national emergency communications plan · 2019. 5. 20. · 1 26 executive summary 27 in 2008, the...

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National Emergency

Communications Plan

2019

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Table of Contents 4

Executive Summary ................................................................................. 1 5

Introduction .............................................................................................. 4 6

Emergency Communications Ecosystem ................................................. 8 7

NECP Strategic Goals ............................................................................ 11 8

Goal 1: Governance and Leadership ........................................................................ 13 9

Goal 2: Planning and Procedures ............................................................................ 19 10

Goal 3: Training, Exercises, and Evaluation ............................................................ 23 11

Goal 4: Communications Coordination ................................................................... 28 12

Goal 5: Technology and Infrastructure .................................................................... 33 13

Goal 6: Cybersecurity ............................................................................................. 37 14

Implementing the NECP ........................................................................ 40 15

Conclusion ............................................................................................. 42 16

Annex I: Success Indicator Descriptions .............................................. 43 17

Appendix 1. Requirements Matrix ........................................................ 63 18

Appendix 2. Key Authorities ................................................................ 64 19

Appendix 3. Roles and Responsibilities ................................................ 66 20

Appendix 4. SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum .......................... 73 21

Appendix 5. Source Documents ............................................................ 74 22

Appendix 6. Glossary ............................................................................ 75 23

Appendix 7. Acronyms ......................................................................... 84 24

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Executive Summary 26

In 2008, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published the first National 27

Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) to accelerate improvements for public 28

safety communications nationwide. Title XVIII of the Homeland Security Act of 29

2002, as amended, directs the DHS Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) 30

to develop and periodically update the NECP in coordination with local, state, 31

territorial, tribal, federal, and private sector stakeholders. The law also directs the 32

NECP to set benchmarks for enhancing emergency communications capabilities 33

and for OEC to measure progress toward achieving those milestones. 34

To prepare stakeholders for rapid technological change and its associated risks, OEC led a national effort to 35

update the NECP in 2014 and 2019. The NECP addresses the integration of technologies (e.g., land mobile 36

radio; Next Generation 911; high-speed broadband; alerts, warnings, and notifications systems) and standard 37

processes to support the interoperability of systems and services for voice, video, and information exchange 38

among the responder and partner communities. Communities are preparing for the First Responder Network 39

Authority’s nationwide broadband communications platform to supplement existing systems and provide 40

public safety users with dedicated spectrum, added broadband capabilities, and advanced technologies. 41

However, network integration presents cybersecurity risks as a result of interconnected, Internet-based 42

technologies. The NECP examines current challenges and opportunities for improving emergency 43

communications capabilities in new goals for technology, infrastructure, and cybersecurity. 44

OEC collaborated with public safety community 45

members nationwide to develop the third iteration of 46

the NECP. It provides guidance to those that plan for, 47

coordinate, invest in, and use communications to 48

support response and recovery operations. This 49

includes traditional emergency responder disciplines 50

(e.g., law enforcement, fire, emergency medical 51

services, dispatch) and other entities that share 52

information during emergencies, such as medical 53

facilities, utilities, nongovernmental organizations, as 54

well as the media and private citizens. 55

Given the diverse entities directly involved, 56

supporting, or impacted by emergencies, the 57

Emergency Communications Ecosystem concept 58

expands to include the various functions and people 59

that exchange information prior to, during, and after 60

incidents. Individuals with roles in emergency 61

communications are not limited to government 62

agencies, traditional emergency responder disciplines, 63

or jurisdictional boundaries. The Ecosystem is 64

dynamic, depending on the incident or planned event. 65

It is multi-directional—anyone can initiate emergency 66

communications. 67

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Over the next five years, OEC will focus on implementing the goals and objectives articulated in the NECP. 68

These critical components for advancing emergency communications fall under three national priorities: 69

Enhance effective governance across partners with a stake in emergency communications, embracing a 70

shared responsibility of the whole community; 71

Address interoperability challenges posed by rapid technology advancements and increased data sharing, 72

ensuring critical information gets to the right people at the right time; and 73

Build resilient and secure emergency communications systems to reduce cybersecurity threats and 74

vulnerabilities. 75

To achieve these priorities, OEC centered the NECP around six goals that build on foundational concepts in 76

the 2008 and 2014 plans, align to the SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum, and consider new risks and 77

threats that need to be addressed today. The NECP goals are strategic in nature and aim to enhance emergency 78

communications capabilities at all levels of government and in coordination with the private sector, 79

nongovernmental organizations, and other key partners across the community. The six NECP goals are: 80

Goal 1 - Governance and Leadership: Develop and maintain effective emergency communications 81

governance and leadership across the Ecosystem 82

Goal 2 - Planning and Procedures: Develop and update comprehensive emergency communications 83

plans and procedures that address the evolution of risks, capabilities, and technologies across the 84

Ecosystem 85

Goal 3 – Training, Exercises, and Evaluation: Develop and deliver training, exercise, and evaluation 86

programs that target gaps in all available emergency communications technologies 87

Goal 4 - Communications Coordination: Improve effective coordination of available operable and 88

interoperable public safety communications capabilities for incidents and planned events 89

Goal 5 – Technology and Infrastructure: Improve lifecycle management of the systems and equipment 90

that enable emergency responders and public safety officials to share information efficiently and securely 91

Goal 6 - Cybersecurity: Strengthen the cybersecurity posture of the Emergency Communications 92

Ecosystem 93

Within each goal, the NECP provides objectives for stakeholders to attain these goals, as well as defines 94

success indicators that result from implementing the objectives. To implement the 2019 NECP, OEC will 95

coordinate with public safety agencies and partners from across the Nation through partnerships such as 96

SAFECOM, the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center, and the National Council of Statewide 97

Interoperability Coordinators, among others. DHS and its partners will identify strategies to accomplish the 98

NECP’s goals and objectives, especially as they align with data collected and gaps reported in the Nationwide 99

Baseline Communications Assessment. The NECP results will help DHS and public safety communications 100

stakeholders target their resources to improve national capabilities. 101

The future of emergency communications is at a critical juncture. Through the NECP and the work of OEC and 102

its partners, DHS is committed to supporting our Nation’s emergency responders as they strive to meet their 103

missions and achieve the long-term vision of the NECP.104

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NECP VISION …………………………………………………………………..

To enable the Nation’s emergency response community to

communicate and share information securely across communications

technologies in real-time, including all levels of government,

jurisdictions, disciplines, organizations, and citizens impacted by any

threats or hazards event.

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Introduction 106

Emergency communications are critical to the Nation’s response to devastating 107

natural disasters, active shooter incidents, terrorist threats, and routine events 108

affecting our communities every day across America. When faced with these 109

situations, the public safety community has a collective responsibility to share 110

information. Achieving this goal requires emergency communications capabilities 111

that are resilient and secure today, yet agile enough to leverage advanced and 112

emerging technologies tomorrow. This important component of national 113

preparedness relies on coordinated input from our whole community—every 114

member contributes, including individuals, the private sector, non-profits, and all 115

levels of government (e.g., local, state, territorial, tribal, federal). 116

Since the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 117

establishment in 2003, one of its top priorities has 118

been to improve communications capabilities among 119

the public safety community. DHS has partnered 120

with emergency responder agencies to ensure access 121

to reliable, secure, and interoperable communications 122

at all times in order to save lives, protect property 123

and the environment, stabilize communities, and meet basic human needs following an incident. 124

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 United States Code § 572) as amended, provided renewed focus and 125

vitality to this critical homeland security mission. The legislation established the DHS Office of Emergency 126

Communications (OEC) to lead development and implementation of a comprehensive approach to advancing 127

national interoperable communications capabilities. To achieve this objective, the Act also required OEC to 128

develop the National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) to “provide recommendations regarding how 129

the United States should support and promote the ability of emergency response providers and relevant 130

government officials to continue to communicate in the event of disasters and to ensure, accelerate, and attain 131

interoperable emergency communications nationwide.” Appendix 1 details statutory requirements for the 132

NECP. 133

OEC collaborates closely with the public safety 134

community to support and promote effective 135

emergency communications through stakeholder-136

driven programs and services. Over the next five 137

years, OEC will focus its efforts on implementing 138

the goals and objectives articulated in the NECP. 139

These critical components for advancing 140

emergency communications fall under three 141

national priorities: first, to enhance effective 142

governance across partners with a stake in 143

emergency communications, embracing a shared 144

responsibility of the whole community, from 145

traditional emergency responders and supporting 146

entities to the citizens served; second, to address 147

interoperability challenges posed by rapid technology advancements and increased information sharing, 148

ensuring the most critical information gets to the right people at the right time; and third, to build resilient and 149

Emergency Communications

National Priorities 134

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secure emergency communications systems to reduce cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities, as introduced 150

through Internet Protocol (IP)-based technologies and services. 151

Purpose 152

As the Nation’s strategic plan for emergency communications, the NECP establishes a vision to enable the 153

public safety community and citizens to communicate and share information securely across communications 154

technologies in real-time, including all levels of government, jurisdictions, disciplines, and organizations 155

impacted by any threats or hazards event. To achieve this vision, the NECP outlines nationwide goals and 156

objectives to improve critical capabilities through partnerships, joint planning, and unified investments across 157

levels of government. 158

Its focus is to ensure the public safety community is collectively driving toward a common end-state for 159

communications. To envision a desired future state, OEC examined current strategies, resource decisions, and 160

investments for emergency communications and impacts from an ever-evolving environment. Through 161

ongoing coordination with emergency responders, OEC 162

tracks the many accomplishments since implementing 163

the first NECP and understands the remaining hurdles 164

to be cleared. 165

OEC conducted the SAFECOM Nationwide Survey and 166

resulting 2018 Nationwide Communications Baseline 167

Assessment, in which thousands of public safety 168

agencies and organizations participated. Additionally, 169

an extensive stakeholder engagement process was used 170

to identify challenges facing emergency 171

communications and propose solutions to address them. 172

Representatives of major public safety organizations, 173

government agencies, and key industry partners from 174

the communications and information technology sectors 175

provided input to the NECP. They recommended 176

updating the NECP’s vision, goals, and objectives to 177

reflect current capability gaps and improvements 178

needed to become a nationwide community that can 179

exchange information securely at any time. The 2019 180

NECP supersedes the 2014 NECP and is effective 181

immediately. 182

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Scope 183

The NECP serves as the Nation’s strategic plan to 184

improve emergency communications. It provides 185

guidance to those that plan for, coordinate, invest in, and 186

use communications to support response and recovery 187

operations. This includes traditional emergency 188

responder disciplines (e.g., law enforcement, fire, 189

emergency medical services [EMS], dispatch) and other 190

entities that share information during emergencies. 191

The NECP is also designed for local, state, territorial, 192

tribal, and federal government personnel who are 193

responsible for setting mission priorities, developing 194

budgets, and planning for and acquiring communications 195

technology assets. 196

The strategic components of the NECP, as depicted in 197

exhibit 1, establishes the strategy to meet the NECP’s 198

goals and objectives and better position the whole 199

community for the future. 200

Whole Community Partners

Law Enforcement

Fire

Emergency Medical Services

Dispatch

Public Works and Services

Public Health and Medical Facilities

Transportation Agencies, Utilities,

Critical Infrastructure Operators, and

Commercial Service Providers

Nongovernmental Organizations,

International Partners, and Auxiliary

Resources

Media

Private Citizens

Elected and Appointed Officials,

Local, State, Territorial, Tribal, and

Federal Government Personnel

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Exhibit 1: NECP Strategy 202

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Emergency Communications Ecosystem 203

Since the first NECP publication in 2008, the public safety community has made 204

significant strides to enhance governance structures, adopt common policies and 205

procedures, expand training and exercise programs, migrate legacy systems and 206

integrate new technologies, and mitigate growing cyber threats. These efforts are 207

not constrained within the limits of traditional emergency response of law 208

enforcement, fire, EMS, and dispatch. Instead, entities with different 209

communications functions, including supporting organizations, decision makers, 210

and citizens, rely on one another to exchange information prior to, during, and after 211

incidents—a concept formally referred to as the Emergency Communications 212

Ecosystem. 213

The public safety community continues to prioritize maintaining land mobile radio (LMR) and data exchange 214

systems and improving operability, interoperability, and resiliency. Emergency responders are also embracing 215

emerging technologies and integrating them with existing systems. With the First Responder Network 216

Authority’s (FirstNet) implementation of the nationwide public safety broadband network, agencies will be 217

able to supplement existing systems to provide public safety users with dedicated spectrum, added broadband 218

capabilities, and advanced technologies to increase situational awareness. Network integration presents new 219

cybersecurity risks as a result of interconnected, IP-based technologies. It requires implementing effective 220

strategies to enhance the resiliency of IP-based infrastructures and safeguard private or sensitive information 221

transmitted across systems and devices, while also enabling response. 222

Response agencies are becoming more connected to other entities that also exchange information during 223

emergencies, such as medical facilities, critical infrastructure operators, and citizens. While these individuals 224

are not typically trained responders, they can share valuable information during response and recovery efforts. 225

Social media use is increasing. Responders need to develop best practices for engaging with the public, and 226

analyzing social media to gain situational awareness in times of civil unrest, emergencies, and disasters. 227

Agencies also face challenges retaining qualified communications personnel, securing adequate funding for 228

ongoing operations and maintenance, and navigating complex and varying governance structures to formalize 229

partnerships and establish resource sharing agreements. 230

To organize the whole community toward the National 231

Preparedness Goal, the National Response Framework 232

and National Incident Management System (NIMS) 233

guide how public safety responds to all types of 234

emergencies. These guiding principles are built on 235

scalable, flexible, and adaptable concepts for managing 236

incidents that range from the serious but purely local, to 237

large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural 238

disasters. They define roles, responsibilities, and 239

The Emergency Communications Ecosystem is comprised of the

various functions and people that exchange information prior to,

during, and after incidents

National Preparedness Goal

A secure and resilient Nation with the capabilities

required across the whole community to prevent,

protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover

from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest

risk

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coordinating structures for delivering core capabilities required to respond to an incident and how response 240

efforts integrate with other preparedness mission areas—Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, and Recovery. 241

Incorporating the National Response Framework and NIMS principles, the Emergency Communications 242

Ecosystem is comprised of the various functions and people that exchange information prior to, during, and 243

after incidents. The Ecosystem includes the 244

breadth of organizations and individuals with 245

roles in emergency communications, beyond 246

traditional emergency responder disciplines, 247

government agencies, and jurisdictional 248

boundaries. The Ecosystem is dynamic, not 249

everyone is needed every day depending on the 250

incident or planned event. It is also multi-251

directional, as anyone can initiate emergency 252

communications, including supporting entities or 253

private citizens. 254

Understanding the Ecosystem, exhibit 2, provides 255

agencies with a full picture of emergency 256

communications functions necessary to achieve 257

reliable, secure, and interoperable emergency 258

communications, which include: reporting and 259

requests for assistance; incident coordination and 260

response; alerts, warnings, and notifications; and 261

public interaction. These primary functions, the 262

timeframes when they occur, their purpose, and 263

examples of each are listed below. 264

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Exhibit 2: Emergency Communications Ecosystem

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NECP Strategic Goals 272

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NECP Strategic Goals Goal 1: Governance and Leadership

Goal 2: Planning and Procedures

Goal 3: Training, Exercises, and Evaluation

Goal 4: Communications Coordination

Goal 5: Technology and Infrastructure

Goal 6: Cybersecurity

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Develop and maintain effective emergency communications 275

governance and leadership across the Ecosystem 276

Objective 1.1: Formalize governance through policy, documentation, and adequate 277

funding 278

Objective 1.2: Structure more inclusive governance by expanding membership 279

composition 280

Objective 1.3: Adopt adaptive governance strategies to address the rapid evolution of 281

technologies, capabilities, and risks 282

Goal 1: Governance and Leadership

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Goal 1: Governance and Leadership 283

Effective coordination and decision making are critical first steps to ensuring successful emergency 284

communications. Achieving this requires robust governance structures and processes designed to ensure 285

accountability, inclusiveness, adaptability, and action. The strength of emergency communications 286

governance is not measured by its ability to maintain status quo, but to drive improvements in balance with 287

the rapid evolution of technologies. 288

Public safety continues to expand its network of partners to include those involved in receiving and sharing 289

information during day-to-day efforts or out-of-the-ordinary, large-scale events. Partnership coordination is 290

further strengthened and verified by establishing formal decision-making bodies, gaining fiscal and 291

legislative support from elected and appointed officials, creating consistent policy, and addressing regulatory 292

change. Governance bodies benefit from the contributions of representatives from all organizations with a 293

role in these operations, including those outside the realm of traditional response (i.e., law enforcement, fire, 294

EMS, and dispatch). With the adoption and integration of new technologies, governance is an initial step 295

toward preparing first responders to manage increased information and data exchange across organizations 296

and the risks they bring. Emergency communications governance remains the primary mechanism through 297

which collaborating agencies establish processes and plans, determine and address capability gaps, and 298

achieve progress toward interoperability. 299

Formalized governance provides a unified approach 300

across multiple disciplines, jurisdictions, and 301

organizational functions. Written agreements, backed by 302

formal governance, establish common goals and 303

minimize risk for the communities they serve. Formal 304

governance structures, such as Statewide Interoperability 305

Governing Bodies (SIGBs), Statewide Interoperability 306

Executive Committees (SIECs), and Statewide 911 307

Boards, provide a foundation for public safety entities to 308

collaborate, plan, and make decisions on strategies and 309

operations that mutually support the investment, 310

sustainment, and advancement of communications-311

related initiatives. Establishing statewide governance or 312

revising the functions of existing bodies through statutes 313

or Executive Orders formalizes the group’s authority to 314

make funding recommendations supported through the 315

state’s general funds or federal grant allocations. A 316

group’s charter or bylaws also authorizes the existence of 317

the group and clarifies governance operations and roles, 318

providing details on how to align its vision to longer-319

term decision-making strategies. 320

Robust governance establishes and maintains central coordination points or decision-making bodies to lead 321

the management and administration of emergency communications systems and services, resource allocation 322

and project prioritization, and collaboration necessary for achieving a strategic vision for interoperability. For 323

instance, the Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC) plans and implements the statewide 324

Objective 1.1. Formalize governance through policy, documentation, and adequate funding

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interoperability program, guided by initiatives outlined in the NECP and the Statewide Communication 325

Interoperability Plan (SCIP). 326

As such, SWICs act as linchpins establishing and maintaining emergency communications governance and 327

planning across each state or territory by bringing together stakeholders from a broad spectrum of public 328

safety communications systems and services. Despite the benefits of having a full-time SWIC, exhibit 3 329

demonstrates a decline in overall SWICs between 2010 and 2017. Federal departments and agencies and 330

tribes also benefit from having a similar coordination point or governance mechanism parallel to the SWIC to 331

implement interoperability policies, decisions, and processes currently scattered across its bureaus, 332

components, offices, and programs. The following are indicators of success for this objective. 333

Success Indicators 334

States and territories create or revise policy and plans to formalize and fund emergency 335

communications governance bodies, such as SIGBs 336

Governance bodies develop and implement governing documents, such as charters or bylaws, to 337

clarify roles, purpose, authority, and methods for adapting to change 338

States and territories provide funding, authority, and governance to support a full-time SWIC in 339

each state or territory, such as the development of legislative language and mandates 340

State and territory governance bodies prioritize communications needs and coordinate with the 341

SWIC and other state-level planners on applications for federal financial assistance 342

Federal departments or agencies establish a federal interoperability office or designate a Federal 343

Interoperability Coordinator 344

Supporting Your SWIC

https://www.dhs.gov/safecom/about-ncswic

https://www.dhs.gov/safecom/about-ncswic

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Governance benefits from including a variety of traditional and non-traditional entities supporting public 345

safety, such as tribes, EMS, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), public works, utilities, forestry 346

services, military, private sector, and the American Red Cross. Successful coordination requires planning 347

discussions across these entities through governance and the involvement of potentially under-represented 348

organizations or sectors when developing strategic, operational, and contingency plans. 349

As the Nation experiences unprecedented 350

changes in system connectivity, the types of 351

technologies used, and the flow and potential 352

exposure of data, information technology (IT) 353

officers, such as the Chief Information Officer 354

(CIO), bring technical expertise and increases 355

public safety community end-user-356

coordination. Their participation on 357

subcommittees related to new technologies, 358

threats, and issues provides subject matter 359

expertise when coordinating the integration of 360

IP-based and advanced technologies. Formal 361

participation of elected officials and decision 362

makers allows those making fiscal and policy 363

decisions to better understand emergency 364

communications priorities, empowering them 365

to take informed action. Formal collaboration 366

also provides greater access to and 367

understanding of strategic plans and short- and 368

long-term priorities, as well as the ability to 369

contribute to the formation of solutions, and 370

necessary support, for key priorities and 371

challenges at state, local, tribal, and territorial 372

levels. The following are indicators of success 373

for this objective. 374

375


Governance bodies identify and include missing or underrepresented partners (i.e., jurisdictions, 377

tribes, sectors, organizations) in formal governance structures, when developing strategic and 378

operational plans and policies, and during training and exercises 379

Governance bodies include information management, network infrastructure, and cybersecurity 380

representatives through membership or formalized coordination 381

Governance bodies coordinate with elected officials to champion public safety communications 382

priorities and lifecycle planning among decision makers 383

Objective 1.2. Structure more inclusive governance by expanding membership composition

Tribal Resources for Coordination

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Building resilient emergency communications is dependent on our capacity to adapt when facing sudden 384

disruption or ongoing, slow-moving change, such as the adoption of a new technology. Adaptive governance 385

models are flexible and support collaborative decision-386

making to build resilience in response to new 387

Ecosystem challenges. This approach considers not 388

only adjustments to stakeholder participation and 389

integrated planning, but governance processes and 390

arrangements that promote the investment of time and 391

resources toward innovation and cross-organizational 392

learning. In the context of emergency communications, 393

public safety organizations should embrace initiatives 394

promoting innovation and technology integration, such 395

as information sharing (e.g., voice, text, video) and 396

smart spectrum optimization, or mitigating their 397

associated risks (e.g., cyber-attacks, interoperability), 398

such as amendments to policy, regulation, and funding 399

for more effective cybersecurity. 400

Adaptive governance regularly considers the entities involved in emergency communications (social), the 401

creation and adoption of communications innovations (technology), changes to policies and laws affecting 402

the public safety communications community (political), and shifts in grant funding and the need to identify 403

alternative resources (economic). Adaptive governance models may also consider a phased approach to 404

strategic planning, forecasting needs in the short-, mid-, and long-term, to convey the value of investments to 405

heads of municipalities, town managers, city councils, and other officials. The following are indicators of 406

success for this objective. 407


Governance bodies undertake technology integration and migration initiatives (e.g., broadband, 409

911, alerts and warnings, information management, network infrastructure, cybersecurity) to guide 410

implementation by public safety 411

Governance bodies identify and address legislative and regulatory issues associated with emerging 412

technology 413

Organizations supporting public safety communications formalize and regularly review cross-414

jurisdictional, multi-state, or multi-organizational agreements (e.g., memoranda of understanding, 415

memoranda of agreement, mutual aid agreements) to account for changes to resources, 416

capabilities, and information or technology sharing needs 417

Objective 1.3. Adopt adaptive governance strategies to address the rapid evolution of technologies, capabilities, and risks

