monitoring of october 1 2012 parliamentary elections final report
TRANSCRIPT
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INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR FAIR ELECTIONS
AND DEMOCRACY (ISFED)
MONITORING OF OCTOBER 1ST,
2012 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
FINAL REPORT
2013
TBILISI
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ISFED election program for 2012 was carried out with the financial support of the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), National Democratic Institute (NDI), European Union (EU), East West Management Institutes project
Policy, Advocacy and Civil Society Development in Georgia (EWMI G-PAC), National Endowment for Democracy (NED),
Open Society Georgia Foundation (OSGF), and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). The contents
of this publication belong solely to the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy and do not necessarily reflect
the views of NDI, NED, EWMI, OSGF, Sida, USAID, the United States Government or the European Union.
Report prepared By: Nino Lomjaria
Nino Rizhamadze
Tamar Bartaia
Elene Nizharadze
Mikheil Benidze
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Contents
I. About the Monitoring Mission .......................................................................................................................... 4II. Key Findings .......................................................................................................................................................... 5
III. Political Context .................................................................................................................................................... 8
IV. Election Laws ..................................................................................................................................................... 9
V. The Inter-Agency Task Force for Free and Fair Elections ..................................................................... 13
VI. The State Audit Office ...................................................................................................................................... 14
VII. Voter Lists ............................................................................................................................................................ 15
VIII. Election Administration ..................................................................................................................................... 16
The Central Election Commission .............................................................................................................. 16
District and Precinct Election Commissions............................................................................................. 19
IX. Pre-Election Monitoring..................................................................................................................................... 21
Methodology ..................................................................................................................................................... 21
Key violations in the pre-election period.................................................................................................. 22
Media environment in the pre-election period ........................................................................................ 29
Monitoring of public meetings held by political parties in the pre-election period ...................... 30
X. Election Day ......................................................................................................................................................... 32
Monitoring Mission ......................................................................................................................................... 32
Monitoring Methodology................................................................................................................................ 32
Results of PVT Monitoring .......................................................................................................................... 33
Election Day Violations and Complaints................................................................................................... 37
XI. Post Election Period ........................................................................................................................................... 39
Complaints and lawsuits filed with district and precinct election commissions
and court .............................................................................................................................................................. 39
Other important post-election developments ............................................................................................ 42
XII. Conclusions and Recommendations............................................................................................................... 43
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I. About the Monitoring Mission
The present report outlines results of monitoring of
the October 1, 2012 Parliamentary Elections carried
out by the International Society for Fair Elections
and Democracy.
During the 2012 parliamentary elections ISFED, as
a monitoring organization with one of the largest
observation networks, was actively involved in pre-election monitoring as well as the monitoring on
the Election Day and post-elections. The monitoring
was carried out by ISFED by utilization of new
methods innovative technologies. The complete
monitoring entailed the following three key stages:
1. Pre-election monitoring was conducted
throughout the period of six months prior
to the elections1 by means of73 long-term
observers of ISFED in all election districts
of Georgia. Length of the monitoring and
use of effective methodology made it possi-
ble to analyze the pre-election process in a
comprehensive and objective manner. The
pre-election monitoring focused on issues
including use of government resources, ac-tivities of the election administrations and
political parties, formation of voter lists,
pressure, and threats on political grounds
and vote buying.
2. The Election Day monitoring was carried
out in 902 election precincts, including par-
allel vote tabulation (PVT) at 600 electionprecincts. In addition to randomly selected
election precincts ISFED also observer302
election precincts through short-term observ-
ers. Together with LTOs the Election Day
monitoring mission was composed of 78
mobile teams, 73 district observers, 15 law-
yers, 15 cameramen and 2 observers sta-tioned at the Central Election Commission
(CEC). The Election Day monitoring had
three key components opening and setting
up of election precinct, voting and vote
counting.
3. Post-election monitoring was carried out by
ISFED by means of73 district observers,15 lawyers and 2 monitors at the CEC.
ISFED monitored activities of the election
administration, consideration of complaints
at district election commissions (DECs) and
the process of vote tabulation.
1 ISFED carried out pre-election monitoring from April 1, 2012 through September 30, 2012
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II. Key Findings
The pre-election period was marked by high political competition between the ruling political force and the
opposition coalition. Due to the tense political background, there was a lack of pre-election campaigning
focused on discussion of election programs and thematic debate. Rather, the pre-election campaign involved
plentiful use of compromising information, multiple violations of law, active use of hate speech, violent and
aggressive clashes.
It seemed that there was a competition between the state and the opposition, as opposed to political parties,
which was caused by absence of a boundary line between the ruling party and the governments adminis-
trative function.
The nature and dynamics of pre-election violations was changing as the election processes entered their activephase. At the beginning of the monitoring in April-May, dismissals from work on political grounds were most
frequent. Later, as the elections approached, number of facts that involved use of government resources,
violence on political grounds, physical clashes and use of administrative sanctions/imprisonment on political
grounds increased. Pre-election violations were reported in almost all regions of Georgia. ISFED included
hundreds of facts of pre-election violation in its reports.
In the run up of the parliamentary elections, the new Election Code was adopted and fundamental changes
were made in the organic law of Georgia on Political Union of Citizens. Further, a number of amendments
were made to the Constitution of Georgia, the Criminal Code and the Code of Administrative Offences of
Georgia.
Although adoption of the new Election Code was a step forward for improving access to media, realization
of passive election rights, promotion of gender participation, procedures for reviewing election disputes, it
failed to remedy fundamental gaps in the existing election system, related to abuse of administrative
resources, ensuring transparency of staffing of election administrations.
New regulations introduced in the law on Political Union of Citizens have proved to be the mostproblematic. Although they increased transparency of party funding, set up an independent body to control
party funding, introduced audit standards, established annual donations and spending threshold, the law
contained certain problematic provisions that was expressly criticized by the civil society. Initial formulation
of the law jeopardized freedom of expression and the right to property, limited civil and political activities
and provided unequal playing field. Prohibitions placed by the law were frequently unreasonable and
sanctions were disproportionate.
As a result of active involvement of member organizations of the It Affects You Too campaign, significant
improvements were made to the law; in particular, norms that jeopardized right to property, freedom of
expression and civil activities were removed. Nevertheless, we believe that it still did not define competencies
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and procedures applicable to the work of body that
controls party funding. Rather, it granted broad
discretion to the latter, posing a threat of selective
application of law.
