nato andd eu shaping new cooperative ties

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NATO and EU: Shaping New Cooperative Ties

By Adrian Pop

Meeting todays security challenges international terrorism, proliferation of weaponsof mass destruction (WMDs), failed states, frozen conflicts, organized crime, threats on

cyber-space, energy shortages, security implications of environmental degradation,

natural and man-made hazards, pandemics, etc. ask for a synergy between NATO and

EU based on a wide-ranging partnership. In accordance with a holistic approach to

security, the two organizations should work on forging a new division of labour in the

security and defence domains.

Although neither the geographic, nor the functional division of labour is a feasible

option, it is now widely accepted that forms of outreach, like peacekeeping in Africa and

the Balkans, should be EU-badged, while others, like current operations in Afghanistan

against the Taliban fall under NATO.

Balkan Lessons

One example of successful cooperation between NATO and EU involved the Ohrid

Agreement to prevent war in Macedonia. In February 2001, at the height of interethnic

strife between Macedonian security forces and armed Albanian insurgents, NATO and

the EU coordinated negotiations that led to the August 2001 Ohrid Framework

Agreement.1 In late August 2001 NATO launched the 30-day OperationEssential

Harvestto disarm ethnic Albanian groups and destroy their weapons. This was followed

by the 3-month OperationAmber Fox with the mandate to protect the international

monitors overseeing implementation of the peace settlement in Macedonia. Then, to

minimize the potential for backsliding, NATO agreed to continue support with Operation

Allied Harmony conducted from December 2002 to March 2003, when it was handed

over to the EU. In late March 2003, the EU launched its first-ever peacekeeping mission.

In this first implementation experience of the Berlin Plus agreement, a small NATO

headquarters remained in Skopje, including a Senior Civilian Representative and a Senior

Military Representative, to assist Macedonian authorities in the development of security

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sector reform and adaptation to NATO standards. The EU maintained Operation

Concordia from March through December 2003, followed by an EU civilian police

mission, OperationProxima, which continued through December 2005. EU police

authorities cooperated with Macedonian police and assisted in the implementation of the

comprehensive reform of the interior ministry and the operational transition toward a

border police as part of a broader EU effort to promote integrated border management.

Another positive example and a true test for NATO-EU cooperation under Berlin Plus

arrangements is illustrated by the Bosnian case2. In December 2004, NATO terminated

its 9-year old IFOR/SFOR operation (ranging from an initial 60,000 troops in January

1996 to 7,000 troops in December 2004), and the EU started its 6,000-troop Operation

Althea. As in Macedonia, DSACEUR was named Operational Commander, acting under

political guidance and direction of the EUs Political and Security Committee (PSC).

NATO maintained a modest headquarters in Sarajevo to assist Bosnia-Herzegovina

authorities with defense reform, handle certain operational tasks involving

counterterrorism and detention of persons indicted for war crimes, and intelligence

coordination with the EU Force. Although operating under the same mandate as SFOR,

EUFOR is different from SFOR not only because of its more flexible organization, but

also because it fights organized crime and is connected to the police.

Strengthening Capabilities

In order to consolidate the cooperation between them, both NATO and the EU have to

focus on strengthening their key capabilities and securing their interoperability

including doctrine, planning, technology, equipment, and training.

By declaring that NATO Response Force (NRF) is fully operational, the Alliances

summit in Riga, in late November 2006, marked a turning point. NATO's rapid reaction

force is capable of performing missions worldwide across the whole spectrum of

operations, including evacuations, disaster management, counterterrorism, and acting

asan initial entry force for larger, follow-on forces.

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Since its emergence in November 2004, the EU plan to develop both national and

multinational Battle Groups has become a major focus of the European Security and

Defence Policy (ESDP). Each Battle Group comprises 1500 troops and two of these

combined arms force packages are now on duty at any one time, providing the EU with a

ready-to-go military capability to respond to crises around the world. However, further

efforts are required in areas such as civil-military coordination to ensure the force

packages fulfil their potential.