Proactive Engagement

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The Emergency Communications Preparedness Center (ECPC) serves as a decision-making body 418

guiding lessons learned, best practices, and partnerships for federal organizations implementing 419

new capabilities 420

Adapting Foundational Governance Practices: The 2018 SAFECOM and

NCSWIC Governance Guides

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Develop and update comprehensive emergency 421

communications plans and procedures that address the 422

evolution of risks, capabilities, and technologies across the 423

Ecosystem 424

Objective 2.1: Develop and regularly-update strategic plans to align with the NECP 425

and address the integration of new emergency communications capabilities (i.e., voice, 426

video, data) 427

Objective 2.2: Align emergency communications funding and investments with 428

strategic and lifecycle planning 429

Objective 2.3: Incorporate risk management strategies to protect against and mitigate 430

disruptions to mission critical communications 431

Goal 2: Planning and Procedures

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Goal 2: Planning and Procedures 432

With the appropriate governance in place, formal written strategies, plans, and procedures guide the 433

deployment of resources and technologies to achieve interoperable communications. Organizations increase 434

their effectiveness by routinely updating these documents to evaluate the long-term direction of formal 435

emergency communications guidance, including forecasting and gaining support for funding requirements 436

through robust lifecycle planning. Rapid technological change requires frequent reexamination of guidance 437

providing strategies to address the evolution of risks. 438

Given the rapidly evolving emergency communications and IT environment, public safety organizations 439

improve voice, video, and data interoperability and information exchange by planning for new investments, 440

maintaining and modernizing legacy systems, and identifying personnel and training needs to meet new 441

challenges. Strategic plans and roadmaps enable an organization to document its vision for the benefit of 442

staff and partner agencies to prioritize communications resources, strengthen governance structures, identify 443

future communications investments, and resolve long-standing interoperability issues. Effective strategic 444

plans consider multi-jurisdictional needs, standardization of technology interfaces in their own community 445

and with surrounding jurisdictions, and processes for testing and updating plan milestones at all levels of 446

government. Additionally, strategic planning for data interoperability incorporates new partners, such as 447

private and health sectors; legal and policy aspects of information and data sharing; funding support for 448

integration and interface; security concerns and solutions; and preparations for forward compatibility of 449

evolving technologies. 450

The SCIP is the primary emergency communications strategy for each state or territory, defining critical 451

emergency communications capabilities and needs. States and territories work with SWICs to align 452

investments with SCIPs and individual implementation plans to improve communications. Since many 453

federal emergency communications grants require recipients to align their projects to the SCIP, local, state, 454

territorial, and tribal public safety agencies benefit from contributing to the development or revision of SCIP 455

content as it pertains to priorities across communities. For federal departments and agencies, the ECPC 456

works with personnel to ensure they have the tools needed to develop, coordinate, and share unique strategic 457

plans across the interagency community to identify opportunities for cooperation. The following are 458

indicators of success for this objective. 459


Public safety organizations use strategic implementation plans (e.g., SCIPs, Regional 461

Interoperability Communications Plans, Next Generation911 Plans, Cybersecurity Plans) to 462

measure progress against NECP objectives and any additional state or territory objectives, and 463

update plans annually 464

Federal agencies or departments develop emergency communications strategic plans in 465

coordination with the ECPC 466

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Objective 2.1. Develop and regularly-update strategic plans to align with the NECP and address the integration of new emergency communications capabilities (i.e., voice, video, data)

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Public safety organizations rely on complex, often expensive, systems to carry out their missions. According 468

to findings from the 2018 Nationwide Communications Baseline Assessment, most public safety 469

organizations have either no funding or insufficient funding for capital investments in interoperability 470

solutions, interoperability-related operations, and maintenance costs. At the agency level, shortfalls in 471

funding continue to affect the ability to properly maintain systems, conduct overall system lifecycle planning, 472

and make decisions. Lifecycle planning requires public safety organizations at all levels of government to 473

collaboratively and regularly assess needs, hazards, risks, and threats in the current environment and through 474

the expected evolution. Consideration of short- and long-term evolution enables an organization to determine 475

its needs and requirements as part of the lifecycle planning process. Identification of funding mechanisms to 476

support those needs and requirements is a key component of lifecycle planning, as costs can be a determining 477

factor in the replacement or refreshment of systems. 478

SAFECOM has produced a vast catalog of resources through its Funding and Sustainment Committee, 479

including the annual SAFECOM Guidance on Emergency Communications Grants, which provides 480

recommendations to grant applicants seeking federal funding, including allowable costs and applicable 481

standards. Additional resources are available on the SAFECOM Funding website, including guidance for 482

lifecycle planning and identifying funding solutions. Public safety agencies seeking to effectively manage the 483

ongoing investments necessary for systems and equipment may refer to the 2018 SAFECOM and NCSWIC 484

Emergency Communications System Lifecycle Planning Guide’s recommendations, checklists, and 485

suggested timelines. Public safety increasingly understands the need to diversify funding mechanisms and 486

resources in their efforts to prioritize system sustainment and upgrade, as detailed in the 2018 SAFECOM 487

and NCSWIC Funding Mechanisms for Public Safety Communications Systems, which lists real-world 488

examples for other agencies to consider. The following are indicators of success for this objective. 489


Federal funding authorities develop federal grant guidance for emergency communications 491

governance and investments consistent with guidelines provided by SAFECOM and the NECP 492

Public safety organizations develop and use lifecycle plans to inform agency funding decisions and 493

implement new technologies while maintaining necessary legacy and back-up systems 494

Public safety organizations and governing bodies identify sustainable funding mechanisms to 495

support the lifecycle planning model 496

The modernization of our emergency communications systems (e.g., Internet of Things [IoT], next 497

generation, data interoperability, social media, encryption) brings a wealth of new capabilities, as well as 498

associated risks (e.g., system failure, cyber-attacks, data breaches). The DHS Threat and Hazard 499

Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR) are helpful when 500

conducting state-level, emergency communications capability evaluations. Communities participate in these 501

Objective 2.2. Align emergency communications funding and investments with strategic and lifecycle planning

Objective 2.3. Incorporate risk management strategies to protect against and mitigate disruptions to mission critical communications

https://www.dhs.gov/safecom/funding





21

interconnected processes to evaluate preparedness, including capabilities for emergency communications. 502

Local and state decision makers and SWICs should apply information within these assessments to direct 503

funding and sustainment resources to new and legacy emergency communications systems. 504

Determining and testing strategies to increase the resiliency of public safety networks and the personnel who 505

run them also help to prevent catastrophic loss of critical communications to end-users during emergencies or 506

disasters. Despite its importance, however, less than half of public safety organizations build processes into 507

their plans to ensure continuity during out-of-the-ordinary emergencies or disasters, as shown in exhibit 4. 508

Incident Response Teams (IRTs), incident response 509

plans, recovery or resiliency plans, and continuity 510

of operations plans are useful in cybersecurity 511

incident response. IT administrators may consider 512

establishing a Computer Security Incident 513

Response Team (CSIRT) or reach an agreement 514

with the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness 515

Team (US-CERT), run by DHS National 516

Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 517

Center (NCCIC), to assist in cybersecurity 518

planning. Additionally, coordinating response and 519

recovery efforts with the SWIC and other IT 520

administrators can increase cybersecurity posture. 521

The following are indicators of success for this 522

objective. 523


Local public safety organizations work with state agencies to evaluate emergency communications 525

threats, hazards, and needs in formal capability reporting mechanisms (e.g., THIRA, SPR) 526

Public safety organizations incorporate risk management strategies into plans for continuity and 527

recovery of critical communications 528

Public safety organizations that use IT have a cybersecurity incident response plan in place 529

Public safety organizations perform resiliency assessments and mitigate vulnerabilities 530

Exhibit 4. Percentage of public safety organizations whose

strategic planning process does not ensure continuity in out-

of-the-ordinary situations

22

Develop and deliver training, exercise, and evaluation programs 531

that target gaps in all available emergency communications 532

technologies 533

Objective 3.1: Update and implement training and exercise programs to address gaps 534

in emergency communications 535

Objective 3.2: Incorporate human factors in training and exercises to address the 536

demands that voice, data, and video information place on personnel 537

Objective 3.3: Ensure training addresses information sharing (i.e., voice, video, data) 538

for multi-agency responses 539

Goal 3: Training, Exercises, and Evaluation

23

Goal 3: Training, Exercises, and Evaluation 540

Effective training and exercise programs bolster emergency professionals’ proficiency with communications 541

equipment, as well as improve their ability to execute policies, plans, and procedures governing the use of 542

communications. The 2018 Nationwide Communications Baseline Assessment findings reflect strong 543

participation in training and exercise programs, indicating progress in the right direction. However, as new 544

and emerging technologies are introduced, it is vital for training and exercise programs to evolve as well, 545

allowing personnel to routinely practice with new communications capabilities, maximizing their benefits. It 546

is pertinent for the public safety community to support communications-specific training and exercise 547

programs, proper evaluation to identify and close gaps, expansion of regular training and exercises through 548

increased awareness and augmentation of available opportunities, and more aggressive tracking and use of 549

NIMS/Incident Command System (ICS)-capable communications support personnel. 550

While the public safety community has made 551

progress, there remains a need to update and 552

implement training and exercise programs to 553

address gaps and ensure personnel are proficient 554

in the increasing number of diverse capabilities 555

used during incident response. As depicted in 556

exhibit 5, the 2018 Nationwide Communications 557

Baseline Assessment findings reflect strong 558

participation in training and exercise programs 559

overall. However, more than a quarter of local 560

public safety organizations and almost one-third 561

of federal and tribal organizations do not 562

exercise. These results indicate opportunities to 563

expand training and exercise participation and 564

content to address new technologies, threats, and 565

organization-specific planning needs. 566

Communications-focused training and exercises 567

demonstrate and test interoperability and 568

continuity capabilities during unplanned incidents. Effective training and exercise programs also incorporate 569

changes in policies, standard operating procedures (SOPs), partners, and technologies as they occur. 570

Assessment of communications during exercises and real-world events and incidents allows public safety 571

organizations to improve operational procedures, policies, and training program effectiveness. Public safety 572

captures improvement-related data through a repetitive, periodic analysis of tabletop, functional, and full-573

scale exercises, planned events, and incident after-action reports (AARs). Outcomes-focused documentation 574

identifies points of system failure, coverage inadequacies (indoor and outdoor), and requirements for 575

primary, secondary, and backup systems. Deficiencies and unmet needs form the basis of an organization’s 576

improvement action plan with solutions to strengthen communications coordination. 577

The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) is the industry standard for developing 578

exercises with objectives supported by exercise evaluation guidelines. Public safety can enhance emergency 579

communications through the evaluation of training and exercises by using communications support personnel 580

in federally-funded exercises and third-party or peer evaluations. 581

Objective 3.1. Update and ensure the availability of training and exercises to address gaps in emergency communications

Exhibit 5. Percentage of public safety organizations that do

not participate in exercises

24

Evaluations are only effective if training and exercise programs are improved because of the lessons learned. 582

However, the 2018 Nationwide Communications Baseline Assessment found most public safety 583

organizations do not document or assess training evaluations along with the changing operational 584

environment. The following are indicators of success for this objective. 585


Public safety organizations develop or update training and exercise programs to address new 587

technologies, data interoperability, cybersecurity, use of federal and national interoperability 588

channels, and continuity of communications 589

Public safety organizations offer training classes and exercises across multiple agencies and 590

jurisdictions whenever possible 591

Public safety organizations coordinate training and technical assistance across the government (as 592

applicable) to ensure current and consistent information 593

Public safety organizations include injects in exercises to test communications system and 594

personnel (including emerging technology and system failure) and utilize third-party evaluators 595

with communications expertise 596

Public safety organizations integrate private sector, NGOs, and public sector communications 597

stakeholders into training and exercises 598

The ECPC analyzes gaps and identifies opportunities for federal interagency training and exercise 599

programs 600

Training Videos for DHS Priority Telecommunications Services Now Available

http://www.dhs.gov/pts-videos

25

Training tools must keep pace with the integration of new communications technologies and services added 601

to public safety professionals’ available capabilities. More technologies and applications result in more data 602

to process, more SOPs to learn, and more stress for the users. To ensure effective use of all available 603

technologies when a responder is under duress, progressive training and exercise programs can be designed 604

to build from previous lessons, adding new objectives along the way. Progressive training and exercises not 605

only build upon each other, but increase repetition of use to develop “muscle memory,” leading to the 606

likelihood of available technologies used appropriately and effectively during incidents and planned events. 607

One downside to repetition is outcomes from recurring exposure to incident scene images, which can 608

increase the risk of post-traumatic stress. In the field, new technologies such as body-worn cameras are 609

changing the nature of incident responses and require training to be used effectively. New technologies bring 610

responders not on-scene even closer to the impacts of a threat or hazard through photos, videos, and live 611

streaming as events unfold. Public safety agencies will benefit from incorporating modules demonstrating 612

techniques to combat “compassion fatigue” or “vicarious trauma” into trainings and building opportunities to 613

practice those methods into exercises. The following are indicators of success for this objective. 614


Public safety organizations implementing Next Generation 911 (NG911) utilize training and tools 616

to address the impact of incident images/videos on dispatcher 617

Public safety organizations implementing mobile data applications utilize training and tools to 618

ensure that responders effectively use and are not overloaded by available information 619

DHS has trained more than 7,000 all-hazards communications support personnel nationwide, resulting in a 620

significant pool of trained staff in every state and territory. While a cadre of thousands of Communications 621

Unit Leaders (COMLs) and Communications Technicians (COMTs) have been trained, agency leadership 622

often do not know or take advantage of this capability during actual responses. Accessing these resources is 623

difficult when not every state has a program with policies and procedures to track, maintain, and utilize 624

NIMS/ICS-capable communications support resources. The NECP promotes progress for Emergency 625

Support Function #2 (ESF-2) and Communications Unit positions to more effectively integrate personnel 626

into operations and to improve capabilities to track and share trained communications support personnel. 627

The ongoing training and development of communications support personnel is an essential part of public 628

safety response to planned events and unplanned incidents, particularly as the scope and complexity of 629

technologies evolve. In 2018, DHS began developing a course for the Information Technology Service Unit 630

Leader (ITSL) to address increased demand for IT devices and networks during an incident or planned event. 631

The ITSL Course ensures that communications support resources are equipped with adequate skills to 632

operate and troubleshoot IT equipment during an activation and to enable service improvements over time. 633

Advances in tracking the training and use of active communications support personnel resolve shortages 634

during an incident or event and fulfill local, state, territory, tribal, and federal requirements for these 635

Objective 3.2. Incorporate human factors in training and exercises to address the demands that voice, data, and video information place on personnel

Objective 3.3. Ensure training addresses information sharing (i.e., voice, video, data) for multi-agency responses

26

positions. The following are indicators of success for this objective. 636


States, territories, and tribal nations implement programs (based on best practices) to oversee the 638

qualification, training, certification, recognition, activation, and currency of communications 639

support personnel 640

States, territories, and tribal nations develop and support instructor cadres to expand training for 641

communications support personnel 642

SAFECOM and the NCSWIC develop training curriculums for additional positions within the 643

Information Technology Service Unit. 644

Communications Unit Personnel Position Task Book Sign-Off Process Template

https://www.dhs.gov/publication/comu-training-documents

27

Improve effective coordination of available operable and 645

interoperable public safety communications capabilities 646

for incidents and planned events 647

Objective 4.1: Confirm the implementation and active use of the NIMS doctrine 648

Objective 4.2: Enhance coordination and effective usage of public safety 649

communications resources at all levels of government 650

Objective 4.3: Develop or update operational protocols and procedures to support 651

interoperability across new technologies 652

Objective 4.4: Strengthen resilience and continuity of communications throughout 653

operations 654

Goal 4: Communications Coordination

28

Goal 4: Communications Coordination 655

Effective coordination and efficient usage of all available communications capabilities is critical to ensure 656

both responder safety and the timely provision of public safety services. Being familiar with the operation 657

and use of available capabilities prior to a response avoids communications challenges during an incident. 658

Similarly, the advantages realized from new technologies can only be maximized when familiarity and usage 659

of the capability comes in the form of repeated real-world application of the technology during operations. 660

While exercise, event, and incident AARs reflect improvements in incident and event coordination through 661

the use of communications technologies, challenges remain due to continuous technological advancements. 662

The significant benefits that communications technologies may introduce to the coordination of incidents and 663

planned events are lost if not applied appropriately. New, improved, or updated features, functions, and 664

capabilities must be accounted for in policies, plans, and procedures. The introduction of new and improved 665

technologies and additional communications capabilities can make coordination more complex and 666

challenging until their usage is more commonplace across the entire spectrum of public safety users. 667

Nevertheless, public safety organizations enhance coordination when they proactively incorporate new and 668

improved communications technologies, as well as commercial and non-traditional communications systems 669

providers. 670

Public safety organizations use NIMS and ICS processes, methods, and structures across all disciplines, 671

jurisdictions, and levels of government to standardize methods, practices, and actions during planned events 672

and incident responses. As public safety organizations maintain, implement, upgrade, or replace existing 673

communications capabilities, those capabilities should reflect an alignment with NIMS and ICS doctrine to 674

ensure available fielded capabilities are sufficient to support primary, secondary, and backup services. 675

Depending on the incident size, scope, location, and progress, various resources may be pressed into service 676

to support an evolving incident. The Incident Commander (IC) or Incident Management Team (IMT) remain 677

informed about the status of all available operable and interoperable communications capabilities through 678

sharing appropriate ICS form(s). 679

Public safety organizations of all disciplines are realizing better information gathering from various reporting 680

sources when larger complements of communications resources are deployed during initial responses to 681

incidents. These heightened responses require pre-planning between public safety organizations, IC and IMT 682

personnel, and communications systems providers. This coordination highlights the value of including 683

providers and helps responders be more aware and comfortable with expected timelines for their inclusion, 684

resulting in coordinated, robust, flexible, and resilient voice and data communications capabilities to 685

effectively support incident objectives. The following are indicators or success for this objective. 686

Objective 4.1. Confirm the implementation and active use of the NIMS doctrine

29


Public safety organizations possess primary, secondary, and backup communications capabilities 688

aligned with NIMS and ICS and share appropriate forms (e.g., ICS 205) illustrating the status of an 689

agency’s capabilities 690

Public safety organizations assess and improve the timeliness of notification, activation, and 691

response of communications systems providers to support the IC and IMT requirements at incidents 692

and planned events 693

As the complexity of communications systems increase at a significant pace, it is incumbent upon public 694

safety organizations to include their communications systems providers in planning and response activities. 695

These resources offer technical assistance and advice to improve coordination for planned events and 696

incident responses. Providers may be internal, external, or a combination of both, and their expertise, 697

knowledge, information, and access to additional communications resources can be the difference between 698

successful or failed incident responses. Public safety organizations should evaluate existing communications 699

policy, plans, agreements, and current systems and capabilities usage to determine appropriate inclusion of 700

commercial providers and non-traditional communications partners. 701

In order to coordinate various communications tools, knowing the availability and current state of all 702

operable and interoperable assets is critical. At a minimum, public safety organizations need to share current 703

communications systems information with contiguous public safety agencies and other organizations which 704

provide or receive mutual aid, share infrastructure, or participate in planned events. Sharing active, available 705

features, functionality, and capabilities of current communications capabilities with partners can expedite 706

communications coordination for both incidents and planned events. The following are indicators of success 707

for this objective. 708


Public safety organizations maintain and readily share comprehensive information about features, 710

functionality, and capabilities of operable and interoperable communication resources 711

Public safety organizations use up-to-date defined practices, procedures, pre-plans, specific 712

venue/location response plans, incident type response plans, SOPs, tactical response directives, 713

and/or tactical interoperability communications plans (TICPs) that identify primary, secondary, 714

and backup LMR assets, mobile data systems, devices and relevant applications for effective 715

communications coordination and information sharing during planned events and incidents 716

Public safety organizations periodically evaluate, engage, and incorporate commercial and non-717

traditional communications partners (e.g., auxiliary communications, volunteers, utilities) in 718

incidents and planned events 719

Objective 4.2. Enhance coordination and effective usage of public safety communications resources at all levels of government

30

As of 2018, a significant percentage of public safety agencies, nearly 25 percent, lacked SOPs on emergency 720

communications. However, the fast-paced evolution of communications capabilities highlights a crucial need 721

to update—and develop, if they do not exist—SOPs and operational plans to address entities, individuals, or 722

organizations that provide or use communications during emergencies (e.g., utilities, transportation sector, 723

commercial carriers). Coupled with effective planning, training, and exercises, SOPs transform policy and 724

best practices into real-world understanding of operational plans, which detail how to establish and maintain 725

communications during an incident or disaster. Analyzing AARs following events can assist with resolving 726

gaps or missing information through the development or revision of SOPs. 727

Public safety organizations establish a 728

repeatable process to periodically observe 729

and record user proficiency for primary, 730

secondary, and backup communications 731

systems. This includes an end-user’s ability 732

to properly access, navigate, manipulate, and 733

use available features, functions, and 734

capabilities of their communications devices 735

and equipment. Observations that illustrate a 736

lack of proficiency, established by set 737

minimum standards, in the use of communications capabilities drive appropriate recommendations for 738

modifications and expansion of user instructional documentation, informal and formal trainings, drills, 739

exercises, and SOPs. The following are indicators of success for this objective. 740


Public safety organizations develop and regularly-update NIMS-aligned SOPs to facilitate the 742

integration, deployment, and use of communications assets 743

Public safety organizations have recommended guidelines developed on the use of personal devices 744

(e.g., bring your own device) based on applicable laws and regulations 745

Public safety organizations leverage training, exercises, and real-world events to test capabilities 746

and update SOPs 747

Public safety organizations periodically review the priority service programs (e.g., TSP, GETS, 748

WPS) to which they subscribe and ensure they have SOPs governing the programs’ use, execution, 749

and testing 750

Public safety organizations periodically test the proficiency of personnel in using communications 751

systems’ features, functions, and capabilities 752

SAFECOM SOPs Resources

Objective 4.3. Develop or update operational protocols and procedures to support interoperability across new technologies

728

729

730

731

732

733

734

735

736

737

https://www.dhs.gov/safecom/sops

https://www.dhs.gov/safecom/sops

31

As emergency communications systems and functions become more interconnected, they also become more 753

susceptible to physical and cyber vulnerabilities and disruptions in other parts of the Emergency 754

Communications Ecosystem. Agencies at all levels of government must plan for the interconnection of voice 755

and data communications. During large-scale events, planning and operations for backup communications 756

need to include all available assets and resources in the impacted incident area. For example, LMR systems 757

may need to be augmented by air and marine mobile communications to create a comprehensive air, sea, and 758

ground network with appropriate levels of security and authentication to ensure continuity of 759

communications. Commercial cellular voice and data networks are often used as backup options as well, but 760

these networks may be overwhelmed by congestion and capacity issues. 761

Achieving secure and resilient voice and data communications across the Ecosystem is essential for public 762

safety agencies to execute their missions under any circumstances. To achieve this level of preparedness, 763

public safety organizations and communications systems providers continually assess the readiness of 764

primary, secondary, and backup communications capabilities. Commonly, public safety communications 765

capabilities are constructed, operated, and maintained to provide the highest levels of availability and access. 766

The incorporation of resiliency and redundancy features ensures resources are available to effectively support 767

critical communications from large numbers of emergency responders, while continuing to support other 768

activities throughout a public safety organization’s jurisdiction. The following are indicators of success for 769

this objective. 770


Public safety organizations establish sufficient testing and usage observations of all operable and 772

interoperable primary, secondary, and backup communications systems 773

Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs), Public Safety Communications Centers (PSCCs), and 774

Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) address systems and staffing to support communications 775

continuity of operations planning 776

SAFECOM and the NCSWIC develop best practices to encourage active network sharing and 777

regionalization of shared services 778

Objective 4.4. Strengthen resilience and continuity of communications throughout operations

Shared System Project: Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands

32

Improve lifecycle management of the systems and 779

equipment that enable emergency responders and public 780

safety officials to share information efficiently and 781

securely 782

Objective 5.1: Support public safety requirements that drive research, development, 783

testing, and evaluation of emergency communications technology 784

Objective 5.2: Ensure communications and information sharing systems meet public 785

safety’s mission critical needs 786

Objective 5.3: Support data interoperability through the development of effective and 787

sustainable information sharing and data exchange standards, policies, and procedures 788

789

Goal 5: Technology and Infrastructure

33

Goal 5: Technology and Infrastructure 790

The rapid rate of technology advancement continues to outpace the public safety community acquisition 791

cycle. New technologies can be expensive and disrupt mission critical operations and communications. Yet, 792

emerging technologies, such as wireless data networks and IP-based mobile communications devices, offer 793

advanced capabilities to enhance command and control and situational awareness for emergency responders. 794

The ability to develop, test, and evaluate new technologies before integrating them ensures successful 795

operability and interoperability with existing communications systems. 796

The public safety community has placed an emphasis on accelerating research, development, testing, 797

evaluation, and standards implementation for emerging technologies that improve communications. With the 798

rollout of FirstNet and greater acknowledgement of the need for data capabilities, many public safety 799

organizations have focused their technology efforts on preparing to implement broadband solutions. In 800

addition, independent, statewide and regional Project 25 (P25) radio systems and NG911 are being deployed. 801

The public safety community continues to develop strategies and technology roadmaps for implementing 802

standards-based, open-source, vendor-neutral devices and applications that can sustain the unique public 803

safety operating environment and provide mission-critical communications. 804

To improve the development of innovative emergency communications capabilities that support the needs of 805

the emergency services sector, public safety organizations must coordinate their approach to research, 806

development, testing, and evaluation to serve the communications needs of organizations from all levels of 807

government. There must also be action to accelerate the development and adoption of mission critical, 808

standards-based communications technology products, applications, and services. The following are 809



SAFECOM and the NCSWIC identify public safety technology and infrastructure capability gaps 812

The ECPC coordinates federal research, development, testing, and evaluation priorities and 813

processes 814

The ECPC cultivates sustained engagement (e.g., cooperative agreements) between federal 815

research, development, testing, and evaluation programs, such as DHS Science and Technology 816

Directorate and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Public Safety 817

Communications Research Division (PSCR), and with public safety organizations focused on 818

resiliency, interoperability, and other challenges 819

The ECPC partners with the private sector to foster an open, innovative, and standards-based 820

commercial marketplace for solutions development and ensure that public safety requirements are 821

addressed in current and emerging standards 822

Objective 5.1. Support public safety requirements that drive research, development, testing, and evaluation of emergency communications technology

34

Public safety must continually evaluate 823

and implement communications 824

standards and programs to keep pace 825

with technological advancements. Once a 826

technology has been successfully tested 827

and evaluated to meet public safety 828

needs, standards must be developed or 829

refined to ensure compatibility with 830

existing systems and enable consistent 831

implementations across the Emergency 832

Communications Ecosystem―improving 833

operability, interoperability, and security. 834

Programs that facilitate technology 835

adoption are necessary to communicate 836

benefits and minimize risks. Not every 837

new or enhanced technology will be 838

appropriate for each unique public safety 839

organization’s mission, nor can a new or 840

enhanced technology be adopted without 841

consideration of impacts to governance, 842

SOPs, use, training, and exercises. The 843

following are indicators of success for 844

this objective. 845


SAFECOM and the NCSWIC communicate emerging technology impacts to public safety, such as 847

those associated with identity management, multimedia, 5G, IoT, social media, network 848

virtualization, spectrum optimization, artificial intelligence, machine intelligence, geographic 849

information systems, and positioning, navigation, and timing systems 850

SAFECOM and the NCSWIC guide standards-based LMR evolution 851

The FirstNet Authority innovates and integrates broadband technology into the Nation’s public 852

safety communications infrastructure 853

The National 911 Program coordinates, in collaboration with all levels of government, the 854

integration of NG911-identified best practices into the Nation’s public safety communications 855

infrastructure 856

Objective 5.2. Ensure communications and information sharing systems meet public safety’s mission critical needs

823

824

825

826

827

828

829

830

831

832

833

834

835

836

837

838

839

840

841

842

843

844

845

35

Data sharing capabilities have continued to evolve 857

since 2014, shaping the way information is 858

communicated and shared. Emerging capabilities 859

expand with whom and how agencies can share 860

information before, during, and throughout an event. 861

While the exchange of data can improve situational 862

awareness and facilitate transfer of mission critical 863

information, the quickly-evolving and complex culture 864

of data sharing also brings risk and privacy 865

considerations. In the 2018 Nationwide 866

Communications Baseline Assessment, on average, 867

less than half of public safety organizations use or test 868

interoperability solutions for data, as shown in exhibit 869

6. One challenge for effective information exchange 870

includes the increasing types of data being exchanged, such as video, geographic information system (GIS) 871

data, evacuee/patient tracking data, accident/crash (telematics) data, biometric data, Computer Aided 872

Dispatch (CAD) data, Automatic Vehicle Location (AVL) data, Common Operation Picture data, and more. 873

Another challenge is the volume of data requiring storage, exchange, maintenance, and analysis. 874

Development of effective and sustainable information sharing and data exchange standards, policies, and 875

procedures will help the public safety community address their data management needs, and adopt solutions 876

for Big Data, IoT, cloud convergence, and other data-intensive disruptive technologies. The following are 877



Public safety organizations employ standards-based information exchange models and data sharing 880

solutions 881

Public safety organizations follow acquisition best practices, including consideration for standards-882

based infrastructure 883

SAFECOM and the NCSWIC publish best practices and updated guidance on SOPs to assist the 884

public safety community in meeting data storage, exchange, maintenance, and analysis challenges 885

Objective 5.3. Support data interoperability through the development of effective and sustainable information sharing and data exchange standards, policies, and procedures

Exhibit 6. Percentage of public safety organizations that

never use or test interoperability solutions for data

36

Strengthen the cybersecurity posture of the Emergency 886

Communications Ecosystem 887

Objective 6.1: Develop and maintain cybersecurity risk management 888

Objective 6.2: Mitigate cybersecurity vulnerabilities 889

Objective 6.3: Determine public safety-specific, standards-based cyber hygiene 890

minimums and fund ongoing risk mitigation 891

Goal 6: Cybersecurity

37

Goal 6: Cybersecurity 892

The time for instituting a “security first” perspective for emergency communications is now. To prepare for 893

cyber-attacks, the public safety community must continually identify risks and address evolving security 894

requirements in coordination with partners in their Emergency Communications Ecosystem. Cybersecurity is 895

a shared mission across all levels of government, the private sector, NGOs, and even the public. 896

As noted in the 2017 National Preparedness Report, despite significant interest in and need for cybersecurity, 897

most states and territories have low confidence in their cybersecurity capabilities. To address this need, the 898

Federal Government established several programs to offer resources to assist organizations in managing their 899

cybersecurity risk. For example, organizations can request self-assessments or onsite assessments from 900

DHS’s Cyber Resilience Review program to uncover gaps and areas for improvement. In addition, DHS 901

established the National Risk Management Center to create a cross-cutting risk management approach 902

between the private sector and government to improve the defense of our Nation’s critical infrastructure. 903

As cyber threats grow in complexity and sophistication, attacks could become more numerous and severe 904

against emergency communications systems. Therefore, it is critical that public safety organizations take 905

proactive measures to carefully manage their cybersecurity risks. 906

Establishing cybersecurity risk management can 907

help to identify and prioritize risks, protect 908

resources, detect threats, and establish response 909

and recovery processes. Despite every effort, 910

cyber threat events will occur. Exhibit 7 shows the 911

significant percentages of public safety 912

organizations affected by cybersecurity, according 913

to results from the 2018 Nationwide 914

Communications Baseline Assessment. Being 915

prepared to execute response processes and 916

procedures, prevent expansion of the event, 917

mitigate its effects, and eradicate the incident is 918

necessary. Incident response plans, recovery or 919

resiliency plans, and continuity of operations plans 920

are useful in cybersecurity incident response. 921

Recovery planning processes and strategies are 922

improved by incorporating lessons learned into 923

future activities. Response personnel should be 924

trained on the latest security, resiliency, continuity, and operational practices and maintain in-service training 925

as new technology and methods are made available. The following are indicators of success for this 926

objective. 927


Public safety organizations, at a minimum, implement the Cybersecurity Framework 929

Public safety organizations use the Critical Infrastructure Cyber Community Voluntary Program 930

(C³ Voluntary Program) 931

Objective 6.1. Develop and maintain cybersecurity risk management

Exhibit 7. Percentage of public safety organizations whose

communications have been impacted by cybersecurity breaches

at some point in the last 5 years

38

The identification and mitigation of threats and vulnerabilities is a shared responsibility. Threat information 932

sharing and shared solution sets are important aspects of cybersecurity. Public safety organizations must 933

make difficult decisions to allocate attention and funding to manage their organization’s cybersecurity risk. 934

They must also consider the impacts of their cybersecurity risk management on interoperability with the 935

broader community. Only when working together will the public safety community be able to implement the 936

most cost-effective and efficient mitigation activities and approaches that enable them to maintain the highest 937

degree of interoperability. 938

SAFECOM and the NCSWIC continues to 939

produce guidance educating the community on 940

known mid- and long-term threats and their 941

mitigations. Voice and data encryption is 942

increasingly in use throughout the public safety 943

community as another means to mitigating 944

threats, but not without challenges. For example, 945

encryption can add a significant level of 946

complexity and should be considered only when 947

operational requirements of the incident outweigh 948

additional complications. Another important 949

aspect of cybersecurity is a comprehensive 950

review of the standardized protocols and proprietary mechanisms connecting devices to and through the 951

Internet. NIST should review protocol standards, as well as provide cybersecurity testing and certification 952

activities, for the public safety community. The following are indicators of success for this objective. 953


SAFECOM and the NCSWIC share planning and mitigation guidance regarding known threats and 955

vulnerabilities 956

Public safety organizations implement interoperable encryption, as needed 957

The ECPC refines the NG911 Emergency Communications Center (EC3) concept 958

NIST evaluates equipment and protocol vulnerabilities that impact the public safety mission 959

Instituting a “security first” perspective for public safety requires stakeholders to join together and establish 960

consistent standards, policies, procedures, interoperability, and implementation guidance for emergency 961

Objective 6.2. Mitigate cybersecurity vulnerabilities

Objective 6.3. Determine public safety-specific, standards-based cyber hygiene minimums and fund ongoing risk mitigation

Encryption and Key Management

Resources

939

940

941

942

943

944

945

946

947

948

949

950

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20160830%20Best%20Practices%20%20for%20Encryption_Final%20Draft508.pdf


http://www.npstc.org/download.jsp?tableId=37&column=217&id=4121&file=NPSTC_Radio_IO_Best_Practice_Overall_Combined_Report_180615.pdf



39

communications deployments, including 962

consideration for the significant costs of these 963

activities. The 2018 Nationwide 964

Communications Baseline Assessment 965

revealed the significant percentages of public 966

safety organizations that lack funding to 967

address their cybersecurity needs, as shown in 968

exhibit 8. 969

Cybersecurity is a continual process of 970

enhancing defense. Some organizations will 971

have less capacity than others to apply for and 972

manage grants. Therefore, NIST should work 973

to develop a plan for setting, testing, and 974

maintaining cyber minimum standards to assist cybersecurity-eligible grant programs in distributing 975

necessary funding to public safety. To promote the importance of cybersecurity to operability and 976

interoperability, cybersecurity should be included as a critical success element in the SAFECOM 977

Interoperability Continuum, which assists emergency response organizations and policy makers to plan and 978

implement interoperability solutions for data and voice communications. National programs and federal 979

agencies also have a role to play evaluating, communicating, and advocating for cybersecurity services and 980

resources. The following are indicators of success for this objective. 981


NIST establishes public safety-specific, standards-based cyber hygiene minimums for public safety 983

SAFECOM updates the Interoperability Continuum to account for cybersecurity 984

SAFECOM and the NCSWIC consolidate and publish information on available cybersecurity 985

services and grant programs, such as those detailed in the DHS Cybersecurity Services Catalog 986

and the Homeland Security Grant Program 987

National Risk Management Center provides a cost study of public safety cybersecurity risk 988

management and evaluates the need for additional grant programs 989

NIST provides incentives for cybersecurity-specific research and development activities based on 990

known threats 991

Exhibit 8. Percentage of public safety organizations that have no

funding or insufficient funding to meet cybersecurity needs

40

Implementing the NECP992

The NECP goals and objectives provide the blueprint to enhance emergency 993

communications capabilities nationwide, consistent with legislative requirements. 994

DHS has a practiced strategy for implementing, measuring, and reporting 995

progress on the NECP in coordination with stakeholders, working together 996

toward the desired end-state of emergency communications. 997

Implementation Action Plan and Promotion 998

OEC is designated as the federal agent charged with overseeing NECP implementation. In this role, OEC 999

will use a two-step approach to implementation: (1) develop and execute an action plan that supports the 1000

NECP’s six goals and supporting objectives; and (2) develop and execute a nationwide publication and 1001

campaign to promote the NECP. Both steps will be coordinated in partnership with stakeholders from the 1002

public safety community. 1003

Although DHS leads the development and management of the NECP, the implementation is a shared 1004

responsibility among the Department and the plan’s stakeholders. This reflects the nature of the public safety 1005

community, which spans disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of government, and also involves the public 1006

and private sectors. As such, the action plan will identify supporting actions that OEC programs, services, or 1007

offerings can update or modify, develop, and enact to implement the NECP. It will further coordinate with 1008

local, state, territorial, tribal, and federal agencies to identify actions each can take to further support the 1009

Plan’s implementation activities. OEC will also work with stakeholders to plan actions within the constraints 1010

of limited resources, as the NECP does not directly provide funding to implement. 1011

The NECP is published on the DHS website and recognized as the strategic plan for the Nation. Similar to 1012

past releases, OEC will launch a promotional campaign following publication to drive the whole community 1013

towards its desired end-state as described in the NECP vision. OEC will enlist its Regional Coordinator 1014

personnel and “champions” from the local, state, territorial, tribal, and federal agencies to promote NECP 1015

implementation through stakeholder engagements and public safety associations. The plan’s success relies on 1016

the whole community embracing the NECP goals and objectives, and most importantly acting on them. 1017

Measuring Progress 1018

The ability of responders to seamlessly communicate and share information to save lives and protect property 1019

is both the most important and challenging criteria by which to measure the NECP’s success. Given the 1020

multitude of public safety agencies across the Nation—and the large number of incidents to which they 1021

respond to daily—consistent evaluation of how well communications function during response operations is 1022

a major challenge that requires cooperation at all levels of government. 1023

OEC will assess progress in achieving the 2019 NECP goals and objectives using the following approach: 1024

Coordinate with the public safety community to share goals and objective to incorporate them into1025

emergency communications plans1026

Use the success indicators within each objective to determine progress towards the individual objectives1027

Assess the collective progress of objectives to indicate progress towards overarching goals using the next1028

statutorily required communications capabilities assessment in 20231029

41

Compare results from the 2018 Nationwide Communications Baseline Assessment to the next 1030

assessment, measuring progress against key gaps identified in the 2019 NECP 1031

Conduct a periodic collective assessment of 2019 NECP goals and the 2023 Nationwide1032

Communications Baseline Assessment to track progress towards the plan’s overall implementation1033

The 2019 NECP goals and objectives are designed to achieve the plan’s vision—enabling the emergency 1034

response community to communicate and share information securely across communications technologies in 1035

real-time, including all levels of government, jurisdictions, disciplines, organizations, and citizens impacted 1036

by any threats or hazards event. Progress toward achieving the NECP vision will be measured via the next 1037

Nationwide Communications Baseline Assessment. OEC conducts the assessment every five years to provide 1038

a national and statistically valid snapshot of public safety agencies’ emergency communications capabilities 1039

and their current use, and to identify gaps that remain for interoperability to be achieved. The results of the 1040

assessment gauge implementation of the NECP, as well as inform the development and update of the next 1041

iteration. 1042

Reporting 1043

In accordance with 6 U.S.C. § 573, DHS is required to develop and submit the Biennial Progress Report on 1044

Emergency Communications to Congress. It is the official reporting mechanism that highlights the 1045

Department’s specific accomplishments in carrying out its responsibilities under Title XVIII, as well as areas 1046

of progress, current gaps, and identified best practices for each element of the SAFECOM Interoperability 1047

Continuum and other critical areas identified by Congress. OEC will report progress on 2019 NECP 1048

implementation through the Biennial Progress Report. 1049

42

Conclusion 1050

Since 2008, tremendous progress has been made to enhance emergency responder 1051

communications capabilities. However, the Nation must build on previous 1052

successes and pursue opportunities for improvement. The 2019 NECP 1053

emphasizes the close collaboration by stakeholders to plan for and shape the 1054

future of emergency communications. The deployment of new technologies 1055

provides emergency responders access to high-speed and cutting-edge 1056

capabilities, while current emergency communications networks offer responders 1057

the security, reliability, and coverage they need to execute their mission in an all-1058

hazards environment. Striking the right balance between addressing existing gaps 1059

and requirements while also integrating new technologies is a significant 1060

challenge facing public safety organizations across all levels of government. 1061

To that end, the NECP sets forth six strategic goals to advance the capabilities needed for operational success 1062

in an increasingly dynamic and interconnected environment. The NECP establishes a series of targeted 1063

objectives that address each goal and collectively emphasize the maintenance and improvement of radio 1064

communications systems, integration of emerging IP-based technologies, and improved coordination among 1065

an expanding emergency response community. It also identifies success indicators as aspirations for 1066

stakeholders to achieve within their communities. For example, stakeholders will use the NECP to enhance 1067

and update the policies, governance structures, planning, and protocols that enable responders to 1068

communicate and share information under all circumstances. Ultimately, the intent of the NECP is to ensure 1069

the emergency response community drives toward a commonly defined end-state for communications. 1070

Moving forward, emergency response agencies will be making critical decisions regarding resources, 1071

personnel, and equipment to address the evolving operating environment. The guidance provided in this plan 1072

will help to advance their efforts. However, success of the NECP will require the support and dedication of 1073

the entire emergency communications community, including government agencies, nongovernmental 1074

organizations, and citizens. In order to realize the NECP’s vision, DHS will work diligently so our Nation’s 1075

emergency responders and supporting entities can fulfill their mission needs in a seamless and fully 1076

interoperable, next generation Emergency Communications Ecosystem. 1077

43

Annex I: Success Indicator Descriptions 1078

Goal 1 - Governance and leadership: Develop and maintain effective emergency 1079

communications governance and leadership across the Ecosystem 1080

Objective 1.1: Formalize governance through policy, documentation, and adequate funding 1081


States and territories create or revise policy and plans to formalize and fund emergency communications 1083

governance bodies, such as SIGBs 1084

Formal governance structures, such as Statewide Interoperability Governing Bodies (SIGBs), Statewide 1085

Interoperability Executive Committees (SIECs), and Statewide 911 Boards, provide a foundation for public 1086

safety entities to collaborate, plan, and make decisions on strategies and operations that mutually support the 1087

investment, sustainment, and advancement of communications-related initiatives. Establishing statewide 1088

governance or revising the functions of existing bodies through statutes or Executive Orders formalizes the 1089

group’s authority to make funding recommendations supported through the state’s general funds or federal 1090

grant allocations. Without formal authority, ad hoc governance structures are vulnerable to disruption and loss 1091

of institutional knowledge as their participation relies on volunteered time. 1092

Governance bodies develop and implement governing documents, such as charters or bylaws, to clarify 1093

roles, purpose, authority, and methods for adapting to change 1094

A charter or bylaws document formally authorizes the existence of the governing body and provides a 1095

reference source for the future. Charters clarify governance operations, providing details on how to align the 1096

group’s vision to a long-term strategy and their responsibilities for making decisions and implementing change. 1097

Additionally, effective charters clarify each participating organization’s role, defines administrative duties, and 1098

outlines the organizational structure and voting processes for decision-making in the group. The charter’s value 1099

increases when buy-in is sought and granted by members of the governance body, encouraging commitment to 1100

the group’s purpose and decision-making strategies, and language remains flexible for adapting its 1101

membership, structures, and processes to the evolution of emergency communications. 1102

States and territories provide funding, authority, and governance to support a full-time Statewide 1103

Interoperability Coordinators (SWIC) in each state or territory, such as the development of legislative 1104

language and mandates 1105

The SWIC’s primary function is to plan and implement the statewide interoperability program, guided by 1106

initiatives outlined in the NECP and the Statewide Communication Interoperability Plan (SCIP). As such, 1107

SWICs act as linchpins establishing and maintaining emergency communications governance and planning 1108

across each state or territory by bringing together stakeholders from a broad spectrum of public safety 1109

communications systems and services. As part of this effort, SWICs are responsible for the implementation of 1110

the SCIP, which establishes a vision for interoperability across the state. SWICs also execute the grant 1111

application process, coordinating decisions on communications investments funded through federal grants to 1112

ensure projects align with the SCIPs and are compatible with surrounding systems. 1113

1114

44

State and territory governance bodies prioritize communications needs and coordinate with the SWIC and 1115

other state-level planners on applications for federal financial assistance 1116

In accordance with the FY 2018 SAFECOM Guidance on Emergency Communications Grants, states and 1117

territories are encouraged to coordinate the SWIC and state-level planners (e.g., broadband and 911 planners, 1118

utilities commissions), as well as the State Administrative Agency (SAA), to ensure projects and investments 1119

align with statewide plans and technical compliance requirements. The SAA, or an equivalent role, administers 1120

all homeland security and emergency communications grant funding for the state and is a principal figure for 1121

ensuring regional project plans are developed and implemented in coordination with contiguous jurisdictions, 1122

mutual aid partners, and other relevant partner organizations, jurisdictions, and sectors. The SAA, in 1123

coordination with the SWIC, is also a good resource for assisting with the State Preparedness Report, regional 1124

and state strategic plans, and project alignment at the local level with the state’s long-term vision for 1125

interoperability. For instance, the SWIC may escalate policy and grant recommendations to the SAA for 1126

consideration by the Governor’s Office. 1127

Federal departments or agencies establish a federal interoperability office or designate a Federal 1128

Interoperability Coordinator 1129

Emergency communications responsibilities at the federal level are often scattered across bureaus, 1130

components, offices, and programs. Few departments or agencies have governance mechanisms to implement 1131

interoperability policies, decisions, and processes. A designated emergency communications interoperability 1132

office, coordinator, or committee improves information sharing activities, better informs decision-making, and 1133

provides a single point of coordination on interoperability issues for all partner agencies. This central authority 1134

leads initiatives across federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial partner agencies. 1135

Objective 1.2: Structure more inclusive governance by expanding membership composition 1136


