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NEGOTIATION AS TENSION MANAGEMENT: A MODEL FOR BUSINESS AND

OTHER INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 1

Tony English

School of Commerce, Flinders University

SCHOOL OF COMMERCE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES: 03-11

ISSN: 1441-3906

Abstract

International managers and negotiators often talk about problems in terms of dilemmas and

other tensions generated by myriad environmental forces, including cultural differences,

politics and personal traits. The generic tension is ‘two phenomena in a dynamic relationship

that involves both competition and complementarity.’ The main premise of this conceptual

paper is that tension-based thinking is normal; we will better understand negotiation if we

study the tension construct and bring it to centre stage. ‘Tension management’ is the process

of identifying and acting upon tensions. Tension-based analysis pervades the literature of

negotiation but the generic tension construct is not recognised, let alone exploited, by

analysts, educators or practitioners. A flexible model of negotiation, built on Phatak and

Habib’s (1996) model of the international context, is proposed as a systematic way of using

the tension construct to understand and manage negotiations, especially where cultural

differences complicate the transaction. Although the paper’s focus is international, tension

management applies in principle to any negotiation.

1 This article is developed from a presentation to a conference of the Australian and New Zealand Academy of Management (English 2002).

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During 1993–1995, the author asked seventy-eight managers and trade officials to define the

key elements of international business transactions, including aspects of negotiation (English

2001). This group comprised Australians, Thais, Indonesians, Americans, Britons, Canadians

and Malaysians. Thirteen negotiation cases were collected in 1999 and 2000. They concerned

international business alliances, the Hong Kong Handover, hostage release, the Torres Strait

Treaty between Papua New Guinea and Australia, and the 1998 Kyoto conference on

greenhouse gas emissions. As with the previous study (English 2001), the interview

transcripts and notes for the negotiation cases include explicit and implicit references to

dilemma, contradiction, contrast, conflict, paradox and other binary relationships. I give the

umbrella label “tensions” to such concepts, which the informants associate with cultural,

political and other forces in their personal, organizational and broader environments (English

2001). For example, a business negotiator knows a bribe to a corrupt official will revive a

negotiation with a potential ally. The CEO tells the negotiator to pay, but to do so would

breach the negotiator’s moral code. The negotiator must deal with the tension generated by

endemic corruption and the mismatch between corporate and personal ethics.

As negotiation scenarios are replete with tensions, I propose that people will become

better at analyzing and managing negotiations if they develop a refined understanding of

tension types and dynamics, and of the forces that generate tensions. I further propose that we

can improve analysis and practice through a systematic search for significant tensions.

Building on English (2001, 2002), this paper offers a model that assumes we can recognize,

understand and manage the tension as a core element of negotiation. The focus here is

international but the model also applies in principle to domestic transactions.

Tensions issue from diverse cultural and other forces in the negotiation context. The

forces that give rise to the ethical tension described above include corporate ethics, personal

ethics and endemic corruption. The list of forces is open in order to reflect the complex

system of interactive forces from which the negotiator must distil manageable order, without

respite. This is the reality that confronts the negotiator, who must extract order from chaos by

deciding what forces ought to be considered for a particular negotiation. In international

transactions, we should always consider culture as it is often a powerful force that generates

myriad tensions and influences the way we perceive and react to them. On the other hand,

culture does not stand alone; nor is it necessarily a dominant or even significant force in a

given international transaction.

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For the purposes of this paper, culture is a set of meanings and associated behaviours

that derive from experience, and tend to be shared by groups of people who accept an identity

such as Italian, Sinhalese, Tamil, Masai or Japanese. Tend is a crucial word. As argued by

Avruch (1998, 2000), culture is distributed, interpreted and played out unevenly within a

given group according to the individual’s experience, psychology, and mix of social

locations. It follows that culture cannot be homogenous, static or concrete; nor is it simply an

active force on passive people.

In my model the tension scenario is a set of tensions that express the actual or potential

influence of culture and other contextual forces on a specific negotiation. Some tensions may

be detected in more than one negotiation but the combination and meaning of each tension

and the set are specific to a case.

In a negotiation there are two categories of tension—content (issues, positions,

interests, and desired outcomes), and process (style, strategy, tactics, and other behavior). We

do not categorize tensions as external or immediate because forces from both categories may

generate a single tension; for example, the ethical tension discussed above. The tensions are

categorized under content and process because negotiators and analysts tend to think about

what is negotiated and how we go about it.

Lewicki, Saunders and Minton (1999) commend “models [that organise forces as] very

good devices for guiding our thinking about global negotiations” (390). The tension scenario

is a guide to thought and action because the process of defining and redefining the tensions is

a form of framing that assists the negotiator to identify and assess the contextual forces at

work in a specific transaction. A clear context should foster well-tailored strategies and

tactics that equip the negotiator to mould the transaction, yet are themselves retailored to suit

contextual change.

