149355538 digested case in natres

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CASES

INNATURAL RESOURCES

SUBMITTED TO: Atty. Ismael Manaligod

SUBMITTED BY:

Sophia E. Matote

Jonna Maye S. Canindo

Maureen Margareth D. Eslava

Sony Berth Daluping

Eric Gonayon

CSU Ll.B- II



G.R. No. 79538.

October 18, 1990

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner ,

vs.

THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OFENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THEBUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENTAND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:

On October 12, 1965, petitioner entered into a timber license agreement with the

Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose

Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber

except prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of

54,920 hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya fromOctober 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990.

However, on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development

(Bureau), Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging

operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging

concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential

instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro

Pena.

Subsequently, petitioner’s timber license agreement was cancelled. He sent a letteraddressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the

Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its contributions to forest conservation and

alleging that it was not given the opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its

logging operations, but no favorable action was taken on his letter;

Barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half of the area formerly covered by

petitioner’s TLA was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation

under a new TLA which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was

allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or

license. The latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed

President Ferdinand Marcos.

Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated

March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to

Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the

reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during

the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin

Peaks Development and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in violation of



forestry laws, rules and

regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner

to take possession of all logs found in the concession area. However, petitioner's request

was denied. Petitioner moved for reconsideration reiterating, among others, its request

that the timber license agreement issued to private respondent be declared null and void.

The MNR however denied this motion. Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders

of the MNR to the Office of the President.

The Office of the President, acting throughthen Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of

merit. Petitioner filed with the Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance

of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction,

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the right to seek the nullification of the Bureau

orders cancelling his timber license agreement and the granting of TLA to private

respondent, which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984, respectively.

HELD:

NO. The failure of petitioner to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period

of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of laches.Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of

time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier,

or to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party

entitled thereto has either abandoned it of declined to assert it. The rule is that

unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may,

depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws did

these who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights. In the case at bar, petitioner

waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the Court

attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984.

Considering that

petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to

seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the time, its delayconstitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the

writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie. There is a more

significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and

against public respondents herein. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the

courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of

government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special

technical knowledge and training of such agencies. More so where, as in the present case,

the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on

the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation.

For this Court recognizes the

wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the appropriate

actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties whoshould enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources. Timber licenses, permits and

license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the

utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.

And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State

to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the

particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended,

modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so



require.

Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of

law clause.



BENGUET CORPORATION, G . R . N o .

163101

Petitioner,

- versus -

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES-MINES

ADJUDICATION BOARD and J.G. REALTY AND MINING CORPORATION,

Respondents.

FACTS:

Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty Agreement with Option to Purchase

(RAWOP) , wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the owner of four mining claims

with a total area of 288.8656 hectares. The parties also executed a Supplemental

Agreement. The mining claims were covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement(MPSA) Application No. APSA-V-0009 jointly filed by J.G. Realty as claim-owner and

Benguet as operator.

After some time, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet, Antonio N. Tachuling, issued

a letter informing J.G. Realty of its intention to develop the mining claims. However, J.G.

Realty, through its President, Johnny L. Tan, then sent a letter to the President of Benguet

informing the latter that it was terminating the RAWOP. The latter alleged that petitioner

violated some of the provisions of the RAWOP, specifically on non-payment of royalties

and non-fulfillment of obligations stipulated therein.

J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of the RAWOP. POAissued a Decision, cancelling the RAWOP and its Supplemental Agreement. BENGUET

was subsequently excluded from the joint MPSA Application over the mineral claims.

Subsequent MR was denied. Said decision was upheld by DENR-MAB.

Hence this instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner the filing of the petition with the Supreme Court is

proper.

HELD:



NO. the instant petition can be denied outright as Benguet resorted to an improper

Remedy.

The last paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the

“Philippine Mining Act of 1995” states, “A petition for review by certiorari and question

of law may be filed by the aggrieved party with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) daysfrom receipt of the order or decision of the [MAB].”

The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule

on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from their judgments and

final orders are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review. A

quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as an organ of government, other than a

court or legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication

or rule-making. MAB falls under this definition; hence, it is no different from the other

quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under Rule 43. Besides, the introductory words in

Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91––“among these agencies are”––indicate that the

enumeration is not exclusive or conclusive and acknowledge the existence of other quasi- judicial agencies which, though not expressly listed, should be deemed included therein.

T he judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct resort from

administrative agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless the redress desired

cannot be obtained from the appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and

compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy falling within and calling for the

exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

Thus Benguet should have filed the appeal with the CA.

Petitioner having failed to properly appeal to the CA under Rule 43, the decision of theMAB has become final and executory. On this ground alone, the instant petition must be

denied.



G.R. No. 148267. August 8, 2002

ARMANDO C. CARPIO, petitioner, vs. SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, respondent.

FACTS:

This case originated from a petition filed by respondent [Sulu Resources DevelopmentCorporation] for Mines Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) No. MPSA-IV-131,covering certain areas in Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioner [Armando C. Carpio] filed anopposition/adverse claim thereto, alleging, inter alia, that his landholdings in Cupang andAntipolo, Rizal will be covered by respondent’s claim, thus he enjoys a preferential right

to explore and extract the quarry resources on his properties.

After due proceedings were held, the Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geo-SciencesBureau of the DENR rendered a Resolution upholding petitioner’s opposition/adverseclaim. Respondent appealed the foregoing Resolution to the Mines Adjudication Board.Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss appeal on the ground of respondent’sfailure to comply with the requirements of the New Mining Act’s Implementing Rulesand Regulations. The Mines Adjudication Board rendered the assailed Order dismissing

petitioner’s opposition/adverse claim. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration ofsaid Order which was denied by the Board. An appeal was filed with the CA but samewas denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appeals from the Decision or Final Orders of the Mines AdjudicationBoard should be made directly to the Supreme Court as contended by the respondent and

the Court of Appeals, or such appeals be first made to the Court of Appeals as contended by herein petitioner.

HELD:



The petition is meritorious.

Factual controversies are usually involved in administrative actions; and the CA is prepared to handle such issues because, unlike this Court, it is mandated to rule onquestions of fact. In Metro Construction, we observed that not only did the CA haveappellate jurisdiction over CIAC decisions and orders, but the review of such decisionsincluded questions of fact and law. At the very least when factual findings of the MABare challenged or alleged to have been made in grave abuse of discretion as in the presentcase, the CA may review them, consistent with the constitutional duty of the judiciary.

To summarize, there are sufficient legal footings authorizing a review of the MAB

Decision under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. First, Section 30 of Article VI of the 1987Constitution, mandates that “[n]o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdictionof the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent.” Onthe other hand, Section 79 of RA No. 7942 provides that decisions of the MAB may bereviewed by this Court on a “petition for review by certiorari.” This provision isobviously an expansion of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, an expansion to which thisCourt has not consented. Indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of this Court would unnecessarily burden it.

Second, when the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, transfersto the CA pending cases involving a review of a quasi-judicial body’s decisions, suchtransfer relates only to procedure; hence, it does not impair the substantive and vestedrights of the parties. The aggrieved party’s right to appeal is preserved; what is changed isonly the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided. The parties still have aremedy and a competent tribunal to grant this remedy.

Third, the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniformrule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from their judgments and final orders are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petitionfor review. A quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as an organ of government,other than a court or legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either

adjudication or rule-making. MAB falls under this definition; hence, it is no differentfrom the other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under Rule 43. Besides, the introductorywords in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91 -- “among these agencies are” -- indicate that theenumeration is not exclusive or conclusive and acknowledge the existence of other quasi- judicial agencies which, though not expressly listed, should be deemed included therein.

Fourth, the Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 as amended by



RA No. 7902, factual controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-judicial bodies; and the CA, which is likewise tasked to resolve questions of fact, has more elbowroom to resolve them. By including questions of fact among the issues that may be raisedin an appeal from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA, Section 3 of Revised AdministrativeCircular No. 1-95 and Section 3 of Rule 43 explicitly expanded the list of such issues.

According to Section 3 of Rule 43, “[a]n appeal under this Rule may be taken to theCourt of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided whether the appealinvolves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.” Hence, appealsfrom quasi-judicial agencies even only on questions of law may be brought to the CA.

Fifth, the judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that directresort from administrative agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless theredress desired cannot be obtained from the appropriate lower tribunals, or unlessexceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy falling within

and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

Consistent with these rulings and legal bases, we therefore hold that Section 79 ofRA 7942 is likewise to be understood as having been modified by Circular No. 1-91, BPBlg. 129 as amended by RA 7902, Revised Administrative Circular 1-95, and Rule 43 ofthe Rules of Court. In brief, appeals from decisions of the MAB shall be taken to the CAthrough petitions for review in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 of the 1997Rules of Court.



DESAMA vs ELISEA GOZUN G.R. No. 157882, March 30, 2006

FACTS:

Executive Order No. 279, promulgated by then President Corazon Aquino,

authorized the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals fromforeign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreementsinvolving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriaterecommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreignproponent.

After some time, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Rep. Act No.7942 entitled, “An Act Instituting A New System of Mineral ResourcesExploration, Development, Utilization and Conservation,” otherwise known as thePhilippine Mining Act of 1995. Then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued

DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 23, Series of 1995, containing theimplementing guidelines of Rep. Act No. 7942. This was soon superseded byDAO No. 96-40, s. 1996, which took effect on 23 January 1997 after duepublication.

Previously, however, or specifically on 20 June 1994, President Ramosexecuted an FTAA with Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC) over a total land areaof 37,000 hectares covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino.Included in this area is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya. Counsels forpetitioners filed a demand letter addressed to then DENR Secretary Heherson

Alvarez, for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA for the primary reason that Rep.

Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations DAO 96-40 areunconstitutional.

Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form asingle company that now goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco MiningCorporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders of which are Australiannationals.MGB rejected the demand of counsels for petitioners for the cancellation of theCAMC FTAA.

Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus,

with a prayer for a temporary restraining order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mining act and its implementing rules and regulationsare void and unconstitutional specifically Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 andSection 107 of DAO 96-40 FOR IT allows the unlawful and unjust “taking” ofprivate property for private purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of



the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

NO. Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40;

Republic Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations contained inDAO 96-40 – insofar as they relate to financial and technical assistanceagreements referred to in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of theConstitution are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

While this Court declares that the assailed provision is a taking provision,this does not mean that it is unconstitutional on the ground that it allows taking ofprivate property without the determination of public use and the payment of justcompensation.

The taking to be valid must be for public use. Public use as a requirement

for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is now synonymous withpublic interest, public benefit, public welfare and public convenience. It includesthe broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. Public use astraditionally understood as “actual use by the public” has already beenabandoned.

Mining industry plays a pivotal role in the economic development of thecountry and is a vital tool in the government’s thrust of accelerated recovery.Irrefragably, mining is an industry which is of public benefit. That public use isnegated by the fact that the state would be taking private properties for thebenefit of private mining firms or mining contractors is not at all true.

There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and itsimplementing rules and regulations do not provide for just compensation inexpropriating private properties. Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section107 of DAO 96-40 provide for the payment of just compensation



LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, Inc. vs RAMOS

G.R. No. 127882 January 27, 2004

FACTS:

On March 3, 1995, President Ramos signed into law R.A. No. 7942. Section 15thereof declares that the Act “shall govern the exploration, development, utilization, and processing of all mineral resources.” Such declaration notwithstanding, R.A. No. 7942does not actually cover all the modes through which the State may undertake theexploration, development, and utilization of natural resources.

The State, being the owner of the natural resources, is accorded the primary powerand responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization thereof. As such, itmay undertake these activities through four modes:

The State may directly undertake such activities.

(2)The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharingagreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations.

(3)Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources byFilipino citizens.

(4)For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance.

R.A. No. 7942 primarily concerns itself with the second and fourth modes.

Petitioners submit that, in accordance with the text of Section 2, Article XII of theConstitution, FTAAs should be limited to “technical or financial assistance” only. Theyobserve, however, that, contrary to the language of the Constitution, the WMCP FTAAallows WMCP, a fully foreign-owned mining corporation, to extend more than merefinancial or technical assistance to the State, for it permits WMCP to manage and operateevery aspect of the mining activity

On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretarydemanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No.96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however,has yet to respond or act on petitioners’ letter.

Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with



a prayer for a temporary restraining order. They allege that at the time of the

filing of the petition, 100 FTAA applications had already been filed, covering an

area of 8.4 million hectares, 64 of which applications are by fully foreign-owned

corporations covering a total of 5.8 million hectares, and at least one by a fully

foreign-owned mining company over offshore areas.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT Republic Act No. 7942 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

HELD:

The Court hereby declares unconstitutional and void the following:

(1) provisions of Republic Act No. 7942:

(a)The proviso in Section 3 (aq),

(b)Section 23,

(c)Section 33 to 41,

(d)Section 56,

(e)The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, and

(f) Section 90.

(2) All provisions of Department of Environment and Natural ResourcesAdministrative Order 96-40, s. 1996 which are not in conformity with this Decision,and

(3) The Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement between the Government ofthe Republic of the Philippines and WMC Philippines, Inc.

It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40 contain provisions that aremore favorable to WMCP, hence, these laws, to the extent that they are favorable toWMCP, govern the FTAA.

In addition, R.A. No. 7942 explicitly makes certain provisions apply to pre-existingagreements.



R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts. Althoughthe statute employs the phrase “financial and technical agreements” in accordance withthe 1987 Constitution, it actually treats these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.



APEX MINING CO., INC.,

Petitioner,

- versus -

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP. ET AL,

Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

BALITE COMMUNAL PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE,

Petitioner,

- versus -

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP., APEX MINING CO., INC., ET

AL,

Respondents.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD AND ITS MEMBERS, THE HON.

VICTOR O. RAMOS (Chairman), UNDERSECRETARY VIRGILIO MARCELO

(Member) and DIRECTOR HORACIO RAMOS (Member),

Petitioners,

- versus -

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION,

Respondent.

FACTS:



This resolves the motion for reconsideration dated 12 July 2006, filed by

Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), of this Court’s Decision

dated 23 June 2006 (Assailed Decision). The Assailed Decision held that the

assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SEM violated one of the

conditions stipulated in the permit, i.e., that the same shall be for the exclusiveuse and benefit of Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) or its duly authorized

agents. Since SEM did not claim or submit evidence that it was a designated

agent of MMC, the latter cannot be considered as an agent of the former that can

use EP 133 and benefit from it. It also ruled that the transfer of EP 133 violated

Presidential Decree No. 463, which requires that the assignment of a mining right

be made with the prior approval of the Secretary of the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Moreover, the Assailed Decision

pointed out that EP 133 expired by non-renewal since it was not renewed before

or after its expiration.

The Assailed Decision likewise upheld the validity of Proclamation No. 297

absent any question against its validity. In view of this, and considering that

under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as the “Mining Act of

1995,” mining operations in mineral reservations may be undertaken directly by

the State or through a contractor, the Court deemed the issue of ownership of

priority right over the contested Diwalwal Gold Rush Area as having beenovertaken by the said proclamation. Thus, it was held in the Assailed Decision

that it is now within the prerogative of the Executive Department to undertake

directly the mining operations of the disputed area or to award the operations to

private entities including petitioners Apex and Balite, subject to applicable laws,

rules and regulations, and provided that these private entities are qualified.

SEM also filed a Motion for Referral of Case to the Court En Banc and forOral Arguments dated 22 August 2006.

Apex, for its part, filed a Motion for Clarification of the Assailed Decision,

praying that the Court elucidate on the Decision’s pronouncement that “mining



operations, are now, therefore within the full control of the State through the

executive branch.” Moreover, Apex asks this Court to order the Mines and

Geosciences Board (MGB) to accept its application for an exploration permit.

In its Manifestation and Motion dated 28 July 2006, Balite echoes the

same concern as that of Apex on the actual takeover by the State of the mining

industry in the disputed area to the exclusion of the private sector. In addition,

Balite prays for this Court to direct MGB to accept its application for an

exploration permit.

Camilo Banad, et al ., likewise filed a motion for reconsideration andprayed that the disputed area be awarded to them.

ISSUE/S:

Whether

Southeast Mindanao Mining Corp. (SEM) acquired a vested

right over the disputed area, which constitutes a property right

protected by the Constitution.

HELD:

NO. SEM does not aver or prove that its mining rights had been perfected

and completed when the Philippine Bill of 1902 was still the operative law.

Surely, it is impossible for SEM to successfully assert that it acquired mining

rights over the disputed area in accordance with the same bill, since it was only

in 1984 that MMC, SEM’s predecessor-in-interest, filed its declaration of locations

and its prospecting permit application in compliance with Presidential Decree No.

463. It was on 1 July 1985 and 10 March 1986 that a Prospecting Permit and EP

133, respectively, were issued to MMC. Considering these facts, there is no

possibility that MMC or SEM could have acquired a perfected mining claim under

the auspices of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Whatever mining rights MMC had that



it invalidly transferred to SEM cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be

considered “mining rights” as contemplated under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and

immortalized in McDaniel and Gold Creek Mining .

SEM likens EP 133 with a building permit. SEM likewise equates its

supposed rights attached to the exploration permit with the rights that a private

property land owner has to said landholding. This analogy has no basis in law.

As earlier discussed, under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, national

wealth, such as mineral resources, are owned by the State and not by their

discoverer. The discoverer or locator can only develop and utilize said minerals

for his own benefit if he has complied with all the requirements set forth by

applicable laws and if the State has conferred on him such right through permits,concessions or agreements. In other words, without the imprimatur of the State,

any mining aspirant does not have any definitive right over the mineral land

because, unlike a private landholding, mineral land is owned by the State, and

the same cannot be alienated to any private person as explicitly stated in Section

2, Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution:

All lands of public domain, waters, minerals x x x and all

other natural resources are owned by the State. With theexception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall

not be alienated. (Emphases supplied.)

Further, a closer scrutiny of the deed of assignment in favor of SEM

reveals that MMC assigned to the former the rights and interests it had in EP

133, thus:

1. That for ONE PESO (P1.00) and other valuable

consideration received by the ASSIGNOR from the ASSIGNEE, the

ASSIGNOR hereby ASSIGNS, TRANSFERS and CONVEYS unto



the ASSIGNEE whatever rights or interest the ASSIGNOR may

have in the area situated in Monkayo, Davao del Norte and

Cateel, Davao Oriental, identified as Exploration Permit No.

133 and Application for a Permit to Prospect in Bunawan, Agusan

del Sur respectively. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is evident that what MMC had over the disputed area during the

assignment was an exploration permit. Clearly, the right that SEM

acquired was limited to exploration, only because MMC was a mere holder

of an exploration permit. As previously explained, SEM did not acquire the

rights inherent in the permit, as the assignment by MMC to SEM was donein violation of the condition stipulated in the permit, and the assignment

was effected without the approval of the proper authority in contravention

of the provision of the mining law governing at that time. In addition, the

permit expired on 6 July 1994. It is, therefore, quite clear that SEM has no

right over the area.



CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING G.R. No. 169080EXPLORATION CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

- versus -

MACROASIA CORPORATION(formerly INFANTA MINERAL AND INDUSTRIALCORPORATION),BLUE RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION, and LEBACH MININGCORPORATION,

Respondents.

FACTS:

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Infanta Mineral

and Industrial Corporation (Infanta) entered into a Mining Lease Contract V-1050.

Infanta’s corporate name was then changed to Cobertson HoldingsCorporation and subsequently to its present name, Macroasia Corporation.

After sometime, Celestial filed a Petition to Cancel the subject mininglease contracts and other mining claims of Macroasia including those covered byMining Lease Contract No. V-1050, before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of theMines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR.

Blue Ridge, in an earlier letter-petition, also wrote the Director of Mines to

seek cancellation of mining lease contracts and other mining rights of Macroasiaand another entity, Lebach Mining Corporation (Lebach), in mining areas inBrooke’s Point.

Celestial is the assignee of 144 mining claims covering such areascontiguous to Infanta’s (now Macroasia) mining lode claims. Celestial also holdsan MPSA with the government which covers 2,835 hectares located at Ipilan/Maasin, Brooke’s Point, Palawan and two pending applications covering another4,040 hectares in Barangay Mainit also in Brooke’s Point.

Celestial sought the cancellation of Macroasia’s lease contracts.

Macroasia refuted the grounds for cancellation invoked by Celestial.

Based on the records of the Bureau of Mines and findings of the fieldinvestigations, the POA granted the petition of Celestial to cancel the MiningLease Contracts of Macroasia; and found the claims of the others indubitablymeritorious. It gave Celestial the preferential right to Macroasia’s mining areas.It upheld Blue Ridge’s petition, but only as against the Mining Lease Contract



areas of Lebach, and the said leased areas were declared automaticallyabandoned. It gave Blue Ridge priority right to the aforesaid Lebach’s areas/mining claims. Blue Ridge and Macroasia appealed before the MAB.

Lebach did not file any notice of appeal with the required memorandum of

appeal; thus, with respect to Lebach, the above resolution became final andexecutory.

The MAB made a decision upholding the Decision of the POA to cancelthe Mining Lode/Lease Contracts of Macroasia.

However, the MAB, subsequently issued a resolution vacating its previousdecision, holding that neither the POA nor the MAB had the power to revoke amineral agreement duly entered into by the DENR Secretary. The MAB furtherheld that the power to cancel or revoke a mineral agreement was exclusivelylodged with the DENR Secretary.

Celestial and Blue Ridge made an appeal.

The CA Special12th Division affirmed the MAB Resolution which upheldthe exclusive authority of the DENR Secretary to approve, cancel, and revokemineral agreements. The CA also denied Celestial’s Motion for Reconsideration.

While the CA Special 10th Division granted Blue Ridge’s petition; reversedand set aside the Resolutions of the MAB; and treated the cancellation of amining lease agreement as a mining dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction ofthe POA under Sec. 77 of RA 7942, explaining that the power to resolve miningdisputes, which is the greater power, necessarily includes the lesser power tocancel mining agreements.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is only the Secretary of the DENR who has the jurisdiction to cancel mining contracts and privileges?

HELD:

YES. It is only the Secretary of the DENR who has jurisdiction to cancelmining contracts and privileges.

After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO 279, RA 7942 and itsimplementing rules and regulations, executive issuances, and case law, we rulethat the DENR Secretary, not the POA, has the jurisdiction to cancel existing



mineral lease contracts or mineral agreements based on the following reasons:

The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral agreementsemanates from his administrative authority, supervision, management, andcontrol over mineral resources under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the

Revised Administrative Code of 1987.

It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that manages, supervises, andregulates the use and development of all mineral resources of the country. It hasexclusive jurisdiction over the management of all lands of public domain, whichcovers mineral resources and deposits from said lands. It has the power tooversee, supervise, and police our natural resources which include mineralresources. Derived from the broad and explicit powers of the DENR and itsSecretary under the Administrative Code of 1987 is the power to approve mineralagreements and necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said agreements.

Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the DENRSecretary over the MGB to cancel or recommend cancellation of mineral rightsclearly demonstrates the authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel or approvethe cancellation of mineral agreements.

The DENR Secretary’s power to cancel mining rights or agreementsthrough the MGB can be inferred from Sec. 230, Chapter XXIV of DENR AO96-40 on cancellation, revocation, and termination of a permit/mineralagreement/FTAA.



[G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990]

LUZ FARMS, petitioner , vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF

THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent .

FACTS: On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved

R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and

swine in its coverage. On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian

Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing

Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of

R.A. No. 6657. On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform

promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of

R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms).

Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in

the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the

same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the

enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d)

and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and

Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No.

6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations

Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on

January 9, 1989.

Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and

rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a

writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining

public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are made

to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers. This



Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1989 resolved to deny, among

others, Luz Farms’ prayer the issuance of a preliminary injunction in its

Manifestation dated May 26 and 31, 1989.

Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24,

1989 resolved to grant said Motion for Reconsideration regarding the

injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by this Court of an

injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This Court also gave

due course to the petition and required the parties to file their

respective memoranda.

ISSUE: WON Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and

17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and

Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No.

6657 is unconstitutional.

HELD: YES. It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II

of R.A. 6657 which includes “private agricultural lands devoted to

commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising” in the definition of

"commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-

industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform

program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock

and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.

Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms’ argument that the requirement in

Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing “corporate farms” which

include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement

“production-sharing plans” (pending final redistribution of their

landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three



percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net

profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for

being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process.



[G.R. No. 61293. February 15, 1990]

DOMINGO B. MADDUMBA and ANITA C. MADDUMBA, petitioners, vs.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Represented by its

Chairman, Board of Trustees, HONORABLE LEONILO OCAMPO,

respondent .

FACTS: On December 10, 1980, respondent GSIS conducted a public

bidding of several foreclosed properties. Included in the properties

offered to the public was a house and lot situated at 3377 NewPanaderos Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of

Title No. 4749 of the Register of Deeds of Manila.

Petitioner Domingo B. Maddumba participated in the public bidding and

submitted his sealed bid in the amount of P98,000.00 in Philippine

currency. The bid was subject to the condition that there should be a

down payment of 35% of the amount thereof, the 10% constituting

the proposal bond with the remaining 25% to be paid after the receipt

of the notice of award or acceptance of the bid. Accordingly, petitioner

enclosed with his sealed bid a manager's check in the amount of

P9,500.00 and cash in the amount of P300.00 to complete the

P9,800.00 proposal bond.