Governance bodies identify and include missing or underrepresented partners (i.e., jurisdictions, tribes, 1138

sectors, organizations) in formal governance structures, when developing strategic and operational plans 1139

and policies, and during training and exercises 1140

Governance is only successful if those affected by emergency communications disruptions are involved in 1141

decision-making processes to prevent them. However, governance in many areas still only involves traditional 1142

disciplines or sectors and excludes those responsible for secondary or tertiary systems or response functions. 1143

Non-traditional organizations responsible for public safety, emergency communications, or emergency services 1144

responding to area-specific hazards (e.g., Forestry Services in rural California, terrorism task forces in large 1145

urban centers) bring unique perspectives and challenges on interoperability. Increased collaboration with a 1146

wider variety of organizations results in reciprocal benefits, such as a larger inventory of available resources 1147

and knowledge between rural and urban communities. Successful coordination requires planning discussions 1148

across these entities through governance and the involvement of potentially under-represented organizations or 1149

sectors when developing strategic, operational, and contingency plans. For instance, public safety agencies 1150

from state/territorial, local, and regional governments and governance bodies benefit from strengthening 1151

relationships and establishing formal mechanisms for achieving interoperability with tribes. Such formal 1152

mechanisms could include establishing legislation for tribal representation on working groups and committees 1153

or memoranda of understanding or agreement (MOUs/MOAs) to define how information, resources, and 1154

infrastructure may be shared. Involvement of tribal points of contact is necessary since tribes may also provide 1155

critical infrastructure support to surrounding jurisdictions or benefit directly from state/territorial, local, and 1156

regional infrastructure and emergency response capabilities. 1157

45

Governance bodies include information management, network infrastructure, and cybersecurity 1158

representatives through membership or formalized coordination 1159

Because of the increasing complexity of interconnected, Internet Protocol (IP)-based technologies and their 1160

integration into emergency communications systems, governance bodies and subgroups benefit from 1161

developing and implementing strategies, policies, and plans to assess, manage, and oversee the progression of 1162

risks and information management in the long term. Inviting information technology (IT) officers, such as the 1163

Chief Information Officer (CIO), to participate in emergency communications governance bodies increases IT 1164

services and public safety community end-user coordination. Additionally, establishing subcommittees related 1165

to new technologies, threats, and issues provides subject matter expertise when coordinating the integration of 1166

IP-based and advanced technologies. 1167

Governance bodies coordinate with elected officials to champion public safety communications priorities 1168

and lifecycle planning among decision makers 1169

Whether it be the elected official or a representative from his or her office, representation from these offices on 1170

formal public safety communications governance bodies allows those making fiscal and policy decisions to 1171

better understand priorities, take informed action, and advocate for resources. Formal collaboration provides 1172

elected officials and other decision makers greater access to and understanding of strategic plans and short- and 1173

long-term priorities, as well as the ability to contribute to the formation of solutions, and necessary support, for 1174

key priorities and challenges at state, local, tribal, and territorial levels. This approach emphasizes the need for 1175

direct discourse between public safety organizations and those forming policy to determine a tangible path 1176

toward interoperability resilience. 1177

Objective 1.3: Adopt adaptive governance strategies to address the rapid evolution of 1178

technologies, capabilities, and risks 1179


Governance bodies undertake technology integration & migration initiatives (e.g., broadband, 911, alerts 1181

and warnings, information management, network infrastructure, cybersecurity) to guide implementation by 1182

public safety 1183

As communications technologies converge, experts who oversee land mobile radio (LMR), broadband/long-1184

term evolution (LTE), 911/Next Generation 911 (NG911), alerts and warnings, IT and security, social media, 1185

and other systems and services, work in tandem to strengthen emergency communications capabilities. Due to 1186

the overlapping nature of their positions, clarifying individual roles, as well as dependencies and collaborative 1187

functions, is key to avoid duplication of efforts and ensure consistent and coordinated deployment of 1188

technologies across existing systems. This approach ensures individual system plans (e.g., statewide 911 plan, 1189

statewide cybersecurity strategy) align with the SCIP and overall strategies for achieving interoperability. 1190

Governance bodies identify and address legislative and regulatory issues associated with emerging 1191

technology 1192

Implementation of new and emerging technology requires awareness and compliance with certain legislative 1193

and regulatory constraints surrounding public safety. For example, the First Responder Network Authority 1194

(FirstNet) is required by statute to develop a national deployment plan for its Radio Access Network. However, 1195

it is important that governing bodies be aware of their own state’s legislature that either limits or enables 1196

implementation of the network and its technology. Periodic reviews of federal, state and local regulations 1197

affecting public safety and emergency communications technology inform governing bodies and public safety 1198

organizations of funding opportunities, as well as any possible restrictions in securing emerging technology. 1199

1200

46

Organizations supporting public safety communications formalize and regularly review cross-jurisdictional, 1201

multi-state, or multi-organizational agreements (e.g., MOUs, MOAs, mutual aid agreements [MAAs]) to 1202

account for changes to resources, capabilities, and information or technology sharing needs 1203

MOUs, MOAs, or MAAs minimize risks for the communities they serve by supplementing informal 1204

relationships between agencies, which are often limited in scope and duration. However, few public safety 1205

organizations work with their partner agencies to review and update emergency communications agreements 1206

on a regular basis. Written agreements, backed by formal governance, bring together multiple organizations 1207

and jurisdictions to establish common goals and objectives toward achieving operable and interoperable public 1208

safety communications. An MOU or MOA may also define party responsibilities for a shared system, provide 1209

its scope and authority, outline compliance issues, and even streamline processes for grant fund application or 1210

award. These agreements are most effective when reviewed regularly to account for changes to resources, 1211

capabilities, and information or technology sharing needs. 1212

The Emergency Communications Preparedness Center (ECPC) serves as a decision-making body guiding 1213

lessons learned, best practices, and partnerships for federal organizations implementing new capabilities 1214

Federal agencies with law enforcement and emergency response missions face ongoing challenges related to 1215

the integration of new capabilities into their operations. The ECPC plays a valuable role assisting agencies to 1216

navigate challenges and realize opportunities associated with transitions to new capabilities. Public safety 1217

organizations follow the ECPC to learn more about how to more effectively share information on pilot 1218

programs and lessons learned, coordinate investments and acquisition strategies, and share systems, where 1219

possible. 1220

Goal 2 - Planning and Procedures: Develop and update comprehensive 1221

emergency communications plans and procedures that address the evolution of risks, 1222

capabilities, and technologies across the Ecosystem 1223

Objective 2.1: Develop and regularly-update strategic plans to align with the NECP and 1224

address the integration of new emergency communications capabilities (i.e., voice, video, and 1225

data) 1226


Public safety organizations use strategic implementation plans (e.g., SCIPs, Regional Interoperability 1228

Communications Plans, NG911 Plans, Cybersecurity Plans) to measure progress against NECP objectives 1229

and any additional state or territory objectives, and update plans annually 1230

The SCIP is the primary strategic implementation plan for each state and territory, defining critical emergency 1231

communications capabilities and needs. The SCIP outlines recommendations from the public safety 1232

community on how to improve voice, video, and data communications across the state/territory through the 1233

development of vision and mission statements, milestones or activities to achieve specific goals, and a 1234

governance structure with specific roles and responsibilities assigned to those executing tasks in the plan. 1235

States and territories work with the SWIC to ensure investments support, and do not contradict, statewide 1236

plans, and align with the NECP goals and objectives. Since many federal emergency communications grants 1237

require recipients to align their projects to the SCIP and SCIP Annual Snapshot, public safety agencies benefit 1238

by contributing to the development or revision of SCIP content as it pertains to priorities across communities. 1239

An overarching statewide/territory-wide emergency communications plan helps states/territories align the 1240

efforts or its stakeholders and focus resources toward activities and investments that will have the broadest and 1241

most profound impacts. 1242

1243

47

Federal agencies or departments develop emergency communications strategic plans in coordination with 1244

the ECPC 1245

Given the rapidly evolving emergency communications and IT environment, it is critical federal departments 1246

and agencies plan for new investments, maintain and modernize legacy systems, and identify personnel and 1247

training needs to meet new challenges. Strategic plans and roadmaps enable an organization to document its 1248

vision for the benefit of staff and partner agencies, prioritize communications resources, strengthen governance 1249

structures, identify future communications investments, and resolve long-standing interoperability issues. 1250

While these plans often look different from agency to agency, the ECPC works with federal personnel to 1251

ensure they have the tools needed to develop, coordinate, and share strategic plans across the interagency 1252

community to identify opportunities for cooperation. 1253

Objective 2.2: Align emergency communications funding and investments with strategic and 1254

lifecycle planning 1255


Federal funding authorities develop federal grant guidance for emergency communications governance and 1257

investments consistent with guidelines provided by SAFECOM and the NECP 1258

Emergency communications guidelines, such as the NECP and SAFECOM Guidance on Emergency 1259

Communications Grants, are regularly updated to align with the newest emergency technologies and 1260

capabilities. In response, federal grant-making agencies, supporting emergency communications activities as 1261

an allowable cost, are encouraged to consistently update their federal grant guidance to accommodate these 1262

changes. Communicating and allowing grant applicants and recipients to fund the latest advancements in 1263

emergency communications technologies provide entities with the most up-to-date information to make sound, 1264

sustainable, and long-term investments in interoperability. 1265

Public safety organizations develop and use lifecycle plans to inform agency funding decisions and 1266

implement new technologies while maintaining necessary legacy and back-up systems 1267

Successful lifecycle plans take each phase of SAFECOM and NCSWIC’s lifecycle planning model into 1268

account and include input from project planners, decision-makers, and other stakeholder as necessary. The plan 1269

also consolidates assessments performed to determine need for equipment or system sustainment and upgrade, 1270

dividing a large communications initiative into smaller projects for funding and implementation in phases over 1271

time. Due to the potential longevity of these plans, content should be reviewed and updated regularly to reflect 1272

changes in project status for planning purposes. Project planners developing implementation portions of the 1273

lifecycle plan, including dates, milestones, roles and responsibilities, should refine content before and after the 1274

request for proposals process to ensure they are accurate and achievable. The DHS Lifecycle Planning Tool is 1275

available to help organizations structure and build major sections of their plan. 1276

Public safety organizations and governing bodies identify sustainable funding mechanisms to support the 1277

lifecycle planning model 1278

Public safety organizations use a variety of funding mechanisms and resources in their efforts to prioritize 1279

system sustainment and upgrade. As detailed in the 2018 SAFECOM and NCSWIC Funding Mechanisms for 1280

Public Safety Communications Systems, examples of alternatives to grant funds include bonds, public-private 1281

partnerships, user fees, 911 surcharges, traffic ticket and vehicle surcharges, leasing equipment and 1282

infrastructure from public and private entities, grants, and other unique streams. The Emergency 1283

Communications System Lifecycle Planning Guide also describes the lifecycle planning model and provides 1284

strategies for funding system purchase, maintenance, and upgrade. 1285

1286

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Sample%20Life%20Cycle%20Plan_508_032017_0.pdf



48

Objective 2.3: Incorporate risk management strategies to protect against and mitigate 1287

disruptions to mission critical communications 1288


Local public safety organizations work with state agencies to evaluate emergency communications threats, 1290

hazards, and needs in formal capability reporting mechanisms (e.g. THIRA, SPR) 1291

The DHS Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and Stakeholder Preparedness 1292

Review (SPR) are helpful when conducting state-level, emergency communications capability evaluations. All 1293

types of communities participate in these interconnected processes to evaluate community preparedness. Local 1294

and state decisions makers and SWICs should apply information within these assessments to direct funding and 1295

sustainment resources to new and legacy emergency communications systems. 1296

Public safety organizations incorporate risk management strategies into plans for continuity and recovery of 1297

critical communications 1298

Determining and testing strategies to increase the resiliency of public safety networks and the personnel who 1299

run them help to prevent catastrophic loss of critical communications to end-users during emergencies or 1300

disasters. Despite its importance, however, less than half of public safety organizations build processes into 1301

their plans to ensure continuity during out-of-the-ordinary emergencies or disasters. Continuity portions of 1302

plans identify minimum communications requirements to perform essential functions and alternate equipment 1303

and systems, staff and their responsibilities, and facilities or base locations. From a purely network resiliency 1304

perspective, three key elements to consider when planning include route diversity, or routing between two 1305

points over one geographic or physical path with no common points; redundancy, when additional or duplicate 1306

communications assets share the load or provide back-up to the primary asset; and protective and restorative 1307

measures to decrease the likelihood a threat will affect a network and the latter which enables rapid 1308

reestablishment of services if disabled or destroyed, such as through OEC’s Telecommunications Service 1309

Priority (TSP). Additionally, continuity of operations plans may provide details on pre-operational and 1310

operational procedures to protect assets, secure information, and backup systems; recovery procedures, 1311

including identification of alternative communications systems available but not used during day-to-day 1312

operations (e.g., satellite); details on communications response and recovery teams; cross-training 1313

opportunities to address potential personnel shortages; communications unit leader training; emergency and 1314

service provider contact lists; and procedures for accessing priority services programs (i.e., TSP, Government 1315

Emergency Telecommunications Service, Wireless Priority Service). 1316

Public safety organizations that use information technology have a cybersecurity incident response plan in 1317

place 1318

Incident Response Teams (IRTs), incident response plans, recovery or resiliency plans, and continuity of 1319

operations plans are useful in cybersecurity incident response. IT administrators may consider establishing a 1320

Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) or reach an agreement with the U.S. Computer 1321

Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) US-CERT, run by DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications 1322

Integration Center (NCCIC), to assist in cybersecurity planning. A CSIRT serves as a centralized authority to 1323

report and analyze security issues within an organization. A CSIRT may also recommend potential solutions to 1324

the threats and publicize known threats, vulnerabilities, and solutions generally or to a specific information-1325

sharing community. The CSIRT works with hardware and software vendors to obtain information about 1326

vulnerabilities and potential solutions. Additionally, coordinating response and recovery efforts with the SWIC 1327

and other IT administrators can increase cybersecurity posture. 1328

Public safety organizations perform resiliency assessments and mitigate vulnerabilities 1329

According to the 2018 Nationwide Communications Baseline Assessment, poor coverage and 1330

system/equipment failure were some of the most common technical factors impacting public safety’s ability to 1331

communicate. Communications continuity is a network’s ability to withstand physical and cyber damage, 1332

49

thereby minimizing the likelihood of a service outage. Three key elements ensure continuity: route diversity, 1333

redundancy, and protective/restorative measures. Performing physical and cyber resiliency assessments can 1334

assist an organization in ensuring continuity of service in the event of an emergency, justifying network 1335

operations and improvement funding requests, increasing organizational control, and prioritizing areas for 1336

network improvement. More information can be found in the Public Safety Network Communications 1337

Resiliency Self-Assessment Guidebook and Public Safety Communications Resiliency: Resiliency Ten Keys to 1338

Obtaining a Resilient Local Access Network. In addition, radio frequency (RF) best practice implementation 1339

plays a critical role throughout the life cycle of a system. RF coverage testing and analysis should be used to 1340

define and refine system coverage requirements, supplement baseline coverage studies, provide supplemental 1341

information related to Coverage Acceptance Testing, provide in-building coverage measurement including 1342

assistance in locating interfering signals, and assist with system optimization as well as ongoing maintenance. 1343

RF interference must also be considered. The SAFECOM/NCSWIC RF Interference Guidebook describes how 1344

RFI can disrupt a variety of mission critical public safety communications (e.g., GPS, cellular/broadband data 1345

communications, unmanned aerial vehicle [UAV] or drone communications, voice over radio communications) 1346

and how to identify, respond to, resolve, and become more resilient to the impacts of RF interference. 1347

Resiliency assessments should account for the entire system lifecycle, including testing and maintenance. 1348

Goal 3 – Training, Exercises, and Evaluations: Develop and deliver training, 1349

exercise, and evaluation programs that target gaps in all available emergency 1350

communications technologies 1351

Objective 3.1: Update and implement training and exercise programs to address gaps in 1352

emergency communications 1353


Public safety organizations develop or update training and exercise programs to address new technologies, 1355

data interoperability, cybersecurity, use of federal and national interoperability channels, and continuity of 1356

communications 1357

The development of standardized communications-focused objectives and evaluation criteria for training and 1358

exercise programs require thorough understanding of existing gaps across levels of government. The 2018 1359

Nationwide Communications Baseline Assessment identified several issues that should be included in training 1360

and exercise programs, such as integrating existing systems with IP-based technologies and services; 1361

establishing processes for data management and exchange; addressing cybersecurity and other risks; increasing 1362

proficiency in end-users ability to program and use federal and national interoperability channels; and 1363

maintaining mission critical communications during disruptions in operations. Updated training and exercise 1364

programs addressing these topics improve the public safety community’s ability to increase capacity and build 1365

on existing capabilities. 1366

Public safety organizations offer training classes and exercises across multiple agencies & jurisdictions 1367

whenever possible 1368

Training and exercise programs help identify and mitigate communications challenges, but only if these 1369

programs tackle interoperability across the emergency communications ecosystem. Comprehensive programs 1370

address technology, process, and human factors related to interoperability; not only an agency’s or 1371

entity’s systems but those of partners, with a focus on where those systems intersect. The capability gaps 1372

and interoperability challenges faced by the ecosystem can be incorporated into objectives, injects, and 1373

scenarios. Where possible, partners from across the entire ecosystem should be invited to attend as participants, 1374

staff, or observers. Serving as evaluation staff is a good way for partners to enhance each other’s 1375

programs. . Reliability of evaluations increases when third parties observe, document, and report on 1376

outcomes. In return, evaluators are introduced to new processes, technologies, and best practices that they 1377

can take back to their home jurisdiction, region, or Tribe. 1378

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Public safety organizations coordinate training and technical assistance across the Government (as 1379

applicable) to ensure current and consistent information 1380

The OEC Regional Coordination and Technical Assistance Programs work with the public safety community 1381

to ensure training and technical assistance remain viable and current. SWICs have an understanding of training 1382

and technical assistance requirements within states and territories. SWICs also assist local, tribal, and 1383

individual organizations to participate in training and technical assistance opportunities. Where training 1384

requirements cannot be fulfilled with in-state resources, SWICs coordinate and identify training resources with 1385

the state training authority (e.g., the State Training Officer). Participation in regional and nationwide public 1386

safety groups and associations allows emergency communicators to ensure their organizations have current 1387

information regarding trainings and technical assistance offerings. 1388

Public safety organizations include injects in exercises to test communications system and personnel 1389

(including emerging technology and system failure) and utilize third-party evaluators with communications 1390

expertise 1391

The public safety community reported the need for third-party or peer evaluators during exercises. Self-1392

evaluations may be influenced by bias resulting in non-credible or false performance data. Given the proper 1393

tools, such as quality exercise evaluation guides (EEGs), any facilitator can accurately observe, appraise, and 1394

document the performance of tasks and activities that compose a capability. At the same time, independent 1395

third-party evaluators, with no connection to the players or their agencies, offer an additional level of objective 1396

evaluation. Partnering agencies that support each other with trainers, exercise controllers, and evaluators 1397

benefit from these cross-agency interactions; leading to improved trainings, exercises, and capabilities on all 1398

sides. Written agreements as to who shoulders costs related to these shared resources are beneficial to support 1399

continued use of third party evaluators, controller, and trainers. 1400

Public safety organizations integrate private sector, non-government organization (NGO), and public- 1401

sector communications stakeholders into training and exercises 1402

Training with organizations from a broader range of disciplines and levels of government enhances 1403

interoperability, and by extension, preparation for events that involve numerous agencies. Currently, only 7 1404

percent of public safety organizations report training with NGOs and private-sector entities. In contrast, 23 1405

percent report not training with any other types of organizations, with the rest of organizations falling 1406

somewhere in between these extremes. NGOs and private sector entities operate critical infrastructure that 1407

provides or supports emergency communications including operations centers, towers, generators, repeaters, 1408

and vehicles. Many NGOs and private sector entities also maintain communications capabilities for day-to-day 1409

safety and security operations, as well as responses to out-of-the-ordinary events. In some cases, NGOs such as 1410

the American Red Cross, engage in day-to-day incident response that necessitates employing emergency 1411

communications technologies. Similarly, other supporting entities such as health and transportation agencies, 1412

routinely use voice and data capabilities to dispatch and communicate with personnel in the field. These 1413

entities may need to interoperate with public safety organizations during out-of-the-ordinary events to 1414

coordinate the deployment of resources and ensure their safety. Effective coordination among public safety 1415

organizations, NGOs, private sector, and supporting entities require resource sharing agreements and benefit 1416

from participation in joint training, exercises, and planned events, such as parades and communications rallies. 1417

The ECPC analyzes gaps and identifies opportunities for federal interagency training and exercise 1418

programs 1419

Due to the Federal Government’s involvement in large-scale emergency preparedness and response, federal 1420

agencies manage, offer, and participate in an array of training and exercise programs aimed at improving the 1421

operability, interoperability, continuity, and security of communications capabilities. The ECPC is well-1422

positioned to analyze mutual capability gaps, develop common objectives, identify opportunities for joint 1423

trainings and exercises, and centrally track interagency progress. 1424

51

Objective 3.2: Incorporate human factors in training and exercises to address the demands 1425

that voice, data, and video information place on personnel 1426


Public safety organizations implementing NG911 utilize training and tools to address the impact of incident 1428

images/videos on dispatcher 1429

New technologies bring responders not on-scene even closer to the impacts of a threat or hazard through 1430

photos, videos, and live streaming as events unfold. Public safety agencies will benefit from incorporating 1431

modules demonstrating techniques to combat “compassion fatigue” or “vicarious trauma” into trainings and 1432

building opportunities to practice those methods into exercises. Trainings and tools to develop “emotional 1433

intelligence” and peer support mechanisms can be added to programs. In many cases, introduction to these 1434

concepts can be delivered through internet-based learning applications that apply distance learning techniques 1435

and can be viewed at the convenience of the responder. Effective tools and trainings address these mental 1436

health issues before exposure and following traumatic events. 1437

Public safety organizations implementing mobile data applications utilize training and tools to ensure that 1438

responders effectively use and are not overloaded by available information 1439

New technologies being integrated into public safety communications are changing the nature of the jobs 1440

performed both in the field and at facilities such as PSAPs and EOCs. Information flow, volume, and sources 1441

of data are all evolving, so training programs need to address the use of new technologies and the impact of 1442

change on responders and the work they do. For example, video messaging changes the interaction of a 1443

dispatcher with a caller from a voice interaction to a face-to-face interaction. Physical reactions of the 1444

dispatcher such as facial expressions are no longer hidden from the distressed caller, necessitating a new set of 1445

skills and coping mechanisms for the dispatcher. In the field, body-worn cameras are another change for 1446

responders where training is necessary. Administratively, the changes that come with new technologies may 1447

require trainings for new approaches to screening and interviewing new applicants and during performance 1448

reviews. To ensure effective use of all available technologies when a responder is under the most stress, 1449

progressive training and exercise programs can be designed to build from previous lessons, adding new 1450

objectives along the way. Progressive training and exercises not only build upon each other, they also increase 1451

repetition of use to develop “muscle memory,” leading to the likelihood of available technologies being used 1452

appropriately and effectively during all events and incidents. 1453

Objective 3.3: Ensure that NIMS training addresses information sharing (i.e., voice, video, 1454

data) for multi-agency responses 1455


States, territories, and tribal nations implement programs (based on best practices) to oversee the 1457

qualification, training, certification, recognition, activation, and currency of communications support 1458

personnel 1459

A designated point of authority to oversee the qualification, training, certification, recognition, activation, and 1460

currency of ESF-2 and Communications Unit personnel, greatly improves the awareness, use, and tracking of 1461

trained personnel for response operations. Managing the tracking aspects of qualification, training, 1462

certification, recognition, and activation of communications support personnel is frequently overlooked. When 1463

training programs lack a proper tracking system for ensuring compliance of personnel, it creates confusion 1464

about overall readiness status, i.e., which personnel are active and ready for deployment. 1465

