11.8in. On paper, at any rate, they had a decided edgeover the Formidables. Some time in 1904-05 work beganon the Danton design, with four 12in and twelve 9.4in.Russia had moved from the Borodinos to the ImperatorPavels, basically similar, but with an 8in secondary battery.Germany had gone from 9.4in and 5.9in guns to 11in and6.7in with the Deutschlands of 1900. America hadfollowed the heavily armed Georgias with the even morepowerful Connecticut and Louisiana of 1902, about whichthe Admiralty were well informed. It is thought that shipson Lord Nelson lines were planned to follow, but changedfor the much more advanced South Carolina when theDreadnought was announced. Finally, Austria-Hungaryhad just about completed the Erzherzogs, and was consid-ering their successors. Her Chief Constructor, SiegfriedPopper, prepared five designs, three of which were half-way to the Dreadnought. The design chosen, whichbecame the Radetzky, was remarkably like what was tobecome the Lord Nelson, though with emphasis on speedrather than heavy armour.As there were major disagreements on the British

design, the Controller held a conference in his room on 2November 1902. At this meeting it was decided that theside armour should be increased from 9in to 12in abreastthe machinery spaces, a very big and heavy change as 9inhad been standard from the Majestics (with Harveyizedarmour) of 1892 onwards. It may well have involved theintroduction of new rolling machinery. The armour rightforward was to be increased to 6in, the 4in plating was tobe carried higher, more armour was to be fitted abreast the

turrets and magazines, and the steering gear betterprotected. All this extra armour weighed 600 tons. Four7.5in guns on the main deck were replaced by two 9.2inon the upper. This would weigh 100 tons extra and cost£10,000 more. It would also require extra space extendingso far forward as to throw the foremast out of position.Magazines and shell rooms would have to be worked inabreast the machinery spaces.The extra weight would require more power; 16,000ihp,

300 extra tons and £30,000 extra cost; a lot in gold sover-eigns. 13,500ihp would have driven the original 14,000ton ship at 18 knots, but every extra ton had its price. TheBoard of Admiralty was anxious to keep the ships as smallas possible, which resulted in a cramped design, especiallywith so many turrets.

Minute to Controller 31/12/02Mods to B3B3a as B3 except that the 2 single amidships 9.2 in gunsdispensed with. FB fwd inc to 24ft. Fwd 12 ax ht incto 27ft. Training of 12in can be inc to 50 deg abaft &bef beam – 280 deg.

Assume that 150t can be saved by mods of armour of12in & 9.2in barbettes. Cost wd be £1,240,000.

B3b armt as B3, B3a mods to FB and ax ht of 12in made.Cost becomes £1,300,000.

B3c As B3b but single 9.2in replaced by double, making12 (i.e. 4 x 12in , 12 x 9.2in.) Cost goes up to£1,370,000.

B3a 15,400t, B3b 15,950, B3c 16,350

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hinking about the Royal Navy’s battleships for1903-04 began in early 1902; there was a feeling

that the King Edward VIIs, as yet incomplete, were toolarge and not powerful enough. They had moved on fromthe standard armament of the 1890s, but so had the shipsdesigned and projected by other powers. Philip Watts, thenew Director of Naval Construction, had a reputation forpacking a heavy armament and other military featuresinto ‘export’ ships smaller than the Admiralty designs ofhis predecessor, Sir William White. Sir William May, theController (= USN Chief of Bu Ord, Buships and muchelse), had implemented a series of studies which suggestedthat much more gun power and armour was needed fornew ships to be militarily effective. The 6in gun was bynow ineffective against the latest battleships. Fitting addi-tional 12in turrets would have required much larger ships,but an improved secondary battery seemed easier, and alsonecessary, as Krupp armour permitted better protection forthe enemy’s secondary batteries, which were the maintarget of one’s own. It was at first hoped to keep to adisplacement of 14,000 tons, that of the Duncans of 1898and 1899, while carrying an armament at least as powerfulas the King Edward VIIs and attaining the Duncans’ speedof 19 knots.A very large number of designs were sketched or worked

out in detail. From May 1902 many were ‘Wattsian’, withmore armament packed in than the ‘Whiteian’ designs ofthe period up to 1901. Not all are recorded, but the ‘A’designs mostly had the King Edward VII armament in asmaller hull, the ‘B’s four 12in, eight 9.2in and twelve 6inin a battery. Protection was reduced in these, the parts ofthe barbettes fore and aft of the citadel being reduced to10in and the 1in upper deck armour being abolished. Thespeed of ‘B1’ was reduced to 18 knots, the barbettes thick-ened again and the turret backs reduced in favour of thearmour deck slopes. ‘B2’ had thicker barbettes. Onenameless design under consideration in May 1902 was of19,000 tons, with 18.5 knots speed, four 12in, twelve9.2in and twelve 6in; a British predecessor of the Aki andSatsuma.‘C’ and her successors were much more radical. The 6in

guns were abolished and the heavy guns placed in trian-gular redoubts at the ends of the ship, each having twin

