] [5.398] [5.063]

    high school pop 7.78 0.60 0.04 2.6 8.35 1.08 0.04 4.66[12.188] [15.387] [6.547] [8.074]

    college pop 0.59 0.05 0.03 0.15 7.55 0.97 0.03 3.26[0.677] [0.666] [4.789] [5.859]

    proximity 0.00 0.00 686 18.93 0.00 0.00 686 18.11[57.455] [41.952] [17.935] [21.379]

    value added tax rate 1.18 0.09 0.07 0.62 0.73 0.10 0.07 0.65[4.784] [4.939] [1.508] [1.533]corp income tax rate 1.65 0.13 0.02 0.29 3.77 0.49 0.02 1.1

    [3.202] [3.175] [3.395] [3.295]incumbent frms 0.01 0.00 65 3.58 0.01 0.00 51 5.22

    [62.528] [31.150] [26.089] [16.116]Sample size 495673 89217LL 41282 7988Chi2 33203 4868Pseudo R2 0.29 0.23

    * Predicted changes (in %) induced by a 1 standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable.Note: Figures in the square bracket are z-statistics.Source: Author's calculations.

    RGHOVDQG LQ7DEOHVKRZDQDO\VHVIURPWKHKHWHURJHQHLW\RIUPVLQWKHLU

    trade type, according to whether they predominantly focus on processing trade or normal

    trade. rocessing trade has been at the center of debates about the sophistication level

    of the Cs exports odrik 200, ang and ei 2008). rocessing trade is largely

    dependent on a limited range of local inputs, mainly labor. rocessing traders import

    sophisticated intermediate goods, and only assembly and related low value-added

    production processing take place locally. herefore, processing traders are relatively less

    dependent on intermediate goods supplier networks, while they are particularly sensitive

    to factors like labor costs, value added tax rate, regional development in infrastructure,

    DQGSUR[LPLW\WRWKH3DFLFFRDVW

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    Table 2: Conditional Logit Model: Processing Traders versus Normal Traders

    Variables Model (3): Processing Traders Model (4): Normal Traders

    Estimates Marginal

    Efects

    Std. dev. Predicted

    Change*

    Estimates Marginal

    Efects

    Std. dev. Predicted

    Change*

    wage_manuacturing 0.00 0.00 3015 2.11 0.00 0.00 3016 2.71[5.329] [5.820] [24.052] [24.794]

    GDP per capita 0 0 4963 2.98 0 0 4886 0.98[17.388] [15.144] [13.511] [10.665]

    waterway 4.99 0.56 0.07 3.96 7.55 0.40 0.07 2.87[19.295] [23.580] [50.721] [26.129]

    highway 3.78 0.42 0.21 8.88 0.12 0.01 0.21 0.13[18.170] [15.932] [1.030] [1.027]

    high school pop 3.82 0.43 0.04 1.84 12.08 0.64 0.04 2.8[3.043] [2.897] [16.203] [21.596]

    college pop 33.63 3.75 0.03 12.52 10.09 0.54 0.03 1.81[17.142] [12.808] [10.476] [14.975]

    proximity 0.00 0.00 686 30.32 0.00 0.00 686 13.17[26.313] [55.907] [51.245] [27.258]

    value added tax rate 3.61 0.40 0.07 2.76 0.67 0.04 0.07 0.24[7.601] [7.883] [2.261] [2.317]

    corp income tax rate 2.32 0.26 0.02 0.58 1.23 0.07 0.02 0.15[2.418] [2.395] [1.981] [1.968]

    incumbent frms 0.01 0.00 75 4.44 0.01 0.00 60 2.36[28.221] [25.095] [50.676] [21.206]

    Sample size 154008 341665LL 11207 29534Chi2 13531 20752Pseudo R2 0.38 0.26

    * Predicted changes (in %) induced by a 1 standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable.Note: Figures in the square bracket are z-statistics.Source: Author's calculations.

    Comparing results between processing traders and normal traders supports intuition.

    rom the regression results, there is indeed a difference in agglomerative effects. A new

    processing trader tends to select a location where other processing traders are operating.

    n fact, the predicted response to a 1 standard deviation increase in the number of

    LQFXPEHQWVLQWHUPVRIFKRLFHSUREDELOLWLHVLVLQWKHFDVHRISURFHVVLQJWUDGHUV

    URXJKO\SHUFHQWDJHSRLQWVDERYHWKHUHVSRQVHRIQRUPDOWUDGHUVRUPDO

    WUDGHUVLQWKHLUORFDWLRQFKRLFHVDUHXQOLNHO\LQXHQFHGE\DUHGXFWLRQLQHLWKHUYDOXH

    added tax rate or corporate income tax rate while processing traders seriously consider

    WKHEHQHWIURPYDOXHDGGHGWD[UDWHUHGXFWLRQ7KHVDPHKROGVIRUSURFHVVLQJWUDGHUV

    sensitivity to distance from the coast. A 1 standard deviation increase in the distance

    IURPWKH3DFLFFRDVWLVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKDPRUHWKDQUHGXFWLRQLQFKRLFHSUREDELOLW\ZKHUHDVWKHUHGXFWLRQIRUQRQSURFHVVLQJWUDGLQJUPVLVDERXW

    he obtained results for the infrastructure variables show that there is a large effect

    of well-developed road infrastructure on the location decisions of processing traders.