In the run up of the parliamentary elections, a
number of new institutes were created, including
the Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF) whose work
is commendable as unlike other agencies its efforts
were more focused on responding to and preventing
violations in pre-election period. As a result of the
work of the task force, number of dismissals onpolitical grounds was reduced in public sector. Fur-
ther, we believe that the IATF played a positive
role in pre-election period in diffusing violence.
Most of the claims have been raised about the work
of the State Audit Service delegated with party
funding regulatory function. While studying finan-
cial activities of political subjects and their support-
ers, the Service instituted unsubstantiated legal pros-
ecution and imposed high, disproportionate sanc-tions.
On frequent occasions, the Audit Service selectively
reacted to certain actions undertaken by the ruling
and opposition parties, suggesting their loyalty to
the United National Movement and excessive strict-ness towards opposition parties.
Owing to the work of the Voter List Verification
Commission (VLVC) information about voters abroad,
deceased persons and persons not living at registra-
tion addresses was more accurate than in previous
elections. Nevertheless, a decision to return voters
removed from registration and voters whose regis-tration had been annulled back to the voter list,
which unprecedentedly increased number of voters
on the list and left room for illegal manipulation
with these voters on the Election Day.
The work of the election administration and the
CEC in particular, is commendable in terms of
transparency and administration of elections. Inter-ested parties had access to election information,
facilitated by the CEC website. Improving the web-
site design greatly simplified search of information.
The fact that under the CEC initiative and with the
involvement of civil society, guidelines were elab-
orated for members of election commissions, ob-
servers, media and political party proxies, whichfacilitated interpretation of election law and its uni-
form application.
Nevertheless, certain decisions of the CEC were
perceived as politically motivated. In particular,
assignation of a ballot paper number to the Geor-
gian Dream as well as the decision prohibiting
photo and video recording on the Election Day atthe polling station. Further, ISFED believes that the
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CEC failed to inform voters living abroad about registration procedures and therefore, it is possible than
many of them refrained from registration at the election precinct.
During the pre-election period media was rather diverse. Television, press, radio and Internet provided access
to variety of information. The problem was that citizens of Georgia and particularly those living in the
regions lacked equal access to all media outlets and in particular, to outlets criticizing the government. The
problem was mostly caused by the fact that majority of cable companies refused to carry broadcasters known
for their criticism of the government.
After the Parliament of Georgia adopted the so-called must carry and must offer regulations for the Election
Code, access to media known for its criticism was greatly improved throughout Georgia as the official pre-
election campaign commenced.
During the pre-election period, interference with journalistic activities was often reported. ISFED identified
dozens of cases that involved hindering of journalists, exerting pressure against them and subjecting them to
violence. The violence mostly targeted representatives of media outlets that were known for their criticism
of the government. Such acts of violence were ineffectively investigated or not investigated at all.
Mostly the Election Day had no significant flaws; however, one important deficiency was that voters often
found someone had already signed along their names beforehand. This frequently hindered voter participation.
Further, at 6% of polling stations violations of inking procedures were reported. The principle of secret ballotwas observed at 98% of polling stations, a significant improvement from the 2008 parliamentary elections.
Notably, vote counting was duly administered at most of the election precincts, with the only exception of
several precincts in Khashuri Election District, where drawing up of protocols was delayed with no reason
until the appearance of Special Forces at these precincts, which eventually lead to the annulment of polling
results at these precincts.
Throughout the course of the elections and during the post-election period, ISFEDs observers acted on total
of223 violations at district and precinct election commissions. Most of the complaints were filed over allegedrestriction of observers rights; agitation at polling stations; signatures made on the list beforehand, instead
of actual voters; voting with wrong documents; violations in casting of lots, marking and vote counting.
The process of examining election complaints was administered in a transparent manner. Interested parties
were able to attend election commission/court sessions and participate in the process. Nevertheless, decisions
delivered by election commissions rejecting claims mostly lacked proper substantiation. Further, election
administration often refused to resort to its own power to investigate under its own initiative and eliminate
polling day violations. As to courts, they often lacked objectivity and failed to examine evidence in acomprehensive and thorough manner before delivering decisions.
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In this light, it is safe to say that notwithstanding a rather problematic pre-election period, the elections were
conducted, first of all owing to high voter turnout on the Election Day and maximum transparency of polling
and vote count processes. Citizens of Georgia were able to express their will, which was duly reflected in
election summary protocols.
III. Political Context
A heightened interest in the 2012 parliamentary elections was caused by several important factors; in
particular, pursuant to the 2010 Constitutional amendments Georgia is switching to a new model of
governance that will come into effect after the president-elect of Georgia takes an oath of office in 2013.
Parliament will be further reinforced as presidential authorities will be reduced.
Active preparations for the 2012 parliamentary elections started as early as on September 17, 2012, by
promulgation of the draft Election Code. On October 7, 2011, Bidzina Ivansihvili made a public statement
about the establishment of a political team and his political goals, followed by sharp intensification of
political processes. It is safe to say that pre-election period in the run up of the 2012 parliamentary elections
lasted for a year. Throughout this time, various actors including the parliament, political parties, media outlets
and election monitoring organizations got actively engaged in the process of adoption of new election
regulations, improvement of media environment and verification of voter lists as early as one year in advance.
Unlike previous parliamentary elections, the 2012 elections featured two political subjects of relatively equal
force the United National Movement on the one hand and the coalition Georgian Dream on the other. The
latter brought together the following six political parties: Georgian Dream Democratic Georgia, Irakli
Alasania Free Democrats, Industry Will Save Georgia, National Forum, Conservative Party, and Republican
Party.
Both political forces had a great number of supporters in public. Further, unlike other opposition forces they
had an important financial advantage. In particular, the United National Movement, the ruling party, had
access to government resources and there were cases when it utilized the resources for political campaigning2.On the other hand, the coalition Georgian Dream created around businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili, had access
to huge financial resources.