12in, a twin 9.2in and two single 9.2in. It is not clear howthese barbettes were arranged; possibly asymmetrically, oreven superimposed. The side armour within the citadelwas reduced to 7in except for 8in abreast the redoubts.The ‘D’ designs were also very heavily armed, with four

12in, eight 9.2in housed in twin turrets and four in singleones. Apart from the latter, the heavy armament wasconcentrated in two redoubts, fore and aft. Again, most ofthe citadel side had 7in armour. The redoubts had 8inarmour from the main deck up, on front and sides, 6in onthe rear (and presumably on the front of the afterredoubt.) An 8in ring protected the 12in barbettes wherethey rose above the redoubt. A similar arrangement wasproposed for the Warrior class cruisers. The redoubt wasroofed by 2in – plunging shell was not yet a serious threat!The gun shields were as for ‘A’.Parallel sketch designs with speeds of 18.5 and 18 knots

were tried and there were many armament variations. Inmost, the heaviest guns remained four 12in of the 40-calibre Mark IX model as in the Duncans and Formidables.One variant apparently carried 12in, 9.2in and 7.5in, butwas soon dropped. Designs with twelve or sixteen 10inand no 12in were also considered. This ‘All-Medium-Gun’ idea was widely favoured at the time and Brazilordered such ships from Elswick. However, Admiral May’sstudies suggested that for ships of about 15,000 tons, the9.2in, firing a 380lb shell, was a better proposition thanthe 10in 500pdr. The Constructor responsible for the newbattleships was J H Narbeth, who many years laterpresented a paper giving an outline of his problems to theRoyal Institution of Naval Architects.After a considerable time, it became clear that the

14,000 ton limit could not survive if the ships were tocarry a heavier armament than their predecessors. ByNovember 1902 a displacement of 16,000 or 16,100 tonsand the abolition of the 6in armament were being consid-ered.At this point it is as well to see what ‘Foreign Powers’

were up to. In 1900 France had authorized the Républiqueclass, much larger than previous French ships. The first ofthis class had a 164.7mm (6.4in) secondary battery, latergoing to single turreted 194mm (7.6in) when the twin6.4in turrets proved cramped. Their side armour was

66

LORD NELSON ANDAGAMEMNON

Lord Nelson and Agamemnon were the Royal Navy’s last and most formidablepre-Dreadnought battleships. In this article Keith McBride looks at the lengthy gestationprocess of the design and the arguments surrounding the composition of their main and

secondary batteries.

T

Lord Nelson with funnel bands and short funnels, photographed between 1909 and 1911. (CPL)

class at 3,000 yards. (This point is mentioned by OscarParkes as having been raised by Admiral John Hopkins, arecent Controller.) A very powerful 10in 50 calibre gun,with penetration equal to a 35 calibre 12in MkIX, wasdesigned, but apparently not built.By April 1903 Narbeth reported that the design could

be completed in full detail in three months, and asked tobe relieved of other duties to concentrate on this once thefinal decisions had been made. As usual, model tests wereonly begun at this late stage; the ConstructiveDepartment had a portfolio of models available, and fromextensive experience over the past fifteen years or so, hada good idea of how the design would work out. It washoped to call for tenders from the shipbuilders in July andto place contracts in October.On 17 April, reports on test tank model ‘OT’ arrived

and were evidently satisfactory; the after part wasunchanged from the Formidable. Orders were given for itto be run at 16,350 tons displacement and 16,150ihp. Inthe meantime, Vickers reported that the new 12in 45calibre gun would fire the existing 850lb shell at 2850fps,and that the mountings would stand 3100fps. The Mark Xwould weigh 57 tons, and the guns for the 1904-05 shipscould be supplied from June to September 1905. It wouldbe possible to fit enlarged chambers if the new propellentunder discussion was adopted. Money was, as ever, tight,and the Controller did not want contracts placed tooearly, before work on the hardware could be started.On 6 August 1903 design ‘G’ was formally approved by

the Board of Admiralty, the displacement being 16,350tons, without a Board Margin, which would mean an

additional 200 tons. The way ahead should have beenclear, but in fact the fur was about to fly. On 5 September,Philip Watts the DNC wrote that ‘I personally concur inthe trustworthiness of the results obtained’. It wasintended that the ships should be capable of being dockedat any at the three Home Ports, Portsmouth, Plymouth orChatham.New docks were planned or building at the former two;