    $VWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQULVH LQURDGVSHUDUHDUDLVHVWKHFKRLFHSUREDELOLW\E\

    ZKHUHDVWKHHIIHFWLVLQVLJQLFDQWIRUQRUPDOWUDGHUVZKLFKFRQIRUPVWRH[SHFWDWLRQVWKDW

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    processing traders are particularly sensitive to transportation costs, and complements

    WKHODUJHFRHIFLHQWHVWLPDWHIRUWKHGLVWDQFHIURPWKHFRDVW$WWKHVDPHWLPHKRZHYHU

    a comparable estimate is obtained for the waterway density of a provincea rise in

    waterway density has an effect of roughly the same magnitude for both processing and

    normal traders.

    verall, it is noticeable that the model seems to do a better job at predicting the choices

    RIORZYDOXHDGGHGSURFHVVLQJUPVGLVSOD\LQJDPXFKEHWWHURYHUDOOPRGHOWZLWKD

    SVHXGRVTXDUHGRIFRPSDUHGWRRWKHUVDPSOHV+LJKYDOXHDGGHGUPVPLJKWEH

    more dependent on highly specialized input factors say, college graduates of a certain

    subject, or intellectual property rights), and therefore their choice propensities may yield

    predictions less accurate by broad provincial level aggregate variables.

    B. Heterogeneity in Origin o Investment Funds

    n order to shed more light on the heterogeneous agglomerative processes in the CsH[SRUWLQGXVWU\WKHLQFXPEHQWUPVDUHGLYLGHGE\WKHLURZQHUVKLSRULJLQIRUHLJQLQYHVWHG

    +RQJRQJKLQD7DLSHLKLQDLQYHVWHG+7VWDWHRZQHG67DQGKLQHVH

    SULYDWHRZQHG3LQFXPEHQWUPVXUWKHUDQDO\VLVZLWKIRXUVXEJURXSHGLQYHVWRUV

    EDVHGRQWKHLURZQHUVKLSDOORZVRQHWRH[DPLQHZKLFKUPVOLNHO\SOD\DVLJQLFDQW

    DJJORPHUDWLYHOHDGLQJUROHIRUVXEVHTXHQWUPVLQWKHVDPHRZQHUVKLSRULJLQDQG

    different origin to their location decision. or example, foreign investors might follow other

    IRUHLJQUPVRUWKHSUHVHQFHRIVWDWHRZQHGUPVPLJKWVKRZDVWURQJDJJORPHUDWLYH

    effect to Chinese private investors.

    able introduces separate incumbent counts depending on investor origin. or the

    IRUHLJQLQYHVWHGVDPSOHZDJHDQGSUR[LPLW\YDULDEOHVDUHWKHPRVWLQXHQWLDOIDFWRUVWRQHZHQWUDQWVIROORZHGE\OHYHORILQIUDVWUXFWXUHGHYHORSPHQW%HQHWVIURP

    the reduction in value added tax rate are also taken critically by foreign investors while

    an incentive from corporative income tax provided by local policy makers is considered

    somewhat to a lesser extent.

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    Table 3: Conditional Logit Model: Foreign Firms and Hong Kong, China/Taipei,China

    Firms

    Variables Model (5): Foreign-Owned Model (6): Hong Kong, China/

    Taipei,China-Owned

    Estimates MarginalEfects

    Std. dev. PredictedChange*

    Estimates MarginalEfects

    Std. dev. PredictedChange*

    wage_manuacturing 0.00 0.00 3037 3.34 0.00 0.00 3005 9.02[21.608] [15.832] [13.435] [9.835]

    GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 5057 1.01 0.00 0.00 4833 2.9[13.481] [8.602] [13.783] [11.800]

    waterway 7.17 0.31 0.07 2.2 7.38 0.97 0.07 6.88[26.881] [16.281] [22.978] [21.786]

    highway 1.57 0.07 0.21 1.43 0.31 0.04 0.21 0.84[8.261] [6.643] [1.165] [1.168]

    high school pop 11.17 0.48 0.04 2.09 7.15 0.94 0.04 4.05[8.853] [11.842] [5.398] [4.836]

    college pop 9.71 0.42 0.03 1.41 50.36 6.61 0.03 22[6.216] [9.015] [20.445] [13.251]

    proximity 0.00 0.00 686 14.61 0.00 0.00 686 34.02[32.301] [15.715] [20.999] [53.876]

    value added tax rate 3.06 0.13 0.07 0.9 1.41 0.19 0.07 1.27[6.565] [6.864] [1.925] [1.946]

    corp income tax rate 2.87 0.12 0.02 0.28 3.99 0.52 0.02 1.18[3.662] [3.751] [2.138] [2.153]