The Basic Tension Construct Defined and Illustrated

A tension is here defined as “two phenomena in a dynamic relationship that involves both

competition and complementarity.” Tensions are expressed as dichotomies to provide a

parsimonious and manageable reflection of tension-based thinking; a double-headed arrow

(↔) represents the relationship between the poles, which must be nouns (perhaps with a

qualifier) because the essence of a tension is the relationship between two phenomena.

Personal ethics ↔ corporate ethics summarizes the tension in the opening paragraph of this

paper. Within the frame of that negotiation, the poles compete and neither makes sense

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without the other; hence they are complementary. The difference between personal and

corporate ethics is unlikely to be absolute, and there may be room for compromise, so the

arrow in this case is a continuum. In other cases the arrow may signify rigid separation,

depending on particular circumstances and individual perceptions.

The tension poles have arbitrary labels with rich meaning for people dealing with the

problem at hand. A hostage negotiator trying to gauge the amount a kidnapper will accept to

release a foreign manager in Colombia must deal with many tensions, including no payment

↔ full payment. This “content” tension reflects the issue of payment: how much and under

what conditions. Refusal to pay anything may lead to permanent captivity or worse; full

payment may encourage other kidnappings or a demand for more money because the

kidnapper sees the negotiator as an easy touch. At the outset, the kidnapper demands a

specific ransom. The balance of power lies with the kidnapper in negotiator control ↔

kidnapper control. The negotiator must move the balance of power from the right pole

towards the left one: “You are trying to get from a position where you’ve got virtually zero

per cent of control to a point where you’ve got at least fifty per cent” (Hostage negotiator

interviewed in London in 1999). This tension concerns the negotiation process. The

negotiator must induce the kidnapper to accept a figure representing a balance between the

two poles of the first tension. This maneuvering along the continuum to gain control is an

example of tension management.

The tactics chosen to manage a transaction are not tensions, but as part of the

immediate context they may generate or intensify tensions. For example, the bribery tactic

required by the CEO in the ethics case above has created personal ethics ↔ corporate ethics,

with meaning specific to this transaction.

The tension as defined in this paper should not be confused with “tension” used as a

popular term for anxiety, suspense, stress, and so on. Such interpretation may lead to a

general view of the tension as a negative construct that works against positive and successful

approaches to negotiation. As a construct, the tension is neutral.

Tensions and Their Management in the Negotiation Literature

Variations on the tension and tension management are explicit or implicit across time, space

and society, sometimes with cultural differences that may influence international

negotiations.The negotiation literature is replete with tensions and tension management, but

the treatment is ad hoc; no one recognizes the generic value of the constructs. Lax and

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Sebenius (1986) see “a central, inescapable tension between cooperative moves to create

value jointly and competitive moves to gain individual advantage” (29–30). Their term

“tension management” refers to the way we create joint value with allies and negotiate our

share of the creation. Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1996) base similar ideas on game theory.

Mnookin and Susskind (1999) explore “the tensions of agency” (2), including the balance

between the interests of the principal and the negotiating agent. Womack and Walsh (1997)

present a tension-based model of the relationship between negotiator and hostage-taker.

In Fisher, Kopelman and Schneider (1994: 40) a table summarizes the Sikh-Hindu

conflict in the Punjab as a set of cultural and other tensions that reflect the core issues of

sovereignty and water supply. Fisher, Schneider, Borgwardt and Ganson (1997) contains a

checklist of frequent differences of interest in cross-border negotiations: one party’s concern

with “form” is paired with the other party’s concern with “substance,” and so on (64).

“Tension management” could describe the process of moving the focus away from positions

towards underlying interests. Watkins and Winters (1997) is a tension-based study of

attempts to manage international dilemmas.

The negotiators’ cultural identity may generate a “fortress” mentality that overwhelms

the “bridging” attitude essential to good communication (Salacuse 1993). To manage this

tension, the negotiator must grasp the other contextual forces that combine with culture to

bolster the fortress mentality. The way culture interacts with other forces is apparent in

disputes about water supply (Faure & Rubin 1993). Salacuse (1998) relates cultural

influences on negotiating style to ten dimensions that are clear tensions.

Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are tensions that reflect the influence of value

differences on cross-cultural relationships (Hofstede 1980, 1994). Values are “broad

tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others. Values are feelings with an arrow to

it: they have a plus and a minus side” (1994: 8). The tension-based model of international

negotiation demonstrated later in this paper absorbs four dimensions identified by Hofstede.