Chatham had dropped out of the first rank while Francewas the main threat, but was now coming back intocontention as Germany moved into the position ofPotential Enemy No 1. The Entente Cordiale as yet lay inthe future. On 17 September, Watts wrote to theController proposing an increase of beam in order toensure stability. The Board had somewhat reluctantlyagreed to twin rudders, now Watts proposed three. It nowcame out, after much prodding by the Controller, that thedesign could not be docked at Chatham, and could onlybe docked at Portsmouth by using the Fountain Lakeentrance and doing additional dredging outside it. By thistime, displacement had grown to 16,500 tons, againwithout Board Margin, which did not inspire the Board’sconfidence in the design, especially since it had been solong in preparation.A long and angry typed note of October 1903 shows

that it had been the Admiralty’s intention to build threeof ‘the new battleship’ by contract under the 1903-04programme, which had been laid before Parliament inMarch 1903. Design work had been in progress since July1902, about the usual time-scale. Since it was now toolate to put the 1903-04 ships out to tender, they were laid

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‘B3a’ had only eight 9.2in, housed in four twin turrets; thispermitted freeboard forward to be increased to 24ft andthe axial height of the forward 12in guns to 27ft. Thetraining arcs of the 12in could be increased to 50° foreand 50° aft of the beam; 280° for each turret. It was hopedthat 150 tons could be saved on the 12in and 9.2inbarbettes. The resulting ship would cost £1,240,000 anddisplace 15,400 tons, not much more than the Formidable.‘B3b’ would retain the ten 9.2in and include ‘B3a’simprovements; she would cost £1,300,000 on 15950 tons.‘B3c’ would retain twelve 9.2in, plus of course the four12in. She would cost £1,370,000 and displace 16350 tons,the same as the King Edward VIIs.In January 1903, at a rather late stage, the Admiralty

asked the Ordnance Board to obtain designs for a morepowerful 12in gun, as introduced by the Americans in1902. This became the Mark X 45 calibre; Narbeth notedthat four would require some 95 to 100 tons extra weight,besides stronger mountings and a considerable ‘growthfactor’. In fact, this major change was handled quickly andeasily; the existing mountings and ring bulkheads provedto have strength to spare. The turret rings were in factconsiderably smaller than previous ones. It was some timebefore enough data on firing the new charges in theexisting Mark IX 40 calibre gun was available, but allwent well. The Mark X was used not only in the LordNelson and Agamemnon, but the as yet undreamed-ofDreadnought, Bellerophon, Invincible and Indefatigable. TheVickers 12in design and mounting were accepted, whilethe 9.2in 50 calibre ones were by Elswick.

As always, ammunition stowage presented problems.The ships, like most pre-dreadnoughts, had fore and aftammunition passages below the armoured deck, and it washoped to stow fourteen 9.2in rounds per gun in these. Thesize of the charge cases was fixed at 36in x 20in diameterfor 9.2in and 45in x 17.5in for 12in, which would permitthe use of existing cases. The new 50 calibre 9.2in, justintroduced for the King Edward VIIs, was to be used,requiring the larger charges.Much concern was felt about a new ‘Rendable’ type

shell, which was an armour-piercer with a sizeable burster;a 6in specimen pierced a 10in KC plate and was picked upintact. Admittedly, the equivalent range was only 800yards, but who knew what a larger calibre ‘Rendable’might do?Designs ‘B3’, ‘B’ and ’B5’ were in the lead at this point

in time. ‘B3’ carried four 12in and ten 9.2in,‘B4’ four 12inand twelve 9.2in and ‘B5’ twelve 10in. All had 18 knotsspeed, slower than the reported speeds of most foreignships. ‘B3’ and ‘B4’ could carry their secondary guns ineither an 8in battery or in separate redoubts for the sameweight. About October 1903 the ‘B’ designs were redesig-nated ‘G’ onward. Designs ‘E’ with 16 10in, ‘F’ possiblywith eight 12in, and ‘H’ with twelve 12in and of 18,400tons, were also considered at various times. Narbethfavoured ‘F’ and brought up the possibility of ‘H’, but itwas decided to stick to the ‘G’ designs with the traditionalfour 12in. The designs with all 10in were rejected on theground that this gun could not pierce the belt or mainturrets of the French 1900 programme République/Liberté