Upon the receipt of the notice of award, petitioner offered to pay the

additional 25% in Land Bank bonds at their face value. These bonds

were issued to petitioner as payment for his riceland consisting of

twenty-six hectares located in Cordon, Isabela acquired by the

Government from him under Presidential Decree No. 27. However, the

GSIS rejected the offer, hence it was withdrawn by petitioner.



Petitioner then offered to pay in cash the remaining 25% down

payment "and all future installments." HYPERLINK "http://

elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/

Decisions/1990.zip%3E12e,df%7C1990/FEB1990/61293.htm" \l

"_ftn1" \o "" Thereafter, on November 16, 1981, petitioner paid in

cash the balance of the required down payment.

A "Deed of Conditional Sale" was executed by the parties on November

19, 1981, where the petitioner as vendee agreed to pay the vendor

GSIS "the balance of the purchase price of SIXTY THREE THOUSAND

SEVEN HUNDRED FIVE & 50/100 (P63,705.50) PESOS. Philippine

currency, in SIXTY (60) monthly installments of ONE THOUSAND FOUR

HUNDRED SIXTEEN & 69/100 (P1,416.69) PESOS. Philippine currency,

at twelve (12%) percent interest per annum, compounded monthly,

beginning December 1, 1981." HYPERLINK "http://



"_ftn2" \o ""

The first installment in the amount of P1,416.00 was paid by petitioner

on December 3, 1981. When the second monthly installment became

due, petitioner sent a letter dated January 5, 1982, to the GSIS Board

of Trustees requesting that he be allowed to pay the monthly

amortizations with his Land Bank bonds commencing in January, 1982

until the exhaustion of the said bonds. HYPERLINK "http://



"_ftn3" \o "" Petitioner invoked the provisions of Section 85 of

Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 251.



The GSIS Board of Trustees, in its Resolution No. 91 adopted on

January 22, 1982, denied petitioner's offer. The board “resolved to

reiterate the policy that Land Bank bonds shall be accepted as

payment only at a discounted rate to yield the System 18% at

maturity.” HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-

dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1990.zip%3E12e,df%7C1990/

FEB1990/61293.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o ""

In a letter dated February 12, 1982, petitioner asked the Board of

Trustees to reconsider Resolution No. 91. HYPERLINK "http://



"_ftn5" \o "" Petitioner reiterated his reliance on Section 85 of

Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, and further supported his position

with the contention that the policy of the GSIS contravenes the ruling

in the case of Gonzales, et al. vs. The Government Insurance System,

etc., et al.. HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-

dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1990.zip%3E12e,df%7C1990/

FEB1990/61293.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" Likewise, petitioner submitted an

opinion of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, dated February 12, 1982,

wherein it was stated, inter alia, that “if the GSIS accepts the Land

Bank bonds as payment thereof, it must accept the same at par or

face value. To accept said bonds at a discounted rate would lessen the

credibility of the bonds as instruments of indebtedness.” HYPERLINK

"http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/

SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1990.zip%3E12e,df%7C1990/

FEB1990/61293.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o ""

In a letter dated May 31, 1982, petitioner was advised by the Manager,



Acquired Assets Department, GSIS that Resolution No. 415 was

adopted on May 18, 1982 by the GSIS Board of Trustees denying the

request of petitioner. Hence, on August 5, 1982, the instant original

action for mandamus was filed by petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not under the provisions of Section 85 of Republic

Act No. 3844, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 251 effective

July 21, 1973, the GSIS may be compelled to accept Land Bank bonds

at their face value in payment for a residential house and lot

purchased by the bondholder from the GSIS.

HELD: Yes. It is not disputed that under the above quoted provisions,

a government-owned or controlled corporation, like the GSIS, is

compelled to accept Land Bank bonds as payment for the purchase of

its assets. As a matter of fact, the bidder who offers to pay in bonds

of the Land Bank is entitled to preference. What respondent GSIS is

resisting, however, is its being compelled to accept said bonds at their

face value. Respondent, in support of its stance that it can discountthe bonds, avers that "(a) PD 251 has amended Section 85 of RA 3844

by deleting and eliminating the original provision that Land Bank bonds

shall be accepted ‘in the amount of their face value’; and (b) to accept

the said bonds at their face value will impair the actuarial solvency of

the GSIS and thoroughly prejudice its capacity to pay death,

retirement, insurance, dividends and other benefits and claims to its

more than a million members, the majority of whom are low salaried

government employees and workers." HYPERLINK "http://



"_ftn8" \o ""



[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET

AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.

FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA

8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act on the ground that the law

amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands

of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural HYPERLINK

"javascript:void(0);"resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine

embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law

basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over

ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al

contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of

“ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include

private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said

law violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is HYPERLINK

"javascript:void(0);"unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they

voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same

result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was

d ismissed and the IPRA law was sus ta ined . Hence ,



ancestral domains may include public domain – somehow against the

regalian doctrine.



[G.R. No. 134958. January 31, 2001]

PATRICIO CUTARAN, DAVID DANGWAS and PACIO DOSIL, petitioners,

vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES, herein

represented by SEC. VICTOR O. RAMOS, OSCAR M. HAMADA and

GUILLERMO S. FIANZA, in his capacity as Chairman of Community

Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands (CSTFAL), Baguio City,

respondents.

FACTS: Cutaran et.al. assails the validity of DENR Special Order31,

Special Order 25, and Department Administrative Order 2 for being

issued without prior legislative authority.- Special Order (SO) 31

(1990): “Creation of a Special Task force on acceptance, identification,

evaluation and delineation of ancestral land claims in the Cordillera

Administrative Region”- Special Order (SO) 25: “Creation of Special

Task Forces provincial and community environment and natural

resources offices for the identification, delineation and recognition of

ancestral land claims nationwide”- DAO 2: Implementing Rules and

Guidelines of Special Order no. 25 The same year SO 31 was issued,relatives of petitioners filed separate applications for Certificate of

Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) for the land they occupy inside the Camp

John Hay Reservation. -These petitions were denied. Also pursuant to

the SO’s, the heirs of A peg Carantes filed application for CALC for

some portions of land in the Camp John Hay Reservation, overlapping

some of the land occupied by the petitioners. The petitioners contend

that if not for the respondent’s timely resistance to the Orders, the

petitioners would be totally evicted from their land.- Petitioners filed in

the CA petition to enjoin respondents from implementing Orders on

ground that they are void for lack of legal basis. CA ruled that SO31

has no force and effect for preempting legislative prerogative for it was

issued prior to the effectivity of RA7586 (National Integrated Protected

Systems), but it sustained SO25and DAO 2 on the ground that they

were issued pursuant to powers delegated to DENR under RA7586.-



Petitioners now contend that CA erred in upholding the validity of

SO25 and DAO 2 and seek to enjoin the DENR from processing the

application of CALC of Heirs of Carantes.

ISSUE: WON SO 25 and DAO 2 are valid

HELD: Not a justiciable controversy. The petition was prematurely

filed. There is yet no justiciable controversy for the court to resolve.

The adverse legal interests involved are the competing claims of the

petitioners and heirs of Carantes to possess a common piece of land.

Since the CALC application of the Heirs of Carantes has not yet been

granted or issued, and which the DENR may or may not grant, there is

yet no actual or imminent violation of petitioner’s asserted right to

possess the disputed land.- Definition of justiciable controversy: adefinite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties

having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law

through the application of a law.- Subject to certain well-defined

exceptions, the courts will not touch an issue involving the validity of a

law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or

performed that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the

person contesting its validity. This Court cannot rule on the basis of

petitioners’ speculation that the DENR will approve the application of

the heirs of Carantes. There must be an actual governmental act which

directly causes or will imminently cause injury to the alleged legal right

of the petitioner to possess the land before the jurisdiction of this

Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners were

being evicted from the land by the heirs of Carantes under orders from

the DENR.



[G.R. No. 59603. April 29, 1987]

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner , vs. HON.

CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of

First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is

where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is

to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development

Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are

registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the

government without them reaching the agreement as to the

compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the

appointment of the commissioners to determine the just

compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the

government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was

objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value

declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by

the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent

Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the

reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed this petition for

certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further

hearing the case.

Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of

determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just



compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes

impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render

the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is

reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree

may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in

determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s

own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to

arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a

judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may

make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation ofthe guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be

taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or

executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail

over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from

looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.



[G.R. No. 127296. January 22, 1998]

EDUBIGIS GORDULA, CELSO V. FERNANDEZ, JR., CELSO A.

FERNANDEZ, NORA ELLEN ESTRELLADO, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINES, J.F. FESTEJO AND CO., INC. AND REGISTER OF DEEDS

OF LAGUNA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the National Power

Corporation), respondents.

FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No.

573[3] withdrawing from sale and settlement and setting aside aspermanent forest reserves, subject to private rights, certain parcels of

the public domain which included Parcel No. 9 - Caliraya-Lumot River

Forest Reserve. They were primarily for use as watershed area. The

parcel of land subject of the case at bar is, by petitioners' explicit

admission,[4]within Parcel No. 9, the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest

Reserve. Petitioner Edubigis Gordula filed with the Bureau of Lands, an

Application[5]for a Free Patent over the land. Manuel Fernandez and

several others also filed free patent applications covering other parcels

of land in the area. Mr. Antonio Aquino, Jr., the Civil Security Officer of

the Cavinti reservoir complex, sent a Memorandum to the President of

the Napocor informing him of the fences and roads being constructed

in the saddle area, more particularly, in the lots sold by petitioner

Fernandez to petitioner Estrellado. Respondent Republic, through the

Napocor, filed against petitioners a Complaint for Annulment of Free

Patent and Cancellation of Titles and Reversion with Writ of Preliminary

Injunction in the RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The trial court rendered

judgment in favor of petitioners. Respondent Republic, through theNapocor, elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals. On

June 20, 1996, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled against

petitioners. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject parcels of land are non-disposable



and inalienable public land?

HELD: The two (2) parcels of land were public disposable and alienable

lands before the issuance, by the former President, of Proclamation

No.573, on June 26, 196. The property was, however, later reserved,under Proclamation No. 573, as a permanent forest, on June26,

196[9]. Since then, the property became non-disposable and

inalienable public land. By their very nature or by executive or

statutory fiat, they are outside the commerce of man, unsusceptible of

private appropriation in any form and inconvertible into any character

less than of inalienable public domain, regardless of their actual state,

for as long as the reservation subsists and is not revoked by a

subsequent valid declassification. Petitioners do not contest the nature

of the land in the case at bar. It is admitted that it lies in the heart of

the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No. 573

classified as inalienable and in disposable. No public land can be

acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from

the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title

from the state. The facts show that petitioner Gordula, did not acquire

title to the subject land prior to its reservation under Proclamation No.

573. He filed his application for free patent only in January, 1973,

more than three (3) years after the issuance of Proclamation No. 573in June, 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot

River Forest Reserve, was no longer open to private ownership as it

has been classified as public forest reserve for the public good.



J.M. TUASON & CO., INC. v. LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION

FACTS: R.A. 2616 authorized expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in

Quezon City owned by petitioner and 2 others. Lands were to be

divided to lots to be sold. They prayed that it be declared

unconstitutional because violative of equal protection clause since

statute applies only to Tatalon estate.

ISSUE: WON

HELD: No person shall be denied equal protection. A judicial being is

included within its terms. Those adversely affected may under such

circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show

that the governmental act assailed was prompted by the spirit of

hostility, or at the very least discrimination that finds no support inreason. Petitioner failed to prove denial of equal protection. Occupants

believe in gf that veterans subdivision is the real owner. Only when the

place vastly improved with building of roads, infrastructure did

petitioner claimed for the first time that they are the owners.



[G.R. No. 84647. May 23, 1991]

MARIA ALICIA LEUTERIO, petitioner , vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

HEIRS OF BENITO LEUTERIO, respondents.

FACTS: Pablo Leuterio died in San Luis, Pampanga on June 15, 1950,

leaving a large estate consisting of several parcels of land in

Pampanga.HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/

SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1991.zip%3E2bc,df%7C1991/MAY1991/84647.htm" \l

"_ftn2" His widow, Ana Maglanque -- who had been one of his domestic

servants and later his mistress, and whom he had married a few

months before his death, more precisely, on February 25, 1950 -- took

possession of his estate and administered it.HYPERLINK "http://

elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1991.zip

%3E2bc,df%7C1991/MAY1991/84647.htm" \l "_ftn3"

On July 23, 1957, Patrocinio Apostol, a niece of Pablo Leuterio, filed apetition in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for her

appointment as guardian of Maria Alicia Leuterio, then 16 years of age,

alleged to be the legitimated daughter of said Pablo

Leuterio.HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/


"_ftn4"

On November 20, 1957, Benito Leuterio, a brother of Pablo Leuterio of

the full blood, instituted proceedings for the settlement of the

decedent's intestate estate in the same Court of First Instance of

Pampanga, praying for his appointment as administrator.HYPERLINK



"http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/

1991.zip%3E2bc,df%7C1991/MAY1991/84647.htm" \l "_ftn5" Benito Leuterio's

petition pertinently alleged that Pablo Leuterio had died without

leaving a will; that he was survived, not only by said Benito Leuterio,

but also by a) the children of Elena Leuterio, deceased, sister of the

full blood of the decedent; b) Vicente D. Leuterio, the son of Gregoria

Leuterio, also deceased, and also a sister of the full blood of Pablo

Leuterio. That Pablo Leuterio died a widower; and that the claim of

Patrocinio Apostol, a niece of the decedent, that the latter had left a

legitimate daughter was "without foundation in fact and in law."

The petition was opposed by Ana Maglanque and Maria Alicia Leuterio

(the latter being represented by the above named Patrocinio Apostol).

After hearing, the Probate Court appointed Ana Maglanque

administratrix of Pablo Leuterio's estate.

The event leading directly to the appellate proceedings at bar was the

filing in the settlement proceeding by Maria Alicia Leuterio on October19, 1962 of a pleading entitled "Assertion of Rights," in which she

averred that she was the only forced heir of Pablo Leuterio and

therefore entitled to succeed to the latter's entire estate, subject only

to the rights accorded by law to her mother, Ana

Maglanque.HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/


"_ftn6"

In respect of this claim, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts

and issues, as regards the celebration and the validity of the marriage

of Pablo Leuterio and Ana Maglanque; the identity of the decedent's



relatives by consanguinity, supra; the character of the decedent's

estate as being "his own separate, exclusive properties and, therefore,

his capital”.

ISSUE: WON the Probate Court had erred -

1) in rejecting (as spurious) Exhibit D, "which is the certificate of therecord of birth of Maria Alicia Leuterio in the Civil Registry of San Luis,Pampanga;"

2) "in not giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of GervacioBagtas and Paula Punzalan who are disinterested witnesses and whoare school teachers at the San Luis Elementary School where appellantMaria Alicia Leuterio was studying;"

3) "in holding that the testimony of Don Sotero Baluyut given in theform of a deposition appears to be in the form of an accommodation;"

4) “in not declaring (on the basis of the evidence) that Maria AliciaLeuterio has been in the possession of the status of a natural childbefore and after the marriage of her parents * * ."

HELD: "In this case, the Court is not inclined to conclude that therewas an express desire on the part of Pablo to recognize Maria Alicia ashis natural child. As previously adverted to, the birth certificate,

baptismal certificate and the photographs do not bear the signaturesof Pablo expressing his acknowledgment of Maria Alicia as his naturaldaughter with Ana Maglanque. Indeed, Maria Alicia is said to havebeen born, reared and raised in the house of Pablo. Appellees explainthis by stating that Ana was a househelp in the house of Pablo. Pablohas no child with his previous wife, and it is not unusual if he lookedupon Maria Alicia as if she were his own daughter in or outside hisresidence. Upon these considerations, the court a quo was correct inrejecting the testimonies of Dar Juan, Paula Punzalan and GervacioBagtas, and the deposition of Sotero Baluyut. With respect to Dar

Juan, Punzalan and Bagtas, the lower court saw and observed theirdemeanor in the witness stand and objected to their vital claims. Withrespect to the testimony of Sotero Baluyut, petitioners admit that heand Pablo were very close friends.

"What clinches the case in favor of appellees, to Our mind, is theabsolute lack of a document or writing, such as receipts of payment ofschool fees in the name of Pablo, signatures in school cards, or a letter



to relatives or friends naming Maria Alicia as his daughter, despite thelapse of 9 years from the birth of Maria Alicia in 1941 up to his deathin 1950.

In her appeal to this Court, petitioner Maria Alicia Leuterio submits

that the Decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed because itwas "clear and patent error" on its part -

1) to surmise "that the action of the petitioner for legitimation isbased on voluntary recognition," and

2) to hold that the "facts and the laws involved place this casesquarely on all fours with the case of Colorado et al. vs. Court ofAppeals, G.R. No. L-39948, February 28, 1985, although the action ofherein petitioner is one for compulsory recognition and forlegitimation."

The petition is without merit, and cannot be granted.

It seems to this Court that both the Court of Appeals and the ProbateCourt were aware of the precise nature of the petitioner's recourse: a judicial declaration of her compulsory or involuntary recognition asPablo Leuterio's natural child. The record discloses that the ProbateCourt went to some lengths to stress the distinction between voluntaryand compulsory recognition, and to make petitioner's counsel identifythe exact character of the remedy that she was seeking -- whether itbe voluntary, or compulsory, recognition -- quoting in this connection,

the exchange between the Judge and petitioner's attorney, whichculminated in the latter's description of the desired relief as "notvoluntary acknowledgment in the sense that the decedent did notexecute a public document expressly acknowledging the petitionerMaria Alicia Leuterio as his natural child. Because we believe that apublic document is one of the evidence of compulsoryacknowledgment." HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1991.zip%3E2bc,df %7C1991/MAY1991/84647.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o "" It said:

"There should not be confusion in terms: one thing is theacknowledgment of a child by the father, made voluntarily; another isthe action that should be instituted by the child against the father tocompel the latter to acknowledge him as a natural child. Thecontinuous possession of the status of a natural child, tolerated by hisfather and justified by direct acts of the latter, does not, of itself,constitute evidence of acknowledgment that he is so in effect. It is, atmost, an evidence to compel the father to acknowledge him. However,



the action for this purpose should be brought within the periods oftime prescribed in Article 137 of the old Civil Code (now Article 285 ofthe new Civil Code). (Gitt vs. Gitt, 68 Phil. 385)."

The Probate Court's statements correctly reflect the state of the law at

the time. HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1991.zip%3E2bc,df%7C1991/MAY1991/84647.htm" \l "_ftn14" \o "" In fact, it is consistent with thestatement of the law attempted by petitioner's own distinguishedcounsel, citing Concepcion vs. Untaran, 38 Phil., 737, 738, viz .:

"The father of a natural child may recognize it in two different ways:(a) by a voluntary recognition (Art, 131, civ. code); (2) by aninvoluntary recognition enforced by either a civil or criminal action(Art. 135, Civ. Code; Art. 499, Pen. Code).

"A voluntary recognition of a natural child may be made: (a) in therecord of births; (b) by will; and (c) by any other public instrument.(Art. 131, Civil Code).

"An involuntary recognition of a natural child is made: (a) by anincontrovertible paper written by the parent expressly recognizing hispaternity; (b) by giving such child the status of a natural child of thefather, justified by direct act of the child of the father or his family (art.135, Civ. Code); and (c) by a criminal action for rape, seduction orabduction. (par. 2, art. 449, Pen. Code)."

It was in this sense, too, that the Court of Appeals appeared to haveunderstood and applied the law to the case. As much is apparent fromits declaration that "(r)ecognition under the Civil Code of 1889 ‘mustbe precise, express and solemn’ (Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 65 SCRA161), whether voluntary or compulsory (Baron vs. Baron, 63 OG No. 2,Jan. 9, 1967)." Like the Probate Court, whose judgment it affirmed,the Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence failed to prove either theexistence of "an incontrovertible paper written by the parent expresslyrecognizing his paternity," or the "giving (to) such child (of) the statusof a natural child of the father" conformably with Article 135 of the

Civil Code of 1889. Hence, there was no factual basis on which to resta declaration of involuntary recognition by Pablo Leuterio of MariaAlicia as his natural daughter.

Now, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, by familiardoctrine, conclusive on this Court and are not thus subject of review,specially where those findings are the same as those made by the TrialCourt. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, but none obtains



in the case at bar.

The petitioner also contests the Appellate Court's holding that Article283 of the present (1950) Civil Code has no retroactive effect. Thatconclusion was no doubt based on the fact that Article 2260 of the

same Code expressly accords such effect only to voluntary recognitionthus by inference excluding compulsory recognition for the causes orunder the circumstances enumerated in Article 283, with its "catch-all"provision that recognition may be compelled if the child has in hisfavor "any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father."HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1991.zip%3E2bc,df%7C1991/MAY1991/84647.htm" \l "_ftn15" \o "" While a contrary view, i.e., infavor of retroactivity, may find support in the excepting clause ofArticle 2253, also of the Civil Code, which gives effect to rights

declared for the first time therein, though arising from acts done orevents occurred under prior law provided no vested or acquired rightsof the same origin are prejudiced thereby, there is little point inpursuing that question insofar as the resolution of this appeal isconcerned.

Whether Article 283 has retroactive effect or it operates onlyprospectively, the fact is that both the Probate Court and the Court ofAppeals rejected in its entirety -- as variously, insufficient,unpersuasive and spurious -- petitioner's evidence both oral anddocumentary bearing on her alleged status as a natural child of Pablo

Leuterio. That rejection forecloses the claim of petitioner to eithervoluntary or compulsory recognition, be it made under the Civil Codeof 1889 which was in force at the time of her asserted birth or, in thecase of compulsory recognition, under the more liberal Article 283 ofthe present Code. It can hardly be disputed that in opening the doorto "any evidence" of paternity in an action to compel acknowledgment,Article 283 by no means did away with the usual tests of competence,sufficiency and credibility to which such evidence is subject whenoffered in a court of law, or strip the courts of their function andprerogative of passing upon its acceptability after applying such tests.

Such evidence here having been found wanting after due assessmentas already stated, petitioner's claim was properly denied.



[G.R. No. 109490. February 14, 1994]

PATROCINIO E. MARGOLLES, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, EDUARDO C.

ESPINOSA, LUCIA E. LAPERAL, NORMA C. ESPINOSA, TERESITA E.CASAL, ALICE E. SOTTO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC., BOOMTOWN DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION, SPOUSES CYNTHIA D. CHING and CHING TIONGKENG, SPOUSES CARMEN SOCO and LORENZO ONG ENG CHONG,SPOUSES SOLEDAD B. YU and YU SY CHIA, and LETICIA NOCONCHAN, respondents.

On 11 July 1985, Firestone, Boomtown, spouses Cynthia D. Ching andChing Tiong Keng, spouses Carmen Soco and Lorenzo Ong Eng Chong,spouses Soledad Yu and Yu Sy Chia, and Leticia Nocon Chan filed withthe Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Makati, Metro Manila, a complaintfor annulment of titles, recovery of possession, and quieting of titlesagainst Patrocinio E. Margolles, Virginia E. Villongco, Edgardo C.Espinosa, Lucia E. Laperal, Norma E. Espinosa, Teresita E. Casal, AliceE. Sotto, Veronica Gana, and Equitable Banking Corporation. Alsoincluded among the defendants were the Land RegistrationCommissioner and the Register of Deeds of Pasay City.

The complaint averred that the parcels of land in question wereregistered in the names of Benito Gonzales and Emeterio Espiritu was

issued pursuant to a decision in Land Registration Case No. N-6625,dated 22 July 1969. On 04 February 1976, the property wassubdivided by Gonzales and Espiritu into five lots, resulting in theissuance of five TCT.

Months after plaintiffs took possession of the premises, the defendantsdemanded that the plaintiffs vacate the premises. Claimingownership, the defendants, on their part, traced their titles fromOriginal Certificate of Title No. 4216 issued to the spouses LorenzoGana and Ma. Juliana Carlos on 26 March 1929 pursuant to Decree No.35183 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 672 of the Court of FirstInstance of Rizal, G.L.R.O. Record No. 30406.

On 04 April 1956, OCT No. 4216 was cancelled and, in its place, TCTNo. 43555 was issued to Lorenzo Gana and Veronica Gana married toRamon Rodriguez. TCT No. 43555 was itself likewise cancelled (on thesame day) and TCT No. 43556 was issued, this time in the name ofVeronica Gana alone. On 13 August 1956, Veronica Gana sold the land



to Patrocinio Margolles, resulting in the issuance of TCT No. 46302.

Margolles subdivided the property into seven (7) lots, each lot beingcovered, respectively, by TCTs No. 379913, No. 379914, No. 379915,No. 379916, No. 379917, No. 379918 and No. 379919.

On 03 November 1972, Margolles sold 1/2 interest in the property toSto. Niño Estate Management Corporation and TCTs No. 382176, No.382177, No. 382178, No. 382179, No. 382180, No. 382181 and No.382182 were thereupon issued in the names of both Sto. Niño EstateManagement Corporation and Patrocinio Margolles.

On 17 May 1973, Sto. Niño Estate Management Corporationreconveyed its interest to the property to Patrocinio Margolles and,again, new TCTs No. 410535, No. 410536, No. 410537, No. 410538,No. 410539, No. 410540 and No. 410541 were issued in the name of

the latter. Subsequently, TCTs No. 410536, No. 410538, No. 410539,No. 410540 and No. 410541 were cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCTNo. S-17992 was issued to Peltan Development Corporation.

