The myth of the civic state a criticalsurvey of Hans Kohnrsquos frameworkfor understanding nationalism

Taras Kuzio

Abstract

Hans Kohnrsquos denition of a more ldquoliberal civic Westernrdquo and ldquoilliberalethnic Easternrdquo nationalism has been highly inuential in providing a frame-work for our understanding of different types of nationalism This articlechallenges the Kohn framework as idealized and argues that it did not reecthistorical reality and is out of step with contemporary theories of national-ism Its continued use also ignores the evolution from communist to civicstates that has taken place in central-eastern Europe during the 1990s Theassumption that Western nation-states were always ldquocivicrdquo from their incep-tion in the late eighteenth century is criticized and a different framework isproposed that sees Western states as only having become civic recently Intimes of crisis (immigration foreign wars domestic secessionism terrorism)the civic element of the state may continue to be overshadowed by ethnicparticularist factors The proportional composition of a countryrsquos ethnic par-ticularism and civic universalism has always been in tension and dependentnot on geography but on two factors the historic stage of the evolution fromethnic to civic state and nationhood and the depth of democratic consoli-dation

Keywords Hans Kohn civic nationalism ethnic nationalism ethnic to civicstate national minorities historical myths

This article makes two arguments Firstly Kohnrsquos (1944 1982) divisioninto lsquocivic Westernrsquo and lsquoethnic Easternrsquo types is idealized and does notmatch up to historical or theoretical scrutiny Pure civic or ethnic statesonly exist in theory All civic states whether in the West or East arebased on ethno-cultural core(s) Each nationalism and nation haselements and dimensions that include both types of nationalism elabor-ated by Kohn (lsquoorganic ethnicrsquo and lsquovoluntary civicrsquo) lsquoNo nation nonationalism can be seen as purely the one or the other even if at certainmoments one or other of these elements predominate in the ensemble

copy 2002 Taylor amp Francis Ltd ISSN 0141-9870 print1466-4356 onlineDOI 1010800141987012011204 9

Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol 25 No 1 January 2002 pp 20ndash39

of components of national identityrsquo (Smith 2000 p 25) This idealtypology has been criticized by other scholars (Smith 1991 Kymlicka1996 Yack 1996 Brown 1999) yet it continues to remain highly inu-ential within academic government and journalistic discourse (Ignatief1993 Brubaker 1995 Freedland 1998) Scholars have often pointed tothe US as the archetypal civic state (Kohn 1957 Lipset 1968) Green(2000 p 84) looks to the US as an example of a state where identitiesare already lsquocosmopolitanrsquo lsquopostmodernrsquo and lsquomultiplersquo and Habermas(1996) as an example of a state built around lsquoconstitutional patriotismrsquo

This article makes two original contributions to the scholarly litera-ture on nationalism Firstly by critically engaging with earlier scholarlycriticism of the Kohn framework within the broader lsquocivic West ethnicEastrsquo study of nationalism Secondly by replacing the Kohn frameworkof a civic identity exported back into history to the end of the eighteenthcentury by an alternative framework The Kohn (1944) idealizationassumes that Western states were always civic from their inception Thisarticle advances an alternative framework that discusses the history ofWestern states as an evolutionary process from ethnic to civic state andnationhood (Kaufmann 1999 2000b) The broad and all-inclusive politi-cal community that has taken shape since the 1960s is how political theorists such as Dahl (1971) and Kymlicka (1996) would dene a civicstate Western civic states from the 1960s are very different from theWestern ethnic states that existed from the late-eighteenth until the mid-twentieth centuries Western civic states that pride themselves on theirliberal present lsquohad illiberal pastsrsquo (Aner 2000 p 231)

This article is divided into three sections The rst section surveysKohnrsquos framework and then discusses its implications within six keyareas The second section argues that civic states are a myth This mythof the civic state is discussed within the context of how ethno-culturalfactors have always played a role in civic states the role played bynationality in civic states and the inuence of historical myths in civicstates The nal section outlines a different framework from Kohnrsquoswhich adds to the literature on nationalism by understanding statehoodand nationality as a process of change that incorporates tension betweencivic universalism and ethnic particularism

Western and Eastern nationalism

Hans Kohn revisited

The tradition of depicting Western nationalism and nation-states asinherently superior to those in the East has a long tradition in Westernpolitical thought and is deep-rooted among academics policy-makersand journalists Kohn (1944 1982) is perhaps best remembered fordeveloping this dichotomy between two types of nationalism although

The myth of the civic state 21

other scholars have continued this tradition The depiction of a lsquoliberalcivic Westernrsquo and an lsquoilliberal ethnic Easternrsquo nationalism is stillaccepted by some scholars and to an even greater extent by policy-makers and journalists (Ignatief 1993 Freedland 1998 pp 142 146148ndash49)

In Kohnrsquos view Western nationalism had a social base in civic insti-tutions and a bourgeoisie In contrast in the East the absence of theseinstitutions and social classes meant that its nationalism was morelsquoorganicrsquo and reliant upon intellectuals to articulate a national idea Inthe East intellectuals fashion and orchestrate national consciousnessthrough the manipulation of memories symbols myths and identitiesIn the West nations began to develop before the rise of nationalismwhereas in the East this only occurred afterwards Nation-building tookplace in Kohnrsquos West within what he terms a political reality without theuse of extensive myth making The differences between the two nation-alisms were

in the West nationalism was a political phenomenon and was precededby the launch of nation-building or coincided with it

in the East nationalism arose later in conict with existing states andwithin the cultural domain

nationalism in the West did not dwell on historical myths whereas theopposite was true of nationalism in the East

nationalism in the West was linked to individual liberty and rationalcosmopolitanism whereas in the East the opposite was the case (Kohn1944 pp 329ndash30)

Kohn (1944) includes within his denition of the lsquocivic Westrsquo veexamples the UK France The Netherlands Switzerland (Kohn 1956)and the USA In all these countries apart from the USA a national stateemerged before the rise of nationalism in the USA this occurred simul-taneously In the East nationalism took place within a lsquobackward socio-political developmentrsquo where the frontiers of the state and nation rarelycoincided Ethnic groups demanded that boundaries be re-drawn in theirfavour The use of historical myths and legends was far greater and pri-mordial ties were stressed German nationalism for example rejectedWestern concepts of individualism rationalism and parliamentarydemocracy and instead focused upon folk culture language and ethnic-ity (Kohn 1994 pp 162ndash65)

Kohn believed that the rise of nationalism in the West in the eight-eenth century took place at the same time as the growth of politicalcivic and individual rights This was particularly developed in Englandwhere nationalism had been evolving from the sixteenth century (Kohn1940) In the states of the north Atlantic individual rights were on theascendancy a middle class was established property rights were

22 Taras Kuzio

codied absolutism was on the decline and government was consideredto be dependent upon trust from freely consenting citizens Thisnationalism was closely tied to Protestantism and based on the civicrights of England in the seventeenth century and late-eighteenthcentury US and French revolutions These democratic values becamepart of their respective national ideas The French revolution synthe-sized these democratic values with a growing allegiance to the nationalcommunity The American national idea Kohn believed was imbuedwith lsquoindividual libertyrsquo and lsquotolerancersquo that lsquoendowed America with aunique power of voluntary assimilation and of creating a spiritual homo-geneity at a time when the European continent with the exception ofSwitzerland followed the opposite patternrsquo (Kohn 1982 p 64)

When nationalism spread to Spain Ireland central and easternEurope often as a reaction against Bonaparte Napoleon it found a weakmiddle class an entrenched aristocracy and weaker civic institutionsNationalism in these regions became dominated by cultural ndash in contrastto civicpolitical ndash elements This rejection of Western civic ideals wasespecially pronounced in Germany where romanticism and culturalnationalism were strong chauvinistic and hostile to the democratic uni-versalist ideals of the US and French revolutions Elsewhere in Italy andIreland nationalism cultural and democratic rights merged into move-ments for independence Nationalism in the East was in Kohnrsquos viewnot tied to libertarian values but to a lsquodivisive nationalismrsquo where lsquoIndi-vidual liberty and constitutional guarantees were subordinated to therealization of national aspirationsrsquo Whenever the two objectives ofnationalism and democracy conicted lsquonationalism prevailedrsquo (Kohn1982 p 61)

Other scholars have built on Kohnrsquos divisions Ignatieff (1993) deneshis civic nationalism lsquoas a community of equal rights-bearing citizensunited in patriotic attachment to a shared set of patriotic practices andvaluesrsquo He contrasts this with ethnic nationalism where lsquoan individualrsquosdeepest attachments are inherited not chosenrsquo because lsquoit is thenationalist community that denes the individual not the individual whodenes the national communityrsquo (Ignatieff 1993 pp 7ndash8 Kymlicka 1995Freedland 1998 p 142)

As a modernist Gellner (1983) may dispute the claim of Kohn and hissupporters that nations began to emerge before the onset of industrial-ization and the rise of nationalism in the late-eighteenth century Never-theless he accepts Kohnrsquos basic lsquocivic West ethnic Eastrsquo division ofnationalism as correct Gellner (1983) argues that in the West nationswere unied on the basis of a high culture lsquowhich only needs animproved bit of political roongrsquo (Gellner 1983 p 99) In the East incontrast there was a lack of a well dened and codied high culture andtherefore ethnic factors played a more prominent role Eastern national-ism was active on behalf of a high culture still in the making It was in

The myth of the civic state 23

intense rivalry with competitors lsquoover a chaotic ethnographic map ofmany dialects with ambiguous historical or linguo-genetic allegiancesand contagious populations which had only just begun to identify withthese emergent national high culturesrsquo (Gellner 1983 p 100)

Six problems with the Kohn framework

The division of nationalism and states according to Kohnrsquos frameworkfails to stand up to objective historical scrutiny and the civic state reectsmore lsquoa mixture of self-congratulation and wishful thinkingrsquo (Yack1996p 196) This section therefore discusses how the Kohn frameworkis problematical in six areas

Firstly all states in the West share cultural horizons values identitiesand historical myths in a common identity that is the lsquonationrsquo Yack(1996 p 201) believes therefore that lsquoAll of these concepts ndash civilsociety the people the nation ndash rest on the notion of a community setapart from and using the state as a means of self governmentrsquo

Liberal theorists have tended to assume that the lsquoPeoplersquo are in placeand thereby they tend to ignore the process of nation-building In a dis-cussion of the evolution of the US political community1 R M Smith(1997 p 9) therefore points out the dilemma faced by political theorists

The failure of liberal democratic civic ideology to indicate why anygroup of human beings should think of themselves as a distinct orspecial people is a great political liability in this regard

Liberalism has been traditionally realized within national communi-ties that are committed to shared principles Without a cultural legacythere will be no shared consent to live together lsquosince there would beno reason for people to seek agreement with any one group of indi-viduals rather than anotherrsquo (Yack 1996 p 208) This is as true ofWestern as it is of Eastern nations something I survey in greater detailin the second section where I discuss the myth of the civic state

Secondly the Kohn framework disregards any anti-democratic lsquonon-Westernrsquo nationalisms that have existed in the West while also ignoringmanifestations of democracy and civic nationalism in the East Kohnlumps into one category all those nationalisms he disliked as lsquoEasternrsquomany of which are not geographically in the East (Symonolewicz-Symmons 1965 p 224) For example during the inter-war years Czecho-slovakia was a democracy

Kohnrsquos West selectively groups together ve countries while ignoringthe majority of other states that geographically belong to this regionIreland Greece Germany Spain and Belgium are sometimes dened aslying in the West but are nevertheless not included within Kohn lsquos veexamples because they would call into question his framework In their

24 Taras Kuzio

study of European nation-states Krejci and Velimsky (1996) concludedthat of the seventy-three ethnic groups in Europe forty-two were bothethnic and political nations Of the remainder twenty-three were purelyethnic and only eight were purely political Those they classied as bothethnic-political in the West included the English French Irish Por-tuguese Scots Spanish Danes Finns Icelanders Norwegians SwedesFlemings Walloons Dutch Maltese Frisians Germans Greeks Italiansand the Swiss (Krejci and Velimsky 1996 pp 212ndash17) Four out of vecountries in Kohnrsquos West (England France The Netherlands andSwitzerland) were consequently classied by them as both ethnic andpolitical The US was not included within this survey but should also beclassied as both ethnic and civic because the former dominated overthe latter until the 1960s (Foner 1998 p 38 Kaufmann 1999 2000b)

Thirdly an articial division of nationalism by geography ignoresethnic and territorial violence that has taken place in Western statesThis discourse which believes that ethnic nationalism and conict areonly endemic to the East is still highly inuential The Organisation forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for example only dealswith ethnic and civic problems in the East Yet arguably there are asmany ethnic conicts in the West as there are in the East although theOSCE does not intervene within the former In post-communist Europeethnic conict has only turned into violence in three regions Yugoslavia(Bosnia Croatia Kosovo) Moldova (Trans-Dniester) and Russia(Chechnya) Meanwhile the West has experienced inter-ethnic conictin the UK (Northern Ireland) France (Corsica Brittany) Belgium(Flanders) Canada (Quebec) and Spain (Basque) Many of these areongoing sometimes turning to violence and their long-term naturesuggests that they may need an outside neutral body such as the OSCEto intervene Ongoing ethnic and religious conicts in Northern Irelandand the Basque region are as deep as any that can be found in post-communist Europe But OSCE intervention in these conicts wouldchallenge the very nature of the still inuential discourse that ethnic andcivic problems only exist in the East ndash not in the West

Kohn also negatively assesses nationalism in the lsquoEastrsquo by reectingon their territorial disputes with neighbours At the same time heignores how the lsquoWestrsquo created large-scale overseas empires during thisperiod and he does not discuss the numerous territorial disputes that theWest was involved in itself during its state and nation-building projectsThe Kohn view of a benign US that did not meet resistance to its terri-torial expansion is still inuential Freedland (1998 p 86) argues thatthe US pioneers saw only lsquoemptinessrsquo when they moved Westwards lsquotoconquer the territory and ll the voidrsquo

The UK had ethnic and imperial problems throughout the period priorto the mid-twentieth century both in Ireland and further aeld The warsof the revolution (1792ndash1802) and the Napoleonic wars (1803ndash1815)

The myth of the civic state 25

immediately followed the French Revolution and led to French terri-torial problems with most of Europe and local territorial conicts withGermany and Belgium (Snyder 2000 pp 154ndash68)

The US invaded Canada in 1812 and the expansion of American terri-tory westwards and southwards brought it into territorial and ethnicconict with Native Indians Spaniards and Mexicans The US Civil Warin the early 1860s produced 600000 casualties a huge number for thetime (in contrast the US had only 50000 casualties a century later in alonger war in Vietnam when its population was proportionately farlarger) After the US-Spanish war in 1898 the US occupied the Philip-pines Guam Hawaii and Puerto Rico but only reluctantly admitted thelatter two into the union in 1900 and 1917 respectively The Philipinoswere lsquouncivilisedrsquo and lsquounassimablersquo and therefore could not be broughtinto the union (R M Smith 1997)

Fourthly Kohnrsquos division of nationalism into two groups idealizesnationalism in the lsquoWestrsquo as a civic phenomenon that was always fullyinclusive of social and ethnic groups He ignores the exclusion of NativeIndians (and blacks) from the US civic nation throughout most of thenineteenth century Indeed eleven southern states denied civil rights toblacks until as late as the 1960s in what can only be dened as a regionalpolicy of apartheid

American policies lsquoworked tirelessly to obliterate all customs that didnot meet their view of civilized actionsrsquo among Native Indians (Nichols1998 pp 28ndash29) The Puritans dened Indians as lsquoSatanicrsquo something thatexcused numerous instances of savagery against them These Englishviews of Native Indians had a long tradition England as the lsquoNew Israelrsquoprovided an ideology that could look to the Old Testament for guidancewhen God destroyed his heathen enemies English Anglo-Saxon cultureand Protestant religion were on the side of lsquogoodrsquo in a battle with lsquoevilrsquo

The earlier English ideas about the backward and savage Irish theundeserving power and the ever-increasing negative ideas about theblack slaves expanded gradually to include Indians

Recent experiences with the Irish had prepared them to considertheir tribal neighbors as backward and savage (Nichols 1998 pp59ndash60)

As North America experienced a rapid growth in colonists the numberof Native Indians rapidly declined because of lsquogenocidersquo and enslave-ment (Nichols 1998) Intolerance grew the Indians became subjectlsquodefeatedrsquo peoples entire tribes (nations) were destroyed and othersforcibly cleansed and their lands taken away (Nichols 1998 p 108)English laws language and culture were forcefully and unequallyimposed upon Native Indians This ethnic cleansing of Indians accom-panied by lsquofraud intimidation and violencersquo became lsquoindispensable to

26 Taras Kuzio

the triumph of manifest destiny and the American mission of spreadingfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p 51)

In the 1940s the US was also nally opened up to Asians Throughout80 per cent of American history US legislation disbarred most people inthe world from becoming US citizens due to their race nationality orgender (R M Smith 1997 p 14) Race and ethnic restrictions on immi-gration were introduced in 1882 and a system of permanent quotas forethnic groups in 1924 (R M Smith 1997 p 118) This policy of lsquoethnicdefencersquo from the 1830s to the 1920s was followed by four decades oflsquoAnglo-conformityrsquo which established Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the US(Kaufmann 2000b)

Nevertheless scholars have traditionally dened the US after 1776 asa civic state Kaufmann (1999 p 443) disagrees and denes the US asone of the rst Western lsquoethnicrsquo nations that was dened by contempor-ary writers in the early-nineteenth century as the lsquoEnglish race inAmericarsquo or lsquoAnglo-Americansrsquo (Kaufmannn 2000b)

In 1776 the colonists in North America were 80 per cent British and98 per cent Protestant Most states introduced anti-Catholic statutes thatgrew out of the French and Indian wars of 1754ndash1763 After the USrevolution an exclusive ethnic Protestant consciousness evolved of alsquochosen peoplersquo based upon an identity of being white (not black orIndian) Protestant (not French or Hispanic Catholic) English in speechand Liberal (in contrast to the royalist British) Other immigrants fromnorth western Europe and Britain were assimilated into a lsquoWASPrsquo(White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) identity

Kaufmann (1999 2000a) therefore sees the US experience as a similarevolution from ethnic to civic statehood as in the remainder of westernEurope with a core ethnic group creating an ethnic state that only gradu-ally evolved into a civic state much later The evolution of the US froman ethnic to a civic state is not unique but part of a broader trend amongWestern states (Kaufmann 2000a)

The evolution of the US into a civic state from the 1960s only occurredafter Anglo-Saxon hegemony had been established and only as a conse-quence of change forced upon it from within and outside (Kaufmannn2000a p 1097) This growing trend in favour of civic nationalism wasnot embraced voluntarily in the US a purely state nationalism failed tosupplant sub-state ethnic loyalties to which citizens may often hold theirprimary allegiance (Kaufmann 2000a pp 1097 1102ndash03)

Tension between civic and ethnic factors in Britain until the 1960s wassubsumed within the conict between the national English lsquoherersquo and theimperial British civic lsquotherersquo (Baucom 1999 p 37) With the empire gonethe ethnic civic conict came back to England Therefore Englishnationalism should not be treated as civic since the sixteenth century asKohn (1940) argued but as ethnic a nationalism only constrained by thecivic nature of British and imperial identity that allowed non-White

The myth of the civic state 27

imperial subjects to be British but never English Threats from immi-gration from the former empire for example can lead civic states toreturn to their ethnic basis as with the 1981 UK Nationality Act Thisdrew much of its strength from racist ideas promoted by Enoch Powellin the 1960s who himself lsquodraws on a long history of the reading of Eng-lishness as primarily a racial categoryrsquo (Baucom 1999 p 15) This tensionbetween the liberal-labour and conservative wings of British politics overregional devolution immigration and multiculturalism continues to thisday

Canada went through a similar process of evolution from ethnic tocivic nationalism as the US where the central preoccupation of statebuilders was to preserve cultural unity so that political and linguisticboundaries coincided (Breton 1988) Rational-legal (civic-territorial)factors came secondary to this endeavour Unlike the US the Canadianstate inherited two not one ethnic cores British and French (Kaufmann1997) Both were initially based upon ethnic nationalism and attemptedto separately construct ethno-cultural societies In French Quebec thisethnic nationalism was more often than not defensive against BritishCanadarsquos attempts at assimilating it In Quebec and Catalonia the evol-ution of nationalism from ethnic to civic variants since the 1960s stilldemands that non-titular nationalities assimilate into the titular ethnicgroup (Harty 1999 pp 672ndash73)

Until the 1950s in Australia a government policy of forced assimi-lation forcibly took children from Aborigines and placed them in white-only schools and families The Australian government still nds itdifcult to apologise and pay compensation for these policies Aborigi-nal peoples were only given the vote in 1967 after an Anglo-SaxonBritish lsquoWhitersquo Australia policy was replaced by multiculturalism

Fifthly the Kohn framework ignores the fact that as in the Westnationalism in the East can also evolve towards a civic variety over timeThis was certainly the case during the 1990s throughout most of post-communist Europe where states have been constructed along civicinclusive lines (although their democracies may as yet be still uncon-solidated) In 1999 the US think-tank Freedom House dened all post-communist European states as lsquocivicrsquo with the exception of Belarus andYugoslavia (Aner 2000 Kuzio 2001)

Sixthly what has been traditionally regarded as positive lsquonation-buildingrsquo processes in the West have been described by (Brubaker 1995see Kuzio 2001) in a negative manner as lsquonationalizing statesrsquo in the EastBoth lsquoWestern civicrsquo and lsquoEastern ethnicrsquo states traditionally homogen-ized their inhabitants Assimilation in civic states such as France meantthe loss of onersquos culture and language as the price for becoming part ofthe French political community Brubakerrsquos lsquonationalizationrsquo of the stateon behalf of the core titular nation in the East is little different from theassimilation by both peaceful and violent means of national minorities

28 Taras Kuzio

in the West (Connor 1972) It ignores the positive role that civic national-ism has played in dismantling empires (eg the former USSR Czecho-slovakia) the removal of dictators (President Slobodan Milosevich inYugoslavia) and opposition to apartheid (the ANC in South Africa)Civic nationalism and liberal democracies are allies ndash not enemies ndash incentral and eastern Europe (Aner 2000 p 245) Both played a role in thetransition from feudalism to modernity in the West there is no reason tobelieve that they will ndash and should ndash not play a similar role in the East

The myth of the civic state

Ethnic and civic states

This article argues that the Kohn (1944 1982) framework is fundamen-tally awed Both the West and the East only became civic from the1960s Western or Eastern states will continue to exhibit ethno-culturalelements even when their nationalisms are civic This article argues thatbecause all states are composed of both civic and ethno-cultural criteriaat different periods of history the proportional mix of the two will bedifferent (Kymlicka 1995 p 88 115 A D Smith 1996 pp 100ndash101 AD Smith 1998 pp 126ndash27) lsquoThe fate of democracy depends on whichone dominates the otherrsquo (Habermas 1996 p 286) Racist views cansometimes go together with strong support for democracy an inclusivestate and respect for fundamental civic and social rights and freedoms1

This may reect the view discussed earlier when civic rights for immi-grants and minorities are only reluctantly granted particularly to thoseperceived as outsiders to the ethnic nation

In the early period of Western states its nationalism was more ethnic(exclusive) than civic (inclusive) (A D Smith 1989 p 149) The strongerpresence of ethnic nationalism in the early stages of state and nation-building may be true of the East as well as the West That the East seemsmore lsquoethnicrsquo today may be therefore more to do with the differenttiming of similar processes

Kymlicka (1996) has criticized the claim that only Eastern nationalismis both ethnic and cultural He believes that cultural nationalism is asmuch at home in the West as it is in the East The rise of English national-ism in the Tudor and Elizabethan eras to which Kohn gives much creditfor later developments was built on cultural nationalism and propagatedby intellectuals poets and writers This English ethnic nationalism re-equipped it for later colonial conquest (Baucom 1999 p 25) There isnothing intrinsically anti-liberal Kymlicka (1996) argues if an ethnicgroup wishes to defend its cultural identity within a civic state

Kymlicka also criticizes Western scholars such as Ignatieff (1993) forwrongly assuming that civic nationalism has no cultural componentbecause all those who are citizens of civic nations participate in a

The myth of the civic state 29

common societal culture Turner (1997 p 9) believes that lsquoCitizenshipidentities and citizenship cultures are national identities and nationalculturesrsquo He continues

When individuals become citizens they not only enter into a set ofinstitutions that confers upon them rights and obligations they notonly acquire an identity they are not only socialised into civic virtuesbut they also become members of a political community with a par-ticular territory and history

The symbios of civic and ethnic actors found within civic states deter-mines the vitality and mobilization capacity of the demos and civilsociety (Miller 1995 2000 Canovan 1996) Although particularism anduniversalism are hostile and competing ideologies in practice national-ism has been the midwife that has brought liberal democracy into theworld and has connected the two ever since If the nation and communityare weakened or decline the demos is also affected The solidarity thatholds together a democracy is the civic nation

Kymlicka (1996) sees no reason to regret the fact that most civic stateshave always been and still are also composed of different cultures Bydenying this factor civic states seek to justify internal homogenization tothe dominant culture and language whether states should therefore bedened as civic or ethnic in Kohnrsquos terms has less to do with the absenceor existence of cultural criteria but if anybody lsquocan be integrated intothe community regardless of race or colourrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 24) andwhat qualications for membership are in place (Canovan 1996 p 19)Kymlicka (1996) therefore stresses that both Western and Easternnationalism have cultural components and identity in both is thereforegrounded in culture

National identity

How do political communities and civic nations hold together Fewscholars would dispute that modern societies require a fraternity (Nisbet1953 pp 153ndash88) a lsquocommunity of valuesrsquo (Parekh 1995 p 436) alsquosingle psychological focus shared by all segmentsrsquo (Connor 1972 p353) a lsquonationalityrsquo (Miller 1995 p 140) a lsquohigh degree of communalsolidarityrsquo (Canovan 1996 pp 28ndash29) and a lsquoWersquo where the nation andthe people are one (Finlayson 1998 p 113) Nevertheless liberal demo-cratic theory assumes a lsquoWersquo is in place and therefore ignores the dif-cult process of forging a lsquoPeoplersquo for the political community Ignoringnationality serves to create a false illusion that lsquocivicrsquo states are purelycivic and are devoid of ethno-cultural factors It also makes it easier todiscuss lsquoWestern civicrsquo states as having always been civic from theirinception

30 Taras Kuzio

Despite the close inter-connection between liberal democracy andnationhood since the late-eighteenth-century political theory tends toignore nationality Nevertheless nationhood is at the heart of politicaltheory even though its particularism has an uneasy marriage with theuniversalism of liberalism How a lsquoPeoplersquo and political solidarity arecreated is often ignored and taken for granted even though it is nation-hood that generates the lsquoWersquo and collective power Successful politiesrequire not only a degree of societal trust but also unity and stabilityfactors which lsquohave always been at the root of politicsrsquo (Canovan 1996p 22)

Advocates of individual rights usually argue that civic states by de-nition are indifferent to ethno-cultural questions Advocates of culturalpluralism on the other hand such as Kymlicka (1996) will counter thosepromoting only individual rights by arguing that all civic states includeethno-cultural elements No civic state can possibly hope to be neutralwhen deciding which ethnic groupsrsquo language culture symbols andanniversaries to promote at the state level (Beissinger 1996 p 101)Although 17 million Americans count Spanish as their rst language onlyone per cent of US federal documents are in non-English languages(Freedland 1998 p 147) Liberals remain concerned that group rightsand cultural pluralism inhibit the creation of a shared identity that civicstates promote They ignore the fact that this shared identity in Westerncivic states is not ethnically or culturally neutral but based upon that ofthe ethnic core (s) Kymlicka (1996) poses a double paradox Multi-ethnic states which represent the majority of nation-states lsquocannotsurvive unless the various national groups have an allegiance to thelarger community they cohabitrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 13) If states ignorethis question and pursue radical homogenizing (or in Brubakerrsquos termlsquonationalizingrsquo) policies this will alienate national minorities and maylead to ethnic and social unrest Civic states have therefore to balancebetween forging an overarching unity in the public domain whileallowing and sometimes fostering polyethnic rights and identities in theprivate sphere (Kuzio forthcoming)

The inclusion of polyethnic rights and the recognition of the value ofcultural pluralism is a relatively recent phenomenon in civic statesWithout the recognition of these rights and pluralism and a concomi-tant rejection of homogenization the imagined civic community will notinclude large numbers of people who do not belong to the ethnic coreKymlicka (1996) and Connor (1972) do not believe that civic statesassimilated non-titulars lsquovoluntarilyrsquo Few national groups voluntarilyassimilated from the eighteenth century and the majority of civic statespursued homogenizing policies until the 1960s France and the US twoof Kohnrsquos civic West still do not legally recognize the concept of nationalminorities because they believe that to do so would undermine their civicstates by prioritizing collective ethnic over individual civic rights Only

The myth of the civic state 31

Canada and Australia adopted multicultural policies in the 1970s (whilenone of Kohnrsquos ve lsquocivicrsquo states adopted similar policies)

Linz and Stepan (1996 pp 35ndash37) dene lsquonationalizingrsquo policies asattempting to homogenize multi-ethnic societies in the East Yet themajority of states both in the West and the East have always been multi-ethnic The newly independent states of the East if they are indeedadopting homogenizing policies are merely mirroring the examples setby the West from the eighteenth century onwards These homogenizingpolicies pursued since the late-eighteenth century in the West were onlymodied in some cases from the 1960s Majority cultures in civic stateshave had a lsquoperverse incentiversquo to destroy the cultures of nationalminorities and lsquothen cite that destruction as a justication for compellingassimilationrsquo (Kymlicka 1995 p 100)

Nation-building in the West was as Connor (1972) commented bothlsquonation creatingrsquo and lsquonation destroyingrsquo All European governmentsincluding those in the West lsquoeventually took steps which homogenizedtheir populationsrsquo (Tilly 1975 p 43) Nation-building in France wasaccompanied by the destruction of local cultures and languages in theperiphery and the imposition of a hegemonic Icircle de France culture thatwas promoted as a benecial lsquola mission civilisatricersquo Weber (1979)describes the slow and uneven process of national integration in Francein the nineteenth century as that of a lsquocolonial empire shaped over thecenturiesrsquo These territories had been lsquoconquered annexed and integratedrsquo by the Icircle de France Parisian ofcials sent to regions such as Brittany felt and behaved as if they were going to an overseas colony

Gellner (1983 pp 142ndash43) sees homogenization as an inevitable by-product of modernization and a functioning national economy Nation-building welded together different peoples into a single communitylsquobased on the cultural heritage of the dominant ethnic corersquo (A D Smith1991 p 68) Thus Western states were not neutral in their nation-building projects and these often marginalized national minorities anddestroyed local identities (Moore 1997 p 904) These factors wereignored by Kohn (1944 1982) in his positive treatment of nationalism inthe West

Historic myths in civic states

Both civic and ethnic states have traditionally used myths and history(Andersen 1991 pp 11ndash12 Schnapper 1997 pp 214 219) As theCouncil of Europe has complained lsquoVirtually all political systems haveused history for their own ends and have imposed both their version ofhistorical facts and their defence of the good and bad gures of historyrsquo(Council of Europe) An objective history may be what historians shouldstrive to write but in reality objective history is as much a myth as states

32 Taras Kuzio

being wholly civic There has often been little to distinguish myth fromhistory as myths have been a lsquopoetic form of historyrsquo (A D Smith 1984p 103)

Smith (1984) points out that all nations since the late-eighteenthcentury have appealed to ancestry and history in the struggle to estab-lish their state and nationhood This process had engulfed the whole ofwestern Europe by 1800 and spread only half a century afterwards toeastern Europe The nationrsquos ancestry had to be demonstrated as vitallsquoboth for self-esteem and security and for external recognitionrsquo (A DSmith 1984 p 101) Historical myths have been traditionally promotedas part of the inculcation of national solidarity within states Myths wereuseful for a variety of policies within the state and nation-buildingproject ndash proving ancient ancestry securing exclusive title to territoryand location the transmission of spiritual values through history pro-motion of heroic ages regeneration of lsquogolden erasrsquo as part of a lsquospecialidentityrsquo and a claim to special status (A D Smith 1984)

The myths of modern Switzerland one of Kohnrsquos ve civic states arefounded on the traditions and memories of an older ethnic nation andare themselves based on a German cultural core The modern Swissstatersquos historical myths and ethno-cultural core are Germanic Through-out Francersquos period of nation-building from 1789ndash1914 the anthem agoaths hymns monuments calendars ceremonies heroes and martyrsappealed to one Gaullist ancestry (A D Smith 1998 p 126) The his-torical past played a prominent role in the inculcation of values andloyalty to the French republic through the construction of monumentsnationalist pedagogy in history teaching museums and memorials inevery commune (Johnson 1993) Just as the English and Americanssought to locate their nation in ancient history the French claimeddescent from the Trojans and Romans The Normans were portrayed asFrankish usurpers who had taken away their rights

Paxman (1999 p 153) believes that lsquoWe must accept rst that a senseof history runs deep in the English peoplersquo The union of Scotland andEngland in 1707 subsumed English within British nationalism that mod-erated English nationalism Nevertheless English myths remained aliveand well in debates over Anglo-Saxon origins archaeology ruralEngland pageants (the opening of parliament the trooping of thecolour the last night of the Proms) and in memories of noble sacriceagainst all odds in World War II such as at Dunkirk (A D Smith 1984p 109) In nineteenth-century England the education system denedEnglish literature as lsquosuperiorrsquo and its culture ideas tastes morals arthistory and family life subscribed to these dominant views of lsquoinferiorrsquoand lsquosuperiorrsquo races not only in the colonies but in countries closer tohome such as Ireland (Hickman 1998) England was the lsquoNew Israelrsquothat was set to deliver its civilization to mankind English history wastreated separately to British and the former placed greater emphasis

The myth of the civic state 33

upon Anglo-Saxon racial origins and an lsquoobsessive interestrsquo in the past(Baucom 1999 pp 15 20 48)

US historical myths linked an alleged pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon loveof liberty with a myth of ethnogenesis which dened the Americans asa new nation that was escaping from the tyranny of the lsquoNormanrsquomonarchs who ruled Britain The US also had an lsquoinfatuationrsquo withAnglo-Saxon history that was included within its myths of ethnogenesis(Kaufmannn 2000b) American exceptionalism portrayed the US nationas the lsquopurestrsquo English (Lipset 1997) a myth of exceptionalism similarto that of the Afrikaner in South Africa the Scots in Ulster and theFrench Canadians in Quebec These American historical myths helpedforge lsquoWASPrsquo cultural boundaries within which dominant Anglo con-formity was promoted in the nineteenth and the rst half of the twenti-eth centuries (Kaufmann 1999 2000b R M Smith 1997 pp 3 460 468)

In a survey of American nation-building from 1776 to the presentSpilman (1997) stressed the centrality of symbols rituals and patrioticorganizations that served to forge a US national identity GeorgeWashington was given a hero-like status after 1789 in portraits birthdaycelebrations shrines books the constitution commemorations ofbattles and independence day celebrations Thanksgiving and MemorialDay were annually celebrated pledges of allegiance were made andlarge historical pageants were held Historical myths have thereforeplayed as important a role in the US as they have in the other fourWestern states cited as lsquocivicrsquo examples by Kohn

Ethnic to civic state an alternative framework

Kohnrsquos division of nationalism traces its positive inclusive qualities retrospectively back to the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries Howevercivic states have never been identical and unanimous in how they wereconstituted The growth of the national state and its provision of civilpolitical cultural and social rights was lsquoslow and unevenrsquo (Mouzelis 1996p 226)

At the time of the American revolution only a small percentage ofwealthy white Protestant males could vote something American colonistsand revolutionaries did not see as unusual Indeed after 1776 slaves con-tinued to be imported into the USA and slavery lsquoemerged from the Revol-ution more rmly entrenched than ever in American lifersquo (Foner 1998 p28) lsquoSlavery rendered blacks all but invisible to those imagining theAmerican communityrsquo (Foner 1998 p 38) US President Thomas Jefferson himself possessed 1000 slaves and believed them to be perma-nently decient in the faculties required to enjoy freedom requiringtutelage by lsquosuperiorrsquo races such as Anglo-Saxons to improve their possi-bility of full civic equality at an unspecied later date (R M Smith 1997p 105) Slavery existed until the 1860s in the USA and the slave trade

34 Taras Kuzio

helped to build up the wealth of Western states Indeed it was only Switzer-land of Kohnrsquos ve Western examples that did not prot from slavery

Although the American national idea as elaborated upon and ideal-ized by Kohn (1944) was based on a mythical devotion to freedom thedenition of who could experience it was initially ethnically narrow andonly gradually evolved into a civic variant after the 1960s The centen-nial of the US revolution in 1876 ignored blacks new non-Anglo-Saxonimmigrants Native Americans and women as not being part of thenation The nineteenth-century US republic had no room for NativeIndian black Spanish or French culture The conquering of New Mexicoand the annexation of Texas was proclaimed as a triumph of ProtestantAnglo-Saxon civilization against the Catholic world and lower racesNew Mexico was not admitted into the union until 1912 even though itpossessed the required population level because it was held to be lsquotooIndianrsquo (Foner 1998 p 79)

By the bicentennial of the US revolution in 1976 the American nationhad evolved from ethnic to civic and included those previously excludedin other words at different times in US history lsquofreedomrsquo had differentmeanings Who was to be included within the American nation is lsquoahighly uneven and bitterly contested part of the story of Americanfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p XVII) Freedom in American history has there-fore been both a lsquomythic idealrsquo and a lsquoliving truthrsquo (Foner 1998 p XXI)

Dahlrsquos denition of a civic state rests on three factors free and fairelections an inclusive suffrage and the right to run for ofce These threebasic civic rights were not always included within Western states In con-temporary denitions of civic states the US and Australia could there-fore not be dened as lsquocivicrsquo states prior to the 1960s because theyexcluded people on the basis of colour and race The breakthrough inwidening the American nation occurred nearly two hundred years afterthe USA was founded when the Civil Rights (1964) Voting Rights (1965)and Fair Housing (1968) Acts were passed

The evolution of states from ethnic to civic statehood occurredthroughout the West and not only in the small number of states dis-cussed in this article This evolution was the norm not the exceptionOnly from the 1960s can we dene Western states as civic while themajority of the East became civic only three decades later in the 1990sAlthough democratic consolidation and civic state building is far fromconsolidated in the East in contrast to the West the East is encouragedby international organizations to continue to evolve along civic lines(something that was not the case in the West) That Western civic statesare still in a process of evolution and are not perfect civic states can beseen in the numerous problems that continue to bedevil them The USstill disenfranchises nearly four million of its citizens a policy that wouldno doubt be condemned by the OSCE if introduced in the East2

By looking at the evolution of Western states in such a manner we

The myth of the civic state 35

shall full two tasks Firstly we shall no longer be able to ignore ethno-cultural factors within civic states Secondly we shall be able to discussin a more frank and open manner the way in which Western statesevolved from ethnic to civic state and nationhood

Conclusion

This article has contributed to the scholarly literature on nationalism byarguing that the Kohn framework of Western states has always been civicfrom the moment of their creation is historically wrong (R S Smith 1997pp 20 31ndash32 499) Western states have evolved from ethnic to civicstates only in the last four decades of the twentieth century Without anunderstanding of this evolution of Western ethnic into civic states wecannot understand the nature of the civic state as containing tensionbetween its universal liberalist and national particularist componentsAll civic states will retain this internal contradiction as long as national-ity remains central to creating the solidarity that pure civic states wouldlack by themselves (Miller 1995 2000)

Both the US and Canadian examples discussed in this article haveshown that Western states typically began as ethnic and only graduallyevolved into civic states from the 1960s Evolution from ethnic to civicnationalism is only likely to take place after the core ethnic group is self-condent within its own bounded territory to open the community tolsquooutsidersrsquo from other ethnic groups Historical evidence shows thatWestern states did not become civic because they so desired but becauseof a multitude of domestic and international pressures (Kaufmann2000b) Belief in civic values can go together with ethnic nationalism andracism and states can move away from their civic bases during times ofperceived crisis

In the US this occurred during the century between the emancipationof the black slaves in the 1860s to re-enfranchising southern blacks inthe 1960s In British Canada this evolution of nationalism took place inthe early twentieth century In French Canada Francophones onlybecame dominant within Quebec after the 1960s a period during whichFrench Canadian nationalism also evolved from ethnic to civic national-ism This process was not solely conned to the US and Canada butoccurred throughout the West

The continued use of the Kohn framework is doubly wrong after adecade of post-Communism in central and eastern Europe when all buttwo of these states became civic Evolution from ethnic to civic stateshas therefore little to do with geography and far more to do with thepositive inuence of international institutions domestic democratic con-solidation and civic institution building Western states have a long his-torical record as ethnic states a factor which makes their evolution moresimilar not different to states in the East

36 Taras Kuzio

Acknowledgements

An earlier and longer version of this paper was presented at the AnnualConvention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities ColumbiaUniversity New York 13ndash15 April 2000 The author would like to thanktwo anonymous ERS referees and Assistant Professor Stephen Shulmanfor their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article

Notes

1 A European Union-wide survey in Spring 1997 found 33 per cent of those inter-viewed describing themselves as lsquoquite racistrsquo or lsquovery racistrsquo Many of these supported thebasic tenets of a civic inclusive liberal democratic state (Eurobarometer Opinion Poll)2 46 states and the District of Columbia have criminal disenfranchisement laws thatdeny the vote to all convicted adults in prison 32 states disenfranchise felons on paroleand 29 those on probation Laws that are unique to the US exist in 14 states that perma-nently disenfranchise former offenders (for life) who have fully served their sentences Thislegislation which runs contrary to established practice in both western and eastern Europeis racially neutral nevertheless due to socio-economic factors it is not surprising that itaffects national minorities blacks and Hispanics more than whites In Florida for example400000 former offenders are permanently excluded from voting of whom half are blacks(representing nearly a third of all blacks in Florida) (Human Rights Watch)

References

ANDERSEN BENEDICT 1991 Imagined Communities London VersoANER STEFAN 2000 lsquoNationalism in central Europe ndash A chance or a threat for theemerging liberal democratic orderrsquo East European Politics and Society vol14 no2pp 213ndash45BAUCOM IAN 1999 Out of Place Englishness Empire and the Location of IdentityPrinceton NJ Princeton University PressBEISSINGER MARK R 1996 lsquoHow nationalism spread Eastern Europe adrift the tidesand cycles of national contentionrsquo Social Research vol 63 no1 pp 97ndash146BOSTOCK WILLIAM W 1997 lsquo ldquoLanguage griefrdquo A ldquoraw materialrdquo of ethnic conictrsquoNationalism and Ethnic Politics vol3 no4 pp 94ndash112BRETON RAYMOND 1988 lsquoFrom ethnic to civic nationalism English Canada andQuebecrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 2 no1 pp 85ndash102BROWN DAVID 1999 lsquoAre there good and bad nationalismsrsquo Nations and Nationalismvol5 no2 pp 281ndash302BRUBAKER ROGERS 1995 lsquoNational minorities nationalizing states and externalhomelands in the new Europersquo Daedalus vol124 no2 pp 107ndash32CANOVAN MARGARET 1996 Nationhood and Political Theory Cheltenham EdwardElgarCONNOR WALKER 1972 lsquoNation-building or nation-destroyingrsquo World PoliticsvolXXIV no3 pp 319ndash55COUNCIL of EUROPE COMMITTEE on CULTURE and EDUCATION Recom-mendation 1283 (22 January 1996) Document 7446DAHL ROBERT 1971 Polyarchy New Haven CT Yale University PressEUROBAROMETER OPINION POLL no471 Luxembourg lsquoRacism and Xeno-phobia in Europersquo 18ndash19 December 1991FINLAYSON ALAN 1998 lsquoIdeology discourse and nationalismrsquo Journal of PoliticalIdeologies vol3 no1 pp 99ndash119

The myth of the civic state 37

of components of national identityrsquo (Smith 2000 p 25) This idealtypology has been criticized by other scholars (Smith 1991 Kymlicka1996 Yack 1996 Brown 1999) yet it continues to remain highly inu-ential within academic government and journalistic discourse (Ignatief1993 Brubaker 1995 Freedland 1998) Scholars have often pointed tothe US as the archetypal civic state (Kohn 1957 Lipset 1968) Green(2000 p 84) looks to the US as an example of a state where identitiesare already lsquocosmopolitanrsquo lsquopostmodernrsquo and lsquomultiplersquo and Habermas(1996) as an example of a state built around lsquoconstitutional patriotismrsquo

This article makes two original contributions to the scholarly litera-ture on nationalism Firstly by critically engaging with earlier scholarlycriticism of the Kohn framework within the broader lsquocivic West ethnicEastrsquo study of nationalism Secondly by replacing the Kohn frameworkof a civic identity exported back into history to the end of the eighteenthcentury by an alternative framework The Kohn (1944) idealizationassumes that Western states were always civic from their inception Thisarticle advances an alternative framework that discusses the history ofWestern states as an evolutionary process from ethnic to civic state andnationhood (Kaufmann 1999 2000b) The broad and all-inclusive politi-cal community that has taken shape since the 1960s is how political theorists such as Dahl (1971) and Kymlicka (1996) would dene a civicstate Western civic states from the 1960s are very different from theWestern ethnic states that existed from the late-eighteenth until the mid-twentieth centuries Western civic states that pride themselves on theirliberal present lsquohad illiberal pastsrsquo (Aner 2000 p 231)

This article is divided into three sections The rst section surveysKohnrsquos framework and then discusses its implications within six keyareas The second section argues that civic states are a myth This mythof the civic state is discussed within the context of how ethno-culturalfactors have always played a role in civic states the role played bynationality in civic states and the inuence of historical myths in civicstates The nal section outlines a different framework from Kohnrsquoswhich adds to the literature on nationalism by understanding statehoodand nationality as a process of change that incorporates tension betweencivic universalism and ethnic particularism

Western and Eastern nationalism

Hans Kohn revisited

The tradition of depicting Western nationalism and nation-states asinherently superior to those in the East has a long tradition in Westernpolitical thought and is deep-rooted among academics policy-makersand journalists Kohn (1944 1982) is perhaps best remembered fordeveloping this dichotomy between two types of nationalism although

The myth of the civic state 21

other scholars have continued this tradition The depiction of a lsquoliberalcivic Westernrsquo and an lsquoilliberal ethnic Easternrsquo nationalism is stillaccepted by some scholars and to an even greater extent by policy-makers and journalists (Ignatief 1993 Freedland 1998 pp 142 146148ndash49)

In Kohnrsquos view Western nationalism had a social base in civic insti-tutions and a bourgeoisie In contrast in the East the absence of theseinstitutions and social classes meant that its nationalism was morelsquoorganicrsquo and reliant upon intellectuals to articulate a national idea Inthe East intellectuals fashion and orchestrate national consciousnessthrough the manipulation of memories symbols myths and identitiesIn the West nations began to develop before the rise of nationalismwhereas in the East this only occurred afterwards Nation-building tookplace in Kohnrsquos West within what he terms a political reality without theuse of extensive myth making The differences between the two nation-alisms were

in the West nationalism was a political phenomenon and was precededby the launch of nation-building or coincided with it

in the East nationalism arose later in conict with existing states andwithin the cultural domain

nationalism in the West did not dwell on historical myths whereas theopposite was true of nationalism in the East

nationalism in the West was linked to individual liberty and rationalcosmopolitanism whereas in the East the opposite was the case (Kohn1944 pp 329ndash30)

Kohn (1944) includes within his denition of the lsquocivic Westrsquo veexamples the UK France The Netherlands Switzerland (Kohn 1956)and the USA In all these countries apart from the USA a national stateemerged before the rise of nationalism in the USA this occurred simul-taneously In the East nationalism took place within a lsquobackward socio-political developmentrsquo where the frontiers of the state and nation rarelycoincided Ethnic groups demanded that boundaries be re-drawn in theirfavour The use of historical myths and legends was far greater and pri-mordial ties were stressed German nationalism for example rejectedWestern concepts of individualism rationalism and parliamentarydemocracy and instead focused upon folk culture language and ethnic-ity (Kohn 1994 pp 162ndash65)

Kohn believed that the rise of nationalism in the West in the eight-eenth century took place at the same time as the growth of politicalcivic and individual rights This was particularly developed in Englandwhere nationalism had been evolving from the sixteenth century (Kohn1940) In the states of the north Atlantic individual rights were on theascendancy a middle class was established property rights were

22 Taras Kuzio

codied absolutism was on the decline and government was consideredto be dependent upon trust from freely consenting citizens Thisnationalism was closely tied to Protestantism and based on the civicrights of England in the seventeenth century and late-eighteenthcentury US and French revolutions These democratic values becamepart of their respective national ideas The French revolution synthe-sized these democratic values with a growing allegiance to the nationalcommunity The American national idea Kohn believed was imbuedwith lsquoindividual libertyrsquo and lsquotolerancersquo that lsquoendowed America with aunique power of voluntary assimilation and of creating a spiritual homo-geneity at a time when the European continent with the exception ofSwitzerland followed the opposite patternrsquo (Kohn 1982 p 64)

When nationalism spread to Spain Ireland central and easternEurope often as a reaction against Bonaparte Napoleon it found a weakmiddle class an entrenched aristocracy and weaker civic institutionsNationalism in these regions became dominated by cultural ndash in contrastto civicpolitical ndash elements This rejection of Western civic ideals wasespecially pronounced in Germany where romanticism and culturalnationalism were strong chauvinistic and hostile to the democratic uni-versalist ideals of the US and French revolutions Elsewhere in Italy andIreland nationalism cultural and democratic rights merged into move-ments for independence Nationalism in the East was in Kohnrsquos viewnot tied to libertarian values but to a lsquodivisive nationalismrsquo where lsquoIndi-vidual liberty and constitutional guarantees were subordinated to therealization of national aspirationsrsquo Whenever the two objectives ofnationalism and democracy conicted lsquonationalism prevailedrsquo (Kohn1982 p 61)

Other scholars have built on Kohnrsquos divisions Ignatieff (1993) deneshis civic nationalism lsquoas a community of equal rights-bearing citizensunited in patriotic attachment to a shared set of patriotic practices andvaluesrsquo He contrasts this with ethnic nationalism where lsquoan individualrsquosdeepest attachments are inherited not chosenrsquo because lsquoit is thenationalist community that denes the individual not the individual whodenes the national communityrsquo (Ignatieff 1993 pp 7ndash8 Kymlicka 1995Freedland 1998 p 142)

As a modernist Gellner (1983) may dispute the claim of Kohn and hissupporters that nations began to emerge before the onset of industrial-ization and the rise of nationalism in the late-eighteenth century Never-theless he accepts Kohnrsquos basic lsquocivic West ethnic Eastrsquo division ofnationalism as correct Gellner (1983) argues that in the West nationswere unied on the basis of a high culture lsquowhich only needs animproved bit of political roongrsquo (Gellner 1983 p 99) In the East incontrast there was a lack of a well dened and codied high culture andtherefore ethnic factors played a more prominent role Eastern national-ism was active on behalf of a high culture still in the making It was in

The myth of the civic state 23

intense rivalry with competitors lsquoover a chaotic ethnographic map ofmany dialects with ambiguous historical or linguo-genetic allegiancesand contagious populations which had only just begun to identify withthese emergent national high culturesrsquo (Gellner 1983 p 100)

Six problems with the Kohn framework

The division of nationalism and states according to Kohnrsquos frameworkfails to stand up to objective historical scrutiny and the civic state reectsmore lsquoa mixture of self-congratulation and wishful thinkingrsquo (Yack1996p 196) This section therefore discusses how the Kohn frameworkis problematical in six areas

Firstly all states in the West share cultural horizons values identitiesand historical myths in a common identity that is the lsquonationrsquo Yack(1996 p 201) believes therefore that lsquoAll of these concepts ndash civilsociety the people the nation ndash rest on the notion of a community setapart from and using the state as a means of self governmentrsquo

Liberal theorists have tended to assume that the lsquoPeoplersquo are in placeand thereby they tend to ignore the process of nation-building In a dis-cussion of the evolution of the US political community1 R M Smith(1997 p 9) therefore points out the dilemma faced by political theorists

The failure of liberal democratic civic ideology to indicate why anygroup of human beings should think of themselves as a distinct orspecial people is a great political liability in this regard

Liberalism has been traditionally realized within national communi-ties that are committed to shared principles Without a cultural legacythere will be no shared consent to live together lsquosince there would beno reason for people to seek agreement with any one group of indi-viduals rather than anotherrsquo (Yack 1996 p 208) This is as true ofWestern as it is of Eastern nations something I survey in greater detailin the second section where I discuss the myth of the civic state

Secondly the Kohn framework disregards any anti-democratic lsquonon-Westernrsquo nationalisms that have existed in the West while also ignoringmanifestations of democracy and civic nationalism in the East Kohnlumps into one category all those nationalisms he disliked as lsquoEasternrsquomany of which are not geographically in the East (Symonolewicz-Symmons 1965 p 224) For example during the inter-war years Czecho-slovakia was a democracy

Kohnrsquos West selectively groups together ve countries while ignoringthe majority of other states that geographically belong to this regionIreland Greece Germany Spain and Belgium are sometimes dened aslying in the West but are nevertheless not included within Kohn lsquos veexamples because they would call into question his framework In their

24 Taras Kuzio

study of European nation-states Krejci and Velimsky (1996) concludedthat of the seventy-three ethnic groups in Europe forty-two were bothethnic and political nations Of the remainder twenty-three were purelyethnic and only eight were purely political Those they classied as bothethnic-political in the West included the English French Irish Por-tuguese Scots Spanish Danes Finns Icelanders Norwegians SwedesFlemings Walloons Dutch Maltese Frisians Germans Greeks Italiansand the Swiss (Krejci and Velimsky 1996 pp 212ndash17) Four out of vecountries in Kohnrsquos West (England France The Netherlands andSwitzerland) were consequently classied by them as both ethnic andpolitical The US was not included within this survey but should also beclassied as both ethnic and civic because the former dominated overthe latter until the 1960s (Foner 1998 p 38 Kaufmann 1999 2000b)