According to Lewicki et al. (1999: 390–393) the dimensions enlighten “global” negotiations:

1. Power Distance (from small to large): “The extent to which the less powerful [and

more powerful?] members of institutions within a country expect and accept that power is

distributed unequally” (1994: 262). Where power distance is large, decisions tend to be taken

at the top (e.g. Malaysia); where it is small, decision-making tends be distributed throughout

the organization (e.g. New Zealand). International negotiators from cultures with large power

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distance “may need to seek approval from their supervisors more frequently, and for more

issues, leading to a slower negotiation process” (Lewicki et al. 1999: 392).

2. Individualism versus Collectivism: In collectivist cultures (e.g. Indonesia) people are

oriented towards “strong, cohesive ingroups [that offer protection] in exchange for

unquestioning loyalty” (Hofstede 1994: 260). In individualist cultures (e.g. Australia) “ties

between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or

her immediate family only [primarily?]” (261). Negotiators from collectivist societies tend to

focus on relationships, so “changing a negotiator changes the relationship, which may take a

long time to rebuild” (Lewicki et al. 1999: 393).

3. Femininity versus Masculinity: In a feminine society (e.g. Finland) “social gender

roles overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender and concerned with

the quality of life” (Hofstede 1994: 261). In a masculine society (e.g. Japan) the “roles are

clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough and focused on material success;

women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life”

(262). Negotiators from feminine cultures may be “more likely to have empathy for the other

party and to seek compromise” while those from masculine cultures are likely to be more

competitive (Lewicki et al. 1999: 393).

4. Uncertainty Avoidance (from weak to strong): This is “the extent to which the

members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations” (Hofstede 1994:

263). Negotiators from countries with strong uncertainty avoidance (e.g. Greece) “are not

comfortable with ambiguous situations and are more likely to seek stable rules and

procedures when they negotiate” (Lewicki et al. 1999: 393). Those from cultures with weak

avoidance (e.g. USA) “are likely to adapt to quickly changing situations and will be less

uncomfortable when the rules of the negotiation are changing or shifting” (393).

The dimensions raise many questions for the practitioner. As the research was based on

nations, should we assume that Malaysian Chinese negotiators have the same tendencies as

Malaysian Tamils or ethnic Malays? Do the practitioner’s tendencies change with experience

in international negotiation? Hofstede’s framework is not perfect, but it does guide

negotiators to some cultural differences that may influence particular negotiators (Brett

2001). “May” is crucial: every negotiator is unique; no one is “normal.” Personal traits and

experience, including internalized culture, temper the environmental and immediate forces of

cultural difference. This generates group ↔ person, a tension in every negotiation (English

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1996). In group work, we should not try in vain to stifle individual differences in culture and

other traits, as we can highlight difference and, paradoxically, employ it to the advantage of

group and individual (Smith & Berg 1997a, 1997b).

A thread of “compete or cooperate” connects Hofstede’s dimensions with negotiation

style, dissected by various authors into more or less complex categories and graphics, often

based on the dual concern model (Blake & Mouton 1964, Pruitt & Rubin 1986). It has four

(sometimes five) styles that reflect the blend of concern for one’s own and others’ interests; it

weighs “assertiveness” against “cooperativeness.” Style is complex; but, regardless of

variation between models in the definitions of labels and the number of dimensions, style

comes down to behavior, at a point in time or in a pattern over time, that locates a negotiator

on the continuum in competition ↔ cooperation. This tension has rich meaning and is

consistent with depictions of style in which the extreme competitor strives to win the largest

slice of the pie—to dominate, to bully—and is more concerned with the self than the other;

whereas the cooperative stylist wants the fairest outcome, may be subordinative or

accommodating, and tends to be concerned with the other as well as the self, perhaps because

otherwise there will be no agreement (Cohen 1980; Fisher, Ury & Patton 1991; Hawkins &

Hudson 1990; Jandt 1985; Thomas & Kilmann 1974). Yin ↔ yang and other tensions are at

the core of Fang (1999), who holds that outsiders cannot understand Chinese negotiating style

without delving into the cultural and other forces that influence Chinese competitive and

cooperative behavior. Kanayama (1996) studies style-related tensions generated by

differences in Japanese and Chinese notions of harmony and conflict. The label ‘tension

manager’ fits the expert negotiators that are said to move themselves and others back and

forth between competitive and cooperative styles (Blackman 1997: 53; Kozicki 1993: 7;

Mulder 1992: 45).