Margolles subdivided the remaining parcels covered by TCTs No.410535 and No. 410537 into fifteen (15) lots, each of which was titledin her name, i.e., TCTs No. S-16369 up to No. S-16383, inclusive.These titles, except TCTs No. S-16372 and No. S-16373 which wereretained in her name, were later cancelled and transferred to herbrother and sisters, her co-defendants and co-petitioners in thepresent case. The transferees Virginia Villongco and Norma Espinosalater mortgaged their own lots to Equitable Banking Corporation.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the genuineness and authenticity of OriginalCertificate of Title No. A-S-47, against an overlapping OriginalCertificate of Title No. 4216, was sufficiently established;

(2) Whether or not Original Certificate of Title No. 4216 was issuedwhile the property was still unclassified public land; and

(3) Whether or not the claim of the petitioners was correctly barred bylaches.

The first issue is basically factual. Ordinarily, only questions of lawmay be raised in a petition for review on certiorari .HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip

%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l "_ftn1" This rule, however, is

subject to exceptions, such as when there are compelling reasons to



justify otherwise,HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l

"_ftn2" or when the appealed decision is clearly contradicted by the

evidence on record.HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/

FEB1994/109490.htm" \l "_ftn3" This case is so illustrative of such

exceptional instances.

To support their claim that OCT No. 4216 is genuine, the petitionershave submitted, among other things, the following pieces ofdocumentary evidence:

(1) The original of OCT No. 4216, as well as the owners’ duplicatecertificates, on file with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal;

(2) The publications (in the English and Spanish versions) of the

Official Gazette (1927 editions), containing notices of the initialhearing in Land Registration Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406),instituted by the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos,covering a parcel of land in Tindig na Mangga, Las Piñas;

(3) The order of then CFI Judge Cecilia Muñoz-Palma, dated 23 March1961, in LRC Case No. N-2126 (GLRO Record No. N-6564), denyingthe registration of a parcel of land by reason of the certification, dated26 June 1959, of the Land Registration Commissioner, Antonio N.Noblejas, that a portion of the property covered in this post-war land

case had been decreed under Decree No. 351823, issued on 05 March1929, in the name of the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana A.Carlos in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406), and while saidcase covered only a part of the property in dispute, it did show,however, that the decree was, in fact, issued to the spouses Gana andCarlos;

(4) The Report, dated 07 June 1983, of the Land RegistrationCommission's Verification Committee, sustaining the validity of DecreeNo. 351823 in favor of Lorenzo J. Gana and Maria Juliana A. Carlos;

(5) Page 209 of the Book of Decrees (Old Book) of the LandRegistration Commission, showing that a decree was "okayed" in GLRORecord No. 30406 (LRC Case No. 672), under the entry "Date O.K. forDecree" on "1-22-29" (22 January 1929) and that a decree was issuedunder the entry "Date Decree Issued" on "3-5-29" (05 March 1929);

(6) The certified true microfilm reproduction of plan Psu-49273covering a parcel of land in Barrio Tindig na Mangga, Las Piñas,



surveyed for Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos, approved by theBureau of Lands in 1926;

(7) The decision of this Court in Guico vs. San Pedro, 72 Phil. 415,pointing to the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal

in LRC Case No. 672 in favor of the spouses Lorenzo Gana and MariaJuliana Carlos; and

(8) The letters of Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and SolicitorGeneral Francisco Chavez, stating that the information and documentssubmitted to the Office of the Solicitor General by the Bureau of Landsand the Land Registration Commission were not sufficient to supportan action for cancellation of OCT No. 4216 and the derivative titlesthereof.

HELD: The above documentary evidence is much too overwhelming to

be simply brushed aside. It is our considered view that the appellatecourt has committed serious error in refusing to give any probativevalue to such evidence. All that the private respondents couldbasically proffer against OCT 4216 are that –

(1) The title is invalid, fake and spurious,HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l "_ftn4" which must have been the

work of "some unscrupulous elements" who could have access to "theRegistry Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of the Province of

Rizal,"HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l

"_ftn5" that explains petitioners' failure to present a copy of the

decision in Land Registration Case No. 672 or Decree No. 351823; and

(2) Assuming OCT No. 4216 to have been issued, the same is invalidhaving been issued on still unclassified land of the public domain.

Section 3, Rule 130, of the Revised Rules of Court, taken from Section321 of Act No. 190, states:

"Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - Whenthe subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shallbe admissible other than the original document itself, except in thefollowing cases:

“(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot beproduced in court, without bad faith on the part of theofferor;



“(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control ofthe party against whom the evidence is offered, and thelatter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

“(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other

documents which cannot be examined in court withoutgreat loss of time and the fact sought to be establishedfrom them is only the general result of the whole; and

“(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of apublic officer or is recorded in a public office."

It has been plainly shown that the failure of the petitioners to producethe Decree is due to the burning of the Archives of the Court of FirstInstance of Rizal during the liberation of Pasig,HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip

%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l "_ftn6" in consequence of whichall pre-war land registration cases in Rizal have beendestroyed.HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l"_ftn7" The respondents’ own witness, Eduardo Santos, Jr., has testified

that the records of pre-war registration cases are thus incomplete ascan be expected.HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l

"_ftn8" The Certification, dated 02 May 1980, of Reynaldo S. Vergara,

Acting Chief of the Docket Division of the Land Registration Authority,

states that the pre-war record of LRC Case No. 672, GLRO Record No.030406 for the province of Rizal, is not among the records on file withthe Vault Section of the Docket Division since the same must havebeen lost or destroyed as a consequence of the last world war.HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l "_ftn9" \o "" Certainly, the petitionerscannot be held to account for those lost or destroyed records.

The private respondents argue that the petitioners should have

asked for the reconstitution of the LRC case and the decree inaccordance with Act No. 3110 HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l"_ftn10" \o "" and Republic Act No. 26, HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l"_ftn11" \o "" or that they could have opposed, or intervened in, the



proceedings in LRC Case No. N-6625 (LRC Record No. N-36579) whereOCT No. A-S-47 has been decreed. For failing to do so, thepetitioners, it is now contended, should be held bound by the order ofdefault issued by the land registration court. The argument isunacceptable. The petitioners are not covered by the general order of

default in LRC Case No. N-6625. Republic Act No. 26 only covers lostor destroyed certificates of title. The original of OCT No. 4216 is notextant; it has, in fact, been presented in evidence. Act No. 3110, onthe other hand, applies only to pending judicial proceedings. ThisCourt has heretofore held, thus -

"The whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or replace recordslost or destroyed so that said records may be complete and courtproceedings may continue from the point or stage where saidproceedings stopped due to the loss of the records. x x x.

"xxx xxx xxx.

"If the records up to a certain point or stage are lost and they are notreconstituted, the parties and the court should go back to the nextpreceding stage where records are available, but not beyond that;otherwise to ignore and go beyond the stage next preceding would bevoiding and unnecessarily ignoring proceedings which are dulyrecorded and documented, to the great prejudice not only of theparties and their witnesses, but also of the court which must gainperforce admit pleadings, rule upon them and then try the case and

decide it anew,--all of these, when the records up to said point orstage are intact and complete, and uncontroverted.

"x x x. Act No. 3110, was not promulgated to penalize people forfailure to observe or invoke its provisions. It contains no penalsanction. It was enacted rather to aid and benefit litigants, so thatwhen court records are destroyed at any stage of judicial proceedings,instead of instituting a new case and starting all over again, they mayreconstitute the records lost and continue the case. If they fail to askfor reconstitution, the worst that can happen to them is that they losethe advantages provided by the reconstitution law. x x x.

"x x x. (T)o require the parties to file their action anew and incur theexpenses and suf(f)er the annoyance and vexation incident to thefiling of pleadings and the conduct of hearings, aside from thepossibility that some of the witnesses may have died or left the jurisdiction, and also to require the court to again rule on thepleadings and hear the witnesses and then decide the case, when all



along and all the time the record of the former pleadings of the trialand evidence and decision are there and are not disputed, all thiswould appear to be not exactly logical or reasonable, or fair and just tothe parties, including the trial court which has not committed anynegligence or fault at all.” HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/

documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df %7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l "_ftn12" \o ""

Furthermore, Section 45 of Act No. 3110, provides that "(n)othingcontained in (the) Act shall be construed to repeal or modify theprovisions of Section Three Hundred and Twenty One of Act NumberedOne Hundred and Ninety." Section 321 of Act No. 190 is now Section 3(aforequoted), Rule 130, of the Revised Rules of Court, otherwiseknown as the “best evidence rule." Hence, even if the petitioners havefailed to have the records of the LRC case reconstituted, they are not

precluded from establishing by other evidence the requisite proof ofvalidity of OCT No. 4216.

Quite recently, in Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (WIDORA) vs.Court of Appeals,HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l

"_ftn13" this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Florentino Feliciano,

said:

"x x x. The copy of OCT No. 351 offered by Ortigas was a certifiedtrue copy of the original thereof found in the Registration Book of the

Register of Deeds of Rizal. The admissibility of such a copy in courtproceedings is an exception to the ordinary rule on secondaryevidence; such admissibility is in fact mandated by Section 47 of ActNo. 496 (The Land Registration Act). Under the Land Registration Actwhich was in force at the time OCT No. 351 issued, the original thereoffound in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Rizal was anofficial transcript of Decree No. 1425, with respect to the land covered

by such decree situated in the Province of Rizal .

"Thus, OCT No. 351 constitutes direct proof of the existence of DecreeNo. 1425 upon which the Ortigas TCTs (Nos. 77652 and 77653) arebased. x x x." (Footnotes omitted; underscoring supplied.)

The private respondents maintain, nonetheless, that OCT No. 4216,issued in favor of the spouses Gana and Carlos, is invalid, so covering,as it supposedly did, unclassified public lands. Here, the privaterespondents base their claim on Forestry Administration Order (FAO)No. 4-1141 (1968), implementing LC Map No. 2623, Project No. 13-A.



According to them, Las Piñas comprises 2,556 hectares, out of which1,200 hectares have been declared alienable and disposable publiclands in 1928, under LC Map No. 766, Project 13, and that "Tindig naMangga" has not been covered thereby until the reclassification in1968. As such, they submit, the Court of First Instance of Rizal,

sitting as Land Registration Court in 1929, did not acquire jurisdictionto adjudicate the property in question to the petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest.HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l"_ftn14"

No cogent proof, however, has been given to support the abovecontention. To the contrary, in fact, is the letter, dated 27 April 1988,of then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, which in part, reads:

"Thirdly, it is also alleged that the title is null and void because it

allegedly covers land within the forest zone. There is no clear-cutproof to that effect. The certification of Mr. Rogelio dela Rosa of theTimber Management Division, Bureau of Forest Development, datedJuly 31, 1979, simply states ‘that the tract of land situated in BarrioTindig na Mangga, Las Piñas, Metro Manila containing an area of197,525 square meters as shown and described on this planPsu-04-006417 x x x was found to be within the Alienable orDisposable Block of LC Project No. 13-A of Las Piñas, Rizal certified assuch on January 3, 1968 per BFD Map LC-2623.’ The certificationrefers to land with an area of only 19.7525 hectares. It does not state

the relationship of said land with the land covered by OCT No. 4216which has an area of 99.6157 hectares.

"xxx xxx xxx.

"Fifthly, the recommendation of the Director of Lands for thecancellation of OCT No. 4216 is premised mainly on the allegation thatthe land is within the forest zone, having been allegedly released as A& D land only in 1968. But the recommendation is based on the samecertification of Mr. de la Rosa of the Bureau of Forest Developmentwhich, as earlier observed, does not make any clear reference to the

land covered by OCT No. 4216 and is, therefore, vague andinconclusive."

Unfortunately, for all concerned, no authentic copy of LC Map No. 766,Project 13, could be presented, albeit understandably, considering thateven the records of the National Mapping and Resource Authority(NAMREA) have apparently been lost or destroyed during the second



World War.

In Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation vs. Courtof AppealsHYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l

"_ftn15" (a case to annul a 1912 decision of the land registration court),the Republic sought to prove that, at the time an original certificate oftitle was issued, the land covered thereby was still within the forestzone. It offered as evidence a land classification map prepared by theDirector of Forestry in 1961. The Court ruled:

“x x x. When the proceedings were originally filed by the Republicbefore the Court of Appeals, the petitioner contended that when thedecree in favor of De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 theparcels of land were still part of the inalienable public forests.However, petitioner's case rested solely on land classification mapsdrawn several years after the issuance of the decree in 1912. Thesemaps failed to conclusively establish the actual classification of theland in 1912 and the years prior to that. Before this Court, petitionerreiterates said contention and refers, for the first time, to a 1908proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a naval reservationand alleging that the subject parcels of land are parts thereof. These xx x are insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor of thedecree's regularity x x x."

Furthermore, FAO No. 4-1141, signed by then Secretary of Agriculture

and Natural Resources Arturo R. Tanco, Jr., on 03 January 1968,provides:

"1. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1827 of the RevisedAdministrative Code, I hereby declare as alienable ordisposable and place the same under the control of theBureau of Lands for administration and disposition inaccordance with the Public Land Act, subject to privaterights, if any there be and to the conditions herein specified,the portions of the public domain situated in theMunicipalities of x x x Las Piñas, x x x Province of Rizal x x xwhich are designated and described as alienable ordisposable on Bureau of Forestry Map LC-2623, approved onJanuary 3, 1968." (Underscoring supplied.)

The issuance of OCT No. 4216 in 1929, conferring a private right, isthen amply protected by FAO No. 4-1141; otherwise, certificates oftitle issued prior to 1968 could possibly be all nullified.



Finally, the private respondents raise estoppel by laches on the part ofthe petitioners. Laches is "the failure or neglect for an unreasonableand unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising duediligence could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence oromission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a

presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned itor has declined to assert it.” HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l"_ftn16" \o ""

Contrary to private respondents’ claim that no action was taken by thepetitioners until a petition for quieting of title was filed in 1985 by theprivate respondents themselves, the records would indicate that uponthe subdivision of the lots in question by Espiritu and Gonzales, and

the subsequent transfers of the same to the private respondents in1976, a demand was seasonably made by the petitioners for theprivate respondents to vacate the premises. From the time OCT No.A-S-47 was issued to the private respondents in 1969 until thedemand was made in 1976, only seven (7) years had elapsed.

Lastly, it is a settled rule that "when two certificates of title are issuedto different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, theearlier in date must prevail, and, in case of successive registrationswhere more than one certificate is issued over the land, the personholding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person

who relies on a subsequent certificate. HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1994.zip%3E128,df%7C1994/FEB1994/109490.htm" \l"_ftn17" \o "" The titles of the petitioners, having emanated from anolder title, should thus be upheld.

.



HYPERLINK "http://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2008/06/sunbeam-convenience-foods-

inc-vs-ca.html"Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. vs. CA

G.R. No. 50464, Jan. 29, 1990

FACTS:

Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. is the recipient of a Sales Patent

issued by the Bureau of Lands over two parcels of land in Bataan. An

OCT was thereby issued. The Solicitor-General filed an action for

reversion on the ground that the lots were forest lands and therefore

inalienable.

CA ruled, upholding the Solicitor-General's contention.

ISSUE:

Whether or not land is alienable

HELD:

The SC affirmed.

Our adherence to the Regalian Doctrine subjects all agricultural,

timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the State. Thus, before

any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into

alienable or disposable land for agricultural purposes, there must be

a positive act from the Government. Even rules on the confirmation of

imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as

forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that

it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public

domain.

The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not



confer any validity on such title if the property covered by the title or

patent is part of the public forest.



Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest: Director of Lands v. IAC (1986)

Labels: 1986, Case Digest, Juris Doctor, Land Titles and Deeds, Land

Titles and Deeds Case Digest

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and

Deeds)

FACTS:

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo

Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the

Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land

possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines

was discovered by Magellan

land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes

on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the

alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M

worth of improvements

ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly

recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of

Maconacon, Isabela

donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela

IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of

ISSUES:



W/N the land is already a private land - YES

W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private

corporations or associations applies- NO

HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc

YES

already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a

grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of

title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by

the courts, an application therefore is sufficient

it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become

private property, at least by presumption

The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which

does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced

by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of

said patent.

The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but

simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by

earlier law

2. NO

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to

which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on

October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must

also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such

acquisition

The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not

acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024

hectares



Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of

carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A

which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces

but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, HYPERLINK

"javascript:void(0);" Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from

Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot

averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be

heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided

by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being

heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling

that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to HYPERLINK

"javascript:void(0);"promote general welfare so as to curb down the

indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due

process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of

the HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);"executive. The movement of carabaos

f r o m o ne a r e a t o t h e o t h e r d o e s n o t H Y P E R L I N K

"javascript:void(0);"mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would

ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the

carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC

found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police

power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not

reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly



oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property

confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is

immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on

the HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);"administrative authorities of the power

to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment

on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of

powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative

powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited

discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.



HYPERLINK "http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/joya-vs-pcgg-225-scra-568-

gr-no-96541.html"JOYA VS. PCGG [225 SCRA 568; G.R. No. 96541;

24 Aug 1993]

Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: HYPERLINK "http://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case

%20Digests"Case Digests, HYPERLINK "http://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/

Political%20Law"Political Law

Facts: On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of

PCGG, wrote then President Corazon C. Aquino, requesting her forauthority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the

R e p u b l i c o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s t h r o u g h P C G G a n d

Christ ie, Manson andWoods Internat ional, Inc concerning the

scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two) Old Masters

Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacañang and the

Metropolitan Museum of Manilaalleged to be part of the ill-gotten

wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. On 14

August 1990, then President Aquino, through former Executive

Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., authorized Chairman Caparas to sign

the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of New York to auction

off the subject art pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the

Philippines. On 15 August 1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas,

representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed

the Consignment Agreement with Christie's of New York. According to

the agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public

auction the eighty-two Old Masters Paintings then found at the

Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as the silverware contained inseventy-one cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the

Philippines, and such other property as may subsequently be identified

by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions

of the agreement.



On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit through then Chairman

Eufemio C. Domingo submitted to President Aquino the audit findings

and observations of COA on the Consignment Agreement of 15 August

1990 to the effect that: the authority of former PCGG Chairman

Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtfullegality; the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government;

PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.;

and, the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had

cultural significance, hence, their disposal was prohibited by law.

After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we issued

immediately our resolution denying the application for preliminary

injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks on the ground

that petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining

order and that proper parties had not been impleaded.

On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled

and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau

of Treasury.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

(2) Whether or not the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware

are embraced in the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation".

(3) Whether or not the paintings and silverware are properties of

public dominion on which can be disposed of through the jointconcurrence of the President and Congress.

(4) Whether or not PCGG has complied with the due process clause

and other statutory requirements for the exportation and sale of the

subject items.



(5) Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic, and if

so, whether the above Issue warrant resolution from this Court.

Held: This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court whichprovides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the

name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest

in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall

be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial

review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the

legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal

standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such

that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of

the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is

material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree,

as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere

incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be

personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate

the constitutional right of some third and related party.

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed

exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings acase for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the

fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and when a

taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the

disbursement of public funds.

Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and

in law. The ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the

foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the publichas been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings

when they were placed on exhibit.

The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration

however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of

these paintings has automatically passed on the government without



complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due

process and just compensation. If these properties were already

acquired by the government, any constitutional or statutory defect in

their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only

by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose authority torecover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by

statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the

legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become

publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right

whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.

Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Obviously,

petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds

but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is

worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique

silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public

money.

Anent the second requisite of actual controversy, petitioners argue that

this case should be resolved by this Court as an exception to the rule

on moot and academic cases; that although the sale of the paintings

and silver has long been consummated and the possibility of retrieving

the treasure trove is nil, yet the novelty and importance of the Issueraised by the petition deserve this Court's attention. They submit that

the resolution by the Court of the Issue in this case will establish

future guiding principles and doctrines on the preservation of the

nation's priceless artistic and cultural possessions for the benefit of the

public as a whole.

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an

actual case of controversy — one which involves a conflict of legalrights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial

resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-

legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of

justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has

become stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this

petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from



holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date — 11

January 1991 — which is long past, the Issue raised in the petition

have become moot and academic.

The cultural properties of the nation which shall be under theprotection of the state are classified as the "important cultural

properties" and the "national cultural treasures." On the other hand, a

"national cultural treasures" is a unique object found locally,

possessing outstanding historical, cultural, artistic and/or scientific

value which is highly significant and important to this country and

nation. This Court takes note of the certification issued by the Director

of the Museum that the Italian paintings and silverware subject of this

petition do not constitute protected cultural properties and are not

among those listed in the Cultural Properties Register of the National

Museum.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and

mandamus is DISMISSED.



MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS Case Digest

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS [267 SCRA 408; G.R. No.

122156; 3 Feb 1997]

Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service

Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of

thePhilippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8

December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of

the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila

Hotel Corporation. In a closebidding held on 18 September 1995 only

two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince

Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of

the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong

Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator,

which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or

P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/

strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts,

matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong

Berhad.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has

disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of

the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with

Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and

mandamus.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the

1987Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified

with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical



monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and

culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who

believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power

and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all

intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC

carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is

owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled

corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the

tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.

Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is

violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy and is

therefore null and void.

Held: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just

any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of

privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a

significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century

Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple meaning of

the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this

Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting theduty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to

respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus

ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA

PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the

shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and

thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other

acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease

and desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian

firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the

petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.



According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10,

second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory

provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs nofurther guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En

Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over

foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.

The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the

51% of the equity of said hotel to fall within the purview of the

constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock.

The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the

nation’s cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in

question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time,

not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from

granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence

of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estoppedfrom assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former

knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.



Manosca Vs CA Case Digest

Manosca Vs. Court Of Appeals

252 SCRA 412

G.R. No. 106440

January 29, 1996

Facts: The National Historical Institute declared the parcel of land

owned by Petitioners as a national historical landmark, because it wasthe site of the birth of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo.

The Republic of the Philippines filed an action to appropriate the land.

Petitioners argued that the expropriation was not for a public purpose.

Issue: Whether or Not the taking or exercise of eminent domain may

be granted.

Held: Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The

taking is for a public use because of the contribution of Felix Manalo to

the culture and history of the Philippines.



HYPERLINK "http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/mmda-vs-bel-air-village-328-

scra-836-gr.html"MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village [328 SCRA 836; G.R. No.

135962; 27 Mar 2000]

Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: HYPERLINK "http://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case

%20Digests"Case Digests, HYPERLINK "http://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/

Political%20Law"Political Law

Facts: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner

herein, is a Government Agency tasked with the delivery of basicservices in Metro Manila . Bel-Air Village Assoc iation (BAVA),

respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to

open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The

said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient

movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City.

This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the

same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter

wall separatingthe subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be

demolished.

The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition

of the wall, filed a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining

order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do so

and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner

appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the

authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an

agent of the State that can practice police power in the delivery ofbasic services in Metro Manila.

Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune

Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers.



Held: The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity

toexercise police power. Police power is primarily lodged in the

National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated togovernment units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not

a p o l i t i c a l g ove rnmen t un i t . T he r e f o r e , t he MMDA

cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them.

It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924

does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions

and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants

of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police

power.

It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and

coordinating with various national government agencies, people’s

organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector

for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast

metropolitan area.



Technology vs CA (193 scra 147)

Facts: Technology Developers Inc. is engaged in manufacturing and

exporting charcoal briquette. On February 16, 1989, they received a

letter from respondent Acting Mayor Pablo Cruz, ordering the full

cessation of the operation of the petitioner’s plant in Sta. Maria,

Bulacan. The letter also requested the company to show to the office

of the mayor some documents, including the Building permit, mayor’s

permit, and Region III-Pollution of Environmental and NaturalResources Anti-Pollution Permit. Since the company failed to comply in

bringing the required documents, respondent Acting Mayor, without

notice, caused the padlock of company’s plant premises, effectively

causing stoppage of its operation. Technology Developers then

instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with

preliminary injuction against respondents, alleging that the closure

order was issued in grave abuse of discretion. The lower court ruled

against the company. The CA affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

Issue: 1. Whether or not the mayor has authority to order the closure

of the plant. YES.

2. Whether or not the closure order was done with grave abuse

of discretion. NO.

Ruling:

1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the

matter of determining whether there is a pollution of the environment

that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is

essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control

Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now the

Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment



and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town

has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution,

and by virture of his police power, he may deny the application for a

permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless

appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to thehealth of the residents of the community from the emissions in the

operation of the business.

2. The Acting Mayor, in the letter, called the attention of petitioner to

the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor

"not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the

residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its

operation until further orders and it was required to bring the

following: a. Building permit; b. Mayor's permit; and c. Region III-

Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution

permit.

3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of

the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the

Provincial Governor through channels.

4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an

investigation was made. It found that the fumes emitted by the plantof petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no

proper air pollution device has been installed.

5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality

of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a building permit issued by an

official of Makati.

6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operateby the then National Pollution Control Commission on December 15,

1987, the permit was good only up to May25, 1988.

Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit



much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any

hazard to the health of the residents of the community. Petitioner

takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in

this dollar-earning industry. It must be stressed however, that

concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute tothe growth of the economy is the equally essential imperative of

protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people, from the

deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.



G.R. No. 108619 July 31, 1997

EPIFANIO LALICAN,

petitioner,

vs. HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, PresidingJudge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City andPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Issue: Whether the term lumber is included in the concept of timber in order to

constitute an offense as stated in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry

Reform Code of the Philippines).