Thirdly an articial division of nationalism by geography ignoresethnic and territorial violence that has taken place in Western statesThis discourse which believes that ethnic nationalism and conict areonly endemic to the East is still highly inuential The Organisation forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for example only dealswith ethnic and civic problems in the East Yet arguably there are asmany ethnic conicts in the West as there are in the East although theOSCE does not intervene within the former In post-communist Europeethnic conict has only turned into violence in three regions Yugoslavia(Bosnia Croatia Kosovo) Moldova (Trans-Dniester) and Russia(Chechnya) Meanwhile the West has experienced inter-ethnic conictin the UK (Northern Ireland) France (Corsica Brittany) Belgium(Flanders) Canada (Quebec) and Spain (Basque) Many of these areongoing sometimes turning to violence and their long-term naturesuggests that they may need an outside neutral body such as the OSCEto intervene Ongoing ethnic and religious conicts in Northern Irelandand the Basque region are as deep as any that can be found in post-communist Europe But OSCE intervention in these conicts wouldchallenge the very nature of the still inuential discourse that ethnic andcivic problems only exist in the East ndash not in the West

Kohn also negatively assesses nationalism in the lsquoEastrsquo by reectingon their territorial disputes with neighbours At the same time heignores how the lsquoWestrsquo created large-scale overseas empires during thisperiod and he does not discuss the numerous territorial disputes that theWest was involved in itself during its state and nation-building projectsThe Kohn view of a benign US that did not meet resistance to its terri-torial expansion is still inuential Freedland (1998 p 86) argues thatthe US pioneers saw only lsquoemptinessrsquo when they moved Westwards lsquotoconquer the territory and ll the voidrsquo

The UK had ethnic and imperial problems throughout the period priorto the mid-twentieth century both in Ireland and further aeld The warsof the revolution (1792ndash1802) and the Napoleonic wars (1803ndash1815)

The myth of the civic state 25

immediately followed the French Revolution and led to French terri-torial problems with most of Europe and local territorial conicts withGermany and Belgium (Snyder 2000 pp 154ndash68)

The US invaded Canada in 1812 and the expansion of American terri-tory westwards and southwards brought it into territorial and ethnicconict with Native Indians Spaniards and Mexicans The US Civil Warin the early 1860s produced 600000 casualties a huge number for thetime (in contrast the US had only 50000 casualties a century later in alonger war in Vietnam when its population was proportionately farlarger) After the US-Spanish war in 1898 the US occupied the Philip-pines Guam Hawaii and Puerto Rico but only reluctantly admitted thelatter two into the union in 1900 and 1917 respectively The Philipinoswere lsquouncivilisedrsquo and lsquounassimablersquo and therefore could not be broughtinto the union (R M Smith 1997)

Fourthly Kohnrsquos division of nationalism into two groups idealizesnationalism in the lsquoWestrsquo as a civic phenomenon that was always fullyinclusive of social and ethnic groups He ignores the exclusion of NativeIndians (and blacks) from the US civic nation throughout most of thenineteenth century Indeed eleven southern states denied civil rights toblacks until as late as the 1960s in what can only be dened as a regionalpolicy of apartheid

American policies lsquoworked tirelessly to obliterate all customs that didnot meet their view of civilized actionsrsquo among Native Indians (Nichols1998 pp 28ndash29) The Puritans dened Indians as lsquoSatanicrsquo something thatexcused numerous instances of savagery against them These Englishviews of Native Indians had a long tradition England as the lsquoNew Israelrsquoprovided an ideology that could look to the Old Testament for guidancewhen God destroyed his heathen enemies English Anglo-Saxon cultureand Protestant religion were on the side of lsquogoodrsquo in a battle with lsquoevilrsquo

The earlier English ideas about the backward and savage Irish theundeserving power and the ever-increasing negative ideas about theblack slaves expanded gradually to include Indians

Recent experiences with the Irish had prepared them to considertheir tribal neighbors as backward and savage (Nichols 1998 pp59ndash60)

As North America experienced a rapid growth in colonists the numberof Native Indians rapidly declined because of lsquogenocidersquo and enslave-ment (Nichols 1998) Intolerance grew the Indians became subjectlsquodefeatedrsquo peoples entire tribes (nations) were destroyed and othersforcibly cleansed and their lands taken away (Nichols 1998 p 108)English laws language and culture were forcefully and unequallyimposed upon Native Indians This ethnic cleansing of Indians accom-panied by lsquofraud intimidation and violencersquo became lsquoindispensable to

26 Taras Kuzio

the triumph of manifest destiny and the American mission of spreadingfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p 51)

In the 1940s the US was also nally opened up to Asians Throughout80 per cent of American history US legislation disbarred most people inthe world from becoming US citizens due to their race nationality orgender (R M Smith 1997 p 14) Race and ethnic restrictions on immi-gration were introduced in 1882 and a system of permanent quotas forethnic groups in 1924 (R M Smith 1997 p 118) This policy of lsquoethnicdefencersquo from the 1830s to the 1920s was followed by four decades oflsquoAnglo-conformityrsquo which established Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the US(Kaufmann 2000b)

Nevertheless scholars have traditionally dened the US after 1776 asa civic state Kaufmann (1999 p 443) disagrees and denes the US asone of the rst Western lsquoethnicrsquo nations that was dened by contempor-ary writers in the early-nineteenth century as the lsquoEnglish race inAmericarsquo or lsquoAnglo-Americansrsquo (Kaufmannn 2000b)

In 1776 the colonists in North America were 80 per cent British and98 per cent Protestant Most states introduced anti-Catholic statutes thatgrew out of the French and Indian wars of 1754ndash1763 After the USrevolution an exclusive ethnic Protestant consciousness evolved of alsquochosen peoplersquo based upon an identity of being white (not black orIndian) Protestant (not French or Hispanic Catholic) English in speechand Liberal (in contrast to the royalist British) Other immigrants fromnorth western Europe and Britain were assimilated into a lsquoWASPrsquo(White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) identity

Kaufmann (1999 2000a) therefore sees the US experience as a similarevolution from ethnic to civic statehood as in the remainder of westernEurope with a core ethnic group creating an ethnic state that only gradu-ally evolved into a civic state much later The evolution of the US froman ethnic to a civic state is not unique but part of a broader trend amongWestern states (Kaufmann 2000a)

The evolution of the US into a civic state from the 1960s only occurredafter Anglo-Saxon hegemony had been established and only as a conse-quence of change forced upon it from within and outside (Kaufmannn2000a p 1097) This growing trend in favour of civic nationalism wasnot embraced voluntarily in the US a purely state nationalism failed tosupplant sub-state ethnic loyalties to which citizens may often hold theirprimary allegiance (Kaufmann 2000a pp 1097 1102ndash03)

Tension between civic and ethnic factors in Britain until the 1960s wassubsumed within the conict between the national English lsquoherersquo and theimperial British civic lsquotherersquo (Baucom 1999 p 37) With the empire gonethe ethnic civic conict came back to England Therefore Englishnationalism should not be treated as civic since the sixteenth century asKohn (1940) argued but as ethnic a nationalism only constrained by thecivic nature of British and imperial identity that allowed non-White

The myth of the civic state 27

imperial subjects to be British but never English Threats from immi-gration from the former empire for example can lead civic states toreturn to their ethnic basis as with the 1981 UK Nationality Act Thisdrew much of its strength from racist ideas promoted by Enoch Powellin the 1960s who himself lsquodraws on a long history of the reading of Eng-lishness as primarily a racial categoryrsquo (Baucom 1999 p 15) This tensionbetween the liberal-labour and conservative wings of British politics overregional devolution immigration and multiculturalism continues to thisday

Canada went through a similar process of evolution from ethnic tocivic nationalism as the US where the central preoccupation of statebuilders was to preserve cultural unity so that political and linguisticboundaries coincided (Breton 1988) Rational-legal (civic-territorial)factors came secondary to this endeavour Unlike the US the Canadianstate inherited two not one ethnic cores British and French (Kaufmann1997) Both were initially based upon ethnic nationalism and attemptedto separately construct ethno-cultural societies In French Quebec thisethnic nationalism was more often than not defensive against BritishCanadarsquos attempts at assimilating it In Quebec and Catalonia the evol-ution of nationalism from ethnic to civic variants since the 1960s stilldemands that non-titular nationalities assimilate into the titular ethnicgroup (Harty 1999 pp 672ndash73)

Until the 1950s in Australia a government policy of forced assimi-lation forcibly took children from Aborigines and placed them in white-only schools and families The Australian government still nds itdifcult to apologise and pay compensation for these policies Aborigi-nal peoples were only given the vote in 1967 after an Anglo-SaxonBritish lsquoWhitersquo Australia policy was replaced by multiculturalism

Fifthly the Kohn framework ignores the fact that as in the Westnationalism in the East can also evolve towards a civic variety over timeThis was certainly the case during the 1990s throughout most of post-communist Europe where states have been constructed along civicinclusive lines (although their democracies may as yet be still uncon-solidated) In 1999 the US think-tank Freedom House dened all post-communist European states as lsquocivicrsquo with the exception of Belarus andYugoslavia (Aner 2000 Kuzio 2001)

Sixthly what has been traditionally regarded as positive lsquonation-buildingrsquo processes in the West have been described by (Brubaker 1995see Kuzio 2001) in a negative manner as lsquonationalizing statesrsquo in the EastBoth lsquoWestern civicrsquo and lsquoEastern ethnicrsquo states traditionally homogen-ized their inhabitants Assimilation in civic states such as France meantthe loss of onersquos culture and language as the price for becoming part ofthe French political community Brubakerrsquos lsquonationalizationrsquo of the stateon behalf of the core titular nation in the East is little different from theassimilation by both peaceful and violent means of national minorities

28 Taras Kuzio

in the West (Connor 1972) It ignores the positive role that civic national-ism has played in dismantling empires (eg the former USSR Czecho-slovakia) the removal of dictators (President Slobodan Milosevich inYugoslavia) and opposition to apartheid (the ANC in South Africa)Civic nationalism and liberal democracies are allies ndash not enemies ndash incentral and eastern Europe (Aner 2000 p 245) Both played a role in thetransition from feudalism to modernity in the West there is no reason tobelieve that they will ndash and should ndash not play a similar role in the East

The myth of the civic state

Ethnic and civic states

This article argues that the Kohn (1944 1982) framework is fundamen-tally awed Both the West and the East only became civic from the1960s Western or Eastern states will continue to exhibit ethno-culturalelements even when their nationalisms are civic This article argues thatbecause all states are composed of both civic and ethno-cultural criteriaat different periods of history the proportional mix of the two will bedifferent (Kymlicka 1995 p 88 115 A D Smith 1996 pp 100ndash101 AD Smith 1998 pp 126ndash27) lsquoThe fate of democracy depends on whichone dominates the otherrsquo (Habermas 1996 p 286) Racist views cansometimes go together with strong support for democracy an inclusivestate and respect for fundamental civic and social rights and freedoms1

This may reect the view discussed earlier when civic rights for immi-grants and minorities are only reluctantly granted particularly to thoseperceived as outsiders to the ethnic nation

In the early period of Western states its nationalism was more ethnic(exclusive) than civic (inclusive) (A D Smith 1989 p 149) The strongerpresence of ethnic nationalism in the early stages of state and nation-building may be true of the East as well as the West That the East seemsmore lsquoethnicrsquo today may be therefore more to do with the differenttiming of similar processes

Kymlicka (1996) has criticized the claim that only Eastern nationalismis both ethnic and cultural He believes that cultural nationalism is asmuch at home in the West as it is in the East The rise of English national-ism in the Tudor and Elizabethan eras to which Kohn gives much creditfor later developments was built on cultural nationalism and propagatedby intellectuals poets and writers This English ethnic nationalism re-equipped it for later colonial conquest (Baucom 1999 p 25) There isnothing intrinsically anti-liberal Kymlicka (1996) argues if an ethnicgroup wishes to defend its cultural identity within a civic state

Kymlicka also criticizes Western scholars such as Ignatieff (1993) forwrongly assuming that civic nationalism has no cultural componentbecause all those who are citizens of civic nations participate in a

The myth of the civic state 29

common societal culture Turner (1997 p 9) believes that lsquoCitizenshipidentities and citizenship cultures are national identities and nationalculturesrsquo He continues

When individuals become citizens they not only enter into a set ofinstitutions that confers upon them rights and obligations they notonly acquire an identity they are not only socialised into civic virtuesbut they also become members of a political community with a par-ticular territory and history

The symbios of civic and ethnic actors found within civic states deter-mines the vitality and mobilization capacity of the demos and civilsociety (Miller 1995 2000 Canovan 1996) Although particularism anduniversalism are hostile and competing ideologies in practice national-ism has been the midwife that has brought liberal democracy into theworld and has connected the two ever since If the nation and communityare weakened or decline the demos is also affected The solidarity thatholds together a democracy is the civic nation

Kymlicka (1996) sees no reason to regret the fact that most civic stateshave always been and still are also composed of different cultures Bydenying this factor civic states seek to justify internal homogenization tothe dominant culture and language whether states should therefore bedened as civic or ethnic in Kohnrsquos terms has less to do with the absenceor existence of cultural criteria but if anybody lsquocan be integrated intothe community regardless of race or colourrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 24) andwhat qualications for membership are in place (Canovan 1996 p 19)Kymlicka (1996) therefore stresses that both Western and Easternnationalism have cultural components and identity in both is thereforegrounded in culture

National identity

How do political communities and civic nations hold together Fewscholars would dispute that modern societies require a fraternity (Nisbet1953 pp 153ndash88) a lsquocommunity of valuesrsquo (Parekh 1995 p 436) alsquosingle psychological focus shared by all segmentsrsquo (Connor 1972 p353) a lsquonationalityrsquo (Miller 1995 p 140) a lsquohigh degree of communalsolidarityrsquo (Canovan 1996 pp 28ndash29) and a lsquoWersquo where the nation andthe people are one (Finlayson 1998 p 113) Nevertheless liberal demo-cratic theory assumes a lsquoWersquo is in place and therefore ignores the dif-cult process of forging a lsquoPeoplersquo for the political community Ignoringnationality serves to create a false illusion that lsquocivicrsquo states are purelycivic and are devoid of ethno-cultural factors It also makes it easier todiscuss lsquoWestern civicrsquo states as having always been civic from theirinception

30 Taras Kuzio

Despite the close inter-connection between liberal democracy andnationhood since the late-eighteenth-century political theory tends toignore nationality Nevertheless nationhood is at the heart of politicaltheory even though its particularism has an uneasy marriage with theuniversalism of liberalism How a lsquoPeoplersquo and political solidarity arecreated is often ignored and taken for granted even though it is nation-hood that generates the lsquoWersquo and collective power Successful politiesrequire not only a degree of societal trust but also unity and stabilityfactors which lsquohave always been at the root of politicsrsquo (Canovan 1996p 22)

Advocates of individual rights usually argue that civic states by de-nition are indifferent to ethno-cultural questions Advocates of culturalpluralism on the other hand such as Kymlicka (1996) will counter thosepromoting only individual rights by arguing that all civic states includeethno-cultural elements No civic state can possibly hope to be neutralwhen deciding which ethnic groupsrsquo language culture symbols andanniversaries to promote at the state level (Beissinger 1996 p 101)Although 17 million Americans count Spanish as their rst language onlyone per cent of US federal documents are in non-English languages(Freedland 1998 p 147) Liberals remain concerned that group rightsand cultural pluralism inhibit the creation of a shared identity that civicstates promote They ignore the fact that this shared identity in Westerncivic states is not ethnically or culturally neutral but based upon that ofthe ethnic core (s) Kymlicka (1996) poses a double paradox Multi-ethnic states which represent the majority of nation-states lsquocannotsurvive unless the various national groups have an allegiance to thelarger community they cohabitrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 13) If states ignorethis question and pursue radical homogenizing (or in Brubakerrsquos termlsquonationalizingrsquo) policies this will alienate national minorities and maylead to ethnic and social unrest Civic states have therefore to balancebetween forging an overarching unity in the public domain whileallowing and sometimes fostering polyethnic rights and identities in theprivate sphere (Kuzio forthcoming)

The inclusion of polyethnic rights and the recognition of the value ofcultural pluralism is a relatively recent phenomenon in civic statesWithout the recognition of these rights and pluralism and a concomi-tant rejection of homogenization the imagined civic community will notinclude large numbers of people who do not belong to the ethnic coreKymlicka (1996) and Connor (1972) do not believe that civic statesassimilated non-titulars lsquovoluntarilyrsquo Few national groups voluntarilyassimilated from the eighteenth century and the majority of civic statespursued homogenizing policies until the 1960s France and the US twoof Kohnrsquos civic West still do not legally recognize the concept of nationalminorities because they believe that to do so would undermine their civicstates by prioritizing collective ethnic over individual civic rights Only

The myth of the civic state 31

Canada and Australia adopted multicultural policies in the 1970s (whilenone of Kohnrsquos ve lsquocivicrsquo states adopted similar policies)

Linz and Stepan (1996 pp 35ndash37) dene lsquonationalizingrsquo policies asattempting to homogenize multi-ethnic societies in the East Yet themajority of states both in the West and the East have always been multi-ethnic The newly independent states of the East if they are indeedadopting homogenizing policies are merely mirroring the examples setby the West from the eighteenth century onwards These homogenizingpolicies pursued since the late-eighteenth century in the West were onlymodied in some cases from the 1960s Majority cultures in civic stateshave had a lsquoperverse incentiversquo to destroy the cultures of nationalminorities and lsquothen cite that destruction as a justication for compellingassimilationrsquo (Kymlicka 1995 p 100)

Nation-building in the West was as Connor (1972) commented bothlsquonation creatingrsquo and lsquonation destroyingrsquo All European governmentsincluding those in the West lsquoeventually took steps which homogenizedtheir populationsrsquo (Tilly 1975 p 43) Nation-building in France wasaccompanied by the destruction of local cultures and languages in theperiphery and the imposition of a hegemonic Icircle de France culture thatwas promoted as a benecial lsquola mission civilisatricersquo Weber (1979)describes the slow and uneven process of national integration in Francein the nineteenth century as that of a lsquocolonial empire shaped over thecenturiesrsquo These territories had been lsquoconquered annexed and integratedrsquo by the Icircle de France Parisian ofcials sent to regions such as Brittany felt and behaved as if they were going to an overseas colony

Gellner (1983 pp 142ndash43) sees homogenization as an inevitable by-product of modernization and a functioning national economy Nation-building welded together different peoples into a single communitylsquobased on the cultural heritage of the dominant ethnic corersquo (A D Smith1991 p 68) Thus Western states were not neutral in their nation-building projects and these often marginalized national minorities anddestroyed local identities (Moore 1997 p 904) These factors wereignored by Kohn (1944 1982) in his positive treatment of nationalism inthe West

Historic myths in civic states

Both civic and ethnic states have traditionally used myths and history(Andersen 1991 pp 11ndash12 Schnapper 1997 pp 214 219) As theCouncil of Europe has complained lsquoVirtually all political systems haveused history for their own ends and have imposed both their version ofhistorical facts and their defence of the good and bad gures of historyrsquo(Council of Europe) An objective history may be what historians shouldstrive to write but in reality objective history is as much a myth as states

32 Taras Kuzio

being wholly civic There has often been little to distinguish myth fromhistory as myths have been a lsquopoetic form of historyrsquo (A D Smith 1984p 103)

Smith (1984) points out that all nations since the late-eighteenthcentury have appealed to ancestry and history in the struggle to estab-lish their state and nationhood This process had engulfed the whole ofwestern Europe by 1800 and spread only half a century afterwards toeastern Europe The nationrsquos ancestry had to be demonstrated as vitallsquoboth for self-esteem and security and for external recognitionrsquo (A DSmith 1984 p 101) Historical myths have been traditionally promotedas part of the inculcation of national solidarity within states Myths wereuseful for a variety of policies within the state and nation-buildingproject ndash proving ancient ancestry securing exclusive title to territoryand location the transmission of spiritual values through history pro-motion of heroic ages regeneration of lsquogolden erasrsquo as part of a lsquospecialidentityrsquo and a claim to special status (A D Smith 1984)

The myths of modern Switzerland one of Kohnrsquos ve civic states arefounded on the traditions and memories of an older ethnic nation andare themselves based on a German cultural core The modern Swissstatersquos historical myths and ethno-cultural core are Germanic Through-out Francersquos period of nation-building from 1789ndash1914 the anthem agoaths hymns monuments calendars ceremonies heroes and martyrsappealed to one Gaullist ancestry (A D Smith 1998 p 126) The his-torical past played a prominent role in the inculcation of values andloyalty to the French republic through the construction of monumentsnationalist pedagogy in history teaching museums and memorials inevery commune (Johnson 1993) Just as the English and Americanssought to locate their nation in ancient history the French claimeddescent from the Trojans and Romans The Normans were portrayed asFrankish usurpers who had taken away their rights

Paxman (1999 p 153) believes that lsquoWe must accept rst that a senseof history runs deep in the English peoplersquo The union of Scotland andEngland in 1707 subsumed English within British nationalism that mod-erated English nationalism Nevertheless English myths remained aliveand well in debates over Anglo-Saxon origins archaeology ruralEngland pageants (the opening of parliament the trooping of thecolour the last night of the Proms) and in memories of noble sacriceagainst all odds in World War II such as at Dunkirk (A D Smith 1984p 109) In nineteenth-century England the education system denedEnglish literature as lsquosuperiorrsquo and its culture ideas tastes morals arthistory and family life subscribed to these dominant views of lsquoinferiorrsquoand lsquosuperiorrsquo races not only in the colonies but in countries closer tohome such as Ireland (Hickman 1998) England was the lsquoNew Israelrsquothat was set to deliver its civilization to mankind English history wastreated separately to British and the former placed greater emphasis

The myth of the civic state 33

upon Anglo-Saxon racial origins and an lsquoobsessive interestrsquo in the past(Baucom 1999 pp 15 20 48)

US historical myths linked an alleged pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon loveof liberty with a myth of ethnogenesis which dened the Americans asa new nation that was escaping from the tyranny of the lsquoNormanrsquomonarchs who ruled Britain The US also had an lsquoinfatuationrsquo withAnglo-Saxon history that was included within its myths of ethnogenesis(Kaufmannn 2000b) American exceptionalism portrayed the US nationas the lsquopurestrsquo English (Lipset 1997) a myth of exceptionalism similarto that of the Afrikaner in South Africa the Scots in Ulster and theFrench Canadians in Quebec These American historical myths helpedforge lsquoWASPrsquo cultural boundaries within which dominant Anglo con-formity was promoted in the nineteenth and the rst half of the twenti-eth centuries (Kaufmann 1999 2000b R M Smith 1997 pp 3 460 468)

In a survey of American nation-building from 1776 to the presentSpilman (1997) stressed the centrality of symbols rituals and patrioticorganizations that served to forge a US national identity GeorgeWashington was given a hero-like status after 1789 in portraits birthdaycelebrations shrines books the constitution commemorations ofbattles and independence day celebrations Thanksgiving and MemorialDay were annually celebrated pledges of allegiance were made andlarge historical pageants were held Historical myths have thereforeplayed as important a role in the US as they have in the other fourWestern states cited as lsquocivicrsquo examples by Kohn

Ethnic to civic state an alternative framework

Kohnrsquos division of nationalism traces its positive inclusive qualities retrospectively back to the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries Howevercivic states have never been identical and unanimous in how they wereconstituted The growth of the national state and its provision of civilpolitical cultural and social rights was lsquoslow and unevenrsquo (Mouzelis 1996p 226)

At the time of the American revolution only a small percentage ofwealthy white Protestant males could vote something American colonistsand revolutionaries did not see as unusual Indeed after 1776 slaves con-tinued to be imported into the USA and slavery lsquoemerged from the Revol-ution more rmly entrenched than ever in American lifersquo (Foner 1998 p28) lsquoSlavery rendered blacks all but invisible to those imagining theAmerican communityrsquo (Foner 1998 p 38) US President Thomas Jefferson himself possessed 1000 slaves and believed them to be perma-nently decient in the faculties required to enjoy freedom requiringtutelage by lsquosuperiorrsquo races such as Anglo-Saxons to improve their possi-bility of full civic equality at an unspecied later date (R M Smith 1997p 105) Slavery existed until the 1860s in the USA and the slave trade

34 Taras Kuzio

helped to build up the wealth of Western states Indeed it was only Switzer-land of Kohnrsquos ve Western examples that did not prot from slavery

Although the American national idea as elaborated upon and ideal-ized by Kohn (1944) was based on a mythical devotion to freedom thedenition of who could experience it was initially ethnically narrow andonly gradually evolved into a civic variant after the 1960s The centen-nial of the US revolution in 1876 ignored blacks new non-Anglo-Saxonimmigrants Native Americans and women as not being part of thenation The nineteenth-century US republic had no room for NativeIndian black Spanish or French culture The conquering of New Mexicoand the annexation of Texas was proclaimed as a triumph of ProtestantAnglo-Saxon civilization against the Catholic world and lower racesNew Mexico was not admitted into the union until 1912 even though itpossessed the required population level because it was held to be lsquotooIndianrsquo (Foner 1998 p 79)

By the bicentennial of the US revolution in 1976 the American nationhad evolved from ethnic to civic and included those previously excludedin other words at different times in US history lsquofreedomrsquo had differentmeanings Who was to be included within the American nation is lsquoahighly uneven and bitterly contested part of the story of Americanfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p XVII) Freedom in American history has there-fore been both a lsquomythic idealrsquo and a lsquoliving truthrsquo (Foner 1998 p XXI)

Dahlrsquos denition of a civic state rests on three factors free and fairelections an inclusive suffrage and the right to run for ofce These threebasic civic rights were not always included within Western states In con-temporary denitions of civic states the US and Australia could there-fore not be dened as lsquocivicrsquo states prior to the 1960s because theyexcluded people on the basis of colour and race The breakthrough inwidening the American nation occurred nearly two hundred years afterthe USA was founded when the Civil Rights (1964) Voting Rights (1965)and Fair Housing (1968) Acts were passed

The evolution of states from ethnic to civic statehood occurredthroughout the West and not only in the small number of states dis-cussed in this article This evolution was the norm not the exceptionOnly from the 1960s can we dene Western states as civic while themajority of the East became civic only three decades later in the 1990sAlthough democratic consolidation and civic state building is far fromconsolidated in the East in contrast to the West the East is encouragedby international organizations to continue to evolve along civic lines(something that was not the case in the West) That Western civic statesare still in a process of evolution and are not perfect civic states can beseen in the numerous problems that continue to bedevil them The USstill disenfranchises nearly four million of its citizens a policy that wouldno doubt be condemned by the OSCE if introduced in the East2

By looking at the evolution of Western states in such a manner we

The myth of the civic state 35

shall full two tasks Firstly we shall no longer be able to ignore ethno-cultural factors within civic states Secondly we shall be able to discussin a more frank and open manner the way in which Western statesevolved from ethnic to civic state and nationhood

Conclusion

This article has contributed to the scholarly literature on nationalism byarguing that the Kohn framework of Western states has always been civicfrom the moment of their creation is historically wrong (R S Smith 1997pp 20 31ndash32 499) Western states have evolved from ethnic to civicstates only in the last four decades of the twentieth century Without anunderstanding of this evolution of Western ethnic into civic states wecannot understand the nature of the civic state as containing tensionbetween its universal liberalist and national particularist componentsAll civic states will retain this internal contradiction as long as national-ity remains central to creating the solidarity that pure civic states wouldlack by themselves (Miller 1995 2000)

Both the US and Canadian examples discussed in this article haveshown that Western states typically began as ethnic and only graduallyevolved into civic states from the 1960s Evolution from ethnic to civicnationalism is only likely to take place after the core ethnic group is self-condent within its own bounded territory to open the community tolsquooutsidersrsquo from other ethnic groups Historical evidence shows thatWestern states did not become civic because they so desired but becauseof a multitude of domestic and international pressures (Kaufmann2000b) Belief in civic values can go together with ethnic nationalism andracism and states can move away from their civic bases during times ofperceived crisis

In the US this occurred during the century between the emancipationof the black slaves in the 1860s to re-enfranchising southern blacks inthe 1960s In British Canada this evolution of nationalism took place inthe early twentieth century In French Canada Francophones onlybecame dominant within Quebec after the 1960s a period during whichFrench Canadian nationalism also evolved from ethnic to civic national-ism This process was not solely conned to the US and Canada butoccurred throughout the West

The continued use of the Kohn framework is doubly wrong after adecade of post-Communism in central and eastern Europe when all buttwo of these states became civic Evolution from ethnic to civic stateshas therefore little to do with geography and far more to do with thepositive inuence of international institutions domestic democratic con-solidation and civic institution building Western states have a long his-torical record as ethnic states a factor which makes their evolution moresimilar not different to states in the East

36 Taras Kuzio

Acknowledgements

An earlier and longer version of this paper was presented at the AnnualConvention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities ColumbiaUniversity New York 13ndash15 April 2000 The author would like to thanktwo anonymous ERS referees and Assistant Professor Stephen Shulmanfor their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article

Notes

1 A European Union-wide survey in Spring 1997 found 33 per cent of those inter-viewed describing themselves as lsquoquite racistrsquo or lsquovery racistrsquo Many of these supported thebasic tenets of a civic inclusive liberal democratic state (Eurobarometer Opinion Poll)2 46 states and the District of Columbia have criminal disenfranchisement laws thatdeny the vote to all convicted adults in prison 32 states disenfranchise felons on paroleand 29 those on probation Laws that are unique to the US exist in 14 states that perma-nently disenfranchise former offenders (for life) who have fully served their sentences Thislegislation which runs contrary to established practice in both western and eastern Europeis racially neutral nevertheless due to socio-economic factors it is not surprising that itaffects national minorities blacks and Hispanics more than whites In Florida for example400000 former offenders are permanently excluded from voting of whom half are blacks(representing nearly a third of all blacks in Florida) (Human Rights Watch)

References

ANDERSEN BENEDICT 1991 Imagined Communities London VersoANER STEFAN 2000 lsquoNationalism in central Europe ndash A chance or a threat for theemerging liberal democratic orderrsquo East European Politics and Society vol14 no2pp 213ndash45BAUCOM IAN 1999 Out of Place Englishness Empire and the Location of IdentityPrinceton NJ Princeton University PressBEISSINGER MARK R 1996 lsquoHow nationalism spread Eastern Europe adrift the tidesand cycles of national contentionrsquo Social Research vol 63 no1 pp 97ndash146BOSTOCK WILLIAM W 1997 lsquo ldquoLanguage griefrdquo A ldquoraw materialrdquo of ethnic conictrsquoNationalism and Ethnic Politics vol3 no4 pp 94ndash112BRETON RAYMOND 1988 lsquoFrom ethnic to civic nationalism English Canada andQuebecrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 2 no1 pp 85ndash102BROWN DAVID 1999 lsquoAre there good and bad nationalismsrsquo Nations and Nationalismvol5 no2 pp 281ndash302BRUBAKER ROGERS 1995 lsquoNational minorities nationalizing states and externalhomelands in the new Europersquo Daedalus vol124 no2 pp 107ndash32CANOVAN MARGARET 1996 Nationhood and Political Theory Cheltenham EdwardElgarCONNOR WALKER 1972 lsquoNation-building or nation-destroyingrsquo World PoliticsvolXXIV no3 pp 319ndash55COUNCIL of EUROPE COMMITTEE on CULTURE and EDUCATION Recom-mendation 1283 (22 January 1996) Document 7446DAHL ROBERT 1971 Polyarchy New Haven CT Yale University PressEUROBAROMETER OPINION POLL no471 Luxembourg lsquoRacism and Xeno-phobia in Europersquo 18ndash19 December 1991FINLAYSON ALAN 1998 lsquoIdeology discourse and nationalismrsquo Journal of PoliticalIdeologies vol3 no1 pp 99ndash119

The myth of the civic state 37

other scholars have continued this tradition The depiction of a lsquoliberalcivic Westernrsquo and an lsquoilliberal ethnic Easternrsquo nationalism is stillaccepted by some scholars and to an even greater extent by policy-makers and journalists (Ignatief 1993 Freedland 1998 pp 142 146148ndash49)

In Kohnrsquos view Western nationalism had a social base in civic insti-tutions and a bourgeoisie In contrast in the East the absence of theseinstitutions and social classes meant that its nationalism was morelsquoorganicrsquo and reliant upon intellectuals to articulate a national idea Inthe East intellectuals fashion and orchestrate national consciousnessthrough the manipulation of memories symbols myths and identitiesIn the West nations began to develop before the rise of nationalismwhereas in the East this only occurred afterwards Nation-building tookplace in Kohnrsquos West within what he terms a political reality without theuse of extensive myth making The differences between the two nation-alisms were

in the West nationalism was a political phenomenon and was precededby the launch of nation-building or coincided with it

in the East nationalism arose later in conict with existing states andwithin the cultural domain

nationalism in the West did not dwell on historical myths whereas theopposite was true of nationalism in the East

nationalism in the West was linked to individual liberty and rationalcosmopolitanism whereas in the East the opposite was the case (Kohn1944 pp 329ndash30)

Kohn (1944) includes within his denition of the lsquocivic Westrsquo veexamples the UK France The Netherlands Switzerland (Kohn 1956)and the USA In all these countries apart from the USA a national stateemerged before the rise of nationalism in the USA this occurred simul-taneously In the East nationalism took place within a lsquobackward socio-political developmentrsquo where the frontiers of the state and nation rarelycoincided Ethnic groups demanded that boundaries be re-drawn in theirfavour The use of historical myths and legends was far greater and pri-mordial ties were stressed German nationalism for example rejectedWestern concepts of individualism rationalism and parliamentarydemocracy and instead focused upon folk culture language and ethnic-ity (Kohn 1994 pp 162ndash65)

Kohn believed that the rise of nationalism in the West in the eight-eenth century took place at the same time as the growth of politicalcivic and individual rights This was particularly developed in Englandwhere nationalism had been evolving from the sixteenth century (Kohn1940) In the states of the north Atlantic individual rights were on theascendancy a middle class was established property rights were

22 Taras Kuzio

codied absolutism was on the decline and government was consideredto be dependent upon trust from freely consenting citizens Thisnationalism was closely tied to Protestantism and based on the civicrights of England in the seventeenth century and late-eighteenthcentury US and French revolutions These democratic values becamepart of their respective national ideas The French revolution synthe-sized these democratic values with a growing allegiance to the nationalcommunity The American national idea Kohn believed was imbuedwith lsquoindividual libertyrsquo and lsquotolerancersquo that lsquoendowed America with aunique power of voluntary assimilation and of creating a spiritual homo-geneity at a time when the European continent with the exception ofSwitzerland followed the opposite patternrsquo (Kohn 1982 p 64)

When nationalism spread to Spain Ireland central and easternEurope often as a reaction against Bonaparte Napoleon it found a weakmiddle class an entrenched aristocracy and weaker civic institutionsNationalism in these regions became dominated by cultural ndash in contrastto civicpolitical ndash elements This rejection of Western civic ideals wasespecially pronounced in Germany where romanticism and culturalnationalism were strong chauvinistic and hostile to the democratic uni-versalist ideals of the US and French revolutions Elsewhere in Italy andIreland nationalism cultural and democratic rights merged into move-ments for independence Nationalism in the East was in Kohnrsquos viewnot tied to libertarian values but to a lsquodivisive nationalismrsquo where lsquoIndi-vidual liberty and constitutional guarantees were subordinated to therealization of national aspirationsrsquo Whenever the two objectives ofnationalism and democracy conicted lsquonationalism prevailedrsquo (Kohn1982 p 61)

Other scholars have built on Kohnrsquos divisions Ignatieff (1993) deneshis civic nationalism lsquoas a community of equal rights-bearing citizensunited in patriotic attachment to a shared set of patriotic practices andvaluesrsquo He contrasts this with ethnic nationalism where lsquoan individualrsquosdeepest attachments are inherited not chosenrsquo because lsquoit is thenationalist community that denes the individual not the individual whodenes the national communityrsquo (Ignatieff 1993 pp 7ndash8 Kymlicka 1995Freedland 1998 p 142)

As a modernist Gellner (1983) may dispute the claim of Kohn and hissupporters that nations began to emerge before the onset of industrial-ization and the rise of nationalism in the late-eighteenth century Never-theless he accepts Kohnrsquos basic lsquocivic West ethnic Eastrsquo division ofnationalism as correct Gellner (1983) argues that in the West nationswere unied on the basis of a high culture lsquowhich only needs animproved bit of political roongrsquo (Gellner 1983 p 99) In the East incontrast there was a lack of a well dened and codied high culture andtherefore ethnic factors played a more prominent role Eastern national-ism was active on behalf of a high culture still in the making It was in

The myth of the civic state 23

intense rivalry with competitors lsquoover a chaotic ethnographic map ofmany dialects with ambiguous historical or linguo-genetic allegiancesand contagious populations which had only just begun to identify withthese emergent national high culturesrsquo (Gellner 1983 p 100)

Six problems with the Kohn framework

The division of nationalism and states according to Kohnrsquos frameworkfails to stand up to objective historical scrutiny and the civic state reectsmore lsquoa mixture of self-congratulation and wishful thinkingrsquo (Yack1996p 196) This section therefore discusses how the Kohn frameworkis problematical in six areas

Firstly all states in the West share cultural horizons values identitiesand historical myths in a common identity that is the lsquonationrsquo Yack(1996 p 201) believes therefore that lsquoAll of these concepts ndash civilsociety the people the nation ndash rest on the notion of a community setapart from and using the state as a means of self governmentrsquo

Liberal theorists have tended to assume that the lsquoPeoplersquo are in placeand thereby they tend to ignore the process of nation-building In a dis-cussion of the evolution of the US political community1 R M Smith(1997 p 9) therefore points out the dilemma faced by political theorists

The failure of liberal democratic civic ideology to indicate why anygroup of human beings should think of themselves as a distinct orspecial people is a great political liability in this regard

Liberalism has been traditionally realized within national communi-ties that are committed to shared principles Without a cultural legacythere will be no shared consent to live together lsquosince there would beno reason for people to seek agreement with any one group of indi-viduals rather than anotherrsquo (Yack 1996 p 208) This is as true ofWestern as it is of Eastern nations something I survey in greater detailin the second section where I discuss the myth of the civic state

Secondly the Kohn framework disregards any anti-democratic lsquonon-Westernrsquo nationalisms that have existed in the West while also ignoringmanifestations of democracy and civic nationalism in the East Kohnlumps into one category all those nationalisms he disliked as lsquoEasternrsquomany of which are not geographically in the East (Symonolewicz-Symmons 1965 p 224) For example during the inter-war years Czecho-slovakia was a democracy

Kohnrsquos West selectively groups together ve countries while ignoringthe majority of other states that geographically belong to this regionIreland Greece Germany Spain and Belgium are sometimes dened aslying in the West but are nevertheless not included within Kohn lsquos veexamples because they would call into question his framework In their

24 Taras Kuzio

study of European nation-states Krejci and Velimsky (1996) concludedthat of the seventy-three ethnic groups in Europe forty-two were bothethnic and political nations Of the remainder twenty-three were purelyethnic and only eight were purely political Those they classied as bothethnic-political in the West included the English French Irish Por-tuguese Scots Spanish Danes Finns Icelanders Norwegians SwedesFlemings Walloons Dutch Maltese Frisians Germans Greeks Italiansand the Swiss (Krejci and Velimsky 1996 pp 212ndash17) Four out of vecountries in Kohnrsquos West (England France The Netherlands andSwitzerland) were consequently classied by them as both ethnic andpolitical The US was not included within this survey but should also beclassied as both ethnic and civic because the former dominated overthe latter until the 1960s (Foner 1998 p 38 Kaufmann 1999 2000b)

Thirdly an articial division of nationalism by geography ignoresethnic and territorial violence that has taken place in Western statesThis discourse which believes that ethnic nationalism and conict areonly endemic to the East is still highly inuential The Organisation forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for example only dealswith ethnic and civic problems in the East Yet arguably there are asmany ethnic conicts in the West as there are in the East although theOSCE does not intervene within the former In post-communist Europeethnic conict has only turned into violence in three regions Yugoslavia(Bosnia Croatia Kosovo) Moldova (Trans-Dniester) and Russia(Chechnya) Meanwhile the West has experienced inter-ethnic conictin the UK (Northern Ireland) France (Corsica Brittany) Belgium(Flanders) Canada (Quebec) and Spain (Basque) Many of these areongoing sometimes turning to violence and their long-term naturesuggests that they may need an outside neutral body such as the OSCEto intervene Ongoing ethnic and religious conicts in Northern Irelandand the Basque region are as deep as any that can be found in post-communist Europe But OSCE intervention in these conicts wouldchallenge the very nature of the still inuential discourse that ethnic andcivic problems only exist in the East ndash not in the West

Kohn also negatively assesses nationalism in the lsquoEastrsquo by reectingon their territorial disputes with neighbours At the same time heignores how the lsquoWestrsquo created large-scale overseas empires during thisperiod and he does not discuss the numerous territorial disputes that theWest was involved in itself during its state and nation-building projectsThe Kohn view of a benign US that did not meet resistance to its terri-torial expansion is still inuential Freedland (1998 p 86) argues thatthe US pioneers saw only lsquoemptinessrsquo when they moved Westwards lsquotoconquer the territory and ll the voidrsquo

The UK had ethnic and imperial problems throughout the period priorto the mid-twentieth century both in Ireland and further aeld The warsof the revolution (1792ndash1802) and the Napoleonic wars (1803ndash1815)

The myth of the civic state 25

immediately followed the French Revolution and led to French terri-torial problems with most of Europe and local territorial conicts withGermany and Belgium (Snyder 2000 pp 154ndash68)

The US invaded Canada in 1812 and the expansion of American terri-tory westwards and southwards brought it into territorial and ethnicconict with Native Indians Spaniards and Mexicans The US Civil Warin the early 1860s produced 600000 casualties a huge number for thetime (in contrast the US had only 50000 casualties a century later in alonger war in Vietnam when its population was proportionately farlarger) After the US-Spanish war in 1898 the US occupied the Philip-pines Guam Hawaii and Puerto Rico but only reluctantly admitted thelatter two into the union in 1900 and 1917 respectively The Philipinoswere lsquouncivilisedrsquo and lsquounassimablersquo and therefore could not be broughtinto the union (R M Smith 1997)

Fourthly Kohnrsquos division of nationalism into two groups idealizesnationalism in the lsquoWestrsquo as a civic phenomenon that was always fullyinclusive of social and ethnic groups He ignores the exclusion of NativeIndians (and blacks) from the US civic nation throughout most of thenineteenth century Indeed eleven southern states denied civil rights toblacks until as late as the 1960s in what can only be dened as a regionalpolicy of apartheid

American policies lsquoworked tirelessly to obliterate all customs that didnot meet their view of civilized actionsrsquo among Native Indians (Nichols1998 pp 28ndash29) The Puritans dened Indians as lsquoSatanicrsquo something thatexcused numerous instances of savagery against them These Englishviews of Native Indians had a long tradition England as the lsquoNew Israelrsquoprovided an ideology that could look to the Old Testament for guidancewhen God destroyed his heathen enemies English Anglo-Saxon cultureand Protestant religion were on the side of lsquogoodrsquo in a battle with lsquoevilrsquo

The earlier English ideas about the backward and savage Irish theundeserving power and the ever-increasing negative ideas about theblack slaves expanded gradually to include Indians

Recent experiences with the Irish had prepared them to considertheir tribal neighbors as backward and savage (Nichols 1998 pp59ndash60)

As North America experienced a rapid growth in colonists the numberof Native Indians rapidly declined because of lsquogenocidersquo and enslave-ment (Nichols 1998) Intolerance grew the Indians became subjectlsquodefeatedrsquo peoples entire tribes (nations) were destroyed and othersforcibly cleansed and their lands taken away (Nichols 1998 p 108)English laws language and culture were forcefully and unequallyimposed upon Native Indians This ethnic cleansing of Indians accom-panied by lsquofraud intimidation and violencersquo became lsquoindispensable to

26 Taras Kuzio

the triumph of manifest destiny and the American mission of spreadingfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p 51)

In the 1940s the US was also nally opened up to Asians Throughout80 per cent of American history US legislation disbarred most people inthe world from becoming US citizens due to their race nationality orgender (R M Smith 1997 p 14) Race and ethnic restrictions on immi-gration were introduced in 1882 and a system of permanent quotas forethnic groups in 1924 (R M Smith 1997 p 118) This policy of lsquoethnicdefencersquo from the 1830s to the 1920s was followed by four decades oflsquoAnglo-conformityrsquo which established Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the US(Kaufmann 2000b)

Nevertheless scholars have traditionally dened the US after 1776 asa civic state Kaufmann (1999 p 443) disagrees and denes the US asone of the rst Western lsquoethnicrsquo nations that was dened by contempor-ary writers in the early-nineteenth century as the lsquoEnglish race inAmericarsquo or lsquoAnglo-Americansrsquo (Kaufmannn 2000b)

In 1776 the colonists in North America were 80 per cent British and98 per cent Protestant Most states introduced anti-Catholic statutes thatgrew out of the French and Indian wars of 1754ndash1763 After the USrevolution an exclusive ethnic Protestant consciousness evolved of alsquochosen peoplersquo based upon an identity of being white (not black orIndian) Protestant (not French or Hispanic Catholic) English in speechand Liberal (in contrast to the royalist British) Other immigrants fromnorth western Europe and Britain were assimilated into a lsquoWASPrsquo(White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) identity

Kaufmann (1999 2000a) therefore sees the US experience as a similarevolution from ethnic to civic statehood as in the remainder of westernEurope with a core ethnic group creating an ethnic state that only gradu-ally evolved into a civic state much later The evolution of the US froman ethnic to a civic state is not unique but part of a broader trend amongWestern states (Kaufmann 2000a)

The evolution of the US into a civic state from the 1960s only occurredafter Anglo-Saxon hegemony had been established and only as a conse-quence of change forced upon it from within and outside (Kaufmannn2000a p 1097) This growing trend in favour of civic nationalism wasnot embraced voluntarily in the US a purely state nationalism failed tosupplant sub-state ethnic loyalties to which citizens may often hold theirprimary allegiance (Kaufmann 2000a pp 1097 1102ndash03)

Tension between civic and ethnic factors in Britain until the 1960s wassubsumed within the conict between the national English lsquoherersquo and theimperial British civic lsquotherersquo (Baucom 1999 p 37) With the empire gonethe ethnic civic conict came back to England Therefore Englishnationalism should not be treated as civic since the sixteenth century asKohn (1940) argued but as ethnic a nationalism only constrained by thecivic nature of British and imperial identity that allowed non-White

The myth of the civic state 27

imperial subjects to be British but never English Threats from immi-gration from the former empire for example can lead civic states toreturn to their ethnic basis as with the 1981 UK Nationality Act Thisdrew much of its strength from racist ideas promoted by Enoch Powellin the 1960s who himself lsquodraws on a long history of the reading of Eng-lishness as primarily a racial categoryrsquo (Baucom 1999 p 15) This tensionbetween the liberal-labour and conservative wings of British politics overregional devolution immigration and multiculturalism continues to thisday

Canada went through a similar process of evolution from ethnic tocivic nationalism as the US where the central preoccupation of statebuilders was to preserve cultural unity so that political and linguisticboundaries coincided (Breton 1988) Rational-legal (civic-territorial)factors came secondary to this endeavour Unlike the US the Canadianstate inherited two not one ethnic cores British and French (Kaufmann1997) Both were initially based upon ethnic nationalism and attemptedto separately construct ethno-cultural societies In French Quebec thisethnic nationalism was more often than not defensive against BritishCanadarsquos attempts at assimilating it In Quebec and Catalonia the evol-ution of nationalism from ethnic to civic variants since the 1960s stilldemands that non-titular nationalities assimilate into the titular ethnicgroup (Harty 1999 pp 672ndash73)

Until the 1950s in Australia a government policy of forced assimi-lation forcibly took children from Aborigines and placed them in white-only schools and families The Australian government still nds itdifcult to apologise and pay compensation for these policies Aborigi-nal peoples were only given the vote in 1967 after an Anglo-SaxonBritish lsquoWhitersquo Australia policy was replaced by multiculturalism

Fifthly the Kohn framework ignores the fact that as in the Westnationalism in the East can also evolve towards a civic variety over timeThis was certainly the case during the 1990s throughout most of post-communist Europe where states have been constructed along civicinclusive lines (although their democracies may as yet be still uncon-solidated) In 1999 the US think-tank Freedom House dened all post-communist European states as lsquocivicrsquo with the exception of Belarus andYugoslavia (Aner 2000 Kuzio 2001)

Sixthly what has been traditionally regarded as positive lsquonation-buildingrsquo processes in the West have been described by (Brubaker 1995see Kuzio 2001) in a negative manner as lsquonationalizing statesrsquo in the EastBoth lsquoWestern civicrsquo and lsquoEastern ethnicrsquo states traditionally homogen-ized their inhabitants Assimilation in civic states such as France meantthe loss of onersquos culture and language as the price for becoming part ofthe French political community Brubakerrsquos lsquonationalizationrsquo of the stateon behalf of the core titular nation in the East is little different from theassimilation by both peaceful and violent means of national minorities

28 Taras Kuzio

in the West (Connor 1972) It ignores the positive role that civic national-ism has played in dismantling empires (eg the former USSR Czecho-slovakia) the removal of dictators (President Slobodan Milosevich inYugoslavia) and opposition to apartheid (the ANC in South Africa)Civic nationalism and liberal democracies are allies ndash not enemies ndash incentral and eastern Europe (Aner 2000 p 245) Both played a role in thetransition from feudalism to modernity in the West there is no reason tobelieve that they will ndash and should ndash not play a similar role in the East

The myth of the civic state

Ethnic and civic states

This article argues that the Kohn (1944 1982) framework is fundamen-tally awed Both the West and the East only became civic from the1960s Western or Eastern states will continue to exhibit ethno-culturalelements even when their nationalisms are civic This article argues thatbecause all states are composed of both civic and ethno-cultural criteriaat different periods of history the proportional mix of the two will bedifferent (Kymlicka 1995 p 88 115 A D Smith 1996 pp 100ndash101 AD Smith 1998 pp 126ndash27) lsquoThe fate of democracy depends on whichone dominates the otherrsquo (Habermas 1996 p 286) Racist views cansometimes go together with strong support for democracy an inclusivestate and respect for fundamental civic and social rights and freedoms1

This may reect the view discussed earlier when civic rights for immi-grants and minorities are only reluctantly granted particularly to thoseperceived as outsiders to the ethnic nation

In the early period of Western states its nationalism was more ethnic(exclusive) than civic (inclusive) (A D Smith 1989 p 149) The strongerpresence of ethnic nationalism in the early stages of state and nation-building may be true of the East as well as the West That the East seemsmore lsquoethnicrsquo today may be therefore more to do with the differenttiming of similar processes

Kymlicka (1996) has criticized the claim that only Eastern nationalismis both ethnic and cultural He believes that cultural nationalism is asmuch at home in the West as it is in the East The rise of English national-ism in the Tudor and Elizabethan eras to which Kohn gives much creditfor later developments was built on cultural nationalism and propagatedby intellectuals poets and writers This English ethnic nationalism re-equipped it for later colonial conquest (Baucom 1999 p 25) There isnothing intrinsically anti-liberal Kymlicka (1996) argues if an ethnicgroup wishes to defend its cultural identity within a civic state

Kymlicka also criticizes Western scholars such as Ignatieff (1993) forwrongly assuming that civic nationalism has no cultural componentbecause all those who are citizens of civic nations participate in a

The myth of the civic state 29

common societal culture Turner (1997 p 9) believes that lsquoCitizenshipidentities and citizenship cultures are national identities and nationalculturesrsquo He continues

When individuals become citizens they not only enter into a set ofinstitutions that confers upon them rights and obligations they notonly acquire an identity they are not only socialised into civic virtuesbut they also become members of a political community with a par-ticular territory and history

The symbios of civic and ethnic actors found within civic states deter-mines the vitality and mobilization capacity of the demos and civilsociety (Miller 1995 2000 Canovan 1996) Although particularism anduniversalism are hostile and competing ideologies in practice national-ism has been the midwife that has brought liberal democracy into theworld and has connected the two ever since If the nation and communityare weakened or decline the demos is also affected The solidarity thatholds together a democracy is the civic nation

Kymlicka (1996) sees no reason to regret the fact that most civic stateshave always been and still are also composed of different cultures Bydenying this factor civic states seek to justify internal homogenization tothe dominant culture and language whether states should therefore bedened as civic or ethnic in Kohnrsquos terms has less to do with the absenceor existence of cultural criteria but if anybody lsquocan be integrated intothe community regardless of race or colourrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 24) andwhat qualications for membership are in place (Canovan 1996 p 19)Kymlicka (1996) therefore stresses that both Western and Easternnationalism have cultural components and identity in both is thereforegrounded in culture

National identity

How do political communities and civic nations hold together Fewscholars would dispute that modern societies require a fraternity (Nisbet1953 pp 153ndash88) a lsquocommunity of valuesrsquo (Parekh 1995 p 436) alsquosingle psychological focus shared by all segmentsrsquo (Connor 1972 p353) a lsquonationalityrsquo (Miller 1995 p 140) a lsquohigh degree of communalsolidarityrsquo (Canovan 1996 pp 28ndash29) and a lsquoWersquo where the nation andthe people are one (Finlayson 1998 p 113) Nevertheless liberal demo-cratic theory assumes a lsquoWersquo is in place and therefore ignores the dif-cult process of forging a lsquoPeoplersquo for the political community Ignoringnationality serves to create a false illusion that lsquocivicrsquo states are purelycivic and are devoid of ethno-cultural factors It also makes it easier todiscuss lsquoWestern civicrsquo states as having always been civic from theirinception

30 Taras Kuzio

Despite the close inter-connection between liberal democracy andnationhood since the late-eighteenth-century political theory tends toignore nationality Nevertheless nationhood is at the heart of politicaltheory even though its particularism has an uneasy marriage with theuniversalism of liberalism How a lsquoPeoplersquo and political solidarity arecreated is often ignored and taken for granted even though it is nation-hood that generates the lsquoWersquo and collective power Successful politiesrequire not only a degree of societal trust but also unity and stabilityfactors which lsquohave always been at the root of politicsrsquo (Canovan 1996p 22)