The literature invites negotiators to be sensitive; that is, to be attentive to the blend of

cultural differences and other contextual forces in specific situations. The blend suggests

sensitivity ↔ insensitivity in the individual and within a group. The arrow is a continuum, as

no one is entirely sensitive or insensitive, and the negotiator’s sensitivity is changeable. As

negotiators need to assess their own and others’ sensitivity to the complex forces at play, the

tension applies to all negotiations. In the literature there is also a constant sense of boundaries

associated with cultural differences and other forces, including the substantive issues under

negotiation. Insiders ↔ outsiders encapsulates the boundaries and is present in all

negotiation scenarios. If agreement is reached, the parties have breached these boundaries

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that hinder communication, and have moved some way along the continuum from right to

left.

In summary, explicit and implicit tensions, and examples of tension management,

pervade studies of negotiation process and content by writers of different cultural origins. On

the other hand, the treatments are independent and ad hoc; no one recognizes the tension and

tension management for their power as generic constructs.

International Negotiation: a Tension-based Definition

If tensions and tension management are at negotiation’s core, an apt definition of negotiation

should make them explicit. Many definitions embody the tension because they are founded

on the idea that all negotiation involves actual or potential conflict: “a process whereby a

compromise is reached by parties whose interests are in conflict” (Bartos 1977: 23); “a field

of knowledge and endeavor that focuses on gaining the favor of people from whom we want

things” (Cohen 1980: 15); “the art of reaching an agreement by resolving differences”

(Kozicki 1993: xiii); “a combination of searching, dividing, game-playing and fraud” (Cross

1977: 35). Most definitions assume conflict is overt from the start. In fact, actual or potential

allies with compatible intentions (e.g. to form a business alliance) may wish to confirm them

and negotiate acceptable ways of achieving them. Nonetheless, actual or potential conflict is

inherent in all definitions, if only because most negotiators want to gain, not lose.

Each of the foregoing definitions subsumes the tension construct, because tensions are

at the heart of transactions involving actual or potential conflict over positions, interests and

elements of process, including style and tactics. Parties communicate because they need to

manage those tensions in ways that contribute to an acceptable agreement. Therefore my

definition of negotiation is “consultation between two or more parties that involves the

management of tensions associated with attempts to seek an agreement. The tensions may be

actual or potential, explicit or implicit.” This definition seems to be compatible with any

other definition and with any negotiation format (e.g. multilateral transactions, mediation); if

we include “international” before “consultation” the definition suits diplomacy and any other

international domain. Even though people of the same nationality could represent different

nations, most international negotiations have cross-cultural complications: “Negotiation is a

social process that is embedded in a much larger context. This context increases in

complexity when more than one culture is involved, making negotiation a highly complicated

process when it occurs across borders” (Lewicki et al. 1999: 379).

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Application: A Tension-Based Model of International Negotiation

My research and the literature indicate that international negotiation involves tension

management. This calls for a model that exploits the tension construct, organizes the

relationship between tensions and their origins, and locates culture within a system of

contextual influences. The model must help practitioners to define negotiation scenarios and

achieve satisfactory outcomes.

An operational definition of tension management is: “(a) deliberate action taken to

identify and define relevant tensions, and/or (b) any calculated action that alters the balance

of tensions or regulates their influence, and/or (c) any calculated attempt to avoid action that

would influence tensions.” Items (b) and (c) include action or inaction by a negotiator who

senses tensions but may not define them or have an explicit intention to influence them. A

single managerial act may influence more than one tension. The definition subsumes two

main functions: first, identifying and defining relevant tensions, and second, dealing with

them.

The tensions that comprise the scenario have traits and categories that require

explanation in managerial terms. Scenario definition is the searching and framing process

designed to fulfill the first managerial function in the definition of tension management. The

negotiator fulfills the second function by using the familiar range of negotiating skills

covered in myriad other works; the negotiator who formally defines a scenario should be able

to apply the familiar skills with better focus.

The scenario is the set of tensions relevant to a specific transaction; myriad forces in

the external and immediate environments generate the tensions. The combination and

meaning of tensions are specific to a transaction; some may apply to other negotiations, but

the interpretation must be case-specific.

Tension Traits

Tension traits concern the nature of the poles, the relationship between them, and the

significance of a tension in a given scenario. The traits identified here are not exhaustive but

they are the ones most likely to serve the negotiator. Most tensions used to illustrate the traits

are drawn from earlier discussion and do not need elaboration.

Some poles are conceptual contrasts, regardless of the way they relate to one another

(yin ↔ yang). Others are obviously different but are not in clear contrast (content ↔

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process). Some poles are on a continuum; they phase into and out of one another and there

may not be a point at which they are thought to be clearly separate: for example,

individualism ↔ collectivism, and content ↔ process to the East Asian respondents in Peng

and Nisbett (1999) and Nisbett, Peng, Choi and Norenzayan (2001). In others, the poles may

interact but would seem discrete to most people, as in self ↔ other, where the self is a

distinct person who interacts with other persons and may be more or less concerned with their

interests as well as his or her own.

