EDITORIAL

Nelson Mandela and the political economy of unfinished liberation

Following the death of Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela on 5 December 2013, current South African President Jacob Zuma declared that the country had lost its ‘greatest son’. Politicians lined up across the world to praise this political icon. But while Mandela unquestionably deserves many of the accolades being showered upon him, his death should also give us pause for thought, and the chance to engage in a discussion about his many legacies, both positive and negative. The following collection of articles published by the Review of African Political

Economy examines the political economy of the transition to democracy and its implications for understanding some of the social and political challenges that characterise South Africa’s unfinished liberation.

The collection begins with two short articles looking directly at Mandela himself. Bill Freund’s obituary (2014) offers an overview of his political life, arguing that his death ‘will initiate the end of a dramatic and memorable act on the South African stage’. As Szeftel (2004, 193) reminds us, however, socialists should display ‘critical sympathy’ when engaging with nationalist politics: recognising its achievements, but also remaining critical of its limitations. In this vein, Freund argues that Mandela’s lasting legacy is far from clear, and that, although stability has been achieved along with some advancements in socioeconomic development, ‘serious disappointments’ with South Africa’s democratic dispensation remain. While Mandela proved extremely adept at loosening the iron grip of the old regime over state power structures (notably in the policy and army), ‘the economy remains dominated to date by the big corporates, now more than before likely to be foreign owned, while the biggest South African businesses have gone global.’ What results is a society that is ‘visibly harshly bifurcated’, according to Freund, reflecting what Patrick Bond (2004) has identified as the transition from racial to class apartheid, rooted in socioeconomic inequalities and uneven access to basic services, land and property. In short, ‘the end of apartheid brought political rights without changing social justice rights’ (Szeftel 2004, 194).

Following this line of analysis, Beresford (2014) argues that the manner in which Mandela has been popularly famed for his ‘moderate’ leadership during the transition to democracy is extremely problematic. While Mandela’s achievements in terms of promoting racial reconciliation and transitional justice are well documented and rightly celebrated, he was less capable of moderating between grossly unequal global class forces. The discourse that Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC) utilised during the early 1990s of being a moderate, ‘disciplined’ political force served to justify a technocratic embrace of neoliberal macroeconomic policies and to stifle domestic resistance to economic reforms. Although Mandela’s memory has been reified in Western capitals, Zizek (2013) is right then to point out that this ‘universal glory’ bestowed upon him following his death ‘is also a sign that he really didn’t disturb the global order of power’.

The next cluster of articles examine why the ANC led South Africa into what Patrick Bond (2000) has famously discussed as the ‘elite transition’ from racial apartheid to neoliberalism. Gary Littlejohn’s short book review (2014) offers some important personal insights into the actors and power-plays at the centre of the transition process. Like the contributions which follow, Littlejohn highlights how the character of South Africa’s transition to democracy was already largely determined before Mandela left jail, and that the dominant narrative that political tensions between the ANC and the old regime were overcome ‘largely through the skill and goodwill of Mandela… ignores the larger interests at play’ that continue to shape the transition to democracy. Littlejohn claims that the ANC was

well aware of the kinds of compromises it would have to make with Western capitals in the late 1980s, and that a decisive meeting in 1988 made it clear to the ANC that the ‘Soviet Union was following the same policy as the USA on Southern Africa’, which severely curtailed the ANC’s political options.