The 2012 parliamentary elections were special due several additional institutes set up that took over important
part of the CEC functions. In particular, for the first time the Election Code of Georgia mandated creation
2 ISFEDs pre-election monitoring reports are available at http://isfed.ge/pdf/2012_Parliamentary_Elections_pre-
election_monitoring_findings_ENG.pdf; http://isfed.ge/pdf/2012-06-15-report-en.pdf; http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ISFED_report_3ENG.pdf http://isfed.ge/pdf/20120-08-20-report-eng.pdf; http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ISFED%20
Fifth%20Interim%20Report%20ENG.pdf
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2 ISFEDs pre-election monitoring reports are available at http://isfed.ge/pdf/2012_Parliamentary_Elections_pre-elec-
tion_monitoring_findings_ENG.pdf; http://isfed.ge/pdf/2012-06-15-report-en.pdf; http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ISFED_report_3ENG.pdf
http://isfed.ge/pdf/20120-08-20-report-eng.pdf; http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ISFED%20Fifth% 20Interim%20Report%20ENG.pdf3 Information about the IATF is available at http://www.nsc.gov.ge/eng/elections2012.php4 Please see the official website of the SAO: http://sao.ge/?action=page&p_id=6&lang=eng5 Please see the official website of the VLVC: http://sia.gov.ge/6 Para.1, Article 49 of the Constitution of Georgia7
Article 1044
of the Constitution of Georgia8 Para.2, Article 49 of the Constitution of Georgia, para.1, Article 111 of the Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of
Georgia
of the Inter-Agency Task Force for Free and Fair Elections. 3 This way, the function of financial
monitoring of parties was now delegated to the State Audit Offices (formerly known as the Chamber of
Control), Party Financial Monitoring Service. 4 The function of verifying voter lists was passed on to the
Voter List Verification Commission (VLVC)5
. The VLVC was manned by equal number of representativesof the ruling party, opposition and NGOs.
IV. Election Laws
Applicable election laws for the 2012 parliamentary elections included the Constitution of Georgia, the
Election Code of Georgia, the Law on Political Union of Citizens, the Criminal Code of Georgia, the Code
of Administrative Offences, etc. Notably, adoption of new election regulations was a continuous process that
started as early as one year prior to the elections.
The Constitution of Georgia
There were two key new regulations introduced in the Constitution of Georgia in May 2012 in the run up
of the 2012 parliamentary elections; in particular,
Number of majoritarian MPs was reduced from 75 to 73, whereas the number of proportional MPs
was increased from 75 to 77; 6
In addition to citizens of Georgia, persons who have reached certain age and were born in Georgia,
have been living permanently in Georgia for the last five years and have a citizenship of an EU-
member state now have the right to vote in presidential and parliamentary elections up until January
1, 2014; 7
Minimum age for passive election right was reduced from 25 to 21 8.
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The Election Code of Georgia
Based on the agreement signed between the political parties, the parliament of Georgia presented draft
Election Code in September 2011 for consideration, which, except for several positive new regulations, did
not offer any other essential changes to improve the election environment. In particular, the new ElectionCode did not offer regulation of important and problematic issues related to observance of the principle of
vote equality, raising barrier for majoritarian elections, introducing tight regulations for the use of government
resources.
On December 27, 2011, the parliament of Georgia adopted the new Election Code, although the process of
amending the Code lasted through July 2012. The new Election Code stipulated the following important new
regulations:
The circle of officials who are not prohibited from pre-election campaigning (engaging in agitation)
has been broadened; in particular, Gamgebelis have been granted the status of a political official 9;
The Voter List Verification Commission (VLVC) took over responsibility of verifying and publishing
voter lists from the CEC; 10
Changes were made in the timeframe for considering election disputes; in particular, the deadline for
appealing in higher election commission was extended but the time for consideration of a complaint
by court was reduced; 11
Prisoners convicted for less grave crimes under the Criminal Code of Georgia have been granted with
the right to vote in elections; 12
Independent candidates nominated by initiative groups have been allowed to run in elections; 13
Video surveillance at polling stations has been prohibited;
An inter-agency task force was set up with the Security Council of Georgia on July 1 of the election
year, for the purpose of preventing and responding to violations of election laws of Georgia by public
servants. 14
9 Para.2z5 of the Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia10 See Chapter VI for detailed information about the commission11 Para.2, Article 77 of the Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia12 Less grave crime is a crime committed intentionally or a reckless crime subject to maximum punishment of five-year
imprisonment under the Criminal Code13 Para.1c, Article 116 of the Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia14 See Chapter V for information about the commission
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Higher standards of transparency were pro-
vided for international monitoring organiza-
tions; 15
Agitation in polling stations on the PollingDay was prohibited; 16
Must carry and must offer regulations were
enacted in pre-election period, which ensured
voters access to pluralistic information.17
Despite the fact that the new Election Code was an
improvement for access to media, realization of
passive election right, promotion of gender partici-pation, procedures for consideration of election dis-
putes, it failed to address problematic issues related
to the existing election system, abuse of administra-
tive resources, ensuring transparency of staffing elec-
tion administrations and their activities. Further,
from a technical point of view the Election Code
became more systemic.
The Law on Political Union of Citizens
On December 12, 2011, a draft law on amendments
and supplements to the law of Georgia on Political
Union of Citizens was initiated in the parliament of
Georgia.
Although it improved transparency of party fund-
ing, the draft law contained regulations that were
flawed and ambiguous and were sharply criticized
by civil society.
In consideration of some of the recommendations
of international and domestic organizations, the law
envisaged setting up of an independent regulatory
agency for party funding, established standards of
financial audit of parties, maximum amount of do-
nations, maximum amount of spending per year.
ISFED together with its partner NGOs harshly crit-
icized the new regulations, as it believed that the
law jeopardized freedom of expression and the right
to property and placed restrictions on civil and
political activities, creating unequal playing field
for political parties. We have highlighted that the
restrictions were frequently unreasonable, sanctions
disproportionate. 18 Further,
With a demand to make changes to the law, civil
sector that included most part of NGOs and media
organizations, launched a large-scale protest cam-
paign It Affects You Too19, where ISFED was
actively involved.
15 Para.5, Article 39 of the Organic Law of Georgia Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia16 Para.9, Article 45 of the Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia17
Paras.17-21, Article 51 of the Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia18 Full statement is available at http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/Joint_Party_Finance-January_27_2012.pdf19 Information about the campaign is available at http://esshengexeba.ge/?page=9&menuid=9&lang=1
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20 Alternative legal proposal submitted by It Affects You Too campaign to the Parliament of Georgia is available at http:/
/esshengekheba.ge/contentimage/ganc/20120228-14507-1ds47h9-0.pdf
As a result of active involvement of the It Affects You Too member organizations, the law was significantly
improved; in particular, individual provisions that jeopardized the right to property, freedom of expression and
civil activities were removed. Nevertheless, we believe that it failed to determine the purview of the
regulatory agency in a comprehensive manner or the rule of its operations and delegated it with unlimiteddiscretion for financial monitoring of parties, which posing the risk of its selective application.
The Criminal Code
New regulations were also introduced in prima Article 164 of the Criminal Code of Georgia regulating vote
buying during official election campaigning.
The amendment was first formulated in a way that a voter who received or requested a monetary or any
other present from a political party or a person related to a political party in a direct or indirect manner,would be sentenced to three years of imprisonment or ordered to pay fine as punishment. Further, the voter
concerned would be imposed with a liability notwithstanding the worth of property received or requested.