    Incumbent_CP 0.01 0.00 26 0.66 0.00 0.00 27 0.97[14.244] [9.124] [5.345] [5.115]

    Incumbent_ST 0.02 0.00 3 0.29 0.00 0.00 3 0.07[4.038] [3.878] [0.374] [0.374]

    Incumbent_HT 0.00 0.00 33 0.12 0.01 0.00 35 2.36[1.990] [1.859] [13.869] [13.375]

    Incumbent_FN 0.02 0.00 20 1.82 0.01 0.00 21 1.74[26.019] [10.406] [7.192] [6.955]

    Sample size 143392 126650LL 11410 8330Chi2 10652 12901Pseudo R2 0.32 0.44

    * Predicted changes (in %) induced by a 1 standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable.Note: Figures in the square bracket are z-statistics.Source: Author's calculations.

    $OOIRXU+6OHYHO LQFXPEHQWVWDWLVWLFVDUHVLJQLFDQWDQGWKHODUJHVWDJJORPHUDWLRQ

    HIIHFWLVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKIRUHLJQRZQHGLQFXPEHQWUPV7ZHQW\DGGLWLRQDOIRUHLJQRZQHG

    LQFXPEHQWVLQDSURYLQFHZRXOGLQFUHDVHWKHFKRLFHSUREDELOLW\E\DERXWDQGWKH

    HIIHFWRIKLQHVHSULYDWHUPVLVFRPSDUDEOH+RZHYHUWKHDJJORPHUDWLRQHIIHFWRI+7

    LQYHVWHGUPVLVQHJDWLYHLQRWKHUZRUGVIRUHLJQLQYHVWRUVDUHOHVVOLNHO\WRFKRRVHD

    location where -invested companies are operating. ew foreign investors seem to

    consider enterprises from ong ong, China and aipei,China as competitors while they

    LQWHUSUHWWKHSUHVHQFHRIRWKHUIRUHLJQUPVDVSRWHQWLDOFRUSRUDWLYHEXVLQHVVSDUWQHUVRU

    WKH\UHFRJQL]HWKHYDOXDEOHH[SHULHQFHRILQFXPEHQWIRUHLJQUPVRSHUDWLQJLQDVLPLODU

    industry sector in the C.

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    Table 4: Conditional Logit Model: Chinese Private Firms

    Variables Model (7): Chinese Private Firms

    Estimates Marginal

    Efects

    Std. dev. Predicted

    Change*

    wage_manuacturing 0.00 0.00 3009 3.01[11.434] [14.028]

    GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 4874 1.95[13.114] [10.252]

    waterway 3.38 0.31 0.07 2.23[14.531] [17.384]

    highway 0.56 0.05 0.21 1.08[3.507] [3.391]

    high school pop 7.64 0.71 0.04 3.07[7.324] [9.234]

    college pop 0.65 0.06 0.03 0.2[0.498] [0.508]

    proximity 0.00 0.00 686 16.33[31.890] [23.249]

    value added tax rate 0.26 0.02 0.07 0.16[0.713] [0.719]corp income tax rate 1.69 0.16 0.02 0.35

    [2.044] [2.006]Incumbent_CP 0.02 0.00 26 4.06

    [43.597] [16.823]Incumbent_ST 0.05 0.01 3 1.44

    [11.628] [10.001]Incumbent_HT 0.00 0.00 26 0.35

    [3.235] [3.389]Incumbent_FN 0.01 0.00 15 1.79

    [13.416] [9.910]Sample size 208699LL 17378

    Chi2 14018Pseudo R2 0.29

    * Predicted changes (in %) induced by a 1 standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable.Note: Figures in the square bracket are z-statistics.Source: Author's calculations.

    n Model ), investors show a preference in their entry decision for a province with a

    large high school graduate population, but a strong restriction for a province with a large

    college graduate population. Most of investors in the C mainly seek low-skilled

    laborers while some foreign investors may need intermediate-level managers with college

    degrees. he obtained result for the wage variable, however, is somewhat puzzling with a

    positive sign. n one hand, provincial individual income level greatly affects the locationGHFLVLRQVRILQYHVWRUVIURP+RQJRQJKLQDDQG7DLSHLKLQD%HQHWVIURPWKH

    reduction in both value-added tax rate and corporate income tax rate are taken intensely

    by investors from ong ong, China and aipei,China.

    he results also reveal a much stronger pattern of the agglomeration effect to foreign-

    invested companies and enterprises from ong ong, China and aipei,China while the

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    FRHIFLHQWIRUVWDWHRZQHGLQFXPEHQWVLVLQVLJQLFDQWLPSO\LQJWKDWWKHSUHVHQFHRIVWDWH

    owned enterprises hardly provides investors from ong ong, China and aipei,China

    ZLWKPXFKLQXHQFHLQWKHLUORFDWLRQFKRLFH

    n contrast, Cs ) seem to behave similarly as foreign-invested companies in locationdecision choice associated with infrastructure-related variables but somewhat differently

    toward tax incentives. Most domestically invested exporters are normal traders about