Segatti and Pons-Vignon (2013) offer a detailed analysis of the adoption of neoliberal macroeconomic policy which, they argue, can be attributed largely to the ‘ideological conversion’ of several key ANC figures and also the emergence and consolidation of a dominant national treasury, which become an epicentre of neoliberal reforms. Like Freund (2013), they highlight the decisive role that Thabo Mbeki played, arguing that his acceptance of a ‘Blairite’ understanding of economic issues, coupled with his early exposure to the investor community in the 1980s put him at centre stage of the ANC’s macroeconomic policy development. In turn, Mbeki groomed other converts, such as Alec Erwin and Trevor Manuel, who would both later serve in his cabinet. Again, this contribution reveals how the shift in the ANC’s ideological approach was foregrounded in the 1980s during early negotiations with capital and was not simply disciplined by Western international financial institutions. Freund’s contribution supports such an argument, pointing out that the ANC had ‘said very little about what potential economic policies it supported’ (2013, 520) during its years in exile, but that a clear shift was led by Mbeki and his acolytes after 1990: a shift that he explains was most graphically illustrated in the declining influence of the left-wing Macro-Economic Research Group (MERG) within ANC policy circles. Freund (2013, 526) claims that Mandela aligned his economic views with left-of-centre Western parties upon his release from prison and that, as Hirsch (2005, 42) has also argued, he was extremely unconfident and ‘wobbly’ in his commitment to a more radical left wing agenda.

What is clear from these contributions is that ANC elites felt under considerable pressure to adopt an orthodox, neoliberal macroeconomic policy. ANC elites were mindful of the severe weakness of the economy, which they inherited from the apartheid regime, and afraid – to the brink of paranoia – that not being seen to be a ‘disciplined’, business-friendly government-in-waiting could trigger a lack of confidence among the business community (both national and transnational), leading to a lack of investment and capital flight. While Segatti and Pons-Vignon (2013, 544) are right to point out how such fears were instrumentally played upon by the neoliberal factions of the ANC elite to consolidate their own positions, it is undoubted that the risk of losing business confidence was very real during this period and continues to constrain the actions of ANC leaders today. As Ben Fine (2012) shows, companies have relocated out of South Africa, and capital flight continues to take place on a large scale. Szeftel’s (2004, 194) contribution provides perhaps the most useful summary of the dilemmas and challenges confronting ANC elites during the transition. He argues that

Democratic structures were grafted onto a social formation defined by inequality, injustice and deprivation, one in which an infinity of urgent needs confronted limited means of delivery. The ANC took over a state whose coffers were bare and an economy which had suffered stagnant or negative growth for more than a decade but which now needed somehow to generate the highest growth rates anywhere in the world if it was to meet even the needs of new job seekers, much less begin to transform society. The structure of economic power, the nature of international capitalist pressures, the poverty of an African population de-skilled by the segregated job market and by Bantu Education, all inhibited the strategic choices available. So too did powerful state institutions and a bloated bureaucracy opposed to any agenda of social change and redistribution. (Szeftel 2004, 194)

Many of these challenges persist to this day and Ben Fine (2012) examines the underlying reasons why the ANC continues to adhere to a fairly orthodox neoliberal approach to macroeconomic management. Fine (2012, 553) argues that trying to track whether changes in ANC policy reflect the party becoming ‘more’ or ‘less’ neoliberal misses what should be

our main focus of analysis if we are to understand why a significant shift in ANC policy is unlikely – namely, the international restructuring of South African capital and the fact that it is now, more than ever before, embedded within global networks of capital accumulation; second, the global trend towards the financialisation of capital, making financial capital more mobile than ever before and drawing investment away from productive sectors; third, the creation and strengthening of a black elite, which owes its being to favourable relations with state elites; and, finally, the control of alternative forces for progressive change, such as the major trade unions in alliance with the ANC, which helps to contain dissent. According to Fine’s analysis of recent ANC policy documents, little has changed in terms of the substance of their economic prescriptions. He argues that it is clear that the ANC does not acknowledge the unequal power relationships between capital and labour and continues to call upon labour to make sacrifices while awarding concessions to business. Indeed, as I have argued in this collection (Beresford 2014), the manner in which the ANC presents itself as a moderating surveyor of the ‘balance of forces’ in its discussion documents mystifies ‘asymmetries of power between transnational capital and domestic constituencies’, particularly the working class. Fine (2012, 566) argues that ‘surely the time has come’ when capital (not labour) is expected – if not demanded – to make the sacrifices needed to rectify endemic unemployment and inequalities.