Facts:The petitioners were apprehended on the Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan Puerto

Princesa for violating Section 68 of PD No. 705 or known as The Forestry Reform Code

of the Philippines. There were 1, 800 board feet of lumber loaded in two (2) passenger

jeeps in different sizes and dimension that were confiscated. On August 9, 1991, all the

accused were pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

Petioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information filed against themcontenting that, Section 68 of PD 705 does not include lumber because the wording of the

law categorically specify timber to be collected as to constitute the violation on the said

law. He further contends that, the law is vague because it does specify the authority or

legal documents required by existing forest law and regulation.

The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not the

courts to determine the wisdom of the law or to set the policy as rest by the legislature.

He further asserts that the word timber should include lumber which is a product or

derivative of a timber. The position of the prosecution could result to the circumvention

of the law, for one could stealthily cut a timber and process it to become a lumber. On

September 24, 1991, the lower court construed the interpretation of the law against the

State thus the motion was granted.The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration on the order underscoring the

fact that the accused presented Private Land Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February

10, 1991 which had expired; that while the certificate of origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz,

the product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the product

were not equipped with certificates of transport agreement. Added to this was the fact

that, if the product were indeed lumber, then the accused could have presented a

certificate of lumber origin, lumber sale invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery

receipts for transportation from one point to another. The motion was approved thus this

case.

Ruling:NO, The Court ruled that, the word lumber includes timber. The primary reason

why the law was enacted is to secure and maximize the use of the natural resources; the

non inclusion of lumber on the law may give rise for the circumvention of law. Section

68 of the said law punishes these acts namely (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or

removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any

authority; or (b) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal

documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations. Be that as it may, the



legislative intent to include possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the

expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under Executive Order No. 277. To

exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly

emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act

which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat

compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of thelaw.

After all, the phrase "forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumbers which,

to reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merely

result in tautology.

G.R. No. 158182 June 12, 2008

SESINANDO MERIDA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,

respondent.

Issue:

1. Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even

though it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer

2. Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705. –

Facts:

Petitioner was charged in the RTC of Romblon with violation of Section 68 of

PD 705 for "cutting, gathering, collecting and removing a lone narra tree inside a private land over

which private complainant Oscar Tansiongco claims ownership. When confronted during

the meeting about the fell narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so withthe permission of one Vicar Calix who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from

Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. It was later found out that he converted the narra

trunk into lumber.

He was found guilty by the Trial Court but he appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his

defense of denial. Petitioner also contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction

over the case because it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as

provided under Section 80 of PD 705. CA affirmed the lower court’s ruling, but ordered

the seized lumber confiscated in the government's favor. Also, it sustained the trial court'sfinding that petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree in

the Mayod Property without any DENR permit.

Ruling:

Yes, The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure list the cases which must be



initiated by a complaint filed by specified individuals, non-compliance of which ousts the

trial court of jurisdiction from trying such cases. However, these cases concern

only defamation and other crimes against chastity and not to cases concerning Section

68 of PD 705. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an interested

person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 ofPD 705, as amended.

Moreover, here, it was not forest officers of employees of the Bureau of Forest

Development who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but

Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus,

Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an investiga tion to dete rmine "if

there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report." At any rate,

Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from

filing a complaint ]before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD705.

2. Yes, Petitioner is guilty of the second paragraph of section 80, which is the cutting, gathering,

collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land

without any authority. The court also said that the lumber or “processed log “is covered by

the “forest products” term in PD 705, as the law does not distinguish between a raw and processed

timber.

A.M. No. MTJ-93-874 March 14, 1995AUGUSTUS L. MOMONGAN petitioner,

vs. JUDGE RAFAEL B. OMIPON,respondent.

Issue:Whether the respondent Judge erred in releasing the truck used to transport an

illegal lumber despite of prima facie evidence for violation of PD 705 as amended by EO

277.

Facts:Augustus Momongan is the Regional Director of DENR in Tacloban City, while

the respondent Judge Omipon is the incumbent Judge of MCTC of Hinunangan Silago,Southern Leyte. At around 10:00 of November 14, 1992 the police officer of Hinunangan

Silago, Southern Leyte apprehended a truck loaded with illegally cut lumber. The truck

was owned by Basilio Cabig drived by Dionisio Golpe. After the apprehension and

confiscation, a preliminary investigation was done to determine whether there is a

probable cause to engender the owner of the truck and the driver guilty on the violation of

PD 705. Despite of the presence of prima facie evidence the respondent Judge ordered

the release of the truck apprehended. Mr.Cabig was charged against PD 705 but Mr.



Golpe the driver was not included in the complaint.

The Regional Director Momongan filed an instant complaint against the judge

alleging that the release order was a violation of PD 705 Sections 68 and 68-A

respectively, and Administrative Order No. 59.Complainant claims that respondent Judge

has no authority to order the release of the truck despite the non-inclusion of Mr. Golpe in

the complaint. The truck should have been turned over to the Community Environmentand Natural Resources Office of San Juan, Southern Leyte for appropriate disposition as

the same falls under the administrative jurisdiction of the Department of Environment

and Natural Resources Office.

Respondent Judge explained that after conducting the preliminary investigation,

he found that Golpe, the owner of the truck, is principally engaged in the hauling of sand

and gravel and the delivery of hollow blocks, and the loading of the timber in the car is

due to the request of his friend Cabig. Respondent Judge observed that Golpe has a lesser

participation in the crime of illegal logging. More importantly, the fact that the complaint

charged only Cabig, respondent Judge, in the exercise of his sound discretion, ordered the

release of the truck owned by Golpe.

Ruling:No, The court found that the respondent order to release the truck owned and

driven by Mr. Dionisio Golpe legally justifiable. According to the RPC, “ Every penalty

imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of

the crime and the instrument or tools with which it was committed." However, this cannot

be done if such proceeds and instruments or tools "be the property of a third person not

liable for offense." In this case, the truck, though used to transport the illegally cut

lumber, cannot be confiscated and forfeited in the event accused therein be convicted

because the truck owner/driver, Mr. Dionisio Golpe was not indicted. Hence, there was

no justification for respondent Judge not to release the truck.

Complainant is correct in pointing out that the DENR Secretary or his dulyauthorized representative has the power to confiscate any illegally obtained or gathered

forest products and all conveyances used in the commission of the offense and to dispose

of the same in accordance with pertinent laws. The release of the truck did not render

nugatory the administrative authority of the DENR Secretary. Despite the order of

release, the truck can be seized again either by filing a motion for reinvestigation and

motion to include the truck owner/driver, as co-accused, which complainant has done as

manifested before the lower court or by enforcing Adm. Order No. 59. Section 12.

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA,

minors, and represented by their parents petitioners,

vs.

THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as theSecretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THEHONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati,Branch 66, respondents.

Issue



Whether children have the legal standing to file the case?

Facts

This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44 children, through

their parents, claiming that they bring the case in the name of “their generation as well asthose generations yet unborn.” Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against the

Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources HYPERLINK

" h t t p : / / e n . w i k i p i l i p i n a s . o r g / i n d e x . p h p ?

title=Department_of_Environment_and_Natural_Resources" \t "_blank" , seeking to have

him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and

desis t from accepti ng and appro ving more timb er license agr eeme nts.

The children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by

the State in its capacity as parens patriae.

The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and

to stop issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural law—

and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was

dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was

brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

Ruling

Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the

legal standing to file the case based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility”.Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that

environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal standing

to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of

contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of

public welfare.



G.R. No. 131270 March 17, 2000

PERFECTO PALLADA,

peti t ioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,

respondent.

Issue:Whether a separate certificates of origin is used for lumber and timber.

Facts:

Sometime in the latter part of 1992, DENR received a reports that illegally cut

lumber were delivered in the warehouse of Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation in

Valencia Bukidnon. DENR officers in collaboration of PNP raided the company’s

warehouse and found a large stockpile of lumber in varying sizes cut by a chainsaw. As

proof that the company had acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two

receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and17, 1992. The DENR officers did not, however, give credit to the receipt considering that

R. L. Rivero Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been suspended. What is more, the

pieces of lumber were cut by chain saw and thus could not have come from a licensed

sawmill operator.

On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with Noel Sy, as

assistant operations manager, and Francisco Tankiko, as president of the Valencia Golden

Harvest Corporation, and Isaias Valdehueza, were charged with violation of section 68 of

P.D. No. 705, as amended. During the trial, the accused presented documents that the

lumber are legally obtained. This may include the certificate of origin. However, the

court found out that Pallada was guilty of the violation of PD 705 and the rest of theaccused were acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence. The case was appealed to the CA

and rendered a decision affirming the decision of the lower court, thus this case was

elevated.

Ruling:

Yes, there should be a separate Certificate of origin. The trial court acted correctly

in not giving credence to the Certificates of Timber Origin presented by petitioner since

the lumber held by the company should be covered by Certificates of Lumber Origin. For

indeed, as BFD Circular No. 10-83 states in pertinent parts:

In order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint accountability andresponsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting

the origin thereof, the attached Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . which

form[s] part of this circular [is] hereby adopted as accountable forms for official

use by authorized BFD officers . . . .

5. Lumber . . . transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate of Lumber

Origin (CLO) . . . as herein required shall be considered as proceeding from

illegal sources and as such, shall be subject to confiscation and disposition in



accordance with LOI 1020 and BFD implementing guidelines.

The irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they are found

not only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court in giving no

credence to the same. The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the

presumption that the CTOs were regularly executed by the DENR officials

concerned.

G.R. No. L-46772 February 13, 1992PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCEOF QUEZON , respondent.

Issue:

Whether the information correctly and properly charged an offense and whether the

trial court had jurisdiction over the case.

Facts:

The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs,

defined and punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as

the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The information provided that Godofredo

Arrozal and Luis Flores, together with 20 other John Does whose identities are still

unknown, the first-named accused being the administrator of the Infanta Logging

Corporation, conspired and entered the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, titled

in the name of her deceased father, Macario Prudente, and proceeded to illegally cut, gather,and take, there from, without the consent of the said owner and without any authority

under a license agreement, 60 logs of different species.

On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the

information on 2grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

and, (2) that the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. Trial

court thus dismissed the information based on the respondent’s grounds.

Ruling:

The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut,

gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or other

forest products cut ,gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to any

private individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without

authority under a license agreement, leas, license, or permit granted by the state. The failure

of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. It



should be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a public forest

but from private woodland registered in the name of complainant's deceased father,

Macario Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or

lease does not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced in

the Philippines including those produced in private woodlands. Thus, ownership is not anessential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. As to

the second issue raised, the regular courts still has jurisdiction. Sec. 80 of PD 705covers 2

specific instances when a forest officer may commence a prosecution for the violation of the

Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.

The first authorizes a forest officer or employee of the Bureau of Forestry to arrest

without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing, in his presence, any of

the offenses described in the decree. The second covers a situation when an offense

described in the decree is not committed in the presence of the forest officer or employee

and the commission is brought to his attention by a report or a complaint. In both cases,

however, the forest officer or employee shall investigate the offender and file a complaint

with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation and file

the necessary informations in court. Unfortunately, the instant case does not fall under any of

the situations covered by Section 80 of P.D. 705. The alleged offense was committed not in the

presence of a forest officer and neither was the alleged commission reported to any forest

officer. The offense was committed in a private land and the complaint was brought by

a private offended party to the fiscal. As such, the OSG was correct in insisting that

P.D. 705 did not repeal Section 1687 of the Administrative Code giving authority tothe fiscal to conduct investigation into the crime of demeanour and have the necessary

information or complaint prepared or made against person charged with the commission of the

crime. In short, Section 80 does not grant exclusive authority to the forest officers, but only

special authority to reinforce the exercise of such by those upon whom vested by the general

law.

G.R. No. 136142 October 24, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFONSO DATOR et.al ,

Accused- Appelant

Issue:

Whether the penalty imposed to Telan the accused is correct in violation of PD

705



Facts:

Pator Teala and his co accused Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol were charged

with the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise

known as the Revised Forestry Code. The accused while transporting pieces of lumber

bound to Maasin Souther Leyte, they were apprehended by the police officer and seizedpieces of lumber. As a result SPO1 Bacala issued a seizure receipt

covering the fifty-one

(51) pieces of confiscated Dita and Antipolo lumber and one (1) unit of Isuzu cargo truck

with Plate No. HAF 628. The confiscated pieces of lumber and the cargo truck were

turned over to SPO3 Daniel Lasala, PNP Property Custodian of Maasin, Southern Leyte

who, in turn, officially transferred custody of the same to the CENRO, Maasin, Southern

Leyte. The accused Telan alleged that the pieces of lumber were cut from the track of

land belonging to his mother in San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte which he intended to

use in the renovation of his house in Barangay Abgao of the same municipality. He

further contends that he secured verbal permission to Boy Leonor an officer-in -charge of

the DENR.

The lower courts found out that the accused is guilty in violation of PD 705

sentencing the accused to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA,

with the accessory penalties provided by law, which is two (2) degrees higher than

PRISION MAYOR maximum, the authorized penalty similar to Qualified Theft, and to

pay the costs. Thus, this case was elevated to the court.

Ruling:

No, In the case at bench, the confiscated fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Dita and

Antipolo lumber were classified by the CENRO officials as soft, and therefore not

premium quality lumber. It may be noted that the said pieces of lumber were cut by theappellant, a mere janitor in a public hospital, from the land owned by his mother, not for

commercial purposes but to be utilized in the renovation of his house. It does not appear

that appellant Telen had been convicted nor was he an accused in any other pending

criminal case involving violation of any of the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code

(P.D. No. 705, as amended). In view of the attendant circumstances of this case, and in

the interest of justice, the basis for the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be

the minimum amount under Article 309 paragraph (6) of the Revised Penal Code which

carries the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods for simple theft.

Considering that the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.

705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal

Code, pursuant to the said decree, the imposable penalty on the appellant shall be

increased by two degrees, that is, from arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods

to prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Applying the Indeterminate

Sentence Law,

the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be six (6) months and

one (1) day of prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.

G.R. No. 120365 December 17, 1996



PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

plaintiff-appellee,

vs. WILSON B. QUE,

accused-

appellant

Issue:

Whether the appellant’s activities consist an offense

Facts: Provincial Task Force got wind that a that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate

number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos

Norte. Acting on sa id in fo rmation, members of the PTF went on patrol

several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City. On

March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer

Patoc went on patrol around the area. At about1:00 in the morning, they posted

themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes

later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate number PAD-548 pass by. They followed

the truck and apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge.On June 23, 1994, accused-appellantwas charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of

P.D. 705as amended by E.O. 277. The Information alleged that, on or about the 8th day of

March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this

Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten

Wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there

willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control and custody 258 pieces

of various sizes of Forest Products Chain saw lumber (Species of Tanguile) with a total

volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount ofP93,232.50 atP25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit, license or authority to do so from the

proper authorities Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he

acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the trial, he

presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa and Elpidio Sabal The

PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest area covered

by the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by

the PLTP’s of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as

payment for his hauling services

Ruling:

Yes, Possession of the lumber without the necessary permit is a violation of the

RFC. When the police apprehended Que, he failed to present documentary evidence to

prove that he has the permit to possess and transport the lumber. All he had was the



permit for the coconut slabs. He even concealed the lumber so as to avoid it from being

seen upon first inspection of the load. Under the circumstances, there is no doubt that the

accused was aware that he needed documents to possess and transport the lumber, but

could not secure one and therefore, concealed such by placing it in such a manner that it

could not be seen by merely looking at the cargo. There are 2 ways of violating Sec. 68 ofthe Revised Forestry Code:

a. by cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without

licence and

b. by possessing timber or other forest products without required legal documents.

In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of said acts. However,

in the second offense, mere possession without proper documentation consummates the

crime.

G.R. No. 161798 October 20, 2004

PICOP RESOURCES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTUS L. CALO, PresidingJudge, respondent

Issue;

Whether petitioner has the right to retain the seized confiscated products by the

virtue of MOA regarding the Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of

Private Tree Plantation.

Facts:

Petitioner PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) owns and operates a multi-billion

peso pulp and paper manufacturing facility in Bislig City, Agusan del Norte. It holds

government-issued Pulpwood and Timber License Agreement (PTLA) No. 47 and

Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) No. 35 which gave petitioner the

exclusive right to co-manage and develop with the State almost 130,000 hectares of forest

land within the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through its

officers, rendered three Memoranda, dated August 22, 1997, February 16, 2001 and April

6, 2001 designating the petitioner as DENR depository and custodian for apprehended

forest products and conveyances within its concession. On May 25, 2001, the Office ofthe CENRO-Bislig and petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)

containing "Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of Private Tree

Plantation."

The MOA provided, among others, that field validation/verification of

applications for Certificates of Private Tree Ownership (CTPOs) shall be conducted

jointly by the DENR, the local government unit concerned, and petitioner. Pursuant to

these Memoranda, petitioner’s security personnel were deputized as DENR officers to

apprehend and seize the tools, equipment and conveyance used in the commission of



illegal logging and the forest products removed and possessed by the offenders.

In the course of the enforcement of the aforesaid Memoranda, petitioner PICOP,

through its security personnel, had on numerous occasions apprehended within its

concession and tree plantation area. These illegally cut forest products and conveyances

were kept in PICOP’s impounding area.

A class suit was initiated among the members of UFAB asking for preliminary

mandatory Injunction. They further asked for the declaration of the memoranda null and

void and sought to restrain the DENR and those who are participants from enforcing the

said memoranda. The RTC ordered Elias R. Seraspio, Jr. to recall, withdraw and abrogate

the enforcement of the assailed Memorandum dated February 16, 2001 and to refrain and

desist from implementation. Petitioner was also ordered to release the

confiscated falcata logs and vehicles to the owners thereof, or to the CENRO-Bislig or

the Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur, where the administrative and

criminal proceedings were ongoing.

Ruling:

Petitioner had no right or interest to protect in the confiscated forest products and

conveyances. Petitioner’s compound was used only as a depository for the confiscated

logs and conveyances by virtue of the Memorandum. While it claimed that some of the

confiscated forest products may have come from its concession area, petitioner admitted

that the ownership of the confiscated products was still to be determined in the cases

pending either at the CENRO-Bislig or at the Office of the Government Prosecution-

Surigao del Sur. Hence, petitioner’s interest in the confiscated forest products was merely

contingent and cannot be material as contemplated under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised

Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner contends that private respondents’ intrusion was in

violation of petitioner’s PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. These license agreements gavepetitioner the exclusive right to co-manage and develop forest lands, and recognized

petitioner as owner of the trees and other products in the concession area. In filing this

petition, petitioner is merely defending its subsisting proprietary interest pursuant to these

license agreements.

It is clear that petitioner has no material interest to protect in the confiscated forest

products and conveyances. It has no subsisting proprietary interest, as borne out by its

licensing agreements, which need to be protected by annulling the writ of injunction

issued by the trial court. Petitioner also cannot claim the right to retain custody of the

apprehended logs and conveyances by virtue of its being designated a depository of the

DENR pursuant to the assailed Memoranda. As such depository, petitioner merely holdsthe confiscated products and conveyances in custody for the DENR while the

administrative or criminal proceedings regarding said products are pending.



GR NO. 152989. September 4, 2002

Roldan, Jr. petitioner v. Hon, Madrona et.al. respondents

Issue:

a. Whether a person who cuts trees for his own use within his property without the

necessary permit from the DENR and without transporting the same outside said

property, be criminally charged for violating PD 705?

b. Whether the owner of a private property is administratively liable under Section

14 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21 despite the fact that he did not transport

the logs out of his property and used them for his own agricultural purposes.

Facts:

On August 9, 2001, petitioner applied for a Private Land Timber Permit (PLTP)

from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for him to cut some trees for

a proposed road and poultry farm in his property. He also paid all the fees required by the

various government agencies. While waiting for the permit to be issued, petitioner was

allegedly informed by some employees from the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources (DENR) that he could proceed with the cutting of trees even though his

application was still awaiting approval. Consequently, petitioner proceeded with the

cutting of trees and bulldozing of the roadway. He used the cut logs as materials to build



his chicken cages. About three weeks later, representatives of the Community

Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment

and Natural Resources and personnel from the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the

Philippines (ISAFP) of Tacloban City raided petitioner’s place, allegedly without a search

warrant. An inventory of the cut trees was conducted there were 872 pieces of sawnlumber/flitches (8,506 board feet) and three felled timber logs with a total market value

of P235,454.68 at P27.00 per board foot.

Ruling:

a. Yes, Under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, it is clear that the

violators of the said law are not declared as being guilty of qualified theft. As to the

assertion that his penalty for cutting trees in his own land should not be equated with that

for qualified theft, suffice it to say that the judiciary is never concerned with the wisdom

of the law. Whether or not the legislature was correct in imposing on violators of PD 705a penalty equal to that imposable on those guilty of qualified theft is a question beyond

the power of the Court to resolve. It is a settled rule that the fundamental duty of the

Court is to apply the law regardless of who may be affected, even if the law is harsh -

dura lex sed lex

Section 14 of Administrative Order No. 2000-21, the “Revised Guidelines in the

Issuance of Private Land Timber Permit/Special Private Land Timber Permit,” provides:

SEC. 14. Penal Provisions. - Any log/timber or finished-wood products covered by these regulations which are transported without the

prescribed documents shall be considered illegal and, therefore, subject to

confiscation in favor of the government and shall be disposed in

accordance with laws, rules and regulations governing the matter.

b. No, The rule is clear. The aforementioned administrative order considers the

mere act of transporting any wood product or timber without the prescribed documents as

an offense which is subject to the penalties provided for by law.



G.R. No. 184098 November 25, 2008

AMADO TAOPA,

petitioner,

vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.

Issue:

Whether the penalty imposed against the petitioner is correct in violation of PD705

Facts:

On April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural Resources

Office of Virac, Catanduanes seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber and arrested

its driver, Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent

detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain

Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of the seized lumber Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded

not guilty on arraignment. After trial on the merits, the RTC found them guilty as charged

beyond reasonable doubt. Only Taopa and Cuison appealed the RTC decision to the Court

of Appeals (CA). Cuison was acquitted but Taopa's conviction was affirmed.The

dispositive portion of the CA decision read:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED with respect

to accused-appellant Cuison, who is

ACQUITTED

of the crime charged on

reasonable doubt, and MODIFIEDwith respect to accused-appellants Amado Taopa

and Rufino Ogalesco by reducing the penalty imposed on them to four (4) years,

nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten

(10) years of prision mayor, as maximum

Ruling:

NO, Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the

Revised Penal Code (RPC) for the penalties to be imposed on violators. Violation of

Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft. The law treats cutting,

gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without license as an

offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.

The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber was P67,630.

Following Article 310 in relation to Article 309, the imposable penalty should

be

reclusion temporal

in its medium and maximum periods or a period ranging from 14

years, eight months and one day to 20 years plus an additional period of four years for theexcess of P47,630.

The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence imposable on Taopa shall be the

penalty next lower to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the minimum term shall be

anywhere between 10 years and one day to 14 years and eight months or prision mayor in

its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.



The maximum term shall be the sum of the additional four years and the medium

period of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or 16 years, five

months and 11 days to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal. The

maximum term therefore may be anywhere between 16 years, five months and 11 days

of

reclusion temporal

to 22 years, two months and 21 days of

reclusion perpetua.

G.R. No. 175289 August 31, 2011

CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN et.al , Petitioners, . PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

Isuue:

Whether mere possession of timber without the legal documents required under

forest laws and regulations makes one automatically liable even criminal intent in

violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, as amended.

Facts:

In a Criminal Complaint filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4,

Cagayan de Oro City by Marcelino B. Pioquinto (Pioquinto), Chief of the Forest

Protection and Law Enforcement Unit under the TL Strike Force Team of Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada) and

three others namely, Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria (Sudaria) of Tagpangi, Cagayan

de Oro City, Marlon Baillo (Baillo) and Cipriano Boyatac (Boyatac), were charged with

violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. The

respondents were guilty of gathering and possessing sixty-three (63) pieces flitches of

varying sizes belonging to the Apitong specie with a total volume of Four Thousand

Three Hundred Twenty Six (4,326) board feet valued at

P108,150.00, without any

authority and supporting documents as required under existing forest laws and regulation

to the damage and prejudice of the government.

Ruling:

Yes, As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum and as

such, criminal intent is not an essential element. There is no dispute that petitioners were

in constructive possession of the timber without the requisite legal documents. Villarin

and Latayada were personally involved in its procurement, delivery and storage without

any license or permit issued by any competent authority. Given these and considering that

the offense is malum prohibitum, petitioners’ contention that the possession of theillegally cut timber was not for personal gain but for the repair of said bridge is, therefore,

inconsequential.



CA-G.R. SP. No. 80927. February 4, 2005

LT. RODELLO B. LARAYA, PN, et.al., petitioners, vs. HON. PERFECTO E. PE,

RTC of Palawan,respondent.

Issue:

Whether the Respondent Judge acted in excess of his Jurisdiction or with Grave

Abuse Of Discretion when he allowed the Re-Opening Of Pre-Trial For Purposes Of

Plea-Bargaining without The consent of the Complainants and Contrary to Section 2,

Rule 116 Of The Revised Rules On Criminal Procedure, As Amended.

