G.R. No. 120066 September 9, 1999OCTABELA ALBA Vda. De RAZ, Spouses MANUEL and SUSANA BRAULIO, RODOLFO, LOURDES and BEATRIZ all surnamed ALBA,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE LACHICA,respondents.YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:Before us is an appeal bycertiorarifrom a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals dated August 18, 1992 affirmingin totothe decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch I, in Land Registration Case No. K-101, LRC Record No. K. 15104, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:1. The parcel of land described in Plan Psu-161277 and the improvements thereon situated in the Poblacion of the Municipality of Banga, Province of Aklan, Philippines, with an area of 4,845 square meters is brought under the operation of the property registration decree (PD No. 1529) and the title thereto is registered and confirmed in the name of applicant Jose Lachica, married to Adela Raz of Kalibo, Aklan, Philippines;2. A ten (10) meter road width along the national road mentioned in the application be segregated for future road widening program upon payment of just compensation to be annotated at the back of the title;3. For lack of merit, the opposition filed by the spouses Manuel and Susana Braulio, Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba are hereby DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.1The factual antecedents of the case as summed by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals are as follows:Applicant Jose Lachica filed this application for title to land on April 28, 1958 with the claim that the land applied for was purchased by him and his wife, Adela Raz from, from one Eulalio Raz. The documents attached to the application are: technical description, surveyor's certificate, certification by the chief deputy assessor of Aklan and the blue print of Psu-161277.The initial hearing was scheduled for October 31, 1958 and the certificate of publication in the Official Gazette was issued on September 23, 1958. The certification of posting of the notice of initial hearing was issued on October 13, 1958.The land applied for is residential, situated in the Poblacion of Banga, Aklan, with an area of 4,845 square meters, bounded on the northeast by the property of the Municipality of Banga (Sketch, Exh. "F").The initial hearing was held on October 31, 1958. An order of general default was issued but those who presented their opposition, namely, Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Manuel and Susana Braulio, Jose Rago, representing Apolonia Rebeco, the Director of Lands and the Municipality of Banga represented by the Provincial Fiscal, were given thirty (30) days to file their written opposition.Manuel C. Braulio and Susana P. Braulio filed their opposition on October 31, 1958. They opposed the registration of the southeastern portion of the 240 square meters of the land applied for alleging that they are the owners in fee simple and possessors of said portion and all the improvements thereon for not less than 70 years together with their predecessor-in-interest deriving their title by purchase from the original owners. They prayed for the Court to declare them the true and absolute owners of the disputed portion of the same in their names.On October 31, 1958, Octabela Vda. de Raz filed her opposition.Jose Rago filed his opposition on November 29, 1958 as the duly constituted attorney-in-fact of Apolonia Rebeco although no special power of attorney was attached. He opposed the registration of the northeastern portion of the land applied for, with an area of 43.83 square meters. He alleged that his principal is the owner by right of succession and is in the possession of said portion with all its improvements for more than 80 years together with his predecessor-in-interest, continuously, peacefully and openly under claim of ownership. He prayed that his principal be declared the true and absolute owner of the disputed portion of 43.83 square meters.1wphi1.ntOn March 22, 1966, the Court issued an Order allowing the applicant to hire another surveyor to segregate the non-controversial portion of the land applied for and to notify the oppositors and their counsels.On January 12, 1970, a motion to lift the order of general default and to admit the attached opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba, as well as a motion to admit the attached amended petition of Octabela Vda. de Raz were filed. The Court in its order dated March 21, 1970 admitted said opposition and set aside the order of default.In their opposition, Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz, alleged that they are the co-owners of a portion of the land applied for with an area of 2,262 square meters bounded on the north by Januario Masigon, Nicolas Realtor, Agustina Rebeldia and Apolonia Rebeco, on the south by Eulalio Raz and on the west by the public market of Banga. They claimed to have inherited the above-mentioned portion from their late father, Eufrosino M. Alba, who purchased the same from Dionisia Regado in 1918. Hence, they have been in possession continuously, openly and peacefully under claim of ownership of the above-mentioned portion for not less 70 years. They prayed that the disputed portion of 2,262 square meters be registered as theirpro-indivisoproperty.In her amended opposition, Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz opposed the registration of the southeastern portion of the land applied for with an area of 331.44 square meters. She claimed to have been in peaceful, continuous and open possession together with her deceased husband, Eulalio Raz, under claim of ownership of the above-mentioned portion for not less than 70 years, by purchase from its owners. She likewise opposed the registration of the western portion of the land applied for, with an area of 676 square meters, having purchased the same from its original owners on (sic) her predecessor-in-interest has been open, peaceful and continuous under claim of ownership for a period of not less than 70 years. She prayed that the portion of 331.44 square meters be registered in her name and that of the heirs of Eulalio Raz,pro indiviso., and the other portion of 676 square meters be registered solely in her name.On February 25, 1970, the applicant Dr. Jose Lachica filed his consolidated opposition and reply to the motion to lift order of default stating that there is no reason to do so under the Rules of Court, and that the opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba, as well as the amended opposition of Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz are without merit in law and in fact.On March 21, 1970, the motion to lift the order of general default was granted and the opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba, as well as the opposition of Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz were all admitted.In the hearing of March 3, 1972, applicant offered for admission exhibits "A" to "I" and the testimonies of Pedro Ruiz (April 20, 1971), Jose Rago (Oct. 23, 1970) and Dr. Jose Lachica (July 16, 1971; Feb. 10, 1972). The Court admitted the same.On March 13, 1974, the Court issued an order appointing Engr. Angeles Relor to act as Commissioner and delimit the portions claimed by the three sets of oppositors and submit an amended approved plan together with the technical description for each portion.The Commissioner's report and sketch was submitted on December 4, 1974. The applicant filed his opposition to the Commissioner's report on December 12, 1974. The Court in its order of December 13, 1974 required the Commissioner to submit an amended report and amended sketch.The Commissioner's corrected report and sketch was submitted on February 24, 1975 which the Court approved on February 25, 1975 there being no objection from the parties.On March 15, 1977, the Court issued an order whereby the testimony of oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz was stricken off the record for her failure to appear in the scheduled hearing on March 15, 1977.Again, in its order dated May 27, 1977 the testimony of Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz was stricken off record because the latter was bedridden and can not possibly appear for cross-examination.Oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz substituted by her heirs filed a formal offer of exhibits on August 24, 1988. Applicant filed his comments thereto on August 29, 1988. The Court admitted said exhibits and the testimony of their witness on March 1, 1989.In this application for title to land filed by applicant Jose Lachica, four oppositions were filed by the following:1. Jose Rago, in representation of Apolonia Rebeco;2. Manuel C. Braulio and Susana Braulio;3. Rodolfo, Lourdes and Beatriz, all surnamed Alba, represented by Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz; and4. Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz.In the hearing of October 23, 1970, counsel for oppositor Jose Rago manifested that he would file a motion for withdrawal of opposition and Jose Rago himself declared his conformity (Tsn, Oct. 23, 1970, p. 5). Although no formal motion to withdraw was actually filed, oppositor Rago has not presented evidence on his behalf; hence, his opposition must be disregarded.As regards oppositor Manuel C. Braulio ans Susana Braulio, a deed of sale supposedly executed by Susana Braulio and Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz in 1956 was identified by Felimon Raz, a witness for the oppositors (Tsn, Sept. 29, 1977, pp. 3 to 4). However, said deed cannot be found in the records. Even so, the Braulios have not presented evidence to show that by the time this application was filed, they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, public, peaceful and continuous possession of the land claimed, in concept of owner, for at least 10 years sufficient to acquire title thereto (Arts. 1117, 1118, 1134, Civil Code of the Philippines). As such, the opposition of Manuel C. Braulio and Susana Braulio must be dismissed.2On the basis of the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the applicant and the oppositor Raz, the courta quorendered judgment in favor of the applicant as stated at the outset. In dismissing the claim of the remaining oppositors Rodolfo, Lourdes and Beatriz, all surnamed Alba, represented by Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz and Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz herself, the trial court in sum noted that said oppositors have never offered any explanation as to the non-payment of realty taxes for the disputed portions of the subject property from 1941 to 1958 while the respondent/applicant continuously paid taxes under Tax Declaration No. 14181 covering said property from 1945-1958 when the case was filed per certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer's Office of Banga.3In rendering judgment in favor of respondent/applicant, the trial court stressed that while it is true that tax receipts and declarations of ownership for tax purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession.Dissatisfied, petitioners interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court.Unfazed, petitioners now come to this Court arguing that 1. The Civil law provisions on prescription are inapplicable.2. The applicable law is Section 48 [a] of the Public Land Law or Act 141, as amended.3. Private respondent has not acquired ownership in fee simple, much less has he met the conditions for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 [a] of Act 141, as amended, except perhaps for a 620 square meter portion of the land applied for because:3.1. There is absolutely no proof of the alleged sales made by Raz and Alba.3.2. There is absolutely no reliable proof of the alleged theft of the deeds of sale.3.3. The identity of the land has not been established.3.4. The Court of Appeals misapplied the basic rules governing the introduction of secondary evidence.3.5. The applicant/respondent's Tax Declaration No. 14181 is a "doctored" tax declaration.3.6. Applicant/respondent's tax declarations have no probative value.3.7. Applicant/respondent has not satisfied the required quantum of evidence in land registration cases.3.8. Petitioners-oppositors have proven their right over the subject property.In rendering judgment in favor of private respondent, the Court of Appeals reasoned,inter alia, as follows:On the basis of the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the applicant, the trial court did not err in confirming that the applicant is the absolute owner in fee simple of the property subject of the application for registration entitling him to register the same in his name under the operation of PD 1529.It is of no moment that the applicant failed to produce the originals of those other deeds/documents of conveyances, for he was able to present sufficient substantial secondary evidence, in accordance with the requirements of Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, now Section 5, same Rule of the Revised Rules on Evidence, and the doctrines in point.Thus,Government vs. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817, explained that when the original writing is not available for one reason or another which is the best or primary evidence, to prove its contents is the testimony of some one who has read or known about it.Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 148, laid out the foundation before secondary evidence is introduced, that the due execution, delivery and reason for non-production of the original writing must first be produced.Raylago vs. Jarabe, 22 SCRA 1247, ruled that it is not necessary to prove the loss of the original document beyond all possibility of mistake. A reasonable probability of its loss is sufficient and this may be shown by abonafide(sic) and diligent search, fruitlessly made, for it in places where it is likely to be found. After proving the due execution and delivery of the document, together with the fact that the same has been lost or destroyed, its contents may be proved, among others, by the recollection of witnesses. AndBeall vs. Dearing, 7 ala. 126; andBogardas vs. Trinity Church, 4 Sandf. Ch. (Nn.y.) 639, are of the view that that where the lost documents are more than thirty (30) years old and would thus prove themselves if produced, secondary evidence of their contents is admissible without proof of their execution.In the case at bar, petitioner acquired the property in 1940-1941. He presented the Deed (Exh. G) executed by the vendor Faustino Martirez. While he failed to present the other deeds of sale covering the other portions of the property, he has sufficiently established that they were notarized documents and were taken by his mother-in-law sometime in 1956. He reported the loss to the authorities and even filed a case of theft. He further exerted efforts and made a diligent search of those documents from the notary public but in vain. He presented the clerk of the Municipal Treasurer's Office of Banga, who testified having seen those deeds as they were presented to him by the applicant and which were used as basis for the preparation and issuance of Tax Declaration No. 14181 in the name of the tax declarant. Tax Declaration No. 14181 (Exh. H) was presented in Court, proving that the land was declared for tax purposes in the name of the applicant and his wife. The applicant has been paying the realty tax covering the property since 1945 and beyond 1958, when the application for registration was filed in court, per certification of the Municipal Treasurer of Banga (Exh. 1).In resume, We find and so hold as did the trial court that Dr. Jose Lachica is the absolute owner in fee simple of the land described in his application for its original registration in his name. The land contains an area of 4,845 square meters, more or less, situated in Banga, Aklan, andBounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by property of Apolonia Rimate; on the SE., along line 2-3, by National road; on the SW., along line 3-4, by property of the Mpl. Government of Banga (Public Market); and on the NW., along line 4-1, by property of the Municipal Government of Banga (Public Market). Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan, being N. 45 deg. 02' E., 423.38 m. from B.L.L.M. 1, Mp. of Banga, Aklan;thence, S. 33 deg. 46' E., 87.66 m. to point "2"thence, S. 56 deg. 42' W., 63.81 m. to point "3"thence, N. 37 deg. 22' W., 59.26 m. to point "4"thence, N. 33 deg. 42' E., 73.08 m. to the point ofbeginning, . . . All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons. Bearings true date of the survey, January 25, 1957, and that of the approval, October 3, 1957.The applicant has been in public, open, continuous and adverse possession of the property since 1940-41 up to the present to the exclusion of all, and thereby also acquired the property by acquisitive prescription, in accordance with Sections 40 and 43 of Act 190, otherwise known as the "Code of Civil Procedure", having been in actual and adverse possession under claim of ownership for over ten (10) years, and thus in whatever way his occupancy might have commenced or continued under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants, resulted in the acquisition of title to the land by acquisitive prescription (Vda. de Delima vs. Tio, 32 SCRA 516).Indeed, to borrow the apt words of theponentein the Delima case, such proof of ownership of, and the adverse, continuous possession of the applicant since 1940, strongly ". . . militate against any judicial cognizance of a matter that could have been withheld in its ken," hence, whatever right oppositors may have had over the property or any portion thereof was thereby also lost through extinctive prescription in favor of the applicant who had been in actual, open, adverse and continuous possession of the land applied for in the concept of owner for over 10 years when the application for registration was filed in court.4It is a fundamental and settled rule that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final, binding or conclusive on the parties and upon this Court,5which will not be reviewed6or disturbed on appeal unless these findings are not supported by evidence7or unless strong and cogent reasons dictate otherwise.8More explicitly, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which are as a general rule deemed conclusive, may be reviewed by this Court in the following instances:1.] When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;92.] When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;103.] When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd11or impossible;4.] Where there is a grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation offacts;125.] When the appellate court in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee;6.] When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts;137.] When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties which, if property considered, would justify a different conclusion;148.] When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;9.] When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; and10.] When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.15The primordial issue to be resolved is whether or not the private respondent/applicant is entitled to the confirmation of his ownership in fee simple for the 4, 845 square meter parcel of land he applied for.In sum, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals adjudicated confirmed private respondent/applicant's title to the land on the basis of the findings that: 1.] the private respondent/applicant purchased the land from Faustino Martirez; 2.] the subject land is covered by Tax Declaration No. 14181; 3.] the private respondent/applicant has paid the realty taxes on the land from 1945 up to the filing of his application in 1958; 4.] the private respondent/applicant has been in actual, open and continuous possession of the subject land in the concept of owner since 1945, and 5.] the private respondent/applicant has acquired the land by prescription.As stated earlier, a review of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is not a function that this Court normally undertakes6unless