The next cluster of articles examines the ANC itself and how the party has adapted to the democratic era. Southall (2008, 290) notes that the considerable business interests connected with the ANC ‘probably now makes it one of the richest political parties in the world!’ However, such connections have also generated contradictions: contradictions that Southall notes have contributed to the ‘moral decay’ of the party. He notes the manner in which the immersion of ANC cadres within the world of business has contributed to the growth of corruption, patronage and the misappropriation of state resources.

The collection offers insights into this murky connection between emerging black business elites (many of which have strong party ties) and capital. Hall’s (2004) examination of land reform is important in this regard. It highlights how – by even its own measures – the government has been unsuccessful at radically transforming land ownership. This is a product, Hall argues, of ‘post-transition pacting between the state white agricultural capital and a small but politically significant class of black commercial farmers’. The alliance that has emerged through this process has built up considerable political resources through its connections with state elites and high-level policy making circles, which has served to undermine much-needed reform and has ‘entrenched forms of exclusion and marginality’ (Hall 2004, 225).

In a similar vein, Gavin Capps’ (2012a, 2012b) detailed history of the platinum sector illustrates the capture of mining capital by state-connected elites. He argues that while the owners of the platinum industry had initially been successful in keeping hold of their interests after apartheid, the meteoric rise of the industry has made it increasingly targeted by the ANC government for transformation through Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) initiatives. Capps details the struggle between the platinum companies and the government, and the manner in which state-connected elites were able to gain a major proportion of share ownership in the industry under the guise of BEE (Capps 2012b, 325–330). The massacre of 34 workers at the Lonmin platinum mine in Marikana has highlighted some of the contradictions of the ANC’s role in big business and the way this puts ANC leaders at odds with the working class: the ANC’s deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa, was the single largest shareholder of Lonmin at the time, and on its board of directors (see Alexander 2013).

This shadowy world of capital accumulation aided and facilitated by close party ties is difficult to reconcile with the stated aims of the ANC, including its loud pronouncements at the party’s centenary year celebrating ‘100 years of selfless sacrifice’. It is this that has generated what Southall (2008) refers to as a ‘moral crisis’ within the party, one compounded by the recent re-election of Jacob Zuma as ANC President despite the allegations of corruption that continue to surround him. Southall (2014) argues that Zuma is now an ‘electoral liability’ because of the way he remains mired in scandal and has marginalised critical voices within the ANC and the Alliance. David McDonald’s (2010) contribution to this issue also highlights the problems the ANC faces with its moral regeneration. He observes that the ANC has promoted the notion of ‘ubuntu capitalism’, which he identifies as a ‘discursive effort on the part of South African state and capital to convince South Africans that market reforms are democratic and egalitarian, while at the same time serving to defuse opposition to underlying neoliberal change’ (2010, 140). McDonald argues that such sentiments are beginning to ring hollow, however, and that the ANC’s attempts at mobilising this discourse of a moral ‘African’ capitalism reflect a broader ideological exhaustion confronting ANC elites.

Von Holdt’s (2013) article further highlights the erosion of ANC’s moral capital. He argues that we can now witness the descent of South Africa into what he calls ‘violent democracy’ characterised by intense inter-elite fighting over access to the resources and spoils of the state. The intensity of these factional struggles has served to destabilise the ANC, leading in the most extreme cases to deadly physical violence between rival groups. The ANC may well be confronted with more internal violence and the contradictions of this morality crisis in the run-up to the 2014 elections. It will also face a much stiffer electoral challenge from the largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), despite its recent difficulties in forging a broader alliance of the centrist opposition parties. But what of the left? The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) has recently been formed with a leftist political platform and has been outwardly critical of the ANC’s failure to provide more radical socioeconomic transformation. However, the EFF, and its leader Julius Malema, remains a problematic party-political standard bearer of the left and it is unclear whether there are currently enough progressive left wing forces outside the ANC capable of offering a serious challenge to what Southall (2014) calls the ANC ‘party machine’ in the short to medium term.