Advocates of individual rights usually argue that civic states by de-nition are indifferent to ethno-cultural questions Advocates of culturalpluralism on the other hand such as Kymlicka (1996) will counter thosepromoting only individual rights by arguing that all civic states includeethno-cultural elements No civic state can possibly hope to be neutralwhen deciding which ethnic groupsrsquo language culture symbols andanniversaries to promote at the state level (Beissinger 1996 p 101)Although 17 million Americans count Spanish as their rst language onlyone per cent of US federal documents are in non-English languages(Freedland 1998 p 147) Liberals remain concerned that group rightsand cultural pluralism inhibit the creation of a shared identity that civicstates promote They ignore the fact that this shared identity in Westerncivic states is not ethnically or culturally neutral but based upon that ofthe ethnic core (s) Kymlicka (1996) poses a double paradox Multi-ethnic states which represent the majority of nation-states lsquocannotsurvive unless the various national groups have an allegiance to thelarger community they cohabitrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 13) If states ignorethis question and pursue radical homogenizing (or in Brubakerrsquos termlsquonationalizingrsquo) policies this will alienate national minorities and maylead to ethnic and social unrest Civic states have therefore to balancebetween forging an overarching unity in the public domain whileallowing and sometimes fostering polyethnic rights and identities in theprivate sphere (Kuzio forthcoming)

The inclusion of polyethnic rights and the recognition of the value ofcultural pluralism is a relatively recent phenomenon in civic statesWithout the recognition of these rights and pluralism and a concomi-tant rejection of homogenization the imagined civic community will notinclude large numbers of people who do not belong to the ethnic coreKymlicka (1996) and Connor (1972) do not believe that civic statesassimilated non-titulars lsquovoluntarilyrsquo Few national groups voluntarilyassimilated from the eighteenth century and the majority of civic statespursued homogenizing policies until the 1960s France and the US twoof Kohnrsquos civic West still do not legally recognize the concept of nationalminorities because they believe that to do so would undermine their civicstates by prioritizing collective ethnic over individual civic rights Only

The myth of the civic state 31

Canada and Australia adopted multicultural policies in the 1970s (whilenone of Kohnrsquos ve lsquocivicrsquo states adopted similar policies)

Linz and Stepan (1996 pp 35ndash37) dene lsquonationalizingrsquo policies asattempting to homogenize multi-ethnic societies in the East Yet themajority of states both in the West and the East have always been multi-ethnic The newly independent states of the East if they are indeedadopting homogenizing policies are merely mirroring the examples setby the West from the eighteenth century onwards These homogenizingpolicies pursued since the late-eighteenth century in the West were onlymodied in some cases from the 1960s Majority cultures in civic stateshave had a lsquoperverse incentiversquo to destroy the cultures of nationalminorities and lsquothen cite that destruction as a justication for compellingassimilationrsquo (Kymlicka 1995 p 100)

Nation-building in the West was as Connor (1972) commented bothlsquonation creatingrsquo and lsquonation destroyingrsquo All European governmentsincluding those in the West lsquoeventually took steps which homogenizedtheir populationsrsquo (Tilly 1975 p 43) Nation-building in France wasaccompanied by the destruction of local cultures and languages in theperiphery and the imposition of a hegemonic Icircle de France culture thatwas promoted as a benecial lsquola mission civilisatricersquo Weber (1979)describes the slow and uneven process of national integration in Francein the nineteenth century as that of a lsquocolonial empire shaped over thecenturiesrsquo These territories had been lsquoconquered annexed and integratedrsquo by the Icircle de France Parisian ofcials sent to regions such as Brittany felt and behaved as if they were going to an overseas colony

Gellner (1983 pp 142ndash43) sees homogenization as an inevitable by-product of modernization and a functioning national economy Nation-building welded together different peoples into a single communitylsquobased on the cultural heritage of the dominant ethnic corersquo (A D Smith1991 p 68) Thus Western states were not neutral in their nation-building projects and these often marginalized national minorities anddestroyed local identities (Moore 1997 p 904) These factors wereignored by Kohn (1944 1982) in his positive treatment of nationalism inthe West

Historic myths in civic states

Both civic and ethnic states have traditionally used myths and history(Andersen 1991 pp 11ndash12 Schnapper 1997 pp 214 219) As theCouncil of Europe has complained lsquoVirtually all political systems haveused history for their own ends and have imposed both their version ofhistorical facts and their defence of the good and bad gures of historyrsquo(Council of Europe) An objective history may be what historians shouldstrive to write but in reality objective history is as much a myth as states

32 Taras Kuzio

being wholly civic There has often been little to distinguish myth fromhistory as myths have been a lsquopoetic form of historyrsquo (A D Smith 1984p 103)

Smith (1984) points out that all nations since the late-eighteenthcentury have appealed to ancestry and history in the struggle to estab-lish their state and nationhood This process had engulfed the whole ofwestern Europe by 1800 and spread only half a century afterwards toeastern Europe The nationrsquos ancestry had to be demonstrated as vitallsquoboth for self-esteem and security and for external recognitionrsquo (A DSmith 1984 p 101) Historical myths have been traditionally promotedas part of the inculcation of national solidarity within states Myths wereuseful for a variety of policies within the state and nation-buildingproject ndash proving ancient ancestry securing exclusive title to territoryand location the transmission of spiritual values through history pro-motion of heroic ages regeneration of lsquogolden erasrsquo as part of a lsquospecialidentityrsquo and a claim to special status (A D Smith 1984)

The myths of modern Switzerland one of Kohnrsquos ve civic states arefounded on the traditions and memories of an older ethnic nation andare themselves based on a German cultural core The modern Swissstatersquos historical myths and ethno-cultural core are Germanic Through-out Francersquos period of nation-building from 1789ndash1914 the anthem agoaths hymns monuments calendars ceremonies heroes and martyrsappealed to one Gaullist ancestry (A D Smith 1998 p 126) The his-torical past played a prominent role in the inculcation of values andloyalty to the French republic through the construction of monumentsnationalist pedagogy in history teaching museums and memorials inevery commune (Johnson 1993) Just as the English and Americanssought to locate their nation in ancient history the French claimeddescent from the Trojans and Romans The Normans were portrayed asFrankish usurpers who had taken away their rights

Paxman (1999 p 153) believes that lsquoWe must accept rst that a senseof history runs deep in the English peoplersquo The union of Scotland andEngland in 1707 subsumed English within British nationalism that mod-erated English nationalism Nevertheless English myths remained aliveand well in debates over Anglo-Saxon origins archaeology ruralEngland pageants (the opening of parliament the trooping of thecolour the last night of the Proms) and in memories of noble sacriceagainst all odds in World War II such as at Dunkirk (A D Smith 1984p 109) In nineteenth-century England the education system denedEnglish literature as lsquosuperiorrsquo and its culture ideas tastes morals arthistory and family life subscribed to these dominant views of lsquoinferiorrsquoand lsquosuperiorrsquo races not only in the colonies but in countries closer tohome such as Ireland (Hickman 1998) England was the lsquoNew Israelrsquothat was set to deliver its civilization to mankind English history wastreated separately to British and the former placed greater emphasis

The myth of the civic state 33

upon Anglo-Saxon racial origins and an lsquoobsessive interestrsquo in the past(Baucom 1999 pp 15 20 48)

US historical myths linked an alleged pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon loveof liberty with a myth of ethnogenesis which dened the Americans asa new nation that was escaping from the tyranny of the lsquoNormanrsquomonarchs who ruled Britain The US also had an lsquoinfatuationrsquo withAnglo-Saxon history that was included within its myths of ethnogenesis(Kaufmannn 2000b) American exceptionalism portrayed the US nationas the lsquopurestrsquo English (Lipset 1997) a myth of exceptionalism similarto that of the Afrikaner in South Africa the Scots in Ulster and theFrench Canadians in Quebec These American historical myths helpedforge lsquoWASPrsquo cultural boundaries within which dominant Anglo con-formity was promoted in the nineteenth and the rst half of the twenti-eth centuries (Kaufmann 1999 2000b R M Smith 1997 pp 3 460 468)

In a survey of American nation-building from 1776 to the presentSpilman (1997) stressed the centrality of symbols rituals and patrioticorganizations that served to forge a US national identity GeorgeWashington was given a hero-like status after 1789 in portraits birthdaycelebrations shrines books the constitution commemorations ofbattles and independence day celebrations Thanksgiving and MemorialDay were annually celebrated pledges of allegiance were made andlarge historical pageants were held Historical myths have thereforeplayed as important a role in the US as they have in the other fourWestern states cited as lsquocivicrsquo examples by Kohn

Ethnic to civic state an alternative framework

Kohnrsquos division of nationalism traces its positive inclusive qualities retrospectively back to the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries Howevercivic states have never been identical and unanimous in how they wereconstituted The growth of the national state and its provision of civilpolitical cultural and social rights was lsquoslow and unevenrsquo (Mouzelis 1996p 226)

At the time of the American revolution only a small percentage ofwealthy white Protestant males could vote something American colonistsand revolutionaries did not see as unusual Indeed after 1776 slaves con-tinued to be imported into the USA and slavery lsquoemerged from the Revol-ution more rmly entrenched than ever in American lifersquo (Foner 1998 p28) lsquoSlavery rendered blacks all but invisible to those imagining theAmerican communityrsquo (Foner 1998 p 38) US President Thomas Jefferson himself possessed 1000 slaves and believed them to be perma-nently decient in the faculties required to enjoy freedom requiringtutelage by lsquosuperiorrsquo races such as Anglo-Saxons to improve their possi-bility of full civic equality at an unspecied later date (R M Smith 1997p 105) Slavery existed until the 1860s in the USA and the slave trade

34 Taras Kuzio

helped to build up the wealth of Western states Indeed it was only Switzer-land of Kohnrsquos ve Western examples that did not prot from slavery

Although the American national idea as elaborated upon and ideal-ized by Kohn (1944) was based on a mythical devotion to freedom thedenition of who could experience it was initially ethnically narrow andonly gradually evolved into a civic variant after the 1960s The centen-nial of the US revolution in 1876 ignored blacks new non-Anglo-Saxonimmigrants Native Americans and women as not being part of thenation The nineteenth-century US republic had no room for NativeIndian black Spanish or French culture The conquering of New Mexicoand the annexation of Texas was proclaimed as a triumph of ProtestantAnglo-Saxon civilization against the Catholic world and lower racesNew Mexico was not admitted into the union until 1912 even though itpossessed the required population level because it was held to be lsquotooIndianrsquo (Foner 1998 p 79)

By the bicentennial of the US revolution in 1976 the American nationhad evolved from ethnic to civic and included those previously excludedin other words at different times in US history lsquofreedomrsquo had differentmeanings Who was to be included within the American nation is lsquoahighly uneven and bitterly contested part of the story of Americanfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p XVII) Freedom in American history has there-fore been both a lsquomythic idealrsquo and a lsquoliving truthrsquo (Foner 1998 p XXI)

Dahlrsquos denition of a civic state rests on three factors free and fairelections an inclusive suffrage and the right to run for ofce These threebasic civic rights were not always included within Western states In con-temporary denitions of civic states the US and Australia could there-fore not be dened as lsquocivicrsquo states prior to the 1960s because theyexcluded people on the basis of colour and race The breakthrough inwidening the American nation occurred nearly two hundred years afterthe USA was founded when the Civil Rights (1964) Voting Rights (1965)and Fair Housing (1968) Acts were passed

The evolution of states from ethnic to civic statehood occurredthroughout the West and not only in the small number of states dis-cussed in this article This evolution was the norm not the exceptionOnly from the 1960s can we dene Western states as civic while themajority of the East became civic only three decades later in the 1990sAlthough democratic consolidation and civic state building is far fromconsolidated in the East in contrast to the West the East is encouragedby international organizations to continue to evolve along civic lines(something that was not the case in the West) That Western civic statesare still in a process of evolution and are not perfect civic states can beseen in the numerous problems that continue to bedevil them The USstill disenfranchises nearly four million of its citizens a policy that wouldno doubt be condemned by the OSCE if introduced in the East2

By looking at the evolution of Western states in such a manner we

The myth of the civic state 35

shall full two tasks Firstly we shall no longer be able to ignore ethno-cultural factors within civic states Secondly we shall be able to discussin a more frank and open manner the way in which Western statesevolved from ethnic to civic state and nationhood

Conclusion

This article has contributed to the scholarly literature on nationalism byarguing that the Kohn framework of Western states has always been civicfrom the moment of their creation is historically wrong (R S Smith 1997pp 20 31ndash32 499) Western states have evolved from ethnic to civicstates only in the last four decades of the twentieth century Without anunderstanding of this evolution of Western ethnic into civic states wecannot understand the nature of the civic state as containing tensionbetween its universal liberalist and national particularist componentsAll civic states will retain this internal contradiction as long as national-ity remains central to creating the solidarity that pure civic states wouldlack by themselves (Miller 1995 2000)

Both the US and Canadian examples discussed in this article haveshown that Western states typically began as ethnic and only graduallyevolved into civic states from the 1960s Evolution from ethnic to civicnationalism is only likely to take place after the core ethnic group is self-condent within its own bounded territory to open the community tolsquooutsidersrsquo from other ethnic groups Historical evidence shows thatWestern states did not become civic because they so desired but becauseof a multitude of domestic and international pressures (Kaufmann2000b) Belief in civic values can go together with ethnic nationalism andracism and states can move away from their civic bases during times ofperceived crisis

In the US this occurred during the century between the emancipationof the black slaves in the 1860s to re-enfranchising southern blacks inthe 1960s In British Canada this evolution of nationalism took place inthe early twentieth century In French Canada Francophones onlybecame dominant within Quebec after the 1960s a period during whichFrench Canadian nationalism also evolved from ethnic to civic national-ism This process was not solely conned to the US and Canada butoccurred throughout the West

The continued use of the Kohn framework is doubly wrong after adecade of post-Communism in central and eastern Europe when all buttwo of these states became civic Evolution from ethnic to civic stateshas therefore little to do with geography and far more to do with thepositive inuence of international institutions domestic democratic con-solidation and civic institution building Western states have a long his-torical record as ethnic states a factor which makes their evolution moresimilar not different to states in the East

36 Taras Kuzio

Acknowledgements

An earlier and longer version of this paper was presented at the AnnualConvention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities ColumbiaUniversity New York 13ndash15 April 2000 The author would like to thanktwo anonymous ERS referees and Assistant Professor Stephen Shulmanfor their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article

Notes

1 A European Union-wide survey in Spring 1997 found 33 per cent of those inter-viewed describing themselves as lsquoquite racistrsquo or lsquovery racistrsquo Many of these supported thebasic tenets of a civic inclusive liberal democratic state (Eurobarometer Opinion Poll)2 46 states and the District of Columbia have criminal disenfranchisement laws thatdeny the vote to all convicted adults in prison 32 states disenfranchise felons on paroleand 29 those on probation Laws that are unique to the US exist in 14 states that perma-nently disenfranchise former offenders (for life) who have fully served their sentences Thislegislation which runs contrary to established practice in both western and eastern Europeis racially neutral nevertheless due to socio-economic factors it is not surprising that itaffects national minorities blacks and Hispanics more than whites In Florida for example400000 former offenders are permanently excluded from voting of whom half are blacks(representing nearly a third of all blacks in Florida) (Human Rights Watch)

References

ANDERSEN BENEDICT 1991 Imagined Communities London VersoANER STEFAN 2000 lsquoNationalism in central Europe ndash A chance or a threat for theemerging liberal democratic orderrsquo East European Politics and Society vol14 no2pp 213ndash45BAUCOM IAN 1999 Out of Place Englishness Empire and the Location of IdentityPrinceton NJ Princeton University PressBEISSINGER MARK R 1996 lsquoHow nationalism spread Eastern Europe adrift the tidesand cycles of national contentionrsquo Social Research vol 63 no1 pp 97ndash146BOSTOCK WILLIAM W 1997 lsquo ldquoLanguage griefrdquo A ldquoraw materialrdquo of ethnic conictrsquoNationalism and Ethnic Politics vol3 no4 pp 94ndash112BRETON RAYMOND 1988 lsquoFrom ethnic to civic nationalism English Canada andQuebecrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 2 no1 pp 85ndash102BROWN DAVID 1999 lsquoAre there good and bad nationalismsrsquo Nations and Nationalismvol5 no2 pp 281ndash302BRUBAKER ROGERS 1995 lsquoNational minorities nationalizing states and externalhomelands in the new Europersquo Daedalus vol124 no2 pp 107ndash32CANOVAN MARGARET 1996 Nationhood and Political Theory Cheltenham EdwardElgarCONNOR WALKER 1972 lsquoNation-building or nation-destroyingrsquo World PoliticsvolXXIV no3 pp 319ndash55COUNCIL of EUROPE COMMITTEE on CULTURE and EDUCATION Recom-mendation 1283 (22 January 1996) Document 7446DAHL ROBERT 1971 Polyarchy New Haven CT Yale University PressEUROBAROMETER OPINION POLL no471 Luxembourg lsquoRacism and Xeno-phobia in Europersquo 18ndash19 December 1991FINLAYSON ALAN 1998 lsquoIdeology discourse and nationalismrsquo Journal of PoliticalIdeologies vol3 no1 pp 99ndash119

The myth of the civic state 37

codied absolutism was on the decline and government was consideredto be dependent upon trust from freely consenting citizens Thisnationalism was closely tied to Protestantism and based on the civicrights of England in the seventeenth century and late-eighteenthcentury US and French revolutions These democratic values becamepart of their respective national ideas The French revolution synthe-sized these democratic values with a growing allegiance to the nationalcommunity The American national idea Kohn believed was imbuedwith lsquoindividual libertyrsquo and lsquotolerancersquo that lsquoendowed America with aunique power of voluntary assimilation and of creating a spiritual homo-geneity at a time when the European continent with the exception ofSwitzerland followed the opposite patternrsquo (Kohn 1982 p 64)

When nationalism spread to Spain Ireland central and easternEurope often as a reaction against Bonaparte Napoleon it found a weakmiddle class an entrenched aristocracy and weaker civic institutionsNationalism in these regions became dominated by cultural ndash in contrastto civicpolitical ndash elements This rejection of Western civic ideals wasespecially pronounced in Germany where romanticism and culturalnationalism were strong chauvinistic and hostile to the democratic uni-versalist ideals of the US and French revolutions Elsewhere in Italy andIreland nationalism cultural and democratic rights merged into move-ments for independence Nationalism in the East was in Kohnrsquos viewnot tied to libertarian values but to a lsquodivisive nationalismrsquo where lsquoIndi-vidual liberty and constitutional guarantees were subordinated to therealization of national aspirationsrsquo Whenever the two objectives ofnationalism and democracy conicted lsquonationalism prevailedrsquo (Kohn1982 p 61)

Other scholars have built on Kohnrsquos divisions Ignatieff (1993) deneshis civic nationalism lsquoas a community of equal rights-bearing citizensunited in patriotic attachment to a shared set of patriotic practices andvaluesrsquo He contrasts this with ethnic nationalism where lsquoan individualrsquosdeepest attachments are inherited not chosenrsquo because lsquoit is thenationalist community that denes the individual not the individual whodenes the national communityrsquo (Ignatieff 1993 pp 7ndash8 Kymlicka 1995Freedland 1998 p 142)

As a modernist Gellner (1983) may dispute the claim of Kohn and hissupporters that nations began to emerge before the onset of industrial-ization and the rise of nationalism in the late-eighteenth century Never-theless he accepts Kohnrsquos basic lsquocivic West ethnic Eastrsquo division ofnationalism as correct Gellner (1983) argues that in the West nationswere unied on the basis of a high culture lsquowhich only needs animproved bit of political roongrsquo (Gellner 1983 p 99) In the East incontrast there was a lack of a well dened and codied high culture andtherefore ethnic factors played a more prominent role Eastern national-ism was active on behalf of a high culture still in the making It was in

The myth of the civic state 23

intense rivalry with competitors lsquoover a chaotic ethnographic map ofmany dialects with ambiguous historical or linguo-genetic allegiancesand contagious populations which had only just begun to identify withthese emergent national high culturesrsquo (Gellner 1983 p 100)

Six problems with the Kohn framework

The division of nationalism and states according to Kohnrsquos frameworkfails to stand up to objective historical scrutiny and the civic state reectsmore lsquoa mixture of self-congratulation and wishful thinkingrsquo (Yack1996p 196) This section therefore discusses how the Kohn frameworkis problematical in six areas

Firstly all states in the West share cultural horizons values identitiesand historical myths in a common identity that is the lsquonationrsquo Yack(1996 p 201) believes therefore that lsquoAll of these concepts ndash civilsociety the people the nation ndash rest on the notion of a community setapart from and using the state as a means of self governmentrsquo

Liberal theorists have tended to assume that the lsquoPeoplersquo are in placeand thereby they tend to ignore the process of nation-building In a dis-cussion of the evolution of the US political community1 R M Smith(1997 p 9) therefore points out the dilemma faced by political theorists

The failure of liberal democratic civic ideology to indicate why anygroup of human beings should think of themselves as a distinct orspecial people is a great political liability in this regard

Liberalism has been traditionally realized within national communi-ties that are committed to shared principles Without a cultural legacythere will be no shared consent to live together lsquosince there would beno reason for people to seek agreement with any one group of indi-viduals rather than anotherrsquo (Yack 1996 p 208) This is as true ofWestern as it is of Eastern nations something I survey in greater detailin the second section where I discuss the myth of the civic state

Secondly the Kohn framework disregards any anti-democratic lsquonon-Westernrsquo nationalisms that have existed in the West while also ignoringmanifestations of democracy and civic nationalism in the East Kohnlumps into one category all those nationalisms he disliked as lsquoEasternrsquomany of which are not geographically in the East (Symonolewicz-Symmons 1965 p 224) For example during the inter-war years Czecho-slovakia was a democracy

Kohnrsquos West selectively groups together ve countries while ignoringthe majority of other states that geographically belong to this regionIreland Greece Germany Spain and Belgium are sometimes dened aslying in the West but are nevertheless not included within Kohn lsquos veexamples because they would call into question his framework In their

24 Taras Kuzio

study of European nation-states Krejci and Velimsky (1996) concludedthat of the seventy-three ethnic groups in Europe forty-two were bothethnic and political nations Of the remainder twenty-three were purelyethnic and only eight were purely political Those they classied as bothethnic-political in the West included the English French Irish Por-tuguese Scots Spanish Danes Finns Icelanders Norwegians SwedesFlemings Walloons Dutch Maltese Frisians Germans Greeks Italiansand the Swiss (Krejci and Velimsky 1996 pp 212ndash17) Four out of vecountries in Kohnrsquos West (England France The Netherlands andSwitzerland) were consequently classied by them as both ethnic andpolitical The US was not included within this survey but should also beclassied as both ethnic and civic because the former dominated overthe latter until the 1960s (Foner 1998 p 38 Kaufmann 1999 2000b)

Thirdly an articial division of nationalism by geography ignoresethnic and territorial violence that has taken place in Western statesThis discourse which believes that ethnic nationalism and conict areonly endemic to the East is still highly inuential The Organisation forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for example only dealswith ethnic and civic problems in the East Yet arguably there are asmany ethnic conicts in the West as there are in the East although theOSCE does not intervene within the former In post-communist Europeethnic conict has only turned into violence in three regions Yugoslavia(Bosnia Croatia Kosovo) Moldova (Trans-Dniester) and Russia(Chechnya) Meanwhile the West has experienced inter-ethnic conictin the UK (Northern Ireland) France (Corsica Brittany) Belgium(Flanders) Canada (Quebec) and Spain (Basque) Many of these areongoing sometimes turning to violence and their long-term naturesuggests that they may need an outside neutral body such as the OSCEto intervene Ongoing ethnic and religious conicts in Northern Irelandand the Basque region are as deep as any that can be found in post-communist Europe But OSCE intervention in these conicts wouldchallenge the very nature of the still inuential discourse that ethnic andcivic problems only exist in the East ndash not in the West

Kohn also negatively assesses nationalism in the lsquoEastrsquo by reectingon their territorial disputes with neighbours At the same time heignores how the lsquoWestrsquo created large-scale overseas empires during thisperiod and he does not discuss the numerous territorial disputes that theWest was involved in itself during its state and nation-building projectsThe Kohn view of a benign US that did not meet resistance to its terri-torial expansion is still inuential Freedland (1998 p 86) argues thatthe US pioneers saw only lsquoemptinessrsquo when they moved Westwards lsquotoconquer the territory and ll the voidrsquo

The UK had ethnic and imperial problems throughout the period priorto the mid-twentieth century both in Ireland and further aeld The warsof the revolution (1792ndash1802) and the Napoleonic wars (1803ndash1815)

The myth of the civic state 25

immediately followed the French Revolution and led to French terri-torial problems with most of Europe and local territorial conicts withGermany and Belgium (Snyder 2000 pp 154ndash68)

The US invaded Canada in 1812 and the expansion of American terri-tory westwards and southwards brought it into territorial and ethnicconict with Native Indians Spaniards and Mexicans The US Civil Warin the early 1860s produced 600000 casualties a huge number for thetime (in contrast the US had only 50000 casualties a century later in alonger war in Vietnam when its population was proportionately farlarger) After the US-Spanish war in 1898 the US occupied the Philip-pines Guam Hawaii and Puerto Rico but only reluctantly admitted thelatter two into the union in 1900 and 1917 respectively The Philipinoswere lsquouncivilisedrsquo and lsquounassimablersquo and therefore could not be broughtinto the union (R M Smith 1997)

Fourthly Kohnrsquos division of nationalism into two groups idealizesnationalism in the lsquoWestrsquo as a civic phenomenon that was always fullyinclusive of social and ethnic groups He ignores the exclusion of NativeIndians (and blacks) from the US civic nation throughout most of thenineteenth century Indeed eleven southern states denied civil rights toblacks until as late as the 1960s in what can only be dened as a regionalpolicy of apartheid

American policies lsquoworked tirelessly to obliterate all customs that didnot meet their view of civilized actionsrsquo among Native Indians (Nichols1998 pp 28ndash29) The Puritans dened Indians as lsquoSatanicrsquo something thatexcused numerous instances of savagery against them These Englishviews of Native Indians had a long tradition England as the lsquoNew Israelrsquoprovided an ideology that could look to the Old Testament for guidancewhen God destroyed his heathen enemies English Anglo-Saxon cultureand Protestant religion were on the side of lsquogoodrsquo in a battle with lsquoevilrsquo

The earlier English ideas about the backward and savage Irish theundeserving power and the ever-increasing negative ideas about theblack slaves expanded gradually to include Indians

Recent experiences with the Irish had prepared them to considertheir tribal neighbors as backward and savage (Nichols 1998 pp59ndash60)

As North America experienced a rapid growth in colonists the numberof Native Indians rapidly declined because of lsquogenocidersquo and enslave-ment (Nichols 1998) Intolerance grew the Indians became subjectlsquodefeatedrsquo peoples entire tribes (nations) were destroyed and othersforcibly cleansed and their lands taken away (Nichols 1998 p 108)English laws language and culture were forcefully and unequallyimposed upon Native Indians This ethnic cleansing of Indians accom-panied by lsquofraud intimidation and violencersquo became lsquoindispensable to

26 Taras Kuzio

the triumph of manifest destiny and the American mission of spreadingfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p 51)

In the 1940s the US was also nally opened up to Asians Throughout80 per cent of American history US legislation disbarred most people inthe world from becoming US citizens due to their race nationality orgender (R M Smith 1997 p 14) Race and ethnic restrictions on immi-gration were introduced in 1882 and a system of permanent quotas forethnic groups in 1924 (R M Smith 1997 p 118) This policy of lsquoethnicdefencersquo from the 1830s to the 1920s was followed by four decades oflsquoAnglo-conformityrsquo which established Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the US(Kaufmann 2000b)

Nevertheless scholars have traditionally dened the US after 1776 asa civic state Kaufmann (1999 p 443) disagrees and denes the US asone of the rst Western lsquoethnicrsquo nations that was dened by contempor-ary writers in the early-nineteenth century as the lsquoEnglish race inAmericarsquo or lsquoAnglo-Americansrsquo (Kaufmannn 2000b)

In 1776 the colonists in North America were 80 per cent British and98 per cent Protestant Most states introduced anti-Catholic statutes thatgrew out of the French and Indian wars of 1754ndash1763 After the USrevolution an exclusive ethnic Protestant consciousness evolved of alsquochosen peoplersquo based upon an identity of being white (not black orIndian) Protestant (not French or Hispanic Catholic) English in speechand Liberal (in contrast to the royalist British) Other immigrants fromnorth western Europe and Britain were assimilated into a lsquoWASPrsquo(White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) identity

Kaufmann (1999 2000a) therefore sees the US experience as a similarevolution from ethnic to civic statehood as in the remainder of westernEurope with a core ethnic group creating an ethnic state that only gradu-ally evolved into a civic state much later The evolution of the US froman ethnic to a civic state is not unique but part of a broader trend amongWestern states (Kaufmann 2000a)

The evolution of the US into a civic state from the 1960s only occurredafter Anglo-Saxon hegemony had been established and only as a conse-quence of change forced upon it from within and outside (Kaufmannn2000a p 1097) This growing trend in favour of civic nationalism wasnot embraced voluntarily in the US a purely state nationalism failed tosupplant sub-state ethnic loyalties to which citizens may often hold theirprimary allegiance (Kaufmann 2000a pp 1097 1102ndash03)

Tension between civic and ethnic factors in Britain until the 1960s wassubsumed within the conict between the national English lsquoherersquo and theimperial British civic lsquotherersquo (Baucom 1999 p 37) With the empire gonethe ethnic civic conict came back to England Therefore Englishnationalism should not be treated as civic since the sixteenth century asKohn (1940) argued but as ethnic a nationalism only constrained by thecivic nature of British and imperial identity that allowed non-White

The myth of the civic state 27

imperial subjects to be British but never English Threats from immi-gration from the former empire for example can lead civic states toreturn to their ethnic basis as with the 1981 UK Nationality Act Thisdrew much of its strength from racist ideas promoted by Enoch Powellin the 1960s who himself lsquodraws on a long history of the reading of Eng-lishness as primarily a racial categoryrsquo (Baucom 1999 p 15) This tensionbetween the liberal-labour and conservative wings of British politics overregional devolution immigration and multiculturalism continues to thisday

Canada went through a similar process of evolution from ethnic tocivic nationalism as the US where the central preoccupation of statebuilders was to preserve cultural unity so that political and linguisticboundaries coincided (Breton 1988) Rational-legal (civic-territorial)factors came secondary to this endeavour Unlike the US the Canadianstate inherited two not one ethnic cores British and French (Kaufmann1997) Both were initially based upon ethnic nationalism and attemptedto separately construct ethno-cultural societies In French Quebec thisethnic nationalism was more often than not defensive against BritishCanadarsquos attempts at assimilating it In Quebec and Catalonia the evol-ution of nationalism from ethnic to civic variants since the 1960s stilldemands that non-titular nationalities assimilate into the titular ethnicgroup (Harty 1999 pp 672ndash73)

Until the 1950s in Australia a government policy of forced assimi-lation forcibly took children from Aborigines and placed them in white-only schools and families The Australian government still nds itdifcult to apologise and pay compensation for these policies Aborigi-nal peoples were only given the vote in 1967 after an Anglo-SaxonBritish lsquoWhitersquo Australia policy was replaced by multiculturalism

Fifthly the Kohn framework ignores the fact that as in the Westnationalism in the East can also evolve towards a civic variety over timeThis was certainly the case during the 1990s throughout most of post-communist Europe where states have been constructed along civicinclusive lines (although their democracies may as yet be still uncon-solidated) In 1999 the US think-tank Freedom House dened all post-communist European states as lsquocivicrsquo with the exception of Belarus andYugoslavia (Aner 2000 Kuzio 2001)

Sixthly what has been traditionally regarded as positive lsquonation-buildingrsquo processes in the West have been described by (Brubaker 1995see Kuzio 2001) in a negative manner as lsquonationalizing statesrsquo in the EastBoth lsquoWestern civicrsquo and lsquoEastern ethnicrsquo states traditionally homogen-ized their inhabitants Assimilation in civic states such as France meantthe loss of onersquos culture and language as the price for becoming part ofthe French political community Brubakerrsquos lsquonationalizationrsquo of the stateon behalf of the core titular nation in the East is little different from theassimilation by both peaceful and violent means of national minorities

28 Taras Kuzio

in the West (Connor 1972) It ignores the positive role that civic national-ism has played in dismantling empires (eg the former USSR Czecho-slovakia) the removal of dictators (President Slobodan Milosevich inYugoslavia) and opposition to apartheid (the ANC in South Africa)Civic nationalism and liberal democracies are allies ndash not enemies ndash incentral and eastern Europe (Aner 2000 p 245) Both played a role in thetransition from feudalism to modernity in the West there is no reason tobelieve that they will ndash and should ndash not play a similar role in the East

The myth of the civic state

Ethnic and civic states

This article argues that the Kohn (1944 1982) framework is fundamen-tally awed Both the West and the East only became civic from the1960s Western or Eastern states will continue to exhibit ethno-culturalelements even when their nationalisms are civic This article argues thatbecause all states are composed of both civic and ethno-cultural criteriaat different periods of history the proportional mix of the two will bedifferent (Kymlicka 1995 p 88 115 A D Smith 1996 pp 100ndash101 AD Smith 1998 pp 126ndash27) lsquoThe fate of democracy depends on whichone dominates the otherrsquo (Habermas 1996 p 286) Racist views cansometimes go together with strong support for democracy an inclusivestate and respect for fundamental civic and social rights and freedoms1

This may reect the view discussed earlier when civic rights for immi-grants and minorities are only reluctantly granted particularly to thoseperceived as outsiders to the ethnic nation

In the early period of Western states its nationalism was more ethnic(exclusive) than civic (inclusive) (A D Smith 1989 p 149) The strongerpresence of ethnic nationalism in the early stages of state and nation-building may be true of the East as well as the West That the East seemsmore lsquoethnicrsquo today may be therefore more to do with the differenttiming of similar processes

Kymlicka (1996) has criticized the claim that only Eastern nationalismis both ethnic and cultural He believes that cultural nationalism is asmuch at home in the West as it is in the East The rise of English national-ism in the Tudor and Elizabethan eras to which Kohn gives much creditfor later developments was built on cultural nationalism and propagatedby intellectuals poets and writers This English ethnic nationalism re-equipped it for later colonial conquest (Baucom 1999 p 25) There isnothing intrinsically anti-liberal Kymlicka (1996) argues if an ethnicgroup wishes to defend its cultural identity within a civic state

Kymlicka also criticizes Western scholars such as Ignatieff (1993) forwrongly assuming that civic nationalism has no cultural componentbecause all those who are citizens of civic nations participate in a

The myth of the civic state 29

common societal culture Turner (1997 p 9) believes that lsquoCitizenshipidentities and citizenship cultures are national identities and nationalculturesrsquo He continues

When individuals become citizens they not only enter into a set ofinstitutions that confers upon them rights and obligations they notonly acquire an identity they are not only socialised into civic virtuesbut they also become members of a political community with a par-ticular territory and history

The symbios of civic and ethnic actors found within civic states deter-mines the vitality and mobilization capacity of the demos and civilsociety (Miller 1995 2000 Canovan 1996) Although particularism anduniversalism are hostile and competing ideologies in practice national-ism has been the midwife that has brought liberal democracy into theworld and has connected the two ever since If the nation and communityare weakened or decline the demos is also affected The solidarity thatholds together a democracy is the civic nation

Kymlicka (1996) sees no reason to regret the fact that most civic stateshave always been and still are also composed of different cultures Bydenying this factor civic states seek to justify internal homogenization tothe dominant culture and language whether states should therefore bedened as civic or ethnic in Kohnrsquos terms has less to do with the absenceor existence of cultural criteria but if anybody lsquocan be integrated intothe community regardless of race or colourrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 24) andwhat qualications for membership are in place (Canovan 1996 p 19)Kymlicka (1996) therefore stresses that both Western and Easternnationalism have cultural components and identity in both is thereforegrounded in culture

National identity

How do political communities and civic nations hold together Fewscholars would dispute that modern societies require a fraternity (Nisbet1953 pp 153ndash88) a lsquocommunity of valuesrsquo (Parekh 1995 p 436) alsquosingle psychological focus shared by all segmentsrsquo (Connor 1972 p353) a lsquonationalityrsquo (Miller 1995 p 140) a lsquohigh degree of communalsolidarityrsquo (Canovan 1996 pp 28ndash29) and a lsquoWersquo where the nation andthe people are one (Finlayson 1998 p 113) Nevertheless liberal demo-cratic theory assumes a lsquoWersquo is in place and therefore ignores the dif-cult process of forging a lsquoPeoplersquo for the political community Ignoringnationality serves to create a false illusion that lsquocivicrsquo states are purelycivic and are devoid of ethno-cultural factors It also makes it easier todiscuss lsquoWestern civicrsquo states as having always been civic from theirinception

30 Taras Kuzio

Despite the close inter-connection between liberal democracy andnationhood since the late-eighteenth-century political theory tends toignore nationality Nevertheless nationhood is at the heart of politicaltheory even though its particularism has an uneasy marriage with theuniversalism of liberalism How a lsquoPeoplersquo and political solidarity arecreated is often ignored and taken for granted even though it is nation-hood that generates the lsquoWersquo and collective power Successful politiesrequire not only a degree of societal trust but also unity and stabilityfactors which lsquohave always been at the root of politicsrsquo (Canovan 1996p 22)

Advocates of individual rights usually argue that civic states by de-nition are indifferent to ethno-cultural questions Advocates of culturalpluralism on the other hand such as Kymlicka (1996) will counter thosepromoting only individual rights by arguing that all civic states includeethno-cultural elements No civic state can possibly hope to be neutralwhen deciding which ethnic groupsrsquo language culture symbols andanniversaries to promote at the state level (Beissinger 1996 p 101)Although 17 million Americans count Spanish as their rst language onlyone per cent of US federal documents are in non-English languages(Freedland 1998 p 147) Liberals remain concerned that group rightsand cultural pluralism inhibit the creation of a shared identity that civicstates promote They ignore the fact that this shared identity in Westerncivic states is not ethnically or culturally neutral but based upon that ofthe ethnic core (s) Kymlicka (1996) poses a double paradox Multi-ethnic states which represent the majority of nation-states lsquocannotsurvive unless the various national groups have an allegiance to thelarger community they cohabitrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 13) If states ignorethis question and pursue radical homogenizing (or in Brubakerrsquos termlsquonationalizingrsquo) policies this will alienate national minorities and maylead to ethnic and social unrest Civic states have therefore to balancebetween forging an overarching unity in the public domain whileallowing and sometimes fostering polyethnic rights and identities in theprivate sphere (Kuzio forthcoming)

The inclusion of polyethnic rights and the recognition of the value ofcultural pluralism is a relatively recent phenomenon in civic statesWithout the recognition of these rights and pluralism and a concomi-tant rejection of homogenization the imagined civic community will notinclude large numbers of people who do not belong to the ethnic coreKymlicka (1996) and Connor (1972) do not believe that civic statesassimilated non-titulars lsquovoluntarilyrsquo Few national groups voluntarilyassimilated from the eighteenth century and the majority of civic statespursued homogenizing policies until the 1960s France and the US twoof Kohnrsquos civic West still do not legally recognize the concept of nationalminorities because they believe that to do so would undermine their civicstates by prioritizing collective ethnic over individual civic rights Only

The myth of the civic state 31

Canada and Australia adopted multicultural policies in the 1970s (whilenone of Kohnrsquos ve lsquocivicrsquo states adopted similar policies)

Linz and Stepan (1996 pp 35ndash37) dene lsquonationalizingrsquo policies asattempting to homogenize multi-ethnic societies in the East Yet themajority of states both in the West and the East have always been multi-ethnic The newly independent states of the East if they are indeedadopting homogenizing policies are merely mirroring the examples setby the West from the eighteenth century onwards These homogenizingpolicies pursued since the late-eighteenth century in the West were onlymodied in some cases from the 1960s Majority cultures in civic stateshave had a lsquoperverse incentiversquo to destroy the cultures of nationalminorities and lsquothen cite that destruction as a justication for compellingassimilationrsquo (Kymlicka 1995 p 100)

Nation-building in the West was as Connor (1972) commented bothlsquonation creatingrsquo and lsquonation destroyingrsquo All European governmentsincluding those in the West lsquoeventually took steps which homogenizedtheir populationsrsquo (Tilly 1975 p 43) Nation-building in France wasaccompanied by the destruction of local cultures and languages in theperiphery and the imposition of a hegemonic Icircle de France culture thatwas promoted as a benecial lsquola mission civilisatricersquo Weber (1979)describes the slow and uneven process of national integration in Francein the nineteenth century as that of a lsquocolonial empire shaped over thecenturiesrsquo These territories had been lsquoconquered annexed and integratedrsquo by the Icircle de France Parisian ofcials sent to regions such as Brittany felt and behaved as if they were going to an overseas colony

Gellner (1983 pp 142ndash43) sees homogenization as an inevitable by-product of modernization and a functioning national economy Nation-building welded together different peoples into a single communitylsquobased on the cultural heritage of the dominant ethnic corersquo (A D Smith1991 p 68) Thus Western states were not neutral in their nation-building projects and these often marginalized national minorities anddestroyed local identities (Moore 1997 p 904) These factors wereignored by Kohn (1944 1982) in his positive treatment of nationalism inthe West

Historic myths in civic states

Both civic and ethnic states have traditionally used myths and history(Andersen 1991 pp 11ndash12 Schnapper 1997 pp 214 219) As theCouncil of Europe has complained lsquoVirtually all political systems haveused history for their own ends and have imposed both their version ofhistorical facts and their defence of the good and bad gures of historyrsquo(Council of Europe) An objective history may be what historians shouldstrive to write but in reality objective history is as much a myth as states

32 Taras Kuzio

being wholly civic There has often been little to distinguish myth fromhistory as myths have been a lsquopoetic form of historyrsquo (A D Smith 1984p 103)

Smith (1984) points out that all nations since the late-eighteenthcentury have appealed to ancestry and history in the struggle to estab-lish their state and nationhood This process had engulfed the whole ofwestern Europe by 1800 and spread only half a century afterwards toeastern Europe The nationrsquos ancestry had to be demonstrated as vitallsquoboth for self-esteem and security and for external recognitionrsquo (A DSmith 1984 p 101) Historical myths have been traditionally promotedas part of the inculcation of national solidarity within states Myths wereuseful for a variety of policies within the state and nation-buildingproject ndash proving ancient ancestry securing exclusive title to territoryand location the transmission of spiritual values through history pro-motion of heroic ages regeneration of lsquogolden erasrsquo as part of a lsquospecialidentityrsquo and a claim to special status (A D Smith 1984)

The myths of modern Switzerland one of Kohnrsquos ve civic states arefounded on the traditions and memories of an older ethnic nation andare themselves based on a German cultural core The modern Swissstatersquos historical myths and ethno-cultural core are Germanic Through-out Francersquos period of nation-building from 1789ndash1914 the anthem agoaths hymns monuments calendars ceremonies heroes and martyrsappealed to one Gaullist ancestry (A D Smith 1998 p 126) The his-torical past played a prominent role in the inculcation of values andloyalty to the French republic through the construction of monumentsnationalist pedagogy in history teaching museums and memorials inevery commune (Johnson 1993) Just as the English and Americanssought to locate their nation in ancient history the French claimeddescent from the Trojans and Romans The Normans were portrayed asFrankish usurpers who had taken away their rights

Paxman (1999 p 153) believes that lsquoWe must accept rst that a senseof history runs deep in the English peoplersquo The union of Scotland andEngland in 1707 subsumed English within British nationalism that mod-erated English nationalism Nevertheless English myths remained aliveand well in debates over Anglo-Saxon origins archaeology ruralEngland pageants (the opening of parliament the trooping of thecolour the last night of the Proms) and in memories of noble sacriceagainst all odds in World War II such as at Dunkirk (A D Smith 1984p 109) In nineteenth-century England the education system denedEnglish literature as lsquosuperiorrsquo and its culture ideas tastes morals arthistory and family life subscribed to these dominant views of lsquoinferiorrsquoand lsquosuperiorrsquo races not only in the colonies but in countries closer tohome such as Ireland (Hickman 1998) England was the lsquoNew Israelrsquothat was set to deliver its civilization to mankind English history wastreated separately to British and the former placed greater emphasis

The myth of the civic state 33

upon Anglo-Saxon racial origins and an lsquoobsessive interestrsquo in the past(Baucom 1999 pp 15 20 48)

US historical myths linked an alleged pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon loveof liberty with a myth of ethnogenesis which dened the Americans asa new nation that was escaping from the tyranny of the lsquoNormanrsquomonarchs who ruled Britain The US also had an lsquoinfatuationrsquo withAnglo-Saxon history that was included within its myths of ethnogenesis(Kaufmannn 2000b) American exceptionalism portrayed the US nationas the lsquopurestrsquo English (Lipset 1997) a myth of exceptionalism similarto that of the Afrikaner in South Africa the Scots in Ulster and theFrench Canadians in Quebec These American historical myths helpedforge lsquoWASPrsquo cultural boundaries within which dominant Anglo con-formity was promoted in the nineteenth and the rst half of the twenti-eth centuries (Kaufmann 1999 2000b R M Smith 1997 pp 3 460 468)

In a survey of American nation-building from 1776 to the presentSpilman (1997) stressed the centrality of symbols rituals and patrioticorganizations that served to forge a US national identity GeorgeWashington was given a hero-like status after 1789 in portraits birthdaycelebrations shrines books the constitution commemorations ofbattles and independence day celebrations Thanksgiving and MemorialDay were annually celebrated pledges of allegiance were made andlarge historical pageants were held Historical myths have thereforeplayed as important a role in the US as they have in the other fourWestern states cited as lsquocivicrsquo examples by Kohn

Ethnic to civic state an alternative framework

Kohnrsquos division of nationalism traces its positive inclusive qualities retrospectively back to the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries Howevercivic states have never been identical and unanimous in how they wereconstituted The growth of the national state and its provision of civilpolitical cultural and social rights was lsquoslow and unevenrsquo (Mouzelis 1996p 226)

At the time of the American revolution only a small percentage ofwealthy white Protestant males could vote something American colonistsand revolutionaries did not see as unusual Indeed after 1776 slaves con-tinued to be imported into the USA and slavery lsquoemerged from the Revol-ution more rmly entrenched than ever in American lifersquo (Foner 1998 p28) lsquoSlavery rendered blacks all but invisible to those imagining theAmerican communityrsquo (Foner 1998 p 38) US President Thomas Jefferson himself possessed 1000 slaves and believed them to be perma-nently decient in the faculties required to enjoy freedom requiringtutelage by lsquosuperiorrsquo races such as Anglo-Saxons to improve their possi-bility of full civic equality at an unspecied later date (R M Smith 1997p 105) Slavery existed until the 1860s in the USA and the slave trade

34 Taras Kuzio

helped to build up the wealth of Western states Indeed it was only Switzer-land of Kohnrsquos ve Western examples that did not prot from slavery

Although the American national idea as elaborated upon and ideal-ized by Kohn (1944) was based on a mythical devotion to freedom thedenition of who could experience it was initially ethnically narrow andonly gradually evolved into a civic variant after the 1960s The centen-nial of the US revolution in 1876 ignored blacks new non-Anglo-Saxonimmigrants Native Americans and women as not being part of thenation The nineteenth-century US republic had no room for NativeIndian black Spanish or French culture The conquering of New Mexicoand the annexation of Texas was proclaimed as a triumph of ProtestantAnglo-Saxon civilization against the Catholic world and lower racesNew Mexico was not admitted into the union until 1912 even though itpossessed the required population level because it was held to be lsquotooIndianrsquo (Foner 1998 p 79)

By the bicentennial of the US revolution in 1976 the American nationhad evolved from ethnic to civic and included those previously excludedin other words at different times in US history lsquofreedomrsquo had differentmeanings Who was to be included within the American nation is lsquoahighly uneven and bitterly contested part of the story of Americanfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p XVII) Freedom in American history has there-fore been both a lsquomythic idealrsquo and a lsquoliving truthrsquo (Foner 1998 p XXI)

Dahlrsquos denition of a civic state rests on three factors free and fairelections an inclusive suffrage and the right to run for ofce These threebasic civic rights were not always included within Western states In con-temporary denitions of civic states the US and Australia could there-fore not be dened as lsquocivicrsquo states prior to the 1960s because theyexcluded people on the basis of colour and race The breakthrough inwidening the American nation occurred nearly two hundred years afterthe USA was founded when the Civil Rights (1964) Voting Rights (1965)and Fair Housing (1968) Acts were passed

The evolution of states from ethnic to civic statehood occurredthroughout the West and not only in the small number of states dis-cussed in this article This evolution was the norm not the exceptionOnly from the 1960s can we dene Western states as civic while themajority of the East became civic only three decades later in the 1990sAlthough democratic consolidation and civic state building is far fromconsolidated in the East in contrast to the West the East is encouragedby international organizations to continue to evolve along civic lines(something that was not the case in the West) That Western civic statesare still in a process of evolution and are not perfect civic states can beseen in the numerous problems that continue to bedevil them The USstill disenfranchises nearly four million of its citizens a policy that wouldno doubt be condemned by the OSCE if introduced in the East2

By looking at the evolution of Western states in such a manner we

The myth of the civic state 35

shall full two tasks Firstly we shall no longer be able to ignore ethno-cultural factors within civic states Secondly we shall be able to discussin a more frank and open manner the way in which Western statesevolved from ethnic to civic state and nationhood

Conclusion

This article has contributed to the scholarly literature on nationalism byarguing that the Kohn framework of Western states has always been civicfrom the moment of their creation is historically wrong (R S Smith 1997pp 20 31ndash32 499) Western states have evolved from ethnic to civicstates only in the last four decades of the twentieth century Without anunderstanding of this evolution of Western ethnic into civic states wecannot understand the nature of the civic state as containing tensionbetween its universal liberalist and national particularist componentsAll civic states will retain this internal contradiction as long as national-ity remains central to creating the solidarity that pure civic states wouldlack by themselves (Miller 1995 2000)

Both the US and Canadian examples discussed in this article haveshown that Western states typically began as ethnic and only graduallyevolved into civic states from the 1960s Evolution from ethnic to civicnationalism is only likely to take place after the core ethnic group is self-condent within its own bounded territory to open the community tolsquooutsidersrsquo from other ethnic groups Historical evidence shows thatWestern states did not become civic because they so desired but becauseof a multitude of domestic and international pressures (Kaufmann2000b) Belief in civic values can go together with ethnic nationalism andracism and states can move away from their civic bases during times ofperceived crisis

In the US this occurred during the century between the emancipationof the black slaves in the 1860s to re-enfranchising southern blacks inthe 1960s In British Canada this evolution of nationalism took place inthe early twentieth century In French Canada Francophones onlybecame dominant within Quebec after the 1960s a period during whichFrench Canadian nationalism also evolved from ethnic to civic national-ism This process was not solely conned to the US and Canada butoccurred throughout the West

The continued use of the Kohn framework is doubly wrong after adecade of post-Communism in central and eastern Europe when all buttwo of these states became civic Evolution from ethnic to civic stateshas therefore little to do with geography and far more to do with thepositive inuence of international institutions domestic democratic con-solidation and civic institution building Western states have a long his-torical record as ethnic states a factor which makes their evolution moresimilar not different to states in the East

36 Taras Kuzio

Acknowledgements

An earlier and longer version of this paper was presented at the AnnualConvention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities ColumbiaUniversity New York 13ndash15 April 2000 The author would like to thanktwo anonymous ERS referees and Assistant Professor Stephen Shulmanfor their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article

Notes

1 A European Union-wide survey in Spring 1997 found 33 per cent of those inter-viewed describing themselves as lsquoquite racistrsquo or lsquovery racistrsquo Many of these supported thebasic tenets of a civic inclusive liberal democratic state (Eurobarometer Opinion Poll)2 46 states and the District of Columbia have criminal disenfranchisement laws thatdeny the vote to all convicted adults in prison 32 states disenfranchise felons on paroleand 29 those on probation Laws that are unique to the US exist in 14 states that perma-nently disenfranchise former offenders (for life) who have fully served their sentences Thislegislation which runs contrary to established practice in both western and eastern Europeis racially neutral nevertheless due to socio-economic factors it is not surprising that itaffects national minorities blacks and Hispanics more than whites In Florida for example400000 former offenders are permanently excluded from voting of whom half are blacks(representing nearly a third of all blacks in Florida) (Human Rights Watch)

References

ANDERSEN BENEDICT 1991 Imagined Communities London VersoANER STEFAN 2000 lsquoNationalism in central Europe ndash A chance or a threat for theemerging liberal democratic orderrsquo East European Politics and Society vol14 no2pp 213ndash45BAUCOM IAN 1999 Out of Place Englishness Empire and the Location of IdentityPrinceton NJ Princeton University PressBEISSINGER MARK R 1996 lsquoHow nationalism spread Eastern Europe adrift the tidesand cycles of national contentionrsquo Social Research vol 63 no1 pp 97ndash146BOSTOCK WILLIAM W 1997 lsquo ldquoLanguage griefrdquo A ldquoraw materialrdquo of ethnic conictrsquoNationalism and Ethnic Politics vol3 no4 pp 94ndash112BRETON RAYMOND 1988 lsquoFrom ethnic to civic nationalism English Canada andQuebecrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 2 no1 pp 85ndash102BROWN DAVID 1999 lsquoAre there good and bad nationalismsrsquo Nations and Nationalismvol5 no2 pp 281ndash302BRUBAKER ROGERS 1995 lsquoNational minorities nationalizing states and externalhomelands in the new Europersquo Daedalus vol124 no2 pp 107ndash32CANOVAN MARGARET 1996 Nationhood and Political Theory Cheltenham EdwardElgarCONNOR WALKER 1972 lsquoNation-building or nation-destroyingrsquo World PoliticsvolXXIV no3 pp 319ndash55COUNCIL of EUROPE COMMITTEE on CULTURE and EDUCATION Recom-mendation 1283 (22 January 1996) Document 7446DAHL ROBERT 1971 Polyarchy New Haven CT Yale University PressEUROBAROMETER OPINION POLL no471 Luxembourg lsquoRacism and Xeno-phobia in Europersquo 18ndash19 December 1991FINLAYSON ALAN 1998 lsquoIdeology discourse and nationalismrsquo Journal of PoliticalIdeologies vol3 no1 pp 99ndash119