the appellate court's findings are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.17A thorough review of the record convinces this Court that the general rule with regard to the conclusiveness of the trial court's and appellate tribunal's factual findings should not be applied because there are material circumstances which, when properly considered, would have altered the result of the case.First, a circumspect scrutiny of the evidence extant on record reveals that with the exception of 620 square meters, there has been no satisfactory showing of how private respondent/applicant acquired the remainder of the subject land.As can be gathered from the discussion of the appellate court, as well as the arguments proffered by private respondent, he acquired the land in question from three (3) sources, namely: a.] A Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1941 allegedly executed by Faustino Martirez covering 840 square meters; b] 300 square meters allegedly purchased from private respondent's father-in-law Eulalio Raz, and c.] 3,725 square meters private respondent allegedly bought in 1940 from Eugrocino Alba.The sale involving the first parcel of land covering 840 square meters, was not questioned by petitioners as its technical description delineated in theEscritura De Venta Absolutadated August 13, 1941,18to wit:Un terreno solar residencia antes palayero regado, actuado en el casco central del municipio de Banga, Capiz. Sin ninguna mejora, de una extension superficial de ochocientos cuarenta metros cuadrados (840 mts. cds.) 6 sean cuarenta metros de frente por otros veinte y unmetrode fondo, cuyos linderos por el Norte con propiedad de Eufrosino Alba y con Eulalio Raz; por Este con Eulalio Raz y con la carretera provincial de Kalibo a Banga; por Sur con la misma carretera provincial y con terreno del municipio para mercado; y por al Oeste con al terreno del mercado municipal de Banga y con propiedad de Eufrosino Alba y al terreno tienes sus mojones de cemento en todos sus cuatro cantos de linderia y sin otro limite visible de linderia mas que dichos mojones y esta amillarado a mi nombre en una sola hoja declaratoria de propiedad Tax No. 12374 en la Oficina del Tasador Provincial de Capiz, cuyo valor amilarado actual es veinte pesos (P20.00). . .leaves no room for doubt as to its identity, total area of 840 square meters as well as its dimensions of 40 meters in front and 21 meters at the base. How this parcel was further reduced to 620 square meters is explained by the fact that the Municipal Government of Banga appropriated 220 square meters thereof for the Banga Public Market Road.What, however, is seriously contested are the alleged purchases of the other two parcels from Eulalio Raz measuring 300 square meters and from Eufrocino Alba measuring 3,725 square meters owing to the questionable circumstances surrounding their acquisition.The records disclose that the subject land was originally owned by Dionisia Regado under Tax Declaration No. 802.19The records further reveal that Dionisia Regado sold: [1.] 1,850 square meters of the land to the Municipality of Banga evidenced by a Spanish document denominated as a deed of sale dated April 29, 1914;20[2.] 1,320 square meters to Eulalio Raz evidenced by a document entitledEscritura de Venta Absolutadated September 6, 1918,21and [3.] 2,938 square meters to Eufrocino Alba evidenced by a deed of conveyance dated September 6, 1918 written in Spanish.22Faustino Martirez acquired a portion of 840 square meters from Eulalio Raz on January 15, 1933.23Raz retained 480 square meters, however, he and his wife Octabela Alba conveyed a 240 square meter portion thereof to Susana Braulio on November 5, 1956.24Subsequently on May 29, 1969, the heirs of Eufrocino Alba sold a 676 square meter portion of the parcel purchased by Eufrocino to Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz.25The deed of conveyance was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Aklan pursuant to Act No. 334 on June 17, 196926and is covered by Tax Declaration No. 332 in the name of Eulalio Raz, her husband.27Other than the foregoing transactions involving the subject land which are borne out by the documentary evidence on record, private respondent/applicant did not produce the alleged deeds of conveyances evidencing the purported transfers made by Eulalio Raz and Eufrocino Alba in his favor. Instead he relied chiefly on secondary evidence to prove the existence thereof which was sustained by both the trial and the appellate courts. Such reliance on secondary evidencevis-a-visthe peculiar facts prevailing in this case rests on infirm legal bases much more so in the face of the overwhelming documentary evidence of petitioners arrayed against it because . . . [a] contract of sale of realty cannot be proven by means of witnesses, but must necessarily be evidenced by a written instrument, duly subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent, or by secondary evidence of their contents. No other evidence, therefore, can be received except the documentary evidence referred to, in so far as regards such contracts, and these are valueless as evidence unless they are drawn up in writing in the manner aforesaid.28An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document evidencing his title thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of his title but the identity of the land therein referred to.The document in such a case is either a basis of his claim for registration or not at all. If, as in this case, he only claims a portion of what is included in his title, he must clearly prove that the property sought to be registered is included in that title.29Second, there are glaring variances in the identities and technical descriptions of the land applied for by private respondent/applicant and the land he purportedly purchased from Eufrocino Alba.Private respondent/applicant alleged that he purchased the remainder of the subject land measuring 3,725 square meters from Eufrocino Alba sometime in 1940 averring that this parcel is listed as Item No. 5 of his Exhibit "I" which is denominated as an "Inventory And Appraisal Of The Properties Of The Spouses Adela Raz De Lachica (Deceased) and Dr. Jose Lachica." ItemNo. 530of the said inventory described the parcel of land mentioned therein as follows:5. Una parcela de terreno cocal secano, amillarado en nombre de Eufrocino Alba bajo el Tax No. 12792 por valor de P390.00, situado en el municipio de Banga, Capiz, que linda el Norte con Lorenzo Retiro, y Silverio Relis; al Este con la carretera provincial Banga-Libacao; al sur con Bienvenido M. Alba y al Oeste con Cirilo rala y Adela Raz; con una extension aproximada de una (1) hectarea (20) areas y (35) centiareas poco mas o menos. (Note: Said property was purchased by the spouses Jose Lachica and Adela Raz Lachica from Eufrocino M. Alba in the amount of P500.00 as evidenced by aEscritura de Compraventaexecuted on November 25, 1940, at Himamaylan, Negros Occidental and notarized by Atty. Conrado Gensiano, as Reg. Not. 122, Pag. 67, Libro VIII, Serie 1940).On the other hand, the land applied for is described technically per Psu 161277 as A parcel of land (as shown on Plan Psu-161277), situated in Poblacion, Municipality of Banga, Province of Aklan. Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by property of Apolonia Rimate; on the SE., along line 2-3, by National Road; on the SW., along line 3-4, by property of the Mpl. Government of Banga (Public Market); and on the NW., along line 4-1, by property of the Municipal Government of Banga (Public Market). Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being N. 45 deg. 02' E., 423.38 m. from B.L.L.M. 1, Mp. of Banga, Aklan;thence S. 33 deg. 46' E. 87.66 m. to point "2"thence S. 56 deg. 42" W., 63.81 m. to point "3"thence N. 37 deg. 22' W., 59.26 m. to point "4"thence N. 33 deg. 42' E., 73.08 m. to the point ofbeginning, containing an area of FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND FORTY FIVE (4,845) SQUARE METERS. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons. Bearings true date of survey, January 25, 1957, and that of the approval, October 3, 1957.31It will be readily notedvis-a-visthe foregoing that: a.] the land applied for is covered by Tax Declaration No. 14181 while the parcel allegedly purchased from Eufrocino Alba is covered by Tax Declaration No. 15792; b.] the land applied for is palayero whereas the land allegedly acquired from Eufrocino Alba iscocal secano. Palay is unhusked rice,32thus, the term palayero refers to land devoted to the planting rice;cocal, on the other hand, means coconut tree plantation33whilesecanodenotes unwatered land or a dry sand bank;34c.] the land applied for has an area of 4,845 square meters whereas the land supposedly sold by Eufrocino Alba measures 12,035 square meters; d.] the land applied for is bounded on the NE by the Banga Public Market, on the SE by Apolinia Rimate, on the SW by the Banga-Kalibo National Road; and on the NW by the Banga Public market whereas the land allegedly obtained from Eufrocino Alba is bounded on the N by Ernesto Retino and Silverio Relis, on the E by the Banga-Libaco Carreta Provincial, on the S by Bienvenido Alba and on the W by the Cirilo Rala and Adela Raz. It needs be stressed in this regard that a person who claims that he has better right to real property must prove not only his ownership of the same but also must satisfactorily prove the identity thereof.35Third, both trial and appellate courts placed undue reliance on Tax Declaration No. 14181 considering that there is no satisfactory explanation of how the area of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 14181 geometrically ballooned from a modest 620 square meter lot to a huge parcel measuring 4,845 square meters.As pointed out by petitioners, Tax Declaration No. 14181 was preceded by 1954 Tax Declaration No. 13578 in the name of private respondent/applicant and his spouse which shows that the land declared therein for taxation purposes covers an area of 620 square meters. Tax Declaration No. 13578 was preceded by 1953 Tax Declaration No. 13040 in the name of Adela Raz, private