Facts:

It was on 12 September 2002, thirty eight (38) Chinese nationals on board their

fishing vessels were caught within the Malampaya Natural Gas Platform Project

Exclusive Zone, in El Nido, Palawan in the act of illegal fishing. Hundreds of kilos of

Groupers (locally known, as Lapu-Lapu), Wrasse (locally known, as Mameng ) and

Snappers (locally known, as Maya-Maya) were found in the said fishing vessels found

within the vessels, among others, were powders and pillets, suspected to be noxious

substances or component ingredients of explosives. A bottle of home-made dynamite was

also retrieved. A criminal complaint was filed against the accused-private respondents

for the violation of Republic Act No. 8550, otherwise known as the Philippine Fisheries

Code of 1998, specifically, Section 87 (Poaching) and Section 88 (Fishing through

Explosives, Noxious or Poisonous Substances) of the said Act.

Subsequently, criminal informations for violation of Republic Act No. 8550 were

filed against all 38 Chinese nationals with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan. All of the

accused-private respondents thereafter pleaded not guilty to the charges on 07 May 2003.

During the pre-trial of the criminal cases, counsel for the accused-private

respondents manifested their intention to enter into plea bargaining by entering a plea of



guilty to a lesser offense under paragraph 2 of Section 88 of Republic Act 8550.

However, the then prosecuting officer of the cases, Provincial Prosecutor Alen Ross B.

Rodriguez did not accede

After prosecution presented its first witness and initial cross-examination was

conducted by the counsel for the defense, or after only two hearing dates, however,

Provincial Prosecutor Alen Ross B. Rodriguez manifested his intention to inhibit from

further prosecuting the criminal cases. Continuation of the trial was, hence, rescheduled

the following day.

On 16 July 2003, with the appearance of a new prosecutor, counsel for the

defense asked the court to re-open the pre-trial stage of the criminal cases and reiterated

the accused-private respondent’s earlier intention of availing plea bargaining. This time,

the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office, represented by Prosecutor Olegario Cayetano, Jr., didnot object. On the contrary, Prosecutor Cayetano manifested that the government was

amenable to re-open pre-trial for the purpose of plea-bargaining. Consequently, the trial

court ordered the re-opening of the pre-trial.

During the re-opened pre-trial stage, all the accused-private respondents through their

counsel plead guilty to violation of Paragraph 2, Section 88 of Republic Act 8550. The

public prosecutor interposed no objection with the change of plea and informed the court

that the prosecutor’s conformity with the plea bargaining was in consonance with the

directive of the Chief State Prosecutor

Ruling:

NO, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides:

“SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising

judicial and quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or

with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no

appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a

person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the

proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law

and just ice may require. XXX

XXX XXX”

Hence, for the herein petitioners to lodge the instant action, they must first be “a



person aggrieved”, otherwise, they would be without legal standing to pursue this legal

recourse. That having been said, this Court rules that the herein petitioners are not

persons aggrieved by the assailed decision of the trial court in the subject criminal cases.

It is elementary in criminal law that a crime is an offense against the State, and is hence

prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines. For this reason, Section 5 of Rule110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “all criminal actions

commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and

control of the prosecutor.” Furthermore, Section 1 of P.D. 1275, provides the exclusive

domain of the prosecutory arm of the government as how best to deal with the

prosecution of criminal cases. Hence, any grievance in course thereof affecting the

interest of the State must proceed only from such an arm of the government.

A.M. No. MTJ- 03- 1487. December 1, 2003

SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF GUINDULMAN, BOHOL, petitioner , vs. JUDGE

MANUEL A. DE CASTRO, Acting Presiding

Judge, MCTC, Guindulman-Duero, Bohol, respondent .

Issue:



Whether the respondent Judge committed gross ignorance of the law for not

imposing the proper penalty provided for in Sec. 90, R.A. No. 8550, otherwise known as

The Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998.

Facts:

It was on May 17, 2002 when lawmen apprehended a boat captain and eight

crew members of the fishing boat B/B Junida-J who were fishing within the vicinity of

the municipal waters and fish sanctuary of Basdio, Guindulman, Bohol with a ring net

(known locally as “licom”). Charges for violation of Sections 86, 90 and 96 of Republic

Act No. 8550 were immediately filed with the MCTC, Guindulman-Duero, Bohol,

presided over in an acting capacity by Judge Manuel A. de Castro. In the morning of the

very next day, a Saturday, two of the accused, namely: Narciso J. Jusay, Jr. (boat owner)

and Rolando T. Amistoso (boat captain) were released from detention upon order ofrespondent. It appears that respondent held a court session on May 18, 2002, despite the

fact that it was a Saturday, and proceeded to arraign both accused who pleaded guilty.

The respondent judge exaggerated the speedy disposition of the case commanding the

accused to pay five thousand pesos and further commanded to return the alleged

impounded boats to the accused. Surprised by such turn of events, the Sangguniang

Bayan passed a resolution for the further investigation on the action of respondent judge

about the crime charged against the accused and a copy thereof was received by the

Office of the Chief Justice, Supreme Court on June 25, 2002.

Ruling:

Yes, the respondent Judge committed a grave ignorance of the law and violation

of circulars issued by the court when he tried a case in Saturday. The respondent judge

impudently misused his authority to impose the penalty under the law which it cannot be

countenanced. If judges wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by law, there will

not only be confusion in the administration of justice but even also oppressive disregard

of the basic requirements of due process. The observance of the law, which he is bound to

know is required of every judge. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it tohis office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of gross

ignorance of the law. A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and

independence. It is a pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and

the changes therein for ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses

no one, not even judges. Indeed, it has been said that -- when the inefficiency springs



from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the

discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position

and the title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately

done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. HYPERLINK "http://

elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/2003.zip%3E152,df%7C2003/DEC2003/am_mtj_03_1487.htm" \l "_ftn20" \o ""

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1430. September 8, 2003

SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ROMEO B. SENSON, complainant , vs. JUDGEHERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN,MTCC, PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, respondent .

Issue:Whether the decision of the respondent judge is correct in approving the Urgent

motion for custody of Fishing Net.

Facts:

On 14 March 2000, several persons were apprehended for violation of Section 86

of Republic Act No. 8550, also known as “The Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998”

HYPERLINK "ht tp : / / sc . judic iary .gov.ph/ jur isprudence/2003/sep2003/

am_mtj_02_1430.htm" \l "_ftn1" \o "" by members of the Philippine National Police.

The items seized from those arrested included (a) 1 unit fish net, (b) 36 units lights (300

watts), (c) 1 unit light (500 watts), (d) 1 unit buoy, (e) 7 containers, (f) 7 plastic containerboxes, (g) 4 styropore boxes, and (h) 10 boxes of fish. On the same day, Criminal Case

No.15019 against them was filed. Three days later, Danilo Alayon and Norma Villarosa,

asserting to be the co-owners of the M/B King Fisher that was used in the illegal fishing

activity, filed an “Urgent Motion for Custody of Fishing Net,” alleging that the fish net

which costs “no less than P600,000.00” was left unattended at the beach exposed to the

elements and movements of the sea which could cause its early deterioration and ultimate

loss. Respondent Judge, despite the vigorous objection of the public prosecutor, granted

the motion in part, to the following effect -

“To obviate their possible loss, destruction and/or deterioration, pending resolution of

the above-captioned case, the apprehending officers or whoever has the custody, areordered to cause the immediate turnover of the following items to movants who undertake

to produce the same whenever needed in court, as they can only be properly confiscated

in favor of the government upon conviction of the accused .

The respondent contended that Republic Act No. 8550, the law under which the

accused were charged with having transgressed, did not provide for the seizure of the

fishing paraphernalia pending trial and that the prosecution still could prove the guilt of



the accused beyond reasonable doubt even without the evidence being presented since it

had sufficient witnesses for the purpose.

Ruling:

No, the seizure of the fishing paraphernalia has been made as being an incident to

a lawful arrest.

Rule 127, Section 12, of the Rules of Court HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/sep2003/am_mtj_02_1430.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o ""

provides:

“SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.- A person lawfully arrested may be searched

for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an

offense, without a search warrant.”

G.R. No. 132451 December 17, 1999

CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA,

petitioner,

vs. HON. RENATO C.CORONA, in his capacity as the ExecutiveSecretary, HON. FRANCISCO VIRAY, in his capacity as

the Secretary of Energy, CALTEX PHILIPPINES INC., PILIPINASSHELL PETROLEUM CORP. and PETRON

CORP.,

respondents.

Issue:

Whether the exclusion of Section 19 (setting the time of full deregulation of oil

law) on RA 8479 made by the congress makes the law unconstitutional.

Facts:November 5, 1997, this Court in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of

Energy and Lagman, et al., v. Hon. Ruben Torres, et al., declared Republic Act No. 8180,

entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes",

unconstitutional, and its implementing Executive Order No. 392 void. R.A. 8180 was

struck down as invalid because three key provisions intended to promote free competition

were shown to achieve the opposite result. More specifically, this Court ruled that its

provisions on tariff differential, stocking of inventories, and predatory pricing inhibit fair

competition, encourage monopolistic power, and interfere with the free interaction of the

market forces.

As a result of the Tatad decision, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8479, a new

deregulation law without the offending provisions of the earlier law. Petitioner Enrique T.

Garcia, a member of Congress, has brought the petition seeking to declare Section 19

thereof, which sets the time of full deregulation, unconstitutional. After failing in his

attempts to have Congress incorporate in the law the economic theory he espouses,

petitioner asks the court, in the name of upholding the Constitution, to undo a violation

which he claims Congress has committed.



Ruling:

No, It bears stressing that R.A. 8180 was declared invalid not because

deregulation is unconstitutional. The law was struck down because, as crafted, three key

provisions plainly encouraged the continued existence if not the proliferation of theconstitutionally proscribed evils of monopoly and restraint of trade. It is not the function

of the Court to safeguard the members of the congress on what law they will enact

because this is the exact tenet on the encroachment of power as stipulated on the principle

of separation of power. The court as a whole, respects the laws legislate by the congress.

The validity of such laws, may only be impugned if it violates the Constitution. In the

case at bar, the Constitution perse was not violated nor ridiculed.

G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OFAPPEALS; HON. JUDGEHERCULANO TECH, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 70, REGIONAL

TRIAL COURT OF BINANGONAN RIZAL; FLEETDEVELOPMENT, INC. and CARLITOARROYO; THE MUNICIPALITY OFBINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.

Issue:

Whether the Local Government Code Code of 1991 repealed the Charter of

Laguna Lake Developmental Authority (RA NO. 4850) in the issuance of fish pen

permits and other related activity involving Laguna de Bay.

Facts:

This is a petition made by Laguna Lake Development Authority to declare an

exclusive power on the regulation of issuing a fish open permits over the businessmen

engage in the Laguna de bay. The power to issue a permit was then transferred to theoffice of the mayor on the different municipalities of Laguna thus making the Laguna de

bay crowded and unhealthy for living of natural resources and danger to the livelihood

among the folks of Laguna.

Ruling:



No, the court holds that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not

necessarily repeal the laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and

granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The

Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which

categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there

was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and itsamendments.

It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority

constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is

a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation

which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-

settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or

class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and

application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the

general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law."

Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute

should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute.

The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special

circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. A special law cannot be repealed, amended

or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.Thus, it has to be concluded

that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991.

G.R. No. L-68474 February 11, 1986

NUCLEAR FREE PHILIPPINE COALITION, ET AL.,

petitioners,

vs. NATIONALPOWER CORPORATION, ET AL.,

respondents.

G.R. No. 70632 February 11, 1986

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE ATOMICENERGY COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents.

Issue:

Whether the judgement of PAEC on the nuclear power plant safe.

Facts:

a. G.R. No. 70632, petitioners question the competence of respondent PAEC

Commissioners to pass judgment on the safety of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1

PNPP-1 in PAEC Licensing Proceedings No. 1-77 without however seeking their ouster

from office, although "proven competence" is one of the qualifications prescribed by law

for PAEC Commissioners. Petitioners also assail the validity of the motion



(application)

filed by the National Power Corporation (NPC) for the conversion of its

construction permit into an operating license for PNPP-1 on the principal ground that it

contained no information regarding the financial qualifications of NPC, its source of

nuclear fuel, and insurance coverage for nuclear damage.

b.. In G.R. No. 68474, acting on the motion filed therein dated June 8, 1985 to

order PAEC to reconsider its orders of May 31 and June 5, 1985, the urgent motion for

mandatory injunction and/or restraining order dated August 3, 1985, the second urgent

motion for mandatory injunction dated August 12, 1985, and the various pleadings and

other documents submitted by the parties relative thereto, and considering the paramount

need of a reasonable assurance that the operation of PNPP-1 will not pose an undue risk

to the health and safety of the people, which dictates that the conduct of the inquiry into

the safety aspects of PNPP-1 be characterized by sufficient latitude, the better to achieve

the end in view, unfettered by technical rules of evidence (Republic Act 5207, section

34), and in keeping with the requirements of due process in administrative proceedings.

Ruling:

a. The Court therefore resolved to RESTRAIN respondent PAEC Commissioners

from further acting in PAEC Licensing Proceedings No. 1-77.the said decision is due to

the pamphlets that PAEC had circulated. Having thus prejudged the safety of the PNPP-1

respondent PAEC Commissioners would be acting with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack of jurisdiction were they to sit in judgment upon the safety of the plant,

absent the requisite objectivity that must characterize such an important inquiry.

b. The respondent PAEC (once reconstituted) to re-open the hearing on PNPP-1

so as to give petitioners sufficient time to complete their cross-examination of the expert

witnesses on quality assurance, to cross-examine the witnesses that petitioners have failed

to cross-examine on and after August 9, 1985, and to complete the presentation of theirevidence, for which purpose, respondent PAEC shall issue the necessary subpoena and

subpoena duces tecum to compel the attendance of relevant witnesses and/or the

production of relevant documents. For the said purposes, the PAEC may prescribe a time

schedule which shall reasonably assure the parties sufficient latitude to adequately

present their case consistently with the requirements of dispatch. lt is understood that the

PAEC may give NPC the opportunity to correct or supply deficiencies in this application

or evidence in support thereof.



Azucena Salalima vs. Employees Compensation Comm. and Soc. Sec. SystemG.R. No.-146360

Facts:

Petitioner’s husband Juancho Saldima was employed for twenty nine years as a routehelper and salesman for the Meycauayan Plant of Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines Inc.during the annual company medical examination, Juancho was diagnosed with pulmonary tuberculosis. Later found him to have cancer of the lungs and died after fewmonths. Azucena, the wife of Juancho is now claiming for the benefits of her husbandfrom the company and the SSS. RTC dismissed the case. CA affirmed and this petitionwas therefore filed.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner is entitled to benefits provided by P.D. 626

Held:

SC answered in the affirmative. Because the facts of the case showed that the cause ofJuancho’s death was his mere work and that his medical history states that his stay atCoca cola is a contributory to his sickness. SSS was ordered to pay the claimant and theRTC’s and CA’s decisions were reversed and set aside.

Social Justice Society, et. al. vs. Honorable Jose Atienza, Jr.G.R. No. 156052

Facts:

Chevron is engaged in the business of importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines while Shell and Petron are engaged in the business ofmanufacturing, refining and likewise importing and marketing of petroleum products.Petitioners sought to compel Mayor Tienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which wasenacted by Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila and became effective upon approval byMayor Atienza. This ordinance reclassifies the area described from industrial tocommercial and directed the owners to cease and desist from operating their businesswithin 6 months. Among the business is the Pandacan Terminal of the Oil companies. Oilcompanies intervened in the issue attacking the validity of the ordinance.

Issue:

Whether the ordinance approved by respondent is valid or not

Held:

Valid. Because the tremendous event happened near the area which many were put intodanger, the Manila Municipal Office shall do its ministerial duty to protect all property



and health of those people who lived in the vicinity and nearby cities. The court orderedthe transfer of Pandacan Terminal within a non extendible period of 90 days. The life ofthe people shall be the utmost priority of the government in terms of its security, thoughthe business will lose billions of money, the municipality cannot sacrifice its people.

Filinvest Credit Corporation vs. IAC and Nestor Sunga, Jr.G.R. No. 65935

Facts:

A case filed by Nestor Sunga Jr., businessman and owner of the NBS Machineries and the NAP-NAP Transit. He purchased a minibus Mazda from Motorcester with an agreementto pay the balance in monthly basis. Later, Nestor failed to pay his obligations to thecompany which cause the confiscation of the minibus by the officers of Filinvest Corp.The minibus was mortgaged to Filinvest Corp. Sunga cleared his obligations to Filinvestwhich the court rendered decisions granting Sunga moral, actual damages, litigation

expenses and Attorney's fees. Filinvest filed motion to review the decision of the court.

Issue:

Whether the award of damages to Sunga is valid

Held:

Yes. It is valid but it is unconscionable, therefore the SC reduced the amount granted toSunga since the facts show that the latter had not suffered much and that it is hisobligation to pay the minibus as it was stipulated between him and Filinvest Corp. Moraland actual damages were granted but litigation expenses was eliminated for it has no price for litigation.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.G.R. Nos. 120865-71

Facts:

A case filed by authority against all those who were given permit by Municipal mayorsPacis, Papa and Jala-Jala to include them as releasers of permits and other respondentsfor violating the provisions who has the jurisdiction to give permits. But the issue notonly lies on the granting of permits but the error on deciding that authority is not a quasi-

judicial agency that R.A. 4850 was amended by P.D. 813 and E.O. 927 s. of 1983 and theLGU has the power to issue permits.

Issue:

Whether LLDA has the power as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body

Held:



Yes. LLDA has express powers as regulatory and quasi-judicial body to cease and desistorders and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fish pens, fish cages and otheraqua-culture structures in Laguna De Bay. It is not co-equal to RTC but only to its extentof power provided by law. All permits issued were declared null and void and allstructures on the said area shall be demolished because of the void permits granted to

owners and operators.

Agapito Magbanwa, et. al. vs. IAC, et. al.G.R. no. 66870-72

Facts:

A case where all plaintiffs who were tenants of the defendants complained the diversionof the free flow of water from their farm lots which caused portions of their landholdingsto dry up to their great damage and prejudice and they were asked to vacate the areas forthey could not plant any longer for lack of water.

Issue:

Whether plaintiffs are entitled to damages

Held:

Yes. Because the closing of water flow to the petitioners’ farm lots caused damage and prejudicial to them in their harvest. It has no showing in the facts that petitioners werenegligent but instead the respondents’ bad faith which caused prejudice to the former.Under the law, the landowner has the obligation to keep tenant in the peaceful andcontinuous cultivation of his landholding. A disturbance of possession such as the actcomplained of is violative of the law. Therefore, the court granted moral and exemplarydamages and Attorney’s fees to plaintiffs.

Ernesto Rodriguez, et. al. vs. IAC and Daytona Construction and DevelopmentCorporationG.R. no. 74816

Facts:

Plaintiffs filed an action for abatement of a public nuisance with damages againstdefendant. After four extensions of time to file an answer by defendant, Daytona moved

to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and cause of action. Motions denied, defendantwas declared in default and authorized plaintiffs to present evidence ex parte. The facts ofthe case at bar shows that there is other nearby residents who were prejudiced by theDaytona Corp. for the running of its business. It affected their health and property. But inthis case, the delay of the respondents to answer id questionable and contrary to law.

Issues:



1. Whether petitioners have cause of action to file the case2. Whether respondents are liable for damages

Held:

1. Yes. Because the business had greatly prejudiced their health and property. The permitgiven to Daytona is valid but the conditions provided were not met.2. Yes. Respondents are liable for damages except nominal damages based on thediscretion of the court instead moral and actual damages were awarded because sufficientevidence had supported as such.

DENR vs. Gregorio Daraman, et. al.G.R. No. 125797

Facts:

This is a case filed by the DENR represented by RED Israel Gaddi against Gregorio

Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio who were caught by one Pablo opinion to transportillegal pieces of lumber using the vehicle of one Baby Lucenecio, the Holy Cross FuneralServices. Here, the respondents alleged that one Asan, owner of furniture shop ask thetwo to bring also some pieces of wood to his house located near the funeral’s location.Opinion, DENR employee, saw the vehicle and inspected it, there he saw some lumberand issued an order of forfeiture. The court granted bond and released the funeral car andlumber because it was found out that Daraman and Lucenecio were not owners of thevehicle and lumber. Hence, this complaint was filed.

Issue:

Whether the respondents violated P.D. 705 section 68-A

Held:

Yes. The court cannot deny the fact that Section 68-A P.D. 705 is also applicable to thosewho transport lumber without proper documents. Here, Daraman and Lucenecio had no permit to transport lumber although they were only asked to bring the lumber to thehouse of one Asan. The RTC has overstepped its jurisdiction of the case since DENR wasgiven the power to confiscate the property in favor of the state/government. The releaseof this property defeated the purpose of section 68-A of P.D. 705. Therefore, SC grantedthe petition of DENR, RTC’s decision was reversed and set aside.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Honorable Roman Cansino, Jr. et. al.G.R. No. L-17923

Facts:

On October 3, 1960, Magdayo Ramirez, owner of 85 tubs of fish filed a complaint forreplevin against Commander Abraham Campo and manager of Royal Cold Storage. Upon



the filing by Ramirez of a P2, 000 bond, Judge Roman Cansino ordered the court sheriffto take possession of the 85 tubs of fish for five days and release it to Ramirez.Commander Ocampo filed a petition to return the fish for the same fish were caught inTONY LEX I boat. Here, the fish were caught through the use of dynamite, which is aviolation and crime under R.A. 428. Action for prohibition and injunction were filed by

Ocampo against the Judge and the sheriff.

Issues:

Whether respondent Judge erred in posting a bond in dissolving the warrant of seizureWhether Ramirez violated R.A. 428

Held:

Yes. RTC Judge Cansino erred in dissolving the warrant of seizure because the petitioneris the R.P and the same is exempt from the obligation to post such a bond.Yes. Ramirez violated R.A. 428 because under this law, it is violative to use dynamite infishing which the Bureau of Fisheries strictly observes the implementation of the saidlaw.

Sea Lion Fishing Corporation vs. People of the PhilippinesG.R. no. 172678

Facts:

This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of CA in denying theMotion for Reconsideration and petition for Certiorari and Mandamus. Here, 17 Chinesefishermen were caught poaching off Mangsee Island in Palawan. The Barangay officialsand team of Philippine Marines found F/V Sea Lion with five boats with fishing netsspread over the water. The court filed various cases against the Chinese fishermen to wit:Violation of section 977 of R.A. 85508[8]; Violation of section 909[9] of R.A. 8550 andviolation of Section 27(a) and (f) 10 [10] of R.A. 9141711(110 and section 8712(12) ofR.A. 8550, F/V sea Lion filed an Urgent Motion for Release of evidence alleging that itowns the vessel. The court released the vessel but later the court found out that theevidence of ownership of Sea Lion was not supported by documents. Therefore,government forfeited the vessel.

Issue:

Whether the forfeiture of F/V Sea Lion in favor of the government was proper

Held:

Yes. The government was correct when it forfeited F/V Sea Lion since its motion wasonly filed after the judgment has been rendered and it failed to seek all remedies giventhe sufficient time to do so. The lower court had jurisdiction over the case and the



petitioner was not denied of due process and gets it failed to comply with the otherrequirements provided in the law.

Legaspi VS. Civil Service CommissionG.R. no. 72119

Facts:

Civil Service Commission denied Valentin Legaspi’s (petitioner) request for informationon the civil service eligibilities of 2 people employed as sanitarians, Julian Sibonghanoyand Mariano Agas, in the Health Department in Cebu. Petitioner claims that his right toinformation is guaranteed by the Constitution prays for the issuance of the extraordinarywrit of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information.The Solicitor General challenges the petitioner’s standing to sue upon the ground that thelatter does not possess any legal right to be informed of the civil services eligibilities ofthe government employees concerned. SolGen further argues that there is no ministerial

duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information heseeks.

Issue:

WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil serviceeligibilities of the Health Department employees.

Held:

Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligible for the position ofsanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy andMariano Agas, for said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested bythe petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.

Aldovino vs AlunanG.R no. 102232

Facts:

The petitioners herein were affected by reorganizing of Ministry of Tourism as providedin Section 29 of Executive Order No. 120 which took effect on January 30, 1987. TheseEO provides that incumbents whose positions are not included in the new position

structure and staffing pattern or who are not reappointed are deemed separated from theservice. Pursuant to this, the Department of Tourism issued various office orders andmemoranda declaring all positions thereat vacant. To that effect, it leads to the separationof many of its employees including the petitioners. The court had previously decidedsimilar cases of Mandani, Abrogar and Arnaldo. The petitioners and intervenors claimedthat they should not be deprived of their life granted to their former co-employees pleadfor reinstatement without the loss of seniority rights. Furthermore, they claimed for back



salaries will be computed under the new staffing pattern from dates of their invalidtermination at rates not lower than their former salaries. The court aims to determinewhether the separation of herein petitioners and intervenors from service was pursuant tooffice orders and memoranda declared void in Mandani case, thus reinstating and payingthem with their back wages.

Issues:

Whether or not the petitioners and intervenors must be reinstated and paid of their backwages.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that herein petitioners are reinstated immediately to theirformer positions without loss of seniority rights and with back salaries computed undernew staffing pattern from the dates of their invalid dismissal at rates not lower than theirformer salaries but not to exceed a period of 5 years with several provisions. Havingfound out that the Executive Order is unconstitutional, thus dismissal of the employees isalso unconstitutional. The courts declared its total nullity. An unconstitutional act is not alaw, it confers no rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. In legalcontemplation, it is inoperative as if it had not been passed.



G.R. No. L-20875 April 30, 1923

VICENTE ABAOAG, ET AL vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL.

Facts:

In the year 1884 a number of "Bagos" or Igorots or non-Christians, numbering at that

time about thirty, were invited by the gobernadorcillo and principalia of the then town of

Alava, now the municipality of Sison, of the Province of Pangasinan.