To the negotiator as manager, the tension traits that seem to matter most are balance

and intensity; the former because it expresses the relative strengths of two interactive,

significant phenomena; the latter because it expresses the actual or potential influence of the

tension on the negotiation. Perceived balance and intensity will influence the negotiator’s

action. The codes in brackets below are applied to tensions when they are formulated, and

may change as a negotiation is reassessed. Broad codes are preferred over scales because

numbers, and statistical analysis based on them, are likely to create a sense of precision that is

at odds with informed speculation about the influence of forces in an open system.

Balance (B). The poles may have equal weight (BE), or one may outweigh the other

(BL for the left; BR for the right). Take individualism ↔ collectivism: in America, the former

pole tends to prevail; in Japan, the latter; in Israel the balance is about even (Hofstede 1994:

54). The balance is assessed for a given time, but may not be stable. A negotiator who makes

cultural gaffes may move to the right in sensitivity ↔ insensitivity, but if she recognizes and

eliminates the problem, she may move the other way. If she makes more gaffes, the

momentum may reverse. At a given time, my style may be “collaborative” but as a shock

tactic I might switch the balance to “competitive.”

Intensity (I). Intensity level (high (IH), medium (IM) or low (IL)) is the perceived (a)

significance of a content tension, in terms of the consequences of a failed negotiation, and (b)

the potential of a process tension to cause a negotiation to fail. “Low” does not imply

weakness or insignificance. If a single high level tension dominates other tensions at a given

time it is cardinal; it is recorded in capitals and does not need a code for intensity. For

example, in ransom negotiations no payment ↔ full payment might dominate other tensions

defined by a practitioner working for an insurance company. Intensity level may modulate

during a negotiation, through managerial or other influence.

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All tensions are manageable, in balance and/or intensity, by the right negotiator for a

specific transaction. An individualistic American negotiator may realize a negotiation is

going nowhere because he is self-focused. He may take action to focus more on the group

interests of his Japanese counterparts, thereby changing the balance of individualism ↔

collectivism in negotiator relationships. Such action might also reduce the intensity from high

to medium or low, so that this area of difference becomes less problematic; indeed,

advantageous if handled well, because group-work seems to benefit from open acceptance

and integration of individual differences (Smith & Berg 1997a, 1997b). The tension manager

does not necessarily make a simplistic choice of one pole over another.

Environmental (macro) forces are uncontrollable in the sense that the negotiator cannot

dispose of them or modify them in any absolute way; but a negotiator who modulates the

intensity of a tension generated by them is managing their micro influence. For example, as

the English language becomes global “the need for intelligibility and the need for identity

often pull people—and countries—in opposing directions” (Crystal 1997: 116). A WTO

negotiator visiting China might not be able to change the balance of identity ↔ intelligibility

but may find a way to reduce its intensity in the interests of better communication in the

specific negotiation.

Tension Categories

There are two categories of tension—content (issues, positions, interests and desired

outcomes) and process (style, strategy, tactics and any other aspects of negotiating behavior).

The tensions are listed by category when a tension scenario is defined. Content ↔ process

reflects the play between the two categories. As cultural difference exaggerates variations in

the way we interpret and manage content, this tension is prominent in international

transactions. I might see a tension where you do not; or we might both see it but in different

ways; or only one of us might think we should do something about a given tension.

In a hostage negotiation, no payment ↔ full payment would be generated primarily by

the ransom demand, in the immediate context, and therefore should be listed under “content.”

Also in the immediate context, the negotiators’ relationship and relative bargaining power

would generate negotiator control ↔ kidnapper control. This tension directly concerns

negotiation conduct and therefore would be in the “process” list. In a different sense to the

cultural difference factor, this tension brings out the interplay of content and process. For

instance, if the hostage negotiator tries to take too much control too soon, and annoys the

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kidnapper, the former may not be able to reduce the ransom. Poor tactics and style (elements

of process) jeopardize the desired outcome (an element of content). Every tension scenario

includes content ↔ process to remind the negotiator that the interplay is always present in

one form or another.