respondent's wife. The land declared for taxation purposes therein also has an area of 620 square meters. Tax Declaration No. 134040 was preceded by 1947 Tax Declaration No. 6528 in the name of private respondent's wife, Adela Raz. The land declared therein for taxation purposes likewise measures 620 square meters.It appears that the quantum leap from 620 square meters in 1947 to 4,845 square meters in 1956 came about on account of an affidavit dated November 17, 1956 wherein private respondent/applicant requested36the Municipal Assessor of Banga to issue a revised tax declaration covering 4,845 square meters on the bare claim that "the area has been decreased" to only 620 square meters. The timing of the revision and its proximity to the date of filing of the application can not but engender serious doubts on the application more so considering that prior thereto realty tax payments covering the period 1945 to 1956 covered an area measuring 620 square meters and private respondent/applicant is banking on said payments to claim possession and ownership over the same period for an infinitely larger area of 4,845 square meters.A tax declaration, by itself, is not conclusive evidence of ownership.37Tax declarations for a certain number of years, although constituting proof of claim of title to land,38is not incontrovertible evidence of ownership unless they are supported by other effective proof.39It was, thus, held in one case40that where realty taxes covering thirty-one (31) years were paid only a few months prior to the filing of an application, such payment does not constitute sufficient proof that the applicant had abona fideclaim of ownership prior to the filing of the application. Still in another case,41the claim that the applicant had been incontinuous and uninterrupted possession of the disputed land was not given credence because it was negated by the fact that he declared the land for taxation purposes in October 1959 when he filed his application for registration although he could have done so in 1937 when he allegedly purchased the land. A belated declaration is, furthermore, indicative that the applicant had no real claim of ownership over the subject land prior to the declaration42and where there are serious discrepancies in the tax declarations as in this case, registration must be denied.43If at all, the foregoing facts only serves to underscore private respondent/applicant's crafty attempt to cloak with judicial color his underhanded scheme to seize the adjoining parcels of land and to enrich himself at the expense of its rightful owners.Fourth, the lower court's reliance on prescription is not well-taken given the peculiar facts prevailing in this case.The law in force at the time an action accrues is what governs the proceeding consistent with the fundamental dictum that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is proved.44Basic is the rule that no statute, decree, ordinance, rule, regulation or policy shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated so.45Along the same vein, a court's jurisdiction depends on the law existing at the time an action is filed46and a law continues to be in force with regard to all rights which accrued prior to the amendment thereof.47In this case, the controlling statute when the private respondent/applicant filed his application for registration on April 28, 1958 is Section 48 of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by RA Nos. 1942 and 6236,48which states that:Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claim and issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States have applied for the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but have with or without default upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their applications.49(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under abona fideclaim of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war orforce majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.50(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under abona fideclaim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.51A circumspect scrutiny of the assailed Decision readily shows that in the affirming the ruling of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the provisions of Section 19 of Act 49652in relation to the Civil Code's provision's on prescription on the assumption that the subject land is private land. Therein lies the flaw in the appellate court's postulate. The application for registration of private respondent is for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title considering that the land is presumed under the Regalian Doctrine to be part of the public domain.Public lands are broadly classified into 1.] Alienable or disposable lands; and, 2.] Inalienable or non-disposable public lands. Non-disposable public lands or those not susceptible of private appropriation include a.] Timber lands; and, b.] Mineral lands.53For purposes of administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain classified as "disposable" or "alienable" are further sub-classified into a.] Agricultural; b.] Residential, commercial, industrial or for similar productive purposes; c.] Educational, charitable or other similar purposes, and d.] Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public purposes.54From the foregoing classifications, public agricultural land may be defined as those alienable portions of the public domain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. Thus the term includes residential, commercial and industrial lands for the reason that these lands are neither timber nor mineral lands.55On the other hand, Section 19 of Act No. 496, as amended, permits the registration of private lands claimed to be owned by the applicant in fee simple which refer to:1.] Lands acquired by various types of titles from the government during the Spanish Regime by way of grants by the Spanish crown namely the: a.]Titulo realor royal grant; b.]Concession especialor special grant; c]Composicion con el estadotitle or adjustment title; d.]Titulo de compraor title by purchase and; e.]Informacion posesoriaor possessory information title, which could become aTitulo gratuitoor a gratuitous title;562.] Lands that are claimed to be owned by accession,i.e. accretion, avulsion, formation of islands, abandoned river beds, as provided for in Articles 457, 461 and 464 of the Civil Code; and3.] Lands which have been acquired in any other manner provided by law.Suffice it to state that the land sought to be registered by private respondent hardly falls under any of the latter classifications of land referred to by Act No. 496, as amended. Given the foregoing facts, prescription in the manner invoked by both courts can not be pleaded to bolster private respondent/applicant's claim because . . . [N]o public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of title from the state . . . .57xxx xxx xxxIndeed, the possession of public agricultural land, however, long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor.58The reason, to reiterate our ruling, is because the statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.59Fifth, even assumingex gratia argumentithat prescription can be applied in the manner invoked by the trial court and the appellate court, it must be pointed out that . . . [W]hile Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that "(o)wnership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years," this provision of law must be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that ". . . (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law." Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless such possession was acquiredcon justo titulo y buena fe(with color of title and good faith).60The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.61For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the recognized modes of acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit anyright.62It can not be said that private respondent's possession wascon justo titulo y buena fe. On the contrary, private respondent/applicant's act of appropriating for himself the entire area of 4,845 square meters to the exclusion of petitioners who have been occupying portions of the disputed land constituted acts of deprivation tantamount to bad faith. Indeed this Court has ruled that the . . . [c]oncealment and misrepresentation in the application that no other persons had any claim or interest in the said land, constitute specific allegations of extrinsic fraud supported by competent proof. Failure and intentional omission of the applicants to disclose the fact of actual physical possession by another person constitutes an allegation of actual fraud.63Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person.64Suffice it to state in this regard that to allow private respondent/applicant to benefit from his own wrong would run counter to the maximex dolo malo non oritur actio no man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing.65It need not be overemphasized that extraordinary acquisitive prescription can not similarly vest ownership over the property upon private respondent/applicant because Article 1137 of the Civil Code states in no uncertain terms that Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of good faith.Needless to state, private respondent/applicant's possession of thirteen (13) years falls way below the thirty-year requirement mandated by Article 1137.Sixth, petitioners/oppositors have, in stark contrast to the secondary proof of private respondent, adduced overwhelming evidence to prove their ownership of the portions they claim in the subject land. The evidence on record clearly points to the fact that private respondent/applicant's right, if at all, is confined to only 620 square meters or what has been left of the 840 square meters he purchased from Faustino Martirez after 220 square meters thereof were appropriated by the Municipality of Banga for the Public Market Road.66The records further bear out that the original owner of the whole area was one Dionisia Regado who executed three (3) deeds of sale covering