The "Bagos" entered upon said land, took possession of it and have continued to live

upon the same and have cultivated it since that date. On February 28, 1919, the “Bagos”

filed an action, claiming the land was registered to them under the Torrens system but

was later dismissed on the grounds of lack of evidence that they are entitled to the land.

Issue:

W/N the court is correct in dismissing the case on the grounds of lack of evidence.

Held:

No, the court is not correct in dismissing the case on the grounds of lack of evidence.

If we were to look into the Royal Decrees of Spain, as the attorney for the appellants has

done, we will find that Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the

Philippines into trespassers of the land which they occupy, or even into tenants at will. Inthe Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754, we find the following: "Where such possessors

shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient

possession as a valid title by prescription." We may add that every presumption of

ownership under the public land laws of the Philippine Islands is in favor of one actually

occupying the land for many years, and against the Government which seeks to deprive

him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of subsequently enacted registration land

act.

In addition to the facts above stated, the record shows that at the time of the delivery of

said parcel of land to the petitioners, it was unoccupied and unimproved public land; that

since their entry upon the possession of the land in the year 1884, they and their ancestors

have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of



the same, believing in good faith that they were the owners.

Wherefore, the court reversed its decision, thus the petitioners where permitted to present

whatever evidence they may have.

G.R. No. L-4231 April 1, 1908

CASTLE BROTHERS, WOLFE AND SONS vs. GUTIERREZ HERMANOS

Facts:

There was a verbal contract between Knight and Don Leopoldo Criado by which the

defendants agreed to sell the plaintiffs 500 bales of “good current Manila” hemp at P24 a

picul. That, while some mention of marks was made, Knight said he could not accept

those marks unless they turned out to be up to the quality of "good current Manila."

However, Don Leopoldo Criado testified that the phrase "good current" was nevermentioned in the conversation and that he stated to Mr. Knight that the defendants had

554 bales of the four marks mentioned, and that of those he sold 500 bales.

Knight’s testimony was supported by the testimony of Higginbotham who was his

assistant in the office and who heard the conversation, and who states that there was a

positive agreement on the part of Don Leopoldo Criado to furnish 500 bales of "good

current Manila."

On the 500 bales, delivered, the plaintiffs accepted and paid for 210 bales and no question

as to these bales on made in the case. They refused to accept 299 bales on the ground that

it was not good current Manila hemp, called upon the defendants to furnish 299 bales of

that quality and notified them that, on failure to do so, they would buy the same in the

market and charge the increased cost of the defendants. The defendants refused to

substitute other bales and the plaintiffs bought 299 bales of good current Manila hemp at

P28.50 a picul, P4.50 more per picul than the price at which the defendants had agreed to



furnish them that quality of hemp. The loss to the plaintiffs was therefore P2,691 and to

recover that sum this action was brought.

Thus the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.

Issue:

W/N the ruling of the court is correct basing from the evidence presented.

Held:

Yes, the ruling of the court is correct.

Aside from Knight and Higginbotham’s testimonies, the other evidence in which the

court based its ruling is the letter received by the plaintiff on September 13, 1906 from

Portland Cordage Company, of Oregon which states that they are asking the plaintiff tooffer them 500 bales of good current Leyte hemp, but the plaintiffs cannot furnish 500

good current Leyte hemp, instead they offered 500 bales of good current Manila hemp.

On the same day, before sending the letter, Knight saw Don Leopoldo Criado who told

him that they could furnish 500 bales of good current Manila Bales, thus their verbal

contract. Don Leopoldo Criado denies that he had the conversation with Knight on that

day, but the fact that the telegrams where sent and received was undeniable.

G.R. No. L-24796 June 28, 1968

Director of Forestry vs. Muñoz

Facts:

Piadeco claims to be the owner of Some 72,000 hectares of land 3 located in the

municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in

Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal. Piadeco's evidence of ownership consists

of Titulo de Propiedad and a deed of absolute sale.



The controversy began when the Acting Director of Forestry Apolonio F. Rivera required

Piadeco to surrender the original certificate to him. Ground for this cancellation was that

Piadeco had violated forestry rules and regulations for cutting trees within the Angat and

Marikina Watershed Reservations, expressly excluded from the said certificate.

Piadeco filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against

the Director of Forestry, Forest Station Warden Marquez and Nawasa, essentially upon

the averment that their acts heretofore narrated were "all precipitate, arbitrary, whimsical

and capricious." The preliminary injunction was granted and then he moved to declare the

forestry officials in default for failure to answer its petition on time. The forestry officials

asked the court to dismiss the petition upon the averments that said court had no

jurisdiction over their persons or the subject matter of the petition, and that administrative

remedies have not yet been exhausted by Piadeco. On the same date, too, but in a

separate motion, said forestry official asked for a reconsideration of the lower court'sorder granting preliminary injunction, bottomed upon their charge that the illegal cutting

of trees by Piadeco inside the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservations — which are

the main source of water supply of the City of Manila and its surrounding towns and

cities — poses a grave danger of causing them to dry up to the prejudice and irreparable

injury of the inhabitants thereof. The forestry officials were declared in default.

Piadeco entered into an amicable settlement with Nawasa whereby Piadeco's case against

Nawasa was withdrawn, the right of way granted by Nawasa to Piadeco remaining

revoked and cancelled; and Nawasa's counterclaim against Piadeco was also withdrawnin consideration of P1,651.59 paid by Piadeco to Nawasa, representing the former's

liabilities to the latter. The court approved of the amicable settlement.

Piadeco applied for the renewal of its Certificate of Private Woodland Registration but

was denied by Assistant Director of Forestry J. L. Utleg but Piadeco continued logging

operations. It was about this time that illegal logging was denounced by some members

of Congress thereby attracting national attention. The Secretary of National Defense

directed the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to implement the request. And, the Chief

of Staff dispatched a task force of the army into the Angat area, which impounded and

seized all logs cut by Piadeco and other loggers which were purportedly conducting

illegal operations and they made a private quarters on a portion of Piadeco’s land and

prevented continuation of logging operations, from cutting and gathering of timber and

other forest products and enjoyment of said property. Hence, Piadeco filed a complaint



but was denied.

Issue:

W/N Piadeco's title is registrable with the Bureau of Forestry

Held:

No. Piadeco’s title is not registarable with the Breau of Forestry.

The pertinent statutory provision is Section 1829 of the Revised AdministrativeCode, viz:

SEC. 1829. Registration of title to private forest land. — Every private owner of land

containing timber, firewood and other minor forest products shall register his title to the

same with the Director of Forestry. A list of such owners, with a statement of the

boundaries of their property, shall be furnished by said Director to the Collector of

Internal Revenue, and the same shall be supplemented from time to time as occasion may

require.

Upon application of the Director of Forestry the fiscal of the province in which any such

land lies shall render assistance in the examination of the title thereof with a view to its

registration in the Bureau of Forestry.

Ampliatory thereof is Section 7, Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 of July 1, 1941, as

amended by Forestry Administrative Order 12-2, which took effect on January 1, 1963. It

reads:

7. Titles that may be registered. — Only the following titles covering lands containing

timber, firewood and other minor forest products may be registered under and pursuant to

Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code;

(a) Administrative titles granted by the present Government, such as homestead patent,

free patent, and sales patent; and

(b) Judicial titles, such as Torrens Title obtained under the Land Registration Act (Act



496, as amended) or under the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as amended).

The amendment of Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 by Forestry Administrative Order

12-2 consisted in theomission of one paragraph, paragraph (c), which particularized as

one of the titles registrable pursuant to Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code,

"[t]itles granted by the Spanish sovereignty in the islands and duly recognized as valid

titles under the existing laws."

In the case at bar however, Piadeco’s title was issued during the Spanish regime. And it is

state in Section 1829, does not describe with particularity titles that may be registered

with the Bureau of Forestry. Spanish titles are quite dissimilar to administrative and

judicial titles under the present system. Although evidences of ownership, these Spanish

titles may be lost thru prescription. They are, therefore, neither indefeasible nor

imprescriptible. It should not have been allowed registration in the first place. Obviously,registration thereof can never be renewed.

G.R. No. L-21814 July 15, 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. MELECIO ABANZADO, ET AL

Facts:

The Director of Forestry filed a petition to review a judgment in a land registration

proceeding, no decree having been issued as yet, arose from its failure to accord him the

opportunity to present his evidence to show that the land in controversy is part of acommunal forestand is thus non-disposable.

More specifically, what was sought by appellant public official in his amended petition

for review was the reconsideration of a previous decision, reached without his being

heard, adjudicating in favor of private respondents what was alleged to be a portion of the

Bais Communal Forest, a non-disposable public land. There was an opposition to such



petition by private respondents, who argued that no extrinsic fraud was alleged and that

the Director of Forestry was barred by estoppel or laches. The appealed order was based

on the absence of actual or extrinsic fraud, thus resulting in the denial of the petition for

review.

Issue:

W / N the court the Director of Forestry / Lands be allowed to present his evidences in

the case at bar.

Held:

Yes, the Director of Forestry / Lands should be allowed to present his evidences in the

case at bar.

A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, the appeal was taken directly to this

Court on a question of law raising the constitutional issues of absence of a hearing in

accordance with due process as well as the deviation from the fundamental principle that

forest resources as part of the national patrimony should be inalienable.

It should be quite apparent why no other decision except that of reversal of the appealed

order is warranted. For in addition to the lack of respect for the requirements of

procedural due process, there was on the part of the lower court a disregard of a basic

state policy. The Constitution then in force, as is similarly the case with the present

Charter, was quite explicit on the point of forest resources being inalienable. That is a

paramount state objective.



In the matter Ozaeta Romulo (July 30 1979)

Facts:

Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner

when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no

imposition or deception is practiced through this use. They also contend that no local

custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s

name; there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila

Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual

members of the firm.

Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court:

1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and

2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976,

praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of

partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both

Petitions were ordered consolidated.

Issue:

W/N the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the partners

who already passed away in the name of the firm

Held:

No. The surviving partners are not allowed to retain the name of the deceased partner in

the name of the firm.

The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations

between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could

give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop

the names of the deceased partners from their firm name.



G.R. No. L-3793 February 19, 1908

CIRILO MAPA vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT

Facts:

The petitioner sought to have registered a tract of land of about 16 hectares in extent,

situated in the barrio of San Antonio, in the district of Mandurriao, in the municipality of

Iloilo. The petitioner presented evidence which appears that the land in question is

lowland, and has been uninterruptedly, for more than twenty years, in the possession of

the petitioner and his ancestors as owners and the same has been used during the said period, and up to the present, as fish ponds, nipa lands, and salt deposits. The witnesses

declare that the land is far from the sea, the town of Molo being between the sea and the

said land. Judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioner and the Government has

appealed.

Issue:

W/ N the said property is an agricultural land.

Held:

The question as to whether the lands there involved were or were not agricultural lands

within the meaning of the sections was neither discussed nor decided.

The decision of that court was based upon Act No. 926 section 54, paragraph 6 which



follows:

All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open,

continuous exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public

lands, as defined by said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a

bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years

next preceding the taking effect of this act, except when prevented by war, or force

majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to

a Government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of

title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.

The main phrase “agricultural lands” as defined by said act of Congress of July 1, is

found not only in section 54 above quoted but in other parts of Act No. 926, and it seems

that the same construction must be given to the phrase wherever it occurs in any part ofthat law. Moreover, if it should be said that there is no definition in the act of Congress of

the phrase "agricultural land," we do not see how any effect could be given to the

provisions of Act No. 916, to which we have referred. If the phrase is not defined in the

act of Congress, then the lands upon which homesteads can be granted cannot be

determined.

G.R. No. L-3714 January 26, 1909

ISABELO MONTANO Y MARCIAL vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, ET AL.

Facts:

Isabelo Montano presents a petition to the Court of Land Registration for the inscription

of a piece of land in the barrio of Libis, municipality of Caloocan, used as a fishery. This

petition was opposed by the Solicitor-General in behalf of the Director of Lands on the

ground that the land in question belonged to the Government of the United States, and the



latter, that it was the absolute owner of all the dry land along the eastern boundary of the

said fishery. The Court of Land Registration in its decision of December 1, 1906,

dismissed the said oppositions without costs in favor of Isabelo Montano y Marcial.

Issue:

W/N the property in question is an agricultural land.

Held:

The property is an agricultural land

The section quoted is section 54, paragraph 6, Act No. 926, in which the phrase used is

"agricultural public lands."

Throughout the opinion the phrase "public lands" is repeatedly and exclusively used. Theentire discussion was directed to the question as to whether the property there in question

being "public land," it could be considered as agricultural public land and the conclusion

reached is stated at page 182, as follows:

In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land," as used in Act No. 926, means those

public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.

In that case the land in question was a long distance from the sea. In fact, the entire town

of Molo was between it and the water. It could in no sense be called tidal land. Therefore,

the opinion was devoted to a consideration of not what were "public lands" but whether

this particular tract was or was not agricultural public land. The question what the phrase

"public lands" meant neither considered nor decided in that opinion, for its resolution was

not necessary. In the concurring opinion, however, that question was discussed and it was

stated that the phrase "public lands" used in Act No. 926 must be interpreted according to

the American understanding of the words employed and the meaning of the terms as

definitely fixed by the decrees of the United States Supreme Court.



G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988

YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN vs.

AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind properties here in

the Philippines.

Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the HYPERLINK"javascript:void(0);"grant of letters of administration alleging that they are the children of

the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al alleging

that Yao Kee is the lawful HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);"wife of the deceased whom

he HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);"married in China. The trial court rendered decision

in favor of the opposition. On HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);"appeal, the Court of

Appeals rendered a decision, modifying the decision declaring the marriage of Sy Kiat to

Yao Kee as not has been proven valid in accordance with the laws of China. Hence, both

parties moved for reconsideration to which the Supreme Court granted.

ISSUE:

W/N the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with Philippine laws.

HELD:

Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine HYPERLINK

"javascript:void(0);"courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be

alleged and proven as any other fact. To establish the validity of marriage, the existence

of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged marriage must be proven by clear and

convincing evidence.



For failure to prove the foreign law or custom and consequently of the marriage, the

marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat in China cannot be recognized in the jurisdiction

of Philippine courts.

G.R. No. 2869 March 25, 1907

MATEO CARIÑO vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT

Facts:

Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies filed for writ of error

because the CFI and SC dismissed his petition for application. For more than 50 years

before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, he and his ancestors had held the land as

recognized owners by the Igorots. Cariño inherited the land in accordance with Igorot

custom. He tried to have the land adjusted under the Spanish land laws, but no document

issued from the Spanish Crown. In 1901, Cariño obtained a possessory title to the land

under the Spanish Mortgage Law. The North American colonial government, however,

ignored his possessory title and built a public road on the land prompting him to seek a



Torrens title to his property in the land registration court.

Issue:

W/N the petitioner is granted ownership of the land.

Held:

Yes. The petitioner is entitled to ownership of said land.

The petitioner's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings

against him or his father ever was made. And also under the Spanish Law: "Where such

possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show

that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years,

uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, 30.

G.R. Nos. L-31666, L-31667 and L-31668 April 30, 1979

LEPANTO vs. DUMYUNG



Facts:

The director of lands filed a criminal case against the defendants on the ground of

misrepresentation and false data and information. The defendants in the three cases filed

an amended joint answer with counterclaim to the complaint in intervention. The

defendants filed a motion to dismiss the same on the ground that the accused had

complied with all the legal requirements in the acquisition of their patents which were

duly issued by the Director of Lands and that they are not guilty of the alleged

falsification of public documents.

Issue:

W/N the defendants are entitled to ownership of the land.

Held:

Yes. The Defendants are entitled to ownership of the land in question.

Section 44 of the Land Act in its second paragraph states:

A member of the national cultural, minorities who has continuously occupied and

cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in- interest, a tract or tracts of

land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in

the preceding paragraph of this section: PROVIDED, that at the time he files his free

patent application, he is not the owner of any real property secured or disposable underthis provision of the Public Land Law.

It is for this reason — that is, to give these national cultural minorities who were driven

from their ancestral abodes, a fair chance to acquire lands of the public domain.



G.R. No. L-37682 March 29, 1974

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. PEDRO SAMSON ANIMAS

Facts:

There was a land in General Santos City which was claimed by Isagani Du Timbol. Theland covered by the free patent and title in question was originally applied for by Precila

Soria, who transferred her rights to the land and its improvements to defendant Isagani

Du Timbol who filed his application as a transferee from Precila Soria.

Bureau of Forestry, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I,

General Santos City to declare the free patent in the name of defendant Isagani Du

Timbol null and void ab initio and to order the reversion of the land in question to the

mass of public domain. The action is based on the ground that the land covered thereby is

a forest or timber land which is not disposable under the Public Land Act. And claimedthat the said patent and title were obtained fraudulently as private respondent Isagani Du

Timbol never occupied and cultivated the land applied for. The case was dismissed.

Issue:

W/N Hon. Animas’ decision is correct.

Held:

No. The First decision was incorrect.

The complaint alleges that applicant Isagani Du Timbol’s actions constitutes as fraud.

A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will be considered void

if it is procured through fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the land under

his name although the property belongs to another. In the case of disposable public



lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a

ground for holding such title void.

GR No.71169, December 22, 1988

Sangalang ET. Al v. IAC,

Facts:

Sangalang filed an action to enforce by specific performance restrictive easement upon

property, specifically the Bel- Air Village subdivision in Makati, Metro Manila, pursuant

to stipulations embodied in the deeds of sale covering the subdivision, and for damages.

Bel - Air itself had brought its own complaints, four in number, likewise for specific

performance and damages to enforce the same 'deed restrictions.' The court ruled in favor

of the plantiffs. The IAC reversed the decision of the court.

Issue:

W/N the IAC erred in the decision of the case at bar.

Held:

No. The IAC did not commit any error in the ruling of the case at bar.



The petitioners have not shown why we should hold otherwise other than for the

supposed "non-impairment" guaranty of the Constitution, which, as we have declared, is

secondary to the more compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not

been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the

judgments so appealed. In that connection, we find no reversible error to have beencommitted by the Court of Appeals.

G.R. No. L-43203 July 29, 1977

JOSE C. CRISTOBAL vs. ALEJANDRO MELCHOR and FEDERICO ARCALA

Facts:

The plaintiff was formerly employed as a private secretary in the President's Private

Office, Malacañang, Manila.

Five of the employees who were separated not including the herein plaintiff filed a civil

and were reinstatement and the payment of their salaries. The plaintiff sent a letter to the



Office of the President requesting reinstatement to his former position and the payment of

salary but the request was denied repeatedly until he received a letter which declared the

matter “definitely closed”. The plaintiff then filed a complaint against the Executive

Secretary, Alejandro Melchor and Federico Arcala, cash disbursing officer, Office of the

President of the Philippines. The defendants argued that the plaintiff had no cause ofaction as he is deemed to have abandoned his office for failure to institute the proper

proceedings to assert his right within one year from the date of separation pursuant to

Sec. 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, he having come to court only after the lapse of

more than nine years, thereby in effect acquiescing to his separation, and therefore he is

not entitled to any salary from termination of his employment. The complaint was

dismissed.

Issue:

W/N the court erred in dismissing the case.

Held:

Yes. The court made an error in dismissing the case.

There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of Jose Cristobal amounting to

abandonment of his right to reinstatement in office. Although Cristobal failed to file his

complaint within one year from the date of separation but, it is claimed, he allowed

almost nine years passing before coming to court by reason of which he is deemed tohave acquiesced to his removal. The Court stated that in a general sense, laches is failure

or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by

exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or

omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the

party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. And it is the

doctrine of laches which is invoked to defeat Jose Cristobal's suit, there are exceptional

circumstances attending which take this case out of the rule enunciated above and lead us

to grant relief to appellant. These are:

-There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of Jose Cristobal amounting to

abandonment of his right to reinstatement in office.

-It was an act of the government through its responsible officials more particularly then

Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc and his successors which contributed to the alleged



delay in the filing of Cristobal's present complaint for reinstatement.

-The dismissal of appellant Cristobal was contrary to law on the strength of this Court's

Decision.

Wherefore, the court ordered the reinstatement and payment of back wages of the plaintiff.

G.R. No. L-36142 March 31, 1973

JAVELLANA VS. TAN

Facts:

In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate HYPERLINK

"javascript:void(0);"implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino

and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from

implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void

because the same was initiated by the president. He argued that the President is w/o

power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution.

Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there being

intimidation and fraud.

ISSUE:

W/N the SC must give due HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);"course to the petition.

HELD:

The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices

expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president

of the Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no

competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to beassumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The

question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to

the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown

such acquiescence.



G.R. No. 81311 June 30, 1988

KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAGLILINGKOD SA PAMAHALAAN VS. TAN

Facts:

EO 273 was issued by the President of the Philippines which amended the Revenue

Code, adopting the value-added tax (VAT) effective 1 January 1988. Four petitions

assailed the validity of the VAT Law for being beyond the President to enact; for being



oppressive, discriminatory, regressive, and violative of the due process and equal

protection clauses, among others, of the Constitution. The Integrated Customs Brokers

Association particularly contend that it unduly discriminate against customs brokers

(Section 103 [r]) as the amended provision of the Tax Code provides that “service

performed in the exercise of profession or calling (except custom brokers) subject tooccupational tax under the Local Tax Code, and professional services performed by

registered general professional partnerships are exempt from VAT.

Issue:

Whether the E-VAT law discriminates against customs brokers.

Held:

The phrase “except custom brokers” is not meant to discriminate against custom brokers but to avert a potential conflict between Sections 102 and 103 of the Tax Code, as

amended. The distinction of the customs brokers from the other professionals who are

subject to occupation tax under the Local Tax Code is based upon material differences, in

that the activities of customs brokers partake more of a business, rather than a profession

and were thus subjected to the percentage tax under Section 174 of the Tax Code prior to

its amendment by EO 273. EO 273 abolished the percentage tax and replaced it with the

VAT. If the Association did not protest the classification of customs brokers then, there is

no reason why it should protest now.

G.R. No. L-23136 August 26, 1974



MATHAY et al vs. THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST COMPANY et al

Facts:

The plaintiff filed a class suit against the defendant bank on the ground of breach of

contract between the plaintiff and defendant bank and "falsely certified to the calling of aspecial stockholders' meeting allegedly pursuant to due notice and call of Defendant

Bank" without notifying the plaintiffs and other stockholders. The defendants moved for

the dismissal of the action on the ground of the plaintiffs-appellants had no legal standing

or capacity to institute the alleged class suit; that the complaint did not state a sufficient

and valid cause of action; and that plaintiffs-appellants' complaint against the increase of

the number of directors did not likewise state a cause of action. Thus the court dismissed

the case. The plaintiffs appealed.

Issue:

W/N the plaintiffs have sufficient cause of action.

Held:

No, there was no sufficient cause of action.

It having been shown that the complaint failed to state ultimate facts to constitute a cause

of action, it becomes unnecessary to discuss the other assignments of errors.



G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CAYAT

Facts:

In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-HYPERLINK"javascript:void(0);"Christians from drinking gin or any other HYPERLINK

"javascript:void(0);"liquor HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);"outside of their customary

alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in

violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be

imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the

constitutionality of the HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);"said Act. He averred, among

others, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said

this attempt to treat them with discrimination or “mark them as inferior or less capable

race and less entitled” will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to

distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians.

ISSUE: W/N the said Act violates the equal protection clause.

HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable

classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have

the characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an

indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;

(1) Must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) Must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) Must not be limited to existing conditions only; and



(4) Must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial,

not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon “accident of birth or

parentage.” The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as “an inferior

or less capable race.” On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of

the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality

in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there

can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the

government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and

civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in

view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes) vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO

Facts:

The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian

inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on

unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative

Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a

site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only

solicit homesteads on thisreservation providing that said homestead applications are

previously recommended by the provincial governor.



In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the

Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River

including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to

take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who

shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed insixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.

Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures

for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests

in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling

within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the

provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on

the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said

to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having

run away from the reservation.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person of hisliberty of abode. Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is

constitutional.

Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a

person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws,

and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute

slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of

the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the

Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Assigned as reasons for the action:



(1) Attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and

(2) The only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to

live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following;

(3) The protection of the Manguianes;

(4) The protection of the public forests in which they roam;

(5) The necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the

degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own

good and the general good of the Philippines.

“Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the

individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-

being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas

corpus can, therefore, not issue.



G.R. No. L-51773 May 16, 1980

LT. COL. RODRIGO S. DE GUZMAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT JUDGE MARCELINO M. ESCALONA, FLORENTINO

RODRIGO, and MARIANO DAYDAY.

Facts:

The defendants Florentino Rodrigo and Mariano Dayday were charged with "Illegal

Possession of Explosive locally known as 'dinamita'.” While in the seawaters of the Cebu,

confederating and mutually helping with one another, without authority of the law and

without proper permit from authorities, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, andfeloniously possess, keep an explosive, locally known as 'DINAMITA' in their banca

purposely for use of illegal fishing and three (3) bottles of explosives, two (2) paddles,

two (2) fishnets locally known as "SIBOT" and one (1) banca were recovered from their

possession and control, which acts of the above-named accused is a gross violation of PD

No. 1058. Both were found guilty of said accusation.

However, the judge only submitted possession of explosives in connection with

subversion is covered by Presidential Decree No. 9, thus, the old law on illegal

possession of explosives, Act 3023, has not been completely repealed; that having foundthat the possession by the two accused of two bottles of home-made explosives was

solely for fishing purposes and had no connection with subversion, the illegal act should

fall not under Presidential Decree No. 9 but under Act 3023.