The myth of the civic state 37

intense rivalry with competitors lsquoover a chaotic ethnographic map ofmany dialects with ambiguous historical or linguo-genetic allegiancesand contagious populations which had only just begun to identify withthese emergent national high culturesrsquo (Gellner 1983 p 100)

Six problems with the Kohn framework

The division of nationalism and states according to Kohnrsquos frameworkfails to stand up to objective historical scrutiny and the civic state reectsmore lsquoa mixture of self-congratulation and wishful thinkingrsquo (Yack1996p 196) This section therefore discusses how the Kohn frameworkis problematical in six areas

Firstly all states in the West share cultural horizons values identitiesand historical myths in a common identity that is the lsquonationrsquo Yack(1996 p 201) believes therefore that lsquoAll of these concepts ndash civilsociety the people the nation ndash rest on the notion of a community setapart from and using the state as a means of self governmentrsquo

Liberal theorists have tended to assume that the lsquoPeoplersquo are in placeand thereby they tend to ignore the process of nation-building In a dis-cussion of the evolution of the US political community1 R M Smith(1997 p 9) therefore points out the dilemma faced by political theorists

The failure of liberal democratic civic ideology to indicate why anygroup of human beings should think of themselves as a distinct orspecial people is a great political liability in this regard

Liberalism has been traditionally realized within national communi-ties that are committed to shared principles Without a cultural legacythere will be no shared consent to live together lsquosince there would beno reason for people to seek agreement with any one group of indi-viduals rather than anotherrsquo (Yack 1996 p 208) This is as true ofWestern as it is of Eastern nations something I survey in greater detailin the second section where I discuss the myth of the civic state

Secondly the Kohn framework disregards any anti-democratic lsquonon-Westernrsquo nationalisms that have existed in the West while also ignoringmanifestations of democracy and civic nationalism in the East Kohnlumps into one category all those nationalisms he disliked as lsquoEasternrsquomany of which are not geographically in the East (Symonolewicz-Symmons 1965 p 224) For example during the inter-war years Czecho-slovakia was a democracy

Kohnrsquos West selectively groups together ve countries while ignoringthe majority of other states that geographically belong to this regionIreland Greece Germany Spain and Belgium are sometimes dened aslying in the West but are nevertheless not included within Kohn lsquos veexamples because they would call into question his framework In their

24 Taras Kuzio

study of European nation-states Krejci and Velimsky (1996) concludedthat of the seventy-three ethnic groups in Europe forty-two were bothethnic and political nations Of the remainder twenty-three were purelyethnic and only eight were purely political Those they classied as bothethnic-political in the West included the English French Irish Por-tuguese Scots Spanish Danes Finns Icelanders Norwegians SwedesFlemings Walloons Dutch Maltese Frisians Germans Greeks Italiansand the Swiss (Krejci and Velimsky 1996 pp 212ndash17) Four out of vecountries in Kohnrsquos West (England France The Netherlands andSwitzerland) were consequently classied by them as both ethnic andpolitical The US was not included within this survey but should also beclassied as both ethnic and civic because the former dominated overthe latter until the 1960s (Foner 1998 p 38 Kaufmann 1999 2000b)

Thirdly an articial division of nationalism by geography ignoresethnic and territorial violence that has taken place in Western statesThis discourse which believes that ethnic nationalism and conict areonly endemic to the East is still highly inuential The Organisation forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for example only dealswith ethnic and civic problems in the East Yet arguably there are asmany ethnic conicts in the West as there are in the East although theOSCE does not intervene within the former In post-communist Europeethnic conict has only turned into violence in three regions Yugoslavia(Bosnia Croatia Kosovo) Moldova (Trans-Dniester) and Russia(Chechnya) Meanwhile the West has experienced inter-ethnic conictin the UK (Northern Ireland) France (Corsica Brittany) Belgium(Flanders) Canada (Quebec) and Spain (Basque) Many of these areongoing sometimes turning to violence and their long-term naturesuggests that they may need an outside neutral body such as the OSCEto intervene Ongoing ethnic and religious conicts in Northern Irelandand the Basque region are as deep as any that can be found in post-communist Europe But OSCE intervention in these conicts wouldchallenge the very nature of the still inuential discourse that ethnic andcivic problems only exist in the East ndash not in the West

Kohn also negatively assesses nationalism in the lsquoEastrsquo by reectingon their territorial disputes with neighbours At the same time heignores how the lsquoWestrsquo created large-scale overseas empires during thisperiod and he does not discuss the numerous territorial disputes that theWest was involved in itself during its state and nation-building projectsThe Kohn view of a benign US that did not meet resistance to its terri-torial expansion is still inuential Freedland (1998 p 86) argues thatthe US pioneers saw only lsquoemptinessrsquo when they moved Westwards lsquotoconquer the territory and ll the voidrsquo

The UK had ethnic and imperial problems throughout the period priorto the mid-twentieth century both in Ireland and further aeld The warsof the revolution (1792ndash1802) and the Napoleonic wars (1803ndash1815)

The myth of the civic state 25

immediately followed the French Revolution and led to French terri-torial problems with most of Europe and local territorial conicts withGermany and Belgium (Snyder 2000 pp 154ndash68)

The US invaded Canada in 1812 and the expansion of American terri-tory westwards and southwards brought it into territorial and ethnicconict with Native Indians Spaniards and Mexicans The US Civil Warin the early 1860s produced 600000 casualties a huge number for thetime (in contrast the US had only 50000 casualties a century later in alonger war in Vietnam when its population was proportionately farlarger) After the US-Spanish war in 1898 the US occupied the Philip-pines Guam Hawaii and Puerto Rico but only reluctantly admitted thelatter two into the union in 1900 and 1917 respectively The Philipinoswere lsquouncivilisedrsquo and lsquounassimablersquo and therefore could not be broughtinto the union (R M Smith 1997)

Fourthly Kohnrsquos division of nationalism into two groups idealizesnationalism in the lsquoWestrsquo as a civic phenomenon that was always fullyinclusive of social and ethnic groups He ignores the exclusion of NativeIndians (and blacks) from the US civic nation throughout most of thenineteenth century Indeed eleven southern states denied civil rights toblacks until as late as the 1960s in what can only be dened as a regionalpolicy of apartheid

American policies lsquoworked tirelessly to obliterate all customs that didnot meet their view of civilized actionsrsquo among Native Indians (Nichols1998 pp 28ndash29) The Puritans dened Indians as lsquoSatanicrsquo something thatexcused numerous instances of savagery against them These Englishviews of Native Indians had a long tradition England as the lsquoNew Israelrsquoprovided an ideology that could look to the Old Testament for guidancewhen God destroyed his heathen enemies English Anglo-Saxon cultureand Protestant religion were on the side of lsquogoodrsquo in a battle with lsquoevilrsquo

The earlier English ideas about the backward and savage Irish theundeserving power and the ever-increasing negative ideas about theblack slaves expanded gradually to include Indians

Recent experiences with the Irish had prepared them to considertheir tribal neighbors as backward and savage (Nichols 1998 pp59ndash60)

As North America experienced a rapid growth in colonists the numberof Native Indians rapidly declined because of lsquogenocidersquo and enslave-ment (Nichols 1998) Intolerance grew the Indians became subjectlsquodefeatedrsquo peoples entire tribes (nations) were destroyed and othersforcibly cleansed and their lands taken away (Nichols 1998 p 108)English laws language and culture were forcefully and unequallyimposed upon Native Indians This ethnic cleansing of Indians accom-panied by lsquofraud intimidation and violencersquo became lsquoindispensable to

26 Taras Kuzio

the triumph of manifest destiny and the American mission of spreadingfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p 51)

In the 1940s the US was also nally opened up to Asians Throughout80 per cent of American history US legislation disbarred most people inthe world from becoming US citizens due to their race nationality orgender (R M Smith 1997 p 14) Race and ethnic restrictions on immi-gration were introduced in 1882 and a system of permanent quotas forethnic groups in 1924 (R M Smith 1997 p 118) This policy of lsquoethnicdefencersquo from the 1830s to the 1920s was followed by four decades oflsquoAnglo-conformityrsquo which established Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the US(Kaufmann 2000b)

Nevertheless scholars have traditionally dened the US after 1776 asa civic state Kaufmann (1999 p 443) disagrees and denes the US asone of the rst Western lsquoethnicrsquo nations that was dened by contempor-ary writers in the early-nineteenth century as the lsquoEnglish race inAmericarsquo or lsquoAnglo-Americansrsquo (Kaufmannn 2000b)

In 1776 the colonists in North America were 80 per cent British and98 per cent Protestant Most states introduced anti-Catholic statutes thatgrew out of the French and Indian wars of 1754ndash1763 After the USrevolution an exclusive ethnic Protestant consciousness evolved of alsquochosen peoplersquo based upon an identity of being white (not black orIndian) Protestant (not French or Hispanic Catholic) English in speechand Liberal (in contrast to the royalist British) Other immigrants fromnorth western Europe and Britain were assimilated into a lsquoWASPrsquo(White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) identity

Kaufmann (1999 2000a) therefore sees the US experience as a similarevolution from ethnic to civic statehood as in the remainder of westernEurope with a core ethnic group creating an ethnic state that only gradu-ally evolved into a civic state much later The evolution of the US froman ethnic to a civic state is not unique but part of a broader trend amongWestern states (Kaufmann 2000a)

The evolution of the US into a civic state from the 1960s only occurredafter Anglo-Saxon hegemony had been established and only as a conse-quence of change forced upon it from within and outside (Kaufmannn2000a p 1097) This growing trend in favour of civic nationalism wasnot embraced voluntarily in the US a purely state nationalism failed tosupplant sub-state ethnic loyalties to which citizens may often hold theirprimary allegiance (Kaufmann 2000a pp 1097 1102ndash03)

Tension between civic and ethnic factors in Britain until the 1960s wassubsumed within the conict between the national English lsquoherersquo and theimperial British civic lsquotherersquo (Baucom 1999 p 37) With the empire gonethe ethnic civic conict came back to England Therefore Englishnationalism should not be treated as civic since the sixteenth century asKohn (1940) argued but as ethnic a nationalism only constrained by thecivic nature of British and imperial identity that allowed non-White

The myth of the civic state 27

imperial subjects to be British but never English Threats from immi-gration from the former empire for example can lead civic states toreturn to their ethnic basis as with the 1981 UK Nationality Act Thisdrew much of its strength from racist ideas promoted by Enoch Powellin the 1960s who himself lsquodraws on a long history of the reading of Eng-lishness as primarily a racial categoryrsquo (Baucom 1999 p 15) This tensionbetween the liberal-labour and conservative wings of British politics overregional devolution immigration and multiculturalism continues to thisday

Canada went through a similar process of evolution from ethnic tocivic nationalism as the US where the central preoccupation of statebuilders was to preserve cultural unity so that political and linguisticboundaries coincided (Breton 1988) Rational-legal (civic-territorial)factors came secondary to this endeavour Unlike the US the Canadianstate inherited two not one ethnic cores British and French (Kaufmann1997) Both were initially based upon ethnic nationalism and attemptedto separately construct ethno-cultural societies In French Quebec thisethnic nationalism was more often than not defensive against BritishCanadarsquos attempts at assimilating it In Quebec and Catalonia the evol-ution of nationalism from ethnic to civic variants since the 1960s stilldemands that non-titular nationalities assimilate into the titular ethnicgroup (Harty 1999 pp 672ndash73)

Until the 1950s in Australia a government policy of forced assimi-lation forcibly took children from Aborigines and placed them in white-only schools and families The Australian government still nds itdifcult to apologise and pay compensation for these policies Aborigi-nal peoples were only given the vote in 1967 after an Anglo-SaxonBritish lsquoWhitersquo Australia policy was replaced by multiculturalism

Fifthly the Kohn framework ignores the fact that as in the Westnationalism in the East can also evolve towards a civic variety over timeThis was certainly the case during the 1990s throughout most of post-communist Europe where states have been constructed along civicinclusive lines (although their democracies may as yet be still uncon-solidated) In 1999 the US think-tank Freedom House dened all post-communist European states as lsquocivicrsquo with the exception of Belarus andYugoslavia (Aner 2000 Kuzio 2001)

Sixthly what has been traditionally regarded as positive lsquonation-buildingrsquo processes in the West have been described by (Brubaker 1995see Kuzio 2001) in a negative manner as lsquonationalizing statesrsquo in the EastBoth lsquoWestern civicrsquo and lsquoEastern ethnicrsquo states traditionally homogen-ized their inhabitants Assimilation in civic states such as France meantthe loss of onersquos culture and language as the price for becoming part ofthe French political community Brubakerrsquos lsquonationalizationrsquo of the stateon behalf of the core titular nation in the East is little different from theassimilation by both peaceful and violent means of national minorities

28 Taras Kuzio

in the West (Connor 1972) It ignores the positive role that civic national-ism has played in dismantling empires (eg the former USSR Czecho-slovakia) the removal of dictators (President Slobodan Milosevich inYugoslavia) and opposition to apartheid (the ANC in South Africa)Civic nationalism and liberal democracies are allies ndash not enemies ndash incentral and eastern Europe (Aner 2000 p 245) Both played a role in thetransition from feudalism to modernity in the West there is no reason tobelieve that they will ndash and should ndash not play a similar role in the East

The myth of the civic state

Ethnic and civic states

This article argues that the Kohn (1944 1982) framework is fundamen-tally awed Both the West and the East only became civic from the1960s Western or Eastern states will continue to exhibit ethno-culturalelements even when their nationalisms are civic This article argues thatbecause all states are composed of both civic and ethno-cultural criteriaat different periods of history the proportional mix of the two will bedifferent (Kymlicka 1995 p 88 115 A D Smith 1996 pp 100ndash101 AD Smith 1998 pp 126ndash27) lsquoThe fate of democracy depends on whichone dominates the otherrsquo (Habermas 1996 p 286) Racist views cansometimes go together with strong support for democracy an inclusivestate and respect for fundamental civic and social rights and freedoms1

This may reect the view discussed earlier when civic rights for immi-grants and minorities are only reluctantly granted particularly to thoseperceived as outsiders to the ethnic nation

In the early period of Western states its nationalism was more ethnic(exclusive) than civic (inclusive) (A D Smith 1989 p 149) The strongerpresence of ethnic nationalism in the early stages of state and nation-building may be true of the East as well as the West That the East seemsmore lsquoethnicrsquo today may be therefore more to do with the differenttiming of similar processes

Kymlicka (1996) has criticized the claim that only Eastern nationalismis both ethnic and cultural He believes that cultural nationalism is asmuch at home in the West as it is in the East The rise of English national-ism in the Tudor and Elizabethan eras to which Kohn gives much creditfor later developments was built on cultural nationalism and propagatedby intellectuals poets and writers This English ethnic nationalism re-equipped it for later colonial conquest (Baucom 1999 p 25) There isnothing intrinsically anti-liberal Kymlicka (1996) argues if an ethnicgroup wishes to defend its cultural identity within a civic state

Kymlicka also criticizes Western scholars such as Ignatieff (1993) forwrongly assuming that civic nationalism has no cultural componentbecause all those who are citizens of civic nations participate in a

The myth of the civic state 29

common societal culture Turner (1997 p 9) believes that lsquoCitizenshipidentities and citizenship cultures are national identities and nationalculturesrsquo He continues

When individuals become citizens they not only enter into a set ofinstitutions that confers upon them rights and obligations they notonly acquire an identity they are not only socialised into civic virtuesbut they also become members of a political community with a par-ticular territory and history

The symbios of civic and ethnic actors found within civic states deter-mines the vitality and mobilization capacity of the demos and civilsociety (Miller 1995 2000 Canovan 1996) Although particularism anduniversalism are hostile and competing ideologies in practice national-ism has been the midwife that has brought liberal democracy into theworld and has connected the two ever since If the nation and communityare weakened or decline the demos is also affected The solidarity thatholds together a democracy is the civic nation

Kymlicka (1996) sees no reason to regret the fact that most civic stateshave always been and still are also composed of different cultures Bydenying this factor civic states seek to justify internal homogenization tothe dominant culture and language whether states should therefore bedened as civic or ethnic in Kohnrsquos terms has less to do with the absenceor existence of cultural criteria but if anybody lsquocan be integrated intothe community regardless of race or colourrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 24) andwhat qualications for membership are in place (Canovan 1996 p 19)Kymlicka (1996) therefore stresses that both Western and Easternnationalism have cultural components and identity in both is thereforegrounded in culture

National identity

How do political communities and civic nations hold together Fewscholars would dispute that modern societies require a fraternity (Nisbet1953 pp 153ndash88) a lsquocommunity of valuesrsquo (Parekh 1995 p 436) alsquosingle psychological focus shared by all segmentsrsquo (Connor 1972 p353) a lsquonationalityrsquo (Miller 1995 p 140) a lsquohigh degree of communalsolidarityrsquo (Canovan 1996 pp 28ndash29) and a lsquoWersquo where the nation andthe people are one (Finlayson 1998 p 113) Nevertheless liberal demo-cratic theory assumes a lsquoWersquo is in place and therefore ignores the dif-cult process of forging a lsquoPeoplersquo for the political community Ignoringnationality serves to create a false illusion that lsquocivicrsquo states are purelycivic and are devoid of ethno-cultural factors It also makes it easier todiscuss lsquoWestern civicrsquo states as having always been civic from theirinception

30 Taras Kuzio

Despite the close inter-connection between liberal democracy andnationhood since the late-eighteenth-century political theory tends toignore nationality Nevertheless nationhood is at the heart of politicaltheory even though its particularism has an uneasy marriage with theuniversalism of liberalism How a lsquoPeoplersquo and political solidarity arecreated is often ignored and taken for granted even though it is nation-hood that generates the lsquoWersquo and collective power Successful politiesrequire not only a degree of societal trust but also unity and stabilityfactors which lsquohave always been at the root of politicsrsquo (Canovan 1996p 22)

Advocates of individual rights usually argue that civic states by de-nition are indifferent to ethno-cultural questions Advocates of culturalpluralism on the other hand such as Kymlicka (1996) will counter thosepromoting only individual rights by arguing that all civic states includeethno-cultural elements No civic state can possibly hope to be neutralwhen deciding which ethnic groupsrsquo language culture symbols andanniversaries to promote at the state level (Beissinger 1996 p 101)Although 17 million Americans count Spanish as their rst language onlyone per cent of US federal documents are in non-English languages(Freedland 1998 p 147) Liberals remain concerned that group rightsand cultural pluralism inhibit the creation of a shared identity that civicstates promote They ignore the fact that this shared identity in Westerncivic states is not ethnically or culturally neutral but based upon that ofthe ethnic core (s) Kymlicka (1996) poses a double paradox Multi-ethnic states which represent the majority of nation-states lsquocannotsurvive unless the various national groups have an allegiance to thelarger community they cohabitrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 13) If states ignorethis question and pursue radical homogenizing (or in Brubakerrsquos termlsquonationalizingrsquo) policies this will alienate national minorities and maylead to ethnic and social unrest Civic states have therefore to balancebetween forging an overarching unity in the public domain whileallowing and sometimes fostering polyethnic rights and identities in theprivate sphere (Kuzio forthcoming)

The inclusion of polyethnic rights and the recognition of the value ofcultural pluralism is a relatively recent phenomenon in civic statesWithout the recognition of these rights and pluralism and a concomi-tant rejection of homogenization the imagined civic community will notinclude large numbers of people who do not belong to the ethnic coreKymlicka (1996) and Connor (1972) do not believe that civic statesassimilated non-titulars lsquovoluntarilyrsquo Few national groups voluntarilyassimilated from the eighteenth century and the majority of civic statespursued homogenizing policies until the 1960s France and the US twoof Kohnrsquos civic West still do not legally recognize the concept of nationalminorities because they believe that to do so would undermine their civicstates by prioritizing collective ethnic over individual civic rights Only

The myth of the civic state 31

Canada and Australia adopted multicultural policies in the 1970s (whilenone of Kohnrsquos ve lsquocivicrsquo states adopted similar policies)

Linz and Stepan (1996 pp 35ndash37) dene lsquonationalizingrsquo policies asattempting to homogenize multi-ethnic societies in the East Yet themajority of states both in the West and the East have always been multi-ethnic The newly independent states of the East if they are indeedadopting homogenizing policies are merely mirroring the examples setby the West from the eighteenth century onwards These homogenizingpolicies pursued since the late-eighteenth century in the West were onlymodied in some cases from the 1960s Majority cultures in civic stateshave had a lsquoperverse incentiversquo to destroy the cultures of nationalminorities and lsquothen cite that destruction as a justication for compellingassimilationrsquo (Kymlicka 1995 p 100)

Nation-building in the West was as Connor (1972) commented bothlsquonation creatingrsquo and lsquonation destroyingrsquo All European governmentsincluding those in the West lsquoeventually took steps which homogenizedtheir populationsrsquo (Tilly 1975 p 43) Nation-building in France wasaccompanied by the destruction of local cultures and languages in theperiphery and the imposition of a hegemonic Icircle de France culture thatwas promoted as a benecial lsquola mission civilisatricersquo Weber (1979)describes the slow and uneven process of national integration in Francein the nineteenth century as that of a lsquocolonial empire shaped over thecenturiesrsquo These territories had been lsquoconquered annexed and integratedrsquo by the Icircle de France Parisian ofcials sent to regions such as Brittany felt and behaved as if they were going to an overseas colony

Gellner (1983 pp 142ndash43) sees homogenization as an inevitable by-product of modernization and a functioning national economy Nation-building welded together different peoples into a single communitylsquobased on the cultural heritage of the dominant ethnic corersquo (A D Smith1991 p 68) Thus Western states were not neutral in their nation-building projects and these often marginalized national minorities anddestroyed local identities (Moore 1997 p 904) These factors wereignored by Kohn (1944 1982) in his positive treatment of nationalism inthe West

Historic myths in civic states

Both civic and ethnic states have traditionally used myths and history(Andersen 1991 pp 11ndash12 Schnapper 1997 pp 214 219) As theCouncil of Europe has complained lsquoVirtually all political systems haveused history for their own ends and have imposed both their version ofhistorical facts and their defence of the good and bad gures of historyrsquo(Council of Europe) An objective history may be what historians shouldstrive to write but in reality objective history is as much a myth as states

32 Taras Kuzio

being wholly civic There has often been little to distinguish myth fromhistory as myths have been a lsquopoetic form of historyrsquo (A D Smith 1984p 103)

Smith (1984) points out that all nations since the late-eighteenthcentury have appealed to ancestry and history in the struggle to estab-lish their state and nationhood This process had engulfed the whole ofwestern Europe by 1800 and spread only half a century afterwards toeastern Europe The nationrsquos ancestry had to be demonstrated as vitallsquoboth for self-esteem and security and for external recognitionrsquo (A DSmith 1984 p 101) Historical myths have been traditionally promotedas part of the inculcation of national solidarity within states Myths wereuseful for a variety of policies within the state and nation-buildingproject ndash proving ancient ancestry securing exclusive title to territoryand location the transmission of spiritual values through history pro-motion of heroic ages regeneration of lsquogolden erasrsquo as part of a lsquospecialidentityrsquo and a claim to special status (A D Smith 1984)

The myths of modern Switzerland one of Kohnrsquos ve civic states arefounded on the traditions and memories of an older ethnic nation andare themselves based on a German cultural core The modern Swissstatersquos historical myths and ethno-cultural core are Germanic Through-out Francersquos period of nation-building from 1789ndash1914 the anthem agoaths hymns monuments calendars ceremonies heroes and martyrsappealed to one Gaullist ancestry (A D Smith 1998 p 126) The his-torical past played a prominent role in the inculcation of values andloyalty to the French republic through the construction of monumentsnationalist pedagogy in history teaching museums and memorials inevery commune (Johnson 1993) Just as the English and Americanssought to locate their nation in ancient history the French claimeddescent from the Trojans and Romans The Normans were portrayed asFrankish usurpers who had taken away their rights

Paxman (1999 p 153) believes that lsquoWe must accept rst that a senseof history runs deep in the English peoplersquo The union of Scotland andEngland in 1707 subsumed English within British nationalism that mod-erated English nationalism Nevertheless English myths remained aliveand well in debates over Anglo-Saxon origins archaeology ruralEngland pageants (the opening of parliament the trooping of thecolour the last night of the Proms) and in memories of noble sacriceagainst all odds in World War II such as at Dunkirk (A D Smith 1984p 109) In nineteenth-century England the education system denedEnglish literature as lsquosuperiorrsquo and its culture ideas tastes morals arthistory and family life subscribed to these dominant views of lsquoinferiorrsquoand lsquosuperiorrsquo races not only in the colonies but in countries closer tohome such as Ireland (Hickman 1998) England was the lsquoNew Israelrsquothat was set to deliver its civilization to mankind English history wastreated separately to British and the former placed greater emphasis

The myth of the civic state 33

upon Anglo-Saxon racial origins and an lsquoobsessive interestrsquo in the past(Baucom 1999 pp 15 20 48)

US historical myths linked an alleged pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon loveof liberty with a myth of ethnogenesis which dened the Americans asa new nation that was escaping from the tyranny of the lsquoNormanrsquomonarchs who ruled Britain The US also had an lsquoinfatuationrsquo withAnglo-Saxon history that was included within its myths of ethnogenesis(Kaufmannn 2000b) American exceptionalism portrayed the US nationas the lsquopurestrsquo English (Lipset 1997) a myth of exceptionalism similarto that of the Afrikaner in South Africa the Scots in Ulster and theFrench Canadians in Quebec These American historical myths helpedforge lsquoWASPrsquo cultural boundaries within which dominant Anglo con-formity was promoted in the nineteenth and the rst half of the twenti-eth centuries (Kaufmann 1999 2000b R M Smith 1997 pp 3 460 468)

In a survey of American nation-building from 1776 to the presentSpilman (1997) stressed the centrality of symbols rituals and patrioticorganizations that served to forge a US national identity GeorgeWashington was given a hero-like status after 1789 in portraits birthdaycelebrations shrines books the constitution commemorations ofbattles and independence day celebrations Thanksgiving and MemorialDay were annually celebrated pledges of allegiance were made andlarge historical pageants were held Historical myths have thereforeplayed as important a role in the US as they have in the other fourWestern states cited as lsquocivicrsquo examples by Kohn

Ethnic to civic state an alternative framework

Kohnrsquos division of nationalism traces its positive inclusive qualities retrospectively back to the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries Howevercivic states have never been identical and unanimous in how they wereconstituted The growth of the national state and its provision of civilpolitical cultural and social rights was lsquoslow and unevenrsquo (Mouzelis 1996p 226)

At the time of the American revolution only a small percentage ofwealthy white Protestant males could vote something American colonistsand revolutionaries did not see as unusual Indeed after 1776 slaves con-tinued to be imported into the USA and slavery lsquoemerged from the Revol-ution more rmly entrenched than ever in American lifersquo (Foner 1998 p28) lsquoSlavery rendered blacks all but invisible to those imagining theAmerican communityrsquo (Foner 1998 p 38) US President Thomas Jefferson himself possessed 1000 slaves and believed them to be perma-nently decient in the faculties required to enjoy freedom requiringtutelage by lsquosuperiorrsquo races such as Anglo-Saxons to improve their possi-bility of full civic equality at an unspecied later date (R M Smith 1997p 105) Slavery existed until the 1860s in the USA and the slave trade

34 Taras Kuzio

helped to build up the wealth of Western states Indeed it was only Switzer-land of Kohnrsquos ve Western examples that did not prot from slavery

Although the American national idea as elaborated upon and ideal-ized by Kohn (1944) was based on a mythical devotion to freedom thedenition of who could experience it was initially ethnically narrow andonly gradually evolved into a civic variant after the 1960s The centen-nial of the US revolution in 1876 ignored blacks new non-Anglo-Saxonimmigrants Native Americans and women as not being part of thenation The nineteenth-century US republic had no room for NativeIndian black Spanish or French culture The conquering of New Mexicoand the annexation of Texas was proclaimed as a triumph of ProtestantAnglo-Saxon civilization against the Catholic world and lower racesNew Mexico was not admitted into the union until 1912 even though itpossessed the required population level because it was held to be lsquotooIndianrsquo (Foner 1998 p 79)

By the bicentennial of the US revolution in 1976 the American nationhad evolved from ethnic to civic and included those previously excludedin other words at different times in US history lsquofreedomrsquo had differentmeanings Who was to be included within the American nation is lsquoahighly uneven and bitterly contested part of the story of Americanfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p XVII) Freedom in American history has there-fore been both a lsquomythic idealrsquo and a lsquoliving truthrsquo (Foner 1998 p XXI)

Dahlrsquos denition of a civic state rests on three factors free and fairelections an inclusive suffrage and the right to run for ofce These threebasic civic rights were not always included within Western states In con-temporary denitions of civic states the US and Australia could there-fore not be dened as lsquocivicrsquo states prior to the 1960s because theyexcluded people on the basis of colour and race The breakthrough inwidening the American nation occurred nearly two hundred years afterthe USA was founded when the Civil Rights (1964) Voting Rights (1965)and Fair Housing (1968) Acts were passed

The evolution of states from ethnic to civic statehood occurredthroughout the West and not only in the small number of states dis-cussed in this article This evolution was the norm not the exceptionOnly from the 1960s can we dene Western states as civic while themajority of the East became civic only three decades later in the 1990sAlthough democratic consolidation and civic state building is far fromconsolidated in the East in contrast to the West the East is encouragedby international organizations to continue to evolve along civic lines(something that was not the case in the West) That Western civic statesare still in a process of evolution and are not perfect civic states can beseen in the numerous problems that continue to bedevil them The USstill disenfranchises nearly four million of its citizens a policy that wouldno doubt be condemned by the OSCE if introduced in the East2

By looking at the evolution of Western states in such a manner we

The myth of the civic state 35

shall full two tasks Firstly we shall no longer be able to ignore ethno-cultural factors within civic states Secondly we shall be able to discussin a more frank and open manner the way in which Western statesevolved from ethnic to civic state and nationhood

Conclusion

This article has contributed to the scholarly literature on nationalism byarguing that the Kohn framework of Western states has always been civicfrom the moment of their creation is historically wrong (R S Smith 1997pp 20 31ndash32 499) Western states have evolved from ethnic to civicstates only in the last four decades of the twentieth century Without anunderstanding of this evolution of Western ethnic into civic states wecannot understand the nature of the civic state as containing tensionbetween its universal liberalist and national particularist componentsAll civic states will retain this internal contradiction as long as national-ity remains central to creating the solidarity that pure civic states wouldlack by themselves (Miller 1995 2000)

Both the US and Canadian examples discussed in this article haveshown that Western states typically began as ethnic and only graduallyevolved into civic states from the 1960s Evolution from ethnic to civicnationalism is only likely to take place after the core ethnic group is self-condent within its own bounded territory to open the community tolsquooutsidersrsquo from other ethnic groups Historical evidence shows thatWestern states did not become civic because they so desired but becauseof a multitude of domestic and international pressures (Kaufmann2000b) Belief in civic values can go together with ethnic nationalism andracism and states can move away from their civic bases during times ofperceived crisis

In the US this occurred during the century between the emancipationof the black slaves in the 1860s to re-enfranchising southern blacks inthe 1960s In British Canada this evolution of nationalism took place inthe early twentieth century In French Canada Francophones onlybecame dominant within Quebec after the 1960s a period during whichFrench Canadian nationalism also evolved from ethnic to civic national-ism This process was not solely conned to the US and Canada butoccurred throughout the West

The continued use of the Kohn framework is doubly wrong after adecade of post-Communism in central and eastern Europe when all buttwo of these states became civic Evolution from ethnic to civic stateshas therefore little to do with geography and far more to do with thepositive inuence of international institutions domestic democratic con-solidation and civic institution building Western states have a long his-torical record as ethnic states a factor which makes their evolution moresimilar not different to states in the East

36 Taras Kuzio

Acknowledgements

An earlier and longer version of this paper was presented at the AnnualConvention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities ColumbiaUniversity New York 13ndash15 April 2000 The author would like to thanktwo anonymous ERS referees and Assistant Professor Stephen Shulmanfor their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article

Notes

1 A European Union-wide survey in Spring 1997 found 33 per cent of those inter-viewed describing themselves as lsquoquite racistrsquo or lsquovery racistrsquo Many of these supported thebasic tenets of a civic inclusive liberal democratic state (Eurobarometer Opinion Poll)2 46 states and the District of Columbia have criminal disenfranchisement laws thatdeny the vote to all convicted adults in prison 32 states disenfranchise felons on paroleand 29 those on probation Laws that are unique to the US exist in 14 states that perma-nently disenfranchise former offenders (for life) who have fully served their sentences Thislegislation which runs contrary to established practice in both western and eastern Europeis racially neutral nevertheless due to socio-economic factors it is not surprising that itaffects national minorities blacks and Hispanics more than whites In Florida for example400000 former offenders are permanently excluded from voting of whom half are blacks(representing nearly a third of all blacks in Florida) (Human Rights Watch)

References

ANDERSEN BENEDICT 1991 Imagined Communities London VersoANER STEFAN 2000 lsquoNationalism in central Europe ndash A chance or a threat for theemerging liberal democratic orderrsquo East European Politics and Society vol14 no2pp 213ndash45BAUCOM IAN 1999 Out of Place Englishness Empire and the Location of IdentityPrinceton NJ Princeton University PressBEISSINGER MARK R 1996 lsquoHow nationalism spread Eastern Europe adrift the tidesand cycles of national contentionrsquo Social Research vol 63 no1 pp 97ndash146BOSTOCK WILLIAM W 1997 lsquo ldquoLanguage griefrdquo A ldquoraw materialrdquo of ethnic conictrsquoNationalism and Ethnic Politics vol3 no4 pp 94ndash112BRETON RAYMOND 1988 lsquoFrom ethnic to civic nationalism English Canada andQuebecrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 2 no1 pp 85ndash102BROWN DAVID 1999 lsquoAre there good and bad nationalismsrsquo Nations and Nationalismvol5 no2 pp 281ndash302BRUBAKER ROGERS 1995 lsquoNational minorities nationalizing states and externalhomelands in the new Europersquo Daedalus vol124 no2 pp 107ndash32CANOVAN MARGARET 1996 Nationhood and Political Theory Cheltenham EdwardElgarCONNOR WALKER 1972 lsquoNation-building or nation-destroyingrsquo World PoliticsvolXXIV no3 pp 319ndash55COUNCIL of EUROPE COMMITTEE on CULTURE and EDUCATION Recom-mendation 1283 (22 January 1996) Document 7446DAHL ROBERT 1971 Polyarchy New Haven CT Yale University PressEUROBAROMETER OPINION POLL no471 Luxembourg lsquoRacism and Xeno-phobia in Europersquo 18ndash19 December 1991FINLAYSON ALAN 1998 lsquoIdeology discourse and nationalismrsquo Journal of PoliticalIdeologies vol3 no1 pp 99ndash119

The myth of the civic state 37

study of European nation-states Krejci and Velimsky (1996) concludedthat of the seventy-three ethnic groups in Europe forty-two were bothethnic and political nations Of the remainder twenty-three were purelyethnic and only eight were purely political Those they classied as bothethnic-political in the West included the English French Irish Por-tuguese Scots Spanish Danes Finns Icelanders Norwegians SwedesFlemings Walloons Dutch Maltese Frisians Germans Greeks Italiansand the Swiss (Krejci and Velimsky 1996 pp 212ndash17) Four out of vecountries in Kohnrsquos West (England France The Netherlands andSwitzerland) were consequently classied by them as both ethnic andpolitical The US was not included within this survey but should also beclassied as both ethnic and civic because the former dominated overthe latter until the 1960s (Foner 1998 p 38 Kaufmann 1999 2000b)

Thirdly an articial division of nationalism by geography ignoresethnic and territorial violence that has taken place in Western statesThis discourse which believes that ethnic nationalism and conict areonly endemic to the East is still highly inuential The Organisation forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for example only dealswith ethnic and civic problems in the East Yet arguably there are asmany ethnic conicts in the West as there are in the East although theOSCE does not intervene within the former In post-communist Europeethnic conict has only turned into violence in three regions Yugoslavia(Bosnia Croatia Kosovo) Moldova (Trans-Dniester) and Russia(Chechnya) Meanwhile the West has experienced inter-ethnic conictin the UK (Northern Ireland) France (Corsica Brittany) Belgium(Flanders) Canada (Quebec) and Spain (Basque) Many of these areongoing sometimes turning to violence and their long-term naturesuggests that they may need an outside neutral body such as the OSCEto intervene Ongoing ethnic and religious conicts in Northern Irelandand the Basque region are as deep as any that can be found in post-communist Europe But OSCE intervention in these conicts wouldchallenge the very nature of the still inuential discourse that ethnic andcivic problems only exist in the East ndash not in the West

Kohn also negatively assesses nationalism in the lsquoEastrsquo by reectingon their territorial disputes with neighbours At the same time heignores how the lsquoWestrsquo created large-scale overseas empires during thisperiod and he does not discuss the numerous territorial disputes that theWest was involved in itself during its state and nation-building projectsThe Kohn view of a benign US that did not meet resistance to its terri-torial expansion is still inuential Freedland (1998 p 86) argues thatthe US pioneers saw only lsquoemptinessrsquo when they moved Westwards lsquotoconquer the territory and ll the voidrsquo

The UK had ethnic and imperial problems throughout the period priorto the mid-twentieth century both in Ireland and further aeld The warsof the revolution (1792ndash1802) and the Napoleonic wars (1803ndash1815)

The myth of the civic state 25

immediately followed the French Revolution and led to French terri-torial problems with most of Europe and local territorial conicts withGermany and Belgium (Snyder 2000 pp 154ndash68)

The US invaded Canada in 1812 and the expansion of American terri-tory westwards and southwards brought it into territorial and ethnicconict with Native Indians Spaniards and Mexicans The US Civil Warin the early 1860s produced 600000 casualties a huge number for thetime (in contrast the US had only 50000 casualties a century later in alonger war in Vietnam when its population was proportionately farlarger) After the US-Spanish war in 1898 the US occupied the Philip-pines Guam Hawaii and Puerto Rico but only reluctantly admitted thelatter two into the union in 1900 and 1917 respectively The Philipinoswere lsquouncivilisedrsquo and lsquounassimablersquo and therefore could not be broughtinto the union (R M Smith 1997)

Fourthly Kohnrsquos division of nationalism into two groups idealizesnationalism in the lsquoWestrsquo as a civic phenomenon that was always fullyinclusive of social and ethnic groups He ignores the exclusion of NativeIndians (and blacks) from the US civic nation throughout most of thenineteenth century Indeed eleven southern states denied civil rights toblacks until as late as the 1960s in what can only be dened as a regionalpolicy of apartheid

American policies lsquoworked tirelessly to obliterate all customs that didnot meet their view of civilized actionsrsquo among Native Indians (Nichols1998 pp 28ndash29) The Puritans dened Indians as lsquoSatanicrsquo something thatexcused numerous instances of savagery against them These Englishviews of Native Indians had a long tradition England as the lsquoNew Israelrsquoprovided an ideology that could look to the Old Testament for guidancewhen God destroyed his heathen enemies English Anglo-Saxon cultureand Protestant religion were on the side of lsquogoodrsquo in a battle with lsquoevilrsquo

The earlier English ideas about the backward and savage Irish theundeserving power and the ever-increasing negative ideas about theblack slaves expanded gradually to include Indians

Recent experiences with the Irish had prepared them to considertheir tribal neighbors as backward and savage (Nichols 1998 pp59ndash60)

As North America experienced a rapid growth in colonists the numberof Native Indians rapidly declined because of lsquogenocidersquo and enslave-ment (Nichols 1998) Intolerance grew the Indians became subjectlsquodefeatedrsquo peoples entire tribes (nations) were destroyed and othersforcibly cleansed and their lands taken away (Nichols 1998 p 108)English laws language and culture were forcefully and unequallyimposed upon Native Indians This ethnic cleansing of Indians accom-panied by lsquofraud intimidation and violencersquo became lsquoindispensable to

26 Taras Kuzio

the triumph of manifest destiny and the American mission of spreadingfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p 51)

In the 1940s the US was also nally opened up to Asians Throughout80 per cent of American history US legislation disbarred most people inthe world from becoming US citizens due to their race nationality orgender (R M Smith 1997 p 14) Race and ethnic restrictions on immi-gration were introduced in 1882 and a system of permanent quotas forethnic groups in 1924 (R M Smith 1997 p 118) This policy of lsquoethnicdefencersquo from the 1830s to the 1920s was followed by four decades oflsquoAnglo-conformityrsquo which established Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the US(Kaufmann 2000b)

Nevertheless scholars have traditionally dened the US after 1776 asa civic state Kaufmann (1999 p 443) disagrees and denes the US asone of the rst Western lsquoethnicrsquo nations that was dened by contempor-ary writers in the early-nineteenth century as the lsquoEnglish race inAmericarsquo or lsquoAnglo-Americansrsquo (Kaufmannn 2000b)

In 1776 the colonists in North America were 80 per cent British and98 per cent Protestant Most states introduced anti-Catholic statutes thatgrew out of the French and Indian wars of 1754ndash1763 After the USrevolution an exclusive ethnic Protestant consciousness evolved of alsquochosen peoplersquo based upon an identity of being white (not black orIndian) Protestant (not French or Hispanic Catholic) English in speechand Liberal (in contrast to the royalist British) Other immigrants fromnorth western Europe and Britain were assimilated into a lsquoWASPrsquo(White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) identity

Kaufmann (1999 2000a) therefore sees the US experience as a similarevolution from ethnic to civic statehood as in the remainder of westernEurope with a core ethnic group creating an ethnic state that only gradu-ally evolved into a civic state much later The evolution of the US froman ethnic to a civic state is not unique but part of a broader trend amongWestern states (Kaufmann 2000a)

The evolution of the US into a civic state from the 1960s only occurredafter Anglo-Saxon hegemony had been established and only as a conse-quence of change forced upon it from within and outside (Kaufmannn2000a p 1097) This growing trend in favour of civic nationalism wasnot embraced voluntarily in the US a purely state nationalism failed tosupplant sub-state ethnic loyalties to which citizens may often hold theirprimary allegiance (Kaufmann 2000a pp 1097 1102ndash03)

Tension between civic and ethnic factors in Britain until the 1960s wassubsumed within the conict between the national English lsquoherersquo and theimperial British civic lsquotherersquo (Baucom 1999 p 37) With the empire gonethe ethnic civic conict came back to England Therefore Englishnationalism should not be treated as civic since the sixteenth century asKohn (1940) argued but as ethnic a nationalism only constrained by thecivic nature of British and imperial identity that allowed non-White

The myth of the civic state 27

imperial subjects to be British but never English Threats from immi-gration from the former empire for example can lead civic states toreturn to their ethnic basis as with the 1981 UK Nationality Act Thisdrew much of its strength from racist ideas promoted by Enoch Powellin the 1960s who himself lsquodraws on a long history of the reading of Eng-lishness as primarily a racial categoryrsquo (Baucom 1999 p 15) This tensionbetween the liberal-labour and conservative wings of British politics overregional devolution immigration and multiculturalism continues to thisday

Canada went through a similar process of evolution from ethnic tocivic nationalism as the US where the central preoccupation of statebuilders was to preserve cultural unity so that political and linguisticboundaries coincided (Breton 1988) Rational-legal (civic-territorial)factors came secondary to this endeavour Unlike the US the Canadianstate inherited two not one ethnic cores British and French (Kaufmann1997) Both were initially based upon ethnic nationalism and attemptedto separately construct ethno-cultural societies In French Quebec thisethnic nationalism was more often than not defensive against BritishCanadarsquos attempts at assimilating it In Quebec and Catalonia the evol-ution of nationalism from ethnic to civic variants since the 1960s stilldemands that non-titular nationalities assimilate into the titular ethnicgroup (Harty 1999 pp 672ndash73)

Until the 1950s in Australia a government policy of forced assimi-lation forcibly took children from Aborigines and placed them in white-only schools and families The Australian government still nds itdifcult to apologise and pay compensation for these policies Aborigi-nal peoples were only given the vote in 1967 after an Anglo-SaxonBritish lsquoWhitersquo Australia policy was replaced by multiculturalism

Fifthly the Kohn framework ignores the fact that as in the Westnationalism in the East can also evolve towards a civic variety over timeThis was certainly the case during the 1990s throughout most of post-communist Europe where states have been constructed along civicinclusive lines (although their democracies may as yet be still uncon-solidated) In 1999 the US think-tank Freedom House dened all post-communist European states as lsquocivicrsquo with the exception of Belarus andYugoslavia (Aner 2000 Kuzio 2001)

Sixthly what has been traditionally regarded as positive lsquonation-buildingrsquo processes in the West have been described by (Brubaker 1995see Kuzio 2001) in a negative manner as lsquonationalizing statesrsquo in the EastBoth lsquoWestern civicrsquo and lsquoEastern ethnicrsquo states traditionally homogen-ized their inhabitants Assimilation in civic states such as France meantthe loss of onersquos culture and language as the price for becoming part ofthe French political community Brubakerrsquos lsquonationalizationrsquo of the stateon behalf of the core titular nation in the East is little different from theassimilation by both peaceful and violent means of national minorities

28 Taras Kuzio

in the West (Connor 1972) It ignores the positive role that civic national-ism has played in dismantling empires (eg the former USSR Czecho-slovakia) the removal of dictators (President Slobodan Milosevich inYugoslavia) and opposition to apartheid (the ANC in South Africa)Civic nationalism and liberal democracies are allies ndash not enemies ndash incentral and eastern Europe (Aner 2000 p 245) Both played a role in thetransition from feudalism to modernity in the West there is no reason tobelieve that they will ndash and should ndash not play a similar role in the East

The myth of the civic state

Ethnic and civic states

This article argues that the Kohn (1944 1982) framework is fundamen-tally awed Both the West and the East only became civic from the1960s Western or Eastern states will continue to exhibit ethno-culturalelements even when their nationalisms are civic This article argues thatbecause all states are composed of both civic and ethno-cultural criteriaat different periods of history the proportional mix of the two will bedifferent (Kymlicka 1995 p 88 115 A D Smith 1996 pp 100ndash101 AD Smith 1998 pp 126ndash27) lsquoThe fate of democracy depends on whichone dominates the otherrsquo (Habermas 1996 p 286) Racist views cansometimes go together with strong support for democracy an inclusivestate and respect for fundamental civic and social rights and freedoms1

This may reect the view discussed earlier when civic rights for immi-grants and minorities are only reluctantly granted particularly to thoseperceived as outsiders to the ethnic nation

In the early period of Western states its nationalism was more ethnic(exclusive) than civic (inclusive) (A D Smith 1989 p 149) The strongerpresence of ethnic nationalism in the early stages of state and nation-building may be true of the East as well as the West That the East seemsmore lsquoethnicrsquo today may be therefore more to do with the differenttiming of similar processes

Kymlicka (1996) has criticized the claim that only Eastern nationalismis both ethnic and cultural He believes that cultural nationalism is asmuch at home in the West as it is in the East The rise of English national-ism in the Tudor and Elizabethan eras to which Kohn gives much creditfor later developments was built on cultural nationalism and propagatedby intellectuals poets and writers This English ethnic nationalism re-equipped it for later colonial conquest (Baucom 1999 p 25) There isnothing intrinsically anti-liberal Kymlicka (1996) argues if an ethnicgroup wishes to defend its cultural identity within a civic state

Kymlicka also criticizes Western scholars such as Ignatieff (1993) forwrongly assuming that civic nationalism has no cultural componentbecause all those who are citizens of civic nations participate in a

The myth of the civic state 29

common societal culture Turner (1997 p 9) believes that lsquoCitizenshipidentities and citizenship cultures are national identities and nationalculturesrsquo He continues

When individuals become citizens they not only enter into a set ofinstitutions that confers upon them rights and obligations they notonly acquire an identity they are not only socialised into civic virtuesbut they also become members of a political community with a par-ticular territory and history

The symbios of civic and ethnic actors found within civic states deter-mines the vitality and mobilization capacity of the demos and civilsociety (Miller 1995 2000 Canovan 1996) Although particularism anduniversalism are hostile and competing ideologies in practice national-ism has been the midwife that has brought liberal democracy into theworld and has connected the two ever since If the nation and communityare weakened or decline the demos is also affected The solidarity thatholds together a democracy is the civic nation

Kymlicka (1996) sees no reason to regret the fact that most civic stateshave always been and still are also composed of different cultures Bydenying this factor civic states seek to justify internal homogenization tothe dominant culture and language whether states should therefore bedened as civic or ethnic in Kohnrsquos terms has less to do with the absenceor existence of cultural criteria but if anybody lsquocan be integrated intothe community regardless of race or colourrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 24) andwhat qualications for membership are in place (Canovan 1996 p 19)Kymlicka (1996) therefore stresses that both Western and Easternnationalism have cultural components and identity in both is thereforegrounded in culture

National identity

How do political communities and civic nations hold together Fewscholars would dispute that modern societies require a fraternity (Nisbet1953 pp 153ndash88) a lsquocommunity of valuesrsquo (Parekh 1995 p 436) alsquosingle psychological focus shared by all segmentsrsquo (Connor 1972 p353) a lsquonationalityrsquo (Miller 1995 p 140) a lsquohigh degree of communalsolidarityrsquo (Canovan 1996 pp 28ndash29) and a lsquoWersquo where the nation andthe people are one (Finlayson 1998 p 113) Nevertheless liberal demo-cratic theory assumes a lsquoWersquo is in place and therefore ignores the dif-cult process of forging a lsquoPeoplersquo for the political community Ignoringnationality serves to create a false illusion that lsquocivicrsquo states are purelycivic and are devoid of ethno-cultural factors It also makes it easier todiscuss lsquoWestern civicrsquo states as having always been civic from theirinception

30 Taras Kuzio

Despite the close inter-connection between liberal democracy andnationhood since the late-eighteenth-century political theory tends toignore nationality Nevertheless nationhood is at the heart of politicaltheory even though its particularism has an uneasy marriage with theuniversalism of liberalism How a lsquoPeoplersquo and political solidarity arecreated is often ignored and taken for granted even though it is nation-hood that generates the lsquoWersquo and collective power Successful politiesrequire not only a degree of societal trust but also unity and stabilityfactors which lsquohave always been at the root of politicsrsquo (Canovan 1996p 22)

Advocates of individual rights usually argue that civic states by de-nition are indifferent to ethno-cultural questions Advocates of culturalpluralism on the other hand such as Kymlicka (1996) will counter thosepromoting only individual rights by arguing that all civic states includeethno-cultural elements No civic state can possibly hope to be neutralwhen deciding which ethnic groupsrsquo language culture symbols andanniversaries to promote at the state level (Beissinger 1996 p 101)Although 17 million Americans count Spanish as their rst language onlyone per cent of US federal documents are in non-English languages(Freedland 1998 p 147) Liberals remain concerned that group rightsand cultural pluralism inhibit the creation of a shared identity that civicstates promote They ignore the fact that this shared identity in Westerncivic states is not ethnically or culturally neutral but based upon that ofthe ethnic core (s) Kymlicka (1996) poses a double paradox Multi-ethnic states which represent the majority of nation-states lsquocannotsurvive unless the various national groups have an allegiance to thelarger community they cohabitrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 13) If states ignorethis question and pursue radical homogenizing (or in Brubakerrsquos termlsquonationalizingrsquo) policies this will alienate national minorities and maylead to ethnic and social unrest Civic states have therefore to balancebetween forging an overarching unity in the public domain whileallowing and sometimes fostering polyethnic rights and identities in theprivate sphere (Kuzio forthcoming)

The inclusion of polyethnic rights and the recognition of the value ofcultural pluralism is a relatively recent phenomenon in civic statesWithout the recognition of these rights and pluralism and a concomi-tant rejection of homogenization the imagined civic community will notinclude large numbers of people who do not belong to the ethnic coreKymlicka (1996) and Connor (1972) do not believe that civic statesassimilated non-titulars lsquovoluntarilyrsquo Few national groups voluntarilyassimilated from the eighteenth century and the majority of civic statespursued homogenizing policies until the 1960s France and the US twoof Kohnrsquos civic West still do not legally recognize the concept of nationalminorities because they believe that to do so would undermine their civicstates by prioritizing collective ethnic over individual civic rights Only

The myth of the civic state 31

Canada and Australia adopted multicultural policies in the 1970s (whilenone of Kohnrsquos ve lsquocivicrsquo states adopted similar policies)

Linz and Stepan (1996 pp 35ndash37) dene lsquonationalizingrsquo policies asattempting to homogenize multi-ethnic societies in the East Yet themajority of states both in the West and the East have always been multi-ethnic The newly independent states of the East if they are indeedadopting homogenizing policies are merely mirroring the examples setby the West from the eighteenth century onwards These homogenizingpolicies pursued since the late-eighteenth century in the West were onlymodied in some cases from the 1960s Majority cultures in civic stateshave had a lsquoperverse incentiversquo to destroy the cultures of nationalminorities and lsquothen cite that destruction as a justication for compellingassimilationrsquo (Kymlicka 1995 p 100)

Nation-building in the West was as Connor (1972) commented bothlsquonation creatingrsquo and lsquonation destroyingrsquo All European governmentsincluding those in the West lsquoeventually took steps which homogenizedtheir populationsrsquo (Tilly 1975 p 43) Nation-building in France wasaccompanied by the destruction of local cultures and languages in theperiphery and the imposition of a hegemonic Icircle de France culture thatwas promoted as a benecial lsquola mission civilisatricersquo Weber (1979)describes the slow and uneven process of national integration in Francein the nineteenth century as that of a lsquocolonial empire shaped over thecenturiesrsquo These territories had been lsquoconquered annexed and integratedrsquo by the Icircle de France Parisian ofcials sent to regions such as Brittany felt and behaved as if they were going to an overseas colony