certain portions of the disputed lands, namely: 1.] the Deed of Sale dated April 29, 1914 covering 1,850 square meters executed in favor of the Municipality of Banga;672.] the Deed of Sale dated July 10, 1915 covering 1,320 square meters executed in favor of Eulalio Raz;68and, 3.] the Deed of Sale dated September 6, 1918 covering the balance with an area of 2,938 square meters in favor of Eufrocino Alba.69Faustino Martirez acquired only an 840 square meter portion of the land by purchase Eulalio Raz on January 15, 1933 as confirmed in paragraph 2 of theEscritura De Venta Absolutaexecuted by him on August 13, 1941.70After selling 840 square meters to Faustino Martirez, Eulalio Raz retained 480 square meters to Susana Braulio71leaving a balance of 240 square meters which remained undiposed.On May 29, 1969, Virginia Alba, Inocentes Alba and Estrella Alba, children of the deceased Eufrocino Alba, sold a 676 square meter portion of the 2,938 square meter lot purchased by their father from Dionisia Regado to petitioner/oppositor Octabela alba Vda. De Raz.72This Deeds was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Aklan in accordance with Act No. 3344 on June 17, 1969.73The land is covered by Tax Declaration No. 332 in the name of Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz's husband.74Petitioner/oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz's ownership of the remaining 240 square meter portion which she and her husband Eulalio Raz bought from Dionisia Regado75and the 676 square meter portion which they bought from the heirs of Eufrocino Alba76is fully substantiated by documentary proof.77Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba's ownership of a portion measuring 1,335 square meters78and another portion measuring 2,262 square meters79is likewise backed by documentary evidence. Susana Braulio's ownership of a 240 square meter portion80which she acquired from Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz on November 11, 195681is also documented, her predecessor-in-interest having acquired the same from Dionisia Regado on September 6, 1918.82The foregoing only serves to underscore the paucity of the proof of private respondent/applicant to support his claim of ownership over the entire 4,845 square meter area. He has not adduced evidence to show how and when he was able to acquire, with the exception of 840 square meters further reduced to 620 square meters on account of 220 square meters appropriated for the market road, the bigger area of 3, 755 square meters from anybody let alone the ancestral owner, Dionisia Regado.His claim is anchored mainly on Revised Tax Declaration No. 14181 which he was able to procure from the Municipal Assessor of Banga in 1956 on the basis of a self-serving affidavit which proffered the lame excuse that there was error in the statement of the area of the land which he claimed to be 4,845 square meters instead of 620 square meters which was the area reflected in earlier tax declarations namely, 1954 Tax Declaration No. 13578; 1953 Tax Declaration No. 13043; and 1947 Tax Declaration No. 6528.Be that as it may, the Court has reservations on the propriety of adjudicating to petitioners the contested portions of the subject land, in view of their failure to present the technical descriptions of these areas. Furthermore, there is no sufficient evidence showing that petitioners have been in open, adverse, exclusive, peaceful and continuous possession thereof in the concept of owner, considering that the testimony of Octabela Alba vda. De Raz was stricken off the record.WHEREFORE, based on foregoing premises, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 1 dated August 18, 1992 in Land Registration Case No. K-101, LRC Record No. K-15104 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:1.] The 620 square meter portion on which private respondent Jose N. Lachica's house is situated, clearly delineating its metes and bounds, is hereby ORDERED segregated from the parcel of land described in Psu-161277 situated in the Poblacion of the Municipality of Banga, Province of Aklan, Philippines with an area of 4,484 square meters, to be registered and confirmed in the name of private respondent;2.] A ten (10) meter road width along the National road mentioned in the application be segregated for future road widening programs upon the payment of just compensation to be annotated at the back of the title.3.] Insofar as the ownership of the remainder of the subject land is concerned, the case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for the reception of further evidence for the petitioners to establish the other requisites for the confirmation of title and registration in their names of the areas they respectively claim.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 122269 September 30, 1999REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE,petitioner,vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VIVENCIO A. BANTUGAN, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Alaminos, Pangasinan, and HEIRS OF ZENAIDA BUSTRIA-TIGNO, represented by CAMILO TIGNO,respondents.MENDOZA,J.:For review is the decision1of the Court of Appeals, dated October 4, 1995, in CA-G.R. SP No. 34013, dismissing a petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines for the annulment of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, which declared private respondents to be the absolute owners of a piece of land in Barangay Malacapas, Dasol, Pangasinan. The government, as petitioner, prays that the aforesaid decision of the trial court, rendered in Civil Case No. A-1759, be annulled.1wphi1.ntThe facts are stated in the following portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals:Sometime in 1957, one Matias Bustamante filed with the then CFI of Pangasinan an application for registration under Act No. 496, as amended, of a tract of land containing an area of 880,000 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay Malacapas, Dasol, Pangasinan.Both the Director of Forestry and the Director of Fisheries filed oppositions to the aforecited application, alleging among others, that "said parcel of land, with the exception of 97,525 square meters, is a part of the Timber Land Block "A" Land Classification Project 44, which is converted into fish ponds." Isidro Bustria [private respondents' predecessor-in-interest] and Julian Bustria, also opposed the said application for land registration, alleging that they "have in the year 1943 occupied in good faith their respective portions having a total area of fifty (50) hectares, more or less . . . converted their respective portions into fish ponds . . . and actually possessed and occupied their respective portions . . . exclusively against all persons, except the Director of Forestry & Director of Fishery." After trial, the lower court rendered a Decision in favor of applicant Bustamante.On appeal to this Honorable Court, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 30058-R, it was found that 783,275 square meters of the land applied for were accretions added to applicant Bustamante's riceland of 9.7525 hectares, and that said accretion was caused by the sea on the southward portion of said riceland. This Honorable Court then ruled:This being so, the said accretion belongs not to the riparian owner but the State. All lands thrown up by the sea and formed upon the shores, belong to the national domain and are for public use, in accordance with the provisions of the Law on Waters of August 3, 1866 (Insular Government vs. Aldecoa, 19 Phil. 505) (p. 20, Decision, November 16, 1967).Thus, modifying the judgment of the lower court, this Honorable Court rendered a Decision on November 16, 1967, disposing:IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby modified so that only 9.7525 of the land applied for is hereby adjudicated and ordered to be registered in the name of the applicant, the remaining area being hereby declared land of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, without prejudice to whatever rights oppositors Isidro Bustria and Julian Bustria may have acquired over portions of the area thus declared as land of the public domain, with costs against applicant.SO ORDERED.When brought up oncertiorarito the Supreme Court, the foregoing Judgment was affirmedin totoin the Resolution in G.R. No. L-18605 dated February 29, 1968.It is relevant to state at this point that the parcel of land that is presently the subject of the dispute in the instant case, Lot No. 7764, CAD 624-D (Portion) [Psu-155696, Lot 3 (Portion)], forms part of the above-mentioned parcel of land declared by this Honorable Court as belonging to the public domain, classified/zonified land available for fishpond development, per L.C. Map No. 3175, approved on June 24, 1984, under administrative Order No. 4-1829 (Annex "D", Petition). The subject lot contains an area of 49,999 square meters, more or less. This lot has been leased to Mr. Porfirio Morado by the [Republic of the Philippines], represented by the Secretary of Agriculture, for a period of twenty-five (25) years, or up to December 31, 2013, under Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 5132, dated August 17, 1989 (Annex "E", Petition).On July 6, 1988, however, the late Zenaida Bustria [daughter of Isidro Bustria] filed a complaint against Porfirio Morado in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Branch 55, for ownership and possession over the lot in question [docketed as Civil Case No. A-1759]. Herein petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, was not made a party to that suit.In her complaint, Zenaida Bustria claimed absolute ownership and quiet and peaceful possession of several lots under PSU-155696 surveyed in the name of her father, Isidro Bustria. She further asserted that said Porfirio Morado maliciously applied for a fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources over Lot 3 thereof (the subject lot), well-knowing that said lot had always been occupied, possessed and worked by her and her predecessors-in-interest.Porfirio Morado denied the allegations in the complaint, claiming that the lot in question is part of the public domain which he developed and converted into a fishpond. Due, however, to Porfirio Morado's and his counsel's failure to appear at the pre-trial and subsequent court hearings, the trial court subsequently declared Porfirio Morado "as in default."On December 17, 1991, respondent Judge rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:(a) Declaring the plaintiff as the exclusive and absolute owner of the land in question stated in paragraph 4 of the Complaint and entitled to the exclusive and quiet possession of the said land; and(b) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and the sum of P500.00 per day of hearing of the counsel; plus costs.