    FRQVLGHULQJFRUSRUDWHLQFRPHWD[UDWHPRUHVHULRXVO\WKDQYDOXHDGGHGWD[

    7KHDJJORPHUDWLRQHIIHFWDVVRFLDWHGZLWKIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGUPVLVVLPLODUWRWKDWIRUWKH

    IRUHLJQRZQHGVXEVDPSOHDQGWKHHIIHFWRI3VLVWKHPRVWVLJQLFDQWZKLOH+7

    LQFXPEHQWVKDYHDQHJOLJLEOHHIIHFW+RZHYHUWKHSUHVHQFHRIVWDWHRZQHGUPVKDVD

    sizable effect on the co-location of Cs.

    n summary, using results from Models 5) to ), it can be observed that the presence

    RIIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGH[SRUWHUVKDVDVLJQLFDQWEHDFRQHIIHFWZLWKWKHVWURQJHVWOHDGLQJUROHLQDJJORPHUDWLRQIRUQHZLQYHVWRUVFRPLQJIURPWKH3+RQJRQJKLQD

    7DLSHLKLQDDQGIRUHLJQFRXQWULHVLQWKH3VH[SRUWLQGXVWU\RUHRYHUSULYDWHO\

    LQYHVWHGKLQHVHHQWHUSULVHVVKRZVRPHWHQGHQF\IRUFRORFDWLRQZLWKVLJQLFDQW

    DJJORPHUDWLYHLQXHQFHH[HUWHGE\RWKHUKLQHVHSULYDWHRZQHGLQFXPEHQWUPV

    C. Processing Traders versus Normal Traders

    he last empirical results provide comparison analysis between processing traders and

    normal traders in different ownership origins. he subsamples in each investment origin

    are further split into processing traders and normal traders. rom Models 8A and 8B) in

    able 5, foreign investors in the processing and normal trade sectors behave analogouslyin location choice with respect to infrastructure and proximity to the coast but the absolute

    PDJQLWXGHRIHDFKHOHPHQWLVPRUHVLJQLFDQWZLWKLQYHVWRUVLQWKHSURFHVVLQJJRRGV

    trade sector than those in the normal goods trade sector. As expected, processing traders

    are more sensitive to an incentive in the form of value added tax reduction than from

    corporate income tax reduction. oreign investors in both the processing trade sector and

    normal trade sector show a tendency to agglomerate with incumbent foreign companies.

    n particular, the latter likely cluster together with privately-owned Chinese incumbents

    while the former shows the opposite.

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    Table 5: Conditional Logit Model: Processing Traders versus Normal Traders

    (oreign-owned rms)

    Variables

    Model (8): Foreign-Owned

    A: Processing Traders B: Normal Traders

    Estimates Marginal

    Efects

    Std.

    dev.

    Predicted

    Change*

    Estimates Marginal

    Efects

    Std.

    dev.

    Predicted

    Change*

    wage_manuacturing 0.00 0.00 3024 3.93 0.00 0.00 3048 2.74[12.959] [11.644] [17.333] [10.857]

    GDP per capita 0 0 5030 2.01 0 0 5080 0.51[13.267] [7.353] [6.016] [4.571]

    waterway 5.91 0.33 0.07 2.34 8.88 0.28 0.07 2[14.255] [12.345] [24.640] [10.653]

    highway 2.32 0.13 0.21 2.72 1.01 0.03 0.21 0.68[7.732] [5.643] [4.052] [3.588]

    high school pop 4.81 0.27 0.04 1.15 16.07 0.51 0.04 2.21[2.335] [2.745] [9.897] [10.730]

    college pop 8.34 0.46 0.03 1.55 21.07 0.67 0.03 2.25[2.966] [2.374] [10.824] [13.712]

    proximity 0.01 0.00 685.8 21.19 0.01 0.00 686 10.01[21.402] [12.132] [23.885] [10.588]

    value added tax rate 4.66 0.26 0.07 1.77 2.15 0.07 0.07 0.47[6.841] [6.874] [3.252] [3.426]

    corp income tax rate 3.26 0.18 0.02 0.41 4.16 0.13 0.02 0.3[2.544] [2.631] [4.089] [4.005]

    Incumbent_CP 0.00 0.00 26 0.02 0.01 0.00 26 0.73[0.126] [0.126] [16.979] [7.414]

    Incumbent_ST 0.01 0.00 3 0.17 0.03 0.00 3 0.33[1.152] [1.145] [5.016] [4.362]

    Incumbent_HT 0.00 0.00 36 0.15 0.00 0.00 30 0.11[1.373] [1.290] [1.685] [1.550]

    Incumbent_FN 0.02 0.00 22 2.78 0.02 0.00 18 1.04[19.780] [8.179] [14.849] [6.570]

    Sample size 65309 78083LL 4903 6331Chi2 5436 5567Pseudo R2 0.36 0.31

    * Predicted changes (in %) induced by a 1 standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable.Note: Figures in the square bracket are z-statistics.Source: Author's calculations.