Gellner (1983 pp 142ndash43) sees homogenization as an inevitable by-product of modernization and a functioning national economy Nation-building welded together different peoples into a single communitylsquobased on the cultural heritage of the dominant ethnic corersquo (A D Smith1991 p 68) Thus Western states were not neutral in their nation-building projects and these often marginalized national minorities anddestroyed local identities (Moore 1997 p 904) These factors wereignored by Kohn (1944 1982) in his positive treatment of nationalism inthe West

Historic myths in civic states

Both civic and ethnic states have traditionally used myths and history(Andersen 1991 pp 11ndash12 Schnapper 1997 pp 214 219) As theCouncil of Europe has complained lsquoVirtually all political systems haveused history for their own ends and have imposed both their version ofhistorical facts and their defence of the good and bad gures of historyrsquo(Council of Europe) An objective history may be what historians shouldstrive to write but in reality objective history is as much a myth as states

32 Taras Kuzio

being wholly civic There has often been little to distinguish myth fromhistory as myths have been a lsquopoetic form of historyrsquo (A D Smith 1984p 103)

Smith (1984) points out that all nations since the late-eighteenthcentury have appealed to ancestry and history in the struggle to estab-lish their state and nationhood This process had engulfed the whole ofwestern Europe by 1800 and spread only half a century afterwards toeastern Europe The nationrsquos ancestry had to be demonstrated as vitallsquoboth for self-esteem and security and for external recognitionrsquo (A DSmith 1984 p 101) Historical myths have been traditionally promotedas part of the inculcation of national solidarity within states Myths wereuseful for a variety of policies within the state and nation-buildingproject ndash proving ancient ancestry securing exclusive title to territoryand location the transmission of spiritual values through history pro-motion of heroic ages regeneration of lsquogolden erasrsquo as part of a lsquospecialidentityrsquo and a claim to special status (A D Smith 1984)

The myths of modern Switzerland one of Kohnrsquos ve civic states arefounded on the traditions and memories of an older ethnic nation andare themselves based on a German cultural core The modern Swissstatersquos historical myths and ethno-cultural core are Germanic Through-out Francersquos period of nation-building from 1789ndash1914 the anthem agoaths hymns monuments calendars ceremonies heroes and martyrsappealed to one Gaullist ancestry (A D Smith 1998 p 126) The his-torical past played a prominent role in the inculcation of values andloyalty to the French republic through the construction of monumentsnationalist pedagogy in history teaching museums and memorials inevery commune (Johnson 1993) Just as the English and Americanssought to locate their nation in ancient history the French claimeddescent from the Trojans and Romans The Normans were portrayed asFrankish usurpers who had taken away their rights

Paxman (1999 p 153) believes that lsquoWe must accept rst that a senseof history runs deep in the English peoplersquo The union of Scotland andEngland in 1707 subsumed English within British nationalism that mod-erated English nationalism Nevertheless English myths remained aliveand well in debates over Anglo-Saxon origins archaeology ruralEngland pageants (the opening of parliament the trooping of thecolour the last night of the Proms) and in memories of noble sacriceagainst all odds in World War II such as at Dunkirk (A D Smith 1984p 109) In nineteenth-century England the education system denedEnglish literature as lsquosuperiorrsquo and its culture ideas tastes morals arthistory and family life subscribed to these dominant views of lsquoinferiorrsquoand lsquosuperiorrsquo races not only in the colonies but in countries closer tohome such as Ireland (Hickman 1998) England was the lsquoNew Israelrsquothat was set to deliver its civilization to mankind English history wastreated separately to British and the former placed greater emphasis

The myth of the civic state 33

upon Anglo-Saxon racial origins and an lsquoobsessive interestrsquo in the past(Baucom 1999 pp 15 20 48)

US historical myths linked an alleged pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon loveof liberty with a myth of ethnogenesis which dened the Americans asa new nation that was escaping from the tyranny of the lsquoNormanrsquomonarchs who ruled Britain The US also had an lsquoinfatuationrsquo withAnglo-Saxon history that was included within its myths of ethnogenesis(Kaufmannn 2000b) American exceptionalism portrayed the US nationas the lsquopurestrsquo English (Lipset 1997) a myth of exceptionalism similarto that of the Afrikaner in South Africa the Scots in Ulster and theFrench Canadians in Quebec These American historical myths helpedforge lsquoWASPrsquo cultural boundaries within which dominant Anglo con-formity was promoted in the nineteenth and the rst half of the twenti-eth centuries (Kaufmann 1999 2000b R M Smith 1997 pp 3 460 468)

In a survey of American nation-building from 1776 to the presentSpilman (1997) stressed the centrality of symbols rituals and patrioticorganizations that served to forge a US national identity GeorgeWashington was given a hero-like status after 1789 in portraits birthdaycelebrations shrines books the constitution commemorations ofbattles and independence day celebrations Thanksgiving and MemorialDay were annually celebrated pledges of allegiance were made andlarge historical pageants were held Historical myths have thereforeplayed as important a role in the US as they have in the other fourWestern states cited as lsquocivicrsquo examples by Kohn

Ethnic to civic state an alternative framework

Kohnrsquos division of nationalism traces its positive inclusive qualities retrospectively back to the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries Howevercivic states have never been identical and unanimous in how they wereconstituted The growth of the national state and its provision of civilpolitical cultural and social rights was lsquoslow and unevenrsquo (Mouzelis 1996p 226)

At the time of the American revolution only a small percentage ofwealthy white Protestant males could vote something American colonistsand revolutionaries did not see as unusual Indeed after 1776 slaves con-tinued to be imported into the USA and slavery lsquoemerged from the Revol-ution more rmly entrenched than ever in American lifersquo (Foner 1998 p28) lsquoSlavery rendered blacks all but invisible to those imagining theAmerican communityrsquo (Foner 1998 p 38) US President Thomas Jefferson himself possessed 1000 slaves and believed them to be perma-nently decient in the faculties required to enjoy freedom requiringtutelage by lsquosuperiorrsquo races such as Anglo-Saxons to improve their possi-bility of full civic equality at an unspecied later date (R M Smith 1997p 105) Slavery existed until the 1860s in the USA and the slave trade

34 Taras Kuzio

helped to build up the wealth of Western states Indeed it was only Switzer-land of Kohnrsquos ve Western examples that did not prot from slavery

Although the American national idea as elaborated upon and ideal-ized by Kohn (1944) was based on a mythical devotion to freedom thedenition of who could experience it was initially ethnically narrow andonly gradually evolved into a civic variant after the 1960s The centen-nial of the US revolution in 1876 ignored blacks new non-Anglo-Saxonimmigrants Native Americans and women as not being part of thenation The nineteenth-century US republic had no room for NativeIndian black Spanish or French culture The conquering of New Mexicoand the annexation of Texas was proclaimed as a triumph of ProtestantAnglo-Saxon civilization against the Catholic world and lower racesNew Mexico was not admitted into the union until 1912 even though itpossessed the required population level because it was held to be lsquotooIndianrsquo (Foner 1998 p 79)

By the bicentennial of the US revolution in 1976 the American nationhad evolved from ethnic to civic and included those previously excludedin other words at different times in US history lsquofreedomrsquo had differentmeanings Who was to be included within the American nation is lsquoahighly uneven and bitterly contested part of the story of Americanfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p XVII) Freedom in American history has there-fore been both a lsquomythic idealrsquo and a lsquoliving truthrsquo (Foner 1998 p XXI)

Dahlrsquos denition of a civic state rests on three factors free and fairelections an inclusive suffrage and the right to run for ofce These threebasic civic rights were not always included within Western states In con-temporary denitions of civic states the US and Australia could there-fore not be dened as lsquocivicrsquo states prior to the 1960s because theyexcluded people on the basis of colour and race The breakthrough inwidening the American nation occurred nearly two hundred years afterthe USA was founded when the Civil Rights (1964) Voting Rights (1965)and Fair Housing (1968) Acts were passed

The evolution of states from ethnic to civic statehood occurredthroughout the West and not only in the small number of states dis-cussed in this article This evolution was the norm not the exceptionOnly from the 1960s can we dene Western states as civic while themajority of the East became civic only three decades later in the 1990sAlthough democratic consolidation and civic state building is far fromconsolidated in the East in contrast to the West the East is encouragedby international organizations to continue to evolve along civic lines(something that was not the case in the West) That Western civic statesare still in a process of evolution and are not perfect civic states can beseen in the numerous problems that continue to bedevil them The USstill disenfranchises nearly four million of its citizens a policy that wouldno doubt be condemned by the OSCE if introduced in the East2

By looking at the evolution of Western states in such a manner we

The myth of the civic state 35

shall full two tasks Firstly we shall no longer be able to ignore ethno-cultural factors within civic states Secondly we shall be able to discussin a more frank and open manner the way in which Western statesevolved from ethnic to civic state and nationhood

Conclusion

This article has contributed to the scholarly literature on nationalism byarguing that the Kohn framework of Western states has always been civicfrom the moment of their creation is historically wrong (R S Smith 1997pp 20 31ndash32 499) Western states have evolved from ethnic to civicstates only in the last four decades of the twentieth century Without anunderstanding of this evolution of Western ethnic into civic states wecannot understand the nature of the civic state as containing tensionbetween its universal liberalist and national particularist componentsAll civic states will retain this internal contradiction as long as national-ity remains central to creating the solidarity that pure civic states wouldlack by themselves (Miller 1995 2000)

Both the US and Canadian examples discussed in this article haveshown that Western states typically began as ethnic and only graduallyevolved into civic states from the 1960s Evolution from ethnic to civicnationalism is only likely to take place after the core ethnic group is self-condent within its own bounded territory to open the community tolsquooutsidersrsquo from other ethnic groups Historical evidence shows thatWestern states did not become civic because they so desired but becauseof a multitude of domestic and international pressures (Kaufmann2000b) Belief in civic values can go together with ethnic nationalism andracism and states can move away from their civic bases during times ofperceived crisis

In the US this occurred during the century between the emancipationof the black slaves in the 1860s to re-enfranchising southern blacks inthe 1960s In British Canada this evolution of nationalism took place inthe early twentieth century In French Canada Francophones onlybecame dominant within Quebec after the 1960s a period during whichFrench Canadian nationalism also evolved from ethnic to civic national-ism This process was not solely conned to the US and Canada butoccurred throughout the West

The continued use of the Kohn framework is doubly wrong after adecade of post-Communism in central and eastern Europe when all buttwo of these states became civic Evolution from ethnic to civic stateshas therefore little to do with geography and far more to do with thepositive inuence of international institutions domestic democratic con-solidation and civic institution building Western states have a long his-torical record as ethnic states a factor which makes their evolution moresimilar not different to states in the East

36 Taras Kuzio

Acknowledgements

An earlier and longer version of this paper was presented at the AnnualConvention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities ColumbiaUniversity New York 13ndash15 April 2000 The author would like to thanktwo anonymous ERS referees and Assistant Professor Stephen Shulmanfor their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article

Notes

1 A European Union-wide survey in Spring 1997 found 33 per cent of those inter-viewed describing themselves as lsquoquite racistrsquo or lsquovery racistrsquo Many of these supported thebasic tenets of a civic inclusive liberal democratic state (Eurobarometer Opinion Poll)2 46 states and the District of Columbia have criminal disenfranchisement laws thatdeny the vote to all convicted adults in prison 32 states disenfranchise felons on paroleand 29 those on probation Laws that are unique to the US exist in 14 states that perma-nently disenfranchise former offenders (for life) who have fully served their sentences Thislegislation which runs contrary to established practice in both western and eastern Europeis racially neutral nevertheless due to socio-economic factors it is not surprising that itaffects national minorities blacks and Hispanics more than whites In Florida for example400000 former offenders are permanently excluded from voting of whom half are blacks(representing nearly a third of all blacks in Florida) (Human Rights Watch)

References

ANDERSEN BENEDICT 1991 Imagined Communities London VersoANER STEFAN 2000 lsquoNationalism in central Europe ndash A chance or a threat for theemerging liberal democratic orderrsquo East European Politics and Society vol14 no2pp 213ndash45BAUCOM IAN 1999 Out of Place Englishness Empire and the Location of IdentityPrinceton NJ Princeton University PressBEISSINGER MARK R 1996 lsquoHow nationalism spread Eastern Europe adrift the tidesand cycles of national contentionrsquo Social Research vol 63 no1 pp 97ndash146BOSTOCK WILLIAM W 1997 lsquo ldquoLanguage griefrdquo A ldquoraw materialrdquo of ethnic conictrsquoNationalism and Ethnic Politics vol3 no4 pp 94ndash112BRETON RAYMOND 1988 lsquoFrom ethnic to civic nationalism English Canada andQuebecrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 2 no1 pp 85ndash102BROWN DAVID 1999 lsquoAre there good and bad nationalismsrsquo Nations and Nationalismvol5 no2 pp 281ndash302BRUBAKER ROGERS 1995 lsquoNational minorities nationalizing states and externalhomelands in the new Europersquo Daedalus vol124 no2 pp 107ndash32CANOVAN MARGARET 1996 Nationhood and Political Theory Cheltenham EdwardElgarCONNOR WALKER 1972 lsquoNation-building or nation-destroyingrsquo World PoliticsvolXXIV no3 pp 319ndash55COUNCIL of EUROPE COMMITTEE on CULTURE and EDUCATION Recom-mendation 1283 (22 January 1996) Document 7446DAHL ROBERT 1971 Polyarchy New Haven CT Yale University PressEUROBAROMETER OPINION POLL no471 Luxembourg lsquoRacism and Xeno-phobia in Europersquo 18ndash19 December 1991FINLAYSON ALAN 1998 lsquoIdeology discourse and nationalismrsquo Journal of PoliticalIdeologies vol3 no1 pp 99ndash119

The myth of the civic state 37

immediately followed the French Revolution and led to French terri-torial problems with most of Europe and local territorial conicts withGermany and Belgium (Snyder 2000 pp 154ndash68)

The US invaded Canada in 1812 and the expansion of American terri-tory westwards and southwards brought it into territorial and ethnicconict with Native Indians Spaniards and Mexicans The US Civil Warin the early 1860s produced 600000 casualties a huge number for thetime (in contrast the US had only 50000 casualties a century later in alonger war in Vietnam when its population was proportionately farlarger) After the US-Spanish war in 1898 the US occupied the Philip-pines Guam Hawaii and Puerto Rico but only reluctantly admitted thelatter two into the union in 1900 and 1917 respectively The Philipinoswere lsquouncivilisedrsquo and lsquounassimablersquo and therefore could not be broughtinto the union (R M Smith 1997)

Fourthly Kohnrsquos division of nationalism into two groups idealizesnationalism in the lsquoWestrsquo as a civic phenomenon that was always fullyinclusive of social and ethnic groups He ignores the exclusion of NativeIndians (and blacks) from the US civic nation throughout most of thenineteenth century Indeed eleven southern states denied civil rights toblacks until as late as the 1960s in what can only be dened as a regionalpolicy of apartheid

American policies lsquoworked tirelessly to obliterate all customs that didnot meet their view of civilized actionsrsquo among Native Indians (Nichols1998 pp 28ndash29) The Puritans dened Indians as lsquoSatanicrsquo something thatexcused numerous instances of savagery against them These Englishviews of Native Indians had a long tradition England as the lsquoNew Israelrsquoprovided an ideology that could look to the Old Testament for guidancewhen God destroyed his heathen enemies English Anglo-Saxon cultureand Protestant religion were on the side of lsquogoodrsquo in a battle with lsquoevilrsquo

The earlier English ideas about the backward and savage Irish theundeserving power and the ever-increasing negative ideas about theblack slaves expanded gradually to include Indians

Recent experiences with the Irish had prepared them to considertheir tribal neighbors as backward and savage (Nichols 1998 pp59ndash60)

As North America experienced a rapid growth in colonists the numberof Native Indians rapidly declined because of lsquogenocidersquo and enslave-ment (Nichols 1998) Intolerance grew the Indians became subjectlsquodefeatedrsquo peoples entire tribes (nations) were destroyed and othersforcibly cleansed and their lands taken away (Nichols 1998 p 108)English laws language and culture were forcefully and unequallyimposed upon Native Indians This ethnic cleansing of Indians accom-panied by lsquofraud intimidation and violencersquo became lsquoindispensable to

26 Taras Kuzio

the triumph of manifest destiny and the American mission of spreadingfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p 51)

In the 1940s the US was also nally opened up to Asians Throughout80 per cent of American history US legislation disbarred most people inthe world from becoming US citizens due to their race nationality orgender (R M Smith 1997 p 14) Race and ethnic restrictions on immi-gration were introduced in 1882 and a system of permanent quotas forethnic groups in 1924 (R M Smith 1997 p 118) This policy of lsquoethnicdefencersquo from the 1830s to the 1920s was followed by four decades oflsquoAnglo-conformityrsquo which established Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the US(Kaufmann 2000b)

Nevertheless scholars have traditionally dened the US after 1776 asa civic state Kaufmann (1999 p 443) disagrees and denes the US asone of the rst Western lsquoethnicrsquo nations that was dened by contempor-ary writers in the early-nineteenth century as the lsquoEnglish race inAmericarsquo or lsquoAnglo-Americansrsquo (Kaufmannn 2000b)

In 1776 the colonists in North America were 80 per cent British and98 per cent Protestant Most states introduced anti-Catholic statutes thatgrew out of the French and Indian wars of 1754ndash1763 After the USrevolution an exclusive ethnic Protestant consciousness evolved of alsquochosen peoplersquo based upon an identity of being white (not black orIndian) Protestant (not French or Hispanic Catholic) English in speechand Liberal (in contrast to the royalist British) Other immigrants fromnorth western Europe and Britain were assimilated into a lsquoWASPrsquo(White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) identity

Kaufmann (1999 2000a) therefore sees the US experience as a similarevolution from ethnic to civic statehood as in the remainder of westernEurope with a core ethnic group creating an ethnic state that only gradu-ally evolved into a civic state much later The evolution of the US froman ethnic to a civic state is not unique but part of a broader trend amongWestern states (Kaufmann 2000a)

The evolution of the US into a civic state from the 1960s only occurredafter Anglo-Saxon hegemony had been established and only as a conse-quence of change forced upon it from within and outside (Kaufmannn2000a p 1097) This growing trend in favour of civic nationalism wasnot embraced voluntarily in the US a purely state nationalism failed tosupplant sub-state ethnic loyalties to which citizens may often hold theirprimary allegiance (Kaufmann 2000a pp 1097 1102ndash03)

Tension between civic and ethnic factors in Britain until the 1960s wassubsumed within the conict between the national English lsquoherersquo and theimperial British civic lsquotherersquo (Baucom 1999 p 37) With the empire gonethe ethnic civic conict came back to England Therefore Englishnationalism should not be treated as civic since the sixteenth century asKohn (1940) argued but as ethnic a nationalism only constrained by thecivic nature of British and imperial identity that allowed non-White

The myth of the civic state 27

imperial subjects to be British but never English Threats from immi-gration from the former empire for example can lead civic states toreturn to their ethnic basis as with the 1981 UK Nationality Act Thisdrew much of its strength from racist ideas promoted by Enoch Powellin the 1960s who himself lsquodraws on a long history of the reading of Eng-lishness as primarily a racial categoryrsquo (Baucom 1999 p 15) This tensionbetween the liberal-labour and conservative wings of British politics overregional devolution immigration and multiculturalism continues to thisday

Canada went through a similar process of evolution from ethnic tocivic nationalism as the US where the central preoccupation of statebuilders was to preserve cultural unity so that political and linguisticboundaries coincided (Breton 1988) Rational-legal (civic-territorial)factors came secondary to this endeavour Unlike the US the Canadianstate inherited two not one ethnic cores British and French (Kaufmann1997) Both were initially based upon ethnic nationalism and attemptedto separately construct ethno-cultural societies In French Quebec thisethnic nationalism was more often than not defensive against BritishCanadarsquos attempts at assimilating it In Quebec and Catalonia the evol-ution of nationalism from ethnic to civic variants since the 1960s stilldemands that non-titular nationalities assimilate into the titular ethnicgroup (Harty 1999 pp 672ndash73)

Until the 1950s in Australia a government policy of forced assimi-lation forcibly took children from Aborigines and placed them in white-only schools and families The Australian government still nds itdifcult to apologise and pay compensation for these policies Aborigi-nal peoples were only given the vote in 1967 after an Anglo-SaxonBritish lsquoWhitersquo Australia policy was replaced by multiculturalism

Fifthly the Kohn framework ignores the fact that as in the Westnationalism in the East can also evolve towards a civic variety over timeThis was certainly the case during the 1990s throughout most of post-communist Europe where states have been constructed along civicinclusive lines (although their democracies may as yet be still uncon-solidated) In 1999 the US think-tank Freedom House dened all post-communist European states as lsquocivicrsquo with the exception of Belarus andYugoslavia (Aner 2000 Kuzio 2001)

Sixthly what has been traditionally regarded as positive lsquonation-buildingrsquo processes in the West have been described by (Brubaker 1995see Kuzio 2001) in a negative manner as lsquonationalizing statesrsquo in the EastBoth lsquoWestern civicrsquo and lsquoEastern ethnicrsquo states traditionally homogen-ized their inhabitants Assimilation in civic states such as France meantthe loss of onersquos culture and language as the price for becoming part ofthe French political community Brubakerrsquos lsquonationalizationrsquo of the stateon behalf of the core titular nation in the East is little different from theassimilation by both peaceful and violent means of national minorities

28 Taras Kuzio

in the West (Connor 1972) It ignores the positive role that civic national-ism has played in dismantling empires (eg the former USSR Czecho-slovakia) the removal of dictators (President Slobodan Milosevich inYugoslavia) and opposition to apartheid (the ANC in South Africa)Civic nationalism and liberal democracies are allies ndash not enemies ndash incentral and eastern Europe (Aner 2000 p 245) Both played a role in thetransition from feudalism to modernity in the West there is no reason tobelieve that they will ndash and should ndash not play a similar role in the East

The myth of the civic state

Ethnic and civic states

This article argues that the Kohn (1944 1982) framework is fundamen-tally awed Both the West and the East only became civic from the1960s Western or Eastern states will continue to exhibit ethno-culturalelements even when their nationalisms are civic This article argues thatbecause all states are composed of both civic and ethno-cultural criteriaat different periods of history the proportional mix of the two will bedifferent (Kymlicka 1995 p 88 115 A D Smith 1996 pp 100ndash101 AD Smith 1998 pp 126ndash27) lsquoThe fate of democracy depends on whichone dominates the otherrsquo (Habermas 1996 p 286) Racist views cansometimes go together with strong support for democracy an inclusivestate and respect for fundamental civic and social rights and freedoms1

This may reect the view discussed earlier when civic rights for immi-grants and minorities are only reluctantly granted particularly to thoseperceived as outsiders to the ethnic nation

In the early period of Western states its nationalism was more ethnic(exclusive) than civic (inclusive) (A D Smith 1989 p 149) The strongerpresence of ethnic nationalism in the early stages of state and nation-building may be true of the East as well as the West That the East seemsmore lsquoethnicrsquo today may be therefore more to do with the differenttiming of similar processes

Kymlicka (1996) has criticized the claim that only Eastern nationalismis both ethnic and cultural He believes that cultural nationalism is asmuch at home in the West as it is in the East The rise of English national-ism in the Tudor and Elizabethan eras to which Kohn gives much creditfor later developments was built on cultural nationalism and propagatedby intellectuals poets and writers This English ethnic nationalism re-equipped it for later colonial conquest (Baucom 1999 p 25) There isnothing intrinsically anti-liberal Kymlicka (1996) argues if an ethnicgroup wishes to defend its cultural identity within a civic state

Kymlicka also criticizes Western scholars such as Ignatieff (1993) forwrongly assuming that civic nationalism has no cultural componentbecause all those who are citizens of civic nations participate in a

The myth of the civic state 29

common societal culture Turner (1997 p 9) believes that lsquoCitizenshipidentities and citizenship cultures are national identities and nationalculturesrsquo He continues

When individuals become citizens they not only enter into a set ofinstitutions that confers upon them rights and obligations they notonly acquire an identity they are not only socialised into civic virtuesbut they also become members of a political community with a par-ticular territory and history

The symbios of civic and ethnic actors found within civic states deter-mines the vitality and mobilization capacity of the demos and civilsociety (Miller 1995 2000 Canovan 1996) Although particularism anduniversalism are hostile and competing ideologies in practice national-ism has been the midwife that has brought liberal democracy into theworld and has connected the two ever since If the nation and communityare weakened or decline the demos is also affected The solidarity thatholds together a democracy is the civic nation

Kymlicka (1996) sees no reason to regret the fact that most civic stateshave always been and still are also composed of different cultures Bydenying this factor civic states seek to justify internal homogenization tothe dominant culture and language whether states should therefore bedened as civic or ethnic in Kohnrsquos terms has less to do with the absenceor existence of cultural criteria but if anybody lsquocan be integrated intothe community regardless of race or colourrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 24) andwhat qualications for membership are in place (Canovan 1996 p 19)Kymlicka (1996) therefore stresses that both Western and Easternnationalism have cultural components and identity in both is thereforegrounded in culture

National identity

How do political communities and civic nations hold together Fewscholars would dispute that modern societies require a fraternity (Nisbet1953 pp 153ndash88) a lsquocommunity of valuesrsquo (Parekh 1995 p 436) alsquosingle psychological focus shared by all segmentsrsquo (Connor 1972 p353) a lsquonationalityrsquo (Miller 1995 p 140) a lsquohigh degree of communalsolidarityrsquo (Canovan 1996 pp 28ndash29) and a lsquoWersquo where the nation andthe people are one (Finlayson 1998 p 113) Nevertheless liberal demo-cratic theory assumes a lsquoWersquo is in place and therefore ignores the dif-cult process of forging a lsquoPeoplersquo for the political community Ignoringnationality serves to create a false illusion that lsquocivicrsquo states are purelycivic and are devoid of ethno-cultural factors It also makes it easier todiscuss lsquoWestern civicrsquo states as having always been civic from theirinception

30 Taras Kuzio

Despite the close inter-connection between liberal democracy andnationhood since the late-eighteenth-century political theory tends toignore nationality Nevertheless nationhood is at the heart of politicaltheory even though its particularism has an uneasy marriage with theuniversalism of liberalism How a lsquoPeoplersquo and political solidarity arecreated is often ignored and taken for granted even though it is nation-hood that generates the lsquoWersquo and collective power Successful politiesrequire not only a degree of societal trust but also unity and stabilityfactors which lsquohave always been at the root of politicsrsquo (Canovan 1996p 22)

Advocates of individual rights usually argue that civic states by de-nition are indifferent to ethno-cultural questions Advocates of culturalpluralism on the other hand such as Kymlicka (1996) will counter thosepromoting only individual rights by arguing that all civic states includeethno-cultural elements No civic state can possibly hope to be neutralwhen deciding which ethnic groupsrsquo language culture symbols andanniversaries to promote at the state level (Beissinger 1996 p 101)Although 17 million Americans count Spanish as their rst language onlyone per cent of US federal documents are in non-English languages(Freedland 1998 p 147) Liberals remain concerned that group rightsand cultural pluralism inhibit the creation of a shared identity that civicstates promote They ignore the fact that this shared identity in Westerncivic states is not ethnically or culturally neutral but based upon that ofthe ethnic core (s) Kymlicka (1996) poses a double paradox Multi-ethnic states which represent the majority of nation-states lsquocannotsurvive unless the various national groups have an allegiance to thelarger community they cohabitrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 13) If states ignorethis question and pursue radical homogenizing (or in Brubakerrsquos termlsquonationalizingrsquo) policies this will alienate national minorities and maylead to ethnic and social unrest Civic states have therefore to balancebetween forging an overarching unity in the public domain whileallowing and sometimes fostering polyethnic rights and identities in theprivate sphere (Kuzio forthcoming)

The inclusion of polyethnic rights and the recognition of the value ofcultural pluralism is a relatively recent phenomenon in civic statesWithout the recognition of these rights and pluralism and a concomi-tant rejection of homogenization the imagined civic community will notinclude large numbers of people who do not belong to the ethnic coreKymlicka (1996) and Connor (1972) do not believe that civic statesassimilated non-titulars lsquovoluntarilyrsquo Few national groups voluntarilyassimilated from the eighteenth century and the majority of civic statespursued homogenizing policies until the 1960s France and the US twoof Kohnrsquos civic West still do not legally recognize the concept of nationalminorities because they believe that to do so would undermine their civicstates by prioritizing collective ethnic over individual civic rights Only

The myth of the civic state 31

Canada and Australia adopted multicultural policies in the 1970s (whilenone of Kohnrsquos ve lsquocivicrsquo states adopted similar policies)

Linz and Stepan (1996 pp 35ndash37) dene lsquonationalizingrsquo policies asattempting to homogenize multi-ethnic societies in the East Yet themajority of states both in the West and the East have always been multi-ethnic The newly independent states of the East if they are indeedadopting homogenizing policies are merely mirroring the examples setby the West from the eighteenth century onwards These homogenizingpolicies pursued since the late-eighteenth century in the West were onlymodied in some cases from the 1960s Majority cultures in civic stateshave had a lsquoperverse incentiversquo to destroy the cultures of nationalminorities and lsquothen cite that destruction as a justication for compellingassimilationrsquo (Kymlicka 1995 p 100)

Nation-building in the West was as Connor (1972) commented bothlsquonation creatingrsquo and lsquonation destroyingrsquo All European governmentsincluding those in the West lsquoeventually took steps which homogenizedtheir populationsrsquo (Tilly 1975 p 43) Nation-building in France wasaccompanied by the destruction of local cultures and languages in theperiphery and the imposition of a hegemonic Icircle de France culture thatwas promoted as a benecial lsquola mission civilisatricersquo Weber (1979)describes the slow and uneven process of national integration in Francein the nineteenth century as that of a lsquocolonial empire shaped over thecenturiesrsquo These territories had been lsquoconquered annexed and integratedrsquo by the Icircle de France Parisian ofcials sent to regions such as Brittany felt and behaved as if they were going to an overseas colony

Gellner (1983 pp 142ndash43) sees homogenization as an inevitable by-product of modernization and a functioning national economy Nation-building welded together different peoples into a single communitylsquobased on the cultural heritage of the dominant ethnic corersquo (A D Smith1991 p 68) Thus Western states were not neutral in their nation-building projects and these often marginalized national minorities anddestroyed local identities (Moore 1997 p 904) These factors wereignored by Kohn (1944 1982) in his positive treatment of nationalism inthe West

Historic myths in civic states

Both civic and ethnic states have traditionally used myths and history(Andersen 1991 pp 11ndash12 Schnapper 1997 pp 214 219) As theCouncil of Europe has complained lsquoVirtually all political systems haveused history for their own ends and have imposed both their version ofhistorical facts and their defence of the good and bad gures of historyrsquo(Council of Europe) An objective history may be what historians shouldstrive to write but in reality objective history is as much a myth as states

32 Taras Kuzio

being wholly civic There has often been little to distinguish myth fromhistory as myths have been a lsquopoetic form of historyrsquo (A D Smith 1984p 103)

Smith (1984) points out that all nations since the late-eighteenthcentury have appealed to ancestry and history in the struggle to estab-lish their state and nationhood This process had engulfed the whole ofwestern Europe by 1800 and spread only half a century afterwards toeastern Europe The nationrsquos ancestry had to be demonstrated as vitallsquoboth for self-esteem and security and for external recognitionrsquo (A DSmith 1984 p 101) Historical myths have been traditionally promotedas part of the inculcation of national solidarity within states Myths wereuseful for a variety of policies within the state and nation-buildingproject ndash proving ancient ancestry securing exclusive title to territoryand location the transmission of spiritual values through history pro-motion of heroic ages regeneration of lsquogolden erasrsquo as part of a lsquospecialidentityrsquo and a claim to special status (A D Smith 1984)

The myths of modern Switzerland one of Kohnrsquos ve civic states arefounded on the traditions and memories of an older ethnic nation andare themselves based on a German cultural core The modern Swissstatersquos historical myths and ethno-cultural core are Germanic Through-out Francersquos period of nation-building from 1789ndash1914 the anthem agoaths hymns monuments calendars ceremonies heroes and martyrsappealed to one Gaullist ancestry (A D Smith 1998 p 126) The his-torical past played a prominent role in the inculcation of values andloyalty to the French republic through the construction of monumentsnationalist pedagogy in history teaching museums and memorials inevery commune (Johnson 1993) Just as the English and Americanssought to locate their nation in ancient history the French claimeddescent from the Trojans and Romans The Normans were portrayed asFrankish usurpers who had taken away their rights

Paxman (1999 p 153) believes that lsquoWe must accept rst that a senseof history runs deep in the English peoplersquo The union of Scotland andEngland in 1707 subsumed English within British nationalism that mod-erated English nationalism Nevertheless English myths remained aliveand well in debates over Anglo-Saxon origins archaeology ruralEngland pageants (the opening of parliament the trooping of thecolour the last night of the Proms) and in memories of noble sacriceagainst all odds in World War II such as at Dunkirk (A D Smith 1984p 109) In nineteenth-century England the education system denedEnglish literature as lsquosuperiorrsquo and its culture ideas tastes morals arthistory and family life subscribed to these dominant views of lsquoinferiorrsquoand lsquosuperiorrsquo races not only in the colonies but in countries closer tohome such as Ireland (Hickman 1998) England was the lsquoNew Israelrsquothat was set to deliver its civilization to mankind English history wastreated separately to British and the former placed greater emphasis

The myth of the civic state 33

upon Anglo-Saxon racial origins and an lsquoobsessive interestrsquo in the past(Baucom 1999 pp 15 20 48)

US historical myths linked an alleged pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon loveof liberty with a myth of ethnogenesis which dened the Americans asa new nation that was escaping from the tyranny of the lsquoNormanrsquomonarchs who ruled Britain The US also had an lsquoinfatuationrsquo withAnglo-Saxon history that was included within its myths of ethnogenesis(Kaufmannn 2000b) American exceptionalism portrayed the US nationas the lsquopurestrsquo English (Lipset 1997) a myth of exceptionalism similarto that of the Afrikaner in South Africa the Scots in Ulster and theFrench Canadians in Quebec These American historical myths helpedforge lsquoWASPrsquo cultural boundaries within which dominant Anglo con-formity was promoted in the nineteenth and the rst half of the twenti-eth centuries (Kaufmann 1999 2000b R M Smith 1997 pp 3 460 468)

In a survey of American nation-building from 1776 to the presentSpilman (1997) stressed the centrality of symbols rituals and patrioticorganizations that served to forge a US national identity GeorgeWashington was given a hero-like status after 1789 in portraits birthdaycelebrations shrines books the constitution commemorations ofbattles and independence day celebrations Thanksgiving and MemorialDay were annually celebrated pledges of allegiance were made andlarge historical pageants were held Historical myths have thereforeplayed as important a role in the US as they have in the other fourWestern states cited as lsquocivicrsquo examples by Kohn

Ethnic to civic state an alternative framework

Kohnrsquos division of nationalism traces its positive inclusive qualities retrospectively back to the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries Howevercivic states have never been identical and unanimous in how they wereconstituted The growth of the national state and its provision of civilpolitical cultural and social rights was lsquoslow and unevenrsquo (Mouzelis 1996p 226)

At the time of the American revolution only a small percentage ofwealthy white Protestant males could vote something American colonistsand revolutionaries did not see as unusual Indeed after 1776 slaves con-tinued to be imported into the USA and slavery lsquoemerged from the Revol-ution more rmly entrenched than ever in American lifersquo (Foner 1998 p28) lsquoSlavery rendered blacks all but invisible to those imagining theAmerican communityrsquo (Foner 1998 p 38) US President Thomas Jefferson himself possessed 1000 slaves and believed them to be perma-nently decient in the faculties required to enjoy freedom requiringtutelage by lsquosuperiorrsquo races such as Anglo-Saxons to improve their possi-bility of full civic equality at an unspecied later date (R M Smith 1997p 105) Slavery existed until the 1860s in the USA and the slave trade

34 Taras Kuzio

helped to build up the wealth of Western states Indeed it was only Switzer-land of Kohnrsquos ve Western examples that did not prot from slavery

Although the American national idea as elaborated upon and ideal-ized by Kohn (1944) was based on a mythical devotion to freedom thedenition of who could experience it was initially ethnically narrow andonly gradually evolved into a civic variant after the 1960s The centen-nial of the US revolution in 1876 ignored blacks new non-Anglo-Saxonimmigrants Native Americans and women as not being part of thenation The nineteenth-century US republic had no room for NativeIndian black Spanish or French culture The conquering of New Mexicoand the annexation of Texas was proclaimed as a triumph of ProtestantAnglo-Saxon civilization against the Catholic world and lower racesNew Mexico was not admitted into the union until 1912 even though itpossessed the required population level because it was held to be lsquotooIndianrsquo (Foner 1998 p 79)

By the bicentennial of the US revolution in 1976 the American nationhad evolved from ethnic to civic and included those previously excludedin other words at different times in US history lsquofreedomrsquo had differentmeanings Who was to be included within the American nation is lsquoahighly uneven and bitterly contested part of the story of Americanfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p XVII) Freedom in American history has there-fore been both a lsquomythic idealrsquo and a lsquoliving truthrsquo (Foner 1998 p XXI)

Dahlrsquos denition of a civic state rests on three factors free and fairelections an inclusive suffrage and the right to run for ofce These threebasic civic rights were not always included within Western states In con-temporary denitions of civic states the US and Australia could there-fore not be dened as lsquocivicrsquo states prior to the 1960s because theyexcluded people on the basis of colour and race The breakthrough inwidening the American nation occurred nearly two hundred years afterthe USA was founded when the Civil Rights (1964) Voting Rights (1965)and Fair Housing (1968) Acts were passed

The evolution of states from ethnic to civic statehood occurredthroughout the West and not only in the small number of states dis-cussed in this article This evolution was the norm not the exceptionOnly from the 1960s can we dene Western states as civic while themajority of the East became civic only three decades later in the 1990sAlthough democratic consolidation and civic state building is far fromconsolidated in the East in contrast to the West the East is encouragedby international organizations to continue to evolve along civic lines(something that was not the case in the West) That Western civic statesare still in a process of evolution and are not perfect civic states can beseen in the numerous problems that continue to bedevil them The USstill disenfranchises nearly four million of its citizens a policy that wouldno doubt be condemned by the OSCE if introduced in the East2

By looking at the evolution of Western states in such a manner we

The myth of the civic state 35

shall full two tasks Firstly we shall no longer be able to ignore ethno-cultural factors within civic states Secondly we shall be able to discussin a more frank and open manner the way in which Western statesevolved from ethnic to civic state and nationhood

Conclusion

This article has contributed to the scholarly literature on nationalism byarguing that the Kohn framework of Western states has always been civicfrom the moment of their creation is historically wrong (R S Smith 1997pp 20 31ndash32 499) Western states have evolved from ethnic to civicstates only in the last four decades of the twentieth century Without anunderstanding of this evolution of Western ethnic into civic states wecannot understand the nature of the civic state as containing tensionbetween its universal liberalist and national particularist componentsAll civic states will retain this internal contradiction as long as national-ity remains central to creating the solidarity that pure civic states wouldlack by themselves (Miller 1995 2000)

Both the US and Canadian examples discussed in this article haveshown that Western states typically began as ethnic and only graduallyevolved into civic states from the 1960s Evolution from ethnic to civicnationalism is only likely to take place after the core ethnic group is self-condent within its own bounded territory to open the community tolsquooutsidersrsquo from other ethnic groups Historical evidence shows thatWestern states did not become civic because they so desired but becauseof a multitude of domestic and international pressures (Kaufmann2000b) Belief in civic values can go together with ethnic nationalism andracism and states can move away from their civic bases during times ofperceived crisis

In the US this occurred during the century between the emancipationof the black slaves in the 1860s to re-enfranchising southern blacks inthe 1960s In British Canada this evolution of nationalism took place inthe early twentieth century In French Canada Francophones onlybecame dominant within Quebec after the 1960s a period during whichFrench Canadian nationalism also evolved from ethnic to civic national-ism This process was not solely conned to the US and Canada butoccurred throughout the West

The continued use of the Kohn framework is doubly wrong after adecade of post-Communism in central and eastern Europe when all buttwo of these states became civic Evolution from ethnic to civic stateshas therefore little to do with geography and far more to do with thepositive inuence of international institutions domestic democratic con-solidation and civic institution building Western states have a long his-torical record as ethnic states a factor which makes their evolution moresimilar not different to states in the East

36 Taras Kuzio

Acknowledgements

An earlier and longer version of this paper was presented at the AnnualConvention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities ColumbiaUniversity New York 13ndash15 April 2000 The author would like to thanktwo anonymous ERS referees and Assistant Professor Stephen Shulmanfor their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article

Notes

1 A European Union-wide survey in Spring 1997 found 33 per cent of those inter-viewed describing themselves as lsquoquite racistrsquo or lsquovery racistrsquo Many of these supported thebasic tenets of a civic inclusive liberal democratic state (Eurobarometer Opinion Poll)2 46 states and the District of Columbia have criminal disenfranchisement laws thatdeny the vote to all convicted adults in prison 32 states disenfranchise felons on paroleand 29 those on probation Laws that are unique to the US exist in 14 states that perma-nently disenfranchise former offenders (for life) who have fully served their sentences Thislegislation which runs contrary to established practice in both western and eastern Europeis racially neutral nevertheless due to socio-economic factors it is not surprising that itaffects national minorities blacks and Hispanics more than whites In Florida for example400000 former offenders are permanently excluded from voting of whom half are blacks(representing nearly a third of all blacks in Florida) (Human Rights Watch)

References

ANDERSEN BENEDICT 1991 Imagined Communities London VersoANER STEFAN 2000 lsquoNationalism in central Europe ndash A chance or a threat for theemerging liberal democratic orderrsquo East European Politics and Society vol14 no2pp 213ndash45BAUCOM IAN 1999 Out of Place Englishness Empire and the Location of IdentityPrinceton NJ Princeton University PressBEISSINGER MARK R 1996 lsquoHow nationalism spread Eastern Europe adrift the tidesand cycles of national contentionrsquo Social Research vol 63 no1 pp 97ndash146BOSTOCK WILLIAM W 1997 lsquo ldquoLanguage griefrdquo A ldquoraw materialrdquo of ethnic conictrsquoNationalism and Ethnic Politics vol3 no4 pp 94ndash112BRETON RAYMOND 1988 lsquoFrom ethnic to civic nationalism English Canada andQuebecrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 2 no1 pp 85ndash102BROWN DAVID 1999 lsquoAre there good and bad nationalismsrsquo Nations and Nationalismvol5 no2 pp 281ndash302BRUBAKER ROGERS 1995 lsquoNational minorities nationalizing states and externalhomelands in the new Europersquo Daedalus vol124 no2 pp 107ndash32CANOVAN MARGARET 1996 Nationhood and Political Theory Cheltenham EdwardElgarCONNOR WALKER 1972 lsquoNation-building or nation-destroyingrsquo World PoliticsvolXXIV no3 pp 319ndash55COUNCIL of EUROPE COMMITTEE on CULTURE and EDUCATION Recom-mendation 1283 (22 January 1996) Document 7446DAHL ROBERT 1971 Polyarchy New Haven CT Yale University PressEUROBAROMETER OPINION POLL no471 Luxembourg lsquoRacism and Xeno-phobia in Europersquo 18ndash19 December 1991FINLAYSON ALAN 1998 lsquoIdeology discourse and nationalismrsquo Journal of PoliticalIdeologies vol3 no1 pp 99ndash119

The myth of the civic state 37

the triumph of manifest destiny and the American mission of spreadingfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p 51)

In the 1940s the US was also nally opened up to Asians Throughout80 per cent of American history US legislation disbarred most people inthe world from becoming US citizens due to their race nationality orgender (R M Smith 1997 p 14) Race and ethnic restrictions on immi-gration were introduced in 1882 and a system of permanent quotas forethnic groups in 1924 (R M Smith 1997 p 118) This policy of lsquoethnicdefencersquo from the 1830s to the 1920s was followed by four decades oflsquoAnglo-conformityrsquo which established Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the US(Kaufmann 2000b)

Nevertheless scholars have traditionally dened the US after 1776 asa civic state Kaufmann (1999 p 443) disagrees and denes the US asone of the rst Western lsquoethnicrsquo nations that was dened by contempor-ary writers in the early-nineteenth century as the lsquoEnglish race inAmericarsquo or lsquoAnglo-Americansrsquo (Kaufmannn 2000b)

In 1776 the colonists in North America were 80 per cent British and98 per cent Protestant Most states introduced anti-Catholic statutes thatgrew out of the French and Indian wars of 1754ndash1763 After the USrevolution an exclusive ethnic Protestant consciousness evolved of alsquochosen peoplersquo based upon an identity of being white (not black orIndian) Protestant (not French or Hispanic Catholic) English in speechand Liberal (in contrast to the royalist British) Other immigrants fromnorth western Europe and Britain were assimilated into a lsquoWASPrsquo(White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) identity

Kaufmann (1999 2000a) therefore sees the US experience as a similarevolution from ethnic to civic statehood as in the remainder of westernEurope with a core ethnic group creating an ethnic state that only gradu-ally evolved into a civic state much later The evolution of the US froman ethnic to a civic state is not unique but part of a broader trend amongWestern states (Kaufmann 2000a)

The evolution of the US into a civic state from the 1960s only occurredafter Anglo-Saxon hegemony had been established and only as a conse-quence of change forced upon it from within and outside (Kaufmannn2000a p 1097) This growing trend in favour of civic nationalism wasnot embraced voluntarily in the US a purely state nationalism failed tosupplant sub-state ethnic loyalties to which citizens may often hold theirprimary allegiance (Kaufmann 2000a pp 1097 1102ndash03)

Tension between civic and ethnic factors in Britain until the 1960s wassubsumed within the conict between the national English lsquoherersquo and theimperial British civic lsquotherersquo (Baucom 1999 p 37) With the empire gonethe ethnic civic conict came back to England Therefore Englishnationalism should not be treated as civic since the sixteenth century asKohn (1940) argued but as ethnic a nationalism only constrained by thecivic nature of British and imperial identity that allowed non-White

The myth of the civic state 27

imperial subjects to be British but never English Threats from immi-gration from the former empire for example can lead civic states toreturn to their ethnic basis as with the 1981 UK Nationality Act Thisdrew much of its strength from racist ideas promoted by Enoch Powellin the 1960s who himself lsquodraws on a long history of the reading of Eng-lishness as primarily a racial categoryrsquo (Baucom 1999 p 15) This tensionbetween the liberal-labour and conservative wings of British politics overregional devolution immigration and multiculturalism continues to thisday

Canada went through a similar process of evolution from ethnic tocivic nationalism as the US where the central preoccupation of statebuilders was to preserve cultural unity so that political and linguisticboundaries coincided (Breton 1988) Rational-legal (civic-territorial)factors came secondary to this endeavour Unlike the US the Canadianstate inherited two not one ethnic cores British and French (Kaufmann1997) Both were initially based upon ethnic nationalism and attemptedto separately construct ethno-cultural societies In French Quebec thisethnic nationalism was more often than not defensive against BritishCanadarsquos attempts at assimilating it In Quebec and Catalonia the evol-ution of nationalism from ethnic to civic variants since the 1960s stilldemands that non-titular nationalities assimilate into the titular ethnicgroup (Harty 1999 pp 672ndash73)

Until the 1950s in Australia a government policy of forced assimi-lation forcibly took children from Aborigines and placed them in white-only schools and families The Australian government still nds itdifcult to apologise and pay compensation for these policies Aborigi-nal peoples were only given the vote in 1967 after an Anglo-SaxonBritish lsquoWhitersquo Australia policy was replaced by multiculturalism

Fifthly the Kohn framework ignores the fact that as in the Westnationalism in the East can also evolve towards a civic variety over timeThis was certainly the case during the 1990s throughout most of post-communist Europe where states have been constructed along civicinclusive lines (although their democracies may as yet be still uncon-solidated) In 1999 the US think-tank Freedom House dened all post-communist European states as lsquocivicrsquo with the exception of Belarus andYugoslavia (Aner 2000 Kuzio 2001)

Sixthly what has been traditionally regarded as positive lsquonation-buildingrsquo processes in the West have been described by (Brubaker 1995see Kuzio 2001) in a negative manner as lsquonationalizing statesrsquo in the EastBoth lsquoWestern civicrsquo and lsquoEastern ethnicrsquo states traditionally homogen-ized their inhabitants Assimilation in civic states such as France meantthe loss of onersquos culture and language as the price for becoming part ofthe French political community Brubakerrsquos lsquonationalizationrsquo of the stateon behalf of the core titular nation in the East is little different from theassimilation by both peaceful and violent means of national minorities

28 Taras Kuzio

in the West (Connor 1972) It ignores the positive role that civic national-ism has played in dismantling empires (eg the former USSR Czecho-slovakia) the removal of dictators (President Slobodan Milosevich inYugoslavia) and opposition to apartheid (the ANC in South Africa)Civic nationalism and liberal democracies are allies ndash not enemies ndash incentral and eastern Europe (Aner 2000 p 245) Both played a role in thetransition from feudalism to modernity in the West there is no reason tobelieve that they will ndash and should ndash not play a similar role in the East

The myth of the civic state

Ethnic and civic states

This article argues that the Kohn (1944 1982) framework is fundamen-tally awed Both the West and the East only became civic from the1960s Western or Eastern states will continue to exhibit ethno-culturalelements even when their nationalisms are civic This article argues thatbecause all states are composed of both civic and ethno-cultural criteriaat different periods of history the proportional mix of the two will bedifferent (Kymlicka 1995 p 88 115 A D Smith 1996 pp 100ndash101 AD Smith 1998 pp 126ndash27) lsquoThe fate of democracy depends on whichone dominates the otherrsquo (Habermas 1996 p 286) Racist views cansometimes go together with strong support for democracy an inclusivestate and respect for fundamental civic and social rights and freedoms1

This may reect the view discussed earlier when civic rights for immi-grants and minorities are only reluctantly granted particularly to thoseperceived as outsiders to the ethnic nation

In the early period of Western states its nationalism was more ethnic(exclusive) than civic (inclusive) (A D Smith 1989 p 149) The strongerpresence of ethnic nationalism in the early stages of state and nation-building may be true of the East as well as the West That the East seemsmore lsquoethnicrsquo today may be therefore more to do with the differenttiming of similar processes

Kymlicka (1996) has criticized the claim that only Eastern nationalismis both ethnic and cultural He believes that cultural nationalism is asmuch at home in the West as it is in the East The rise of English national-ism in the Tudor and Elizabethan eras to which Kohn gives much creditfor later developments was built on cultural nationalism and propagatedby intellectuals poets and writers This English ethnic nationalism re-equipped it for later colonial conquest (Baucom 1999 p 25) There isnothing intrinsically anti-liberal Kymlicka (1996) argues if an ethnicgroup wishes to defend its cultural identity within a civic state

Kymlicka also criticizes Western scholars such as Ignatieff (1993) forwrongly assuming that civic nationalism has no cultural componentbecause all those who are citizens of civic nations participate in a

The myth of the civic state 29

common societal culture Turner (1997 p 9) believes that lsquoCitizenshipidentities and citizenship cultures are national identities and nationalculturesrsquo He continues

When individuals become citizens they not only enter into a set ofinstitutions that confers upon them rights and obligations they notonly acquire an identity they are not only socialised into civic virtuesbut they also become members of a political community with a par-ticular territory and history

The symbios of civic and ethnic actors found within civic states deter-mines the vitality and mobilization capacity of the demos and civilsociety (Miller 1995 2000 Canovan 1996) Although particularism anduniversalism are hostile and competing ideologies in practice national-ism has been the midwife that has brought liberal democracy into theworld and has connected the two ever since If the nation and communityare weakened or decline the demos is also affected The solidarity thatholds together a democracy is the civic nation

Kymlicka (1996) sees no reason to regret the fact that most civic stateshave always been and still are also composed of different cultures Bydenying this factor civic states seek to justify internal homogenization tothe dominant culture and language whether states should therefore bedened as civic or ethnic in Kohnrsquos terms has less to do with the absenceor existence of cultural criteria but if anybody lsquocan be integrated intothe community regardless of race or colourrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 24) andwhat qualications for membership are in place (Canovan 1996 p 19)Kymlicka (1996) therefore stresses that both Western and Easternnationalism have cultural components and identity in both is thereforegrounded in culture

National identity

How do political communities and civic nations hold together Fewscholars would dispute that modern societies require a fraternity (Nisbet1953 pp 153ndash88) a lsquocommunity of valuesrsquo (Parekh 1995 p 436) alsquosingle psychological focus shared by all segmentsrsquo (Connor 1972 p353) a lsquonationalityrsquo (Miller 1995 p 140) a lsquohigh degree of communalsolidarityrsquo (Canovan 1996 pp 28ndash29) and a lsquoWersquo where the nation andthe people are one (Finlayson 1998 p 113) Nevertheless liberal demo-cratic theory assumes a lsquoWersquo is in place and therefore ignores the dif-cult process of forging a lsquoPeoplersquo for the political community Ignoringnationality serves to create a false illusion that lsquocivicrsquo states are purelycivic and are devoid of ethno-cultural factors It also makes it easier todiscuss lsquoWestern civicrsquo states as having always been civic from theirinception

30 Taras Kuzio

Despite the close inter-connection between liberal democracy andnationhood since the late-eighteenth-century political theory tends toignore nationality Nevertheless nationhood is at the heart of politicaltheory even though its particularism has an uneasy marriage with theuniversalism of liberalism How a lsquoPeoplersquo and political solidarity arecreated is often ignored and taken for granted even though it is nation-hood that generates the lsquoWersquo and collective power Successful politiesrequire not only a degree of societal trust but also unity and stabilityfactors which lsquohave always been at the root of politicsrsquo (Canovan 1996p 22)