It is also unclear whether such an alliance would be able to avoid engaging in the violent rush for spoils described by von Holdt. Beresford’s (2012) assessment of organised labour’s political position suggests that it is important to examine how unions have been profoundly impacted by what Karl von Holdt (2003) has identified as the great ‘transition from below’ and also the kind of patronage-fuelled squabbles for positions of power he identifies in this collection (2013, 601). Beresford (2012) notes how processes of class formation, particularly the growth of a layer of middle class workers in the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the competition for positions of authority, have eroded the coherent class identity of the Union. The resulting divisions have not only generated an organisational crisis; they have severally undermined the capacity of the union movement to unite around a broader political strategy.

We can also witness the spread of corrosive ANC factionalism into the union movement as whole. Since Zuma’s accession to power, the independence of the unions is being eroded by factional struggles within the ruling party, which are spilling over into the unions, causing divisions and curbing union autonomy. This has been played out across COSATU affiliates and, most notably, within COSATU itself. As Zuma has sought to extend his control over the unions, however, his strategy has been increasingly resisted. Recently, factions loyal to Zuma lined up to alienate COSATU General Secretary Zwelinzima Vavi,

who has subsequently been suspended from his position. This has led to the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) withdrawing political funding for the ANC. NUMSA has even threatened to leave COSATU entirely unless Vavi is reinstated. Alexander argues that

In essence, the divide is between unionists whose first loyalty is to the SACP/ANC alliance, and those who privilege the wishes of their members. This reflects a 1980s division between “populists”, including NUM, and “workerists”, who included NUMSA’s forerunner. (Alexander 2013, 616)

On the one hand, such infighting might generate massive instability, division and breakdown. On the other hand, it could be productive for the labour movement if it serves to provoke the kind of debate that is needed about the future political direction of the movement and its close ties to the ANC. Much will depend on whether such battles revolve neatly around the clear political divide between ‘workerists’ and ‘populists’ that Alexander identifies, or whether they are instead defined along ANC factional fault lines between those for and against Jacob Zuma. If the latter, the union movement’s political and organisational independence could be terminally undermined.

Alexander Beresford

School of Politics and International Studies,

University of Leeds, Leeds, UK

Email: a.beresford@leeds.ac.uk

References

Alexander, P. 2013. “Marikana, Turning Point in South African History.” Review of African Political

Economy 40 (138): 605–619. doi: 10.1080/03056244.2013.860893. (Included in this collection)

Beresford, A. 2012. “Organised Labour and the Politics of Class Formation in Post-apartheid South Africa. Review of African Political Economy 39 (134): 569–589. (Included in this collection)

Beresford, A. 2014. “Nelson Mandela and the Politics of South Africa’s Unfinished Liberation.” Review of African Political Economy 41 (140). doi: 10.1080/03056244.2014.883114. (Included in this collection)

Bond, P. 2000. Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa. London: Pluto Press.

Bond, P. 2004. “South Africa’s Frustrating Decade of Freedom: From Racial to Class Apartheid.” Monthly Review 55 (10): 45–59.

Capps, G. 2012a. “Victim of its own Success? The Platinum Mining Industry and the Apartheid Mineral Property System in South Africa’s Political Transition.” Review of African Political Economy

39 (131): 63–84. (Included in this collection)

Capps, G. 2012b. “A Bourgeois Reform with Social Justice? The Contradictions of the Minerals Development Bill and Black Economic Empowerment in the South African Platinum Mining Industry.” Review of African Political Economy 39 (132): 315–333. (Included in this collection)

Fine, B. 2012. “Assessing South Africa’s New Growth Path: Framework for Change?” Review of

African Political Economy 39 (134): 551–568. (Included in this collection)

Freund, B. 2014. “The Shadow of Nelson Mandela, 1918 – 2013.” Review of African Political

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Freund, W. 2013. “Swimming against the Tide: The Macro-economic Research Group in the South African Transition 1991–94.” Review of African Political Economy 40 (138): 519 – 536. doi: 10.1080/03056244.2013.854038. (Included in this collection)

Hall, R. 2004. “A Political Economy of Land Reform in South Africa.” Review of African Political

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Southall, R. 2008. “The ANC for Sale? Money, Morality and Business in South Africa.” Review of

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