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Agamemnon as completed. (CPL)

Lord Nelson, photographed at Devonport. (CPL)

engine rooms. It took a lot of effort to shoehorn every-thing into a limited hull space; the citadel was only 190ftlong against 225ft in the King Edward VII. Every effort wasmade to adjust the various armour and backing thick-nesses to present a smooth exterior, with no angles intowhich enemy shells might bite. The side armour was KC,turret tops being KNC. The 12pdr anti-torpedo boat gunswere increased to twenty-four; no-one worried undulyabout the extra topweight.Throughout the design process, weight and space were

at a premium. It was decided to accept a slightly deeperdraught rather than to increase length or beam. It was asusual suggested that weight be saved by fitting faster-running machinery, but the Controller and the First Lord(= Secretary of the Navy) stuck firmly to the traditionalpolicy of fitting slow-running machinery, which was lessliable to hot bearings and other forms of grief.The reasons for the docking fiasco are obscure, but it is

at least possible that Watts, who has been described as abrilliant but lazy man, careless over detail, was trying toget the Admiralty committed to larger ships than theywanted, and that he either could not or would not get theConstructive Department to do what the Board wanted.Two final bridges remained to be crossed. In 1902,

thanks to British mediation, Chile and Argentina had

declared peace with each other. This threw two Chileanbattleships building in Britain and two Argentine cruisersbuilding in Italy onto the open market. After much nego-tiation and intrigue, the cruisers went to Japan, as Kasugaand Nisshin, the necessary amount of gold coin beingmade available by the British embassy in Rome, just intime for them to sail and take part in the Russo-JapaneseWar. The British Government agreed, somewhat reluc-tantly, to purchase the two Chilean battleships, whichbecame HMS Triumph and Swiftsure. However, theyinsisted on two armoured ships being sacrificed from the1904-05 programme, and one ‘G5’ battleship and oneMinotaur class armoured cruiser, provisionally namedOrion, were accordingly cancelled. In the meantime, SirJohn Fisher, the First Sea Lord designate, wrote to LordSelborne, urging him to cancel the two remaining LordNelson battleships, given that thinking about theDreadnought was already well advanced. However, LordSelborne refused, saying that he favoured building eachyear the best ships possible in that year. Even at the firsttwo meetings of the Dreadnought Committee in late1904, Watts advanced ‘Super-Lord Nelson’ designs, firstwith four 12in and eighteen 9.2in, of which six were incasemates under the muzzles of the 12in guns (possiblylike the German ships of the early 1890s?), and then with

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71

down as King Edward VIIs in the Dockyards, Africa atChatham, Britannia at Portsmouth and Hibernia atDevonport. The opportunity was taken to fit longer 6inguns in these ships, and ‘the New Battleships’ weredeferred to the 1904-05 programme. May and no doubtthe rest of the Board were very angry at Watts, but thelatter was in a stronger position than might be thought;only two years before, his predecessor White had beeneased out hastily after the fiasco over the Royal YachtVictoria and Albert; to lose a second DNC in two yearswould, to quote Oscar Wilde, have looked like careless-ness. Naval matters were rightly of intense public concernat the time and such a scandal might have brought thegovernment down.Apart from losing the year 1903-04, the deadline for the

1904-05 naval estimates was now getting near; workcontinued with great intensity on what had been DesignB3b, but was now re-numbered design ‘G’. On 13November, the Controller asked the reason for the infe-rior hull form of G5; Watts explained the variations in the‘G’ series:

– G was the 16,350 ton design as approved on 6 Aug 03.– G1 was as modified after approval; she had an additionalpumping engine for the turrets, a 3in torpedo directortower, extra coal hoists, increased torpedo aircompressor plant, and a wider beam; this put her up to16,500 tons.

– G2 was G1 lengthened to give a 200 ton Board Margin

for any additional weights added later and started at16,900 tons. Despite the additional engine, onlyenough hydraulic power was provided to work the 12inturrets and the 9.2in ones on one side simultaneously.

– G3 was G increased to 16,550 tons, with boats carriedat flying deck level. It might be necessary to use 45ftsteam pinnaces instead of the usual 56ft ones. Thesides of the 9.2in gunhouses were reduced to 7in from8in, the roofs were to remain unchanged. If the weightof boats and the thickness of the 9.2in turret sides werekept as in G1, G3’s displacement would be 16,600tons.

– G4 was G1 but with only 10 x 9.2in (4x2 and 2x1) togive 200 tons Board Margin, i.e. 16,500 tons ‘Legend’ or‘Navy List’.