Tension Management: Item (a)—The Process of Scenario Definition

The process of creating tension scenarios fulfills part (a) of the definition of tension

management: “deliberate action taken to identify and define relevant tensions.” The

negotiator extracts manageable order from chaotic information by defining an appropriate set

of tensions. Figure 1

Template for an International Tension Scenario

1. Content Process

2. ? ↔ ? 6. Power Distance (Large) ↔ PD (Small) 3. ? ↔ ? 7. Uncertainty Avoid. (High) ↔ UA (Low) 4. ? ↔ ? 8. Individualism ↔ Collectivism 5. ? ↔ ? 9. Competition ↔ Cooperation 10. Sensitivity ↔ Insensitivity 11. Insiders ↔ Outsiders 12. Group ↔ Person Other (? ↔ ?) (The question-marks represent the labels of non-standard tensions defined for a specific negotiation.) Key: B - Balance (E - Even, R - Right, L - Left) I - Intensity (H - High, M - Medium, L - Low) (Codes for Balance and Intensity are added to each tension when the template is used to record the tensions for a specific negotiation.)

The tension scenario is expressed as a list of tensions under two headings—“content”

and “process”—and always includes content ↔ process (Figure 1). In international

negotiation, every scenario also includes three tensions based on Hofstede’s (1980, 1994)

dimensions: power distance (large) ↔ power distance (small), uncertainty avoidance (high)

↔ uncertainty avoidance (low), and individualism ↔ collectivism. Hofstede’s masculinity-

femininity dimension is covered adequately by the style tension competition ↔ cooperation,

present in every negotiation and included in all scenarios. Also embodied in the style tension

are the complexities of the dual concern model. For the sake of parsimony, individualism ↔

collectivism also embraces low-context/high-context communication (Hall 1976), associated

with individualism at one extreme and collectivism at the other (Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey

1988). Sensitivity ↔ insensitivity is also included for reasons outlined above (p. 7). Every

scenario also includes the boundary tension, insiders ↔ outsiders (p. 7). Group ↔ person is

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always there to remind the negotiator to explore people as individuals, not as clone-like

members of cultural or other groups (p. 6). These seven tensions are always listed under

“process” but interact with content because they concern variations in the way we interpret as

well as manage negotiation. When we define a scenario we must explore the meaning of

every standard tension, in context. The seven process tensions are usually adequate. As no

scenario is definitive, Other (? ↔ ?) is always included to remind the negotiator to consider

additions that cannot be absorbed by tensions already recorded. Overall, order in the list does

not reflect significance but the cardinal tension always heads the “content” or “process”

column.

A single tension cannot convey the kaleidoscope of negotiation, while fifty would clog

the system. For international negotiations, my experience is that the eight standard tensions,

plus three or four created for the specific negotiation, capture the event and are easy to work

with. A more complex scenario tends to be unwieldy. The non-standard tensions created for

the specific transaction are usually under “content” but sometimes a few are added to the

standard seven under “process”: for example, negotiator control ↔ kidnapper control in a

hostage negotiation. The seven are prominent in my research transcripts and notes, and have

an explicit or implicit presence in the literature discussed above.

I have trained people from diverse cultures to extract tension scenarios from complex

cases (English 2001). Figure 2 represents the process used by people creating scenarios in

training programs or actual negotiations.

TENSIONS

Figure 2 The Process of Scenario Definition

?

STATE CORE ISSUES

IDENTIFY FORCES

RELEVANT TO CONTENT & PROCESS

CONSTRUCT

TENSION SCENARIO

SCAN ENVIRONMENTAL

& IMMEDIATE CONTEXTS

? REVISE

& REFINE

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Individuals can use the process well but simulations suggest it works better with groups

guided by a facilitator, who may or may not be a negotiator in the relevant transaction. To

encourage open opinion, the tension definers would normally be the negotiators and advisers

for one party. The facilitator should use the joint exploration to encourage empathy with the

players on the other side, and to discourage “the tendency [for Western teams in particular] to

lack integration and cohesion, and to be internally divisive” (March 1988: 184). Participants

build on one another’s ideas and questions. Experts may be enlisted to help explore issues,

identify and assess relevant forces, or explain the nature and implications of the standard

tensions. The process may be used to prepare for a new negotiation, analyze a current

negotiation or conduct a post-mortem.

A group session begins with discussion of scenario definition as a process. The next

step is an attempt to state the core issues (see Figure 2, p. 13) to everyone’s satisfaction, in

plain language and in a few words: for example, “sovereignty and water supply” or

“localization of managerial positions held by expatriates in Indonesia.” Brainstorming is a

good way to launch the process, especially if the participants are not familiar with the core

issues. The participants scan the two contexts to identify forces associated with the issues; the

issues themselves may be treated as contextual forces that generate tensions in the content

category. To encourage original thinking, there is no definitive list of forces but the

participants must relate identified forces to the environmental and immediate contexts. A

macro force in the former may have a micro counterpart in the latter: for instance, cultural

differences.