52

States, territories, and tribal nations develop and support instructor cadres to expand training for 1466

communications support personnel 1467

During emergencies and planned events, ESF-2 and communications support personnel are typically required. 1468

In order to meet demand, there needs to be adequate training available to allow new personnel to be trained and 1469

for existing personnel to renew their qualifications, certifications, and credentialing. Increased support for 1470

communications instructor cadres will ensure communications support programs have a sufficient number of 1471

accredited personnel at all times. 1472

SAFECOM and the NCSWIC develop training curriculums for additional positions within the Information 1473

Technology Service Unit 1474

Incident AARs regularly document communications and information management challenges. Additionally, 1475

providing data connectivity at most incidents is common place; however, there is no specific person or place 1476

within ICS responsible for providing such personnel or resources. To simultaneously establish positive radio 1477

communications and network connectivity to manage the demand for digital information in multiple forms, 1478

new positions and requisite curriculums are needed to support communications during all-hazards planned 1479

events and unplanned incidents. 1480

Goal 4 – Communications Coordination: Improve effective coordination of 1481

available operable and interoperable public safety communications capabilities for 1482

incidents and planned events 1483

Objective 4.1: Confirm the implementation and active use of the NIMS doctrine 1484


Public safety organizations possess primary, secondary, and backup communications capabilities aligned 1486

with NIMS and ICS and share appropriate forms (e.g., ICS 205) illustrating the status of an agency’s 1487

capabilities 1488

As public safety organizations maintain, implement, upgrade, or replace existing communications capabilities, 1489

those capabilities should reflect an alignment with NIMS and ICS doctrine to ensure available fielded 1490

capabilities are sufficient to support primary, secondary, and backup communications services required by 1491

planned events and incident responses. 1492

As the scope of a reported incident becomes known, the communications capabilities required to coordinate the 1493

incident activities, like all other response attributes must scale appropriately to meet the on-scene 1494

communications needs while preserving enough capability and capacity for normal operations within the 1495

incident jurisdiction. Public safety organizations and discipline specific communications requirements based 1496

upon the initial report of the incident type may alter established pre-plans and the normally or commonly used 1497

communications pathways. The evolving nature of a no-notice incident or damage to primary, secondary, or 1498

backup communications capabilities may alter the predetermined use of specific capabilities at an incident 1499

scene. As the initial units arrive, communications play a pivotal role in the confirmation and determination of 1500

the type of incident, its scope, and the requirements for additional public safety resources. Depending upon 1501

initial observations and determinations, coupled with additional incoming information to Public Safety 1502

Answering Points (PSAP) and Public Safety Communications Centers (PSCC), various communications 1503

resources may be pressed into service to support an evolving incident. Depending upon the incident size, 1504

scope, location, and evolution progress, the Incident Commander (IC) or Incident Management Team (IMT) 1505

should remain well-informed about the status of all available operable and interoperable communications 1506

capabilities, information that is easily obtained through sharing appropriate ICS form(s). 1507

53

Public safety organizations assess and improve the timeliness of notification, activation, and response of 1508

communications systems providers to support the IC and IMT requirements at incidents and planned events 1509

Public safety organizations’ incident response evolves through necessity to respond quicker with more 1510

appropriate resources to stabilize major incidents, remove threats, and provide expedient aid more effectively. 1511

Anecdotal trends indicate that public safety organizations, of all disciplines, are committing larger 1512

complements of resources during initial responses to reported critical incidents based upon better information 1513

gathering from various reporting sources. These heightened responses require more and better pre-planning 1514

with competent and experienced IC and IMT personnel supported by communications systems providers and 1515

augmented by coordinated, robust, flexible, and resilient voice and data communications capabilities to 1516

effectively address incidents and planned events of all types and sizes. Recognizing the importance of the 1517

inclusion of communications systems providers, public safety organizations and IC/IMT personnel must be 1518

cognizant and comfortable of the expected timelines to acquire support of communications systems providers. 1519

Equally important, the criteria for event planning is also evolving to ensure that public safety organizations 1520

effectively plan for contingencies where a planned event evolves into a critical incident. It is incumbent upon 1521

public safety organizations to ensure sufficient primary, secondary, and backup communications capabilities 1522

are available to scale quickly to effectively support and facilitate the transition of a planned event to a critical 1523

incident. 1524

As the complexity of communications systems increase due to the unrelenting pace of technological advances, 1525

it is incumbent upon public safety organizations to improve the inclusiveness of their communications systems 1526

providers to offer necessary technical assistance and advice to improve coordination and planning for planned 1527

events and incident response activities. Regardless whether public safety organizations’ communications 1528

systems providers are internal, external, or both, the expertise, knowledge, information, and access to 1529

additional communications resources can be the difference between a successful or failed incident response. 1530

The following are activities recommended to achieve this objective. 1531

Objective 4.2: Enhance coordination and effective usage of public safety communications 1532

resources at all levels of government 1533


Public safety organizations maintain and readily share comprehensive information about features, 1535

functionality, and capabilities of operable and interoperable communication resources 1536

The ability for public safety organizations at all levels of government and in every discipline to effectively 1537

communicate is crucial when delivering critical, lifesaving services. In order to coordinate various 1538

communications tools, knowing the availability and current state of all operable and interoperable assets is 1539

critical. At a minimum, all public safety organizations need to share current communications systems 1540

information with contiguous public safety agencies and other organizations who may provide or receive 1541

automatic aid, mutual aid, or share infrastructure or resources or participate in planned events. This sharing of 1542

active, available features, functionality, and capabilities of current communications capabilities can expedite 1543

communications coordination for both incidents and planned events. 1544

Public safety organizations use up-to-date defined practices, procedures, pre-plans, specific venue/location 1545

response plans, incident type response plans, SOPs, tactical response directives, and/or tactical 1546

interoperability communications plans (TICPs) that identify primary, secondary, and backup LMR assets, 1547

mobile data systems, devices, and relevant applications for effective communications coordination and 1548

information sharing during planned events and incidents 1549

Public safety organizations of various disciplines use a variety of practices, defined plans, and procedures to 1550

delineate voice and data communications capabilities available for incident and event communications 1551

coordination. These practices, plans, and procedures, and the accuracy and completeness of the information 1552

therein, can vary widely depending upon the involved agencies’ size, location, sophistication, and established 1553

54

cooperation with other contiguous or non-contiguous agencies. As the scope of an evolving incident increases 1554

or a planned event requires communications assets and personnel from greater distances, incident commanders 1555

and communications providers must continually assess the best communications capabilities to incorporate in 1556

the incident management plan(s) or planned event criteria. The doctrine can be essential in completing 1557

necessary ICS forms that effectively communicate the categories, types and availability of primary, secondary, 1558

and backup communication capabilities available. 1559

Public safety organizations periodically evaluate, engage, and incorporate commercial and non-traditional 1560

communications partners (e.g., auxiliary communications, volunteers, utilities) in incidents and planned 1561

events 1562

As an enhancement to communications coordination public safety organizations should evaluate existing 1563

communications policy, plans, agreements, and current systems and capabilities usage to determine appropriate 1564

inclusion of commercial and non-traditional communications partners and providers. Through this assessment, 1565

public safety organizations determine opportunities for improvements to communications coordination 1566

available through these entities. Moreover, these commercial and non-traditional partners and providers should 1567

be included in event and incident planning functions so that their resources are readily engaged when needed. 1568

Objective 4.3: Develop or update operational protocols and procedures to support 1569

interoperability across new technologies 1570


Public safety organizations develop and regularly-update NIMS-aligned SOPs to facilitate the integration, 1572

deployment, and use of communications assets 1573

As of 2018, a significant percentage of public safety agencies, nearly 25 percent, lacked SOPs on emergency 1574

communications, and very few of those focused on emergency communications topics. As noted in the 2018 1575

Nationwide Communications Baseline Assessment findings, few agencies have developed interoperability 1576

policies for emerging communications technologies—only 20 percent of SOPs cover NG911; 18 percent cover 1577

broadband; 18 percent cover priority services; and 16 percent cover cybersecurity. Clear and effective SOPs 1578

enable emergency communications personnel from across the Ecosystem to successfully coordinate for 1579

planned events and unplanned incidents. Additionally, SOPs with mission- or capability-specific roles require 1580

coordination across agencies to standardize procedures in the event of an incident requiring cross-jurisdictional 1581

response. 1582

NIMS includes communications tactical requirements and resources in the incident action plan (IAP). Incident 1583

Command System (ICS) Form 205 serves as the tool to ensure incident responders have the necessary 1584

resources, including equipment, frequencies, and other assets that may be in short supply during a large-scale 1585

event. While completing ICS Form 205 is important, sharing the IAP, which includes Form 205, is imperative 1586

to ensure communications are interoperable and resources align to objectives. When an event is planned or 1587

slow forming, agencies share IAPs ahead of time so that adjustments can be made in a timely manner. Even 1588

when operational periods are short and IAPs are produced quickly, planning personnel must work with 1589

Communications Unit personnel to ensure resources are distributed appropriately and all section chiefs ensure 1590

the IAP is shared with incident responders. Incident commanders and section chiefs promote the need for 1591

communications planning at the tactical level. 1592

Public safety organizations have recommended guidelines developed on the use of personal devices (e.g. , 1593

bring your own device [BYOD]) based on applicable laws and regulations 1594

The proliferation of personal mobile devices and implementation of network policies, such as BYOD, require 1595

strong authentication, data encryption and consistent policies and configuration guidance in order for 1596

organizations to remain secure and interoperable. Public safety organizations should create and enforce mobile 1597

device policies regarding accreditation, acquisition, provisioning, configuration, use of encryption, monitoring, 1598

control, service management, security management, expense management, customer care, retirement and reuse 1599

55

of mobile devices. In addition, public safety organizations should consider the use of mobile device 1600

management (MDM) solutions that address configuration management, software patches, audio/video 1601

permissions, device-level intrusion detection and prevention, and digital asset management systems, such as a 1602

“sandbox” or “virtual desktop”. Working with vendors to develop mission-related use cases and requirements 1603

to inform comprehensive MDM solutions can also improve implementation of these solutions. DHS’ Mobile 1604

Device Adoption Best Practices Guide provides introductory best practices when considering mobile device 1605

use, though organizational-level guidance should be in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 1606

Public safety organizations leverage training, exercises, and real-world events to test capabilities and update 1607

SOPs 1608

Real-world events, whether planned or unplanned, provide opportunities to translate SOPs from policy to 1609

practice and test their aptitude for establishing and maintaining communications during an emergency or 1610

disaster event. For instance, multi-organizational communications planning bodies benefit from developing 1611

documentation prior to planned events to capture the operationalization of emergency communications 1612

systems. These efforts include clarifying roles, sharing applications, developing channel plans, collecting and 1613

processing historical information and institutional knowledge, and establishing coordination processes for 1614

interoperable talkgroups and sharing assets. Processes developed to test the use of existing or new technologies 1615

may be exercised during scenarios, leading to SOP resolution prior to real events. Agencies develop after-1616

action reports (AARs) following events to assist with defining gaps or missing information resolved through 1617

the development or revision of SOPs. 1618

Public safety organizations periodically review the priority service programs (e.g., 1619

Telecommunications Service Priority, Government Emergency Telecommunications Service, and 1620

Wireless Priority Service) to which they subscribe and ensure they have SOPs governing the 1621

programs’ use, execution, and testing 1622

Telecommunications Service (GETS) provides emergency access and priority processing on the local and 1623

long-distance portions of the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). The Wireless Priority Service 1624

(WPS) gives Federal, State, local, and critical infrastructure personnel priority access calling on cellular 1625

networks for NS/EP purposes during times of high network congestion. The Telecommunications Service 1626

Priority (TSP) Program managed by Priority Telecommunications Service gives NS/EP users priority 1627

processing of their telecommunications service requests in the event of service disruption. 1628

Public safety organizations periodically test the proficiency of personnel in using communications systems’ 1629

features, functions, and capabilities 1630

Public safety organizations establish a repeatable process to periodically observe and record the proficiency of 1631

users of primary, secondary, and backup communications systems. This includes an end-user’s ability to 1632

properly access, navigate, manipulate, and use available features, functions, and capabilities of their 1633

communications devices and equipment. Observations that illustrate a lack of proficiency, established by set 1634

minimum standards, in the use of communications capabilities drive appropriate recommendations for 1635

modifications and expansion of user instructional documentation, informal and formal trainings, drills, 1636

exercises, and SOPs. 1637

Objective 4.4: Strengthen resilience and continuity of communications throughout operations 1638


Public safety organizations establish sufficient testing and usage observations of all operable and 1640

interoperable primary, secondary, and backup communications systems 1641

It is important for public safety organizations establish a repetitive periodic testing procedure for all operable 1642

and interoperable communications resources (e.g., primary, secondary, and backup) to confirm highest 1643

availability and readiness of those resources. For primary systems, usage observations in lieu of testing are 1644

56

sufficient to ensure the highest degree of availability. Processes to ensure proper notification procedures need 1645

to be established to alert communications systems providers for timely repair responses and end-users of any 1646

failures or unavailability of a communications feature, function, or capability. 1647

PSAPs, PSCCs, and Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) address systems and staffing to support 1648

communications continuity of operations planning 1649

As part of continuity of operations planning, PSAPs, PSCCs, and EOCs should address staffing requirements 1650

and technical resources to support their ability to maintain communications and functions during incidents. 1651

This includes succession as well as backup procedures for major systems, such as computer-aided dispatch, 1652

radio, and power supply. In addition, PSAPs, PSCCs, and EOCs continuity of operations planning should 1653

incorporate relevant capabilities and assets, such as the Telecommunicator Emergency Response Task Forces 1654

initiative. Telecommunicator Emergency Response Task Forces can help states develop programs to train 1655

teams that can be quickly mobilized and deployed to assist communications centers in the aftermath of 1656

disasters. These efforts can strengthen centers’ ability to maintain continuity as the public’s main point of 1657

contact during crises, while also serving as key coordinators of emergency management activities by 1658

dispatching information to responders. 1659

SAFECOM and the NCSWIC develop best practices to encourage active network sharing and 1660

regionalization of shared services 1661

SAFECOM and the NCSWIC’s Shared Systems Project focuses on creating the plans, processes, and 1662

structures to enhance LMR operability, interoperability, security, and continuity throughout the Nation. 1663

Benefits of network sharing include improved spectrum use, optimization of resources, positive environmental 1664

impacts, a decrease in duplicate investment, reduction of capital and operational expenditure, streamlined 1665

interagency operations, enhanced operational coordination, and economies of scale for subscriber units. 1666

Goal 5 – Technology and Infrastructure: Improve lifecycle management of the 1667

systems and equipment that enable emergency responders and public safety officials 1668

to share information efficiently and securely 1669

Objective 5.1: Support public safety requirements that drive research, development, testing, 1670

and evaluation of emergency communications technology 1671


SAFECOM and the NCSWIC identify public safety technology and infrastructure capability gaps 1673

Public safety communications benefit from a validated national perspective on capability gaps. SAFECOM and 1674

the NCSWIC identify capability gaps that impact the operability, interoperability, and security of public safety 1675

communications. SAFECOM and the NCSWIC provides the capability gaps to ECPC, which address how they 1676

can be met through existing technology, technological research and development, and/or marketplace 1677

innovation. SAFECOM and the NCSWIC will ensure capability gaps collected are also addressed through 1678

governance, standard operating procedures, training and exercise guidance and advancements. 1679

The ECPC coordinates federal research, development, testing, and evaluation priorities and processes 1680

With organizations often facing common technology challenges, the ECPC can help coordinate these activities 1681

by maintaining a database of research and development (R&D) projects on its Federal Emergency 1682

Communications R&D Portal, through conducting joint initiatives and assessments, and by driving multi-1683

agency participation in testing programs. ECPC coordinates with: 1684

Research centers and laboratories that develop and test new communications technologies. 1685

Organizations conducting R&D to address DHS Component requirements and that partner with other 1686

public safety organizations to extend this research to meet their needs. 1687

57

Programs that evaluate the reliability and effectiveness of commercially developed solutions for public 1688

safety use. 1689

A coordination point for research, development, testing, and evaluation efforts can prioritize activities that pose 1690

the greatest operational benefit to public safety, increase return on investment, and reduce time to market. 1691

The ECPC cultivates sustained engagement (e.g., conferences, summits, cooperative agreements) 1692

between federal research, development, testing and evaluation programs, such as DHS Science and 1693

Technology Directorate and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Public Safety 1694

Communications Research Division (PSCR), and public safety organizations focused on resiliency, 1695

interoperability, and other challenges 1696

With limited resources, local, state, territorial, and tribal organizations are often limited in their ability to 1697

develop new technologies. Through its laboratories and testing environments, the Federal Government plays a 1698

leading role in helping to research, develop, test, and evaluate communications technology for the entire public 1699

safety community. Engagement will include greater collaboration between ECPC Working Groups and the 1700

SAFECOM Technology Policy Committee to ensure that federal programs are meeting and reflecting a broad 1701

cross-section of stakeholder concerns. Also, ECPC will encourage federal programs to regularly engage 1702

through conferences, summits, pilot projects and cooperative agreements, such as that performed by 1703

organizations such as DHS Science and Technology Directorate and NIST PSCR. The ECPC may also have 1704

increased cross collaboration with PSCR on initiatives related to resiliency and capacity building to further 1705

identify critical communications technology gaps. Increased ECPC interaction with industry and stakeholders 1706

(e.g., communications and IT sector-specific councils and information sharing and analysis centers [ISAC], 1707

cross collaboration with SAFECOM) will help to identify key focus areas. Sustained engagement allows for 1708

strategic technology partnerships that meet public safety capability gaps for the entire community. 1709

The ECPC partners with the private sector to cultivate an open, innovative, and standards-based 1710

commercial marketplace for solutions development and ensure that public safety requirements are 1711

addressed in current and emerging standards 1712

While direct federal investment in research and development is important to technology development, private 1713

industry plays a critical role by innovating and developing systems, devices, and applications for the public 1714

safety market. Including private industry is essential to the success of any strategy for coordinating the 1715

direction of research and development into new capabilities, and public safety organizations have several 1716

opportunities to ensure that the commercial public safety communications market is open, transparent, and 1717

informed on the priorities of public safety customers. Federal testing facilities can provide a controlled 1718

environment for industry engineers and public safety representatives to evaluate the performance of their 1719

solutions against public safety standards. Compliance certification programs can provide industry with an 1720

opportunity to demonstrate the compliance of new devices and applications with critical technology standards 1721

for public safety voice, and data systems, and provide public safety agencies with transparent documentation 1722

that standards are fully supported before they engage with vendors. Federal agencies can help coordinate 1723

industry engagement by funding pilot programs for new commercial systems, devices, and applications that 1724

target the priorities of the public safety community and ensuring that the findings of those pilot programs are 1725

disseminated openly and transparently to public safety stakeholders. Federal departments and organizations 1726

and communications service providers can partner to ensure that priority service offerings keep pace with 1727

commercial deployment of IP networks, including 5G technologies. Public safety organizations can collaborate 1728

with standards development organizations to ensure requirements are incorporated into emerging 1729

technology―greatly reducing future costs and re-engineering challenges. 1730

58

Objective 5.2: Ensure communications and information sharing systems meet public safety’s 1731

mission critical needs 1732


SAFECOM and the NCSWIC communicate emerging technology impacts to public safety, such as those 1734

associated with identity management, multimedia, 5G, Internet of Things (IoT), social media, network 1735

virtualization, spectrum optimization, artificial intelligence, machine intelligence, geographic information 1736

systems, and positioning, navigation, and timing systems 1737

The results of research, development, testing, evaluation, standards development, and early adoption of 1738

emerging technology must be communicated to the broader public safety community in plain language. 1739

SAFECOM and the NCSWIC best practices and educational guidance allow the community to harness 1740

emerging technology benefits, while also preempting or mitigating the risks associated with wide-scale 1741

deployment. 1742

SAFECOM and the NCSWIC guide standards-based LMR evolution 1743

The Project 25 (P25) suite of standards for LMR support interoperability and communications continuity for 1744

the public safety community. SAFECOM and the NCSWIC continues to encourage organizations purchasing 1745

P25 communications equipment to use the resources made available by P25 Compliance Assessment Program 1746

and continue to support P25 standards development for interoperability. DHS, as the senior federal partner in 1747

the P25 standards development process and the chair of the P25 Steering Committee continues to help drive 1748

interoperability testing, the addition of enhanced security features, and support for future communications 1749

capabilities such as P25 to LTE interfaces. 1750

The FirstNet Authority innovates and integrates broadband technology into the Nation’s public safety 1751

communications infrastructure 1752

The FirstNet Authority has responsibility to ensure the successful deployment, operation, improvement, and 1753

financial sustainability of the nationwide broadband communications platform. The FirstNet Authority is also 1754

responsible for the advancement or enhancement of public safety communications through standards-based 1755

technology delivery, innovation and participation in standards-bodies related to emergency services and 1756

interoperability. 1757

To support this work, the FirstNet Authority engages with local, state, tribal, and federal public safety entities 1758

and works with national public safety associations that are members of the FirstNet Public Safety Advocacy 1759

Committee to understand their trends, drivers, and priorities. These public safety engagements allow the 1760

FirstNet Authority to remain current on needs and assist public safety entities in understanding how they can 1761

maximize the value they derive from FirstNet. FirstNet delivers specialized features to public safety such as 1762

priority access, preemption, end-to-end encryption, quality of service, more network capacity, and a resilient, 1763

hardened connection supported by dedicated infrastructure. 1764

The National 911 Program coordinates, in collaboration with all levels of government, the integration of 1765

NG911-identified best practices into the Nation’s public safety communications infrastructure 1766

The Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s 911 Program Office 1767

plays an active role in coordinating and contributing to 911 policy, standards, and technology development 1768

through its work with public safety organizations across the country. The office coordinates with the Federal 1769

Communications Commission (FCC), which promotes enhanced and NG911 through its role as a regulator 1770

(e.g., Task Force on Optimal PSAP Architecture) and administers the 911 Grant Program. It also provides 1771

strategic planning for collection and use of nationwide 911 data and guidance for interstate implementation of 1772

NG911. The National 911 Program Office and SAFECOM and the NCSWIC have partnered on the promotion 1773

of consistent terminology and assessment of NG9-1 maturity, as well as guidance on Cyber Risks to Next 1774

Generation 911 Systems. DoT also chairs the Next Generation 9-1-1- Working Group within the ECPC, which 1775

59

is working to complete a report which inventories federal PSAP and PSCC assets across the US. 1776

Objective 5.3: Support data interoperability through the development of effective and 1777

sustainable information sharing and data exchange standards, policies, and procedures 1778


Public safety organizations employ standards-based information exchange models and data sharing 1780

solutions 1781

To communicate seamlessly with the increasingly interconnected systems of the broader community, public 1782

safety organizations should use standards-based information exchange models, such as Organization for the 1783

Advancement of Structured Information Standards Emergency Data eXchange Language (EDXL), National 1784