Conscious of the potential duplication between the NRF and BGs, NATO and EU have

started to work on securing that the two forces have compatible standards and common

methods and procedures in such a way that they would complement rather duplicate each

other. Other than that, effective NATO-EU cooperation on capabilities development is

still lagging and there is enough room for improving the coordination between NATOs

Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) and the European Capabilities Action Plan

(ECAP).

Current acquisition and investment programmes do not meet the needs of todays

multinational forces. In that area NATO and EU roles should complement each other and

NATO-EU collaboration needs to be upgraded and targeted to ensure that effective and

cost-effective assets are provided.

Cutting through the transatlantic tangle of defence equipment export controls is an area of

potential cooperation between the EU and US as well. Politicians on both sides of the

Atlantic are tempted to cite national security when are moving to protect their domestic

defence industries. The US, for instance, uses the International Traffic in Arms

Regulations (ITAR) regulations as a means of restricting European sales. However,

controls on technology transfer and export licensing are becoming more and more of a

little relevance when two-way investment flows across the Atlantic are creating an

increasingly unified EU-US defence sector. This is all the more true since terrorism

threats are promoting the drive for more dual-use technology solutions and the emerging

European market on defence and industrial cooperation, although still undermined by

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fragmentation and duplication is bound to stimulate more and more relevant transatlantic

partnerships.

Towards a Global Partnership

Building on the lessons learned in the Balkans, the cooperation between the two

organizations should be taken to a new level, having as its theatre of operation the global

arena.

Recognizing the increasingly global dimension of international security, following the

9/11 terrorist attacks NATO engaged itself irreversibly into out-of-area operations well

beyond its traditional Euro-Atlantic centre of gravity. Assuming ISAFs leadership, the

Alliance opened the door for political dialogue, consultation and partnerships with pivotalstates located beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, including Australia, New Zealand and

Pakistan.3

Partnerships at the global level are likely to set up a culture of security cooperation

between the Alliance and other actors, reduce misunderstanding and misconceptions, and

enhance knowledge and awareness of regional conditions which are crucial in the design

of efficient security responses to current and emerging threats.4 Against the background

of Alliances likely expanded operational partnerships with more geographically distant

global partners, the cooperation with the EU should become the backbone of a strong

Euro-Atlantic community.

Despite its still unsolved equipment, financial and human resources problems, through its

ESDP, rather remaining merely a regional player the EU has increasingly become an

international actor, too, performing military and civilian crisis management, security

sector reform, rule of law enforcement, and border assistance missions not only in its

immediate neighbourhood, in the Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia),

Caucasus and Eastern Europe (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova), Mediterranean and Middle

East (Egypt, Gaza), but also in far-away places such as the Democratic Republic of

Congo and Indonesia. Particularly, the mid-2006 deployment of EU troops in Congo to

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assist UN peacekeepers in overseeing elections there drove home the point that sub-

Saharan Africa will be a focal point of EU security and outreach, along with the Balkans.

In recent past, as highlighted by the NATO- EU cooperation in Darfur, which occurred

without recourse to Berlin Plus arrangements, there was some sort of a beauty contest

between the two organizations.5 As underlined by NATOs Secretary General Jaap de

Hoop Schefferthat should be put to an end and the duplication of efforts stopped. Instead

there has to be a sustained dialogue on harmonizing military transformation, and ensuring

the smooth cooperation on advanced planning and capabilities, combined with flexible

structures for communications.

Current hot spots in the Balkans, Wider Black Sea region and Afghanistan provide

enough room for constructive and innovative cooperation between the two organizations.

There is scope for complementary policymaking and an opportunity for forging new

cooperative links between NATO and EU in Kosovo, where the two organizations face

the same challenges. According to the UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari plan, the UN

will soon withdraw its field presence from Kosovo, and will be replaced by the EU. The

European Union will act in Kosovo through an International Civilian Representative

(ICR) who, along with a team of experts, will be in charge of the implementation of the

final agreement on the status issue, as well as through a new civilian mission under the

ESDP umbrella, with a clear function of consolidating the rule of law. Managing a de

facto statehood for Kosovo will constitute a significant challenge for the EUs civilian

crisis management capabilities. The outcome will depend largely on member states

willingness and efforts and the type of mandate that will be proposed by the new UN

Security Council resolution. The EU will have to overcome its relative lack of direct

experience in managing great field operations by relying on the NATO presence, which

will be crucial in supporting Kosovos inexperienced government. After its fall 2006

transformation, KFOR is presumably better prepared for crowd control operations,

continuing to provide presence, supervision, and deterrence, and to direct support to

authorities and the public.