In plenary session and in sub-groups, the participants formulate and reformulate

tensions as they refine their grasp of the contextual forces and their significance. The labels

of the eight standard tensions for an international negotiation do not change, but their specific

meaning for the transaction is explored and refined. This may give rise to dramatic

restatement of the core issues. The process spurs the players to question their own and others’

assumptions about the case and negotiation in general. The question-marks in Figure 2 are

there to stress the value of the questioning habit.

When the participants agree on a basic scenario, they code the tensions for balance and

intensity. For an impending negotiation, the codes reflect the expected situation. For an

ongoing negotiation or a post-mortem, the choice of timing for the codes is ad hoc. This

exercise is crucial as it forces the participants to study the scenario in detail with a view to

devising, reviewing or assessing strategies and tactics that are specific to the negotiation. As

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the tensions are abstractions from an open system, and therefore interrelated, any managerial

action will influence more than one tension. An astute negotiator will keep this in mind.

The participants end up with a scenario recorded as a simple list of tensions under

content and process; the two headings are depicted as a tension (Figure 1, p. 12). Owing to

the way it was created, the list has deep meaning about a particular negotiation and serves as

a mnemonic aid, augmented by notes made during and after the exploratory sessions.

A common scenario is recorded for a group but individuals may add private tensions

associated with personal concerns that may influence a transaction. For example, Wilson

(1992) identifies internal conflict associated with the negotiator’s need to balance concern for

substantive issues with concern for personal image in the eyes of constituents and other

negotiators. Eban (1998) examines the ethical dilemmas of diplomats who must face “the

confrontation between power and conscience” (39) in their negotiation and other roles; for

example, as they attempt to reconcile the doctrine of state sovereignty with the principle of

universal human rights. Bartos (1977: 13) identifies a tension between “the individual

(competitive) desire to maximize one’s own utility and the collectivistic (cooperative) desire

to reach a fair solution.” The players are not passive objects that respond to outside forces

affecting a negotiation. Rather, they carry unique experience, cultural knowledge and other

personal traits that influence the way they see and are seen, and the way they negotiate

(Avruch 1998). If a diplomat is depressed because his wife has just left him, his feelings are

likely to influence the atmosphere and conduct of a negotiation about matters of state. He

might not discuss those feelings in public but should express them in his personal record of

the scenario.

Like negotiation itself, the process of defining scenarios is not strictly logical or linear;

it is as much art as science. Just as a sculptor works with clay, we shape and reshape the set

of tensions until we decide that the rational-intuitive exercise has created a convincing

scenario, given the core issues and the contextual forces at play.

Tension Management: Items (b) and (c)—Dealing with Tensions

By influencing tensions, the negotiator fulfills parts (b) and (c) of the definition of

tension management: any calculated action that alters the balance of tensions or regulates

their influence, and/or any calculated attempt to avoid action that would influence tensions.

They exist with or without formal identification and definition, and the negotiator may

influence them regardless of conscious and explicit intention. Someone who formally defines

16

a tension scenario may proceed to negotiate without referring to the list but will still influence

all or some of the defined tensions, as well as others that have not been defined.

The importance of the model lies in the suggestion that a negotiator who has a strong

sense of tensions is likely to respond to them with skillful action. The responses are within

the repertoire of any good international negotiator. This is an important point because the

only new skill that I advocate is scenario definition. In doing so I propose that an intellectual

grasp of the tension construct, its manifestations and its origins will equip negotiators to

refine their grasp of content and process. There will be a better foundation for action; good

negotiators can improve.

Tension Management: Some Implications for Theory and Practice

Negotiators and researchers must test the model, but it seems credible because it relies on a

pervasive way of thinking, links familiar environmental forces with a structured view of their

influence on specific transactions, and places culture in the context of other local and

international influences. This is not to say that culture-related tensions (e.g. about power

distance) are irrelevant to intra-cultural negotiations, as culture does not cease to exist

because the negotiators have common cultural origins. These tensions must also be

considered in multicultural negotiations within a country. The point is that an international

context tends to complicate negotiations through the injection of cultural, political, and other

snags that are likely to be more familiar in domestic transactions, even very complex ones

(e.g. in Israel and Sri Lanka).

Although common process tensions are prescribed for international scenarios to help

us understand and improve negotiation, the set is reinterpreted to take into account the

nuances of each transaction. It would not make sense to prescribe content tensions; but,

whatever they are for a given case, the model always relates them to the standard process

tensions. Other (? ↔ ?) encourages the negotiator to keep an open mind about forces and

their influence, so that the framework encourages flexible rather than formulaic thinking

about negotiations. Tensions are always grounded in a specific case; the detailed tension

descriptions make deep sense only in relation to that case. Conversely, the selection and

integrated explanation of the tensions elucidates the case: there is no sense of reductionism or

fragmentation. Practitioners who learn to use the model will find that it highlights rather than

obscures the specifics at the same time as it brings out general principles. For example, the

application of Hofstede’s dimensions should contribute to awareness that cultural differences

17

can be employed to advantage and need not inhibit negotiations. The model also encourages

us to see that individuals play out culture, with some flexibility: culture is not a strait-jacket.