– G5 was G4 but with beam reduced to 79ft 6in to get,just, into the Chatham docks, everything elseunchanged. Speed would be slightly reduced but on 13November Watts wrote to the Controller that heshould still expect 18kts.

G5 was finally accepted by the Board of Admiralty on 10February 1904.As usual, a mass of detail had to be settled. The stern

had to be safe without support when docking, there had tobe sufficient space to enter the 9.2in turrets from theirroofs but below the flying deck on which the boats and12pdr anti-torpedo boat guns were placed. More electricpower was needed, but the dynamos were not to be in the

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Sir Charles Monro and General Birdwood in dicussion on the quarterdeck of Lord Nelson during the Gallipoli campaign, with otherbattleships of the British squadron visible in the background. (CPL)

A wartime view of Lord Nelson, possibly during the Dardanelles campaign, showing the searchlights added to her mainmast. (CPL)

four 12in and sixteen 9.2in housed in eight turrets, fourper side. He got no support, and this effort may merelyhave been a committee tactic to draw out possible criticsof the Dreadnought.The remaining two ships were laid down, with a

planned completion date of 22 August 1907: Lord Nelsonat Palmers on the Tyne, and Agamemnon at Beardmore’s atDalmuir. The dates were not kept as Lord Fisher seizedtheir turrets for the Dreadnought, so that they were notready for service until 1908. On trials they did well.Agamemnon ran hers, possibly with ballast instead ofturrets, on 17 to 28 August 1907, with great success. Sheachieved 11.75 knots on the 1/5 power thirty-houreconomical speed trial against a hoped-for 11.2, on the30-hour 7/10 power ‘maximum continuous speed’ trial16.86 against 16.25, and on the eight-hour full power trial18.8 knots against a contract speed of 18, the draught atthe start being in each case 26ft 6in forward and 27ft 6inaft. Vibration was reported as very slight at all speeds,especially during the 1/5 and full power trials. Steeringqualities were exceptional, the Agamemnon responding to

the slightest touch of the rudder, but being easily straight-ened by using plenty of opposite helm. Even inexperi-enced quartermasters had no difficulty holding the shipon a steady course and she handled much better than thesmaller Majestic or Irresistible.Her turning circle was exceptionally small, the average

tactical diameter being 363 yards against 530 for theDuncan and 438 for the King Edward VII.Behaviour in the small amount of bad weather encoun-

tered was good, though some water was taken over thebow, due to its shape and the new-fangled (for the Navy)hawsepipe anchors. There were the almost inevitableminor defects: poor ventilation in the Leading Stokers’bathrooms, minor troubles with the compasses and thereversing gear. It was also noticed that part of the forefunnel became red hot during the full power trial, causingthe flying deck to rise, which suggests some over-enthusi-astic stoking.During the transitional period while only a few dread-

noughts existed, they were in the front line, but by 1914their lack of speed, usually listed as 18.5 knots, hamperedthem. The British pair were well liked by their crews, whowere quite prepared to take on early dreadnoughts orbattlecruisers. They were better protected than theDreadnought against both gunfire and underwater attack.The two-calibre armament gave little trouble except atlong ranges, near the limit for the 9.2in. Their metacen-tric height was 3.4ft against 5.3ft in the King Edwards,which made them steady gun platforms, though lessresistant to capsize. Being heavily armoured, they weresent to the Dardanelles, where they exchanged some hardknocks with the Turkish shore batteries, and supportedthe Gallipoli landings. Afterwards they remained in theAegean to keep an eye on the Goeben/Yavuz. Standingorders were that neither ship was to engage her singly. On22 January 1918, when she made her long-awaited sortiefrom the Dardanelles, one was away, as the localcommander, Admiral Gough-Calthorpe, had sailed in heron a ceremonial visit, so the Raglan and M28 passedunavenged. The then First Sea Lord, Admiral Wemyss,thought this ‘perfectly damnable’, but was apparentlyunable to do anything about it. As it happened, theGoeben hit three mines, and was not repaired until thelate 1920s, while the Breslau was also mined, and sank.While at Salonika, Agamemnon claimed to have shotdown a Zeppelin; perhaps a case of the old vanquishingthe new.At the end of the war, Agamemnon was converted into

the world’s first radio-controlled target ship, but the day ofmixed armament ships was gone. They were alwaysregarded as very good, tough ships, but the First WorldWar came too late for them. Like the mule, they hadneither pride of ancestry nor hope of posterity, but, asshown at the Dardanelles and Gallipoli, they coulddeliver a good kick.

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The bow of Lord Nelson in dry dock during the First WorldWar. (CPL)