Petitioner Lt. Col. Rodrigo S. De Guzman, PC Provincial Commander Integrated

National Police Superintendent at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City, instituted these



certiorari proceedings alleging mainly that the offense charged was one for possession of

explosives intended for illegal fishing under Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by

Presidential Decree No. 1058, and not for violation of Act 3023 which had long been

repealed by several laws and decrees; that the penalty provided for by current legislation

is one which falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance;and that respondent Judge's Decision has no legal basis.

Issue:

W/N the responded judge erred in rendering judgment even though the court has no

jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Held:

Yes. Considering that the Municipal Circuit Court lacked competent jurisdiction over the

subject matter of the criminal complaint against the accused respondents.

Presidential Decree No. 1058 is an amendatory decree, which increased the penalties for

certain forms of illegal fishing and for other acts made punishable under Presidential

Decree No. 704 or the "Fisheries Decree of 1975". The pertinent portion of Section 33 of

Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1058 reads:

Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing;

dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. - It shall be unlawful for any



person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken gathered fish or fisheries/

aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous

substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d),

respectively, of Section 3 hereof: Provided, that possession of such explosives with intent

to use the same for illegal fishing as herein defined shall be punishable as hereinafter provided. ... (Emphasis supplied).

Section 38, subsection a (1) of Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential

Decree No. 1058, correspondingly provides:

(1) By the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years to twenty-five (25)

years in the case of mere possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing. ...

(Emphasis supplied).

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in the Comment he filed for petitioner

People of the Philippines, respondent Judge's reference to Presidential Decree No. 9 is

misplaced for, indeed, there is no mention at all of, nor any reference to, Presidential

Decree No. 9 in the Complaint.



G.R. No. L-25434 July 25, 1975

HONORABLE ARSENIO N. ROLDAN, JR., in his capacity as Acting Commissioner,

Philippine Fisheries Commission, and THE PHILIPPINE NAVY

vs.HONORABLE FRANCISCO ARCA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of

Manila (Branch 1) and MORABE, DE GUZMAN & COMPANY

Facts:

On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats, Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also

respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, were actually seized for illegal fishing

with dynamite. Fish caught with dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard

the two vessels.

It was alleged that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in issue, the same were

engaged in legitimate fishing operations off the coast of Palawan; that by virtue of the

offer of compromise dated September 13, 1965 by respondent company to the Secretary

of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the numerous violations of the Fishery Laws, if

any, by the crew members of the vessels were settled. However, the ships were

apprehended without warrant for alleged violations of some provisions of the Fisheries

Act and the rules and regulations promulgated there under.

Respondent filed with the Court against petitioner Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N.

Roldan, Jr., for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (one of two fishing boats in

question) which had been seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner

through the Philippine Navy. The court dismissed the complaint for failure of the

petitioner to prosecute and failure of the defendant to appear.

It was held that Hon. Roldan acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of

discretion.

Issue:

W/N is it lawful to apprehend fishing boats without warrant.

Held:

Yes. In the case at bar, it is lawful to apprehend the fishing boats without warrant.



The word boat in its ordinary sense, means any water craft, the fishing boats Tony Lex III

and Tony Lex VI are likewise vessels within the meaning of the term vessel. the accepted

definition of vessel includes "every description of water craft, large or small, used or

capable of being used as a means of transportation on water"

Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of the

customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a

search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction

in which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant could be secured; hence

it is not practicable to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be

constitutionally effected.

Since the crew of certain fishing vessels were caught, in flagrante, illegally fishing with

dynamite and without the requisite license, their apprehension without a warrant of arrestand the seizure of the vessel, as well as its equipment and the dynamites found therein, as

an incident to a lawful arrest was held to be lawful.

G.R. No. L-9699 August 26, 1915

THE UNITED STATES vs. JUAN HERNANDEZ, ET AL.

Facts:

In 1947, Liberato Jimenez was appointed as a temporary legal investigator in the

Philippine Veterans Board (PVB). In 1949, he was promoted as HYPERLINK

"javascript:void(0);"the Chief of the Investigation Section but still in a temporary

capacity because he is not civil service eligible. In 1950, he took a promotional civil

service exam. In July 1951, Jimenez received a letter from PVB Chairman Gen.

Guillermo Francisco advising him that he is being replaced by a civil service eligible. In

September 1951, Jimenez received the results of the civil service exam he took in 1950;

he passed. He then appealed his separation from service.

ISSUE:

W/N Jimenez should be reinstated.

HELD:

No. In fact, he should have been separated from HYPERLINK "javascript:void(0);"the

service even before 1951. Under the law, he was supposed to only hold such temporary



appointment for three months while the appointing power is still looking for a civil

service eligible. His extended stay in the service is only upon the grace of the appointing

power. Further, there is no law which provides that a temporary appointment may ripen to

a permanent one. When he met the civil service eligibility, Jimenez did not become

entitled to a permanent position in the PVD. The power to appoint is in essencediscretionary on the part of the proper authority, in this case the head of the department.

The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to

his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified for any competitive position in

the Civil Service. Mere certification as a civil service eligible does not amount to an

appointment. The Civil Service Commission does not insure any appointment; it only

certifies an eligible to be possessed of the qualification as required for a position

classified under its rules.



G.R. No. 152644 February 10, 2006

JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and B. HERNANDEZ, Petitioners,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are thePresident and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Managerfor Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation(“Marcopper”), a corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque.

Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit that dischargedmillions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.

The DOJ separately charged petitioners in the MTC of Boac, Marinduque withviolation of Article 91(B), sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No.1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines (“PD 1067”), Section 8 of PD No. 984or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (“PD 984”), Section 108 ofRepublic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (“RA 7942”), and

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (“RPC”) for Reckless ImprudenceResulting in Damage to Property.

Petitioners moved to quash the Information on the following grounds:

the Information were “duplicitous” as the Department of Justice charged morethan one offense for a single act;petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of

Marcopper when the incident subject of the Information took place; andthe Informations contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.



MTC issued a Consolidated Order”), granting partial reconsideration to its JointOrder and quashing the Information for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. TheMTC maintained the Information for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of theRPC. Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Boac,Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the

Informations for violation of RA 7942. The RTC granted public respondent’sappeal but denied petitioners’ petition. Branch 94 set aside the ConsolidatedOrder in so far as it quashed the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD984 and ordered those charges reinstated. RTC affirmed the Consolidated Orderin all other respects. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of

Appeals. Petitioners contended that since the acts complained of in the chargesfor violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are “the very same actscomplained of” in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the latterabsorbs the former. Hence, petitioners should only be prosecuted for violation of

Article 365 of the RPC. The Court of Appeals affirmed RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashedfor duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting inDamage to Property should stand.

HELD:

NO. The information filed by the petitioner should not be quashed.

There is no duplicity of charges in the present case.

There is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information chargesmore than one offense. Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules ofCriminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground toquash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoidconfusing the accused in preparing his defense. Here, however, the prosecutioncharged each petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging

only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as aground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the petition deservesoutright denial.



G.R. No. 139548. December 22, 2000

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

ALBERTO G. BUMOLO et al., , respondents.

FACTS:

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION registered its mining claims in Pao,Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya with the DENR from February 02,1982 to October 12,1982. Private respondents Alberto G. Bumolo and others registered their mining

claims in the same area from 28 July 1981 to 22 September 1988, which claimswere subsequently converted into Mineral Production Sharing Agreements(MPSA).

On March 12, 1982 petitioner entered into Option Agreements over the mining.Under the Agreements, petitioner was granted the exclusive and irrevocable rightto explore the mining claims for three (3) years with provision for extension.

On December 23, 1982 and March 26, 1987 petitioner filed Prospecting Permit Applications (PPA) with the Bureau of Forest Development, DENR, on thealleged ground that a portion of the area covered by the mining claims was within

the Magat River Forest Reservation under Proc. 573 of June 26, 1969 and withDAR on account of alleged coverage of the other portion within the NuevaVizcaya-Quirino Civil Reservation under Proc. 1498 of 11 September 1975.

On 15 July 1991 Executive Director Leonardo A. Paat rejected petitioner’sProspecting Permit Application (PPA) on the ground that the Memorandum ofJuly 08, 1991 endorsed by the Regional Technical Director for Mines revealed



that the area covered was outside government reservation; that the prospectclaim was in conflict with existing claims; and, that the area had been extensivelyexplored in the early 1980's.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Regional Executive Director Samuel

Paragas recommended to the DENR Secretary that petitioner's request forreconsideration be denied; that the existing rights of mining claim holders berespected; and, that the prior legal rights of MPSA/Financial and Technical

Assistance Agreement applicants over subject area be recognized.

As regards petitioner's PPA filed with the DAR, it appeared that it was issued aclearance to prospect for six (6) months from December 11, 1995.

On August 15, 1997 petitioner appealed to public respondent Mines AdjudicationBoard (MAB). Petitioner maintained that subject area was within the Magat RiverForest Reservation. On June 11, 1998 the rejection of the PPA was affirmed

whereas the mining claims of respondents Alberto G. Bumolo et al. that had beenconverted into a MPSA, subject to compliance with R.A. 7942 and DAO No.96-40, were given due course.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Respondent MAB denied petitioner’smotion .

ISSUE:

Whether respondent MAB erred in finding that the area subject of the PPA was

outside the Magat River Forest Reservation.

HELD:

Respondent MAB correctly upheld the ratiocination of Regional ExecutiveDirector Paragas in denying petitioner's PPA.

The disapproval of Marcopper’s PPA moreover, did not emanate from a singlerecommendation of the RTD for Mines. Records would show that as early asMay 31, 1989 x x x the Bumolo group of PD 463 claims which Marcopper haseventually surrounded by filing its own PAO 1-30 group of claims x x x x wasconfirmed by the Forest Engineering Section of the region to be outsideproclaimed watershed areas, wilderness, national parks and existing governmentreforestation projects x x x x

In other words, the circumstance that the area covered by petitioner's PPA isoutside the Magat River Forest Reservation has been adequately established bythe following evidence: (a) confirmation as early as 31 May 1989 by the Forest



Engineering Section of Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (b) the 8 July 1991 MemorandumReport of Regional Technical Director Punsal Jr.; and, (c) plotting provided by theNational Mapping and Resources Information Authority per its 2 June 1995indorsement of the maps to the office of the Regional Executive Director.Petitioner contests the exclusion of the area subject of its PPA within the Magat

River Forest Reservation based merely on the alleged "typographical errorcommitted by somebody in the Engineering Section of the DENR." Aside from thefact that the allegation does not have anything to support it, the aforementioneddocuments which the Regional Executive Directors relied upon in denying thePPA had already settled the issue.

Furthermore, respondent MAB even fortified the bases for the rejection ofpetitioner's PPA. As plotted by the Lands Management Sector of DENR Region2 contained in the sketch plan of 11 November 1996 and as shown in the LandUse map of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Dupax,Nueva Vizcaya, the area covered under the PPA is indeed outside any

government reservation.

G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995

MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner ,

vs.

HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary of Environment and NaturalResources, and JOEL D. MUYCO, Director of Mines and Geosciences Bureau,respondents.

FACTS:

Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279, authorizing the DENRSecretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineralresources, and prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and thoseagreements involving technical or financial assistance by foreign-ownedcorporations for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,the DENR Secretary issued DENR Administrative Order No. 57, series of 1989,

entitled "Guidelines on Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under ExecutiveOrder No. 279." HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/S U P R E M E _ C O U R T / D e c i s i o n s / 1 9 9 5 . z i p % 3 E 1 4 d , d f % 7 C 1 9 9 5 /JAN1995/98332.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" Under the transitory provision of said DENR

Administrative Order No. 57, embodied in its Article 9, all existing mining leasesor agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitutionpursuant to Executive Order No. 211, except small scale mining leases and thosepertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area of twenty



(20) hectares or less, shall be converted into production-sharing agreementswithin one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines.

The Secretary of the DENR then further issued DENR Administrative Order No.82, series of 1990, laying down the "Procedural Guidelines on the Award ofMineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation."HYPERLINK "ht tp: / /e l ibrary. judic iary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/S U P R E M E _ C O U R T / D e c i s i o n s / 1 9 9 5 . z i p % 3 E 1 4 d , d f % 7 C 1 9 9 5 /JAN1995/98332.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o ""

The issuance and the impending implementation by the DENR of AdministrativeOrder Nos. 57 and 82 after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners

Association of the Philippines, Inc. HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1995.zip%3E14d,df %7C1995/JAN1995/98332.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" to file the instant petition assailingtheir validity and constitutionality before this Court.

Petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., mainly contends that theadministrative orders do not conform with Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279,petitioner contends that both orders violate the non-impairment of contractprovision under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution on the ground that

Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining leases andother mining agreements and automatically converts them into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from its effectivity date. On the otherhand, Administrative Order No. 82 declares that failure to submit Letters of Intentand Mineral Production-Sharing Agreements within two (2) years from the date ofeffectivity of said guideline or on July 17, 1991 shall cause the abandonment oftheir mining, quarry and sand gravel permits.

Petitioner argued that Executive Order No. 279 does not contemplate automaticconversion of mining lease agreements into mining production-sharingagreement as provided under Article 9, Administrative Order No. 57 and/or theconsequent abandonment of mining claims for failure to submit LOIs and MPSAsunder Section 3, Administrative Order No. 82 because Section 1 of saidExecutive Order No. 279 empowers the DENR Secretary to negotiate and enterinto voluntary agreements which must set forth the minimum terms andconditions provided under Section 2 thereof. Moreover, petitioner contends thatthe power to regulate and enter into mining agreements does not include thepower to preterminate existing mining lease agreements.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 issued by the DENRSecretary are unconstitutional.

HELD:

NO. DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 are not unconstitutional.



The questioned administrative orders are reasonably directed to theaccomplishment of the purposes of the law under which they were issued andwere intended to secure the paramount interest of the public, their economicgrowth and welfare. The validity and constitutionality of Administrative OrderNos. 57 and 82 must be sustained, and their force and effect upheld.

Administrative Order No. 57 applies only to all existing mining leases oragreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitutionpursuant to Executive Order No. 211. It bears mention that under the text ofExecutive Order No. 211, there is a reservation clause which provides that theprivileges as well as the terms and conditions of all existing mining leases oragreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant toExecutive Order No. 211, shall be subject to any and all modifications oralterations which Congress may adopt pursuant to Article XII, Section 2 of the1987 Constitution. Hence, the strictures of the non-impairment of contract clauseunder Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1995.zip%3E14d,df%7C1995/JAN1995/98332.htm" \l "_ftn20" \o "" do not applyto the aforesaid mining leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of the1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. They can be amended,modified or altered by a statute passed by Congress to achieve the purposes of

Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

Moreover, nowhere in Administrative Order No. 57 is there any provision whichwould lead us to conclude that the questioned order authorizes the automaticconversion of mining leases and agreements granted after the effectivity of the1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, to production-sharingagreements. The provision in Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 that "allsuch leases or agreements shall be converted into production sharingagreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines" could notpossibly contemplate a unilateral declaration on the part of the Government thatall existing mining leases and agreements are automatically converted intoproduction-sharing agreements. On the contrary, the use of the term"production-sharing agreement" in the same provision implies negotiationbetween the Government and the applicants, if they are so minded. Negotiationnegates compulsion or automatic conversion as suggested by petitioner in theinstant petition. A mineral production-sharing agreement (MPSA) requires ameeting of the minds of the parties after negotiations arrived at in good faith andin accordance with the procedure laid down in the subsequent AdministrativeOrder No. 82.



OLYMPIC MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., Petitioner,

- versus - PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION, Respondent. CITINICKEL MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,Petitioner,

- versus -

HON. JUDGE BIENVENIDO C. BLANCAFLOR, in his capacity as thePresiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 95, PuertoPr i ncesa C i ty , Pa l awan , and PLATI NUM GROUP M ETAL

CORPORATION, Respondents

PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION, Petitioner,



- versus - CITINICKEL MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, acting for itsown interest and on behalf of OLYMPIC MINES AND DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION,

Respondent.PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus -

COURT OF APPEALS and POLLY C. DY, Respondents

FACTS:

In 1971 and 1980, Olympic was granted “Mining Lease Contracts” by the

Secretary of the DENR covering mining areas located in the municipalities of

Narra and Espanola, Palawan.

On July 18, 2003, Olympic entered into an Operating Agreement with Platinum,

by virtue of which Platinum was given the exclusive right to control, possess,

manage/operate, and conduct mining operations, and to market or dispose

mining products on the Toronto Nickel Mine in the Municipality of Narra. Inreturn, Platinum would pay Olympic a royalty fee of 2!% of the gross revenues.

Olympic and Platinum applied for, and were subsequently granted the necessary

government permits and environmental compliance certificates.

On April 24, 2006, Olympic sent a letter to Platinum, informing the latter of the

immediate termination of the Operating Agreement on account of Platinum’sgross violations of its terms, and directing Platinum to immediately surrenderpossession of the subject mining areas under the Operating Agreement.

Olympic instituted an action for the issuance of an injunctive writ before the RTC

of Puerto Princesa against Platinum. In its prayer, Olympic sought to enjoin

Platinum from conducting mining operations on the subject mining areas, and



also to recover possession thereof. The RTC dismissed Olympic’s complaint.

Olympic then filed two cases with the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board

(PMRB) for the revocation of the SSMPs of Platinum, on the ground of Olympic’stermination of the Operating Agreement because of the alleged gross violations

thereof by Platinum. This was dismissed and POA for the cancellation of the

Operating Agreement and the revocation of the SSMPs of Platinum. This case

was subsequently withdrawn by .

While these two administrative cases were pending, Olympic transferred its

applications for mineral agreements, including its rights under the Operating

Agreement, to Citinickel via a Deed of , without the knowledge or consent ofPlatinum. This assignment was thereafter approved by the Regional Director of

the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB).

After the assignment, Citinickel filed Civil Case No. 06-0185 before the RTC of

Parañaque, on June 21, 2006, seeking to invalidate the Operating Agreement

based on Platinum’s alleged violation of its terms. This action was also

dismissed by the trial court, citing forum shopping and improper venue as among

the grounds for dismissal. Citinickel did not bother to appeal this dismissal,

opting instead to find other remedies.

Citinickel thereafter filed three administrative cases: PMRB Case No. 002-06,

DENR Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) Case No. 8253, and POA

Case No. 2006-02-B.

Civil Case No. 4199 involved a complaint for quieting of title, damages, breach ofcontract, and specific performance filed by Platinum against Olympic before theRTC of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, Branch 95 on June 14, 2006.

Olympic sought the dismissal of Platinum’s Civil Case No. 4199 through a motionto dismiss where Olympic alleged that the trial court was without jurisdiction torule on the issues raised in the case. Olympic contended that the case involved



a mining dispute requiring the technical expertise of the POA; accordingly, jurisdiction should be with the PO

ISSUE:

Which body has the authority to hear and decide the dispute between Olympic/Citinickel and Platinum, as parties to the operating agreement.

HELD:

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is

determined by the allegations of the complaint. It is thus obvious that the

complaint falls within the ambit of the RTC’s original jurisdiction, to the exclusion

of all other judicial or quasi-judicial bodies.

Although Section 77 (d) of the Mining Act has transferred to the POA jurisdictionover disputes pending before the Bureau of Mines and the DENR, Section 77 (b)did not adopt the wording of Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (c) of PD No. 1281 soas to include all other forms of contracts – public or private – involving miningrights; Section 77 (b) in relation to Section 3 (ab) of the Mining Act did not includea general catch-all phrase to cover other agreements involving mining rightssimilar to those in Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (c) of PD No. 1281. Instead, theMining Act, through the above-quoted Sections 3 (ab) and 26, has limited the

jurisdiction of the POA, as successor of the adjudicatory functions of the Bureauof Mines, to mineral agreements between the government and the privatecontractor. Otherwise stated, while disputes between parties to any miningcontract (including operating agreements) may previously fall within the Bureauof Mines’ jurisdiction under Section 7 (a) or (c) of PD No. 1281, it can no longerbe so placed now within the authority of the POA to settle under Section 77 (b) ofthe Mining Law because its jurisdiction has been limited to the resolution ofdisputes involving public mineral agreements.

The controlling factor in determining venue for cases is the primary objective for

which said cases are filed. Platinum’s primary objective in filing the complaint isto protect its interest in the subject mining areas, although it joined its claims of

breach of contract, damages, and specific performance in the case. In any

event, the Rules of Court allow joinder of causes of action in the RTC, provided

one of the causes of action (in this case, the cause of action for quieting of title or

interest in real property located in Palawan) falls within the jurisdiction of said

court and venue lies therein. In fine, there is absolutely no reason to disturb



the CA’s findings that venue was properly laid in the Palawan court.

G.R. No. 163509

PICOP RESOURCES, INC.,petitioner,

- versus -



BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES CORPORATION and THE MINES

ADJUDICATION BOARD, respondents.

FACTS:

Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation (CMMCI for brevity)entered into a Mines Operating Agreement (Agreement for brevity) with BanahawMining and Development Corporation (Banahaw Mining for brevity) whereby thelatter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the exploration, development, and

eventual commercial operation of CMMCI’s eighteen (18) mining claims locatedin Agusan del Sur.

Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications forMining Lease Contracts over the mining claims with the Bureau of Mines. So thatBanahaw Mining was issued a Mines Temporary Permit authorizing it to extractand dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims. Upon itsexpiration, the temporary permit was subsequently renewed thrice by the Bureauof Mines, the last being on June 28, 1991.

Since a portion of Banahaw Mining’s mining claims was located in petitioner

PICOP’s logging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitionerPICOP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement, whereby, in mutualrecognition of each other’s right to the area concerned, petitioner PICOP allowedBanahaw Mining an access/right of way to its mining claims. Banahaw Miningconverted its mining claims to applications for Mineral Production Sharing

Agreements (MPSA for brevity).

While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996,decided to sell/assign its rights and interests over thirty-seven (37) mining claimsin favor of private respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation (BaseMetals for brevity). The transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw Mining

in its own right as claim owner, as well as those covered by its mining operatingagreement with CMMCI.

Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediatelyapproved the assignment made by Banahaw Mining in favor of privaterespondent Base Metals, thereby recognizing private respondent Base Metals asthe new operator of its claims.



On March 10, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended BanahawMining’s pending MPSA applications with the Bureau of Mines to substitute itselfas applicant and to submit additional documents in support of the application.

Area clearances from the DENR Regional Director and Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary were submitted, as required.

On October 7, 1997, private respondent Base Metals’ amended MPSAapplications were published in accordance with the requirements of the Mining

Act of 1995.

On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-SciencesBureau (MGB), Caraga Regional Office No. XIII an Adverse Claim and/orOpposition to private respondent Base Metals’ application. After the submissionof their respective position paper, the Panel Arbitrator issued an Orderdisapproving private respondent Base Metals’ MPSA on the reasons that adverseclaim was filed on time, that the granting of the MPSA application on area subject

of an IFMA or PTLA which is covered by a Presidential Warranty, the panelbelieves it cannot, unless the grantee consents thereto, without the grantee’sconsent, the area is considered closed to mining location (sec. 19) (b) (No. 2),DAO No. 96-40) and that the mining location in forest or timberland is allowedonly if such forest or timberland is not leased by the government to a qualifiedperson or entity and if it is leased the consent of the lessor is necessary, inaddition to the area clearance to be issued by the agency concerned before it issubjected to mining operation.

Plantation is considered closed to mining locations because it is off tangent tomining. Both are extremes. They can not exist at the same time. The other must

necessarily stop before the other operate.

Private respondent Base Metals filed a Notice of Appeal with public respondent MAB, the latter rendered the assailed decision setting aside the Panel

Arbitrator’s order. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB.

Hence this petition.

PICOP presents the following issues: (1) the 2,756 hectares subject of BaseMetals’ MPSA are closed to mining operations except upon PICOP’s writtenconsent pursuant to existing laws, rules and regulations and by virtue of the

Presidential Warranty; (2) its Presidential Warranty is protected by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution; and (3) it does not raise new issues in itspetition.

PICOP asserts that its concession areas are closed to mining operations asthese are within the Agusan-Surigao-Davao forest reserve established underProclamation No. 369 of then Gov. Gen. Dwight Davis. The area is allegedly alsopart of permanent forest established under Republic Act No. 3092 (RA 3092),



and overlaps the wilderness area where mining applications are expresslyprohibited under RA 7586. Hence, the area is closed to mining operations underSec. 19(f) of RA 7942.

ISSUE: Whether or not the area covered by Base Metals’ MPSA is, by law, closed tomining activities

Whether or not the Presidential Warranty is a contract protected by the non-impairment clause of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

Anent the first issue, the Court ruled that the area covered by Base Metals’MPSA is, by law, not closed to mining activities.

There is no evidence in this case that the area covered by Base Metals’ MPSAhas been proclaimed as watershed forest reserves.

Even granting that the area covered by the MPSA is part of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, such does not necessarily signify that the area isabsolutely closed to mining activities. Contrary to PICOP’s obvious misreading ofour decision in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, supra, to the effect that mineralagreements are not allowed in the forest reserve established under Proclamation

369, the Court in that case actually ruled that pursuant to PD 463 as amended byPD 1385, one can acquire mining rights within forest reserves, such as the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, by initially applying for a permit toprospect with the Bureau of Forest and Development and subsequently for apermit to explore with the Bureau of Mines and Geosciences.