(Annex "A", Petition)On January 23, 1992, Porfirio Morado filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment which was denied on July 21, 1992 for lack of merit.On July 8, 1992, a writ of execution was issued, and it was implemented by Sheriffs Manuel O. de Asis and Sheriff Cesar A. Gines. Spouses Porfirio Morado and Juliana Morado thereafter filed with this Honorable Court a Petition forCertiorariwith Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 28932. In a Resolution dated December 11, 1992, the Petition was denied for lack of merit. The related Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the Resolution dated February 18, 1993. (Rollo, pp. 107-112) (emphasis omitted)2On April 19, 1994, petitioner, invoking 9 of B.P. Blg. 129,3filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the annulment of the trial court's decision, dated December 17, 1991. Petitioner alleged that the land in question is within the classified/zonified alienable and disposable lend for fishpond development, per L.C. Map No. 3175 approved on June 24, 1984, under Administrative Order No. 4-1829 and that since the land formed part of the public domain, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) has jurisdiction over its disposition in accordance with P.D. No 704, 4.On October 4, 1995 the, Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition.4Hence, this petition for review.The judgment rendered in a case may be annulled on any of the following grounds: (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law; or (b) it was obtained through extrinsic fraud.5The question in this case is whether the decision of the Regional Trial Court is void on any of these grounds. The preliminary question, however, is whether the government can bring such action even though it was not a party to the action in which the decision sought to be annulled was rendered.We shall deal with these questions in inverse order.First, is the question whether petitioner has personality to bring the action below. To begin with, an action to recover a parcel of land isin personam. As such, it is binding only between the parties thereto, as this Court explained inChing v.Court of Appeals,6viz:An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an actionin remor an action against the whole world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an actionin personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Actionsin personamand actionsin remdiffer in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an actionin personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.The appellate court, holding that the proceedings before the trial court werein personam, ruled that since petitioner was not a party to Civil Case No. A-1759, it is not a real party-in-interest and, therefore, has no personality to bring the action for annulment of the judgment rendered in that case. The appellate court said:Private respondents are correct. Civil Case No. A-1759 was purely for "Ownership and Possession". The decision sought to be annulled is solely "between the private respondents [the Bustrias] and Porfirio Morado" (Rollo, p. 142). Petitioner Republic was not a party in the case and is not bound by the judgment rendered therein.It is settled, a real party-in-interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit (Salonga vs. Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd., 88 Phil. 128; University of the Philippines Board of Regents vs. Ligot-Telan, 227 SCRA 342; Tampingco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 207 SCRA 652; Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 203 SCRA 310; Travelwide Associated Sales, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 205).Petitioner Republic not being a party, and the judgment not beingin rem, it does not stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment sought. Petitioner Republic can on its own, and even without resorting to this petition for annulment of judgment, institute the proper action to assert its claim that the "subject lot is a land forming part of the public domain'' (Rollo, p. 145). It need not seek the annulment of the subject judgment, in Civil Case No. A-1759 in which it was not a party and involves merely a question of ownership; and possession between plaintiffs Zenaida B. Bustria and defendant Porfirio Morado and which decision is not binding on it, to be able to assert its claim or interest in the property. It is clear for this reason that petitioner is not a real party-in-interest (Section 2, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court).7The appellate court is in error. InIslamic Da'wah Council of the Phils.v.Court of Appeals,8this Court held that a party claiming ownership of a parcel of land which is the subject of foreclosure proceedings has a sufficient interest to bring an action for annulment of the judgment rendered in the foreclosure proceedings even though it was not in the party in such proceedings. It was held:[A] person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. What is essential is that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.In this present case it is true that the heirs of Araneta are not parties to the foreclosure case. Neither are they principally nor secondarily bound by the judgment rendered therein. However, in their petition filed with the Court of Appeals they alleged fraud and connivance perpetuated by and between the Da Silvas and the Council as would adversely affect them. This allegation, if fully substantiated by preponderance of evidence, could be the basis for the annulment of Civil Case No. 4-43476.9This ruling was reiterated inTop Management Programs Corp.v.Court of Appeals.10The next question is whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to declare the land in question to belong to private respondent. The government asserts that the lot is within the "classified/zonified alienable and disposable land for fishpond development," hence, it is part of the public domain;11that under P.D. No. 704, 4, jurisdiction over its disposition is vested in the BFAR; that unlike agricultural land, public lands which are declared suitable for fishpond purposes may only be disposed of by way of license, concession, or lease; and that possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership.12On the other hand, private respondents do not deny that Isidro Bustria, to whom they trace their ownership, previously filed a fishpond application with the BFAR over the disputed land.13Neither do they deny that the disputed land formed part of the public domain. They insist, however, that P.D. No. 704 applies only to "lands suitable for fishpond purposes" while the land in dispute is already a "fully developed fishpond." They assert ownership of the subject lot through open and continuous possession of their predecessor-in-interest since the Second World War.14We agree with petitioner. The State clearly stands to be adversely affected by the trial court's disposition of in alienable public land.The land involved in this case was classified as public land suitable for fishpond development.15In controversies involving the disposition of public land, the burden of overcoming, the presumption of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant.16Private respondents have not discharged this burden.The fact that the land in dispute was transformed into a "fully developed fishpond" does not mean that it has lost its character as one declared "suitable for fishpond purposes" under the decree. By applying for a fishpond permit with the BFAR, Isidro Bautista admitted the character of the land as one suitable for fishpond development since the disposition of such lands is vested in the BFAR. Consequently, private respondents, as his successors-in-interest, are estopped from claiming otherwise.It is settled under the Public Land Law17that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessor-in-interest, openly, continuously, and exclusively for 30 years isipso jureconverted to private property by the mere lapse of time.18However, only public lands classified as agricultural19are alienable. Lands declared for fishery purposes are not alienable20and their possession, no matter how long continued, cannot ripen into ownership.Since the disposition of lands declared suitable for fishpond purposes fall within the jurisdiction of the BFAR, in accordance with P.D. No 704, 4,21the trial court's decision, dated December 17, 1991, is null and void. The trial court has no jurisdiction to make a disposition of inalienable public land. If, as claimed, Porfirio Morado secured a fishpond permit through fraud and misrepresentation, private respondents' sole recourse, if any, is to secure the annulment of the same before the BFAR and apply for a new one in their favor, provided that they are qualified therefor. What they did, however, was not only to bring their action in the wrong forum but to ask to be declared owners of the land in dispute.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, Ninth Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 34013, dated October 4, 1995, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The decision of Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Branch 55, in Civil Case No. A-1759 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.1wphi1.ntSO ORDERED.Bellosillo, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.G.R. No. 122269. September 30, 1999]REPUBLIC vs. CA, ET. AL.,