Information Exchange Model (NIEM), Structured Threat Information eXpression/Trusted Automated 1785

eXchange of Indicator Information (STIX/TAXII), and Global Reference Architecture (GRA). Using these 1786

models can reduce the total cost of ownership of exchanging information among organizations, increase 1787

interoperability, improve grant-eligibility, and provide leverage community-wide for standards-compliant 1788

infrastructure. 1789

Public safety organizations follow acquisition best practices, including consideration for standards-based 1790

infrastructure 1791

Acquisition of standards-based infrastructure in a multi-vendor environment supported by compliance testing 1792

minimizes the risk of operability and interoperability challenges. Standards-based infrastructure also often 1793

supports a consistent set of security features, which can improve the security posture of the entire Ecosystem. 1794

After defining clear and concise requirements, public safety organizations use generic or non-proprietary 1795

language, as appropriate, when crafting acquisition documents and consider the need for standards-based, 1796

interoperable, secure infrastructure during solution selection. Additional acquisition practices can be found in 1797

the 2018 Emergency Communications System Lifecycle Planning Guide. 1798

SAFECOM and the NCSWIC publish best practices and updated guidance on standard operating 1799

procedures to assist the public safety community in meeting data storage, exchange, maintenance, and 1800

analysis challenges 1801

The standards, policies, and procedures for data sharing range from informal verbal agreements to formal 1802

written documentation to standardized interfaces enabled by technology. The guidelines are developed by 1803

organizations at various levels of government and by dedicated organizations specially formed to improve data 1804

sharing capabilities. As reported in the 2018 Nationwide Communications Baseline Assessment, many local 1805

and tribal public safety organizations follow local-level guidance to develop their SOPs. This indicates that 1806

most public safety organizations’ emergency communications at the local-level are influenced by their own set 1807

of standards, policies, and procedures. SAFECOM and the NCSWIC best practices on data lifecycle 1808

management will improve data usage, interoperability and security across the Ecosystem. 1809

Goal 6 – Cybersecurity: Strengthen the cybersecurity posture of the Emergency 1810

Communications Ecosystem 1811

Objective 6.1: Develop and maintain cybersecurity risk management 1812


Public safety organizations, at a minimum, implement the Cybersecurity Framework 1814

The NIST Cybersecurity Framework is a flexible, risk-based approach to improving the security of critical 1815

infrastructure. Collaboratively developed between government and the private sector, the framework is 1816

designed to complement an existing risk management process or to develop a credible program if one does not 1817

60

exist. Public safety cyber risk programs should be coordinated with existing and future DHS THIRA and SPR 1818

requirements. Ideally, organizations using the Framework and THIRA/SPR will be able to measure and assign 1819

values to their risk along with the cost and benefits of steps taken to reduce risk to acceptable levels. The better 1820

an organization can measure its risk, costs, and benefits of cybersecurity strategies and steps, the more rational, 1821

effective, and valuable its cybersecurity approach and investments will be. 1822

Public safety organizations use the Critical Infrastructure Cyber Community Voluntary Program (C³ 1823

Voluntary Program) 1824

The C³ Voluntary Program is a public-private partnership aligning business enterprises, as well as local, state, 1825

territorial, tribal, and federal governments in the Emergency Services Sector to existing resources to assist their 1826

efforts in using the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. The C³ Voluntary Program, and its implementation 1827

guidance, aims to simplify the process for all organizations in the Emergency Services Sector— regardless of 1828

their size, cybersecurity risk, or current level of cybersecurity sophistication—to apply the principles and best 1829

practices of risk management. Ultimately, the NIST Cybersecurity Framework and C³ Voluntary Program are 1830

focused on helping individual organizations reduce and better manage their cybersecurity risks, contributing to 1831

a more secure and resilient sector overall. 1832

Objective 6.2: Mitigate cybersecurity vulnerabilities 1833


SAFECOM and the NCSWIC share planning and mitigation guidance regarding known threats and 1835

vulnerabilities 1836

In addition to promoting US-CERT and other Information Sharing Environment notifications of public safety-1837

specific threats and attacks, SAFECOM and the NCSWIC guidance educates the community on known threats 1838

and their mitigations. For example, SAFECOM and the NCSWIC guidance regarding RF interference, or 1839

“jamming”: (1) educates and trains personnel to identify and respond appropriately to RF interference; (2) 1840

familiarizes organizations with how to report incidents of RF interference to the FCC and other appropriate 1841

authorities; and (3) helps legislators and regulators understand the value of enforcement legislation. Depending 1842

on the threat, guidance could also encourage risk mitigation through implementation of current network 1843

management techniques, such as virtual private networks, access control systems, firewalls, segmentation, or 1844

continuous monitoring systems, to decrease public safety network vulnerability, as well as identify areas for 1845

necessary R&D. 1846

Public safety organizations implement interoperable encryption, as needed 1847

Voice and data encryption are increasing in use throughout the public safety community. The decision to use 1848

encrypted interoperable communications must be made with the understanding that encryption can add a 1849

significant level of complexity and should be considered only when the operational requirements of the 1850

incident outweigh the additional complications. In addition, managing the associated encryption keys across 1851

their lifecycle can result in additional vulnerabilities and could possibly make important data inaccessible to 1852

authorized users1. Guidance on encryption and key management is available to the community, such as the 1853

Best Practices for Encryption in Project 25 Public Safety Land Mobile Radio Systems and Best Practices for 1854

Public Safety Interoperable Communications.2 1855

1 The use of voice encryption on designated interoperability and mutual aid channels can create obstacles to interoperability and is highly discouraged. In the

event encryption is deemed necessary due to unique operational needs, it must follow existing FCC regulations and comply with an approved regional

communications plan. 2 NPSTC’s Best Practices for Public Safety Interoperable Communications, Best Practice #11 - Managing Encryption for Interoperability Resources: The use of

voice encryption on designated interoperability and mutual aid channels can create obstacles to interoperability and is highly discouraged. In the event encryption

is deemed necessary due to unique operational needs, it must follow existing FCC regulations and comply with an approved regional communications plan.

NPSTC Report: Best Practices for Public Safety Interoperable Communications, May 2018.




http://npstc.org/download.jsp?tableId=37&column=217&id=4121&file=NPSTC_Radio_IO_Best_Practice_Overall_Combined_Report_180615.pdf

61

The ECPC refines the NG911 Emergency Communications Center (EC3) concept 1856

NG911 networks introduce new vectors for attack that can disrupt or disable operations. As such, the Federal 1857

Communications Commission’s Task Force on Optimal PSAP Architecture has recommended the 1858

implementation of EC3s.3,4 EC3s detect, analyze, and respond to cybersecurity incidents using a combination 1859

of technology solutions, security analysts, and a strong set of processes to serve any emergency communication 1860

services that would benefit from using centralized, core cybersecurity services. The EC3 cybersecurity layer 1861

for the NG911 architecture will play a vital part in the operation and maintenance of NG911. The ECPC will 1862

need to help refine fundamental attributes of EC3, including governance, funding, usage, operating procedures, 1863

technical capabilities, technical architecture, and interconnection requirements. The EC3 layer must provide 1864

defined value for PSAPs―compelling benefits to help them address cybersecurity and, potentially, the Big 1865

Data issues associated with acceptance of data-based communications, such as texts, photos, and videos. 1866

NIST evaluates equipment and protocol vulnerabilities that impact the public safety mission 1867

One of the most important aspects of cybersecurity for the evolving emergency communications environment 1868

is a comprehensive review of the standardized protocols and proprietary mechanisms connecting devices to 1869

and through the Internet. Not only will protocols and mechanisms need to be secure, but device manufacturers 1870

and system administrators will need to understand the importance of cybersecurity in an interconnected 1871

network environment, even when it impacts the simplicity and efficiency of their products. Evaluations may 1872

include supply and repair chain risk management, as well as deployment, operations and maintenance 1873

guidance. NIST should review protocol standards, as well as provide cybersecurity testing and certification 1874

activities, for the public safety community. 1875

Objective 6.3: Determine public safety-specific, standards-based cyber hygiene minimums 1876

and fund ongoing risk mitigation 1877


NIST establishes public safety-specific, standards-based cyber hygiene minimums for public safety 1879

Cybersecurity is not a static process to be completed once, but a continual process of enhancing defense. Some 1880

organizations will have less capacity than others to apply for and manage grants, and therefore NIST should 1881

work to develop a plan for setting, testing, and maintaining cyber minimum standards to assist cybersecurity-1882

eligible grant programs in distributing necessary funding to public safety stakeholders. According to the 2018 1883

Nationwide Communications Baseline Assessment results, 37 percent of respondents indicated that 1884

cybersecurity incidents have had an impact on the ability of their emergency response providers and 1885

government officials’ ability to communicate over the past five years. Yet, almost half of respondents had not 1886

instituted cybersecurity best practices, such as risk assessment, continuous monitoring, and identity 1887

management. In fact, only one in five respondents indicated having cybersecurity incident response plans, 1888

policies and capabilities. 1889

SAFECOM updates the Interoperability Continuum to account for cybersecurity 1890

To promote the importance of cybersecurity to operability and interoperability, cybersecurity should be 1891

included as a critical success element in the SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum. The Continuum assists 1892

emergency response organizations and policy makers to plan and implement interoperability solutions for data 1893

and voice communications. 1894

3 FCC Task Force on Optimal PSAP Architecture, Adopted Final Report. 29 Jan 2016,

https://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/911/TFOPA/TFOPA_FINALReport_012916.pdf 4 FCC Task Force on Optimal PSAP Architecture, Optimal Cybersecurity Approach for PSAPs, 2 December 2016,

https://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/911/TFOPA/TFOPA_WG1_Supplemental_Report-120216.pdf

https://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/911/TFOPA/TFOPA_FINALReport_012916.pdf

https://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/911/TFOPA/TFOPA_WG1_Supplemental_Report-120216.pdf

62

SAFECOM and the NCSWIC consolidate and publish information on available cybersecurity services and 1895

grant programs, such as those detailed in the DHS Cybersecurity Services Catalog and the Homeland 1896

Security Grant Program 1897

There are voluntary, non-binding, and no cost cybersecurity services available from the Federal Government to 1898

the SLTT community, as detailed in the DHS Cybersecurity Services Catalog for SLTT. In addition, public 1899

safety organizations may leverage Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) State Homeland Security 1900

Program (SHSP) and/or Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants for their cybersecurity risk management. 1901

The 911 Grant Program might also provide funds for cybersecurity solutions as part of broader operation of 1902

NG911 systems. 1903

National Risk Management Center provides a cost study of public safety cybersecurity risk management and 1904

evaluates the need for additional grant programs 1905

Eighty percent of state CIO’s surveyed in the 2016 National Association of State Chief Information Officers 1906

(NASCIO) study indicated lack of sufficient funding as their primary challenge in cybersecurity, and according 1907

to the 2018 Nationwide Communications Baseline Assessment, most organizations (81–84 percent) have no 1908

funding or insufficient funding for cybersecurity. Targeted grant programs may be necessary to enable public 1909

safety organizations’ investment in cybersecurity, including foundational security architecture, advanced 1910

protective tools, and experienced technical professionals to manage them. 1911

NIST provides incentives for cybersecurity-specific R&D activities based on known threats 1912

Government and academic research facilities identify and develop new technologies that address public safety 1913

mission critical cybersecurity requirements that are not currently offered by commercial solutions. PSCR 1914

incentives may include grant programs, pilot programs, hackathons, or other activities. PSCR may collaborate 1915

with SAFECOM and the NCSWIC, the National Public Safety Telecommunications Council, and the FirstNet 1916

Authority to identify and develop cybersecurity requirements. Additional collaboration with US-CERT, 1917

NCCIC, and others will help PSCR to collect and prioritize known cyber threats for research and development. 1918

https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/c3vp/sltt/SLTT_Hands_On_Support.pdf

https://www.911.gov/project_911grantprogram.html

63

Appendix 1. Requirements Matrix 1919

1920 Table A1-1. 6 U.S.C. § 572 Requirements Cross-referenced with 2019 NECP

Content

2019 NECP Section 6 U.S.C. § 572 Requirement Filled

Section 1.0 - Introduction

6 U.S.C. § 572(a)-(b)

6 U.S.C. § 572(c)(7)

6 U.S.C. § 572(c)(10)

Section 2.0 – Emergency

Communications Ecosystem

6 U.S.C. § 572(b)(1)-(2)

6 U.S.C. § 572(c)(3)

6 U.S.C. § 572(c)(5)

Section 3.0 – NECP Strategic Goals 6 U.S.C. § 572(c)

Goal 1

6 U.S.C. § 572(b)

6 U.S.C. § 572(c)(5)-(7)

6 U.S.C. § 572(c)(9)

Goal 2

6 U.S.C. § 572(c)(1)

6 U.S.C. § 572(c)(4)

6 U.S.C. § 572(c)(7)

Goal 3

6 U.S.C. § 572(a)(1)-(2)

6 U.S.C. § 572(c)(3)

6 U.S.C. § 572(c)(5)-(6)

6 U.S.C. § 572(c)(8)

Goal 4

6 U.S.C. § 572(a)(1)-(2)

6 U.S.C. § 572(c)(2)

6 U.S.C. § 572(c)(4)-(6)

6 U.S.C. § 572(c)(9)

Goal 5

6 U.S.C. § 572(a)(1)-(2)

6 U.S.C. § 572(c)(1)-(6)

6 U.S.C. § 572(c)(8)

Goal 6

6 U.S.C. § 572(a)(1)-(2)

6 U.S.C. § 572(c)(1)-(2)

6 U.S.C. § 572(c)(8)

Section 4.0 - Implementation 6 U.S.C. § 572(c)

6 U.S.C. § 572(c)(10)

Section 5.0 - Conclusion 6 U.S.C. § 572(c)

6 U.S.C. § 572(c)(8)

1921

64

Appendix 2. Key Authorities 1922

Statutory Authorities 1923

This appendix lists key authorities that guide the development, implementation, and management of the 1924

National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP). For example, Title XVIII of the Department of Homeland 1925

Security (DHS) Appropriations Act of 2007 impacts the NECP directly by requiring DHS to periodically 1926

update the plan.5 In addition, related statutes pertaining to emergency communications nationwide also 1927

indirectly help to guide NECP improvements and revisions. This list identifies the foundation of statutes on 1928

which emergency communications functions are executed. 1929

1. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416) (1934), as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1930

1996, Pub. L. No 104-104 (1996) 1931

2. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (“Stafford Act”), Pub. L. No. 93-288 (as 1932

amended 1988) 1933

3. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 (as amended 2002) 1934

4. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458 (codified as amended at 6 1935

U.S.C. § 194(a)(1)) (2004)) 1936

5. Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–347 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1201 1937

(2006)) 1938

6. Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53 (codified as 1939

amended at 6 U.S.C. §§ 572(c)(10) 1940

7. Middle-Class Tax Relief and Jobs Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-96 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1426 1941

2012) 1942

8. Next Generation 911 Advancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.(P.L. 112-96) (codified as amended at 47 1943

U.S.C. 942 (2012)) 1944

Administrative and Executive Authorities 1945

Tables A2-2 to A2-5 describe related presidential directives and executive orders that affect NECP 1946

development and implementation processes. For example, these authorities set national policy and provide 1947

executive direction in areas closely related to emergency communications, including national preparedness, 1948

domestic incident management, critical infrastructure resilience, cybersecurity, and continuity of government 1949

operations. As such, NECP concepts and strategies align with these authorities, are shaped by them, or both. 1950

1. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) –5, Management of Domestic Incident (2003) 1951

2. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7—Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 1952

Protection. (2003) 1953

3. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12 – Policy for a Common Identification Standard for 1954

Federal Employees and Contractors (2004) 1955

4. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 20 – National Continuity policy (2004) 1956

5. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 51/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 20, 1957

National Continuity Policy (2007) 1958

6. National Security Decision Directive 97—National Security Telecommunications Policy, (1983) 1959

7. National Security Presidential Directive 39 – U.S. Space-Based Position, Navigation, and Timing Policy 1960

(2004) 1961

8. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) – 8, National Preparedness, (2011) 1962

9. PPD – 21, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, (2013) 1963

10. PDD – 4: National Space Policy (2007) 1964

11. PDD – 41: U.S. Cyber Incident Coordination (2016) 1965

5 6 U.S.C. § 572. NECP (2007).

65

12. Executive Order (E.O) 13175 – Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal (2000) 1966

13. E.O. 13407 – Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (2006) 1967

14. E.O. 13618 – Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Communications Functions 1968

(2012) 1969

15. E.O. 13616 – Accelerating Broadband Infrastructure Deployment (2012) 1970

16. E.O. 13636 – Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (2013) 1971

Related Authorities 1972

While Tables A2-1 to A2-5 include primary authorities that most directly impact emergency communications, 1973

Table A2-6 lists other homeland security policy, plans, and doctrine that influence the NECP development and 1974

implementation lifecycle and that the NECP, in turn, helps to accomplish. 1975

1. National Preparedness System (2011) 1976

2. National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) – NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure 1977

Security and Resilience (2013) 1978

3. National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition (2015) 1979

4. National Response Framework, Third Edition (2016) 1980

5. Response Federal Interagency Operational Plans, Second Edition (2016) 1981

6. National Preparedness Report (2017) 1982

7. National Incident Management System, Third Edition (2017) 1983

https://www.dhs.gov/publication/nipp-2013-partnering-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience

https://www.dhs.gov/publication/nipp-2013-partnering-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience

66

Appendix 3. Roles and Responsibilities 1984

This appendix provides an overview of the roles and responsibilities of the key public and private stakeholders 1985

who are involved in the emergency communications mission and the implementation of the NECP. In addition 1986

to emergency responders at all levels of government, this appendix also addresses key private sector and 1987

nongovernmental organizations, as well as partnerships and advisory committees, with whom the Federal 1988

Government coordinates emergency communications policies, plans, and programs. 1989

All Levels of Government 1990

The responsibility for responding to and managing planned events and unplanned incidents begins at the local 1991

level with individuals, first responders, and public officials in the county, city, or town affected by the incident. 1992

When emergencies escalate, additional support may be requested from other jurisdictions, states, or even the 1993

Federal Government. Operational communications is a core capability for any incident, regardless of size, 1994

location, or cause; therefore, each level of government must take the necessary preparedness actions to ensure 1995

the capacity to communicate with both the emergency response community and the affected populations, as 1996

well as with other governmental entities. 1997

Local Jurisdictions 1998

Local leaders, emergency managers, and public safety officials prepare their communities to manage incidents 1999

locally. Among their numerous responsibilities, these officials provide strategic guidance, manage resources, 2000

develop and implement policies and budgets, and oversee local preparedness efforts to improve emergency 2001

management and response capabilities. A number of local entities involved in response operations require 2002

interoperable, continuous, and secure communications to carry out their missions. This includes public safety 2003

disciplines, such as local law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical service personnel who respond to the 2004

early stages of an incident and are primarily responsible for the protection and preservation of life, property, 2005

evidence, and the environment. In addition, emergency management agencies are also involved with 2006

coordination and communications during incidents by disseminating alerts and warnings and operating 2007

emergency operations centers, among other key functions. Local Public Safety Answering Points and Public 2008

Safety Communications Centers also play critical roles by serving as key communications and information 2009

conduits between the public and emergency responders. Since natural and man-made emergency response 2010

efforts generally begin at the local level, coordination among these entities is critical to ensuring effective 2011

communications and information sharing when responding to emergencies of all scopes and sizes. 2012

State Agencies 2013

State agencies and officials help coordinate and integrate statewide responders and resources into the local 2014

incident command before, during, and after incidents. States must be prepared to maintain or accelerate the 2015

provision of emergency communications resources and services when an incident grows and local capabilities 2016

are unable to keep up with demand. Likewise, if a state anticipates that its resources may be exceeded, they 2017

must have a process in place to request and integrate Federal assistance. A listing of the key statewide officials 2018

and governing bodies with responsibility for emergency communications are described below. This list is not 2019

intended to be exhaustive as some states have additional agencies or individuals with whom they interact.6 2020

Statewide Interoperability Coordinator. The Statewide Interoperability Coordinator, or SWIC, serves as 2021

the state’s single point of coordination for interoperable communications and implements the Statewide 2022

Communication Interoperability Plan, which establishes a vision for interoperability in the state. 2023

6 Each State has the ability to designate other officials and offices to oversee aspects of emergency communications and information technology.