If we accept Hofstede’s (1994) analogy of culture as “software of the mind” we must further

accept that the user can modify the software.

The model does not reduce negotiation content to tensions and only tensions. To

identify and define tensions associated with issues does not dilute those issues, nor the

positions, interests and desired outcomes associated with them. To the contrary, no one can

formulate the right content tensions without meticulous exploration of issues and their

origins. Moeover, process tensions cannot be well understood if isolated from the strategies

and tactics that are used to manage them. It follows that practitioners who define and

formulate tensions are likely to gain deep insight into issues and will be better placed to

devise strategies and tactics.

The concept of tension management is neither formulaic nor reductionist. As a unique

tension manager, the negotiator brings into play a personal repertoire of negotiation skills to

deal with the balance and intensity of tensions. He or she uses the repertoire to manage the

influence of the forces that generate sets of tensions. The model provides a framework for

identifying the forces relevant to a specific negotiation and for assessing their influence in

terms of intensity and balance. It is reasonable to assume that the searching process will assist

the practitioner to develop focused strategies and tactics to deal with that influence: “What

tensions are inherent in this negotiation? Which are most significant to me and to the other

players? Why do the tensions exist? What are their traits? How should I react? How, why and

when are there changes in the individual tensions and the scenario?” Of course, there is no

suggestion that the negotiator is (or should be) always rational or capable of flawless action.

Nonetheless, empirical research could test the hypothesis that negotiators trained to define

scenarios will report better understanding of issues, better strategic and tactical skills, and

better outcomes in later negotiations. Clarity of insight into previous negotiations could also

be tested. Associated studies could bring out the finer points of balance and intensity, identify

other significant traits, and develop sub-categories of tensions under content and process.

The model does not cast any negotiation in concrete. The tension scenario is designed

to express the dynamism of an open system while extracting manageable order from chaos at

a given point in time. If we had observe a negotiation over several weeks, we would revise

the scenario regularly to track changes in content, process and the associated environmental

forces. March (1988: 169) associates negotiation management with the “ability to analyze

18

situations and develop a comprehensive understanding of complex matters [and] continuing

awareness of and reflection on the ongoing negotiation experience.” This counsel is applied

when a team defines a scenario, takes note of trends to anticipate review, and reviews the

transaction from time to time.

There is another sense in which scenarios are not absolute. Your tensions for a given

case might differ from mine in nature or number, depending on such influences as your

personal history, your national allegiance, what you consider to be the main issues, and your

role (if any) in the negotiation.

The assertion that scenarios change, and that people may define them differently for the

same transaction, links tension management to the concepts of framing and reframing in

negotiation. Frames are “fields of vision or frames of reference that help [negotiators]

construct meaning or make sense of the situation” (Putnam & Holmer 1992: 128). We carry

and modify frames, whether or not we are aware of them. Complex personal attributes,

including our notions of negotiation itself, influence the way we define and interpret content

and process. Reframing is revision of the frame due to experience, new information or some

other development associated with the negotiation. Scholars define framing and reframing in

various ways, but “both concepts refer to the way negotiators come to understand their

situation” (128). Defining and redefining tension scenarios is a method that researchers may

use to frame and reframe the course of negotiations, with particular concern for the influence

of the negotiator as tension manager. Yet the model of negotiation as tension management is

more than a guide to research: the model also guides negotiators as they manipulate frames to

engineer acceptable outcomes for one or more parties. This complex area invites a separate

paper that explores the tension scenario and its management in the context of frame theory.

The author’s current purpose is much broader.

In summary, the model of negotiation as tension management induces us to explore

different points of view, and to refine our grasp of tension types, balance and intensity as we

create parsimonious, evolving scenarios with rich meaning that informs our action. The

tension scenario is not a catch-all frame, but a consciously defined statement of negotiation

tensions that we identify and refine as we try to take into account the gamut of biases and

other influences on our analysis and practice. Ongoing scenario definition is the serial

extraction of manageable order from chaos, based on observed change and better

understanding of things that have not changed. The approach itself is more important than

whether we accept the process tensions suggested for international transactions, whether

19

scenarios should be consistent from one analyst to another, and whether tensions can and

should be measured. From theoretical and practical points of view, perhaps what matters

most is that the model embraces and builds on other authors’ more limited concepts of

tension, specifies tension traits, and brings tension management to center stage as the essence

of negotiation.

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