Advocates of individual rights usually argue that civic states by de-nition are indifferent to ethno-cultural questions Advocates of culturalpluralism on the other hand such as Kymlicka (1996) will counter thosepromoting only individual rights by arguing that all civic states includeethno-cultural elements No civic state can possibly hope to be neutralwhen deciding which ethnic groupsrsquo language culture symbols andanniversaries to promote at the state level (Beissinger 1996 p 101)Although 17 million Americans count Spanish as their rst language onlyone per cent of US federal documents are in non-English languages(Freedland 1998 p 147) Liberals remain concerned that group rightsand cultural pluralism inhibit the creation of a shared identity that civicstates promote They ignore the fact that this shared identity in Westerncivic states is not ethnically or culturally neutral but based upon that ofthe ethnic core (s) Kymlicka (1996) poses a double paradox Multi-ethnic states which represent the majority of nation-states lsquocannotsurvive unless the various national groups have an allegiance to thelarger community they cohabitrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 13) If states ignorethis question and pursue radical homogenizing (or in Brubakerrsquos termlsquonationalizingrsquo) policies this will alienate national minorities and maylead to ethnic and social unrest Civic states have therefore to balancebetween forging an overarching unity in the public domain whileallowing and sometimes fostering polyethnic rights and identities in theprivate sphere (Kuzio forthcoming)

The inclusion of polyethnic rights and the recognition of the value ofcultural pluralism is a relatively recent phenomenon in civic statesWithout the recognition of these rights and pluralism and a concomi-tant rejection of homogenization the imagined civic community will notinclude large numbers of people who do not belong to the ethnic coreKymlicka (1996) and Connor (1972) do not believe that civic statesassimilated non-titulars lsquovoluntarilyrsquo Few national groups voluntarilyassimilated from the eighteenth century and the majority of civic statespursued homogenizing policies until the 1960s France and the US twoof Kohnrsquos civic West still do not legally recognize the concept of nationalminorities because they believe that to do so would undermine their civicstates by prioritizing collective ethnic over individual civic rights Only

The myth of the civic state 31

Canada and Australia adopted multicultural policies in the 1970s (whilenone of Kohnrsquos ve lsquocivicrsquo states adopted similar policies)

Linz and Stepan (1996 pp 35ndash37) dene lsquonationalizingrsquo policies asattempting to homogenize multi-ethnic societies in the East Yet themajority of states both in the West and the East have always been multi-ethnic The newly independent states of the East if they are indeedadopting homogenizing policies are merely mirroring the examples setby the West from the eighteenth century onwards These homogenizingpolicies pursued since the late-eighteenth century in the West were onlymodied in some cases from the 1960s Majority cultures in civic stateshave had a lsquoperverse incentiversquo to destroy the cultures of nationalminorities and lsquothen cite that destruction as a justication for compellingassimilationrsquo (Kymlicka 1995 p 100)

Nation-building in the West was as Connor (1972) commented bothlsquonation creatingrsquo and lsquonation destroyingrsquo All European governmentsincluding those in the West lsquoeventually took steps which homogenizedtheir populationsrsquo (Tilly 1975 p 43) Nation-building in France wasaccompanied by the destruction of local cultures and languages in theperiphery and the imposition of a hegemonic Icircle de France culture thatwas promoted as a benecial lsquola mission civilisatricersquo Weber (1979)describes the slow and uneven process of national integration in Francein the nineteenth century as that of a lsquocolonial empire shaped over thecenturiesrsquo These territories had been lsquoconquered annexed and integratedrsquo by the Icircle de France Parisian ofcials sent to regions such as Brittany felt and behaved as if they were going to an overseas colony

Gellner (1983 pp 142ndash43) sees homogenization as an inevitable by-product of modernization and a functioning national economy Nation-building welded together different peoples into a single communitylsquobased on the cultural heritage of the dominant ethnic corersquo (A D Smith1991 p 68) Thus Western states were not neutral in their nation-building projects and these often marginalized national minorities anddestroyed local identities (Moore 1997 p 904) These factors wereignored by Kohn (1944 1982) in his positive treatment of nationalism inthe West

Historic myths in civic states

Both civic and ethnic states have traditionally used myths and history(Andersen 1991 pp 11ndash12 Schnapper 1997 pp 214 219) As theCouncil of Europe has complained lsquoVirtually all political systems haveused history for their own ends and have imposed both their version ofhistorical facts and their defence of the good and bad gures of historyrsquo(Council of Europe) An objective history may be what historians shouldstrive to write but in reality objective history is as much a myth as states

32 Taras Kuzio

being wholly civic There has often been little to distinguish myth fromhistory as myths have been a lsquopoetic form of historyrsquo (A D Smith 1984p 103)

Smith (1984) points out that all nations since the late-eighteenthcentury have appealed to ancestry and history in the struggle to estab-lish their state and nationhood This process had engulfed the whole ofwestern Europe by 1800 and spread only half a century afterwards toeastern Europe The nationrsquos ancestry had to be demonstrated as vitallsquoboth for self-esteem and security and for external recognitionrsquo (A DSmith 1984 p 101) Historical myths have been traditionally promotedas part of the inculcation of national solidarity within states Myths wereuseful for a variety of policies within the state and nation-buildingproject ndash proving ancient ancestry securing exclusive title to territoryand location the transmission of spiritual values through history pro-motion of heroic ages regeneration of lsquogolden erasrsquo as part of a lsquospecialidentityrsquo and a claim to special status (A D Smith 1984)

The myths of modern Switzerland one of Kohnrsquos ve civic states arefounded on the traditions and memories of an older ethnic nation andare themselves based on a German cultural core The modern Swissstatersquos historical myths and ethno-cultural core are Germanic Through-out Francersquos period of nation-building from 1789ndash1914 the anthem agoaths hymns monuments calendars ceremonies heroes and martyrsappealed to one Gaullist ancestry (A D Smith 1998 p 126) The his-torical past played a prominent role in the inculcation of values andloyalty to the French republic through the construction of monumentsnationalist pedagogy in history teaching museums and memorials inevery commune (Johnson 1993) Just as the English and Americanssought to locate their nation in ancient history the French claimeddescent from the Trojans and Romans The Normans were portrayed asFrankish usurpers who had taken away their rights

Paxman (1999 p 153) believes that lsquoWe must accept rst that a senseof history runs deep in the English peoplersquo The union of Scotland andEngland in 1707 subsumed English within British nationalism that mod-erated English nationalism Nevertheless English myths remained aliveand well in debates over Anglo-Saxon origins archaeology ruralEngland pageants (the opening of parliament the trooping of thecolour the last night of the Proms) and in memories of noble sacriceagainst all odds in World War II such as at Dunkirk (A D Smith 1984p 109) In nineteenth-century England the education system denedEnglish literature as lsquosuperiorrsquo and its culture ideas tastes morals arthistory and family life subscribed to these dominant views of lsquoinferiorrsquoand lsquosuperiorrsquo races not only in the colonies but in countries closer tohome such as Ireland (Hickman 1998) England was the lsquoNew Israelrsquothat was set to deliver its civilization to mankind English history wastreated separately to British and the former placed greater emphasis

The myth of the civic state 33

upon Anglo-Saxon racial origins and an lsquoobsessive interestrsquo in the past(Baucom 1999 pp 15 20 48)

US historical myths linked an alleged pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon loveof liberty with a myth of ethnogenesis which dened the Americans asa new nation that was escaping from the tyranny of the lsquoNormanrsquomonarchs who ruled Britain The US also had an lsquoinfatuationrsquo withAnglo-Saxon history that was included within its myths of ethnogenesis(Kaufmannn 2000b) American exceptionalism portrayed the US nationas the lsquopurestrsquo English (Lipset 1997) a myth of exceptionalism similarto that of the Afrikaner in South Africa the Scots in Ulster and theFrench Canadians in Quebec These American historical myths helpedforge lsquoWASPrsquo cultural boundaries within which dominant Anglo con-formity was promoted in the nineteenth and the rst half of the twenti-eth centuries (Kaufmann 1999 2000b R M Smith 1997 pp 3 460 468)

In a survey of American nation-building from 1776 to the presentSpilman (1997) stressed the centrality of symbols rituals and patrioticorganizations that served to forge a US national identity GeorgeWashington was given a hero-like status after 1789 in portraits birthdaycelebrations shrines books the constitution commemorations ofbattles and independence day celebrations Thanksgiving and MemorialDay were annually celebrated pledges of allegiance were made andlarge historical pageants were held Historical myths have thereforeplayed as important a role in the US as they have in the other fourWestern states cited as lsquocivicrsquo examples by Kohn

Ethnic to civic state an alternative framework

Kohnrsquos division of nationalism traces its positive inclusive qualities retrospectively back to the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries Howevercivic states have never been identical and unanimous in how they wereconstituted The growth of the national state and its provision of civilpolitical cultural and social rights was lsquoslow and unevenrsquo (Mouzelis 1996p 226)

At the time of the American revolution only a small percentage ofwealthy white Protestant males could vote something American colonistsand revolutionaries did not see as unusual Indeed after 1776 slaves con-tinued to be imported into the USA and slavery lsquoemerged from the Revol-ution more rmly entrenched than ever in American lifersquo (Foner 1998 p28) lsquoSlavery rendered blacks all but invisible to those imagining theAmerican communityrsquo (Foner 1998 p 38) US President Thomas Jefferson himself possessed 1000 slaves and believed them to be perma-nently decient in the faculties required to enjoy freedom requiringtutelage by lsquosuperiorrsquo races such as Anglo-Saxons to improve their possi-bility of full civic equality at an unspecied later date (R M Smith 1997p 105) Slavery existed until the 1860s in the USA and the slave trade

34 Taras Kuzio

helped to build up the wealth of Western states Indeed it was only Switzer-land of Kohnrsquos ve Western examples that did not prot from slavery

Although the American national idea as elaborated upon and ideal-ized by Kohn (1944) was based on a mythical devotion to freedom thedenition of who could experience it was initially ethnically narrow andonly gradually evolved into a civic variant after the 1960s The centen-nial of the US revolution in 1876 ignored blacks new non-Anglo-Saxonimmigrants Native Americans and women as not being part of thenation The nineteenth-century US republic had no room for NativeIndian black Spanish or French culture The conquering of New Mexicoand the annexation of Texas was proclaimed as a triumph of ProtestantAnglo-Saxon civilization against the Catholic world and lower racesNew Mexico was not admitted into the union until 1912 even though itpossessed the required population level because it was held to be lsquotooIndianrsquo (Foner 1998 p 79)

By the bicentennial of the US revolution in 1976 the American nationhad evolved from ethnic to civic and included those previously excludedin other words at different times in US history lsquofreedomrsquo had differentmeanings Who was to be included within the American nation is lsquoahighly uneven and bitterly contested part of the story of Americanfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p XVII) Freedom in American history has there-fore been both a lsquomythic idealrsquo and a lsquoliving truthrsquo (Foner 1998 p XXI)

Dahlrsquos denition of a civic state rests on three factors free and fairelections an inclusive suffrage and the right to run for ofce These threebasic civic rights were not always included within Western states In con-temporary denitions of civic states the US and Australia could there-fore not be dened as lsquocivicrsquo states prior to the 1960s because theyexcluded people on the basis of colour and race The breakthrough inwidening the American nation occurred nearly two hundred years afterthe USA was founded when the Civil Rights (1964) Voting Rights (1965)and Fair Housing (1968) Acts were passed

The evolution of states from ethnic to civic statehood occurredthroughout the West and not only in the small number of states dis-cussed in this article This evolution was the norm not the exceptionOnly from the 1960s can we dene Western states as civic while themajority of the East became civic only three decades later in the 1990sAlthough democratic consolidation and civic state building is far fromconsolidated in the East in contrast to the West the East is encouragedby international organizations to continue to evolve along civic lines(something that was not the case in the West) That Western civic statesare still in a process of evolution and are not perfect civic states can beseen in the numerous problems that continue to bedevil them The USstill disenfranchises nearly four million of its citizens a policy that wouldno doubt be condemned by the OSCE if introduced in the East2

By looking at the evolution of Western states in such a manner we

The myth of the civic state 35

shall full two tasks Firstly we shall no longer be able to ignore ethno-cultural factors within civic states Secondly we shall be able to discussin a more frank and open manner the way in which Western statesevolved from ethnic to civic state and nationhood

Conclusion

This article has contributed to the scholarly literature on nationalism byarguing that the Kohn framework of Western states has always been civicfrom the moment of their creation is historically wrong (R S Smith 1997pp 20 31ndash32 499) Western states have evolved from ethnic to civicstates only in the last four decades of the twentieth century Without anunderstanding of this evolution of Western ethnic into civic states wecannot understand the nature of the civic state as containing tensionbetween its universal liberalist and national particularist componentsAll civic states will retain this internal contradiction as long as national-ity remains central to creating the solidarity that pure civic states wouldlack by themselves (Miller 1995 2000)

Both the US and Canadian examples discussed in this article haveshown that Western states typically began as ethnic and only graduallyevolved into civic states from the 1960s Evolution from ethnic to civicnationalism is only likely to take place after the core ethnic group is self-condent within its own bounded territory to open the community tolsquooutsidersrsquo from other ethnic groups Historical evidence shows thatWestern states did not become civic because they so desired but becauseof a multitude of domestic and international pressures (Kaufmann2000b) Belief in civic values can go together with ethnic nationalism andracism and states can move away from their civic bases during times ofperceived crisis

In the US this occurred during the century between the emancipationof the black slaves in the 1860s to re-enfranchising southern blacks inthe 1960s In British Canada this evolution of nationalism took place inthe early twentieth century In French Canada Francophones onlybecame dominant within Quebec after the 1960s a period during whichFrench Canadian nationalism also evolved from ethnic to civic national-ism This process was not solely conned to the US and Canada butoccurred throughout the West

The continued use of the Kohn framework is doubly wrong after adecade of post-Communism in central and eastern Europe when all buttwo of these states became civic Evolution from ethnic to civic stateshas therefore little to do with geography and far more to do with thepositive inuence of international institutions domestic democratic con-solidation and civic institution building Western states have a long his-torical record as ethnic states a factor which makes their evolution moresimilar not different to states in the East

36 Taras Kuzio

Acknowledgements

An earlier and longer version of this paper was presented at the AnnualConvention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities ColumbiaUniversity New York 13ndash15 April 2000 The author would like to thanktwo anonymous ERS referees and Assistant Professor Stephen Shulmanfor their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article

Notes

1 A European Union-wide survey in Spring 1997 found 33 per cent of those inter-viewed describing themselves as lsquoquite racistrsquo or lsquovery racistrsquo Many of these supported thebasic tenets of a civic inclusive liberal democratic state (Eurobarometer Opinion Poll)2 46 states and the District of Columbia have criminal disenfranchisement laws thatdeny the vote to all convicted adults in prison 32 states disenfranchise felons on paroleand 29 those on probation Laws that are unique to the US exist in 14 states that perma-nently disenfranchise former offenders (for life) who have fully served their sentences Thislegislation which runs contrary to established practice in both western and eastern Europeis racially neutral nevertheless due to socio-economic factors it is not surprising that itaffects national minorities blacks and Hispanics more than whites In Florida for example400000 former offenders are permanently excluded from voting of whom half are blacks(representing nearly a third of all blacks in Florida) (Human Rights Watch)

References

ANDERSEN BENEDICT 1991 Imagined Communities London VersoANER STEFAN 2000 lsquoNationalism in central Europe ndash A chance or a threat for theemerging liberal democratic orderrsquo East European Politics and Society vol14 no2pp 213ndash45BAUCOM IAN 1999 Out of Place Englishness Empire and the Location of IdentityPrinceton NJ Princeton University PressBEISSINGER MARK R 1996 lsquoHow nationalism spread Eastern Europe adrift the tidesand cycles of national contentionrsquo Social Research vol 63 no1 pp 97ndash146BOSTOCK WILLIAM W 1997 lsquo ldquoLanguage griefrdquo A ldquoraw materialrdquo of ethnic conictrsquoNationalism and Ethnic Politics vol3 no4 pp 94ndash112BRETON RAYMOND 1988 lsquoFrom ethnic to civic nationalism English Canada andQuebecrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 2 no1 pp 85ndash102BROWN DAVID 1999 lsquoAre there good and bad nationalismsrsquo Nations and Nationalismvol5 no2 pp 281ndash302BRUBAKER ROGERS 1995 lsquoNational minorities nationalizing states and externalhomelands in the new Europersquo Daedalus vol124 no2 pp 107ndash32CANOVAN MARGARET 1996 Nationhood and Political Theory Cheltenham EdwardElgarCONNOR WALKER 1972 lsquoNation-building or nation-destroyingrsquo World PoliticsvolXXIV no3 pp 319ndash55COUNCIL of EUROPE COMMITTEE on CULTURE and EDUCATION Recom-mendation 1283 (22 January 1996) Document 7446DAHL ROBERT 1971 Polyarchy New Haven CT Yale University PressEUROBAROMETER OPINION POLL no471 Luxembourg lsquoRacism and Xeno-phobia in Europersquo 18ndash19 December 1991FINLAYSON ALAN 1998 lsquoIdeology discourse and nationalismrsquo Journal of PoliticalIdeologies vol3 no1 pp 99ndash119

The myth of the civic state 37

imperial subjects to be British but never English Threats from immi-gration from the former empire for example can lead civic states toreturn to their ethnic basis as with the 1981 UK Nationality Act Thisdrew much of its strength from racist ideas promoted by Enoch Powellin the 1960s who himself lsquodraws on a long history of the reading of Eng-lishness as primarily a racial categoryrsquo (Baucom 1999 p 15) This tensionbetween the liberal-labour and conservative wings of British politics overregional devolution immigration and multiculturalism continues to thisday

Canada went through a similar process of evolution from ethnic tocivic nationalism as the US where the central preoccupation of statebuilders was to preserve cultural unity so that political and linguisticboundaries coincided (Breton 1988) Rational-legal (civic-territorial)factors came secondary to this endeavour Unlike the US the Canadianstate inherited two not one ethnic cores British and French (Kaufmann1997) Both were initially based upon ethnic nationalism and attemptedto separately construct ethno-cultural societies In French Quebec thisethnic nationalism was more often than not defensive against BritishCanadarsquos attempts at assimilating it In Quebec and Catalonia the evol-ution of nationalism from ethnic to civic variants since the 1960s stilldemands that non-titular nationalities assimilate into the titular ethnicgroup (Harty 1999 pp 672ndash73)

Until the 1950s in Australia a government policy of forced assimi-lation forcibly took children from Aborigines and placed them in white-only schools and families The Australian government still nds itdifcult to apologise and pay compensation for these policies Aborigi-nal peoples were only given the vote in 1967 after an Anglo-SaxonBritish lsquoWhitersquo Australia policy was replaced by multiculturalism

Fifthly the Kohn framework ignores the fact that as in the Westnationalism in the East can also evolve towards a civic variety over timeThis was certainly the case during the 1990s throughout most of post-communist Europe where states have been constructed along civicinclusive lines (although their democracies may as yet be still uncon-solidated) In 1999 the US think-tank Freedom House dened all post-communist European states as lsquocivicrsquo with the exception of Belarus andYugoslavia (Aner 2000 Kuzio 2001)

Sixthly what has been traditionally regarded as positive lsquonation-buildingrsquo processes in the West have been described by (Brubaker 1995see Kuzio 2001) in a negative manner as lsquonationalizing statesrsquo in the EastBoth lsquoWestern civicrsquo and lsquoEastern ethnicrsquo states traditionally homogen-ized their inhabitants Assimilation in civic states such as France meantthe loss of onersquos culture and language as the price for becoming part ofthe French political community Brubakerrsquos lsquonationalizationrsquo of the stateon behalf of the core titular nation in the East is little different from theassimilation by both peaceful and violent means of national minorities

28 Taras Kuzio

in the West (Connor 1972) It ignores the positive role that civic national-ism has played in dismantling empires (eg the former USSR Czecho-slovakia) the removal of dictators (President Slobodan Milosevich inYugoslavia) and opposition to apartheid (the ANC in South Africa)Civic nationalism and liberal democracies are allies ndash not enemies ndash incentral and eastern Europe (Aner 2000 p 245) Both played a role in thetransition from feudalism to modernity in the West there is no reason tobelieve that they will ndash and should ndash not play a similar role in the East

The myth of the civic state

Ethnic and civic states

This article argues that the Kohn (1944 1982) framework is fundamen-tally awed Both the West and the East only became civic from the1960s Western or Eastern states will continue to exhibit ethno-culturalelements even when their nationalisms are civic This article argues thatbecause all states are composed of both civic and ethno-cultural criteriaat different periods of history the proportional mix of the two will bedifferent (Kymlicka 1995 p 88 115 A D Smith 1996 pp 100ndash101 AD Smith 1998 pp 126ndash27) lsquoThe fate of democracy depends on whichone dominates the otherrsquo (Habermas 1996 p 286) Racist views cansometimes go together with strong support for democracy an inclusivestate and respect for fundamental civic and social rights and freedoms1

This may reect the view discussed earlier when civic rights for immi-grants and minorities are only reluctantly granted particularly to thoseperceived as outsiders to the ethnic nation

In the early period of Western states its nationalism was more ethnic(exclusive) than civic (inclusive) (A D Smith 1989 p 149) The strongerpresence of ethnic nationalism in the early stages of state and nation-building may be true of the East as well as the West That the East seemsmore lsquoethnicrsquo today may be therefore more to do with the differenttiming of similar processes

Kymlicka (1996) has criticized the claim that only Eastern nationalismis both ethnic and cultural He believes that cultural nationalism is asmuch at home in the West as it is in the East The rise of English national-ism in the Tudor and Elizabethan eras to which Kohn gives much creditfor later developments was built on cultural nationalism and propagatedby intellectuals poets and writers This English ethnic nationalism re-equipped it for later colonial conquest (Baucom 1999 p 25) There isnothing intrinsically anti-liberal Kymlicka (1996) argues if an ethnicgroup wishes to defend its cultural identity within a civic state

Kymlicka also criticizes Western scholars such as Ignatieff (1993) forwrongly assuming that civic nationalism has no cultural componentbecause all those who are citizens of civic nations participate in a

The myth of the civic state 29

common societal culture Turner (1997 p 9) believes that lsquoCitizenshipidentities and citizenship cultures are national identities and nationalculturesrsquo He continues

When individuals become citizens they not only enter into a set ofinstitutions that confers upon them rights and obligations they notonly acquire an identity they are not only socialised into civic virtuesbut they also become members of a political community with a par-ticular territory and history

The symbios of civic and ethnic actors found within civic states deter-mines the vitality and mobilization capacity of the demos and civilsociety (Miller 1995 2000 Canovan 1996) Although particularism anduniversalism are hostile and competing ideologies in practice national-ism has been the midwife that has brought liberal democracy into theworld and has connected the two ever since If the nation and communityare weakened or decline the demos is also affected The solidarity thatholds together a democracy is the civic nation

Kymlicka (1996) sees no reason to regret the fact that most civic stateshave always been and still are also composed of different cultures Bydenying this factor civic states seek to justify internal homogenization tothe dominant culture and language whether states should therefore bedened as civic or ethnic in Kohnrsquos terms has less to do with the absenceor existence of cultural criteria but if anybody lsquocan be integrated intothe community regardless of race or colourrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 24) andwhat qualications for membership are in place (Canovan 1996 p 19)Kymlicka (1996) therefore stresses that both Western and Easternnationalism have cultural components and identity in both is thereforegrounded in culture

National identity

How do political communities and civic nations hold together Fewscholars would dispute that modern societies require a fraternity (Nisbet1953 pp 153ndash88) a lsquocommunity of valuesrsquo (Parekh 1995 p 436) alsquosingle psychological focus shared by all segmentsrsquo (Connor 1972 p353) a lsquonationalityrsquo (Miller 1995 p 140) a lsquohigh degree of communalsolidarityrsquo (Canovan 1996 pp 28ndash29) and a lsquoWersquo where the nation andthe people are one (Finlayson 1998 p 113) Nevertheless liberal demo-cratic theory assumes a lsquoWersquo is in place and therefore ignores the dif-cult process of forging a lsquoPeoplersquo for the political community Ignoringnationality serves to create a false illusion that lsquocivicrsquo states are purelycivic and are devoid of ethno-cultural factors It also makes it easier todiscuss lsquoWestern civicrsquo states as having always been civic from theirinception

30 Taras Kuzio

Despite the close inter-connection between liberal democracy andnationhood since the late-eighteenth-century political theory tends toignore nationality Nevertheless nationhood is at the heart of politicaltheory even though its particularism has an uneasy marriage with theuniversalism of liberalism How a lsquoPeoplersquo and political solidarity arecreated is often ignored and taken for granted even though it is nation-hood that generates the lsquoWersquo and collective power Successful politiesrequire not only a degree of societal trust but also unity and stabilityfactors which lsquohave always been at the root of politicsrsquo (Canovan 1996p 22)

Advocates of individual rights usually argue that civic states by de-nition are indifferent to ethno-cultural questions Advocates of culturalpluralism on the other hand such as Kymlicka (1996) will counter thosepromoting only individual rights by arguing that all civic states includeethno-cultural elements No civic state can possibly hope to be neutralwhen deciding which ethnic groupsrsquo language culture symbols andanniversaries to promote at the state level (Beissinger 1996 p 101)Although 17 million Americans count Spanish as their rst language onlyone per cent of US federal documents are in non-English languages(Freedland 1998 p 147) Liberals remain concerned that group rightsand cultural pluralism inhibit the creation of a shared identity that civicstates promote They ignore the fact that this shared identity in Westerncivic states is not ethnically or culturally neutral but based upon that ofthe ethnic core (s) Kymlicka (1996) poses a double paradox Multi-ethnic states which represent the majority of nation-states lsquocannotsurvive unless the various national groups have an allegiance to thelarger community they cohabitrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 13) If states ignorethis question and pursue radical homogenizing (or in Brubakerrsquos termlsquonationalizingrsquo) policies this will alienate national minorities and maylead to ethnic and social unrest Civic states have therefore to balancebetween forging an overarching unity in the public domain whileallowing and sometimes fostering polyethnic rights and identities in theprivate sphere (Kuzio forthcoming)

The inclusion of polyethnic rights and the recognition of the value ofcultural pluralism is a relatively recent phenomenon in civic statesWithout the recognition of these rights and pluralism and a concomi-tant rejection of homogenization the imagined civic community will notinclude large numbers of people who do not belong to the ethnic coreKymlicka (1996) and Connor (1972) do not believe that civic statesassimilated non-titulars lsquovoluntarilyrsquo Few national groups voluntarilyassimilated from the eighteenth century and the majority of civic statespursued homogenizing policies until the 1960s France and the US twoof Kohnrsquos civic West still do not legally recognize the concept of nationalminorities because they believe that to do so would undermine their civicstates by prioritizing collective ethnic over individual civic rights Only

The myth of the civic state 31

Canada and Australia adopted multicultural policies in the 1970s (whilenone of Kohnrsquos ve lsquocivicrsquo states adopted similar policies)

Linz and Stepan (1996 pp 35ndash37) dene lsquonationalizingrsquo policies asattempting to homogenize multi-ethnic societies in the East Yet themajority of states both in the West and the East have always been multi-ethnic The newly independent states of the East if they are indeedadopting homogenizing policies are merely mirroring the examples setby the West from the eighteenth century onwards These homogenizingpolicies pursued since the late-eighteenth century in the West were onlymodied in some cases from the 1960s Majority cultures in civic stateshave had a lsquoperverse incentiversquo to destroy the cultures of nationalminorities and lsquothen cite that destruction as a justication for compellingassimilationrsquo (Kymlicka 1995 p 100)

Nation-building in the West was as Connor (1972) commented bothlsquonation creatingrsquo and lsquonation destroyingrsquo All European governmentsincluding those in the West lsquoeventually took steps which homogenizedtheir populationsrsquo (Tilly 1975 p 43) Nation-building in France wasaccompanied by the destruction of local cultures and languages in theperiphery and the imposition of a hegemonic Icircle de France culture thatwas promoted as a benecial lsquola mission civilisatricersquo Weber (1979)describes the slow and uneven process of national integration in Francein the nineteenth century as that of a lsquocolonial empire shaped over thecenturiesrsquo These territories had been lsquoconquered annexed and integratedrsquo by the Icircle de France Parisian ofcials sent to regions such as Brittany felt and behaved as if they were going to an overseas colony

Gellner (1983 pp 142ndash43) sees homogenization as an inevitable by-product of modernization and a functioning national economy Nation-building welded together different peoples into a single communitylsquobased on the cultural heritage of the dominant ethnic corersquo (A D Smith1991 p 68) Thus Western states were not neutral in their nation-building projects and these often marginalized national minorities anddestroyed local identities (Moore 1997 p 904) These factors wereignored by Kohn (1944 1982) in his positive treatment of nationalism inthe West

Historic myths in civic states

Both civic and ethnic states have traditionally used myths and history(Andersen 1991 pp 11ndash12 Schnapper 1997 pp 214 219) As theCouncil of Europe has complained lsquoVirtually all political systems haveused history for their own ends and have imposed both their version ofhistorical facts and their defence of the good and bad gures of historyrsquo(Council of Europe) An objective history may be what historians shouldstrive to write but in reality objective history is as much a myth as states

32 Taras Kuzio

being wholly civic There has often been little to distinguish myth fromhistory as myths have been a lsquopoetic form of historyrsquo (A D Smith 1984p 103)

Smith (1984) points out that all nations since the late-eighteenthcentury have appealed to ancestry and history in the struggle to estab-lish their state and nationhood This process had engulfed the whole ofwestern Europe by 1800 and spread only half a century afterwards toeastern Europe The nationrsquos ancestry had to be demonstrated as vitallsquoboth for self-esteem and security and for external recognitionrsquo (A DSmith 1984 p 101) Historical myths have been traditionally promotedas part of the inculcation of national solidarity within states Myths wereuseful for a variety of policies within the state and nation-buildingproject ndash proving ancient ancestry securing exclusive title to territoryand location the transmission of spiritual values through history pro-motion of heroic ages regeneration of lsquogolden erasrsquo as part of a lsquospecialidentityrsquo and a claim to special status (A D Smith 1984)

The myths of modern Switzerland one of Kohnrsquos ve civic states arefounded on the traditions and memories of an older ethnic nation andare themselves based on a German cultural core The modern Swissstatersquos historical myths and ethno-cultural core are Germanic Through-out Francersquos period of nation-building from 1789ndash1914 the anthem agoaths hymns monuments calendars ceremonies heroes and martyrsappealed to one Gaullist ancestry (A D Smith 1998 p 126) The his-torical past played a prominent role in the inculcation of values andloyalty to the French republic through the construction of monumentsnationalist pedagogy in history teaching museums and memorials inevery commune (Johnson 1993) Just as the English and Americanssought to locate their nation in ancient history the French claimeddescent from the Trojans and Romans The Normans were portrayed asFrankish usurpers who had taken away their rights

Paxman (1999 p 153) believes that lsquoWe must accept rst that a senseof history runs deep in the English peoplersquo The union of Scotland andEngland in 1707 subsumed English within British nationalism that mod-erated English nationalism Nevertheless English myths remained aliveand well in debates over Anglo-Saxon origins archaeology ruralEngland pageants (the opening of parliament the trooping of thecolour the last night of the Proms) and in memories of noble sacriceagainst all odds in World War II such as at Dunkirk (A D Smith 1984p 109) In nineteenth-century England the education system denedEnglish literature as lsquosuperiorrsquo and its culture ideas tastes morals arthistory and family life subscribed to these dominant views of lsquoinferiorrsquoand lsquosuperiorrsquo races not only in the colonies but in countries closer tohome such as Ireland (Hickman 1998) England was the lsquoNew Israelrsquothat was set to deliver its civilization to mankind English history wastreated separately to British and the former placed greater emphasis

The myth of the civic state 33

upon Anglo-Saxon racial origins and an lsquoobsessive interestrsquo in the past(Baucom 1999 pp 15 20 48)

US historical myths linked an alleged pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon loveof liberty with a myth of ethnogenesis which dened the Americans asa new nation that was escaping from the tyranny of the lsquoNormanrsquomonarchs who ruled Britain The US also had an lsquoinfatuationrsquo withAnglo-Saxon history that was included within its myths of ethnogenesis(Kaufmannn 2000b) American exceptionalism portrayed the US nationas the lsquopurestrsquo English (Lipset 1997) a myth of exceptionalism similarto that of the Afrikaner in South Africa the Scots in Ulster and theFrench Canadians in Quebec These American historical myths helpedforge lsquoWASPrsquo cultural boundaries within which dominant Anglo con-formity was promoted in the nineteenth and the rst half of the twenti-eth centuries (Kaufmann 1999 2000b R M Smith 1997 pp 3 460 468)

In a survey of American nation-building from 1776 to the presentSpilman (1997) stressed the centrality of symbols rituals and patrioticorganizations that served to forge a US national identity GeorgeWashington was given a hero-like status after 1789 in portraits birthdaycelebrations shrines books the constitution commemorations ofbattles and independence day celebrations Thanksgiving and MemorialDay were annually celebrated pledges of allegiance were made andlarge historical pageants were held Historical myths have thereforeplayed as important a role in the US as they have in the other fourWestern states cited as lsquocivicrsquo examples by Kohn

Ethnic to civic state an alternative framework

Kohnrsquos division of nationalism traces its positive inclusive qualities retrospectively back to the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries Howevercivic states have never been identical and unanimous in how they wereconstituted The growth of the national state and its provision of civilpolitical cultural and social rights was lsquoslow and unevenrsquo (Mouzelis 1996p 226)

At the time of the American revolution only a small percentage ofwealthy white Protestant males could vote something American colonistsand revolutionaries did not see as unusual Indeed after 1776 slaves con-tinued to be imported into the USA and slavery lsquoemerged from the Revol-ution more rmly entrenched than ever in American lifersquo (Foner 1998 p28) lsquoSlavery rendered blacks all but invisible to those imagining theAmerican communityrsquo (Foner 1998 p 38) US President Thomas Jefferson himself possessed 1000 slaves and believed them to be perma-nently decient in the faculties required to enjoy freedom requiringtutelage by lsquosuperiorrsquo races such as Anglo-Saxons to improve their possi-bility of full civic equality at an unspecied later date (R M Smith 1997p 105) Slavery existed until the 1860s in the USA and the slave trade

34 Taras Kuzio

helped to build up the wealth of Western states Indeed it was only Switzer-land of Kohnrsquos ve Western examples that did not prot from slavery

Although the American national idea as elaborated upon and ideal-ized by Kohn (1944) was based on a mythical devotion to freedom thedenition of who could experience it was initially ethnically narrow andonly gradually evolved into a civic variant after the 1960s The centen-nial of the US revolution in 1876 ignored blacks new non-Anglo-Saxonimmigrants Native Americans and women as not being part of thenation The nineteenth-century US republic had no room for NativeIndian black Spanish or French culture The conquering of New Mexicoand the annexation of Texas was proclaimed as a triumph of ProtestantAnglo-Saxon civilization against the Catholic world and lower racesNew Mexico was not admitted into the union until 1912 even though itpossessed the required population level because it was held to be lsquotooIndianrsquo (Foner 1998 p 79)

By the bicentennial of the US revolution in 1976 the American nationhad evolved from ethnic to civic and included those previously excludedin other words at different times in US history lsquofreedomrsquo had differentmeanings Who was to be included within the American nation is lsquoahighly uneven and bitterly contested part of the story of Americanfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p XVII) Freedom in American history has there-fore been both a lsquomythic idealrsquo and a lsquoliving truthrsquo (Foner 1998 p XXI)

Dahlrsquos denition of a civic state rests on three factors free and fairelections an inclusive suffrage and the right to run for ofce These threebasic civic rights were not always included within Western states In con-temporary denitions of civic states the US and Australia could there-fore not be dened as lsquocivicrsquo states prior to the 1960s because theyexcluded people on the basis of colour and race The breakthrough inwidening the American nation occurred nearly two hundred years afterthe USA was founded when the Civil Rights (1964) Voting Rights (1965)and Fair Housing (1968) Acts were passed

The evolution of states from ethnic to civic statehood occurredthroughout the West and not only in the small number of states dis-cussed in this article This evolution was the norm not the exceptionOnly from the 1960s can we dene Western states as civic while themajority of the East became civic only three decades later in the 1990sAlthough democratic consolidation and civic state building is far fromconsolidated in the East in contrast to the West the East is encouragedby international organizations to continue to evolve along civic lines(something that was not the case in the West) That Western civic statesare still in a process of evolution and are not perfect civic states can beseen in the numerous problems that continue to bedevil them The USstill disenfranchises nearly four million of its citizens a policy that wouldno doubt be condemned by the OSCE if introduced in the East2

By looking at the evolution of Western states in such a manner we

The myth of the civic state 35

shall full two tasks Firstly we shall no longer be able to ignore ethno-cultural factors within civic states Secondly we shall be able to discussin a more frank and open manner the way in which Western statesevolved from ethnic to civic state and nationhood

Conclusion

This article has contributed to the scholarly literature on nationalism byarguing that the Kohn framework of Western states has always been civicfrom the moment of their creation is historically wrong (R S Smith 1997pp 20 31ndash32 499) Western states have evolved from ethnic to civicstates only in the last four decades of the twentieth century Without anunderstanding of this evolution of Western ethnic into civic states wecannot understand the nature of the civic state as containing tensionbetween its universal liberalist and national particularist componentsAll civic states will retain this internal contradiction as long as national-ity remains central to creating the solidarity that pure civic states wouldlack by themselves (Miller 1995 2000)

Both the US and Canadian examples discussed in this article haveshown that Western states typically began as ethnic and only graduallyevolved into civic states from the 1960s Evolution from ethnic to civicnationalism is only likely to take place after the core ethnic group is self-condent within its own bounded territory to open the community tolsquooutsidersrsquo from other ethnic groups Historical evidence shows thatWestern states did not become civic because they so desired but becauseof a multitude of domestic and international pressures (Kaufmann2000b) Belief in civic values can go together with ethnic nationalism andracism and states can move away from their civic bases during times ofperceived crisis

In the US this occurred during the century between the emancipationof the black slaves in the 1860s to re-enfranchising southern blacks inthe 1960s In British Canada this evolution of nationalism took place inthe early twentieth century In French Canada Francophones onlybecame dominant within Quebec after the 1960s a period during whichFrench Canadian nationalism also evolved from ethnic to civic national-ism This process was not solely conned to the US and Canada butoccurred throughout the West

The continued use of the Kohn framework is doubly wrong after adecade of post-Communism in central and eastern Europe when all buttwo of these states became civic Evolution from ethnic to civic stateshas therefore little to do with geography and far more to do with thepositive inuence of international institutions domestic democratic con-solidation and civic institution building Western states have a long his-torical record as ethnic states a factor which makes their evolution moresimilar not different to states in the East

36 Taras Kuzio

Acknowledgements

An earlier and longer version of this paper was presented at the AnnualConvention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities ColumbiaUniversity New York 13ndash15 April 2000 The author would like to thanktwo anonymous ERS referees and Assistant Professor Stephen Shulmanfor their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article

Notes

1 A European Union-wide survey in Spring 1997 found 33 per cent of those inter-viewed describing themselves as lsquoquite racistrsquo or lsquovery racistrsquo Many of these supported thebasic tenets of a civic inclusive liberal democratic state (Eurobarometer Opinion Poll)2 46 states and the District of Columbia have criminal disenfranchisement laws thatdeny the vote to all convicted adults in prison 32 states disenfranchise felons on paroleand 29 those on probation Laws that are unique to the US exist in 14 states that perma-nently disenfranchise former offenders (for life) who have fully served their sentences Thislegislation which runs contrary to established practice in both western and eastern Europeis racially neutral nevertheless due to socio-economic factors it is not surprising that itaffects national minorities blacks and Hispanics more than whites In Florida for example400000 former offenders are permanently excluded from voting of whom half are blacks(representing nearly a third of all blacks in Florida) (Human Rights Watch)

References

ANDERSEN BENEDICT 1991 Imagined Communities London VersoANER STEFAN 2000 lsquoNationalism in central Europe ndash A chance or a threat for theemerging liberal democratic orderrsquo East European Politics and Society vol14 no2pp 213ndash45BAUCOM IAN 1999 Out of Place Englishness Empire and the Location of IdentityPrinceton NJ Princeton University PressBEISSINGER MARK R 1996 lsquoHow nationalism spread Eastern Europe adrift the tidesand cycles of national contentionrsquo Social Research vol 63 no1 pp 97ndash146BOSTOCK WILLIAM W 1997 lsquo ldquoLanguage griefrdquo A ldquoraw materialrdquo of ethnic conictrsquoNationalism and Ethnic Politics vol3 no4 pp 94ndash112BRETON RAYMOND 1988 lsquoFrom ethnic to civic nationalism English Canada andQuebecrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 2 no1 pp 85ndash102BROWN DAVID 1999 lsquoAre there good and bad nationalismsrsquo Nations and Nationalismvol5 no2 pp 281ndash302BRUBAKER ROGERS 1995 lsquoNational minorities nationalizing states and externalhomelands in the new Europersquo Daedalus vol124 no2 pp 107ndash32CANOVAN MARGARET 1996 Nationhood and Political Theory Cheltenham EdwardElgarCONNOR WALKER 1972 lsquoNation-building or nation-destroyingrsquo World PoliticsvolXXIV no3 pp 319ndash55COUNCIL of EUROPE COMMITTEE on CULTURE and EDUCATION Recom-mendation 1283 (22 January 1996) Document 7446DAHL ROBERT 1971 Polyarchy New Haven CT Yale University PressEUROBAROMETER OPINION POLL no471 Luxembourg lsquoRacism and Xeno-phobia in Europersquo 18ndash19 December 1991FINLAYSON ALAN 1998 lsquoIdeology discourse and nationalismrsquo Journal of PoliticalIdeologies vol3 no1 pp 99ndash119

The myth of the civic state 37

in the West (Connor 1972) It ignores the positive role that civic national-ism has played in dismantling empires (eg the former USSR Czecho-slovakia) the removal of dictators (President Slobodan Milosevich inYugoslavia) and opposition to apartheid (the ANC in South Africa)Civic nationalism and liberal democracies are allies ndash not enemies ndash incentral and eastern Europe (Aner 2000 p 245) Both played a role in thetransition from feudalism to modernity in the West there is no reason tobelieve that they will ndash and should ndash not play a similar role in the East

The myth of the civic state

Ethnic and civic states

This article argues that the Kohn (1944 1982) framework is fundamen-tally awed Both the West and the East only became civic from the1960s Western or Eastern states will continue to exhibit ethno-culturalelements even when their nationalisms are civic This article argues thatbecause all states are composed of both civic and ethno-cultural criteriaat different periods of history the proportional mix of the two will bedifferent (Kymlicka 1995 p 88 115 A D Smith 1996 pp 100ndash101 AD Smith 1998 pp 126ndash27) lsquoThe fate of democracy depends on whichone dominates the otherrsquo (Habermas 1996 p 286) Racist views cansometimes go together with strong support for democracy an inclusivestate and respect for fundamental civic and social rights and freedoms1

This may reect the view discussed earlier when civic rights for immi-grants and minorities are only reluctantly granted particularly to thoseperceived as outsiders to the ethnic nation

In the early period of Western states its nationalism was more ethnic(exclusive) than civic (inclusive) (A D Smith 1989 p 149) The strongerpresence of ethnic nationalism in the early stages of state and nation-building may be true of the East as well as the West That the East seemsmore lsquoethnicrsquo today may be therefore more to do with the differenttiming of similar processes

Kymlicka (1996) has criticized the claim that only Eastern nationalismis both ethnic and cultural He believes that cultural nationalism is asmuch at home in the West as it is in the East The rise of English national-ism in the Tudor and Elizabethan eras to which Kohn gives much creditfor later developments was built on cultural nationalism and propagatedby intellectuals poets and writers This English ethnic nationalism re-equipped it for later colonial conquest (Baucom 1999 p 25) There isnothing intrinsically anti-liberal Kymlicka (1996) argues if an ethnicgroup wishes to defend its cultural identity within a civic state

Kymlicka also criticizes Western scholars such as Ignatieff (1993) forwrongly assuming that civic nationalism has no cultural componentbecause all those who are citizens of civic nations participate in a

The myth of the civic state 29

common societal culture Turner (1997 p 9) believes that lsquoCitizenshipidentities and citizenship cultures are national identities and nationalculturesrsquo He continues

When individuals become citizens they not only enter into a set ofinstitutions that confers upon them rights and obligations they notonly acquire an identity they are not only socialised into civic virtuesbut they also become members of a political community with a par-ticular territory and history

The symbios of civic and ethnic actors found within civic states deter-mines the vitality and mobilization capacity of the demos and civilsociety (Miller 1995 2000 Canovan 1996) Although particularism anduniversalism are hostile and competing ideologies in practice national-ism has been the midwife that has brought liberal democracy into theworld and has connected the two ever since If the nation and communityare weakened or decline the demos is also affected The solidarity thatholds together a democracy is the civic nation

Kymlicka (1996) sees no reason to regret the fact that most civic stateshave always been and still are also composed of different cultures Bydenying this factor civic states seek to justify internal homogenization tothe dominant culture and language whether states should therefore bedened as civic or ethnic in Kohnrsquos terms has less to do with the absenceor existence of cultural criteria but if anybody lsquocan be integrated intothe community regardless of race or colourrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 24) andwhat qualications for membership are in place (Canovan 1996 p 19)Kymlicka (1996) therefore stresses that both Western and Easternnationalism have cultural components and identity in both is thereforegrounded in culture

National identity

How do political communities and civic nations hold together Fewscholars would dispute that modern societies require a fraternity (Nisbet1953 pp 153ndash88) a lsquocommunity of valuesrsquo (Parekh 1995 p 436) alsquosingle psychological focus shared by all segmentsrsquo (Connor 1972 p353) a lsquonationalityrsquo (Miller 1995 p 140) a lsquohigh degree of communalsolidarityrsquo (Canovan 1996 pp 28ndash29) and a lsquoWersquo where the nation andthe people are one (Finlayson 1998 p 113) Nevertheless liberal demo-cratic theory assumes a lsquoWersquo is in place and therefore ignores the dif-cult process of forging a lsquoPeoplersquo for the political community Ignoringnationality serves to create a false illusion that lsquocivicrsquo states are purelycivic and are devoid of ethno-cultural factors It also makes it easier todiscuss lsquoWestern civicrsquo states as having always been civic from theirinception

30 Taras Kuzio

Despite the close inter-connection between liberal democracy andnationhood since the late-eighteenth-century political theory tends toignore nationality Nevertheless nationhood is at the heart of politicaltheory even though its particularism has an uneasy marriage with theuniversalism of liberalism How a lsquoPeoplersquo and political solidarity arecreated is often ignored and taken for granted even though it is nation-hood that generates the lsquoWersquo and collective power Successful politiesrequire not only a degree of societal trust but also unity and stabilityfactors which lsquohave always been at the root of politicsrsquo (Canovan 1996p 22)

Advocates of individual rights usually argue that civic states by de-nition are indifferent to ethno-cultural questions Advocates of culturalpluralism on the other hand such as Kymlicka (1996) will counter thosepromoting only individual rights by arguing that all civic states includeethno-cultural elements No civic state can possibly hope to be neutralwhen deciding which ethnic groupsrsquo language culture symbols andanniversaries to promote at the state level (Beissinger 1996 p 101)Although 17 million Americans count Spanish as their rst language onlyone per cent of US federal documents are in non-English languages(Freedland 1998 p 147) Liberals remain concerned that group rightsand cultural pluralism inhibit the creation of a shared identity that civicstates promote They ignore the fact that this shared identity in Westerncivic states is not ethnically or culturally neutral but based upon that ofthe ethnic core (s) Kymlicka (1996) poses a double paradox Multi-ethnic states which represent the majority of nation-states lsquocannotsurvive unless the various national groups have an allegiance to thelarger community they cohabitrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 13) If states ignorethis question and pursue radical homogenizing (or in Brubakerrsquos termlsquonationalizingrsquo) policies this will alienate national minorities and maylead to ethnic and social unrest Civic states have therefore to balancebetween forging an overarching unity in the public domain whileallowing and sometimes fostering polyethnic rights and identities in theprivate sphere (Kuzio forthcoming)

The inclusion of polyethnic rights and the recognition of the value ofcultural pluralism is a relatively recent phenomenon in civic statesWithout the recognition of these rights and pluralism and a concomi-tant rejection of homogenization the imagined civic community will notinclude large numbers of people who do not belong to the ethnic coreKymlicka (1996) and Connor (1972) do not believe that civic statesassimilated non-titulars lsquovoluntarilyrsquo Few national groups voluntarilyassimilated from the eighteenth century and the majority of civic statespursued homogenizing policies until the 1960s France and the US twoof Kohnrsquos civic West still do not legally recognize the concept of nationalminorities because they believe that to do so would undermine their civicstates by prioritizing collective ethnic over individual civic rights Only

The myth of the civic state 31

Canada and Australia adopted multicultural policies in the 1970s (whilenone of Kohnrsquos ve lsquocivicrsquo states adopted similar policies)

Linz and Stepan (1996 pp 35ndash37) dene lsquonationalizingrsquo policies asattempting to homogenize multi-ethnic societies in the East Yet themajority of states both in the West and the East have always been multi-ethnic The newly independent states of the East if they are indeedadopting homogenizing policies are merely mirroring the examples setby the West from the eighteenth century onwards These homogenizingpolicies pursued since the late-eighteenth century in the West were onlymodied in some cases from the 1960s Majority cultures in civic stateshave had a lsquoperverse incentiversquo to destroy the cultures of nationalminorities and lsquothen cite that destruction as a justication for compellingassimilationrsquo (Kymlicka 1995 p 100)

Nation-building in the West was as Connor (1972) commented bothlsquonation creatingrsquo and lsquonation destroyingrsquo All European governmentsincluding those in the West lsquoeventually took steps which homogenizedtheir populationsrsquo (Tilly 1975 p 43) Nation-building in France wasaccompanied by the destruction of local cultures and languages in theperiphery and the imposition of a hegemonic Icircle de France culture thatwas promoted as a benecial lsquola mission civilisatricersquo Weber (1979)describes the slow and uneven process of national integration in Francein the nineteenth century as that of a lsquocolonial empire shaped over thecenturiesrsquo These territories had been lsquoconquered annexed and integratedrsquo by the Icircle de France Parisian ofcials sent to regions such as Brittany felt and behaved as if they were going to an overseas colony

Gellner (1983 pp 142ndash43) sees homogenization as an inevitable by-product of modernization and a functioning national economy Nation-building welded together different peoples into a single communitylsquobased on the cultural heritage of the dominant ethnic corersquo (A D Smith1991 p 68) Thus Western states were not neutral in their nation-building projects and these often marginalized national minorities anddestroyed local identities (Moore 1997 p 904) These factors wereignored by Kohn (1944 1982) in his positive treatment of nationalism inthe West

Historic myths in civic states

Both civic and ethnic states have traditionally used myths and history(Andersen 1991 pp 11ndash12 Schnapper 1997 pp 214 219) As theCouncil of Europe has complained lsquoVirtually all political systems haveused history for their own ends and have imposed both their version ofhistorical facts and their defence of the good and bad gures of historyrsquo(Council of Europe) An objective history may be what historians shouldstrive to write but in reality objective history is as much a myth as states

32 Taras Kuzio

being wholly civic There has often been little to distinguish myth fromhistory as myths have been a lsquopoetic form of historyrsquo (A D Smith 1984p 103)

Smith (1984) points out that all nations since the late-eighteenthcentury have appealed to ancestry and history in the struggle to estab-lish their state and nationhood This process had engulfed the whole ofwestern Europe by 1800 and spread only half a century afterwards toeastern Europe The nationrsquos ancestry had to be demonstrated as vitallsquoboth for self-esteem and security and for external recognitionrsquo (A DSmith 1984 p 101) Historical myths have been traditionally promotedas part of the inculcation of national solidarity within states Myths wereuseful for a variety of policies within the state and nation-buildingproject ndash proving ancient ancestry securing exclusive title to territoryand location the transmission of spiritual values through history pro-motion of heroic ages regeneration of lsquogolden erasrsquo as part of a lsquospecialidentityrsquo and a claim to special status (A D Smith 1984)

The myths of modern Switzerland one of Kohnrsquos ve civic states arefounded on the traditions and memories of an older ethnic nation andare themselves based on a German cultural core The modern Swissstatersquos historical myths and ethno-cultural core are Germanic Through-out Francersquos period of nation-building from 1789ndash1914 the anthem agoaths hymns monuments calendars ceremonies heroes and martyrsappealed to one Gaullist ancestry (A D Smith 1998 p 126) The his-torical past played a prominent role in the inculcation of values andloyalty to the French republic through the construction of monumentsnationalist pedagogy in history teaching museums and memorials inevery commune (Johnson 1993) Just as the English and Americanssought to locate their nation in ancient history the French claimeddescent from the Trojans and Romans The Normans were portrayed asFrankish usurpers who had taken away their rights

Paxman (1999 p 153) believes that lsquoWe must accept rst that a senseof history runs deep in the English peoplersquo The union of Scotland andEngland in 1707 subsumed English within British nationalism that mod-erated English nationalism Nevertheless English myths remained aliveand well in debates over Anglo-Saxon origins archaeology ruralEngland pageants (the opening of parliament the trooping of thecolour the last night of the Proms) and in memories of noble sacriceagainst all odds in World War II such as at Dunkirk (A D Smith 1984p 109) In nineteenth-century England the education system denedEnglish literature as lsquosuperiorrsquo and its culture ideas tastes morals arthistory and family life subscribed to these dominant views of lsquoinferiorrsquoand lsquosuperiorrsquo races not only in the colonies but in countries closer tohome such as Ireland (Hickman 1998) England was the lsquoNew Israelrsquothat was set to deliver its civilization to mankind English history wastreated separately to British and the former placed greater emphasis

The myth of the civic state 33

upon Anglo-Saxon racial origins and an lsquoobsessive interestrsquo in the past(Baucom 1999 pp 15 20 48)