    Models 9A and 9B) exhibit the results for investors from ong ong, China and

    aipei,China in processing and normal trade sectors able ). nvestors in the processing

    WUDGHVHFWRUDUHVHQVLWLYHWRYDOXHDGGHGWD[UDWHZKLOHWKHFRHIFLHQWRIFRUSRUDWH

    LQFRPHWD[UDWHLVLQVLJQLFDQW6XUSULVLQJO\LQYHVWRUVIURP+RQJRQJKLQDDQG7DLSHLKLQDLQWKHQRUPDOWUDGHVHFWRUDUHQRWLQXHQFHGE\DQ\WD[LQFHQWLYHQYHVWRUV

    from ong ong, China and aipei,China in the processing and normal trade sectors

    seem to agglomerate with incumbent foreign-invested and -invested companies.

    nvestors in the normal trade sector show a tendency to choose a province with

    incumbent Chinese privately invested companies while investors in the processing trade

    VHFWRUDUHXQOLNHO\WRRFNWRJHWKHUZLWKSULYDWHO\RZQHGKLQHVHLQFXPEHQWV

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    Table 6: Conditional Logit Model: Processing Traders versus Normal Traders

    (Hong Kong, China/Taipei,China rms)

    Variables

    Model (9): Hong Kong, China/Taipei,China-Owned

    A: Processing Traders B: Normal Traders

    Estimates Marginal

    Efects

    Std.

    dev.

    Predicted

    Change*

    Estimates Marginal

    Efects

    Std.

    dev.

    Predicted

    Change*

    wage_manuacturing 0.00 0.00 3005 16.23 0.00 0.00 3006 1.8[14.299] [16.707] [3.060] [2.722]

    GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 4905 3.43 0.00 0.00 4760 1.9[11.095] [10.940] [7.963] [6.771]

    waterway 7.68 0.92 0.07 6.53 8.70 0.86 0.07 6.13[13.934] [13.054] [20.842] [17.879]

    highway 1.48 0.18 0.21 3.74 0.80 0.08 0.21 1.67[3.163] [3.194] [2.464] [2.427]

    high school pop 15.99 1.91 0.04 8.25 1.19 0.12 0.04 0.51[7.984] [9.203] [0.662] [0.679]

    college pop 92.16 11.03 0.03 36.72 19.91 1.97 0.03 6.57[22.706] [39.666] [6.314] [4.947]

    proximity 0.00 0.00 686 29.08 0.00 0.00 686 29.84[10.869] [9.425] [18.864] [30.889]

    value added tax rate 3.37 0.40 0.07 2.76 0.55 0.05 0.07 0.37[2.620] [2.652] [0.582] [0.586]

    corp income tax rate 5.33 0.64 0.02 1.44 3.10 0.31 0.02 0.7[1.315] [1.286] [1.453] [1.470]

    Incumbent_CP 0.01 0.00 27 2.19 0.01 0.00 28 1.4[5.460] [5.311] [9.438] [8.023]

    Incumbent_ST 0.01 0.00 4 0.31 0.01 0.00 3 0.32[1.036] [1.036] [1.651] [1.639]

    Incumbent_HT 0.01 0.00 37 3.17 0.00 0.00 34 0.87[11.846] [10.067] [4.893] [5.078]

    Incumbent_FN 0.01 0.00 22 1.37 0.01 0.00 19 1.05[3.747] [3.673] [4.109] [3.920]

    Sample size 63510 63140LL 3200 4698Chi2 8418 5346Pseudo R2 0.57 0.36

    * Predicted changes (in %) induced by a 1 standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable.Note: Figures in the square bracket are z-statistics.Source: Author's calculations.

    3ULYDWHO\RZQHGKLQHVHUPV$LQWKHSURFHVVLQJWUDGHVHFWRU7DEOHDUHTXLWH

    sensitive to corporate tax incentives. nvestors in both the processing and normal trade

    sectors reveal a strong agglomeration effect associated with all types of incumbents

    except incumbents. or processing traders, foreign incumbents have the mostVLJQLFDQWDJJORPHUDWLRQHIIHFWZKLOHKLQHVHSULYDWHO\LQYHVWHGLQFXPEHQWVDJJORPHUDWH

    normal traders of privately invested entrants 10B).

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    Table 7: Conditional Logit Model: Processing Traders versus Normal Traders

    (Chinese private rms)

    Variables Model (10): Chinese Private Firms

    A: Processing Traders B: Normal Traders

    Estimates MarginalEfects

    Std.dev.

    PredictedChange*

    Estimates MarginalEfects

    Std.dev.