67

State Single Point of Contact. The Single Point of Contact, or SPOC, serves as the coordinator for the 2024

State and Local Implementation Grant Program and First Responder Network Authority efforts with 2025

respect to the Nationwide Public Safety Broadband Network. This person may or may not be the Statewide 2026

Interoperability Coordinator. 2027

Statewide Interoperability Governing Body or Statewide Interoperability Executive Committee. The 2028

Statewide Interoperability Governing Body or Statewide Interoperability Executive Committee serves as 2029

the primary steering group for the statewide interoperability strategy. Its mission is to support the National 2030

Council of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators in efforts to improve emergency response 2031

communications across the state through enhanced data and voice communications interoperability. 2032

Statewide Interoperability Governing Bodies and Statewide Interoperability Executive Committees often 2033

include representatives from various jurisdictions, disciplines, as well as subject matter experts. 2034

State Emergency Management Agency Director. The director of the state emergency management 2035

agency is responsible for ensuring that the state is prepared to deal with any type of emergency, as well as 2036

coordinating statewide incident response. This includes collaborating with appropriate statewide 2037

representatives for critical capabilities, such as emergency communications. The director may also have the 2038

responsibility for statewide 911 communications and public alerting. 2039

State Information Technology and Security Officials. A state’s or territory’s chief information officer, 2040

chief technology officer, and chief information security officer manage key information technology and 2041

broadband deployment initiatives, including information technology procurement, security, and 2042

information technology planning and budgeting. 2043

State 911 Administrator. This individual manages a state’s or territory’s 911 functions as determined by 2044

state legislation. The official title and role of this position may vary by state or territory. 2045

Territories 2046

Similar to each state, territorial governments are also responsible for coordinating the emergency 2047

communications resources needed to respond to incidents of all types and any scale, determining their resource 2048

capacity, and ensuring an efficient process for requesting assistance, when necessary. Given that their 2049

geographical locations often present unique challenges for receiving assistance during times of disaster, it is 2050

equally important for territorial governments to prioritize emergency communications. It is especially critical 2051

for territories to build relationships and partnerships among neighboring islands, other nearby countries, states, 2052

the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and the Federal Government. 2053

Tribal Nations 2054

Tribal Nations are geographically dispersed across the United States, and tribe size varies significantly, both by 2055

enrollment and land area. Federal agencies respect tribal self-government and sovereignty, honor tribal treaties 2056

and other rights, and strive to meet the responsibilities that arise from the unique legal relationship between the 2057

Federal Government and tribal governments. Communications and emergency services might be handled 2058

internally by a tribe; provided by Federal, state, or county entities; or handled by any combination, thereof. 2059

These jurisdictional complexities can greatly complicate emergency response and communications. Many 2060

reservations are located in rural areas far from emergency services, which also pose challenges for first 2061

responder communications. 2062

68

Federal Departments and Agencies 2063

The Federal Government has an array of capabilities 2064

and resources that can be made available to support 2065

emergency response efforts at all levels of government. 2066

Federal departments or agencies may function as first 2067

responders for incidents involving primary Federal 2068

jurisdiction or authorities (e.g., on a military base, a 2069

Federal facility, or Federal lands). Under these 2070

circumstances, a Federal department or agency becomes 2071

the central coordinator of emergency communications 2072

activities with state, local, tribal, territorial, and regional 2073

partners. Examples include the United States Coast 2074

Guard or the Environmental Protection Agency for oil 2075

and hazardous materials spills and the United States 2076

Forest Service or the Department of the Interior for fires 2077

on Federal lands. 2078

At the same time, the Federal Government is 2079

responsible for ensuring the efficient delivery of Federal 2080

capabilities for large-scale and catastrophic incidents in 2081

support of state, local, tribal, and territorial government 2082

efforts, as well as other Federal partners. This can 2083

include the following communication functions: 2084

Facilitating Federal, state, local, tribal, and 2085

territorial planning through funding, technical 2086

assistance, and guidance; 2087

Promoting the development of national, regional, 2088

and statewide communications plans to address how available Federal assets can be incorporated during 2089

times of crisis; 2090

Promoting the alignment of Federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector emergency 2091

communications plans and preparedness activities to facilitate the development of robust regional 2092

communications coordination capabilities; and 2093

Supporting Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial operational efforts, providing surge capacity and 2094

coordinating distribution of Federal resources to support emergency communications. 2095

Emergency Communications

Preparedness Center

Members

Department of Agriculture

Department of Commerce

Department of Defense

Department of Energy

Department of Health & Human

Services

Department of Homeland Security

Department of the Interior

Department of Justice

Department of Labor

Department of State

Department of Transportation

Department of the Treasury

Federal Communications Commission

General Services Administration

69

Private Sector Entities and Nongovernmental Organizations 2096

Private Sector 2097

As the owners and operators of the majority of the 2098

Nation’s critical infrastructure, private sector 2099

entities are responsible for protecting key 2100

commercial communications assets, as well as 2101

ensuring the resiliency and reliability of 2102

communications during day-to-day operations and 2103

emergency response and recovery efforts. In 2104

addition, commercial communications carriers have 2105

a primary role in network restoration during outages 2106

and service failures and support reconstitution for 2107

emergency response and recovery operations. The 2108

communications sector has a history of successfully 2109

cooperating both within the sector and with 2110

response entities at all levels of government. These 2111

relationships help government and the private sector 2112

coordinate joint incident response activities, share 2113

and analyze infrastructure information, and 2114

coordinate standards development and priority 2115

service technologies. 2116

The private sector’s extensive experience 2117

protecting, restoring, and reconstituting the 2118

communications infrastructure will be particularly 2119

important as the Nation plans and prepares for the adoption, migration, and use of emerging technologies, 2120

including the continued deployment of the Nationwide Public Safety Broadband Network. Its expertise 2121

provides insight on how to address network vulnerabilities so that emergency communications are reliable and 2122

resilient during times of crisis. 2123

Depending on the type of incident and its scale, other private sector entities may also have a role supporting, 2124

facilitating, or using communications during emergencies, as well as provide services and networks for the 2125

government to alert the public. For example, key private sector partners—including privately-owned 2126

transportation and transit, telecommunications, utilities, financial institutions, hospitals, and other health 2127

regulated facilities—may need to establish and maintain a direct line of communication between their 2128

organization and emergency response officials. 2129

Private Sector Partnerships

“Update national strategies (such as the

National Response Framework and the NECP)

and initiatives to account for advanced [Next

Generation Network] communications

capabilities, such as the Nationwide Public

Safety Broadband Network, and to reflect the

evolving communications environment.”

- National Security Telecommunications

Advisory Committee Report to the

President on the National Security and

Emergency Preparedness Implications of

a Nationwide Public Safety Broadband

Network

70

Nongovernmental Organizations 2130

Nongovernmental organizations can play vital roles during emergency response and recovery operations, as 2131

they have the capability to deliver specialized services that support core capabilities, including operational 2132

communications.7 Nongovernmental organizations include voluntary and non-profit organizations that provide 2133

shelter, food, and other essential support 2134

services and disaster relief.8 As technology 2135

evolves, NGOs are also implementing new 2136

ways to facilitate communications and 2137

information sharing during emergencies. 2138

Individuals and Volunteer 2139

Organizations 2140

As discussed in Section 2.0 of the NECP, the 2141

public and volunteer groups play an 2142

increasingly important role in emergency 2143

communications. Emergencies are often first 2144

reported to authorities by members of the 2145

public seeking assistance, and—more than 2146

ever before—the public is encouraged to alert 2147

the government to potentially dangerous or 2148

suspicious activities or update officials on the 2149

aftermath of an incident. For example, the 2150

Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) “If 2151

You See Something, Say Something” 2152

campaign emphasizes the importance of 2153

reporting suspicious activity to the proper local 2154

law enforcement authorities. 2155

Likewise, volunteer organizations such as community emergency response teams and auxiliary 2156

communications volunteers play key roles in emergency communications and preparedness. Volunteer 2157

emergency communications operators and groups using amateur radio have been providing backup 2158

communications to event planners, public safety officials, and emergency managers at all levels of government 2159

for nearly 100 years. Often, amateur radio services have been used when other forms of communications have 2160

failed or have been disrupted. Today, nearly all the states and territories have incorporated some level of 2161

participation by amateur radio auxiliary communication operators into their Tactical Interoperable 2162

Communications Plans and Statewide Communication Interoperability Plans, allowing them to quickly 2163

integrate the operators into response efforts, which can strengthen communications and operations during 2164

incidents of any scale. 2165

Partnership and Advisory Groups 2166

Partnership groups are key mechanisms for successful implementation of the NECP and execution of the 2167

national emergency communications mission. They provide best practices and subject matter expertise to the 2168

government and allow emergency response stakeholders to cultivate working relationships and help shape 2169

strategic and operational plans to improve emergency communications. With the changes in the emergency 2170

communications ecosystem, as noted in Section 2.0 of the NECP, the pool of partnerships and their roles and 2171

responsibilities for supporting emergency communications continues to evolve and expand. The list below 2172

includes key partnership organizations and advisory bodies: 2173

7 For a list of all core capabilities, refer to the National Preparedness Goal, www.fema.gov/ppd8. 8 FEMA. National Response Framework, June 2016, pg. 9. https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1466014682982-9bcf8245ba4c60c120aa915abe74e15d/National_Response_Framework3rd.pdf

Nongovernmental Organization

Communications during Response

Operations

The American Red Cross has established a digital

operations center in Washington, D.C., that enables

the organization to more effectively understand and

anticipate disaster needs in order to deploy assistance

more efficiently. The center has the capability to

monitor, respond to, and analyze social media

platforms, share timely information, coordinate with

other emergency response entities, and allocate

resources accordingly. The American Red Cross has

developed a training program to leverage digital

volunteers that can be called upon to scale up digital

operations for emergency situations such as

Hurricanes Maria, Harvey and Florence.

http://www.fema.gov/ppd8

https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1466014682982-9bcf8245ba4c60c120aa915abe74e15d/National_Response_Framework3rd.pdf


71

Canada – United States Communications Interoperability Working Group. The Canada – United 2174

States Communications Interoperability Working Group is a joint effort between Canada and the United 2175

States. It is co-chaired by Public Safety Canada and DHS’ Office of Emergency Communications. The 2176

Interoperability Working Groups goal is to support each country’s national interoperability strategy and 2177

work to resolve bilateral issues of common interest concerning cross-border communications and 2178

information exchange. 2179

Communications Security, Reliability and Interoperability Council. The Communications Security, 2180

Reliability and Interoperability Council is an advisory committee that provides recommendations to the 2181

FCC to ensure, among other things, optimal security and reliability of communications systems, including 2182

telecommunications, media, and public safety. 2183

Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council. The Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory 2184

Council is a DHS program established to facilitate effective coordination of critical infrastructure activities 2185

among the Federal Government; the private sector; and state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. 2186

Emergency Communications Preparedness Center. As the Federal interagency focal point for 2187

interoperable and operable emergency communications coordination, the Emergency Communications 2188

Preparedness Center’s mission is to improve emergency communications collaboration across the Federal 2189

Government, and align initiatives with national goals, policy, and guidance. The 14 Federal departments 2190

and agencies that comprise the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center represent the Federal 2191

Government’s broad role in emergency communications, including planning, policy, operations, grants, 2192

and technical assistance. 2193

National Council of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators. Comprised of all Statewide 2194

Interoperability Coordinators (SWICs), the National Council of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators 2195

assists SWICs with promoting the critical importance of interoperable communications and the sharing of 2196

best practices to ensure the highest level of interoperable communications across the Nation. 2197

National Public Safety Telecommunications Council. Composed of state and local public safety 2198

representatives, the National Public Safety Telecommunications Council is a federation of national public 2199

safety leadership organizations dedicated to improving emergency response communications and 2200

interoperability through collaborative leadership. 2201

National Security/Emergency Preparedness. Committee in July 2012 as a forum—comprised of 2202

representatives from at least eight designated Federal agencies—to recommend policy and advise the 2203

President on national security and emergency preparedness communications issues. 2204

Communications Executive Committee. Executive Order 13618, Assignment of National Security and 2205

Emergency Preparedness Communications Functions, established the National Security and Emergency 2206

Preparedness Executive 2207

National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee. The President’s National Security 2208

Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) is composed of private sector executives who 2209

represent major communications and network service providers, as well as information technology, 2210

finance, and aerospace companies. Through DHS, NSTAC provides private sector-based analyses and 2211

recommendations to the President and the Executive Branch on policy and enhancements to national 2212

security and emergency preparedness communications information and communications services, as well 2213

as advice regarding the feasibility of implementing specific measures to improve the telecommunications 2214

aspects of the national security posture. 2215

72

Public Safety Advisory Committee. The Public Safety Advisory Committee is a standing advisory 2216

committee that assists the First Responder Network Authority in carrying out its duties and responsibilities. 2217

The Public Safety Advisory Committee is comprised of 40 representatives from various public safety 2218

organizations that are part of the DHS SAFECOM program. 2219

Regional Emergency Communications Coordination Working Group. The Regional Emergency 2220

Communications Coordination Working Groups serve as the single coordination points for emergency 2221

communications at the regional level. A Regional Emergency Communications Coordination Working 2222

Group has been established in each of the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions. 2223

Each Regional Emergency Communications Coordination Working Group has unique membership 2224

dependent on regional government structure and processes. 2225

SAFECOM. SAFECOM is an emergency communications program of the DHS. As a stakeholder-driven 2226

program, SAFECOM is led by an Executive Committee, in support of the overall membership, which is 2227

primarily composed of state and local emergency responders and intergovernmental and national public 2228

safety communications associations. SAFECOM regularly convenes to discuss interoperability and 2229

emergency communications, and to provide input on challenges, needs, and best practices of emergency 2230

responders. OEC develops policy, guidance, and future initiatives by drawing on the expertise of the 2231

Executive Committee. 2232

73

Appendix 4. SAFECOM Interoperability 2233

Continuum 2234

Developed with practitioner input from the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) SAFECOM program, 2235

the Interoperability Continuum is designed to assist emergency response agencies and policy makers to plan 2236

and implement interoperability solutions for data and voice communications. This tool identifies the five 2237

critical success elements that must be addressed to achieve a sophisticated interoperability solution: 2238

governance, standard operating procedures, technology, training and exercises, and usage of interoperable 2239

communications. The Interoperability Continuum can be used by jurisdictions to track progress in 2240

strengthening interoperable communications. In addition, the DHS Office of Emergency Communications has 2241

used the Interoperability Continuum to develop the priorities and measure the goals of the NECP. For more 2242

information, see Section 4.0 Implementing the NECP. 2243

Interoperability is a multi-dimensional challenge. To gain a true picture of a region’s interoperability, progress 2244

in each of the five interdependent elements must be considered. For example, when a region procures new 2245

equipment, that region should plan and conduct training and exercises to maximize the use of that equipment. 2246

Optimal level interoperability is contingent upon individual agency and jurisdictional needs. The Continuum is 2247

designed as a guide for jurisdictions that are pursuing a new interoperability solution, based on changing needs 2248

or additional resources; it is an evolving tool that supports national preparedness doctrine including, but not 2249

limited to, the National Incident Management System, the National Response Framework, and the NECP. To 2250

maximize the Interoperability Continuum’s value to the emergency response community, SAFECOM will 2251

regularly update the tool through a consensus process involving practitioners, technical experts, and 2252

representatives from federal, state, local, and tribal agencies. 2253

Exhibit A5-1. SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum

74

Appendix 5. Source Documents 2254

This appendix lists the key source documents that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) used to inform 2255

and shape the concepts, goals, and objectives of the 2019 NECP. This list is not exhaustive; rather, it highlights 2256

the primary source documents that were developed since the 2014 NECP. 2257

Federal Departments and Agencies 2258

1. DHS/FEMA: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201: Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk 2259

Assessment (THIRA) and Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR) Guide 2018 2260

https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/165308 2261

2. DHS/Office of Emergency Communications: FY18 SAFECOM Guidance on Emergency Communications 2262

Grants 2263

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY2018_SAFECOM_Guidance_FINAL_508C_060512264

8.pdf 2265

3. National Institute of Standards and Technology Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 2266

Cybersecurity (2018): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf 2267

4. DHS Cybersecurity Services Catalog for SLTT(2018): https://www.us-2268

cert.gov/sites/default/files/c3vp/sltt/SLTT_Hands_On_Support.pdf 2269

5. DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA): 2017 National Incident Management System 2270

https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1508151197225-2271

ced8c60378c3936adb92c1a3ee6f6564/FINAL_NIMS_2017.pdf 2272

6. DHS/FEMA: 2017 National Preparedness Report https://www.fema.gov/media-library-2273

data/1503926640648-2274

0b64216b808eb42a93ba96fe8888d113/2017NationalPreparednessReport_508_COMPLIANT.pdf 2275

7. DHS/FEMA: National Response Framework, Third Edition https://www.fema.gov/media-library-2276

data/1466014682982-9bcf8245ba4c60c120aa915abe74e15d/National_Response_Framework3rd.pdf 2277

8. National Institute of Standards and Technology: Project 25 Compliance Assessment Program (P25 CAP) 2278

https://www.nist.gov/ctl/pscr/newsroom/press/p25-cap 2279

9. United States National Grid Recommendations for update of the National Emergency Communications 2280

Plan (NECP) 2281

Congressional Panels, Testimonies, and Reports 2282

1. Written Testimony of Rear Admiral Ronald Hewitt, USCG (Retired) Director, OEC: 2283

https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM12/20171012/106503/HHRG-115-HM12-Wstate-HewittR-2284

20171012.pdf 2285

National Associations, Advisory Boards and Groups, Other Research 2286

Reports 2287

1. 2018 National Emergency Management Association Biennial Report, 2018 2288

2. Via Satellite: First Responder’s Guide to Satellite Communications, 2018 2289

3. 2017 Joint Meeting of the Major Cities Chiefs Association’s Technology and FirstNet: Workshop on Law 2290

Enforcement Priorities and Recommendations for FirstNet 2291

4. NPSTC Report Best Practices for Public Safety Interoperable Communications: Best Practices 2017 2292

5. SAFECOM/NCSWIC/Federal Partnership for Interoperable Communications (FPIC) Security Working 2293

Group Best Practices for Encryption in Project 25 (P25) Public Safety Land Mobile Radio Systems (LMR): 2294

Best Practices 2016 2295

6. Using Future Broadband Communications Technologies to Strengthen Law Enforcement, RAND 2296

https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/165308

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY2018_SAFECOM_Guidance_FINAL_508C_060518.pdf

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY2018_SAFECOM_Guidance_FINAL_508C_060518.pdf

https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf



https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1508151197225-ced8c60378c3936adb92c1a3ee6f6564/FINAL_NIMS_2017.pdf

https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1508151197225-ced8c60378c3936adb92c1a3ee6f6564/FINAL_NIMS_2017.pdf

https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1503926640648-0b64216b808eb42a93ba96fe8888d113/2017NationalPreparednessReport_508_COMPLIANT.pdf





https://www.nist.gov/ctl/pscr/newsroom/press/p25-cap

https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM12/20171012/106503/HHRG-115-HM12-Wstate-HewittR-20171012.pdf

https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM12/20171012/106503/HHRG-115-HM12-Wstate-HewittR-20171012.pdf

75

Appendix 6. Glossary2297

2298

After-Action Report 2299

A professional document formulated in partnership 2300 with participants in a process. Evaluators, 2301 sponsoring agencies, and key participants from 2302 government agencies participate in the formulation 2303 of the after-action report. It furnishes a historical 2304 record of findings and forms the foundation for 2305 refinements to plans, policies, procedures, training, 2306 equipment, and overall preparedness of an entity. 2307 The report depicts the process, preliminary 2308 observations, and major issues, and makes 2309 recommendations for improvements. 2310 2311

All Hazards Incident Dispatch 2312

Team (IDT) 2313

Specially trained communications personnel who are 2314 certified in tactical, wildland and urban-interference 2315 incidents. The IDT responds to large scale events 2316 and incidents and work the varying levels of 2317 communications at the scene. 2318

Applications 2319

A set of features and a user interface that may be 2320 realized by fixed or mobile devices. User services 2321 are logical building blocks of application-layer 2322 functionality. 2323 2324

Agreements 2325

Formal mechanisms to govern interagency 2326 coordination and the use of interoperable emergency 2327 communications solutions. 2328

Assessment 2329

The process of acquiring, collecting, processing, 2330 examining, analyzing, evaluating, monitoring, and 2331 interpreting the data, information, evidence, objects, 2332 measurements, images, and sound, among others, 2333 whether tangible or intangible, to provide a basis for 2334 decision-making. 2335

2336

Amateur Radio Service 2337

A radio communication service for the purpose of 2338 self-training, intercommunication, and technical 2339 investigations carried out by amateurs, who are duly 2340 authorized persons interested in radio technique 2341 solely with a personal aim and without pecuniary 2342 interest. 2343

2344

Auxiliary Communications 2345

(AUXCOMM) 2346

Backup emergency radio communications provided 2347 by volunteers who support public safety and 2348 emergency response professionals and their 2349 agencies. 2350 2351

Big Data 2352

The analysis of datasets that are too massive, too 2353 complex, or too disparate to be handled by 2354 traditional data processing methods. For example, 2355 the New York City Fire Department utilizes a Risk-2356 Based Inspection System (RBIS) to score buildings’ 2357 fire risk and prioritize those that need inspection 2358 most urgently. Big Data also includes predictive 2359 algorithms that give advance notice for disasters, 2360 both natural and man-made; management of After 2361 Action Reports within the context of larger data sets; 2362 analytic engines that reveal important correlations 2363 that can improve management efficiency for public 2364 safety, reduce overhead costs and manpower 2365 requirements, and even improve responder health 2366 and safety. 2367

2368

Broadband 2369

High-speed Internet that allows users to access the 2370 Internet and Internet-related services at significantly 2371 higher speeds using Long-Term Evolution 2372 Technology (LTE). Broadband and LTE allow users 2373 to access the next evolution of commercial 2374 broadband wireless communications technology, 2375 which was developed to address the demand for 2376 high-speed, data intensive communications, such as 2377 situational awareness, advanced analytics, database 2378 queries, and video applications. Transmission is 2379 digital, meaning that text, images, and sound are all 2380 transmitted as bits of data. The transmission 2381 technologies that make broadband possible move 2382 these bits much more quickly than traditional 2383 telephone or wireless connections. 2384 2385

Capital Investments 2386

Equipment and other one-time costs. 2387 2388

Common Alerting Protocol 2389

The Common Alerting Protocol is a digital format 2390 for exchanging emergency alerts allowing consistent 2391 alert messages to be disseminated simultaneously 2392 over many different communications systems. 2393

76

Communications Coordinator 2394

(COMC) 2395

Serves as a point of contact and is responsible for 2396 maintaining contact with local agencies and 2397 collecting information about local resources to aid 2398 the Communications Unit Leader (COML) and helps 2399 with such tasks as assigning equipment, frequencies, 2400 and following up on and keeping track of the status 2401 of orders. The COMC determines the extent and 2402 availability of communications coordination possible 2403 for a given incident. 2404 2405

Communications Duty Officer 2406

(CDO) 2407

Similar to the Communications Coordinator 2408 (COMC), serves as a point of contact and is 2409 responsible for maintaining contact with local 2410 agencies and collecting information about local 2411 resources to aid the Communications Unit Leader 2412 (COML). 2413 2414

Continuity 2415

Ability to provide and maintain acceptable levels of 2416 communications during disruptions in operations. 2417 2418

Continuity of Communications 2419

The ability of emergency response agencies to 2420 maintain communications capabilities when primary 2421 infrastructure is damaged or destroyed. 2422 2423

Core Capabilities 2424

Distinct critical elements necessary to achieve the 2425 National Preparedness Goal. 2426 2427

Critical Infrastructure 2428

Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so 2429 vital to the United States that the incapacity or 2430 destruction of such systems and assets would have a 2431 debilitating impact on security, national economic 2432 security, national public health or medical, or safety, 2433 or any combination of those matters. (Source: 2013 2434 National Infrastructure Protection Plan) 2435 2436

Cross-Discipline 2437

Involving emergency response providers from 2438 different disciplines (e.g., police, fire, emergency 2439 medical services). 2440 2441

2442

Cybersecurity 2443

The prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, or 2444 exploitation of, and, if needed, the restoration of 2445 electronic information and communications systems 2446 and the information contained therein to ensure 2447 confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Includes 2448 protection and restoration, when needed, of 2449 information networks and wireline, wireless, 2450 satellite, public safety answering points, and 911 2451 communications systems and control systems. 2452 (Source: 2013 National Infrastructure Protection 2453 Plan 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure 2454 Security and Resilience) 2455 2456

Cybersecurity Risks 2457

Occur when a cybersecurity threat exploits a 2458 vulnerability, increasing the likelihood of or leading 2459 to an undesired event that has a negative 2460 consequence on the desired state of the network. 2461 2462

Cybersecurity Threats 2463

Anything that has the potential to harm the system 2464 and are produced by “threat actors” who possess 2465 capabilities to carry out an attack. 2466 2467

Day-to-Day Situations 2468

Situations within the general normal structure for an 2469 organization, including routine operations. 2470 2471

Decision-Making Groups 2472

A group or governing body with a published 2473 agreement that designates its authority, mission, and 2474 responsibilities. 2475 2476

Dispatch Center 2477

Agency or interagency dispatch centers, 911 call 2478 centers (e.g., public safety answering points), 2479 emergency control or command dispatch centers, or 2480 any naming convention given to the facility and staff 2481 that handles emergency calls from the public and 2482 communication with emergency 2483 management/response personnel. 2484 2485

Emergency Communications 2486

The means and methods for exchanging 2487 communications and information necessary for 2488 successful incident management. 2489 2490

2491

77

Emergency Management 2492

Assistance Compact 2493

A congressionally ratified mutual aid compact that 2494 legally establishes a national system to facilitate 2495 resources across State lines during an emergency or 2496 disaster. 2497 2498

Emergency Response Providers 2499

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 defines 2500 emergency response providers as Federal, state, and 2501 local governmental and nongovernmental emergency 2502 public safety, fire, law enforcement, emergency 2503 response, emergency medical (including hospital 2504 emergency facilities), and related personnel, 2505 agencies, and authorities. 2506 2507

Emergency Support Functions 2508

Used by the Federal Government and many state 2509 governments as the primary mechanism at the 2510 operational level to organize and provide assistance. 2511 Emergency Support Functions align categories of 2512 resources and provide strategic objectives for their 2513 use. Emergency Support Functions utilize 2514 standardized resource management concepts such as 2515 typing, inventorying, and tracking to facilitate the 2516 dispatch, deployment, and recovery of resources 2517 before, during, and after an incident. 2518 2519