FACTS: The parcel of land that is presently the subject of the dispute in the instant case Lot 3 Portion forms part of the above-mentioned parcel of land declared by this Honorable Court as belonging to the public domain, classified/zonified land available for fishpond development.

This lot has been leased to Mr. Porfirio Morado by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Secretary of Agriculture, for a period of 25 years, or up to December 31, 2013, under Fishpond Lease Agreement.

On July 6, 1988, however, the late Zenaida Bustria [daughter of Isidro Bustria] filed a complaint against Porfirio Morado in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan for ownership and possession over the lot in question. Herein petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, was not made a party to that suit.

In her complaint, Zenaida Bustria claimed absolute ownership and quiet and peaceful possession of several lots under PSU-155696 surveyed in the name of her father, Isidro Bustria. She further asserted that said Porfirio Morado maliciously applied for a fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources over Lot 3 thereof (the subject lot), well-knowing that said lot had always been occupied, possessed and worked by her and her predecessors-in-interest.

Porfirio Morado denied the allegations in the complaint, claiming that the lot in question is part of the public domain which he developed and converted into a fishpond. Due, however, to Porfirio Morados and his counsels failure to appear at the pre-trial and subsequent court hearings, the trial court subsequently declared Porfirio Morado as in default.

Respondent Judge rendered a decision declaring the plaintiff as the exclusive and absolute owner of the land in question. Petitioner (REPUBLIC), filed with the CA a petition for the annulment of the trial courts decision. Petitioner alleged that the land in question is within the classified/zonified alienable and disposable land for fishpond development and that since the land formed part of the public domain, the BFAR has jurisdiction over its disposition in accordance with P.D. No. 704, 4. CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition. Hence, this petition for review.

The judgment rendered in a case may be annulled on any of the following grounds: (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law; or (b) it was obtained through extrinsic fraud. The question in this case is whether the decision of the Regional Trial Court is void on any of these grounds. The preliminary question, however, is whether the government can bring such action even though it was not a party to the action in which the decision sought to be annulled was rendered. We shall deal with these questions in inverse order.

RULING: First, is the question whether petitioner has personality to bring the action below. To begin with, an action to recover a parcel of land is in personam. As such, it is binding only between the parties thereto, as this Court explained in Ching v. Court of Appeals, viz:

An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.

The appellate court, holding that the proceedings before the trial court were in personam, ruled that since petitioner was not a party to Civil Case No. A-1759, it is not a real party-in-interest and, therefore, has no personality to bring the action for annulment of the judgment rendered in that case.

The appellate court is in error. In Islamic Dawah Council of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a party claiming ownership of a parcel of land which is the subject of foreclosure proceedings has a sufficient interest to bring an action for annulment of the judgment rendered in the foreclosure proceedings even though it was not a party in such proceedings. It was held:

[A] person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. What is essential is that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.

Private respondents do not deny that Isidro Bustria, to whom they trace their ownership, previously filed a fishpond application with the BFAR over the disputed land. Neither do they deny that the disputed land formed part of the public domain.

We agree with petitioner. The State clearly stands to be adversely affected by the trial courts disposition of inalienable public land. The land involved in this case was classified as public land suitable for fishpond development. In controversies involving the disposition of public land, the burden of overcoming the presumption of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant. Private respondents have not discharged this burden.

The fact that the land in dispute was transformed into a fully developed fishpond does not mean that it has lost its character as one declared suitable for fishpond purposes under the decree. By applying for a fishpond permit with BFAR, Isidro Bautista admitted the character of the land as one suitable for fishpond development since the disposition of such lands is vested in the BFAR. Consequently, private respondents, as his successors-in-interests, are estopped from claiming otherwise.

It is settled under the Public Land Law that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessor-in-interest, openly, continuously, and exclusively for 30 years is ipso jure converted to private property by the mere lapse of time. However, only public lands classified as agricultural are alienable. Lands declared for fishery purposes are not alienable and their possession, no matter how long continued, cannot ripen into ownership.Since the disposition of lands declared suitable for fishpond purposes fall within the jurisdiction of the BFAR, in accordance with P.D. No 704, 4, the trial courts decision is null and void. The trial court has no jurisdiction to make a disposition of inalienable public land.