    PredictedChange*

    wage_manuacturing 0.00 0.00 3020 0.3 0.00 0.00 3008 3.01[0.319] [0.323] [11.603] [14.179]

    GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 4928 4.93 0.00 0.00 4867 1.95[6.408] [5.999] [11.353] [8.907]

    waterway 3.13 0.49 0.07 3.51 4.07 0.35 0.07 2.46[3.835] [3.343] [16.619] [17.984]

    highway 1.93 0.30 0.21 6.38 0.46 0.04 0.21 0.82[3.629] [3.500] [2.736] [2.659]

    high school pop 5.40 0.85 0.04 3.7 9.00 0.76 0.04 3.32[1.631] [1.546] [8.144] [10.635]

    college pop 17.92 2.82 0.03 9.47 2.49 0.21 0.03 0.71[4.720] [3.975] [1.770] [1.918]

    proximity 0.00 0 686 29.29 0.00 0 686 14.75[9.739] [15.956] [29.888] [20.469]

    value added tax rate 0.79 0.12 0.07 0.85 0.22 0.02 0.07 0.13[0.774] [0.782] [0.576] [0.581]

    corp income tax rate 5.97 0.94 0.02 2.12 1.39 0.12 0.02 0.27[2.686] [2.543] [1.565] [1.543]

    Incumbent_CP 0.01 0.00 28 3.87 0.02 0.00 26 4.01[8.399] [7.353] [42.971] [15.156]

    Incumbent_ST 0.05 0.01 4 3.19 0.05 0.00 3 1.3[4.570] [4.413] [10.784] [9.132]

    Incumbent_HT 0.00 0.00 37 0.64 0.00 0.00 25 0.18[1.297] [1.263] [1.551] [1.597]

    Incumbent_FN 0.02 0.00 21 7.47 0.01 0.00 14 1.29[11.235] [8.658] [9.700] [7.667]

    Sample size 22489 186210LL 1808 15425Chi2 1636 12671Pseudo R2 0.31 0.29

    * Predicted changes (in %) induced by a 1 standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable.Note: Figures in the square bracket are z-statistics.Source: Author's calculations.

    VI. Policy Implications

    or governors in the C whose most decisive achievements are judged by increasing

    gross domestic product in the region, attracting new foreign and domestic direct

    LQYHVWPHQWLVEHQHFLDOLQVSXUULQJHFRQRPLFJURZWKJHQHUDWLQJPRUHHPSOR\PHQW

    expanding the tax base, and boosting resident income. ocal policy makers encourage

    WHFKQRORJLFDOO\VRSKLVWLFDWHGUPVWRHQWHUWKHLUSURYLQFHIRUJUDGXDOLPSURYHPHQWRI

    production technologies in related industries by means of technology and management

    knowledge spillover. Correspondingly, policy makers prefer to train and produce a highly

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    VNLOOLQWHQVLYHODERUIRUFHWKDWZLOOKHOSPHHWWKHGHPDQGIRUKLJKTXDOLW\REVDVKLJKO\

    sophisticated, technology-based, and &-intensive foreign and domestic) enterprises

    enter their province. herefore, provincial planners tend to pay particular attention to

    WKHHIIHFWRIWKHLUSROLFLHVDQGDFWLRQVRQWKHEHKDYLRURIUPVWKDWDUHOLNHO\WRHQJDJH

    LQ'DFWLYLW\UPVWKDWIRFXVRQKLJKTXDOLW\WHFKQRORJ\GHYHORSPHQWDQGUPVWKDWZLOOSURGXFHVRSKLVWLFDWHGQDOJRRGVLQWKHKLJKWHFKQRORJ\EDVHGLQGXVWU\7KHUHIRUH

    they may want to attract foreign-invested enterprises with high technology, as the

    knowledge and technology transfer induced by their market entry will clearly be welcome

    externalities.

    ome explanatory variables analyzed in the empirical section are explicitly and/

    RULPSOLFLWO\FRQWUROOHGDQGLQXHQFHGE\SURYLQFLDOOHYHOSROLF\FKRLFHVQSDUWLFXODU

    SROLF\PDNHUVZRXOGOLNHWRXQGHUVWDQGKRZYDULDWLRQVLQWKHLUORFDOSROLF\LQXHQFH

    WKHPDUNHWHQWU\GHFLVLRQVRIFHUWDLQJURXSVRIUPVRUH[DPSOHKLJKZD\VSHUDUHD

    and length of inland waterways are infrastructure-related policy variables that can be

    LQXHQFHGE\EXLOGLQJPRUHKLJKZD\VPDNLQJPRUHULYHUVVXLWDEOHIRUFRPPHUFLDOWUDIFor constructing canals. An upgrade to the waterway and highway infrastructure in the

    SURYLQFHLVSUHGLFWHGWRKDYHDVLJQLFDQWHIIHFWRQWKHHQWU\GHFLVLRQVRISURFHVVLQJ

    goods traders see Model in able 2). A 1 standard deviation increase in waterways

    DQGKLJKZD\VZLOOUDLVHFKRLFHSUREDELOLWLHVE\DERXWDQGUHVSHFWLYHO\7KHVKDUH

    RIKLJKVFKRROJUDGXDWHVDQGFROOHJHJUDGXDWHVLQWKHSRSXODWLRQFRXOGEHLQXHQFHGE\

    province-level policies aimed at encouraging higher education.