US historical myths linked an alleged pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon loveof liberty with a myth of ethnogenesis which dened the Americans asa new nation that was escaping from the tyranny of the lsquoNormanrsquomonarchs who ruled Britain The US also had an lsquoinfatuationrsquo withAnglo-Saxon history that was included within its myths of ethnogenesis(Kaufmannn 2000b) American exceptionalism portrayed the US nationas the lsquopurestrsquo English (Lipset 1997) a myth of exceptionalism similarto that of the Afrikaner in South Africa the Scots in Ulster and theFrench Canadians in Quebec These American historical myths helpedforge lsquoWASPrsquo cultural boundaries within which dominant Anglo con-formity was promoted in the nineteenth and the rst half of the twenti-eth centuries (Kaufmann 1999 2000b R M Smith 1997 pp 3 460 468)

In a survey of American nation-building from 1776 to the presentSpilman (1997) stressed the centrality of symbols rituals and patrioticorganizations that served to forge a US national identity GeorgeWashington was given a hero-like status after 1789 in portraits birthdaycelebrations shrines books the constitution commemorations ofbattles and independence day celebrations Thanksgiving and MemorialDay were annually celebrated pledges of allegiance were made andlarge historical pageants were held Historical myths have thereforeplayed as important a role in the US as they have in the other fourWestern states cited as lsquocivicrsquo examples by Kohn

Ethnic to civic state an alternative framework

Kohnrsquos division of nationalism traces its positive inclusive qualities retrospectively back to the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries Howevercivic states have never been identical and unanimous in how they wereconstituted The growth of the national state and its provision of civilpolitical cultural and social rights was lsquoslow and unevenrsquo (Mouzelis 1996p 226)

At the time of the American revolution only a small percentage ofwealthy white Protestant males could vote something American colonistsand revolutionaries did not see as unusual Indeed after 1776 slaves con-tinued to be imported into the USA and slavery lsquoemerged from the Revol-ution more rmly entrenched than ever in American lifersquo (Foner 1998 p28) lsquoSlavery rendered blacks all but invisible to those imagining theAmerican communityrsquo (Foner 1998 p 38) US President Thomas Jefferson himself possessed 1000 slaves and believed them to be perma-nently decient in the faculties required to enjoy freedom requiringtutelage by lsquosuperiorrsquo races such as Anglo-Saxons to improve their possi-bility of full civic equality at an unspecied later date (R M Smith 1997p 105) Slavery existed until the 1860s in the USA and the slave trade

34 Taras Kuzio

helped to build up the wealth of Western states Indeed it was only Switzer-land of Kohnrsquos ve Western examples that did not prot from slavery

Although the American national idea as elaborated upon and ideal-ized by Kohn (1944) was based on a mythical devotion to freedom thedenition of who could experience it was initially ethnically narrow andonly gradually evolved into a civic variant after the 1960s The centen-nial of the US revolution in 1876 ignored blacks new non-Anglo-Saxonimmigrants Native Americans and women as not being part of thenation The nineteenth-century US republic had no room for NativeIndian black Spanish or French culture The conquering of New Mexicoand the annexation of Texas was proclaimed as a triumph of ProtestantAnglo-Saxon civilization against the Catholic world and lower racesNew Mexico was not admitted into the union until 1912 even though itpossessed the required population level because it was held to be lsquotooIndianrsquo (Foner 1998 p 79)

By the bicentennial of the US revolution in 1976 the American nationhad evolved from ethnic to civic and included those previously excludedin other words at different times in US history lsquofreedomrsquo had differentmeanings Who was to be included within the American nation is lsquoahighly uneven and bitterly contested part of the story of Americanfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p XVII) Freedom in American history has there-fore been both a lsquomythic idealrsquo and a lsquoliving truthrsquo (Foner 1998 p XXI)

Dahlrsquos denition of a civic state rests on three factors free and fairelections an inclusive suffrage and the right to run for ofce These threebasic civic rights were not always included within Western states In con-temporary denitions of civic states the US and Australia could there-fore not be dened as lsquocivicrsquo states prior to the 1960s because theyexcluded people on the basis of colour and race The breakthrough inwidening the American nation occurred nearly two hundred years afterthe USA was founded when the Civil Rights (1964) Voting Rights (1965)and Fair Housing (1968) Acts were passed

The evolution of states from ethnic to civic statehood occurredthroughout the West and not only in the small number of states dis-cussed in this article This evolution was the norm not the exceptionOnly from the 1960s can we dene Western states as civic while themajority of the East became civic only three decades later in the 1990sAlthough democratic consolidation and civic state building is far fromconsolidated in the East in contrast to the West the East is encouragedby international organizations to continue to evolve along civic lines(something that was not the case in the West) That Western civic statesare still in a process of evolution and are not perfect civic states can beseen in the numerous problems that continue to bedevil them The USstill disenfranchises nearly four million of its citizens a policy that wouldno doubt be condemned by the OSCE if introduced in the East2

By looking at the evolution of Western states in such a manner we

The myth of the civic state 35

shall full two tasks Firstly we shall no longer be able to ignore ethno-cultural factors within civic states Secondly we shall be able to discussin a more frank and open manner the way in which Western statesevolved from ethnic to civic state and nationhood

Conclusion

This article has contributed to the scholarly literature on nationalism byarguing that the Kohn framework of Western states has always been civicfrom the moment of their creation is historically wrong (R S Smith 1997pp 20 31ndash32 499) Western states have evolved from ethnic to civicstates only in the last four decades of the twentieth century Without anunderstanding of this evolution of Western ethnic into civic states wecannot understand the nature of the civic state as containing tensionbetween its universal liberalist and national particularist componentsAll civic states will retain this internal contradiction as long as national-ity remains central to creating the solidarity that pure civic states wouldlack by themselves (Miller 1995 2000)

Both the US and Canadian examples discussed in this article haveshown that Western states typically began as ethnic and only graduallyevolved into civic states from the 1960s Evolution from ethnic to civicnationalism is only likely to take place after the core ethnic group is self-condent within its own bounded territory to open the community tolsquooutsidersrsquo from other ethnic groups Historical evidence shows thatWestern states did not become civic because they so desired but becauseof a multitude of domestic and international pressures (Kaufmann2000b) Belief in civic values can go together with ethnic nationalism andracism and states can move away from their civic bases during times ofperceived crisis

In the US this occurred during the century between the emancipationof the black slaves in the 1860s to re-enfranchising southern blacks inthe 1960s In British Canada this evolution of nationalism took place inthe early twentieth century In French Canada Francophones onlybecame dominant within Quebec after the 1960s a period during whichFrench Canadian nationalism also evolved from ethnic to civic national-ism This process was not solely conned to the US and Canada butoccurred throughout the West

The continued use of the Kohn framework is doubly wrong after adecade of post-Communism in central and eastern Europe when all buttwo of these states became civic Evolution from ethnic to civic stateshas therefore little to do with geography and far more to do with thepositive inuence of international institutions domestic democratic con-solidation and civic institution building Western states have a long his-torical record as ethnic states a factor which makes their evolution moresimilar not different to states in the East

36 Taras Kuzio

Acknowledgements

An earlier and longer version of this paper was presented at the AnnualConvention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities ColumbiaUniversity New York 13ndash15 April 2000 The author would like to thanktwo anonymous ERS referees and Assistant Professor Stephen Shulmanfor their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article

Notes

1 A European Union-wide survey in Spring 1997 found 33 per cent of those inter-viewed describing themselves as lsquoquite racistrsquo or lsquovery racistrsquo Many of these supported thebasic tenets of a civic inclusive liberal democratic state (Eurobarometer Opinion Poll)2 46 states and the District of Columbia have criminal disenfranchisement laws thatdeny the vote to all convicted adults in prison 32 states disenfranchise felons on paroleand 29 those on probation Laws that are unique to the US exist in 14 states that perma-nently disenfranchise former offenders (for life) who have fully served their sentences Thislegislation which runs contrary to established practice in both western and eastern Europeis racially neutral nevertheless due to socio-economic factors it is not surprising that itaffects national minorities blacks and Hispanics more than whites In Florida for example400000 former offenders are permanently excluded from voting of whom half are blacks(representing nearly a third of all blacks in Florida) (Human Rights Watch)

References

ANDERSEN BENEDICT 1991 Imagined Communities London VersoANER STEFAN 2000 lsquoNationalism in central Europe ndash A chance or a threat for theemerging liberal democratic orderrsquo East European Politics and Society vol14 no2pp 213ndash45BAUCOM IAN 1999 Out of Place Englishness Empire and the Location of IdentityPrinceton NJ Princeton University PressBEISSINGER MARK R 1996 lsquoHow nationalism spread Eastern Europe adrift the tidesand cycles of national contentionrsquo Social Research vol 63 no1 pp 97ndash146BOSTOCK WILLIAM W 1997 lsquo ldquoLanguage griefrdquo A ldquoraw materialrdquo of ethnic conictrsquoNationalism and Ethnic Politics vol3 no4 pp 94ndash112BRETON RAYMOND 1988 lsquoFrom ethnic to civic nationalism English Canada andQuebecrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 2 no1 pp 85ndash102BROWN DAVID 1999 lsquoAre there good and bad nationalismsrsquo Nations and Nationalismvol5 no2 pp 281ndash302BRUBAKER ROGERS 1995 lsquoNational minorities nationalizing states and externalhomelands in the new Europersquo Daedalus vol124 no2 pp 107ndash32CANOVAN MARGARET 1996 Nationhood and Political Theory Cheltenham EdwardElgarCONNOR WALKER 1972 lsquoNation-building or nation-destroyingrsquo World PoliticsvolXXIV no3 pp 319ndash55COUNCIL of EUROPE COMMITTEE on CULTURE and EDUCATION Recom-mendation 1283 (22 January 1996) Document 7446DAHL ROBERT 1971 Polyarchy New Haven CT Yale University PressEUROBAROMETER OPINION POLL no471 Luxembourg lsquoRacism and Xeno-phobia in Europersquo 18ndash19 December 1991FINLAYSON ALAN 1998 lsquoIdeology discourse and nationalismrsquo Journal of PoliticalIdeologies vol3 no1 pp 99ndash119

The myth of the civic state 37

common societal culture Turner (1997 p 9) believes that lsquoCitizenshipidentities and citizenship cultures are national identities and nationalculturesrsquo He continues

When individuals become citizens they not only enter into a set ofinstitutions that confers upon them rights and obligations they notonly acquire an identity they are not only socialised into civic virtuesbut they also become members of a political community with a par-ticular territory and history

The symbios of civic and ethnic actors found within civic states deter-mines the vitality and mobilization capacity of the demos and civilsociety (Miller 1995 2000 Canovan 1996) Although particularism anduniversalism are hostile and competing ideologies in practice national-ism has been the midwife that has brought liberal democracy into theworld and has connected the two ever since If the nation and communityare weakened or decline the demos is also affected The solidarity thatholds together a democracy is the civic nation

Kymlicka (1996) sees no reason to regret the fact that most civic stateshave always been and still are also composed of different cultures Bydenying this factor civic states seek to justify internal homogenization tothe dominant culture and language whether states should therefore bedened as civic or ethnic in Kohnrsquos terms has less to do with the absenceor existence of cultural criteria but if anybody lsquocan be integrated intothe community regardless of race or colourrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 24) andwhat qualications for membership are in place (Canovan 1996 p 19)Kymlicka (1996) therefore stresses that both Western and Easternnationalism have cultural components and identity in both is thereforegrounded in culture

National identity

How do political communities and civic nations hold together Fewscholars would dispute that modern societies require a fraternity (Nisbet1953 pp 153ndash88) a lsquocommunity of valuesrsquo (Parekh 1995 p 436) alsquosingle psychological focus shared by all segmentsrsquo (Connor 1972 p353) a lsquonationalityrsquo (Miller 1995 p 140) a lsquohigh degree of communalsolidarityrsquo (Canovan 1996 pp 28ndash29) and a lsquoWersquo where the nation andthe people are one (Finlayson 1998 p 113) Nevertheless liberal demo-cratic theory assumes a lsquoWersquo is in place and therefore ignores the dif-cult process of forging a lsquoPeoplersquo for the political community Ignoringnationality serves to create a false illusion that lsquocivicrsquo states are purelycivic and are devoid of ethno-cultural factors It also makes it easier todiscuss lsquoWestern civicrsquo states as having always been civic from theirinception

30 Taras Kuzio

Despite the close inter-connection between liberal democracy andnationhood since the late-eighteenth-century political theory tends toignore nationality Nevertheless nationhood is at the heart of politicaltheory even though its particularism has an uneasy marriage with theuniversalism of liberalism How a lsquoPeoplersquo and political solidarity arecreated is often ignored and taken for granted even though it is nation-hood that generates the lsquoWersquo and collective power Successful politiesrequire not only a degree of societal trust but also unity and stabilityfactors which lsquohave always been at the root of politicsrsquo (Canovan 1996p 22)

Advocates of individual rights usually argue that civic states by de-nition are indifferent to ethno-cultural questions Advocates of culturalpluralism on the other hand such as Kymlicka (1996) will counter thosepromoting only individual rights by arguing that all civic states includeethno-cultural elements No civic state can possibly hope to be neutralwhen deciding which ethnic groupsrsquo language culture symbols andanniversaries to promote at the state level (Beissinger 1996 p 101)Although 17 million Americans count Spanish as their rst language onlyone per cent of US federal documents are in non-English languages(Freedland 1998 p 147) Liberals remain concerned that group rightsand cultural pluralism inhibit the creation of a shared identity that civicstates promote They ignore the fact that this shared identity in Westerncivic states is not ethnically or culturally neutral but based upon that ofthe ethnic core (s) Kymlicka (1996) poses a double paradox Multi-ethnic states which represent the majority of nation-states lsquocannotsurvive unless the various national groups have an allegiance to thelarger community they cohabitrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 13) If states ignorethis question and pursue radical homogenizing (or in Brubakerrsquos termlsquonationalizingrsquo) policies this will alienate national minorities and maylead to ethnic and social unrest Civic states have therefore to balancebetween forging an overarching unity in the public domain whileallowing and sometimes fostering polyethnic rights and identities in theprivate sphere (Kuzio forthcoming)

The inclusion of polyethnic rights and the recognition of the value ofcultural pluralism is a relatively recent phenomenon in civic statesWithout the recognition of these rights and pluralism and a concomi-tant rejection of homogenization the imagined civic community will notinclude large numbers of people who do not belong to the ethnic coreKymlicka (1996) and Connor (1972) do not believe that civic statesassimilated non-titulars lsquovoluntarilyrsquo Few national groups voluntarilyassimilated from the eighteenth century and the majority of civic statespursued homogenizing policies until the 1960s France and the US twoof Kohnrsquos civic West still do not legally recognize the concept of nationalminorities because they believe that to do so would undermine their civicstates by prioritizing collective ethnic over individual civic rights Only

The myth of the civic state 31

Canada and Australia adopted multicultural policies in the 1970s (whilenone of Kohnrsquos ve lsquocivicrsquo states adopted similar policies)

Linz and Stepan (1996 pp 35ndash37) dene lsquonationalizingrsquo policies asattempting to homogenize multi-ethnic societies in the East Yet themajority of states both in the West and the East have always been multi-ethnic The newly independent states of the East if they are indeedadopting homogenizing policies are merely mirroring the examples setby the West from the eighteenth century onwards These homogenizingpolicies pursued since the late-eighteenth century in the West were onlymodied in some cases from the 1960s Majority cultures in civic stateshave had a lsquoperverse incentiversquo to destroy the cultures of nationalminorities and lsquothen cite that destruction as a justication for compellingassimilationrsquo (Kymlicka 1995 p 100)

Nation-building in the West was as Connor (1972) commented bothlsquonation creatingrsquo and lsquonation destroyingrsquo All European governmentsincluding those in the West lsquoeventually took steps which homogenizedtheir populationsrsquo (Tilly 1975 p 43) Nation-building in France wasaccompanied by the destruction of local cultures and languages in theperiphery and the imposition of a hegemonic Icircle de France culture thatwas promoted as a benecial lsquola mission civilisatricersquo Weber (1979)describes the slow and uneven process of national integration in Francein the nineteenth century as that of a lsquocolonial empire shaped over thecenturiesrsquo These territories had been lsquoconquered annexed and integratedrsquo by the Icircle de France Parisian ofcials sent to regions such as Brittany felt and behaved as if they were going to an overseas colony

Gellner (1983 pp 142ndash43) sees homogenization as an inevitable by-product of modernization and a functioning national economy Nation-building welded together different peoples into a single communitylsquobased on the cultural heritage of the dominant ethnic corersquo (A D Smith1991 p 68) Thus Western states were not neutral in their nation-building projects and these often marginalized national minorities anddestroyed local identities (Moore 1997 p 904) These factors wereignored by Kohn (1944 1982) in his positive treatment of nationalism inthe West

Historic myths in civic states

Both civic and ethnic states have traditionally used myths and history(Andersen 1991 pp 11ndash12 Schnapper 1997 pp 214 219) As theCouncil of Europe has complained lsquoVirtually all political systems haveused history for their own ends and have imposed both their version ofhistorical facts and their defence of the good and bad gures of historyrsquo(Council of Europe) An objective history may be what historians shouldstrive to write but in reality objective history is as much a myth as states

32 Taras Kuzio

being wholly civic There has often been little to distinguish myth fromhistory as myths have been a lsquopoetic form of historyrsquo (A D Smith 1984p 103)

Smith (1984) points out that all nations since the late-eighteenthcentury have appealed to ancestry and history in the struggle to estab-lish their state and nationhood This process had engulfed the whole ofwestern Europe by 1800 and spread only half a century afterwards toeastern Europe The nationrsquos ancestry had to be demonstrated as vitallsquoboth for self-esteem and security and for external recognitionrsquo (A DSmith 1984 p 101) Historical myths have been traditionally promotedas part of the inculcation of national solidarity within states Myths wereuseful for a variety of policies within the state and nation-buildingproject ndash proving ancient ancestry securing exclusive title to territoryand location the transmission of spiritual values through history pro-motion of heroic ages regeneration of lsquogolden erasrsquo as part of a lsquospecialidentityrsquo and a claim to special status (A D Smith 1984)

The myths of modern Switzerland one of Kohnrsquos ve civic states arefounded on the traditions and memories of an older ethnic nation andare themselves based on a German cultural core The modern Swissstatersquos historical myths and ethno-cultural core are Germanic Through-out Francersquos period of nation-building from 1789ndash1914 the anthem agoaths hymns monuments calendars ceremonies heroes and martyrsappealed to one Gaullist ancestry (A D Smith 1998 p 126) The his-torical past played a prominent role in the inculcation of values andloyalty to the French republic through the construction of monumentsnationalist pedagogy in history teaching museums and memorials inevery commune (Johnson 1993) Just as the English and Americanssought to locate their nation in ancient history the French claimeddescent from the Trojans and Romans The Normans were portrayed asFrankish usurpers who had taken away their rights

Paxman (1999 p 153) believes that lsquoWe must accept rst that a senseof history runs deep in the English peoplersquo The union of Scotland andEngland in 1707 subsumed English within British nationalism that mod-erated English nationalism Nevertheless English myths remained aliveand well in debates over Anglo-Saxon origins archaeology ruralEngland pageants (the opening of parliament the trooping of thecolour the last night of the Proms) and in memories of noble sacriceagainst all odds in World War II such as at Dunkirk (A D Smith 1984p 109) In nineteenth-century England the education system denedEnglish literature as lsquosuperiorrsquo and its culture ideas tastes morals arthistory and family life subscribed to these dominant views of lsquoinferiorrsquoand lsquosuperiorrsquo races not only in the colonies but in countries closer tohome such as Ireland (Hickman 1998) England was the lsquoNew Israelrsquothat was set to deliver its civilization to mankind English history wastreated separately to British and the former placed greater emphasis

The myth of the civic state 33

upon Anglo-Saxon racial origins and an lsquoobsessive interestrsquo in the past(Baucom 1999 pp 15 20 48)

US historical myths linked an alleged pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon loveof liberty with a myth of ethnogenesis which dened the Americans asa new nation that was escaping from the tyranny of the lsquoNormanrsquomonarchs who ruled Britain The US also had an lsquoinfatuationrsquo withAnglo-Saxon history that was included within its myths of ethnogenesis(Kaufmannn 2000b) American exceptionalism portrayed the US nationas the lsquopurestrsquo English (Lipset 1997) a myth of exceptionalism similarto that of the Afrikaner in South Africa the Scots in Ulster and theFrench Canadians in Quebec These American historical myths helpedforge lsquoWASPrsquo cultural boundaries within which dominant Anglo con-formity was promoted in the nineteenth and the rst half of the twenti-eth centuries (Kaufmann 1999 2000b R M Smith 1997 pp 3 460 468)

In a survey of American nation-building from 1776 to the presentSpilman (1997) stressed the centrality of symbols rituals and patrioticorganizations that served to forge a US national identity GeorgeWashington was given a hero-like status after 1789 in portraits birthdaycelebrations shrines books the constitution commemorations ofbattles and independence day celebrations Thanksgiving and MemorialDay were annually celebrated pledges of allegiance were made andlarge historical pageants were held Historical myths have thereforeplayed as important a role in the US as they have in the other fourWestern states cited as lsquocivicrsquo examples by Kohn

Ethnic to civic state an alternative framework

Kohnrsquos division of nationalism traces its positive inclusive qualities retrospectively back to the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries Howevercivic states have never been identical and unanimous in how they wereconstituted The growth of the national state and its provision of civilpolitical cultural and social rights was lsquoslow and unevenrsquo (Mouzelis 1996p 226)

At the time of the American revolution only a small percentage ofwealthy white Protestant males could vote something American colonistsand revolutionaries did not see as unusual Indeed after 1776 slaves con-tinued to be imported into the USA and slavery lsquoemerged from the Revol-ution more rmly entrenched than ever in American lifersquo (Foner 1998 p28) lsquoSlavery rendered blacks all but invisible to those imagining theAmerican communityrsquo (Foner 1998 p 38) US President Thomas Jefferson himself possessed 1000 slaves and believed them to be perma-nently decient in the faculties required to enjoy freedom requiringtutelage by lsquosuperiorrsquo races such as Anglo-Saxons to improve their possi-bility of full civic equality at an unspecied later date (R M Smith 1997p 105) Slavery existed until the 1860s in the USA and the slave trade

34 Taras Kuzio

helped to build up the wealth of Western states Indeed it was only Switzer-land of Kohnrsquos ve Western examples that did not prot from slavery

Although the American national idea as elaborated upon and ideal-ized by Kohn (1944) was based on a mythical devotion to freedom thedenition of who could experience it was initially ethnically narrow andonly gradually evolved into a civic variant after the 1960s The centen-nial of the US revolution in 1876 ignored blacks new non-Anglo-Saxonimmigrants Native Americans and women as not being part of thenation The nineteenth-century US republic had no room for NativeIndian black Spanish or French culture The conquering of New Mexicoand the annexation of Texas was proclaimed as a triumph of ProtestantAnglo-Saxon civilization against the Catholic world and lower racesNew Mexico was not admitted into the union until 1912 even though itpossessed the required population level because it was held to be lsquotooIndianrsquo (Foner 1998 p 79)

By the bicentennial of the US revolution in 1976 the American nationhad evolved from ethnic to civic and included those previously excludedin other words at different times in US history lsquofreedomrsquo had differentmeanings Who was to be included within the American nation is lsquoahighly uneven and bitterly contested part of the story of Americanfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p XVII) Freedom in American history has there-fore been both a lsquomythic idealrsquo and a lsquoliving truthrsquo (Foner 1998 p XXI)

Dahlrsquos denition of a civic state rests on three factors free and fairelections an inclusive suffrage and the right to run for ofce These threebasic civic rights were not always included within Western states In con-temporary denitions of civic states the US and Australia could there-fore not be dened as lsquocivicrsquo states prior to the 1960s because theyexcluded people on the basis of colour and race The breakthrough inwidening the American nation occurred nearly two hundred years afterthe USA was founded when the Civil Rights (1964) Voting Rights (1965)and Fair Housing (1968) Acts were passed

The evolution of states from ethnic to civic statehood occurredthroughout the West and not only in the small number of states dis-cussed in this article This evolution was the norm not the exceptionOnly from the 1960s can we dene Western states as civic while themajority of the East became civic only three decades later in the 1990sAlthough democratic consolidation and civic state building is far fromconsolidated in the East in contrast to the West the East is encouragedby international organizations to continue to evolve along civic lines(something that was not the case in the West) That Western civic statesare still in a process of evolution and are not perfect civic states can beseen in the numerous problems that continue to bedevil them The USstill disenfranchises nearly four million of its citizens a policy that wouldno doubt be condemned by the OSCE if introduced in the East2

By looking at the evolution of Western states in such a manner we

The myth of the civic state 35

shall full two tasks Firstly we shall no longer be able to ignore ethno-cultural factors within civic states Secondly we shall be able to discussin a more frank and open manner the way in which Western statesevolved from ethnic to civic state and nationhood

Conclusion

This article has contributed to the scholarly literature on nationalism byarguing that the Kohn framework of Western states has always been civicfrom the moment of their creation is historically wrong (R S Smith 1997pp 20 31ndash32 499) Western states have evolved from ethnic to civicstates only in the last four decades of the twentieth century Without anunderstanding of this evolution of Western ethnic into civic states wecannot understand the nature of the civic state as containing tensionbetween its universal liberalist and national particularist componentsAll civic states will retain this internal contradiction as long as national-ity remains central to creating the solidarity that pure civic states wouldlack by themselves (Miller 1995 2000)

Both the US and Canadian examples discussed in this article haveshown that Western states typically began as ethnic and only graduallyevolved into civic states from the 1960s Evolution from ethnic to civicnationalism is only likely to take place after the core ethnic group is self-condent within its own bounded territory to open the community tolsquooutsidersrsquo from other ethnic groups Historical evidence shows thatWestern states did not become civic because they so desired but becauseof a multitude of domestic and international pressures (Kaufmann2000b) Belief in civic values can go together with ethnic nationalism andracism and states can move away from their civic bases during times ofperceived crisis

In the US this occurred during the century between the emancipationof the black slaves in the 1860s to re-enfranchising southern blacks inthe 1960s In British Canada this evolution of nationalism took place inthe early twentieth century In French Canada Francophones onlybecame dominant within Quebec after the 1960s a period during whichFrench Canadian nationalism also evolved from ethnic to civic national-ism This process was not solely conned to the US and Canada butoccurred throughout the West

The continued use of the Kohn framework is doubly wrong after adecade of post-Communism in central and eastern Europe when all buttwo of these states became civic Evolution from ethnic to civic stateshas therefore little to do with geography and far more to do with thepositive inuence of international institutions domestic democratic con-solidation and civic institution building Western states have a long his-torical record as ethnic states a factor which makes their evolution moresimilar not different to states in the East

36 Taras Kuzio

Acknowledgements

An earlier and longer version of this paper was presented at the AnnualConvention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities ColumbiaUniversity New York 13ndash15 April 2000 The author would like to thanktwo anonymous ERS referees and Assistant Professor Stephen Shulmanfor their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article

Notes

1 A European Union-wide survey in Spring 1997 found 33 per cent of those inter-viewed describing themselves as lsquoquite racistrsquo or lsquovery racistrsquo Many of these supported thebasic tenets of a civic inclusive liberal democratic state (Eurobarometer Opinion Poll)2 46 states and the District of Columbia have criminal disenfranchisement laws thatdeny the vote to all convicted adults in prison 32 states disenfranchise felons on paroleand 29 those on probation Laws that are unique to the US exist in 14 states that perma-nently disenfranchise former offenders (for life) who have fully served their sentences Thislegislation which runs contrary to established practice in both western and eastern Europeis racially neutral nevertheless due to socio-economic factors it is not surprising that itaffects national minorities blacks and Hispanics more than whites In Florida for example400000 former offenders are permanently excluded from voting of whom half are blacks(representing nearly a third of all blacks in Florida) (Human Rights Watch)

References

ANDERSEN BENEDICT 1991 Imagined Communities London VersoANER STEFAN 2000 lsquoNationalism in central Europe ndash A chance or a threat for theemerging liberal democratic orderrsquo East European Politics and Society vol14 no2pp 213ndash45BAUCOM IAN 1999 Out of Place Englishness Empire and the Location of IdentityPrinceton NJ Princeton University PressBEISSINGER MARK R 1996 lsquoHow nationalism spread Eastern Europe adrift the tidesand cycles of national contentionrsquo Social Research vol 63 no1 pp 97ndash146BOSTOCK WILLIAM W 1997 lsquo ldquoLanguage griefrdquo A ldquoraw materialrdquo of ethnic conictrsquoNationalism and Ethnic Politics vol3 no4 pp 94ndash112BRETON RAYMOND 1988 lsquoFrom ethnic to civic nationalism English Canada andQuebecrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 2 no1 pp 85ndash102BROWN DAVID 1999 lsquoAre there good and bad nationalismsrsquo Nations and Nationalismvol5 no2 pp 281ndash302BRUBAKER ROGERS 1995 lsquoNational minorities nationalizing states and externalhomelands in the new Europersquo Daedalus vol124 no2 pp 107ndash32CANOVAN MARGARET 1996 Nationhood and Political Theory Cheltenham EdwardElgarCONNOR WALKER 1972 lsquoNation-building or nation-destroyingrsquo World PoliticsvolXXIV no3 pp 319ndash55COUNCIL of EUROPE COMMITTEE on CULTURE and EDUCATION Recom-mendation 1283 (22 January 1996) Document 7446DAHL ROBERT 1971 Polyarchy New Haven CT Yale University PressEUROBAROMETER OPINION POLL no471 Luxembourg lsquoRacism and Xeno-phobia in Europersquo 18ndash19 December 1991FINLAYSON ALAN 1998 lsquoIdeology discourse and nationalismrsquo Journal of PoliticalIdeologies vol3 no1 pp 99ndash119

The myth of the civic state 37

Despite the close inter-connection between liberal democracy andnationhood since the late-eighteenth-century political theory tends toignore nationality Nevertheless nationhood is at the heart of politicaltheory even though its particularism has an uneasy marriage with theuniversalism of liberalism How a lsquoPeoplersquo and political solidarity arecreated is often ignored and taken for granted even though it is nation-hood that generates the lsquoWersquo and collective power Successful politiesrequire not only a degree of societal trust but also unity and stabilityfactors which lsquohave always been at the root of politicsrsquo (Canovan 1996p 22)

Advocates of individual rights usually argue that civic states by de-nition are indifferent to ethno-cultural questions Advocates of culturalpluralism on the other hand such as Kymlicka (1996) will counter thosepromoting only individual rights by arguing that all civic states includeethno-cultural elements No civic state can possibly hope to be neutralwhen deciding which ethnic groupsrsquo language culture symbols andanniversaries to promote at the state level (Beissinger 1996 p 101)Although 17 million Americans count Spanish as their rst language onlyone per cent of US federal documents are in non-English languages(Freedland 1998 p 147) Liberals remain concerned that group rightsand cultural pluralism inhibit the creation of a shared identity that civicstates promote They ignore the fact that this shared identity in Westerncivic states is not ethnically or culturally neutral but based upon that ofthe ethnic core (s) Kymlicka (1996) poses a double paradox Multi-ethnic states which represent the majority of nation-states lsquocannotsurvive unless the various national groups have an allegiance to thelarger community they cohabitrsquo (Kymlicka 1996 p 13) If states ignorethis question and pursue radical homogenizing (or in Brubakerrsquos termlsquonationalizingrsquo) policies this will alienate national minorities and maylead to ethnic and social unrest Civic states have therefore to balancebetween forging an overarching unity in the public domain whileallowing and sometimes fostering polyethnic rights and identities in theprivate sphere (Kuzio forthcoming)

The inclusion of polyethnic rights and the recognition of the value ofcultural pluralism is a relatively recent phenomenon in civic statesWithout the recognition of these rights and pluralism and a concomi-tant rejection of homogenization the imagined civic community will notinclude large numbers of people who do not belong to the ethnic coreKymlicka (1996) and Connor (1972) do not believe that civic statesassimilated non-titulars lsquovoluntarilyrsquo Few national groups voluntarilyassimilated from the eighteenth century and the majority of civic statespursued homogenizing policies until the 1960s France and the US twoof Kohnrsquos civic West still do not legally recognize the concept of nationalminorities because they believe that to do so would undermine their civicstates by prioritizing collective ethnic over individual civic rights Only

The myth of the civic state 31

Canada and Australia adopted multicultural policies in the 1970s (whilenone of Kohnrsquos ve lsquocivicrsquo states adopted similar policies)

Linz and Stepan (1996 pp 35ndash37) dene lsquonationalizingrsquo policies asattempting to homogenize multi-ethnic societies in the East Yet themajority of states both in the West and the East have always been multi-ethnic The newly independent states of the East if they are indeedadopting homogenizing policies are merely mirroring the examples setby the West from the eighteenth century onwards These homogenizingpolicies pursued since the late-eighteenth century in the West were onlymodied in some cases from the 1960s Majority cultures in civic stateshave had a lsquoperverse incentiversquo to destroy the cultures of nationalminorities and lsquothen cite that destruction as a justication for compellingassimilationrsquo (Kymlicka 1995 p 100)

Nation-building in the West was as Connor (1972) commented bothlsquonation creatingrsquo and lsquonation destroyingrsquo All European governmentsincluding those in the West lsquoeventually took steps which homogenizedtheir populationsrsquo (Tilly 1975 p 43) Nation-building in France wasaccompanied by the destruction of local cultures and languages in theperiphery and the imposition of a hegemonic Icircle de France culture thatwas promoted as a benecial lsquola mission civilisatricersquo Weber (1979)describes the slow and uneven process of national integration in Francein the nineteenth century as that of a lsquocolonial empire shaped over thecenturiesrsquo These territories had been lsquoconquered annexed and integratedrsquo by the Icircle de France Parisian ofcials sent to regions such as Brittany felt and behaved as if they were going to an overseas colony

Gellner (1983 pp 142ndash43) sees homogenization as an inevitable by-product of modernization and a functioning national economy Nation-building welded together different peoples into a single communitylsquobased on the cultural heritage of the dominant ethnic corersquo (A D Smith1991 p 68) Thus Western states were not neutral in their nation-building projects and these often marginalized national minorities anddestroyed local identities (Moore 1997 p 904) These factors wereignored by Kohn (1944 1982) in his positive treatment of nationalism inthe West

Historic myths in civic states

Both civic and ethnic states have traditionally used myths and history(Andersen 1991 pp 11ndash12 Schnapper 1997 pp 214 219) As theCouncil of Europe has complained lsquoVirtually all political systems haveused history for their own ends and have imposed both their version ofhistorical facts and their defence of the good and bad gures of historyrsquo(Council of Europe) An objective history may be what historians shouldstrive to write but in reality objective history is as much a myth as states

32 Taras Kuzio

being wholly civic There has often been little to distinguish myth fromhistory as myths have been a lsquopoetic form of historyrsquo (A D Smith 1984p 103)

Smith (1984) points out that all nations since the late-eighteenthcentury have appealed to ancestry and history in the struggle to estab-lish their state and nationhood This process had engulfed the whole ofwestern Europe by 1800 and spread only half a century afterwards toeastern Europe The nationrsquos ancestry had to be demonstrated as vitallsquoboth for self-esteem and security and for external recognitionrsquo (A DSmith 1984 p 101) Historical myths have been traditionally promotedas part of the inculcation of national solidarity within states Myths wereuseful for a variety of policies within the state and nation-buildingproject ndash proving ancient ancestry securing exclusive title to territoryand location the transmission of spiritual values through history pro-motion of heroic ages regeneration of lsquogolden erasrsquo as part of a lsquospecialidentityrsquo and a claim to special status (A D Smith 1984)

The myths of modern Switzerland one of Kohnrsquos ve civic states arefounded on the traditions and memories of an older ethnic nation andare themselves based on a German cultural core The modern Swissstatersquos historical myths and ethno-cultural core are Germanic Through-out Francersquos period of nation-building from 1789ndash1914 the anthem agoaths hymns monuments calendars ceremonies heroes and martyrsappealed to one Gaullist ancestry (A D Smith 1998 p 126) The his-torical past played a prominent role in the inculcation of values andloyalty to the French republic through the construction of monumentsnationalist pedagogy in history teaching museums and memorials inevery commune (Johnson 1993) Just as the English and Americanssought to locate their nation in ancient history the French claimeddescent from the Trojans and Romans The Normans were portrayed asFrankish usurpers who had taken away their rights

Paxman (1999 p 153) believes that lsquoWe must accept rst that a senseof history runs deep in the English peoplersquo The union of Scotland andEngland in 1707 subsumed English within British nationalism that mod-erated English nationalism Nevertheless English myths remained aliveand well in debates over Anglo-Saxon origins archaeology ruralEngland pageants (the opening of parliament the trooping of thecolour the last night of the Proms) and in memories of noble sacriceagainst all odds in World War II such as at Dunkirk (A D Smith 1984p 109) In nineteenth-century England the education system denedEnglish literature as lsquosuperiorrsquo and its culture ideas tastes morals arthistory and family life subscribed to these dominant views of lsquoinferiorrsquoand lsquosuperiorrsquo races not only in the colonies but in countries closer tohome such as Ireland (Hickman 1998) England was the lsquoNew Israelrsquothat was set to deliver its civilization to mankind English history wastreated separately to British and the former placed greater emphasis

The myth of the civic state 33

upon Anglo-Saxon racial origins and an lsquoobsessive interestrsquo in the past(Baucom 1999 pp 15 20 48)

US historical myths linked an alleged pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon loveof liberty with a myth of ethnogenesis which dened the Americans asa new nation that was escaping from the tyranny of the lsquoNormanrsquomonarchs who ruled Britain The US also had an lsquoinfatuationrsquo withAnglo-Saxon history that was included within its myths of ethnogenesis(Kaufmannn 2000b) American exceptionalism portrayed the US nationas the lsquopurestrsquo English (Lipset 1997) a myth of exceptionalism similarto that of the Afrikaner in South Africa the Scots in Ulster and theFrench Canadians in Quebec These American historical myths helpedforge lsquoWASPrsquo cultural boundaries within which dominant Anglo con-formity was promoted in the nineteenth and the rst half of the twenti-eth centuries (Kaufmann 1999 2000b R M Smith 1997 pp 3 460 468)

In a survey of American nation-building from 1776 to the presentSpilman (1997) stressed the centrality of symbols rituals and patrioticorganizations that served to forge a US national identity GeorgeWashington was given a hero-like status after 1789 in portraits birthdaycelebrations shrines books the constitution commemorations ofbattles and independence day celebrations Thanksgiving and MemorialDay were annually celebrated pledges of allegiance were made andlarge historical pageants were held Historical myths have thereforeplayed as important a role in the US as they have in the other fourWestern states cited as lsquocivicrsquo examples by Kohn

Ethnic to civic state an alternative framework

Kohnrsquos division of nationalism traces its positive inclusive qualities retrospectively back to the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries Howevercivic states have never been identical and unanimous in how they wereconstituted The growth of the national state and its provision of civilpolitical cultural and social rights was lsquoslow and unevenrsquo (Mouzelis 1996p 226)

At the time of the American revolution only a small percentage ofwealthy white Protestant males could vote something American colonistsand revolutionaries did not see as unusual Indeed after 1776 slaves con-tinued to be imported into the USA and slavery lsquoemerged from the Revol-ution more rmly entrenched than ever in American lifersquo (Foner 1998 p28) lsquoSlavery rendered blacks all but invisible to those imagining theAmerican communityrsquo (Foner 1998 p 38) US President Thomas Jefferson himself possessed 1000 slaves and believed them to be perma-nently decient in the faculties required to enjoy freedom requiringtutelage by lsquosuperiorrsquo races such as Anglo-Saxons to improve their possi-bility of full civic equality at an unspecied later date (R M Smith 1997p 105) Slavery existed until the 1860s in the USA and the slave trade

34 Taras Kuzio

helped to build up the wealth of Western states Indeed it was only Switzer-land of Kohnrsquos ve Western examples that did not prot from slavery

Although the American national idea as elaborated upon and ideal-ized by Kohn (1944) was based on a mythical devotion to freedom thedenition of who could experience it was initially ethnically narrow andonly gradually evolved into a civic variant after the 1960s The centen-nial of the US revolution in 1876 ignored blacks new non-Anglo-Saxonimmigrants Native Americans and women as not being part of thenation The nineteenth-century US republic had no room for NativeIndian black Spanish or French culture The conquering of New Mexicoand the annexation of Texas was proclaimed as a triumph of ProtestantAnglo-Saxon civilization against the Catholic world and lower racesNew Mexico was not admitted into the union until 1912 even though itpossessed the required population level because it was held to be lsquotooIndianrsquo (Foner 1998 p 79)

By the bicentennial of the US revolution in 1976 the American nationhad evolved from ethnic to civic and included those previously excludedin other words at different times in US history lsquofreedomrsquo had differentmeanings Who was to be included within the American nation is lsquoahighly uneven and bitterly contested part of the story of Americanfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p XVII) Freedom in American history has there-fore been both a lsquomythic idealrsquo and a lsquoliving truthrsquo (Foner 1998 p XXI)

Dahlrsquos denition of a civic state rests on three factors free and fairelections an inclusive suffrage and the right to run for ofce These threebasic civic rights were not always included within Western states In con-temporary denitions of civic states the US and Australia could there-fore not be dened as lsquocivicrsquo states prior to the 1960s because theyexcluded people on the basis of colour and race The breakthrough inwidening the American nation occurred nearly two hundred years afterthe USA was founded when the Civil Rights (1964) Voting Rights (1965)and Fair Housing (1968) Acts were passed

The evolution of states from ethnic to civic statehood occurredthroughout the West and not only in the small number of states dis-cussed in this article This evolution was the norm not the exceptionOnly from the 1960s can we dene Western states as civic while themajority of the East became civic only three decades later in the 1990sAlthough democratic consolidation and civic state building is far fromconsolidated in the East in contrast to the West the East is encouragedby international organizations to continue to evolve along civic lines(something that was not the case in the West) That Western civic statesare still in a process of evolution and are not perfect civic states can beseen in the numerous problems that continue to bedevil them The USstill disenfranchises nearly four million of its citizens a policy that wouldno doubt be condemned by the OSCE if introduced in the East2

By looking at the evolution of Western states in such a manner we

The myth of the civic state 35

shall full two tasks Firstly we shall no longer be able to ignore ethno-cultural factors within civic states Secondly we shall be able to discussin a more frank and open manner the way in which Western statesevolved from ethnic to civic state and nationhood

Conclusion

This article has contributed to the scholarly literature on nationalism byarguing that the Kohn framework of Western states has always been civicfrom the moment of their creation is historically wrong (R S Smith 1997pp 20 31ndash32 499) Western states have evolved from ethnic to civicstates only in the last four decades of the twentieth century Without anunderstanding of this evolution of Western ethnic into civic states wecannot understand the nature of the civic state as containing tensionbetween its universal liberalist and national particularist componentsAll civic states will retain this internal contradiction as long as national-ity remains central to creating the solidarity that pure civic states wouldlack by themselves (Miller 1995 2000)

Both the US and Canadian examples discussed in this article haveshown that Western states typically began as ethnic and only graduallyevolved into civic states from the 1960s Evolution from ethnic to civicnationalism is only likely to take place after the core ethnic group is self-condent within its own bounded territory to open the community tolsquooutsidersrsquo from other ethnic groups Historical evidence shows thatWestern states did not become civic because they so desired but becauseof a multitude of domestic and international pressures (Kaufmann2000b) Belief in civic values can go together with ethnic nationalism andracism and states can move away from their civic bases during times ofperceived crisis

In the US this occurred during the century between the emancipationof the black slaves in the 1860s to re-enfranchising southern blacks inthe 1960s In British Canada this evolution of nationalism took place inthe early twentieth century In French Canada Francophones onlybecame dominant within Quebec after the 1960s a period during whichFrench Canadian nationalism also evolved from ethnic to civic national-ism This process was not solely conned to the US and Canada butoccurred throughout the West

The continued use of the Kohn framework is doubly wrong after adecade of post-Communism in central and eastern Europe when all buttwo of these states became civic Evolution from ethnic to civic stateshas therefore little to do with geography and far more to do with thepositive inuence of international institutions domestic democratic con-solidation and civic institution building Western states have a long his-torical record as ethnic states a factor which makes their evolution moresimilar not different to states in the East

36 Taras Kuzio

Acknowledgements

An earlier and longer version of this paper was presented at the AnnualConvention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities ColumbiaUniversity New York 13ndash15 April 2000 The author would like to thanktwo anonymous ERS referees and Assistant Professor Stephen Shulmanfor their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article

Notes

1 A European Union-wide survey in Spring 1997 found 33 per cent of those inter-viewed describing themselves as lsquoquite racistrsquo or lsquovery racistrsquo Many of these supported thebasic tenets of a civic inclusive liberal democratic state (Eurobarometer Opinion Poll)2 46 states and the District of Columbia have criminal disenfranchisement laws thatdeny the vote to all convicted adults in prison 32 states disenfranchise felons on paroleand 29 those on probation Laws that are unique to the US exist in 14 states that perma-nently disenfranchise former offenders (for life) who have fully served their sentences Thislegislation which runs contrary to established practice in both western and eastern Europeis racially neutral nevertheless due to socio-economic factors it is not surprising that itaffects national minorities blacks and Hispanics more than whites In Florida for example400000 former offenders are permanently excluded from voting of whom half are blacks(representing nearly a third of all blacks in Florida) (Human Rights Watch)

References

ANDERSEN BENEDICT 1991 Imagined Communities London VersoANER STEFAN 2000 lsquoNationalism in central Europe ndash A chance or a threat for theemerging liberal democratic orderrsquo East European Politics and Society vol14 no2pp 213ndash45BAUCOM IAN 1999 Out of Place Englishness Empire and the Location of IdentityPrinceton NJ Princeton University PressBEISSINGER MARK R 1996 lsquoHow nationalism spread Eastern Europe adrift the tidesand cycles of national contentionrsquo Social Research vol 63 no1 pp 97ndash146BOSTOCK WILLIAM W 1997 lsquo ldquoLanguage griefrdquo A ldquoraw materialrdquo of ethnic conictrsquoNationalism and Ethnic Politics vol3 no4 pp 94ndash112BRETON RAYMOND 1988 lsquoFrom ethnic to civic nationalism English Canada andQuebecrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 2 no1 pp 85ndash102BROWN DAVID 1999 lsquoAre there good and bad nationalismsrsquo Nations and Nationalismvol5 no2 pp 281ndash302BRUBAKER ROGERS 1995 lsquoNational minorities nationalizing states and externalhomelands in the new Europersquo Daedalus vol124 no2 pp 107ndash32CANOVAN MARGARET 1996 Nationhood and Political Theory Cheltenham EdwardElgarCONNOR WALKER 1972 lsquoNation-building or nation-destroyingrsquo World PoliticsvolXXIV no3 pp 319ndash55COUNCIL of EUROPE COMMITTEE on CULTURE and EDUCATION Recom-mendation 1283 (22 January 1996) Document 7446DAHL ROBERT 1971 Polyarchy New Haven CT Yale University PressEUROBAROMETER OPINION POLL no471 Luxembourg lsquoRacism and Xeno-phobia in Europersquo 18ndash19 December 1991FINLAYSON ALAN 1998 lsquoIdeology discourse and nationalismrsquo Journal of PoliticalIdeologies vol3 no1 pp 99ndash119

The myth of the civic state 37

Canada and Australia adopted multicultural policies in the 1970s (whilenone of Kohnrsquos ve lsquocivicrsquo states adopted similar policies)

Linz and Stepan (1996 pp 35ndash37) dene lsquonationalizingrsquo policies asattempting to homogenize multi-ethnic societies in the East Yet themajority of states both in the West and the East have always been multi-ethnic The newly independent states of the East if they are indeedadopting homogenizing policies are merely mirroring the examples setby the West from the eighteenth century onwards These homogenizingpolicies pursued since the late-eighteenth century in the West were onlymodied in some cases from the 1960s Majority cultures in civic stateshave had a lsquoperverse incentiversquo to destroy the cultures of nationalminorities and lsquothen cite that destruction as a justication for compellingassimilationrsquo (Kymlicka 1995 p 100)

Nation-building in the West was as Connor (1972) commented bothlsquonation creatingrsquo and lsquonation destroyingrsquo All European governmentsincluding those in the West lsquoeventually took steps which homogenizedtheir populationsrsquo (Tilly 1975 p 43) Nation-building in France wasaccompanied by the destruction of local cultures and languages in theperiphery and the imposition of a hegemonic Icircle de France culture thatwas promoted as a benecial lsquola mission civilisatricersquo Weber (1979)describes the slow and uneven process of national integration in Francein the nineteenth century as that of a lsquocolonial empire shaped over thecenturiesrsquo These territories had been lsquoconquered annexed and integratedrsquo by the Icircle de France Parisian ofcials sent to regions such as Brittany felt and behaved as if they were going to an overseas colony

Gellner (1983 pp 142ndash43) sees homogenization as an inevitable by-product of modernization and a functioning national economy Nation-building welded together different peoples into a single communitylsquobased on the cultural heritage of the dominant ethnic corersquo (A D Smith1991 p 68) Thus Western states were not neutral in their nation-building projects and these often marginalized national minorities anddestroyed local identities (Moore 1997 p 904) These factors wereignored by Kohn (1944 1982) in his positive treatment of nationalism inthe West

Historic myths in civic states

Both civic and ethnic states have traditionally used myths and history(Andersen 1991 pp 11ndash12 Schnapper 1997 pp 214 219) As theCouncil of Europe has complained lsquoVirtually all political systems haveused history for their own ends and have imposed both their version ofhistorical facts and their defence of the good and bad gures of historyrsquo(Council of Europe) An objective history may be what historians shouldstrive to write but in reality objective history is as much a myth as states

32 Taras Kuzio

being wholly civic There has often been little to distinguish myth fromhistory as myths have been a lsquopoetic form of historyrsquo (A D Smith 1984p 103)

Smith (1984) points out that all nations since the late-eighteenthcentury have appealed to ancestry and history in the struggle to estab-lish their state and nationhood This process had engulfed the whole ofwestern Europe by 1800 and spread only half a century afterwards toeastern Europe The nationrsquos ancestry had to be demonstrated as vitallsquoboth for self-esteem and security and for external recognitionrsquo (A DSmith 1984 p 101) Historical myths have been traditionally promotedas part of the inculcation of national solidarity within states Myths wereuseful for a variety of policies within the state and nation-buildingproject ndash proving ancient ancestry securing exclusive title to territoryand location the transmission of spiritual values through history pro-motion of heroic ages regeneration of lsquogolden erasrsquo as part of a lsquospecialidentityrsquo and a claim to special status (A D Smith 1984)

The myths of modern Switzerland one of Kohnrsquos ve civic states arefounded on the traditions and memories of an older ethnic nation andare themselves based on a German cultural core The modern Swissstatersquos historical myths and ethno-cultural core are Germanic Through-out Francersquos period of nation-building from 1789ndash1914 the anthem agoaths hymns monuments calendars ceremonies heroes and martyrsappealed to one Gaullist ancestry (A D Smith 1998 p 126) The his-torical past played a prominent role in the inculcation of values andloyalty to the French republic through the construction of monumentsnationalist pedagogy in history teaching museums and memorials inevery commune (Johnson 1993) Just as the English and Americanssought to locate their nation in ancient history the French claimeddescent from the Trojans and Romans The Normans were portrayed asFrankish usurpers who had taken away their rights

Paxman (1999 p 153) believes that lsquoWe must accept rst that a senseof history runs deep in the English peoplersquo The union of Scotland andEngland in 1707 subsumed English within British nationalism that mod-erated English nationalism Nevertheless English myths remained aliveand well in debates over Anglo-Saxon origins archaeology ruralEngland pageants (the opening of parliament the trooping of thecolour the last night of the Proms) and in memories of noble sacriceagainst all odds in World War II such as at Dunkirk (A D Smith 1984p 109) In nineteenth-century England the education system denedEnglish literature as lsquosuperiorrsquo and its culture ideas tastes morals arthistory and family life subscribed to these dominant views of lsquoinferiorrsquoand lsquosuperiorrsquo races not only in the colonies but in countries closer tohome such as Ireland (Hickman 1998) England was the lsquoNew Israelrsquothat was set to deliver its civilization to mankind English history wastreated separately to British and the former placed greater emphasis

The myth of the civic state 33

upon Anglo-Saxon racial origins and an lsquoobsessive interestrsquo in the past(Baucom 1999 pp 15 20 48)

US historical myths linked an alleged pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon loveof liberty with a myth of ethnogenesis which dened the Americans asa new nation that was escaping from the tyranny of the lsquoNormanrsquomonarchs who ruled Britain The US also had an lsquoinfatuationrsquo withAnglo-Saxon history that was included within its myths of ethnogenesis(Kaufmannn 2000b) American exceptionalism portrayed the US nationas the lsquopurestrsquo English (Lipset 1997) a myth of exceptionalism similarto that of the Afrikaner in South Africa the Scots in Ulster and theFrench Canadians in Quebec These American historical myths helpedforge lsquoWASPrsquo cultural boundaries within which dominant Anglo con-formity was promoted in the nineteenth and the rst half of the twenti-eth centuries (Kaufmann 1999 2000b R M Smith 1997 pp 3 460 468)

In a survey of American nation-building from 1776 to the presentSpilman (1997) stressed the centrality of symbols rituals and patrioticorganizations that served to forge a US national identity GeorgeWashington was given a hero-like status after 1789 in portraits birthdaycelebrations shrines books the constitution commemorations ofbattles and independence day celebrations Thanksgiving and MemorialDay were annually celebrated pledges of allegiance were made andlarge historical pageants were held Historical myths have thereforeplayed as important a role in the US as they have in the other fourWestern states cited as lsquocivicrsquo examples by Kohn

Ethnic to civic state an alternative framework

Kohnrsquos division of nationalism traces its positive inclusive qualities retrospectively back to the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries Howevercivic states have never been identical and unanimous in how they wereconstituted The growth of the national state and its provision of civilpolitical cultural and social rights was lsquoslow and unevenrsquo (Mouzelis 1996p 226)