Moreover, Sec. 18 RA 7942 allows mining even in timberland or forestty subjectto existing rights and reservations. Similarly, Sec. 47 of PD 705 permits miningoperations in forest lands which include the public forest, the permanent forest orforest reserves, and forest reservations

With regard to the second issue, the Court do not subscribe to PICOP’sargument that the Presidential Warranty dated September 25, 1968 is a contractprotected by the non-impairment clause of the 1987 Constitution. Anexamination of the Presidential Warranty at once reveals that it simply reassuresPICOP of the government’s commitment to uphold the terms and conditions of itstimber license and guarantees PICOP’s peaceful and adequate possession andenjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources of raw materials for its woodprocessing complex. The warranty covers only the right to cut, collect, and



remove timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the utilization ofother resources, such as mineral resources, occurring within the concession.

The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a contract distinct fromPTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. It is merely a collateral undertaking which cannot

amplify PICOP’s rights under its timber license. Since timber licenses are notcontracts, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.

PYRO COPPER MINING CORPORATION, petitioner,



versus

MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD-DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT ANDNATURAL RESOURCES, ET AL, respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine lawsengaged in the business of mining. On 31 March 2000, petitioner’s Applicationfor Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA), for the exploration,development and commercial utilization of certain pyrite ore and other mineraldeposits in a 4,360.71-hectare land in Dasol, Pangasinan, was approved andMPSA No. 153-2000-1 was issued in its favor.

Private respondent is also a corporation organized and existing under the laws of

the Philippines and engaged in the business of mining. Private respondent filedan Application for Exploration Permit with MGB covering the same propertiescovered by and during the subsistence of APSA-SF-000089 and MPSA No.153-2000-1 of petitioner. In turn, petitioner filed a Verified Protest/Opposition tothe Application for Exploration Permit of the private respondent. It was allegedlyfiled with the Panel of Arbitrators on 30 August 2005 and was received by thelatter on 5 September 2005.

Prior, however, to petitioner’s filing of its Verified Protest/Opposition to the privaterespondent’s Application for Exploration Permit, petitioner’s MPSA No.153-2000-1 was cancelled, a Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.

The MGB issued EP No. 05-001 to private respondent.

Panel of Arbitrators dismissed motu proprio the Verified Protest/Opposition ofpetitioner. Petitioner elevated by appeal to the MAB which was also dismissed.

The case was elevated to the Court of appeals but judgment was renderedagainst the petitioner.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the Panel of Arbitrators has jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or revokeEP No. 05-001 issued by MGB to private respondent.



HELD:

NO. The Panel of Arbitrators has no jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or revokeEP No. 05-001 issued by MGB to private respondent

Section 77 of Republic Act No. 7942 establishes the jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators, thus:

Sec. 77. Panel of Arbitrators. – x x x. Within thirty (30) working days, after thesubmission of the case by the parties for decision, the panel shall have

exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide on the following:

Disputes involving rights to mining areas;

Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits;

Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires;and

Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of theeffectivity of this Act.

The Panel of Arbitrators only has jurisdiction over adverse claims,conflicts, and oppositions relating to applications for the grant of mineralrights, but not over cancellation of mineral rights already granted andexisting.

As to who has jurisdiction to cancel an existing exploration permit, Section 28 ofDAO NO. 96-40 explicitly provides:

Section 28. Cancellation of an Exploration Permit . – TheDirector/concerned Regional Director may cancel the ExplorationPermit for failure of the Permittee to comply with any of therequirements and for violation(s) of the terms and conditionsunder which the Permit is issued. For renewed ExplorationPermits, the Secretary upon the recommendation o f t h eDirector shall cause the cancellation of the same.

According to Section 5 of DAO No. 96-40, “Director” means the Director of theMGB Central Office, while “Regional Director” means the Regional Director ofany MGB Regional Office. As the authority to issue an Exploration Permit isvested in the MGB, then the same necessarily includes the corollary power torevoke, withdraw or cancel the same. Indisputably, the authority to deny, revoke,or cancel EP No. 05-001 of private respondent is already lodged with the MGB,and not with the Panel of Arbitrators.



G.R. No. L-49109. December 1, 1987

SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner , vs. HON. MINISTER OFNATURAL RESOURCES JOSE J. LEIDO, JR. AND DIRECTOR OF MINESJUANITO C. FERNANDEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner , Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc., is a mining corporation dulyorganized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It alleges that it is theholder of fifty (50) valid mining claims situated in Jose Panganiban, CamarinesNorte, acquired under the provisions of the Act of the U.S. Congress dated 1 July

1902 (Philippine Bill of 1902, for short).

On 14 October 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1214 was issued, requiring holdersof subsisting and valid patentable mining claims located under the provisions ofthe Philippine Bill of 1902 to file a mining lease application within one (1) yearfrom the approval of the Decree. Petitioner accordingly filed a mining leaseapplication, but "under protest", on 13 October 1978, with a reservationannotated on the back of its application that it is not waiving its rights over itsmining claims until the validity of Presidential Decree No. 1214 shall have beenpassed upon by this Court HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1987.zip%3E338,df %7C1987_proofreaded/DEC1987/l_49109.htm" \l "_ftn1" \o "" .

On 10 October 1978, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari andprohibition, alleging that it has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy inthe ordinary course of law to protect its rights (except by said petition). Petitionerassails Presidential Decree No. 1214 as unconstitutional in that it amounts to adeprivation of property without due process of law.

Petitioner avers that its fifty (50) mining claims had already been declared as itsown private and exclusive property in final judgments. The respondents, on theother hand, allege that petitioner has no standing to file the instant petition as itfailed to fully exhaust administrative remedies.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional.

HELD:



Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not unconstitutional.

It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands ofthe public domain, of which petitioner's mining claims still form a part, and over

the patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits are a valuable asset. Itmay be underscored, in this connection, that the Decree does not cover allmining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims overwhich their locators had failed to obtain a patent. And even then, such locatorsmay still avail of the renewable twenty-five year (25) lease prescribed by Pres.Dec. No. 463, the Mineral Development Resources Decree of 1974.

Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV of the 1973Constitution.

Petition is dismissed.



G.R. No. 135190. April 3, 2002

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION, petitioner , vs.BALITE PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE and others similarly situated; andTHE HONORABLE ANTONIO CERILLES, in his capacity as Secretary of theDepartment of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), PROVINCIALMINING REGULATORY BOARD OF DAVAO (PMRB-Davao), respondents.

FACTS:The instant case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve known as the “Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.”Located at Mt. Diwata in the municipalities of Monkayo and Cateel in Davao DelNorte, the land has been embroiled in controversy since the mid-80’s due to thescramble over gold deposits found within its bowels.

On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was grantedExploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, whichincluded the hotly-contested Diwalwal area.

Not long thereafter, Congress enacted on June 27, 1991 Republic Act No. 7076,or the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act. The law established a People’s Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the Secretary of the DENRHYPERLINK "ht tp: / /e l ibrary. judic iary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/S U P R E M E _ C O U R T / D e c i s i o n s / 2 0 0 2 . z i p % 3 E 1 c , d f % 7 C 2 0 0 2 /

APR2002/135190.htm" \l "_edn3" \o "" and created the Provincial MiningRegulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR Secretary’s direct supervision andcontrol. HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/S U P R E M E _ C O U R T / D e c i s i o n s / 2 0 0 2 . z i p % 3 E 1 c , d f % 7 C 2 0 0 2 /

APR2002/135190.htm" \l "_edn4" \o "" The statute also authorized the PMRB todeclare and set aside small-scale mining areas subject to review by the DENR

Secretary HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/S U P R E M E _ C O U R T / D e c i s i o n s / 2 0 0 2 . z i p % 3 E 1 c , d f % 7 C 2 0 0 2 / APR2002/135190.htm" \l "_edn5" \o "" and award mining contracts to small-scale miners under certain conditions. HYPERLINK "http:/ /el ibrary. judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/S U P R E M E _ C O U R T / D e c i s i o n s / 2 0 0 2 . z i p % 3 E 1 c , d f % 7 C 2 0 0 2 /

APR2002/135190.htm" \l "_edn6" \o ""On December 21, 1991, DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran issued



Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 66, declaring 729 hectares of theDiwalwal area as non-forest land open to small-scale mining. HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/2002.zip%3E1c,df%7C2002/APR2002/135190.htm" \l "_edn7" \o "" Theissuance was made pursuant to the powers vested in the DENR Secretary by

Proclamation No. 369, which established the Agusan-Davao-Surigao ForestReserve.

On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03HYPERLINK "ht tp: / /e l ibrary. judic iary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/S U P R E M E _ C O U R T / D e c i s i o n s / 2 0 0 2 . z i p % 3 E 1 c , d f % 7 C 2 0 0 2 /

APR2002/135190.htm" \l "_edn10" \o "" which directs the DENR to studythoroughly and exhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the mineral

resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Such study shall include, but shall notbe limited to, studying and weighing the feasibility of entering into managementagreements or operating agreements, or both, with the appropriate governmentinstrumentalities or private entities, or both, in carrying out the declared policy of

rationalizing the mining operations in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area; suchagreements shall include provisions for profit-sharing between the state and thesaid parties, including profit-sharing arrangements with small-scale miners, aswell as the payment of royalties to indigenous cultural communities, amongothers. The Undersecretary for Field Operations, as well as the Undersecretaryfor Legal and Legislative Affairs and Attached Agencies, and the Director of theMines and Geo-sciences Bureau are hereby ordered to undertake such studies.

x x x HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/S U P R E M E _ C O U R T / D e c i s i o n s / 2 0 0 2 . z i p % 3 E 1 c , d f % 7 C 2 0 0 2 /

APR2002/135190.htm" \l "_edn11" \o ""

Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamusbefore the Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary andBalite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC), which represented all theOTP grantees. It prayed for the nullification of the above-quoted MemorandumOrder No. 97-03 on the ground that the “direct state utilization” espoused thereinwould effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It ruled that the DENR Secretarydid not abuse his discretion in issuing Memorandum Order No. 97-03 since thesame was merely a directive to conduct studies on the various options availableto the government for solving the Diwalwal conflict.

HYPERLINK "http:/ /el ibrary. judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/S U P R E M E _ C O U R T / D e c i s i o n s / 2 0 0 2 . z i p % 3 E 1 c , d f % 7 C 2 0 0 2 /

APR2002/135190.htm" \l "_edn9" \o ""ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the assailedmemorandum order did not adopt the “direct state utilization scheme” in resolvingthe Diwalwal dispute.



Held:

We agree with the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the challenged MO 97-03 did not

conclusively adopt “direct state utilization” as a policy in resolving the Diwalwaldispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directedthereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing else. Contrary topetitioner’s contention, it did not grant any management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter, butsimply instructed the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to determineits feasibility.

G.R. No. 69997. September 30, 1987

UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC., petitioner , vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, GREGORIA BOLANOS, AUREA

ARAOJO, GERVACIO ARAOJO, MARIA BERNAL, FELIX DETECIO, JESUS ASUNCION, MELANIO ASUNCION and BIENVENIDO ASUNCION,respondents.

FACTS:

On July 20, 1962, the President of the Philippines granted mining patents onmineral claims located at Ungay Malobago, Rapu-Rapu, Albay to hereinpetitioners and other private individuals.

Way back on October 30, 1959, John Canson, Jr. and Carlos Stilianopulosassigned their rights to their mining claims in favor of the petitioner. Theassignment of rights was recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albayon December 2, 1959.

The aforestated mining patents, after their issuance on July 20, 1962, were allrecorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on August 28, 1962 andtranscribed on September 4, 1962 in the Registration Book of the Registry of



Deeds of Albay. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Albay issued therespective original certificates of titles pursuant to Section 122 of Act No. 496 inthe names of John Canson, Jr., Carlos Stilianopulos, and the petitioner.

Subsequently, or from 1968 to 1974, tree patents were granted by therespondent Director of Lands and the corresponding original certificates of titleswere issued by the Register of Deeds to private respondents.

All of the above patents covered portions of the lots covered by the patentsbelonging to the petitioner.

The petitioner filed a complaint for annulment and cancellation of patents againstthe private respondents and prayed that all the free patent titles issued in theirfavor for properties over which original certificates of title had already beenissued in its favor be declared null and void.

The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint

The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lands in question belong to the public domain;

Whether or not the appellate court erred in dismissing the complaint on the

ground that the petitioner had no personality to institute the same

HELD:

No.

Article XIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution provides:

"All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and othernatural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of thePhilippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of thecapital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government

established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception ofpublic agricultural land, shall not be alienated and no license, concession, orlease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the naturalresources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewablefor another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in whichcases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant." (Emphasis



supplied)

Therefore, applying the aforequoted provision to the case at bar, we concludethat the issuance of the lode patents on mineral claims by the President of thePhilippines in 1962 in favor of the petitioner granted to it only the right to extractor utilize the minerals which may be found on or under the surface of the land.On the other hand, the issuance of the free patents by the respondent Director ofLands in 1979 in favor of the private respondents granted to them the ownershipand the right to use the land for agricultural purposes but excluding theownership of, and the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be foundon or under the surface.

There is no basis in the records for the petitioner's stand that it acquired the rightto the mineral lands prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, thus, makingsuch acquisition outside its purview and scope.

Anent the second issue, the petitioner has no personality to institute the action

below for annulment and cancellation of patents. The mineral lands over which ithas a right to extract minerals remained part of the inalienable lands of the publicdomain and thus, only the Solicitor General or the person acting in his stead canbring an action for reversion.

LOCAL GOVERNANCE CASES:

G.R. No. 110249. August 21, 1997

ALFREDO TANO, ET AL, petitioners,

vs.

GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES ET AL respondents.

Facts:

On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa Cityenacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: “ANORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTEROUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHERPURPOSES THEREOF.

To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Luceroissued Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 which readsas follows:

“In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No.



PD426-14-74, otherwise known as ‘AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANYPERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS,TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HISPOSSESSION ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIREDTO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYOR’S PERMIT” and “City Ordinance No.

15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH ANDLOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TOJANUARY 1, 1998, you are hereby authorized and directed to check or conductnecessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shippedout from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port withinthe jurisdiction of the City to any point of destinations [sic] either via aircraft orseacraft.

On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government ofPalawan enacted Resolution No. 33 entitled: “A RESOLUTION PROHIBITINGTHE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING ANDSHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS, TO

WIT: FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS FASCIATUS (SUNO).CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS (PANTHER OR SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW200 GRAMS AND SPAWNING, TRADACNA GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADAMARGARITEFERA (MOTHER PEARL, OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHERSPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON (TIGER PRAWN-BREEDER SIZE ORMOTHER), EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) ANDFAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE(5) YEARS IN AND COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS,and,ORDINANCE NO. 2, Series of 1993

Entitled, “Ordinance Prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying,selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: 1.Family: Scaridae (Mameng), 2. Epinephelus Fasciatus (Suno), 3. Cromileptesaltivelis (Panther or Senorita), lobster below 200 grams and spawning), 4.Tridacna Gigas (Taklobo), 5. Pinctada Margaretefera (Mother Pearl, Oysters,Giant Clams and other species), 6. Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn-breeder sizeor mother), 7. Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green Grouper) and 8. Family:Balistidae (Topical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of five (5) years in and comingfrom Palawan Waters.

Respondents implemented the said ordinances, thereby depriving all thefishermen of the whole province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa oftheir only means of livelihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association ofPalawan and other marine merchants from performing their lawful occupationand trade.

Petitioners filed this petition directly with the COURT alleging that the Ordinancesdeprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted themfrom the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution; that the Office Order No. 23



contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayor’s permit could begranted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the absolute authority todetermine whether or not to issue permit and; that Ordinance No. 2 of theProvince of Palawan “altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession,buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any

distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method,” theOrdinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood inlawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Associationare concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation andentering “into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry outtheir business endeavors to a successful conclusion.”

And finally, to declare Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as nulland void,

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE ASSAILED ORDINANCES AREUNCONSTITUTIONAL.

HELD:

It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by localgovernment units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. HYPERLINK "http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1997.zip%3E57,df%7C1997/AUG1997/110249.htm" \l "_edn15" \o "" Tooverthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of theConstitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, theconflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt.HYPERLINK "ht tp: / /e l ibrary. judic iary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/S U P R E M E _ C O U R T / D e c i s i o n s / 1 9 9 7 . z i p % 3 E 5 7 , d f % 7 C 1 9 9 7 /

AUG1997/110249.htm" \l "_edn16" \o "" Where doubt exists, even if wellfounded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.HYPERLINK "ht tp: / /e l ibrary. judic iary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/S U P R E M E _ C O U R T / D e c i s i o n s / 1 9 9 7 . z i p % 3 E 5 7 , d f % 7 C 1 9 9 7 /

AUG1997/110249.htm" \l "_edn17" \o ""

After a scrunity of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of theConstitution petitioners claim to have been violated, we find petitioners’contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer from any infirmity,both under the Constitution and applicable laws.

Under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have thepower, inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to abalanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests municipalities with the power to



grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or chargestherefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxiousor poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami , and other deleterious methods offishing; and to prosecute other methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violationof the provisions of applicable fishing laws. HYPERLINK "http://

elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1997.zip%3E57,df%7C1997/AUG1997/110249.htm" \l "_edn46" \o "" Finally, itimposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and thesangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to “[p]rotect theenvironment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger theenvironment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing…and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophicationof rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance.”

G.R. No. L-40243. March 11, 1992

CELESTINO TATEL, petitioner , vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC, SALVADOR A.SURTIDA, in his capacity as Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; GAVINO V.GUERRERO, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; JOSE T.BUEBOS, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ANGELESTABLIZO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ELPIDIO T. ZAFE,

in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; MARIANO ALBERTO, in hiscapacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; JULIA A. GARCIA, in her capacityas Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; and PEDRO A. GUERRERO, in his capacityas Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes, respondents.

FACTS:



Celestino Tatel, a businessman, is engaged in the import and export of abacaand other products. He has a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena.

Residents of barrio Sta. Elena filed a complaint against petitioner. They allegedthat the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine insidethe warehouse of petitioner affected the peace and tranquility of theneighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust emitted by themachine. A committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac toinvestigate the matter. The committee noted the crowded nature of theneighborhood with narrow roads and the surrounding residential houses, somuch so that an accidental fire within the warehouse of petitioner occasioned bya continuance of the activity inside the warehouse and the storing of inflammablematerials created a danger to the lives and properties of the people within theneighborhood.

Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on April 22, 1966 declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a

public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Municipal Council ofVirac.

Petitioner instituted the present petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction.

ISSUES:

WHETHER OR NOT petitioner's warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning of Article 694 of the Civil Code and whether Ordinance No. 13, S. 1952 of theMunicipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void.

HELD:

Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Viracin the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipalcorporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance oflocal self-government and as such are endowed with police powers in order toeffectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.

HYPERLINK "ht tp: / /e l ibrary. judic iary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1992.zip%3E290,df%7C1992/MAR1992/l_40243.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o "" Its authority emanates from the general welfareclause under the Administrative Code.

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers ofthe municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedureprescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and



basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that amunicipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2)must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) mustnot prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with publicpolicy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. HYPERLINK "http://

elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1992.zip%3E290,df%7C1992/MAR1992/l_40243.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" OrdinanceNo. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.

LAND TENURE CASES:

G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990

LUZ FARMS, petitioner , vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THEDEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent .

FACTS:

On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657,which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.

On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated theGuidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as



embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657.

On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules andRegulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms).

Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and

poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly standsto be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known asComprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and ProceduresImplementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated onJanuary 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereofas promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657, the Guidelines and

Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 are unconstitutional.

HELD:

Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of theraising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the ImplementingRules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are null and void forbeing unconstitutional.

Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes “private agricultural lands devoted tocommercial livestock, poultry and swine raising” in the definition of "commercial

farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities aremade to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simplyno reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarianreform. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never theintention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultryindustry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reformprogram of the Government.

The requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing “corporate farms”which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement “production-

sharing plans” (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby theyare called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and tenpercent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation isunreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process.

HYPERLINK "http:/ /el ibrary. judiciary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1992.zip%3E290,df%7C1992/MAR1992/



l_40243.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o ""

G.R. No. 78742. July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR.,BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO,FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C.BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J.PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. APRESTO, CONSUELOM. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEONS. FERRER, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIANREFORM, respondent .

G.R. No. 79310. July 14, 1989

ARSENIO AL. ACUÑA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNISJEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO andPLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias, NegrosOccidental, petitioners, vs. JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO andPRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, respondents.

G.R. No. 79744. July 14, 1989



INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner , vs. HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OFTHE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO,EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs.SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCEÑA, andROBERTO TAAY, respondents.

G.R. No. 79777. July 14, 1989

NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners, vs. HON.PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OFTHE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

G.R. No. 79777

Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos.228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657.

The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants andowned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare ricelandworked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Agustin Hermano, Jr. Thetenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualifiedfarmers under P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on

grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and theconstitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public usewithout just compensation.

They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when shepromulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of

Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limitsfor small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4)and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.

The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial

prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solvethe agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their landsand the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

G.R. No. 79310

The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias MillDistrict, Victorias, Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is



an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks toprohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.

The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive AgrarianReform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not thePresident. Although they agree that the President could exercise legislativepower until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to enactemergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming thatthe interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No.131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating theconstitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equalprotection.

They contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of justcompensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but nosuch payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229

G.R. No. 79744

The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform,"in violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation, placed hislandholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer Certificates of LandTransfer were subsequently issued to the private respondents, who then refusedpayment of lease rentals to him.

On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of hissmall landholding under Operation Land Transfer and asked for the recall andcancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the privaterespondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his petition was deniedwithout hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration,which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued.These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directlyeffected the transfer of his land to the private respondents.

The petitioner now argues that:

(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of thePhilippines.

(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that noprivate property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.

(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for underthe 1987 Constitution.

G.R. No. 78742



The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 toowners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they arecultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceedthe statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating suchlands.

According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No.27:

No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall beejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rightsof the tenant-farmers and the landowner shall have been determined inaccordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoytheir right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far notissued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They

therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issuethe said rules.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228and 229 are constitutional.

HELD:

R.A. No. 6657, Section 18 of the CARP Law, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, andE.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are constitutional.

The Court declared that the content and manner of the just compensationprovided for in Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution.

E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21,

1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.(Emphasis supplied.)

it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree,after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and fullpayment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Orderto also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner bythe farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership



after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advancepayment for the land."

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownershipof the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the correspondingpayment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bondswith an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner.HYPERLINK "ht tp: / /e l ibrary. judic iary.gov.ph/documents-dtsearch/SUPREME_COURT/Decisions/1989.zip%3E1f3,df%7C1989_proofreaded/JUL1989/78742.htm" \l "_ftn57" \o "" No outright change of ownership iscontemplated either.

Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process byarbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.

The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required

by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of itsmost controversial provisions. This section declares:

Retention Limits. - Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may ownor retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size ofwhich shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, suchas commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined bythe Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in nocase shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3)hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following

qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he isactually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landownerswhose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowedto keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That originalhomestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the originalhomestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas aslong as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a billshall have only one subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only shortattention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue ofits contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text.



Ibid., p. 20; Fabian v. Desierto, supra, p. 487.

Id.

See § 1, Art. VIII, Constitution.

Fabian v. Desierto, supra, p. 489.

Ibid., p. 492; Metro Construction v. Chatham Properties, supra, pp. 22-23.

Its precursors are Circular No. 1-91, which prescribed the rules governing

appeals to the CA from the final orders or decision of the Court of Tax Appealsand quasi-judicial agencies; and Administrative Circular No. 1-95, which revisedthe earlier circular.

Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

Metro Construction v. Chatham Properties, supra, p. 20.

Ibid.

Prior to BP Blg. 129, the jurisdiction of the CA, under the Judiciary Act of 1948, was as

follows:

“SEC. 29. Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. - The Court of Appeals shall haveexclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases, actions, and proceedings, notenumerated in section seventeen of this Act, properly brought to it, except final

judgments or decisions of Court of First Instance rendered after trial on the meritsin the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, which affirm in full the judgment ordecision of a municipal or city court, in which cases the aggrieved party may



elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals only on petition for review, to which theCourt of Appeals shall give due course only when the petition shows prima faciethat the court has committed errors of fact or of fact and law that would warrantreversal or modification of the judgment or decisions sought to be reviewed. Thedecision of the Court of Appeals shall be final: Provided, however, That the

Supreme Court in its discretion may, in any case involving a question of law,upon petition of the party aggrieved by the decision and under rules andconditions that it may prescribe, require by certiorari that the said case becertified to it for review and determination, as if the case had been brought beforeit on appeal. (RA No. 5433)”

“SEC. 30. Original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. - The Court of Appealsshall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, injunction,certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and process in aid of itsappellate jurisdiction.”

The jurisdiction of the CA was expanded by BP Blg. 129 and RA No. 7902 to read:

“SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

“(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether ornot in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;

“(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments ofRegional Trial Courts; and

“(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicialagencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities andExchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the EmployeesCompensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except thosefalling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance withthe Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No.442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the thirdparagraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of theJudiciary Act of 1948.

“The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings,receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factualissues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction,including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trialsor hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completedwithin three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.”



Metro Construction v. Chatham Properties, supra, p. 22.

St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission, 295 SCRA494, 510, September 16, 1998.

149355538 digested case in natres

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