Encryption 2520

Method of mitigating threats from the potential 2521 compromise of personal or sensitive data by 2522 encoding information in such a way that only 2523 authorized parties can access it. 2524 2525

Exercises 2526

Instruments to train for, assess, practice, and 2527 improve performance in prevention, protection, 2528 mitigation, response, and recovery capabilities in a 2529 risk-free environment. Exercises can be used for 2530 testing and validating policies, plans, procedures, 2531 training, equipment, and interagency agreements; 2532 clarifying and training personnel in roles and 2533 responsibilities; improving interagency coordination 2534 and communications; improving individual 2535 performance; identifying gaps in resources; and 2536 identifying opportunities for improvement. 2537 2538

2539

First Responder Network Authority 2540

An independent authority within the National 2541 Telecommunications and Information 2542 Administration that is responsible for ensuring the 2543 building, deployment, and operation of the first high-2544 speed, nationwide public safety broadband network. 2545 2546

First Responders 2547

See “emergency response provider.” (The 2548 Implementing the 9/11 Commission 2549 Recommendations Act of 2007 states that the term 2550 first responder shall have the same meaning as the 2551 term emergency response provider, which is defined 2552 in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.) 2553 2554

Government Emergency 2555

Telecommunications Service 2556

Service that provides national security and 2557 emergency preparedness personnel priority access 2558 and prioritized processing in the local and long 2559 distance segments of the Public Switched Telephone 2560 Network, greatly increasing the probability of call 2561 completion. Government Emergency 2562 Telecommunications Service is intended to be used 2563 in an emergency or crisis situation when the Public 2564 Switched Telephone Network is congested and the 2565 probability of completing a normal call is reduced. 2566 2567

Governance 2568

Relates to consistent management, cohesive policies, 2569 guidance, processes, and decision-rights for a given 2570 area of responsibility. 2571

Homeland Security Exercise and 2572

Evaluation Program 2573

Provides a set of guiding principles for exercise 2574 programs, as well as a common approach to exercise 2575 program management, design and development, 2576 conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning. 2577 HSEEP exercise and evaluation doctrine is flexible, 2578 adaptable, and is for use by stakeholders across the 2579 whole community and is applicable for exercises 2580 across all mission areas – prevention, protection, 2581 mitigation, response, and recovery. 2582

2583

78

Incident Action Plan 2584

An oral or written plan containing general objectives 2585 reflecting the overall strategy for managing an 2586 incident. It may include the identification of 2587 operational resources and assignments. It may also 2588 include attachments that provide direction and 2589 important information for management of the 2590 incident during one or more operational periods. 2591 2592

Incident Communications Center 2593

Manager (INCM) 2594

Manages an Incident Communications Center, (ICC) 2595 when the Communications Unit Leader’s span of 2596 control would be exceeded by the complexity of the 2597 incident. The INCM serves primarily to supervise 2598 radio operators and manage the increased complexity 2599 of an ICC during large incidents. 2600 2601

Incident Communications Center 2602

(ICC) 2603

An established location close to an Incident 2604 Command Post (ICP) from which coordination, 2605 communications, and support of incident 2606 management activities is directed. 2607 2608

Incident Command System 2609

A standardized on-scene emergency management 2610 construct specifically designed to provide for the 2611 adoption of an integrated organizational structure 2612 that reflects the complexity and demands of single or 2613 multiple incidents, without being hindered by 2614 jurisdictional boundaries. The incident command 2615 system is the combination of facilities, equipment, 2616 personnel, procedures, and communications 2617 operating within a common organizational structure, 2618 designed to aid in the management of resources 2619 during incidents. It is used for all kinds of 2620 emergencies and is applicable to small and large, 2621 complex incidents. The incident command system is 2622 used by various jurisdictions and functional 2623 agencies, both public and private, to organize field-2624 level incident management operations. 2625 2626

Incident Communication Manager 2627

(ICM) 2628

Restores normal service operation as possible to 2629 minimize impact of disruption and responsible for 2630 planning and coordinating activities require to 2631 perform, monitor, and report on the process. 2632 2633

2634

Information Sharing Environment 2635

Broadly refers to the people, projects, systems, and 2636 agencies that enable responsible information sharing 2637 for national security. 2638 2639

Information Technology Service 2640

Unit Leader 2641

Responsible for coordinating with the 2642 Communications Leader (COML) and Incident 2643 Commander Staff to determine IT resource 2644 requirements to support incident objectives such as 2645 developing Information Management Plan (manage 2646 data sharing); determining and ordering needed 2647 personnel, equipment, and services; and supervising 2648 IT and Communications Help Desk. 2649 2650

International/Cross-Border Entities 2651

Foreign organizations (e.g., Canadian or Mexican 2652 organizations). 2653 2654

Interoperability 2655

Ability of emergency response providers and 2656 relevant government officials to communicate across 2657 jurisdictions, disciplines, and levels of government 2658 as needed and as authorized. 2659 2660

Interoperability Solutions 2661

Any method, process, or system used to enable 2662 interoperability (e.g., radio swaps, channel or 2663 console cross-patching, and shared system or 2664 channels). 2665 2666

Internet of Things (IoT) 2667

The Internet of Things (IoT) is the network of 2668 physical devices and connectivity that enables 2669 objects to connect to one another, to the Internet, and 2670 exchange data amongst themselves. IoT can benefit 2671 public safety by providing ubiquitous network 2672 connectivity, enhanced situational awareness, 2673 process optimization, and real-time response/control 2674 of autonomous systems. However, integrating IoT 2675 into a public safety operational framework also poses 2676 some concerns regarding cybersecurity, scale, 2677 network congestion, interoperability, human impacts, 2678 and policy over IoT provisioning and priority and 2679 privacy of data. 2680 2681

2682

79

Jurisdiction 2683

A range or sphere of authority. Public safety 2684 agencies have jurisdiction at an incident related to 2685 their legal responsibilities and authority. 2686 Jurisdictional authority at an incident can be political 2687 or geographical (e.g., Federal, state, tribal, local 2688 boundary lines) or functional (e.g., law enforcement, 2689 public health, medical). 2690 2691

Land Mobile Radio Systems 2692

Terrestrially-based wireless narrowband 2693 communications systems commonly used by 2694 Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial emergency 2695 responders, public works companies, and even the 2696 military to support voice and low-speed data 2697 communications. 2698 2699

Lifecycle Planning 2700

The process of designing, implementing, supporting, 2701 and maintaining a land mobile radio or mobile data-2702 based public safety communications system. Enables 2703 practitioners to better forecast long-term funding 2704 requirements and helps to set the framework for 2705 establishing and maintaining a public safety system. 2706 2707

Mission Areas 2708

Groups of core capabilities, including Prevention, 2709 Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery. 2710 2711

Multi-jurisdictional 2712

Involving agencies from different jurisdictions (e.g., 2713 across state, county, or regional boundaries). 2714 2715

Mutual Aid Agreement or 2716

Assistance Agreement 2717

Written or oral agreement between and among 2718 agencies, organizations, or jurisdictions that provides 2719 a mechanism to quickly obtain emergency assistance 2720 in the form of personnel, equipment, materials, and 2721 other associated services. The primary objective is to 2722 facilitate rapid, short-term deployment of emergency 2723 support prior to, during, or after an incident. 2724 2725

MsgR 2726

Message Runners, (MsgRs) physically relay 2727 messages to areas not yet served with any 2728 communications system 2729 2730

2731

NECP 2732

The Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, 2733 requires DHS to develop the NECP; the Plan serves 2734 as the Nation’s strategic plan for improving 2735 emergency response communications and efforts in 2736 the United States. 2737 2738

National Incident Management 2739

System 2740

Provides a systematic, proactive approach and 2741 template to guide departments and agencies at all 2742 levels of government, nongovernmental 2743 organizations, and the private sector to work 2744 seamlessly to prevent, protect against, respond to, 2745 recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, 2746 regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, in 2747 order to reduce the loss of life or property and harm 2748 to the environment. 2749 2750

National Preparedness Goal 2751

The cornerstone for the implementation of 2752 Presidential Policy Directive-8, it establishes the 2753 capabilities and outcomes for the Nation to 2754 accomplish across five mission areas (Prevention, 2755 Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery) in 2756 order to be secure and resilient. The Goal establishes 2757 distinct core capabilities and corresponding target 2758 elements for each mission area. 2759 2760

Nationwide Public Safety 2761

Broadband Network 2762

A dedicated, wireless, interoperable, 2763 communications long-term evolution-based network 2764 (consisting of a core network and radio access 2765 network) that allows public safety to receive and 2766 share critical information with their counterparts 2767 across the Nation. 2768 2769

National Response Framework 2770

A guide to how the Nation responds to all types of 2771 disasters and emergencies. It describes specific 2772 authorities and best practices for managing incidents 2773 that range from the serious but purely local to large-2774 scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural 2775 disasters. 2776 2777

2778

80

National Security and Emergency 2779

Preparedness Communications 2780

Functions 2781

The ability of the Federal Government to 2782 communicate at all times and under all 2783 circumstances to carry out its most critical and time 2784 sensitive missions. This includes the survivable, 2785 resilient, enduring, and effective communications, 2786 both domestic and international, that are essential to 2787 enable the executive branch to communicate within 2788 itself and with: the legislative and judicial branches; 2789 state, local, tribal, and territorial governments; 2790 private sector entities; and the public, allies, and 2791 other nations. 2792 2793

Network Decommissioning 2794

The process of removing systems and equipment 2795 from active service. 2796 2797

Nongovernmental Organization 2798

As noted in the National Response Framework, these 2799 include voluntary, racial and ethnic, faith-based, 2800 veteran-based, and nonprofit organizations that 2801 provide sheltering, emergency food supplies, and 2802 other essential support services. Nongovernmental 2803 organizations are inherently independent and 2804 committed to specific interests and values. 2805 2806

NGOs/Private Sector 2807

Non-profit or for-profit organizations participating in 2808 public safety/emergency communications planning, 2809 use or reconstitution (e.g., Non-Governmental 2810 Organizations [NGOs], utilities, communication 2811 service providers, equipment operators, 2812 transportation, food distribution, Volunteer 2813 Organizations Active in Disasters [VOAD]). 2814 2815

Operability 2816

Ability to provide and maintain reliable 2817 communications functionality throughout the area of 2818 responsibility. 2819 2820

Operating Environment 2821

For the purposes of the NECP, this refers to the 2822 people, processes, policies, and technologies for 2823 emergency communications. 2824 2825

Other Disciplines 2826

Personnel with another organization of a different 2827 discipline (e.g., fire, law enforcement) within the 2828 same jurisdiction. 2829 2830

Out-of-the-Ordinary Situations 2831

Situations that may stretch and/or overwhelm the 2832 abilities of an organization. 2833 2834

Personnel 2835

Individuals responsible for communications 2836 installations, operations, and maintenance. 2837 2838

Position Task Book (PTB) 2839

Primary tool for observing and evaluating the 2840 performance of Incident Command System (ICS) 2841 trainees. They allow documentation of a trainee’s 2842 ability to perform each task, as prescribed by 2843 position. 2844 2845

Priority Telecommunications 2846

Service: Implements policy, assigns 2847

responsibilities, and establishes procedures for the 2848 Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) 2849 Program. Authorizes priority services for domestic 2850 telecommunications services (e.g., Government 2851 Emergency Telecommunications Service [GETS] 2852 and Wireless Priority Service [WPS]). 2853 2854

Private Sector Entity 2855

Per the National Response Framework, private 2856 sector entities include large, medium, and small 2857 businesses; commerce, private cultural and 2858 educational institutions; and industry, as well as 2859 public-private partnerships that have been 2860 established specifically for emergency management 2861 purposes. 2862 2863

Project 25 2864

(P25 or APCO-25) is a suite of standards for digital 2865 radio communications for use by federal, 2866 state/province and local public safety agencies in 2867 North America to enable them to communicate with 2868 other agencies and mutual aid response teams in 2869 emergencies. In this regard, P25 fills the same role as 2870 the European Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) 2871 protocol, but the two are not interoperable. 2872 2873

Protective/Restorative Measures 2874

Protective measures decrease the likelihood that a 2875 threat will affect the network, while restorative 2876 measures, such as OEC’s Telecommunications 2877 Service Priority, enable rapid restoration if services 2878 are damaged or destroyed. 2879 2880

2881

81

Public Safety Entity 2882

An entity that provides public safety services and 2883 that include services provided by emergency 2884 response providers, as defined in the Homeland 2885 Security Act of 2002. 2886 2887

Public safety 2888

Refers to the welfare and protection of the general 2889 public. 2890 2891

Public Safety/Emergency 2892

Communications 2893

Capabilities needed to transmit/receive information 2894 during public safety incidents (e.g., natural disasters, 2895 acts of terrorism, other man-made events). 2896 2897

Public Safety Services 2898

Includes services defined in the Communications Act 2899 of 1934 as those with the sole or principal purpose of 2900 which is to protect the safety of life, health, or 2901 property; that are provided—by state or local 2902 government entities; or by nongovernmental 2903 organizations that are authorized by a governmental 2904 entity whose primary mission is the provision of 2905 such services; and that are not made commercially 2906 available to the public by the provider. Also 2907 includes services provided by emergency response 2908 providers, as defined in Section 2 of the Homeland 2909 Security Act of 2002. 2910

2911

Public Safety Answering Point 2912

A facility that has been designated to receive 911 2913 calls and route them to emergency services 2914 personnel. A Public Safety Answering Point may act 2915 as a dispatch center. Public Safety Answering Point 2916 is often used with the term Public Safety 2917 Communications Center. 2918 2919

Radio Operator (RADO) 2920

Staffs the Incident Communications Center (ICC), 2921 using radios to receive information and relay 2922 messages. 2923 2924

Reliability 2925

Achieved in public safety land mobile radio systems 2926 through equipment redundancy and minimizing 2927 single points of failures through careful system 2928 design. System operators stock spare parts and, in 2929 some cases, transportable backup systems to restore 2930 system failures that do occur. Reliability must be 2931 considered at the earliest stages of system design. 2932 2933

Redundancy 2934

Additional or duplicate communications assets share 2935 the load or provide back-up to the primary asset. 2936 2937

Resources 2938

Personnel and major items of equipment, supplies, 2939 and facilities available or potentially available for 2940 assignment to incident operations and for which 2941 status is maintained. Resources are described by 2942 kind and type and may be used in operational 2943 support or supervisory capacities at an incident or at 2944 an Emergency Operations Center. 2945 2946

Route Diversity 2947

Communications routing between two points over 2948 more than one geographic or physical path with no 2949 common points. 2950 2951

Social Media 2952

Refers to the means of interactions among people in 2953 which they create, share, or exchange information 2954 and ideas in virtual communities and networks. 2955 2956

Standard Operating Procedures 2957

Generally refers to a reference document or an 2958 operations manual that provides the purpose, 2959 authorities, duration, and details for the preferred 2960 method of performing a single function or a number 2961 of interrelated functions in a uniform manner. 2962 2963

State Preparedness Review 2964

Required by several DHS grants, the THIRA process 2965 helps communities understand threats and hazards 2966 their varying impacts. The THIRA process results in 2967 community-informed capability targets and resource 2968 requirements necessary to address anticipated and 2969 unanticipated risks.[1] https://www.fema.gov/media-2970 library/assets/documents/165308 2971 2972

Strategic Planning 2973

Planning process that establishes organizational 2974 goals and identifies, scopes, and establishes 2975 requirements for the provisioning of capabilities and 2976 resources to achieve them. 2977 2978

2979



82

Statewide Communication 2980

Interoperability Plan 2981

Stakeholder-driven, multi-jurisdictional, and multi-2982 disciplinary statewide plans that outline and define 2983 the current and future vision for communications 2984 interoperability within the state or territory. The 2985 Statewide Communications Interoperability Plan is a 2986 critical strategic planning tool to help states prioritize 2987 resources, establish and strengthen governance, 2988 identify future technology investments, and address 2989 interoperability gaps. 2990 2991

Statewide Interoperability 2992

Coordinator 2993

Serves as the state’s single point of coordination for 2994 interoperable communications and implements the 2995 Statewide Communication Interoperability Plan. 2996 2997


Governing Bodies 2999

Serves as the primary steering group for the 3000 statewide interoperability strategy. Its mission is to 3001 support the Statewide Interoperability Coordinator in 3002 efforts to improve emergency response 3003 communications across the state through enhanced 3004 data and voice communications interoperability. 3005 They often include representatives from various 3006 jurisdictions, disciplines, as well as subject matter 3007 experts. 3008 3009


Executive Committees 3011

Used interchangeably with Statewide 3012 Interoperability Governing Bodies. 3013 3014

Tactical Interoperable 3015

Communications Plan 3016

A plan providing rapid provision of on-scene, 3017 incident-based mission critical voice 3018 communications among all first responder agencies 3019 (e.g., emergency medical services, fire, and law 3020 enforcement), as appropriate for the incident, and in 3021 support of an incident command system as defined in 3022 the National Incident Management System. 3023 3024

Tactical Dispatcher 3025

Supports Communications Unit staff with accurate 3026 and timely documentation of events during high-risk 3027 operations, special events and major incidents in 3028 which a command post is activated. 3029 3030

Tactical Dispatch Team (TDT) 3031

Provide on-site communications support during 3032 incidents or planned events. The TDT provides 3033 support to the Incident Commander with accurate 3034 and timely documentation of events during a planned 3035 events and unplanned incidents. 3036 3037

Technical Assistance 3038

Support to state, local, tribal, and territorial 3039 emergency responders and government officials 3040 through the development and delivery of training, 3041 tools, and onsite assistance to advance public safety 3042 interoperable communications capabilities. 3043 3044

Technology 3045

Per the SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum, 3046 applies to a capability element that encompasses the 3047 systems and equipment that enable emergency 3048 responders to share information efficiently and 3049 securely during an emergency incident, and 3050 addresses the functionality, performance, 3051 interoperability, and continuity capabilities of those 3052 systems and equipment. 3053 3054

Telecommunications Service 3055

Priority 3056

A DHS OEC program that authorizes NS/EP 3057 organizations to receive priority treatment for vital 3058 voice and data circuits or other telecommunications 3059 services. See 3060 https://www.dhs.gov/telecommunications-service-3061 priority-tsp. 3062 3063

Threat and Hazard Identification 3064

and Risk Assessment 3065

Required by several DHS grants, the THIRA process 3066 helps communities understand threats and hazards 3067 their varying impacts. The THIRA process results in 3068 community-informed capability targets and resource 3069 requirements necessary to address anticipated and 3070 unanticipated risks. 3071 3072

THSP 3073

Technical Specialists (THSP) is a catch-all term for 3074 outside specialists providing expertise to the 3075 Communications Unit Leader (COML) including 3076 amateur radio, computer network technicians, and 3077 satellite communications (SATCOM). 3078 3079

3080

https://www.dhs.gov/telecommunications-service-priority-tsp

https://www.dhs.gov/telecommunications-service-priority-tsp

83

Usage 3081

Per the SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum, this 3082 applies to the frequency and familiarity with which 3083 emergency responders use interoperable emergency 3084 communications solutions. 3085 3086

Vulnerabilities 3087

Weaknesses in a system, network, or asset that could 3088 enable an undesired outcome. 3089 3090

Wireless Priority Services 3091

A DHS OEC program that improves the connection 3092 capabilities for authorized National 3093 Security/Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) cell 3094 phone users, (e.g., senior members of the 3095 Presidential administration, local emergency 3096 managers, fire, and police chiefs, and technicians in 3097 wireline and wireless carriers, banking, nuclear 3098 facilities, and other vital national infrastructures). 3099 See https://www.dhs.gov/wireless-priority-service-3100 wps. 3101 3102

Whole Community 3103

Per the National Preparedness Goal, the term whole 3104 community applies to the focus on enabling the 3105 participation in national preparedness activities of a 3106 wider range of players from the private and nonprofit 3107 sectors, including nongovernmental organizations 3108 and the general public, in conjunction with the 3109 participation of Federal, state, local, tribal, and 3110 territorial governmental partners in order to foster 3111 better coordination and working relationships3112

https://www.dhs.gov/wireless-priority-service-wps

https://www.dhs.gov/wireless-priority-service-wps

84

Appendix 7. Acronyms3113

3114

5G Fifth Generation 3115

AVL Automatic Vehicle Location 3116

C3 Critical Infrastructure Cyber 3117

Community Voluntary Program 3118

CAD Computer Aided Dispatch 3119

CAT Coverage Acceptance Testing 3120

CIO Chief Information Officer 3121

CSIRT Computer Security Incident 3122

Response Team 3123

DHS Department of Homeland Security 3124

EC3 Emergency Communications Center 3125

ECPC Emergency Communications 3126

Preparedness Center 3127

EDXL Emergency Data EXchange 3128

Language 3129

EMS Emergency Medical Services 3130

EOC Emergency Operations Centers 3131

FCC Federal Communications 3132

Commission 3133

FEMA Federal Emergency Management 3134

Agency 3135

GIS Geographic Information System 3136

GRA Global Reference Architecture 3137

HSEEP Homeland Security Exercise and 3138

Evaluation Program 3139

HSGP Homeland Security Grant Program 3140

IAP Incident Action Plan 3141

ICAM Identity, Credential, and Access 3142

Management 3143

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs 3144

Enforcement 3145

IoT Internet of Things 3146

IP Internet Protocol 3147

IPAWS Integrated Public Alert and Warning 3148

System 3149

IRT Incident Response Teams 3150

ISE Information Sharing 3151

Environment 3152

IT Information Technology 3153

JWPMO Joint Wireless Program 3154

Management Office 3155

LMR Land Mobile Radio 3156

LTE Long-Term Evolution 3157

MAA Mutual Aid Agreements 3158

MCPTT Mission Critical Push-to-Talk 3159

MOA Memoranda of Agreement 3160

MOU Memoranda of Understanding 3161

NCCIC National Cybersecurity and 3162

Communications Integration 3163

Center 3164

NCSWIC National Council of Statewide 3165

Interoperability Coordinators 3166

NECP National Emergency 3167

Communications Plan 3168

NGO Nongovernmental Organization 3169

NG911 Next Generation 911 3170

NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety 3171

Administration 3172

NIEM National Information Exchange 3173

Model 3174

NIMS National Incident Management 3175

System 3176

NIST National Institute of Standards 3177

and Technology 3178

NPSTC National Public Safety 3179

Telecommunications Council 3180

OASIS Organization for the 3181

Advancement of Structured 3182

Information Standards 3183

OEC Office of Emergency 3184

Communications 3185

P25 Project 25 3186

PSAP Public Safety Answering Points 3187

85

PSCC Public Safety Communications 3188

Centers 3189

PSCR Public Safety Communications 3190

Research Program 3191

PSRC Public Safety Research Center 3192

R&D Research and Development 3193

RAN Radio Access Network 3194

RF Radio Frequency 3195

RICP Regional Interoperable 3196

Communications Plans 3197

SAA State Administrative Agency 3198

SDO Standard Development 3199

Organizations 3200

SHSP State Homeland Security Program 3201

SIEC Statewide Interoperability 3202

Executive Committees 3203

3204

SIGB Statewide Interoperability 3205

Governing Bodies 3206

SOP Standard Operating Procedure 3207

SPR Stakeholder Preparedness 3208

Review 3209

SPR State Preparedness Review 3210

86

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