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As suggested, another productive area for EUNATO cooperation in the Balkans would

emerge if the Southeast European Defence Ministerial (SEDM) were broadened to

include civil emergency planning and interior ministers to form a Southeast European

Homeland Defense Ministerial (SEHDM). By linking the new body with the Southeast

European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Regional Centre for Combating Transborder

Crime in Bucharest, the SEHDMSECI nexus could become the organizational locus for

implementing a coordinated EUNATO West Balkan strategy to combat trafficking of

drugs, small arms and light weapons (SALW) and human beings. Moreover, by setting up

a regional civil protection coordination center under SEHDMs umbrella, the new forum

could also be linked with the Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG) in Constanta,

Romania, to deal with issues of civil protection.6

The Wider Black Sea region is another area where NATO and EU could and should

complement each other. In the Wider Black Sea region NATO and EU have many goals

in common such as maintaining stability, improving its economic outlook, promoting

security sector reform (SSR), curtailing arms, drugs and human trafficking, improving

border management, and democratization.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 in New York and 3/11 in Madrid have led to a thorough

review of global geopolitics as they have underscored the fact that the greatest security

threats are likely to come from the Greater Middle East. Against the background of the

redefinition of theHeartland, the Black Sea region has been rediscovered by the West

and pushed from the periphery to the center of Western attention.7

Currently, NATO and the EU do not have a common strategic vision for the Wider Black

Sea region. Conceptual differences, which in turn speak about differences in vision and

strategic priorities between EU and NATO in dealing with the security problems of the

Black Sea region, are impeding a unified approach of the Euro-Atlantic community. Via

the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the EU aims at setting up a ring of friends

at its periphery, according to a concentric circles pattern, which includes as a distinct

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component the Black Sea region. Pointing to the fact that the Black Sea region is both a

bridge towards the Caspian Sea energy rich region and a barrier against transnational

threats, NATO promotes a bridge/barrier concept of the Black Sea.

The Black Sea region requires now a comprehensive Euro-Atlantic strategy for dealing

with frozen conflicts, transborder crime, democratic deficits, failed states and economic

backwardness. A joint NATO-EU regional strategy for the Wider Black Sea area would

be a valuable and tangible contribution to bringing security stability and prosperity in that

strategic region. A Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Wider Black Sea region should decide

how to link the efforts of the EU and NATO with regional cooperation schemes such as

the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organization, GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine,

Azerbaijan, and Moldova), Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BlackSeafor) and

Black Sea Harmony initiatives.

In addition to supporting existing cooperative schemes, NATO and EU could work

together to encourage regional cooperation in the Wider Black Sea region in key security

sectors such as airspace reconnaissance, border controls and coastal security, and civil-

military planning.8

Afghanistan provides also room for an increased NATO-EU cooperation. It needs more

police, judges, engineers aid workers, development advisers and administrators, resources

which are available to the EU but not to the NATO peacekeepers. In November 2006, the

EU Commission approved some 10.6 million Euros to support the delivery of services

and improved governance under the NATO-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams.9

Almost concomitantly, at the NATO summit in Riga, NATO's Secretary General

announced the intention of involving the EU in a future Contact Group for Afghanistan.

Furthermore, NATOs Afghanistan mission, which has been a test case for NATO, might

usefully be supported by an ESDP civilian mission for rule of law assistance and police

training.

New Areas of Cooperation

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The world continues to face a range of challenging and uncertain threats to its security,

from terrorism designed to cause maximum shock and disruption, to natural emergencies

which can strike at any time.

Terrorist groups and criminal networks operate internationally, benefiting from real-time

communications, information-sharing and relative freedom of travel illicitly or

otherwise. The degree to which nation states and organizations such as NATO and EU

also share information, cooperate in interdicting such groups and engage in

counterterrorism and combating organized crime is critical to their efficacy.