The legislative amendment prohibited vote buying not only during the pre-election campaign but at any given
time. Further, criminal liability would apply not only to the person who offered material goods or services
to a voter for political purposes but also to a citizen who accepted or requested the offer. The law
prescribed a three-year imprisonment as a sanction for committing the crime.
The foregoing new regulations introduced in the Criminal Code were fundamentally unacceptable to us. We
believed that it provided unreasonable restrictions that could have affected any citizen. Ambiguity of the
provisions posed a great risk for their inconsistent and selective implementation. Further, it did not envisage
any legal liability for funding activities with an effect of vote buying from state or municipal budgets.
The campaign It Affects You Too offered alternative formulation of Article 164 1 to the Parliament of
Georgia20, which was taken into account in part. Eventually, due to the active involvement of the campaign
members, the regulations were modified in a way that criminal liability would be imposed on voters for
knowingly receiving material benefit. Further, it was specified that transfer of a gift would be considered vote
buying if it was done for election purposes.
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21 Information about the IATF is available at http://www.nsc.gov.ge/eng/elections2012.php22 The IATF issued total of 12 recommendations in the run up of the 2012 parliamentary elections. For a complete list of
its recommendations please see http://www.nsc.gov.ge/eng/elections2012.php?typ=1#start23 Recommendation about dismissals from work is available at http://www.nsc.gov.ge/eng/elections2012.php?typ=1&cp=2#start24 Recommendation about termination of social benefits is available at http://www.nsc.gov.ge/eng/elections2012.php?typ=1&cp=2#start
V. Inter-Agency Task Force for Free and Fair Elections
For the purpose of identifying and preventing abuse of administrative resources by public servants under the
Election Code of Georgia, the Inter-Agency Task Force for Free and Fair Elections was set up under the
National Security Council of Georgia on May 18, 2012.21 Members of the IATF included deputy ministers
of Justice, Finance, Regional Development and Infrastructure, Foreign Affairs, and the Deputy Secretary
National Security Council. Later deputy ministers of Education and Science, and Labor, Health and Social
Affairs also joined the IATF members.
Within the scope of its activities the IATF was holding meetings with local and international organizations,
observers, political parties/election subjects and other stakeholders. The meetings were held in a constructive
environment.
Throughout the course of the pre-election monitoring, ISFED updated the IATF about violations of election
laws on a systematic basis. The IATF in its turn was actively involved in the process of examination of pre-
election violations and provided subsequent recommendations in response to these violations.
Based on the trends identified in pre-election period, the IATF issued recommendations for political parties,
media outlets, ministries and various public agencies on a number of occasions. The recommendations were
mostly timely and adequate; 22 however, violations could not always be effectively prevented in time.
The IATF issued total of 12 recommendations, including
IATF recommendation to public agencies forelimination of dismissals on political basis23 the
ISFEDs monitoring illustrates that after issuance of the recommendation on May 31, 2012 by the
IATF, number of dismissals on political grounds was reduced; however, such facts could not be fully
prevented, possibly due to the fact that the IATFs purview covers only public sector. Regrettably,
dismissals on alleged political grounds in private sector fell beyond the IATFs focus.
IATF Recommendation to the Ministry of Labor, Healthcare, and Social Protection about suspension
of reevaluations of persons registered in the database of the socially vulnerable24
aftermonitoring organizations reported termination of social aid benefits on political grounds, the IATF
called on the Ministry to study the decisions of the Social Service Agency about terminating social
aid deemed controversial by NGOs and political parties. Further, the IATF called on the Ministry to
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25 During the monitoring ISFED reported five cases of termination/suspension of social benefits on alleged political grounds.
After examining grounds for the termination/suspension by the IATF, social benefits were restored to Mevlud Shushanash-
vili and Irma Petriashvili26 Recommendation about holding public rallies in a peaceful environment is available at http://www.nsc.gov.ge/eng/
elections2012.php27 See Chapter IV for more information about the new regulations28
Under the June 22, 2012 amendments to the Law on Chamber of Control, the agency was renamed to the State AuditOffice
29 Statement of It Affects You Too is available at http://esshengekheba.ge/?lang=1&menuid=9&id=198
suspendfor the duration of the electoral periodreevaluations of social aid benefits for citizens
already receiving them; 25
IATF recommendation for the law enforcement authorities and political parties to ensure that
public rallies are held peacefully26
the recommendation called on the law enforcement authoritiesto ensure that protest rallies were held with minimum risks of physical clash between participants.
We believe that the IATFs work was positive, as unlike other agencies it was much more focused on
responding to and preventing violations in pre-election period. As a result of the IATFs work, number of
dismissals from public service on political grounds was reduced; further, we believe that the IATF played a
positive role in diffusing acts of violence in pre-election period.
VI. State Audit Service
On December 27, 2011, pursuant to the amendments to the Law on Political Union of Citizens27, the authority
of financial monitoring of parties was transferred to the Chamber of Control of Georgia (afterwards renamed
as the State Audit Office). 28 Fundamental amendments to the law delegated the SAO with broad authority,
without any legal mechanisms for curbing its power. Therefore, instead of improving the election environ-
ment, the work of SAOs financial monitoring service of parties resembled selective application of justice.
The work of the financial monitoring service was harshly criticized from the beginning by monitoringorganizations. Violations reported during obtaining of statements from citizens in March 2012 are particularly
notable, as the process involved abuse of dignity of citizens, exerting moral and psychological pressure
against them, disregarding their procedural rights and limiting journalistic activities. After the members of the
It Affects You Too campaign harshly criticized the work of the SAO29 and called on the financial monitoring
service to abide by law in its activities, the situation was relatively improved to a certain extent, the
process of questioning citizens followed applicable legal standards.
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While studying financial activities of political subjects and their supporters, the SAO instituted unsubstanti-
ated legal prosecution30 against individuals and imposed high, disproportionate sanctions. 31
State agencies and the SAO in particular, selectively reacted to certain actions undertaken by the ruling and
opposition parties, suggesting their loyalty to the United National Movement and excessive strictness towardsopposition parties. 32
VII. Voter Lists
Pursuant to the second paragraph of the June 27, 2011agreement reached between the ruling and several
opposition parties on making of legal amendments, a special commission for verification of voter lists was
to be set up. The commission would be manned by representatives of the authorities, opposition and NGOs.
On October 13, 2011, Article 12918 was inserted in the Election Code of Georgia concerning verification of
voter lists in the run up of the 2012 parliamentary elections. It was determined that a commission set up
under the executive order would ensure verification of voter lists throughout Georgia until July 1, 2012.