    WZRXOGEHIHDVLEOHIRUSURYLQFLDOSODQQHUVWRQGWKHVSHFLFFRVWRIJHQHUDWLQJD

    particular infrastructure upgradefor example, building additional highwaysand setting

    it in relation to the expected effect. or example, suppose that 5,000 new enterprises

    enter the Cs export industry every year, and an increase of the choice probabilityE\ZRXOGUHVXOWLQDQH[SHFWHGDGGLWLRQDOUPV7KHH[SHFWHGEHQHWVRIVXFK

    DGGLWLRQDOLQYHVWPHQWFRXOGEHFRPSDUHGWRWKHFRVWRIVSHFLFSROLF\LQWHUYHQWLRQV

    he average wage level in the manufacturing sector is related to policy in important

    ZD\VWKHIRUPXODWLRQDQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIODERUODZVLQFOXVLYHRIWKHPLQLPXPZDJH

    the restriction of domestic migrant workers for example, hukouV\VWHPDQGWKHVWDQFH

    WDNHQE\SROLF\PDNHUVLQODERUGLVSXWHVDOOLQXHQFHWKHIDFWRUSULFHRIODERUVLQJWKH

    Model 8A), a 1 standard deviation increase to the average wage in manufacturing sector

    ZLOOUHGXFHFKRLFHSUREDELOLWLHVE\DERXWQHVWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQLV\XDQSHU

    year, or 252 yuan per month. his is a sizable wage increase and its predicted effect is

    relatively large. verall, investors seem sensitive to the average wage rate in a province.aking oxconn for example, the wage level for its low-skilled workers increased by

    DQGWKHFRPSDQ\PRYHGLWVIDFWRU\IURP6KHQ]KHQLQ*XDQJGRQJSURYLQFHWR

    Chengdu in ichuan province in 2011.

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    HGXFWLRQLQWD[UDWHVSDUWLFXODUO\YDOXHDGGHGWD[EULQJVDVLJQLFDQWLQXHQFHWR

    investors from foreign countries and ong ong, China/aipei,China in their location

    choice. An interesting policy implication is given by Models 8) to 10). he agglomeration

    effect of foreign-invested enterprises seems notably strong for foreign-invested processing

    traders, - invested companies, and private Chinese investors in the processing tradeVHFWRU+RVWLQJIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGHQWHUSULVHVLQRQHORFDWLRQFRXOGDWWUDFWVXEVHTXHQW

    LQYHVWRUVLQWKHVDPHORFDWLRQIWKHSURYLQFLDOJRYHUQPHQWWDUJHWVDVSHFLFLQGXVWU\WR

    be developed, then our results suggest that it might kick-start this industry by hosting a

    number of foreign-invested enterprises to locate in a particular location. he presence of

    IRUHLJQLQYHVWHGLQFXPEHQWUPVZRXOGUDLVHWKHSUHGLFWHGSUREDELOLW\RIPDUNHWHQWU\

    RIRWKHUIRUHLJQUPVLQWKHSURFHVVLQJH[SRUWLQGXVWU\E\DERXWDQGWKDWRISULYDWH

    KLQHVHLQYHVWRUVE\URXJKO\7KH3VLQGXVWU\VWUXFWXUHLVVWLOOURRWHGLQORZ

    VNLOOHGODERULQWHQVLYHPDQXIDFWXUHGJRRGVSURGXFWLRQDQGKLJKO\VRSKLVWLFDWHGQDOJRRGV

    are mostly assembled by foreign-invested enterprises. olicy makers in the C need

    WRQGZD\VWRDFKLHYHDVXEVWDQWLDOOHYHORIWHFKQRORJ\VSLOORYHUIURPIRUHLJQLQYHVWHG

    enterprises operating in high-technology industry areas to local producers manufacturingLQWHUPHGLDWHJRRGV7HFKQRORJ\VSLOORYHUFDQEHDFTXLUHGWKURXJKLQWHUQDWLRQDOL]DWLRQRI

    KRVWLQJIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGUPVSURGXFLQJKLJKVNLOOHGWHFKQRORJ\JRRGVDIWHUZKLFKORFDO

    producers that obtained high-technology skills will be encouraged to gradually replace the

    foreign-invested processing goods traders through internalization/localization in production

    of sophisticated manufactured goods.

    imilarly, the presence of state-owned enterprises in a certain industry will attract more

    privately invested Chinese companies Models 10A and 10B) and foreign normal goods

    traders Model 8B). hese increases only apply to the subpopulation of investors active in

    WKLVSDUWLFXODUSURGXFWFODVVVRWKDWWKHQXPEHURIUPVWKDWFDQEHLQGXFHGWRHQWHULQ

    this way may still be small. t suggests that a state-owned infant industry may still play aOLPLWHGOHDGLQJUROHWRGHYHORSVSHFLFWDUJHWLQGXVWULHV

    VII. Conclusion

    he most important result of this study is the proof of a basic concept that heterogeneity