Confronted with the threat of bioterrorist attacks and pandemics, both NATO and EU are

preoccupied for raising their member states awareness of the benefits of working

together. Faced with the lack of enough money being put on the table by member states

and the rejection of the European Commissions suggestion of central stockpiling of

vaccines, EU is looking for new ways of getting the member states to work together. As

for NATO, it is working on the skill sets required in such cases and the need to integrate

the various medical centres of expertise into crisis management exercises. Against this

background, in Brussels there is a widespread feeling that between the two organizations

there is scope for more dialogue, cooperation, and coordination. In order to successfully

meet the challenges of bioterrorist attacks and pandemics, EU and NATO need to make

more use of shared information and expertise, put a greater focus on risk management, be

aware of the reactions of different cultures, share national best practices on an

international level and reach a greater level of overall preparedness. From an institutional

viewpoint, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and NATOs

Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre could lead the way in forging such a badly needed

coordination.

Another promising area for future EU-NATO cooperation is energy security. For some

EU countries significant reliance on external sources of energy has long been a reality,

while for others it is a new, but near-term prospect. As the landscape of energy supply

changes so is global demand growing. The continued emergence of China and India as

major economic powers will be the principal factor in an expected rise in global energy

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demand of almost 60% over the next 20 years, creating increased competition among

consumers. There is a need to develop coordinated, multidisciplinary responses to the

challenges of energy security, that incorporate the capabilities and thinking of the armed

forces and defence industry, a domain in which the Alliance is better positioned to come

up with new answers.

Currently, the Alliance is evaluating how it might get involved in the securitization of the

energy infrastructure networks. As underlined by Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning

in the Private Office of the Secretary General at NATO Headquarters, the Alliance has

already discussed with big oil producing companies such as Royal Dutch Shell Plc and

BP Plc the possibility of deployment of maritime rapid reaction forces to combat attacks

on key oil facilities as well as oil-related kidnapping and piracy in Africa, Asia and theMiddle East. Additionally, as illustrated by talks with Qatar, the Alliance examines also

ways of providing security for natural gas facilities worldwide.

To sum up, in order to forge a solid and comprehensive partnership between them,

NATO and EU need to strengthen the transatlantic link, further reconcile the transatlantic

agenda, which was dramatically shattered throughout the war in Iraq, build on the lessons

learned from previous cooperation and identify new areas for cooperative ties.

Adrian Pop is Professor with the National School for Political Studies and Public

Administration in Bucharest, Romania.

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1 Adrian Pop, Security: From Powder to Cooperation, in Wim van Meurs (ed.),Prospects and Risks Beyond EU

Enlargement. Southeastern Europe: Weak States and Strong International Support, Leske + Budrich, Opladen 2003, p. 123.2 Kristin Archick,NATO and the European Union, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL 32342, updated May 12,2005, p. 17, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/index.html.3 Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, The enduring influence of operations on NATOs transformation,NATO Review, winter 2006.4 Allen G. Sens, Riga and beyond: The political transformation of NATO,NATO Review, summer 2006.5 Daniel Keohane, Unblocking EU/NATO Co-operation, CER Bulletin, Issue 48, June/July 2006.6 Jeffrey Simon, Preventing Balkan Conflict: The Role of Euroatlantic Institutions, Strategic Forum, No. 226, April 2007,

p. 8.7 Ronald D. Asmus, Bruce P. Jackson, The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom, inPolicy Review, No. 125, June-July

2004, pp. 17-26. The article was republished in Ronald D. Asmus, Konstantin Dimitrov, Joerg Forbrig (Eds.),A New Euro-

Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington D.C. and

Bratislava, 2004, pp. 17-26.8 Eugene B. Rumer and Jeffrey Simon, Toward a Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region, Institute for National

Strategic Studies National Defense University, Occasional Paper 3, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C.,

April 2006, pp. 23-27.9 Leo Michel,NATO-EU Cooperation in Operations, NATO Research Paper No. 31, NATO Defense College, Rome,

February 2007, p. 3.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/index.htmlhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/index.htmlhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/index.html

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