Thus, an independent agency, the Voter List Verification Commission (VLVC) was tasked with verifying
voter lists for the 2012 parliamentary elections. The VLVC was manned in observance of the parity principle
and its members included representatives of the authorities, opposition and NGOs (seven members from
each). The VLVC Chairperson was elected according to the Election Code requirements, out of the opposition
members of the VLVC. The legal framework of the work of the VLVC consisted of applicable norms of the
Election Code and the VLVC regulations initiated by the VLVC and adopted by the president of Georgia.
30 The decision to impound satellite dish antennas of a tele-communications company Global Contact Consulting and Maestro
TV can be qualified as unjustified legal prosecution and unfounded application of financial sanctions, similar to finding
of Bidzina Ivanishvili on charges of making an illegal donation to Global Contact Consulting. Analysis of these casesshows that proceedings fell short of standards of transparency, objectivity and comprehensive examination of evidence
31 Fining of employees of Cartu Bank Irakli Beria, Nato Khaindrava, Nodar Javakhishvili, Ia Gamtsemlidze, Davit
Galuashvili on charges of making donations in favor of a public movement Georgian Dream; fining of Bidzina
Ivanishvili and Kakha Kaladze for withdrawing cash from their personal accounts, when total amount of fine exceeded
GEL 37 million; fining of Bidzina Giorgobiani for making a donation in favor of Komagi Foundation32 27 persons who made donations in favor of the UNM the total amount of which was GEL 651 440, were also registered
in the database of the socially vulnerable. The SAO deemed only five of them as violators of the law and applied to court
seeking impounding of their property; for absence of evidence the SAO did not deem a celebratory dinner hosted byMajoritarian MP of Tetristskaro Davit Bejuashvili as violation of law; the SAO fined a member of Sakrebulo with GEL
7920 for distributing sheep and wine among the population of Rustavi in celebration of Easter
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Under Article 2 of the Regulations, it is the key
function of the VLVC to ensure verification of
voter lists throughout Georgia for the 2012 parlia-
mentary elections. This triggered particular interestof public in the work of the VLVC.
Work of the VLVC was transparent and focused on
cooperation with political parties and monitoring
organizations. ISFED monitored all stages of the
work of the VLVC, including 10 000 visits of the
VLVC members by means of direct monitoring.
ISFED believes that the VLVC succeeded in veri-
fying information about voters abroad, deceased
voters and voters that do not reside at their places
of registration, which was an improvement from
previous elections. Nevertheless, the decision to
return voters removed from registration and voters
whose registration had been annulled back to the
voter list, increased number of voters on the list33
and left room for illegal manipulation with these
voters on the Election Day. 34
VIII. Election Administration
ISFED has been monitoring all 73 election district
and election precincts within them starting from
August 1, 2012, when the commencement of offi-
cial pre-election campaign was announced.
The Central Election Commission
Under the new Election Code for the 2012 parlia-
mentary elections, the scope of the CECs regulato-
ry activities was narrowed down and limited to
administration of elections. In particular, it was no
longer tasked with verification of voter lists and
monitoring of party finances. After an inter-agency
state commission undertook the functions of regu-
lating the use of government resources, the CECs
role became even more passive in this regard.
Neither did the CEC carry out media monitoring
for the elections about coverage of election subjects
by media outlets; rather, the function was fully
undertaken by government and media organizations.
ISFED believes that the work of the CEC has been
improved from technical point of view. Its website
was improved, making search much easier for vot-
ers and other interested persons.
Further, we commend the fact that under the CECs
initiative and with the involvement of civil organi-
zations, detailed and more flexible guidelines on
election procedures were elaborated, not only for
members of the election commissions but for mon-
itors, media and political parties as well. Further,
the guidelines were available to international com-
munity as well as ethnic minorities.
33 Owing to the work of the VLVC, number of voters increased up to 3 669 88734 ISFEDs corresponding statement is available at http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/2012_09_29.pdf
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The CEC launched a large-scale voter awareness campaign. Under the initiative of the CEC, an educational film
focusing on election-related procedures was produced and aired on various TV companies on a regular basis.
The VLVC actively partnered with local and international organizations, political subjects, by organizing
meetings and sessions with them, and providing access to public information. The process of examiningvarious issues and making decisions during the CEC meetings was transparent.
Nevertheless, certain decisions of the CEC were perceived as politically motivated. In particular, assignation
of a ballot paper number to the Georgian Dream as well as the decision prohibiting photo and video
recording on the Election Day at the polling station. 35 Further, ISFED believes that the CEC failed to inform
voters living abroad about registration procedures and therefore, it is possible than many of them refrained
from registration at the election precinct. 36
Memorandum on the use of administrative resources on August 16, 2012, a memorandum ofunderstanding (MOU) was signed between seven local NGOs37 (one of which was ISFED), the IATF within
the Security Council and the CEC. 38 The MOU contains interpretation of stipulations of the Election Code
about use of government resources. The parties agreed during administrative and court proceedings they will
be guided by interpretations outlined by the MOU.
The Code of Ethics for officers of the election administration on March 9, 2012, the CEC approved
a resolution on the adoption of the Code of Ethics for officers of the election administration #14/2012. 39 The
Code determined key principles of the work of the election administration officers, violation of which wouldresult in imposition of disciplinary liability as prescribed by the Georgian legislation. We believe that when
commenting on the statement of ISFED and Georgian Young Lawyers Association (in the statement the
organizations expressed their position on the replacement of representatives of the election subject UNM-
More Benefit to the People in a number of DECs and the resolution of the CEC Secretary), the CEC ignored
stipulations of the Code of Ethics to to express its opinions by relaying substantiated criticism in a tactful
35 ISFEDs opinion about restriction of photo and video shooting at polling stations is available at http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/
2012-09-25.pdf36 There were reports during pre-election period that voters could register with precincts set up abroad only after registration
with consular office, which was untrue. The CEC made a statement to clarify the issue only several days prior to
expiration of the time for registration37 The MOU was signed by the following NGOs: the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, Georgian
Young Lawyers Association, Transparency International Georgia, New Generation New Initiative, Elections and
Political Technologies Research Center, Center for the Development of Civil Society and Democracy, International Center
for Civil Culture38
Full text of the memorandum on use of government resources is available at http://cesko.ge/files/2012/MoU.pdf39 The Code of Ethics for election administration officers is available at https://matsne.gov.ge/index.php?option=
com_ldmssearch&view=docView&id=1608029&lang=ge
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manner, by making incorrect comments and saying
that opinions expressed by the NGOs was unpro-
fessional. 40
Resolution of the CEC specifying procedures ofphoto and video shooting at polling stations on
September 24, 2012, 7 days prior to the elections,
the CEC adopted a resolution 42/2012 specifying
procedures of photo and video shooting at polling
stations from opening of the polling stations through
drawing up of summary protocols by the election
commissions.