G.R. No. 116109 September 14, 1999JACINTO OLAN and RENATO EBALLE,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES LIBRADO F. VILLANUEVA and TOMASA L. IGNACIO,respondents.GONZAGA-REYES,J.:Before us is a Petition for Review onCertiorari1andMandamusto set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals2on April 11, 1994 in CA-GR. SP No. 31618 entitled "JACINTO OLAN and RENATO EBALLE versus Hon. Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 35,et.al.", which dismissed herein petitioner's Petition for Review, and to order the respondent Court of Appeals to allow petitioners to submit evidence in support of their contention that the lot they were possessing was not the lot described in the dispositive portion of the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Ejectment Case No. 979.1wphi1.ntPetitioners Jacinto Olan and Renato Eballe were defendants in Ejectment Case No. 929 in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Los Baos, Laguna filed by herein respondent spouses Librado Villanueva and Tomasa Ignacio. The MTC3ordered OLAN and EBALLE to entirely vacate Lot 3839 and Lot 3842, both of the Los Baos Cadastre 450-D, situated at Brgy. Timugan, Los Baos, Laguna, which lots said defendants are now unlawfully occupying, and to turn them over to the possession of plaintiffs LIBRADO VILLANUEVA and TOMASA L. IGNACIO.4Petitioners appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna which affirmed the decision of the MTC. A writ of execution pending appeal was granted by the RTC which petitioners moved to quash in the Court of Appeals5(CA. G.R. No. 30812) on the ground that the lot occupied by petitioners was different from the lots ordained on decreed in the dispositive portion of the MTC decision. The Motion to Quash the writ of execution was denied for failure to file a bond to stay execution; the court added that:Furthermore, the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution dated March 4, 1993 and "Motion to Relocate Lots subject Matter of Writ of Execution" dated March 24, 1993, filed by counsel for defendants on the ground that defendants were occupying a different lot (Lot 8253) from that which is the object of the writ of execution of Lot 3839 or 3842, subject matter of the decision (the Motion for Relocation having been reiterated before this court by counsel for petitioner), were correctly denied by the Municipal Court of Los Baos, Laguna, in Civil Case No. 979, on October 1, 1982, which judicially inspected the property in question, the parties therein, including the petitioner being present, which inspection of the property was even a part of the order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Calamba, Laguna, in Civil Case No. 176-83-C, on February 9, 1983, without petitioners questioning or raising the issue that the property object of the ocular inspection and now subject of the writ of execution was a property different from that which is the object of the complaint and decision of the court.It should be noted that it was not until a writ of execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 979 of the Municipal Trial Court pending appeal was issued by respondent court on January 23, 1993 that respondents claimed for the first time that the lot, subject of the ocular inspection and subject matter of the decision, was not the lot in question.6Meanwhile, petitioners appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals (C.A. G.R. No. 31618) which affirmed the RTC decision.7The Court of Appeals ruled that:In their petition for review, the herein petitioners simply reiterates/repeats their abovementioned argument that the lot occupied by Olan is not the lot "ordained or decreed to be delivered to respondents herein in the dispositive portion of the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Los Baos, Laguna, which decision was affirmedin totoby the Regional Trial Court on appeal.8Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied9. Hence this petition, wherein petitioners raise the following issues:I. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 979 IN THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF LOS BAOS, LAGUNA, HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.II. ASSUMING THAT THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 979 HAS NOT ATTAINED FINALITY, WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING C.A. G.R. NO. 31618.III. AGAIN ASSUMING THAT THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 979 HAS NOT ATTAINED FINALITY, WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT CAN BE COMPELLED TO ORDER A HEARING AND RECEIVE NEW EVIDENCE PURPORTING TO SHOW THAT THE PARCEL OF LAND UNDER QUESTION IS IN THE NAME OF PETITIONER JACINTO OLAN.10Petitioners argue that the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 979 never attained finality. In support of this argument, petitioners claim that the dispositive portion of the MTC decision stated that the adjudication of the court was "without prejudice to whatever final action the Department of Natural Resources/Bureau of Lands may take on the pending sales application". Thus, the decision was incomplete since it left other matters to be done. Moreover, petitioners seek to compel the Court of Appeals through the Writ ofMandamusto receive into evidence a certification made by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to the effect that the lot possessed by petitioner OLAN is different from the lots decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision as newly discovered evidence.11We resolve to deny the petition.Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for not admitting the certification made by the DENR as "newly discovered evidence" to show that OLAN was not in possession of the lots in questioni.e. Lot Nos. 3839 and 3842 but Lot No. 8253.12We are not persuaded that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 37 of the 1964 Rules of Court as amended13read:Sec. 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial. Within the period for perfecting appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party:(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights;(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered, and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result;(c) Award of excessive damages, or insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision, or that the decision is against the law.Sec. 2. Contents of motion for new trial and notice thereof. The motion shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefor, a written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party.When the motion is made for the causes mentioned in subdivisions, (a) and (b) of the preceding section, it shall be proved in the manner provided for proof of motions. Affidavit or affidavits of merit shall also be attached to a motion for the cause mentioned in subdivision (a) which may be rebutted with counter-affidavits. . . . .Instead of filing a petition for review of the RTC decision affirming the MTC and a motion to quash the writ of execution issued by the RTC, merely attaching thereto the alleged "newly discovered evidence", petitioners should have filed a motion for new trial with the RTC on the ground of newly discovered evidence in accordance with the aforequoted Rule 37 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Petitioners failed to support their claim with affidavits to show compliance with the following requisites for newly discovered evidence as a ground for new trial: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted will probably change the judgment.14Even assuming that petitioners complied with the abovementioned requirements we are not convinced that the certification in question is "newly discovered evidence". Petitioners did not prove that, even with the use reasonable diligence, they could not have obtained the certification during the trial. The fact that petitioners' request with the DENR to determine whether there was a relationship between Lot 3839 and 3842 with Lot 8253 was made only on April 13, 199315or almost ten years after the decision of the MTC was rendered on May 18, 1992 shows that petitioners did not exercise reasonable diligence to obtain this evidence.Neither can we sustain petitioners' contention that the decision in the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 979) never became final considering the statement in the MTC decision that it was "without prejudice to whatever final action the Department of Natural Resources/Bureau of Lands may take on the pending sales application". Petitioners themselves recognize and "do not question the correctness of the now final decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Los Baos, Laguna, in Ejectment Case No. 979",16but are objecting to the fact that the lot they are occupying is different from the lots, which lots as per aforesaid decision, they were required to vacate and to deliver to plaintiffs, as shown by the documents from the DENR in their possession. However, the identity of the lots subject of the ejectment case was determined and finally settled by this Court in G.R. No. 112469, promulgated on January 17, 1994 which denied petitioners' petition for review of the Court of Appeal's decision denying petitioners' motion to quash the writ of execution on the ground that they failed to show why the actions of the three courts which have passed on the same issue should be reversed; that these courts' final factual findings are not based on substantial evidence; and that their decisions are contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence.17Moreover, it bears stress that the adjudication of the Bureau of Lands on the sales application will determine the issue of ownership of the lots in questioni.e. the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve disposition of public lands.18On the other hand, the only issue for resolution in an ejectment case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party litigants.19The power to determine who has the actual, physical possession or occupation or the better right of possession over public lands remains with the courts.20A judgment rendered in an ejectment case shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.21Finally, it must be pointed out that the writ ofmandamusis not the proper remedy to compel a court to grant a new trial on the ground of "newly discovered evidence".Mandamusis employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty. It is nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.22WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, and the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.1wphi1.ntSO ORDERED.Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 113539 March 12, 1998CELSO R. HALILI and ARTHUR R. HALILI,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, HELEN MEYERS GUZMAN, DAVID REY GUZMAN and EMILIANO CATANIAG,respondents.PANGANIBAN,J.:The factual findings of a trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, may no longer be reviewed and reversed by this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The transfer of an interest in a piece of land to an alien may no longer be assailed on constitutional grounds after the entire parcel has been sold to a qualified citizen.The CaseThese familiar and long-settled doctrines are applied by this Court in denying this petition under Rule 45 to set aside the Decision1of the Court of Appeals2in CA-GR CV No. 37829 promulgated on September 14, 1993, the dispositive portion of which states:3WHEREFORE, and upon all the foregoing, the Decision of the court below dated March 10, 1992 dismissing the complaint for lack of merit is AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs.The FactsThe factual antecedents, as narrated by Respondent Court, are not disputed by the parties. We reproduce them in part, as follows:Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, defendant appellee [herein private respondent] Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son, defendant appellee [also herein private respondent] David Rey Guzman, both of whom are also American citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim (Annex A-Complaint), assigning [,] transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests in and over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from Simeon.Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation, . . . situated in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, containing an area of 6,695 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-170514 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. The quitclaim having been registered, TCT No. T-170514 was cancelled and TCT No. T-120259 was issued in the name of appellee David Rey Guzman.On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to defendant-appellee [also herein private respondent] Emiliano Cataniag, upon which TCT No. T-120259 was cancelled and TCT No. T-130721(M) was issued in the latter's name.4Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, questioning the constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances between Helen Guzman and David Rey Guzman, and between the latter and Emiliano Cataniag and claiming ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption under Art. 16215of the Civil Code.In its decision6dated March 10, 1992,7the trial court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that Helen Guzman's waiver of her inheritance in favor of her son was not contrary to the constitutional prohibition against the sale of land to an alien, since the purpose of the waiver was simply authorize David Rey Guzman to dispose of their properties in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the Philippines, and not to subvert them. On the second issue, it held that the subject land was urban; hence, petitioners had no reason to invoke their right of redemption under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code.The Halilis sought a reversal from the Court of Appeals which, however, denied their appeal. Respondent Court affirmed the factual finding of the trial court that the subject land was urban. CitingTejido vs.Zamacoma,8andYap vs.Grageda,9it further held that, although the transfer of the land to David Rey may have been invalid for being contrary to the Constitution, there was no more point in allowing herein petitioners to recover the property, since it has passed on to and was thus already owned by a qualified person.Hence, this petition.10IssuesThe petition submits the following assignment of errors:. . . the Honorable Court of Appeals 1. Erred in affirming the conclusion of the trial court that the land in question is urban, not rural2. Erred in denying petitioners' right of redemption under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code3. Having considered the conveyance from Helen Meyers Guzman to her son David Rey Guzman illegal, erred in not declaring the same null and void[.]11The Court's RulingThe petition has no merit.First Issue: The Land Is Urban;Thus, No Right of RedemptionThe first two errors assigned by petitioners being interrelated the determination of the first being a prerequisite to the resolution of the second shall be discussed togetherSubject Land Is UrbanWhether the land in dispute is rural or urban is a factual question which, as a rule, is not reviewable by this Court.12Basic and long-settled is the doctrine that findings of fact of a trial judge, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme Court. This admits of only a few exceptions, such as when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; when an inference made by the appellate court from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; when there is a misappreciation of facts; when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence or are contradicted by evidence on record.13The instant case does not fall within any of the aforecited exceptions. In fact, the conclusion of the trial court that the subject property is urban land is based on clear and convincing evidence, as shown in its decision which disposed thus:. . . As observed by the court, almost all the roadsides along the national ghighway [sic] of Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, are lined up with residential, commercial or industrial establishments. Lined up along the Bagbaguin Road are factories of feeds, woodcrafts [sic] and garments, commercial stores for tires, upholstery materials, feeds supply and spare parts. Located therein likewise were the Pepsi-Cola Warehouse, the Cruz Hospital, three gasoline stations, apartment buildings for commercial purposes and construction firms. There is no doubt, therefore, that the community is a commercial area thriving in business activities. Only a short portion of said road [is] vacant. It is to be noted that in the Tax Declaration in the name of Helen Meyers Guzman[,] the subject land is termed agricultural[,] while in the letter addressed to defendant Emiliano Cataniag, dated October 3, 1991, the Land Regulatory Board attested that the subject property is commercial and the trend of development along the road is commercial. The Board's classification is based on the present condition of the property and the community thereat. Said classification is far more later [sic] than the tax declaration.14No Ground to InvokeRight of RedemptionIn view of the finding that the subject land is urban in character, petitioners have indeed no right to invoke Art. 1621 of the Civil Code, which presupposes that the land sought to be redeemed is rural. The provision is clearly worded