    LQUPRZQHUVKLSDQGWUDGHW\SHFDQHQKDQFHWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRILQYHVWPHQWORFDWLRQ

    decisions in the C. rocessing traders differ substantially from nonprocessing traders

    in response to changes in wage cost, level of development in infrastructure, and proximityWRWKH3DFLFFRDVW3UHVHQFHRIIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGHQWHUSULVHVFUHDWHVDEHDFRQHIIHFWRQ

    VXEVHTXHQWIRUHLJQDQGGRPHVWLFLQYHVWRUV

    7KHPRVWEDVLFFRQFOXVLRQIURPWKHHPSLULFDODQDO\VHVLVWKDWSUR[LPLW\WRWKH3DFLF

    coast and new economic geography of agglomeration effect and the presence of

    LQFXPEHQWUPVLQWKHVDPHSURGXFWFODVVDUHWKHVWURQJHVWGHWHUPLQDQWVRIDQLQYHVWRUV

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    location choice in the Cs export industry. Agglomeration also plays a greater role

    for investors specializing in processing goods trade and highly skill-intensive or &

    intensive production. irms with a higher educated workforce agglomerate more than

    others.

    6LPLODUO\SURFHVVLQJWUDGHUPVGLVSOD\VWURQJHUDJJORPHUDWLYHEHKDYLRUWKDQ

    nonprocessing traders. Moreover, processing traders are more sensitive to the wage

    level and value proximity to the coast more. A wide range of industrial policies designed

    WRDWWUDFWFOXVWHUVRIOHDGLQJUPVPD\EHXVWLDEOHRQWKHVHJURXQGV$PRQJLQYHVWRUV

    of different origin, ong ong, China and aipei,China investors seem the least driven

    by agglomeration. nvestors from ong ong, China and aipei,China, by contrast, tend

    WRFRORFDWHZLWKRWKHUUPVIURPWKHVDPHUHJLRQZKLOHIRUHLJQLQYHVWHGUPVVHHPWR

    EHQHJDWLYHO\LQXHQFHGE\WKHSUHVHQFHRI+RQJRQJKLQD7DLSHLKLQDLQFXPEHQWV

    RUHLJQLQYHVWHGLQFXPEHQWUPVKDYHDYHU\ODUJHHIIHFWRQVXEVHTXHQWSULYDWHKLQHVH

    investors in processing trade sector, and have a sizable effect on other foreign investors

    and investors from ong ong, China and aipei,China.

    %HQHWVIURPUHGXFWLRQLQYDOXHDGGHGWD[UDWHVDQGFRUSRUDWHLQFRPHWD[UDWHVSOD\

    an evident role for foreign investors and investors in the processing trade sector.

    owever, since 2008, a number of provinces started dismantling preferential labor

    laws, export subsidies, favorable value-added tax rates, and corporate tax rates to low-

    skill-intensive foreign enterprises including processing goods traders. olicy makers

    have publicly stated their goal that the C will dynamically transform its comparative

    advantage from low-skill-intensive to high-tech industry concentrated. olicy makers in

    the C intend to transform the internationalization process through attraction of foreign

    investment toward localization by reducing the processing good trading portion and by

    increasing the supply of domestically produced intermediate inputs for their exports. Asthe C moves up to the high value supply chain, expands its domestic market, and

    exports skill-intensive goods, processing goods traders might consider new places or new

    business models.

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    About the PaperMinsoo Lee analyzes the spatial determinants of new foreign and domestic enterprisesin the export industry of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) by applying new economicgeography of agglomeration theory, tax competition theory by resource flow model,and comparative advantage analysis. He finds that agglomeration plays a greaterrole for foreign investors specializing in the processing goods trade and highly skill-

    intensive or research and development-intensive production, and that benefits fromreduction in the value added tax rate and corporate income tax rate play an evidentrole for foreign investors and Hong Kong, China and Taipei,China investors in theprocessing trade sector. As the PRC moves up the high-value supply chain and transformsthe internationalization process through attraction of foreign investment towardlocalization by reducing the processing goods trading portion and increasing thesupply of domestically produced intermediate inputs for their exports, processing goodstraders may consider new locations or business models.

    About the Asian Development BankADBs vision is an Asia and Pacific region free of poverty. Its mission is to help its

    developing member countries reduce poverty and improve the quality of life of theirpeople. Despite the regions many successes, it remains home to two-thirds of theworlds poor: 1.8 billion people who live on less than $2 a day, with 903 millionstruggling on less than $1.25 a day. ADB is committed to reducing poverty throughinclusive economic growth, environmentally sustainable growth, and regionalintegration.

    Based in Manila, ADB is owned by 67 members, including 48 from the region. Itsmain instruments for helping its developing member countries are policy dialogue, loans,equity investments, guarantees, grants, and technical assistance.

    Asian Development Bank6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City1550 Metro Manila, Philippineswww.adb.org/economicsISSN: 1655-5252Publication Stock No. WPS124550

    January 2012

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