ISFED and other partner NGOs believe that thedocument placed unjustified prohibitions on the right
of observers and media representatives to be present
at a polling station at any time on the Polling Day,
their right to a free movement a the premises of the
election precinct and to observe all stages of poll-
ing freely, without any restrictions and from any
place, as guaranteed by the Election Code of Geor-
gia.41
Notably, the resolution was adopted 7 daysprior to the election, without allowing adequate
time for keeping PECs, observers and media repre-
sentatives duly informed.
ISFED, GYLA and Media Club of Georgia filed an
administrative complaint with the Board of Admin-
istrative Cases of Tbilisi City Court on September
26, 2012, seeking annulment of the resolution.
However, both the city court and the appellatecourt rejected the claim for being groundless.
Registration of Political Subjects
Total of 41 political unions applied to the CEC for
their right to participate in the October 1, 2012
Parliamentary Elections. After documents submitted
by the applicants were verified by the CEC and all
gaps were remedied, total of 14 political parties and
two election blocs were registered for the parlia-
mentary elections.
The CEC registered the following political subjects
for the 2012 parliamentary elections:
40
Response of the CEC to the statement of the NGOs is available at http://www.cesko.ge/index.php?lang_id=GEO&sec_id=13&info_id=10943
41 Statement of the NGOs is available at http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/2012-10-07.pdf
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The process of registration of parties at the CEC was quite open and transparent. Determination of the
number ofBidzina Ivanishvili Georgian Dreamon ballot papers was rather controversial. The election bloc
had been using number 7 in its campaigning; nevertheless, the CEC assigned number 41 based on casting
of lots. Number 7 that the bloc was going to use in the elections belonged to one of the members of the
bloc, Conservative Party. The latter had been assigned the number for 2008 parliamentary elections. Althoughat the 2010 municipal elections the CEC allowed election blocs to use a number of one of its members, it
interpreted the same stipulation of the law in a different way for the 2012 parliamentary elections and
resorted to casting of lots for determining the number for the bloc Bidzina Ivanishvili Georgian Dream.
The CEC explained that it had adopted a resolution on procedures regulating the use of election ballot
number by election blocs; however, this time it did not consider the possibility of adopting a resolution due
to the lack of political readiness to adopt a new resolution.
Despite political protest, no further legal actions were taken with regards to the dispute.
District and Precinct Election Commissions
Observation of staffing and work of precinct and district election commissions was one of the important
components of the election monitoring carried out by ISFED. In frames of the election administration
monitoring, ISFEDs long-term observers (LTOs) attended meetings held at district and precinct election
commissions, monitoring whether the election commissions observed election procedures and timeframes
stipulated by election laws.
The monitoring showed that the DECs acted in compliance to procedures and timeframes stipulated by theElection Code by publishing by August 12, 2012, election precinct numbers, PEC addresses, telephone (fax)
numbers and other information by means of various media outlets, including press. DECs mostly published
information on public notices boards and local media.
The monitoring also showed that interested individuals could easily attend meetings of DECs and PECs.
Initial meetings of precinct election commissions were held in compliance to stipulations of the law on
August 26, 27 and 28.42
Starting from August 1 through October 31, 2012, observers of ISFED and GYLA carried out a jointmonitoring of staffing of precinct election commissions in all election districts of Georgia. To study the
process, the organizations carried out a statistical research of randomly and representatively selected 396
election precincts. Further, they also monitored enforcement of the Code of Ethics of election administration
officers, as well as any violations of the election laws and subsequent legal proceedings.
The study showed that initial meetings of precinct election commissions throughout the country were held in
observance of stipulations of the law on August 16, 27 and 28, 2012. 43
42 Held no later than 34 days prior to the Election Day, under para.2, Article 21 of the Election Code43 Held no later than 34 days prior to the Election Day, under para.2, Article 21 of the Election Code
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Gender balance: research of information about PEC members showed that in 5075 members elected by
DECs and appointed by political parties, women accounted for 64,3%, men 35,7%. Gender analysis of
members elected to PEC offices showed that there were equal numbers of chairmen and chairwomen (50%).
In deputy PEC chairpersons, women accounted for 60%, men 40%, whereas most of the PEC secretaries
were women (80,3%) while men accounted for only 19,3%.
The research showed the following trend in party affiliation of PEC secretaries:
a) Political Union European Democrats - 35,9%;
b) Political Union Christian Democratic Movement - 25,7%;
c) Christian Democratic Peoples Party - 18,6%;
d) Industry Will Save Georgia - 6,5%;e) Conservative Party - 5,5%;
f) Labor Party - 1,3%.
In 6,5% of cases PEC secretaries were elected out of the members elected by the DEC. 44
With regards to relevant experience and qualification in elections, the research showed that The research
revealed that out of the members of the election administration elected by the District Election Commission
only 17,4% had a certificate of an election administration officer, whereas the remaining 82,6% did not havethe certificate; however, analysis of PECs showed that 47,5% had at least one member elected by the DEC
who had a certificate of an election administration officer. 83,3% of members of target PECs (both PEC-
elected and party appointed) about whom we could obtain information had some experience, whereas the
remaining 16,7% has no experience.
Conflict of Interests: Qualitative and quantitative analysis of target 396 precincts randomly selected
throughout Georgia revealed 52 facts allegedly involving conflict of interests in 12,6% of precincts. The
reasons of alleged conflict of interests revealed by the research were family ties between PEC members as
well as subordination at permanent workplace - e.g. when a teacher and a school principal, both membersof the same PEC, are working at the same school. Further, in similar cases it does not matter whether a
teacher is subordinated to the principal in frames of the commission due to the latters status, i.e. whether
the teacher is a member and the principal is the chairperson of the PEC. Subordination at permanent
workplace is an important factor notwithstanding their positions at the PEC, which may have an adverse
impact on impartial work of the commission.