At the time of the American revolution only a small percentage ofwealthy white Protestant males could vote something American colonistsand revolutionaries did not see as unusual Indeed after 1776 slaves con-tinued to be imported into the USA and slavery lsquoemerged from the Revol-ution more rmly entrenched than ever in American lifersquo (Foner 1998 p28) lsquoSlavery rendered blacks all but invisible to those imagining theAmerican communityrsquo (Foner 1998 p 38) US President Thomas Jefferson himself possessed 1000 slaves and believed them to be perma-nently decient in the faculties required to enjoy freedom requiringtutelage by lsquosuperiorrsquo races such as Anglo-Saxons to improve their possi-bility of full civic equality at an unspecied later date (R M Smith 1997p 105) Slavery existed until the 1860s in the USA and the slave trade

34 Taras Kuzio

helped to build up the wealth of Western states Indeed it was only Switzer-land of Kohnrsquos ve Western examples that did not prot from slavery

Although the American national idea as elaborated upon and ideal-ized by Kohn (1944) was based on a mythical devotion to freedom thedenition of who could experience it was initially ethnically narrow andonly gradually evolved into a civic variant after the 1960s The centen-nial of the US revolution in 1876 ignored blacks new non-Anglo-Saxonimmigrants Native Americans and women as not being part of thenation The nineteenth-century US republic had no room for NativeIndian black Spanish or French culture The conquering of New Mexicoand the annexation of Texas was proclaimed as a triumph of ProtestantAnglo-Saxon civilization against the Catholic world and lower racesNew Mexico was not admitted into the union until 1912 even though itpossessed the required population level because it was held to be lsquotooIndianrsquo (Foner 1998 p 79)

By the bicentennial of the US revolution in 1976 the American nationhad evolved from ethnic to civic and included those previously excludedin other words at different times in US history lsquofreedomrsquo had differentmeanings Who was to be included within the American nation is lsquoahighly uneven and bitterly contested part of the story of Americanfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p XVII) Freedom in American history has there-fore been both a lsquomythic idealrsquo and a lsquoliving truthrsquo (Foner 1998 p XXI)

Dahlrsquos denition of a civic state rests on three factors free and fairelections an inclusive suffrage and the right to run for ofce These threebasic civic rights were not always included within Western states In con-temporary denitions of civic states the US and Australia could there-fore not be dened as lsquocivicrsquo states prior to the 1960s because theyexcluded people on the basis of colour and race The breakthrough inwidening the American nation occurred nearly two hundred years afterthe USA was founded when the Civil Rights (1964) Voting Rights (1965)and Fair Housing (1968) Acts were passed

The evolution of states from ethnic to civic statehood occurredthroughout the West and not only in the small number of states dis-cussed in this article This evolution was the norm not the exceptionOnly from the 1960s can we dene Western states as civic while themajority of the East became civic only three decades later in the 1990sAlthough democratic consolidation and civic state building is far fromconsolidated in the East in contrast to the West the East is encouragedby international organizations to continue to evolve along civic lines(something that was not the case in the West) That Western civic statesare still in a process of evolution and are not perfect civic states can beseen in the numerous problems that continue to bedevil them The USstill disenfranchises nearly four million of its citizens a policy that wouldno doubt be condemned by the OSCE if introduced in the East2

By looking at the evolution of Western states in such a manner we

The myth of the civic state 35

shall full two tasks Firstly we shall no longer be able to ignore ethno-cultural factors within civic states Secondly we shall be able to discussin a more frank and open manner the way in which Western statesevolved from ethnic to civic state and nationhood

Conclusion

This article has contributed to the scholarly literature on nationalism byarguing that the Kohn framework of Western states has always been civicfrom the moment of their creation is historically wrong (R S Smith 1997pp 20 31ndash32 499) Western states have evolved from ethnic to civicstates only in the last four decades of the twentieth century Without anunderstanding of this evolution of Western ethnic into civic states wecannot understand the nature of the civic state as containing tensionbetween its universal liberalist and national particularist componentsAll civic states will retain this internal contradiction as long as national-ity remains central to creating the solidarity that pure civic states wouldlack by themselves (Miller 1995 2000)

Both the US and Canadian examples discussed in this article haveshown that Western states typically began as ethnic and only graduallyevolved into civic states from the 1960s Evolution from ethnic to civicnationalism is only likely to take place after the core ethnic group is self-condent within its own bounded territory to open the community tolsquooutsidersrsquo from other ethnic groups Historical evidence shows thatWestern states did not become civic because they so desired but becauseof a multitude of domestic and international pressures (Kaufmann2000b) Belief in civic values can go together with ethnic nationalism andracism and states can move away from their civic bases during times ofperceived crisis

In the US this occurred during the century between the emancipationof the black slaves in the 1860s to re-enfranchising southern blacks inthe 1960s In British Canada this evolution of nationalism took place inthe early twentieth century In French Canada Francophones onlybecame dominant within Quebec after the 1960s a period during whichFrench Canadian nationalism also evolved from ethnic to civic national-ism This process was not solely conned to the US and Canada butoccurred throughout the West

The continued use of the Kohn framework is doubly wrong after adecade of post-Communism in central and eastern Europe when all buttwo of these states became civic Evolution from ethnic to civic stateshas therefore little to do with geography and far more to do with thepositive inuence of international institutions domestic democratic con-solidation and civic institution building Western states have a long his-torical record as ethnic states a factor which makes their evolution moresimilar not different to states in the East

36 Taras Kuzio

Acknowledgements

An earlier and longer version of this paper was presented at the AnnualConvention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities ColumbiaUniversity New York 13ndash15 April 2000 The author would like to thanktwo anonymous ERS referees and Assistant Professor Stephen Shulmanfor their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article

Notes

1 A European Union-wide survey in Spring 1997 found 33 per cent of those inter-viewed describing themselves as lsquoquite racistrsquo or lsquovery racistrsquo Many of these supported thebasic tenets of a civic inclusive liberal democratic state (Eurobarometer Opinion Poll)2 46 states and the District of Columbia have criminal disenfranchisement laws thatdeny the vote to all convicted adults in prison 32 states disenfranchise felons on paroleand 29 those on probation Laws that are unique to the US exist in 14 states that perma-nently disenfranchise former offenders (for life) who have fully served their sentences Thislegislation which runs contrary to established practice in both western and eastern Europeis racially neutral nevertheless due to socio-economic factors it is not surprising that itaffects national minorities blacks and Hispanics more than whites In Florida for example400000 former offenders are permanently excluded from voting of whom half are blacks(representing nearly a third of all blacks in Florida) (Human Rights Watch)

References

ANDERSEN BENEDICT 1991 Imagined Communities London VersoANER STEFAN 2000 lsquoNationalism in central Europe ndash A chance or a threat for theemerging liberal democratic orderrsquo East European Politics and Society vol14 no2pp 213ndash45BAUCOM IAN 1999 Out of Place Englishness Empire and the Location of IdentityPrinceton NJ Princeton University PressBEISSINGER MARK R 1996 lsquoHow nationalism spread Eastern Europe adrift the tidesand cycles of national contentionrsquo Social Research vol 63 no1 pp 97ndash146BOSTOCK WILLIAM W 1997 lsquo ldquoLanguage griefrdquo A ldquoraw materialrdquo of ethnic conictrsquoNationalism and Ethnic Politics vol3 no4 pp 94ndash112BRETON RAYMOND 1988 lsquoFrom ethnic to civic nationalism English Canada andQuebecrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 2 no1 pp 85ndash102BROWN DAVID 1999 lsquoAre there good and bad nationalismsrsquo Nations and Nationalismvol5 no2 pp 281ndash302BRUBAKER ROGERS 1995 lsquoNational minorities nationalizing states and externalhomelands in the new Europersquo Daedalus vol124 no2 pp 107ndash32CANOVAN MARGARET 1996 Nationhood and Political Theory Cheltenham EdwardElgarCONNOR WALKER 1972 lsquoNation-building or nation-destroyingrsquo World PoliticsvolXXIV no3 pp 319ndash55COUNCIL of EUROPE COMMITTEE on CULTURE and EDUCATION Recom-mendation 1283 (22 January 1996) Document 7446DAHL ROBERT 1971 Polyarchy New Haven CT Yale University PressEUROBAROMETER OPINION POLL no471 Luxembourg lsquoRacism and Xeno-phobia in Europersquo 18ndash19 December 1991FINLAYSON ALAN 1998 lsquoIdeology discourse and nationalismrsquo Journal of PoliticalIdeologies vol3 no1 pp 99ndash119

The myth of the civic state 37

being wholly civic There has often been little to distinguish myth fromhistory as myths have been a lsquopoetic form of historyrsquo (A D Smith 1984p 103)

Smith (1984) points out that all nations since the late-eighteenthcentury have appealed to ancestry and history in the struggle to estab-lish their state and nationhood This process had engulfed the whole ofwestern Europe by 1800 and spread only half a century afterwards toeastern Europe The nationrsquos ancestry had to be demonstrated as vitallsquoboth for self-esteem and security and for external recognitionrsquo (A DSmith 1984 p 101) Historical myths have been traditionally promotedas part of the inculcation of national solidarity within states Myths wereuseful for a variety of policies within the state and nation-buildingproject ndash proving ancient ancestry securing exclusive title to territoryand location the transmission of spiritual values through history pro-motion of heroic ages regeneration of lsquogolden erasrsquo as part of a lsquospecialidentityrsquo and a claim to special status (A D Smith 1984)

The myths of modern Switzerland one of Kohnrsquos ve civic states arefounded on the traditions and memories of an older ethnic nation andare themselves based on a German cultural core The modern Swissstatersquos historical myths and ethno-cultural core are Germanic Through-out Francersquos period of nation-building from 1789ndash1914 the anthem agoaths hymns monuments calendars ceremonies heroes and martyrsappealed to one Gaullist ancestry (A D Smith 1998 p 126) The his-torical past played a prominent role in the inculcation of values andloyalty to the French republic through the construction of monumentsnationalist pedagogy in history teaching museums and memorials inevery commune (Johnson 1993) Just as the English and Americanssought to locate their nation in ancient history the French claimeddescent from the Trojans and Romans The Normans were portrayed asFrankish usurpers who had taken away their rights

Paxman (1999 p 153) believes that lsquoWe must accept rst that a senseof history runs deep in the English peoplersquo The union of Scotland andEngland in 1707 subsumed English within British nationalism that mod-erated English nationalism Nevertheless English myths remained aliveand well in debates over Anglo-Saxon origins archaeology ruralEngland pageants (the opening of parliament the trooping of thecolour the last night of the Proms) and in memories of noble sacriceagainst all odds in World War II such as at Dunkirk (A D Smith 1984p 109) In nineteenth-century England the education system denedEnglish literature as lsquosuperiorrsquo and its culture ideas tastes morals arthistory and family life subscribed to these dominant views of lsquoinferiorrsquoand lsquosuperiorrsquo races not only in the colonies but in countries closer tohome such as Ireland (Hickman 1998) England was the lsquoNew Israelrsquothat was set to deliver its civilization to mankind English history wastreated separately to British and the former placed greater emphasis

The myth of the civic state 33

upon Anglo-Saxon racial origins and an lsquoobsessive interestrsquo in the past(Baucom 1999 pp 15 20 48)

US historical myths linked an alleged pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon loveof liberty with a myth of ethnogenesis which dened the Americans asa new nation that was escaping from the tyranny of the lsquoNormanrsquomonarchs who ruled Britain The US also had an lsquoinfatuationrsquo withAnglo-Saxon history that was included within its myths of ethnogenesis(Kaufmannn 2000b) American exceptionalism portrayed the US nationas the lsquopurestrsquo English (Lipset 1997) a myth of exceptionalism similarto that of the Afrikaner in South Africa the Scots in Ulster and theFrench Canadians in Quebec These American historical myths helpedforge lsquoWASPrsquo cultural boundaries within which dominant Anglo con-formity was promoted in the nineteenth and the rst half of the twenti-eth centuries (Kaufmann 1999 2000b R M Smith 1997 pp 3 460 468)

In a survey of American nation-building from 1776 to the presentSpilman (1997) stressed the centrality of symbols rituals and patrioticorganizations that served to forge a US national identity GeorgeWashington was given a hero-like status after 1789 in portraits birthdaycelebrations shrines books the constitution commemorations ofbattles and independence day celebrations Thanksgiving and MemorialDay were annually celebrated pledges of allegiance were made andlarge historical pageants were held Historical myths have thereforeplayed as important a role in the US as they have in the other fourWestern states cited as lsquocivicrsquo examples by Kohn

Ethnic to civic state an alternative framework

Kohnrsquos division of nationalism traces its positive inclusive qualities retrospectively back to the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries Howevercivic states have never been identical and unanimous in how they wereconstituted The growth of the national state and its provision of civilpolitical cultural and social rights was lsquoslow and unevenrsquo (Mouzelis 1996p 226)

At the time of the American revolution only a small percentage ofwealthy white Protestant males could vote something American colonistsand revolutionaries did not see as unusual Indeed after 1776 slaves con-tinued to be imported into the USA and slavery lsquoemerged from the Revol-ution more rmly entrenched than ever in American lifersquo (Foner 1998 p28) lsquoSlavery rendered blacks all but invisible to those imagining theAmerican communityrsquo (Foner 1998 p 38) US President Thomas Jefferson himself possessed 1000 slaves and believed them to be perma-nently decient in the faculties required to enjoy freedom requiringtutelage by lsquosuperiorrsquo races such as Anglo-Saxons to improve their possi-bility of full civic equality at an unspecied later date (R M Smith 1997p 105) Slavery existed until the 1860s in the USA and the slave trade

34 Taras Kuzio

helped to build up the wealth of Western states Indeed it was only Switzer-land of Kohnrsquos ve Western examples that did not prot from slavery

Although the American national idea as elaborated upon and ideal-ized by Kohn (1944) was based on a mythical devotion to freedom thedenition of who could experience it was initially ethnically narrow andonly gradually evolved into a civic variant after the 1960s The centen-nial of the US revolution in 1876 ignored blacks new non-Anglo-Saxonimmigrants Native Americans and women as not being part of thenation The nineteenth-century US republic had no room for NativeIndian black Spanish or French culture The conquering of New Mexicoand the annexation of Texas was proclaimed as a triumph of ProtestantAnglo-Saxon civilization against the Catholic world and lower racesNew Mexico was not admitted into the union until 1912 even though itpossessed the required population level because it was held to be lsquotooIndianrsquo (Foner 1998 p 79)

By the bicentennial of the US revolution in 1976 the American nationhad evolved from ethnic to civic and included those previously excludedin other words at different times in US history lsquofreedomrsquo had differentmeanings Who was to be included within the American nation is lsquoahighly uneven and bitterly contested part of the story of Americanfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p XVII) Freedom in American history has there-fore been both a lsquomythic idealrsquo and a lsquoliving truthrsquo (Foner 1998 p XXI)

Dahlrsquos denition of a civic state rests on three factors free and fairelections an inclusive suffrage and the right to run for ofce These threebasic civic rights were not always included within Western states In con-temporary denitions of civic states the US and Australia could there-fore not be dened as lsquocivicrsquo states prior to the 1960s because theyexcluded people on the basis of colour and race The breakthrough inwidening the American nation occurred nearly two hundred years afterthe USA was founded when the Civil Rights (1964) Voting Rights (1965)and Fair Housing (1968) Acts were passed

The evolution of states from ethnic to civic statehood occurredthroughout the West and not only in the small number of states dis-cussed in this article This evolution was the norm not the exceptionOnly from the 1960s can we dene Western states as civic while themajority of the East became civic only three decades later in the 1990sAlthough democratic consolidation and civic state building is far fromconsolidated in the East in contrast to the West the East is encouragedby international organizations to continue to evolve along civic lines(something that was not the case in the West) That Western civic statesare still in a process of evolution and are not perfect civic states can beseen in the numerous problems that continue to bedevil them The USstill disenfranchises nearly four million of its citizens a policy that wouldno doubt be condemned by the OSCE if introduced in the East2

By looking at the evolution of Western states in such a manner we

The myth of the civic state 35

shall full two tasks Firstly we shall no longer be able to ignore ethno-cultural factors within civic states Secondly we shall be able to discussin a more frank and open manner the way in which Western statesevolved from ethnic to civic state and nationhood

Conclusion

This article has contributed to the scholarly literature on nationalism byarguing that the Kohn framework of Western states has always been civicfrom the moment of their creation is historically wrong (R S Smith 1997pp 20 31ndash32 499) Western states have evolved from ethnic to civicstates only in the last four decades of the twentieth century Without anunderstanding of this evolution of Western ethnic into civic states wecannot understand the nature of the civic state as containing tensionbetween its universal liberalist and national particularist componentsAll civic states will retain this internal contradiction as long as national-ity remains central to creating the solidarity that pure civic states wouldlack by themselves (Miller 1995 2000)

Both the US and Canadian examples discussed in this article haveshown that Western states typically began as ethnic and only graduallyevolved into civic states from the 1960s Evolution from ethnic to civicnationalism is only likely to take place after the core ethnic group is self-condent within its own bounded territory to open the community tolsquooutsidersrsquo from other ethnic groups Historical evidence shows thatWestern states did not become civic because they so desired but becauseof a multitude of domestic and international pressures (Kaufmann2000b) Belief in civic values can go together with ethnic nationalism andracism and states can move away from their civic bases during times ofperceived crisis

In the US this occurred during the century between the emancipationof the black slaves in the 1860s to re-enfranchising southern blacks inthe 1960s In British Canada this evolution of nationalism took place inthe early twentieth century In French Canada Francophones onlybecame dominant within Quebec after the 1960s a period during whichFrench Canadian nationalism also evolved from ethnic to civic national-ism This process was not solely conned to the US and Canada butoccurred throughout the West

The continued use of the Kohn framework is doubly wrong after adecade of post-Communism in central and eastern Europe when all buttwo of these states became civic Evolution from ethnic to civic stateshas therefore little to do with geography and far more to do with thepositive inuence of international institutions domestic democratic con-solidation and civic institution building Western states have a long his-torical record as ethnic states a factor which makes their evolution moresimilar not different to states in the East

36 Taras Kuzio

Acknowledgements

An earlier and longer version of this paper was presented at the AnnualConvention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities ColumbiaUniversity New York 13ndash15 April 2000 The author would like to thanktwo anonymous ERS referees and Assistant Professor Stephen Shulmanfor their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article

Notes

1 A European Union-wide survey in Spring 1997 found 33 per cent of those inter-viewed describing themselves as lsquoquite racistrsquo or lsquovery racistrsquo Many of these supported thebasic tenets of a civic inclusive liberal democratic state (Eurobarometer Opinion Poll)2 46 states and the District of Columbia have criminal disenfranchisement laws thatdeny the vote to all convicted adults in prison 32 states disenfranchise felons on paroleand 29 those on probation Laws that are unique to the US exist in 14 states that perma-nently disenfranchise former offenders (for life) who have fully served their sentences Thislegislation which runs contrary to established practice in both western and eastern Europeis racially neutral nevertheless due to socio-economic factors it is not surprising that itaffects national minorities blacks and Hispanics more than whites In Florida for example400000 former offenders are permanently excluded from voting of whom half are blacks(representing nearly a third of all blacks in Florida) (Human Rights Watch)

References

ANDERSEN BENEDICT 1991 Imagined Communities London VersoANER STEFAN 2000 lsquoNationalism in central Europe ndash A chance or a threat for theemerging liberal democratic orderrsquo East European Politics and Society vol14 no2pp 213ndash45BAUCOM IAN 1999 Out of Place Englishness Empire and the Location of IdentityPrinceton NJ Princeton University PressBEISSINGER MARK R 1996 lsquoHow nationalism spread Eastern Europe adrift the tidesand cycles of national contentionrsquo Social Research vol 63 no1 pp 97ndash146BOSTOCK WILLIAM W 1997 lsquo ldquoLanguage griefrdquo A ldquoraw materialrdquo of ethnic conictrsquoNationalism and Ethnic Politics vol3 no4 pp 94ndash112BRETON RAYMOND 1988 lsquoFrom ethnic to civic nationalism English Canada andQuebecrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 2 no1 pp 85ndash102BROWN DAVID 1999 lsquoAre there good and bad nationalismsrsquo Nations and Nationalismvol5 no2 pp 281ndash302BRUBAKER ROGERS 1995 lsquoNational minorities nationalizing states and externalhomelands in the new Europersquo Daedalus vol124 no2 pp 107ndash32CANOVAN MARGARET 1996 Nationhood and Political Theory Cheltenham EdwardElgarCONNOR WALKER 1972 lsquoNation-building or nation-destroyingrsquo World PoliticsvolXXIV no3 pp 319ndash55COUNCIL of EUROPE COMMITTEE on CULTURE and EDUCATION Recom-mendation 1283 (22 January 1996) Document 7446DAHL ROBERT 1971 Polyarchy New Haven CT Yale University PressEUROBAROMETER OPINION POLL no471 Luxembourg lsquoRacism and Xeno-phobia in Europersquo 18ndash19 December 1991FINLAYSON ALAN 1998 lsquoIdeology discourse and nationalismrsquo Journal of PoliticalIdeologies vol3 no1 pp 99ndash119

The myth of the civic state 37

upon Anglo-Saxon racial origins and an lsquoobsessive interestrsquo in the past(Baucom 1999 pp 15 20 48)

US historical myths linked an alleged pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon loveof liberty with a myth of ethnogenesis which dened the Americans asa new nation that was escaping from the tyranny of the lsquoNormanrsquomonarchs who ruled Britain The US also had an lsquoinfatuationrsquo withAnglo-Saxon history that was included within its myths of ethnogenesis(Kaufmannn 2000b) American exceptionalism portrayed the US nationas the lsquopurestrsquo English (Lipset 1997) a myth of exceptionalism similarto that of the Afrikaner in South Africa the Scots in Ulster and theFrench Canadians in Quebec These American historical myths helpedforge lsquoWASPrsquo cultural boundaries within which dominant Anglo con-formity was promoted in the nineteenth and the rst half of the twenti-eth centuries (Kaufmann 1999 2000b R M Smith 1997 pp 3 460 468)

In a survey of American nation-building from 1776 to the presentSpilman (1997) stressed the centrality of symbols rituals and patrioticorganizations that served to forge a US national identity GeorgeWashington was given a hero-like status after 1789 in portraits birthdaycelebrations shrines books the constitution commemorations ofbattles and independence day celebrations Thanksgiving and MemorialDay were annually celebrated pledges of allegiance were made andlarge historical pageants were held Historical myths have thereforeplayed as important a role in the US as they have in the other fourWestern states cited as lsquocivicrsquo examples by Kohn

Ethnic to civic state an alternative framework

Kohnrsquos division of nationalism traces its positive inclusive qualities retrospectively back to the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries Howevercivic states have never been identical and unanimous in how they wereconstituted The growth of the national state and its provision of civilpolitical cultural and social rights was lsquoslow and unevenrsquo (Mouzelis 1996p 226)

At the time of the American revolution only a small percentage ofwealthy white Protestant males could vote something American colonistsand revolutionaries did not see as unusual Indeed after 1776 slaves con-tinued to be imported into the USA and slavery lsquoemerged from the Revol-ution more rmly entrenched than ever in American lifersquo (Foner 1998 p28) lsquoSlavery rendered blacks all but invisible to those imagining theAmerican communityrsquo (Foner 1998 p 38) US President Thomas Jefferson himself possessed 1000 slaves and believed them to be perma-nently decient in the faculties required to enjoy freedom requiringtutelage by lsquosuperiorrsquo races such as Anglo-Saxons to improve their possi-bility of full civic equality at an unspecied later date (R M Smith 1997p 105) Slavery existed until the 1860s in the USA and the slave trade

34 Taras Kuzio

helped to build up the wealth of Western states Indeed it was only Switzer-land of Kohnrsquos ve Western examples that did not prot from slavery

Although the American national idea as elaborated upon and ideal-ized by Kohn (1944) was based on a mythical devotion to freedom thedenition of who could experience it was initially ethnically narrow andonly gradually evolved into a civic variant after the 1960s The centen-nial of the US revolution in 1876 ignored blacks new non-Anglo-Saxonimmigrants Native Americans and women as not being part of thenation The nineteenth-century US republic had no room for NativeIndian black Spanish or French culture The conquering of New Mexicoand the annexation of Texas was proclaimed as a triumph of ProtestantAnglo-Saxon civilization against the Catholic world and lower racesNew Mexico was not admitted into the union until 1912 even though itpossessed the required population level because it was held to be lsquotooIndianrsquo (Foner 1998 p 79)

By the bicentennial of the US revolution in 1976 the American nationhad evolved from ethnic to civic and included those previously excludedin other words at different times in US history lsquofreedomrsquo had differentmeanings Who was to be included within the American nation is lsquoahighly uneven and bitterly contested part of the story of Americanfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p XVII) Freedom in American history has there-fore been both a lsquomythic idealrsquo and a lsquoliving truthrsquo (Foner 1998 p XXI)

Dahlrsquos denition of a civic state rests on three factors free and fairelections an inclusive suffrage and the right to run for ofce These threebasic civic rights were not always included within Western states In con-temporary denitions of civic states the US and Australia could there-fore not be dened as lsquocivicrsquo states prior to the 1960s because theyexcluded people on the basis of colour and race The breakthrough inwidening the American nation occurred nearly two hundred years afterthe USA was founded when the Civil Rights (1964) Voting Rights (1965)and Fair Housing (1968) Acts were passed

The evolution of states from ethnic to civic statehood occurredthroughout the West and not only in the small number of states dis-cussed in this article This evolution was the norm not the exceptionOnly from the 1960s can we dene Western states as civic while themajority of the East became civic only three decades later in the 1990sAlthough democratic consolidation and civic state building is far fromconsolidated in the East in contrast to the West the East is encouragedby international organizations to continue to evolve along civic lines(something that was not the case in the West) That Western civic statesare still in a process of evolution and are not perfect civic states can beseen in the numerous problems that continue to bedevil them The USstill disenfranchises nearly four million of its citizens a policy that wouldno doubt be condemned by the OSCE if introduced in the East2

By looking at the evolution of Western states in such a manner we

The myth of the civic state 35

shall full two tasks Firstly we shall no longer be able to ignore ethno-cultural factors within civic states Secondly we shall be able to discussin a more frank and open manner the way in which Western statesevolved from ethnic to civic state and nationhood

Conclusion

This article has contributed to the scholarly literature on nationalism byarguing that the Kohn framework of Western states has always been civicfrom the moment of their creation is historically wrong (R S Smith 1997pp 20 31ndash32 499) Western states have evolved from ethnic to civicstates only in the last four decades of the twentieth century Without anunderstanding of this evolution of Western ethnic into civic states wecannot understand the nature of the civic state as containing tensionbetween its universal liberalist and national particularist componentsAll civic states will retain this internal contradiction as long as national-ity remains central to creating the solidarity that pure civic states wouldlack by themselves (Miller 1995 2000)

Both the US and Canadian examples discussed in this article haveshown that Western states typically began as ethnic and only graduallyevolved into civic states from the 1960s Evolution from ethnic to civicnationalism is only likely to take place after the core ethnic group is self-condent within its own bounded territory to open the community tolsquooutsidersrsquo from other ethnic groups Historical evidence shows thatWestern states did not become civic because they so desired but becauseof a multitude of domestic and international pressures (Kaufmann2000b) Belief in civic values can go together with ethnic nationalism andracism and states can move away from their civic bases during times ofperceived crisis

In the US this occurred during the century between the emancipationof the black slaves in the 1860s to re-enfranchising southern blacks inthe 1960s In British Canada this evolution of nationalism took place inthe early twentieth century In French Canada Francophones onlybecame dominant within Quebec after the 1960s a period during whichFrench Canadian nationalism also evolved from ethnic to civic national-ism This process was not solely conned to the US and Canada butoccurred throughout the West

The continued use of the Kohn framework is doubly wrong after adecade of post-Communism in central and eastern Europe when all buttwo of these states became civic Evolution from ethnic to civic stateshas therefore little to do with geography and far more to do with thepositive inuence of international institutions domestic democratic con-solidation and civic institution building Western states have a long his-torical record as ethnic states a factor which makes their evolution moresimilar not different to states in the East

36 Taras Kuzio

Acknowledgements

An earlier and longer version of this paper was presented at the AnnualConvention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities ColumbiaUniversity New York 13ndash15 April 2000 The author would like to thanktwo anonymous ERS referees and Assistant Professor Stephen Shulmanfor their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article

Notes

1 A European Union-wide survey in Spring 1997 found 33 per cent of those inter-viewed describing themselves as lsquoquite racistrsquo or lsquovery racistrsquo Many of these supported thebasic tenets of a civic inclusive liberal democratic state (Eurobarometer Opinion Poll)2 46 states and the District of Columbia have criminal disenfranchisement laws thatdeny the vote to all convicted adults in prison 32 states disenfranchise felons on paroleand 29 those on probation Laws that are unique to the US exist in 14 states that perma-nently disenfranchise former offenders (for life) who have fully served their sentences Thislegislation which runs contrary to established practice in both western and eastern Europeis racially neutral nevertheless due to socio-economic factors it is not surprising that itaffects national minorities blacks and Hispanics more than whites In Florida for example400000 former offenders are permanently excluded from voting of whom half are blacks(representing nearly a third of all blacks in Florida) (Human Rights Watch)

References

ANDERSEN BENEDICT 1991 Imagined Communities London VersoANER STEFAN 2000 lsquoNationalism in central Europe ndash A chance or a threat for theemerging liberal democratic orderrsquo East European Politics and Society vol14 no2pp 213ndash45BAUCOM IAN 1999 Out of Place Englishness Empire and the Location of IdentityPrinceton NJ Princeton University PressBEISSINGER MARK R 1996 lsquoHow nationalism spread Eastern Europe adrift the tidesand cycles of national contentionrsquo Social Research vol 63 no1 pp 97ndash146BOSTOCK WILLIAM W 1997 lsquo ldquoLanguage griefrdquo A ldquoraw materialrdquo of ethnic conictrsquoNationalism and Ethnic Politics vol3 no4 pp 94ndash112BRETON RAYMOND 1988 lsquoFrom ethnic to civic nationalism English Canada andQuebecrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 2 no1 pp 85ndash102BROWN DAVID 1999 lsquoAre there good and bad nationalismsrsquo Nations and Nationalismvol5 no2 pp 281ndash302BRUBAKER ROGERS 1995 lsquoNational minorities nationalizing states and externalhomelands in the new Europersquo Daedalus vol124 no2 pp 107ndash32CANOVAN MARGARET 1996 Nationhood and Political Theory Cheltenham EdwardElgarCONNOR WALKER 1972 lsquoNation-building or nation-destroyingrsquo World PoliticsvolXXIV no3 pp 319ndash55COUNCIL of EUROPE COMMITTEE on CULTURE and EDUCATION Recom-mendation 1283 (22 January 1996) Document 7446DAHL ROBERT 1971 Polyarchy New Haven CT Yale University PressEUROBAROMETER OPINION POLL no471 Luxembourg lsquoRacism and Xeno-phobia in Europersquo 18ndash19 December 1991FINLAYSON ALAN 1998 lsquoIdeology discourse and nationalismrsquo Journal of PoliticalIdeologies vol3 no1 pp 99ndash119

The myth of the civic state 37

helped to build up the wealth of Western states Indeed it was only Switzer-land of Kohnrsquos ve Western examples that did not prot from slavery

Although the American national idea as elaborated upon and ideal-ized by Kohn (1944) was based on a mythical devotion to freedom thedenition of who could experience it was initially ethnically narrow andonly gradually evolved into a civic variant after the 1960s The centen-nial of the US revolution in 1876 ignored blacks new non-Anglo-Saxonimmigrants Native Americans and women as not being part of thenation The nineteenth-century US republic had no room for NativeIndian black Spanish or French culture The conquering of New Mexicoand the annexation of Texas was proclaimed as a triumph of ProtestantAnglo-Saxon civilization against the Catholic world and lower racesNew Mexico was not admitted into the union until 1912 even though itpossessed the required population level because it was held to be lsquotooIndianrsquo (Foner 1998 p 79)

By the bicentennial of the US revolution in 1976 the American nationhad evolved from ethnic to civic and included those previously excludedin other words at different times in US history lsquofreedomrsquo had differentmeanings Who was to be included within the American nation is lsquoahighly uneven and bitterly contested part of the story of Americanfreedomrsquo (Foner 1998 p XVII) Freedom in American history has there-fore been both a lsquomythic idealrsquo and a lsquoliving truthrsquo (Foner 1998 p XXI)

Dahlrsquos denition of a civic state rests on three factors free and fairelections an inclusive suffrage and the right to run for ofce These threebasic civic rights were not always included within Western states In con-temporary denitions of civic states the US and Australia could there-fore not be dened as lsquocivicrsquo states prior to the 1960s because theyexcluded people on the basis of colour and race The breakthrough inwidening the American nation occurred nearly two hundred years afterthe USA was founded when the Civil Rights (1964) Voting Rights (1965)and Fair Housing (1968) Acts were passed

The evolution of states from ethnic to civic statehood occurredthroughout the West and not only in the small number of states dis-cussed in this article This evolution was the norm not the exceptionOnly from the 1960s can we dene Western states as civic while themajority of the East became civic only three decades later in the 1990sAlthough democratic consolidation and civic state building is far fromconsolidated in the East in contrast to the West the East is encouragedby international organizations to continue to evolve along civic lines(something that was not the case in the West) That Western civic statesare still in a process of evolution and are not perfect civic states can beseen in the numerous problems that continue to bedevil them The USstill disenfranchises nearly four million of its citizens a policy that wouldno doubt be condemned by the OSCE if introduced in the East2

By looking at the evolution of Western states in such a manner we

The myth of the civic state 35

shall full two tasks Firstly we shall no longer be able to ignore ethno-cultural factors within civic states Secondly we shall be able to discussin a more frank and open manner the way in which Western statesevolved from ethnic to civic state and nationhood

Conclusion

This article has contributed to the scholarly literature on nationalism byarguing that the Kohn framework of Western states has always been civicfrom the moment of their creation is historically wrong (R S Smith 1997pp 20 31ndash32 499) Western states have evolved from ethnic to civicstates only in the last four decades of the twentieth century Without anunderstanding of this evolution of Western ethnic into civic states wecannot understand the nature of the civic state as containing tensionbetween its universal liberalist and national particularist componentsAll civic states will retain this internal contradiction as long as national-ity remains central to creating the solidarity that pure civic states wouldlack by themselves (Miller 1995 2000)

Both the US and Canadian examples discussed in this article haveshown that Western states typically began as ethnic and only graduallyevolved into civic states from the 1960s Evolution from ethnic to civicnationalism is only likely to take place after the core ethnic group is self-condent within its own bounded territory to open the community tolsquooutsidersrsquo from other ethnic groups Historical evidence shows thatWestern states did not become civic because they so desired but becauseof a multitude of domestic and international pressures (Kaufmann2000b) Belief in civic values can go together with ethnic nationalism andracism and states can move away from their civic bases during times ofperceived crisis

In the US this occurred during the century between the emancipationof the black slaves in the 1860s to re-enfranchising southern blacks inthe 1960s In British Canada this evolution of nationalism took place inthe early twentieth century In French Canada Francophones onlybecame dominant within Quebec after the 1960s a period during whichFrench Canadian nationalism also evolved from ethnic to civic national-ism This process was not solely conned to the US and Canada butoccurred throughout the West

The continued use of the Kohn framework is doubly wrong after adecade of post-Communism in central and eastern Europe when all buttwo of these states became civic Evolution from ethnic to civic stateshas therefore little to do with geography and far more to do with thepositive inuence of international institutions domestic democratic con-solidation and civic institution building Western states have a long his-torical record as ethnic states a factor which makes their evolution moresimilar not different to states in the East

36 Taras Kuzio

Acknowledgements

An earlier and longer version of this paper was presented at the AnnualConvention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities ColumbiaUniversity New York 13ndash15 April 2000 The author would like to thanktwo anonymous ERS referees and Assistant Professor Stephen Shulmanfor their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article

Notes

1 A European Union-wide survey in Spring 1997 found 33 per cent of those inter-viewed describing themselves as lsquoquite racistrsquo or lsquovery racistrsquo Many of these supported thebasic tenets of a civic inclusive liberal democratic state (Eurobarometer Opinion Poll)2 46 states and the District of Columbia have criminal disenfranchisement laws thatdeny the vote to all convicted adults in prison 32 states disenfranchise felons on paroleand 29 those on probation Laws that are unique to the US exist in 14 states that perma-nently disenfranchise former offenders (for life) who have fully served their sentences Thislegislation which runs contrary to established practice in both western and eastern Europeis racially neutral nevertheless due to socio-economic factors it is not surprising that itaffects national minorities blacks and Hispanics more than whites In Florida for example400000 former offenders are permanently excluded from voting of whom half are blacks(representing nearly a third of all blacks in Florida) (Human Rights Watch)

References

ANDERSEN BENEDICT 1991 Imagined Communities London VersoANER STEFAN 2000 lsquoNationalism in central Europe ndash A chance or a threat for theemerging liberal democratic orderrsquo East European Politics and Society vol14 no2pp 213ndash45BAUCOM IAN 1999 Out of Place Englishness Empire and the Location of IdentityPrinceton NJ Princeton University PressBEISSINGER MARK R 1996 lsquoHow nationalism spread Eastern Europe adrift the tidesand cycles of national contentionrsquo Social Research vol 63 no1 pp 97ndash146BOSTOCK WILLIAM W 1997 lsquo ldquoLanguage griefrdquo A ldquoraw materialrdquo of ethnic conictrsquoNationalism and Ethnic Politics vol3 no4 pp 94ndash112BRETON RAYMOND 1988 lsquoFrom ethnic to civic nationalism English Canada andQuebecrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 2 no1 pp 85ndash102BROWN DAVID 1999 lsquoAre there good and bad nationalismsrsquo Nations and Nationalismvol5 no2 pp 281ndash302BRUBAKER ROGERS 1995 lsquoNational minorities nationalizing states and externalhomelands in the new Europersquo Daedalus vol124 no2 pp 107ndash32CANOVAN MARGARET 1996 Nationhood and Political Theory Cheltenham EdwardElgarCONNOR WALKER 1972 lsquoNation-building or nation-destroyingrsquo World PoliticsvolXXIV no3 pp 319ndash55COUNCIL of EUROPE COMMITTEE on CULTURE and EDUCATION Recom-mendation 1283 (22 January 1996) Document 7446DAHL ROBERT 1971 Polyarchy New Haven CT Yale University PressEUROBAROMETER OPINION POLL no471 Luxembourg lsquoRacism and Xeno-phobia in Europersquo 18ndash19 December 1991FINLAYSON ALAN 1998 lsquoIdeology discourse and nationalismrsquo Journal of PoliticalIdeologies vol3 no1 pp 99ndash119

The myth of the civic state 37

shall full two tasks Firstly we shall no longer be able to ignore ethno-cultural factors within civic states Secondly we shall be able to discussin a more frank and open manner the way in which Western statesevolved from ethnic to civic state and nationhood

Conclusion

This article has contributed to the scholarly literature on nationalism byarguing that the Kohn framework of Western states has always been civicfrom the moment of their creation is historically wrong (R S Smith 1997pp 20 31ndash32 499) Western states have evolved from ethnic to civicstates only in the last four decades of the twentieth century Without anunderstanding of this evolution of Western ethnic into civic states wecannot understand the nature of the civic state as containing tensionbetween its universal liberalist and national particularist componentsAll civic states will retain this internal contradiction as long as national-ity remains central to creating the solidarity that pure civic states wouldlack by themselves (Miller 1995 2000)

Both the US and Canadian examples discussed in this article haveshown that Western states typically began as ethnic and only graduallyevolved into civic states from the 1960s Evolution from ethnic to civicnationalism is only likely to take place after the core ethnic group is self-condent within its own bounded territory to open the community tolsquooutsidersrsquo from other ethnic groups Historical evidence shows thatWestern states did not become civic because they so desired but becauseof a multitude of domestic and international pressures (Kaufmann2000b) Belief in civic values can go together with ethnic nationalism andracism and states can move away from their civic bases during times ofperceived crisis

In the US this occurred during the century between the emancipationof the black slaves in the 1860s to re-enfranchising southern blacks inthe 1960s In British Canada this evolution of nationalism took place inthe early twentieth century In French Canada Francophones onlybecame dominant within Quebec after the 1960s a period during whichFrench Canadian nationalism also evolved from ethnic to civic national-ism This process was not solely conned to the US and Canada butoccurred throughout the West

The continued use of the Kohn framework is doubly wrong after adecade of post-Communism in central and eastern Europe when all buttwo of these states became civic Evolution from ethnic to civic stateshas therefore little to do with geography and far more to do with thepositive inuence of international institutions domestic democratic con-solidation and civic institution building Western states have a long his-torical record as ethnic states a factor which makes their evolution moresimilar not different to states in the East

36 Taras Kuzio

Acknowledgements

An earlier and longer version of this paper was presented at the AnnualConvention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities ColumbiaUniversity New York 13ndash15 April 2000 The author would like to thanktwo anonymous ERS referees and Assistant Professor Stephen Shulmanfor their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article

Notes

1 A European Union-wide survey in Spring 1997 found 33 per cent of those inter-viewed describing themselves as lsquoquite racistrsquo or lsquovery racistrsquo Many of these supported thebasic tenets of a civic inclusive liberal democratic state (Eurobarometer Opinion Poll)2 46 states and the District of Columbia have criminal disenfranchisement laws thatdeny the vote to all convicted adults in prison 32 states disenfranchise felons on paroleand 29 those on probation Laws that are unique to the US exist in 14 states that perma-nently disenfranchise former offenders (for life) who have fully served their sentences Thislegislation which runs contrary to established practice in both western and eastern Europeis racially neutral nevertheless due to socio-economic factors it is not surprising that itaffects national minorities blacks and Hispanics more than whites In Florida for example400000 former offenders are permanently excluded from voting of whom half are blacks(representing nearly a third of all blacks in Florida) (Human Rights Watch)

References

ANDERSEN BENEDICT 1991 Imagined Communities London VersoANER STEFAN 2000 lsquoNationalism in central Europe ndash A chance or a threat for theemerging liberal democratic orderrsquo East European Politics and Society vol14 no2pp 213ndash45BAUCOM IAN 1999 Out of Place Englishness Empire and the Location of IdentityPrinceton NJ Princeton University PressBEISSINGER MARK R 1996 lsquoHow nationalism spread Eastern Europe adrift the tidesand cycles of national contentionrsquo Social Research vol 63 no1 pp 97ndash146BOSTOCK WILLIAM W 1997 lsquo ldquoLanguage griefrdquo A ldquoraw materialrdquo of ethnic conictrsquoNationalism and Ethnic Politics vol3 no4 pp 94ndash112BRETON RAYMOND 1988 lsquoFrom ethnic to civic nationalism English Canada andQuebecrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 2 no1 pp 85ndash102BROWN DAVID 1999 lsquoAre there good and bad nationalismsrsquo Nations and Nationalismvol5 no2 pp 281ndash302BRUBAKER ROGERS 1995 lsquoNational minorities nationalizing states and externalhomelands in the new Europersquo Daedalus vol124 no2 pp 107ndash32CANOVAN MARGARET 1996 Nationhood and Political Theory Cheltenham EdwardElgarCONNOR WALKER 1972 lsquoNation-building or nation-destroyingrsquo World PoliticsvolXXIV no3 pp 319ndash55COUNCIL of EUROPE COMMITTEE on CULTURE and EDUCATION Recom-mendation 1283 (22 January 1996) Document 7446DAHL ROBERT 1971 Polyarchy New Haven CT Yale University PressEUROBAROMETER OPINION POLL no471 Luxembourg lsquoRacism and Xeno-phobia in Europersquo 18ndash19 December 1991FINLAYSON ALAN 1998 lsquoIdeology discourse and nationalismrsquo Journal of PoliticalIdeologies vol3 no1 pp 99ndash119

The myth of the civic state 37

Acknowledgements

An earlier and longer version of this paper was presented at the AnnualConvention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities ColumbiaUniversity New York 13ndash15 April 2000 The author would like to thanktwo anonymous ERS referees and Assistant Professor Stephen Shulmanfor their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article

Notes

1 A European Union-wide survey in Spring 1997 found 33 per cent of those inter-viewed describing themselves as lsquoquite racistrsquo or lsquovery racistrsquo Many of these supported thebasic tenets of a civic inclusive liberal democratic state (Eurobarometer Opinion Poll)2 46 states and the District of Columbia have criminal disenfranchisement laws thatdeny the vote to all convicted adults in prison 32 states disenfranchise felons on paroleand 29 those on probation Laws that are unique to the US exist in 14 states that perma-nently disenfranchise former offenders (for life) who have fully served their sentences Thislegislation which runs contrary to established practice in both western and eastern Europeis racially neutral nevertheless due to socio-economic factors it is not surprising that itaffects national minorities blacks and Hispanics more than whites In Florida for example400000 former offenders are permanently excluded from voting of whom half are blacks(representing nearly a third of all blacks in Florida) (Human Rights Watch)

References

ANDERSEN BENEDICT 1991 Imagined Communities London VersoANER STEFAN 2000 lsquoNationalism in central Europe ndash A chance or a threat for theemerging liberal democratic orderrsquo East European Politics and Society vol14 no2pp 213ndash45BAUCOM IAN 1999 Out of Place Englishness Empire and the Location of IdentityPrinceton NJ Princeton University PressBEISSINGER MARK R 1996 lsquoHow nationalism spread Eastern Europe adrift the tidesand cycles of national contentionrsquo Social Research vol 63 no1 pp 97ndash146BOSTOCK WILLIAM W 1997 lsquo ldquoLanguage griefrdquo A ldquoraw materialrdquo of ethnic conictrsquoNationalism and Ethnic Politics vol3 no4 pp 94ndash112BRETON RAYMOND 1988 lsquoFrom ethnic to civic nationalism English Canada andQuebecrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 2 no1 pp 85ndash102BROWN DAVID 1999 lsquoAre there good and bad nationalismsrsquo Nations and Nationalismvol5 no2 pp 281ndash302BRUBAKER ROGERS 1995 lsquoNational minorities nationalizing states and externalhomelands in the new Europersquo Daedalus vol124 no2 pp 107ndash32CANOVAN MARGARET 1996 Nationhood and Political Theory Cheltenham EdwardElgarCONNOR WALKER 1972 lsquoNation-building or nation-destroyingrsquo World PoliticsvolXXIV no3 pp 319ndash55COUNCIL of EUROPE COMMITTEE on CULTURE and EDUCATION Recom-mendation 1283 (22 January 1996) Document 7446DAHL ROBERT 1971 Polyarchy New Haven CT Yale University PressEUROBAROMETER OPINION POLL no471 Luxembourg lsquoRacism and Xeno-phobia in Europersquo 18ndash19 December 1991FINLAYSON ALAN 1998 lsquoIdeology discourse and nationalismrsquo Journal of PoliticalIdeologies vol3 no1 pp 99ndash119

The myth of the civic state 37

FONER ERIC 1998 The Story of American Freedom London and New YorkWWNortonFREEDLAND JONATHAN 1998 Bring Home the Revolution How Britain Can Live theAmerican Dream London Fourth EstateGELLNER ERNEST 1983 Nations and Nationalism Ithaca NY Cornell University PressGREEN DAVID M 2000 lsquoThe end of identity The implication of post-modernity forpolitical identicationrsquo Nationalism and Ethnic Politics vol6 no3 pp 68ndash90HABERMAS JUumlRGEN 1996 lsquoThe European nation-state its achievements and its limitsOn the past and future of sovereignty and citizenshiprsquo in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed)Mapping the Nation London Verso pp 281ndash94HARTY SIOBHAN 1999 lsquoThe nation as a communal good a nationalist response to theliberal concept of communityrsquo Canadian Political Science Journal volXXXII no4 pp665ndash89HICKMAN MARY J 1998 lsquoReconstructing deconstructing ldquoracerdquo British politicaldiscourses about the Irishrsquo Ethnic and Racial Studies vol21 no2 pp 288ndash307HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH lsquoLosing the vote The sentencing projectrsquo(wwwhrworgreports98vote)IGNATIEFF MICHAEL 1993 Blood and Belonging Journeys into the New NationalismNew York Farrar Strauss and GirouxJOHNSON DOUGLAS 1993 lsquoThe making of the French nationrsquo in Mikulas Teich andRoy Porter (eds) The National Question in Historical Context Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press pp 35ndash62KAUFMANN ERIC 1997 lsquoCondemned to rootlessness the loyalist origins of Canadarsquosidentity crisisrsquo Nationalism and Ethnic Politics vol3 no1 pp 110ndash35mdashmdash 1999 lsquoAmerican exceptionalism reconsidered Anglo-Saxon ethnogenesis in theldquoUniversalrdquo Nationrsquo Journal of American Studies vol33 part 3 pp 437ndash58mdashmdash 2000a lsquoLiberal ethnicity beyond liberal nationalism and minority rightsrsquo Ethnic andRacial Studies vol23 no6 pp 1086ndash1119mdashmdash 2000b lsquoEthnic or civic nation Theorizing the American casersquo Canadian Review ofStudies in Nationalism volXXVII nos1ndash2 pp 133ndash55KOHN HANS 1940 lsquoThe genesis and character of English nationalismrsquo Journal of theHistory of Ideas vol1 no1 pp 69ndash94mdashmdash 1944 The Idea of Nationalism A Study in Its Origins and Background New YorkMacmillanmdashmdash 1956 Nationalism and Liberty The Swiss Example New York Macmillanmdashmdash 1957 American Nationalism An Interpretative Essay New York Macmillanmdashmdash 1982 Nationalism Its Meaning and History Malabar FL Krieger Publishersmdashmdash 1994 lsquoWestern and eastern nationalismrsquo in John Hutchinson and Anthony DSmith(eds) Nationalism Oxford Oxford University Press pp 162ndash65KREJCI JAROSLAW and VELIMSKY VITEZSLAV 1996 lsquoEthnic and political nationsin Europersquo in John Hutchinson and ADSmith (eds) Ethnicity Oxford Oxford UniversityPress pp 212ndash217KUZIO TARAS 2001 lsquoNationalising states or nation building A critical survey of thetheoretical literature and empirical evidencersquo Nations and Nationalism vol7 part 2 pp135ndash54mdashmdash forthcoming lsquoMulticulturalism homogenisation or ldquoUnity in Diversityrdquo Balancingunity and plurality in newly independent statesrsquo Canadian Journal of Political ScienceKYMLICKA WILL 1995 lsquoMisunderstanding nationalismrsquo Dissent pp 130ndash35mdashmdash 1996 Multicultural Citizenship Oxford Clarenden PressLINZ JUAN J and STEPAN ALFRED 1996 Problems of Democratic Transition andConsolidation Southern Europe South America and post-Communist Europe BaltimoreMD Johns Hopkins University PressLIPSET MARTIN S 1968 The First New Nation The United States in Historical andComparative Perspective London Heinemann

38 Taras Kuzio

LIPSET M S 1997 American Exceptionalism A Double-Edged Sword New YorkWWNortonLYONS FRANCIS S L 1982 Culture and Anarchy in Ireland 1890ndash1939 Oxford OxfordUniversity PressMILLER DAVID 1995 On Nationality Oxford Clarendon Pressmdashmdash 2000 Citizenship and National Identity Oxford Polity PressMOUZELIS NICOS 1996 lsquoModernity late development and civil societyrsquo in John AHall(ed) Civil Society Theory History Comparison Cambridge Polity Press pp 224ndash49MOORE MARGARET 1997 lsquoOn national self-determinationrsquo Political Studies volXLVno5 pp 900ndash913NICHOLS ROGERS 1998 Indians in the United States and Canada A ComparativeHistory Lincoln NE University of NebraskaNISBET ROBERT A 1953 The Quest for Community Oxford Oxford University PressPALMER ROBERT R 1940 lsquoThe national idea in France before the revolutionrsquo Journalof the History of Ideas vol1 no1 pp 95ndash111PAREKH BHIKHU 1995 lsquoCultural pluralism and the limits of diversityrsquo Alternativesvol20 no4 pp 431ndash58PAXMAN JEREMY 1999 The EnglishmdashA Portrait of a People London PenguinSCHNAPPER DOMINIQUE 1997 lsquoThe European debate on citizenshiprsquo Daedalusvol126 no3 pp 199ndash222SMITH ANTHONY D 1984 lsquoNational identity and myths of ethnic descentrsquo Research inSocial Movements vol7 pp 95ndash130mdashmdash 1989 The Ethnic Origins of Nations Oxford Basil Blackwellmdashmdash 1991 National Identity London Penguinmdashmdash 1996 Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era Cambridge Polity Pressmdashmdash 1998 Nationalism and Modernism London Routledgemdashmdash 2000 The Nation in History Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity CambridgePolity PressSMITH ROGERS M 1997 Civic Ideals Conicting Visions of Citizenship in US HistoryNew Haven CT Yale University PressSNYDER JACK 2000 From Voting to Violence Democratization and Nationalist ConictNew York WWNortonSPILLMAN LYN 1997 Nation and Commemoration Creating National Identities in theUnited States and Australia New York Cambridge University PressSYMONOLEWICZ-SYMMONS K 1965 lsquoNationalist movements an attempt at acomparative typologyrsquo Comparative Studies in Society and History vol 7 no2 pp 221ndash30TILLY CHARLES 1975 lsquoReections on the history of European state-makingrsquo in CTilly(ed) The Formation of National States in Western Europe Princeton NJ PrincetonUniversity Press 1975 pp 3ndash83TURNER BRYAN 1997 lsquoCitizenship studies a general theoryrsquo Citizenship Studies vol1no1 pp 5ndash18YACK BERNARD 1996 lsquoThe myth of the civic nationrsquo Critical Review vol10 no2 pp193ndash211WEBER EUGENE 1979 Peasants into Frenchmen The Modernisation of Rural France1870ndash1914 London Chatto and Windus

TARAS KUZIO is a Research Associate at the Centre for Internationaland Security Studies York University TorontoADDRESS Centre for International and Security Studies York Uni-versity 4700 Keele Street TorontoOnt Canada M3J 1P3

The myth of the civic state 39