44
Under para.19, Article 25 of the Election Code, If no candidate for secretary of the PEC is nominated as defined by thisArticle, secretary of the PEC shall be elected from the members of commission by a majority of the total number of the
commission; any two members of the commission are authorized to nominate a candidate
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The monitoring revealed 75 persons who had been
imposed with disciplinary liability during 2010
municipal elections and were re-elected as PEC
members by DECs for the 2012 parliamentary elec-
tions. Majority of these person (33) were elected as
PEC members in Khobi DEC; 16 were elected in
Kutaisi DEC, nine in Kobuleti DEC, six in Batumi
DEC, four in Shuakhevi DEC, three in Chughureti
DEC and one in each of the DECs of Krtsanisi,
Tskaltubo, Rustavi and Tsalenjikha. In majority of
cases these persons were appointed as members of
PECs that they served in 2010 elections. GYLA
and ISFED provided the information about 75 mem-
bers of PECs who had previously been imposed
with administrative liability to the Central Elections
Commission of Georgia.
IX. Pre-Election Monitoring Methodology
ISFED carried out pre-election monitoring through
73 LTOs for the period of 6 months, throughout all
election districts of Georgia. There were two stages
of monitoring that can be divided into unofficial
and official pre-election periods.
Although official pre-election period is launched
after scheduling of the elections, in view of the fact
that the characteristics of a pre-election campaign
were evident earlier, ISFED launched monitoring of
pre-election processes on April 1, 2012. From April
1through July 31, 2012, ISFED monitored election
processes as part of unofficial election campaign,
whereas official pre-election campaign was moni-tored from August 1 up until the Election Day.
LTOs were monitoring the pre-election period by
means of specially designed electronic question-
naires. Prior to the launch of the monitoring, 73
LTOs of ISFED underwent two-day training in two
stages in pre-election monitoring and reporting meth-
odology.
To obtain comprehensive and thorough information,
ISFED identified concrete issues and designed mech-
anisms for obtaining information throughout the
monitoring. The monitoring mostly focused on is-
sues including
Abuse of administrative resources;
Vote buying, threats/pressure;
Violence and physical assault;
Interference with political activities;
Dismissals from work on political grounds;
Public meetings of political parties;
Promises made by election subjects;
The work of the election administration.
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ISFEDs LTOs received information from adminis-
trative agencies by means of requesting access to
public information, as well as from political parties,
media outlets and citizens. Further, they consistent-
ly attended and monitored meetings of political
parties and local self-government agencies, course
of these meetings and promises made to voters by
election subjects.
Key violations in the pre-election period
In frames of the pre-election monitoring, ISFED
published five interim reports on a monthly basis45
and a number of statements46.
Throughout the six-month pre-election monitoring,
ISFED reported multiple violations of election laws,
criminal offences and other types of violations. In
addition to studying the violations, ISFED also
called on the authorities to take efficient steps for
eliminating and preventing violations.
Scale of incidents reported by ISFED in pre-
election period according to their geographic scope:
Nature and dynamics of pre-election violations
was changing as the election processes entered their
active phase. At the beginning of the monitoring in
April-May, dismissals from work on political grounds
were most frequent. Later, as the elections ap-
proached, number of facts that involved use of
government resources, violence on political grounds,
physical clashes and use of administrative sanc-
tions/imprisonment on political grounds increased.
Pre-election violations were reported in almost all
regions of Georgia. Various types of violations
mostly prevailed in Gori, Kaspi, Dedoplistskaro,
Gurjaani, Akhmeta, Kutaisi and Batumi districts.47
The chart below illustrates the number of viola-
tions reported by ISFEDs LTOs from April 1 to
September 30, 2012:
Abuse of Government Resources
When identifying abuse of government resources,
ISFEDs LTOs mostly focused on the following
aspects: use of buildings/edifices funded from the
45 Pre-election monitoring reports are available at http://www.isfed.ge/eng/elections/reports/46 http://isfed.ge/pdf/2012-09-27(1).pdf47 Information about violations reported by ISFED in pre-election period is available at the elections portal http://
electionsportal.ge/en/incidents/map/pre-election/?source=1.1&category=all
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48 Although use of government resources is prohibited during official pre-election campaign only, ISFED reported all cases
that involved abuse of the resources both during official and unofficial pre-election campaigning49 See the map illustrating abuse of government resources reported by ISFED: http://electionsportal.ge/en/incidents/map/pre-
election/?source=1.1&category=3.0
state or municipal budgets, material goods, budget
programs and projects for the benefit of a political
party; involvement of public servants in pre-election
campaign/agitation.
Throughout the pre-election monitoring, ISFEDs
observers reported 73 cases that involved abuse of
government resources.
The map below illustrates geographic scope of
abuse of administrative resources reported by
ISFED in pre-election period:
Involvement of public servants and mostly, repre-
sentatives of local self-governments and law en-
forcement authorities in pre-election campaigning
and agitation meetings was the most common form
of abuse of government resources. Frequently, pub-
lic servants themselves acted as oppressors and/orwere engaged in physical assaults.48
In parallel to electoral processes entering their active
phase, the trend of individuals with different political
beliefs and opinions attending public meetings held
by the coalition Georgian Dream was revealed, in-
cluding Gamgebelis, public servants and trustees of
different communities or territorial agencies. Local
self-government officials were particularly active in
terms of interference with the political activities.
They also pressured local population which in addi-
tion to interference with political activities also amounts
to abuse of government resources. 49
Cases of abuse of government resources particularlyincreased as elections approached. Majority of the
violations were reported in Gurjaani, Sighnaghi,
Dedoplistskaro, Gori, Kaspi, Ozurgeti and Tkibuli
districts.
The chart below illustrates monthly dynamics of
abuse of government resources reported by IS-
FED:
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50 http://electionsportal.ge/ge/incidents/map/pre-election/?source=1.1&category=1.0
Politically Motivated Threats/Pressure
In alleged cases of politically motivated pressure,
LTOs reported facts including:
Threats made/pressure exerted against vot-
ers, party supporters, activists, commission
members, private property owners on polit-
ical grounds;
Use of mechanisms of violence against po-
litical opponents, their supporters and vot-
ers.
In frames of the monitoring, total of53 cases of
making threats/exerting pressure were reported.
The chart below illustrates geographic scope and
scale of facts of exerting pressure on political
grounds, as reported by ISFED in pre-election
period:
The monitoring showed that frequently mechanisms
of threats/pressures were used against citizens, po-
litical activists or individual entrepreneurs. Public
servants from municipal self-governments and law
enforcement authorities frequently threatened politi-
cally active citizens and mostly supporters of the
coalition Georgian Dream. Threats were made about
dismissal, termination of social benefits, etc., moti-
vated by various political activities of citizens, in-
cluding collection of voter signatures for various
purposes, attending opposition party meetings, re-
fusing to attend events held by the authorities,
participating in rallies.
Politically motivated pressure and threats frequently
also amounted to abuse of government resources.Public servants exerted pressure by abusing their
official power. Such violations were reported in
almost all regions of Georgia and particularly in
Gurjaani, Dedoplistskaro, Gori, Kaspi, Kutaisi,
Chokhatauri and Lanchkhuti district. 50
The chart below illustrates dynamics of political-
ly motivated cases of pressure/threats:
Dismissal from Work on Alleged Political Grounds
Dismissal from work on political grounds was one
of the most problematic issues during the pre-
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election environment. During monitoring ISFED
reported total of37 dismissals from work on polit-
ical grounds.
The map below illustrates geographic scope ofdismissals from work on political grounds re-
ported by ISFED during pre-election period:
Sympathy towards the Georgian Dream was most
frequently cited as the motive for dismissals from
work. Apparently, employees found political senti-ments of their employees and their activities in
favor of opposition party unacceptable. Employees
were most often dismissed from work on political
grounds in educational institutes and local self-
governments. Violations were particularly evident in
the regions of Kakheti and Imereti.51
ISFED was updating on a periodic basis the IATFwith reports of these violations, for the purpose of
taking further actions. After examining and verify-
ing ISFEDs reports, six persons were reinstated to
work.52 In remaining other cases, reinstatement was
impossible.
The chart below illustrates monthly dynamics of
dismissals from work on political grounds:
The chart below illustrates dismissals from work
reported by ISFED according to individual pro-
fessions:
51 See the map illustrating dismissals from work in pre-election period reported by ISFED at http://electionsportal.ge/en/
incidents/map/pre-election/?source=1.1&category=1.152 However, one of them refused to accept the job as he was not reinstated to his previous position but rather, was offered
an alternative job
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Violence/Physical Confrontation
In addition to other important matters, one of the
most pressing issues of the pre-election period was
frequent physical confrontations on political grounds.There were instances when a political dispute be-
tween persons with different political affiliation turned
into a clash and harsh violence. Opposing sides
frequently involved representatives of the Georgian
Dream and the UNM. Acts of physical violence
mostly occurred against supporters of the Georgian
Dream. However, there were individual acts of
violence against UNM representatives.53
Total of48 cases of physical confrontation on politi-
cal grounds was reported throughout monitoring in
Sighnaghi, Gurjaani, Sagarejo, Kaspi, Gori, Tbilisi,
Rustavi, Borjomi, Ninotsminda, Mestia, Samtredia,
Ozrugeti, Lanchkhuti, Kutaisi, Tskaltubo and Khobi.54
The map below illustrates geographic scope of the
acts of physical confrontation on political groundsreported by ISFED during pre-election period:
Growing of pre-election campaign into violence was
mostly caused by the law enforcements failure to
act. As frequency of acts of violence increased, the
IATF elaborated a recommendation, calling on the
law enforcement authorities to ensure that public
rallies are held under peaceful circumstances, in a
way that that allows keeping a distance betweenpersons with different opinions, so that risks of
physical confrontation are reduced. Regrettably, the
recommendation proved to be unsuccessful in pre-
venting physical confrontation on political grounds.
More importantly, frequency of such facts was in-
creased in August-September, with passive role of
the law enforcement authorities remaining to be a
problem. Frequently they failed to act on violationsin a timely manner and mostly arrested activists of
the Georgian Dream. Notably, court ordered dispro-
portionate sanctions against arrested individuals. The
monitoring revealed a trend in which court resorted
to maximum measure of administrative liability
administrative imprisonment - against arrested ac-
tivists of the coalition Georgian Dream, whereas it
resorted to minimum period of administrative im-prisonment against UNM supporters.
The chart below illustrates monthly dynamics of
acts physical confrontation:
53 ISFEDs statement on acts of physical confrontation is available at http://isfed.ge/pdf/2012-09-27(1).pdf54 Map illustrating incidents that involved physical confrontation is available at http://electionsportal.ge/en/incidents/map/pre-
election/?source=1.1&category=1.5
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Interference in Political Activities
One of the most important trends revealed in pre-
election period was interference in political activi-
ties. For instance, meetings held by the coalitionGeorgian Dream were attended by people holding
different political views and opinion, including Gamge-
belis, public servants, representatives of different
communities and territorial agencies. Representa-
tives of municipal authorities were particularly ac-
tive in interference of political activities and exert-
ed pressure on local population. Further, there were
instances of interference in political activities by
hindering spreading of agitation proclamations, dam-
aging/destroying agitation materials, etc. Total of
32 violations were reported by ISFED throughout
monitoring mostly in Kakheti, Imereti and Shida
Kartli regions55.
The map below illustrates geographic scope ofthe acts of interference in political activities re-
ported by ISFED during pre-election period:
Acts of interference in political activities showed
signs of crime envisaged by Article 166 of the
Criminal Code of Georgia. In particular, frequently
interference in political activities was perpetrated
by violence, threats of violence or abuse of official
power.
The chart below illustrates monthly dynamics of
interference in political activities:
Measures of administrative liability used against
political activists
Administrative arrests on political grounds particu-
larly prevailed in August-September. Out of the
total of 21 cases, majority was reported in Gori,
Kaspi, Gurjaani, Dedoplistskaro, Sagarejo and Rustavi
districts. 56
The map below illustrates geographic scope of
using measures of administrative liability report-
ed by ISFED during pre-election period:
55 Interference in political activities: http://electionsportal.ge/en/incidents/map/pre-election/?source=1.1&category=1.756 ISFEDs statement about arrests on political grounds is available at http://isfed.ge/pdf/2012-09-27(1).pdf
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Administrative detainees mostly included activists
or supporters of opposition parties, even if they had
not initiated physical confrontation. In late Septem-
ber frequency of using administrative imprisonment
as sanction against political party supporters was
unprecedentedly increased. Around 34 activists were
imprisoned on administrative charges, whereas more
than 15 persons were sentenced to administrative
sanction. Political activists were arrested by law
enforcement authorities on charges of hooliganism
and/or disobedience to lawful orders of the police.
Charges frequently lacked due substantiation. Fur-
ther, almost all of the cases involved violation of
mandatory human rights standards by failure of the
authorities to explain grounds of the arrest or to
provide access to a lawyer.
The chart below illustrates monthly dynamics of
use of administrative measures against political
activists:
Vote Buying
ISFED reported 12 cases that showed signs of vote
buying throughout the monitoring.
The map below illustrates geographic scope ofalleged vote buying reported by ISFED during
pre-election period:
These trends mostly entailed transferring of or prom-
ising to transfer various types of gifts to voters by
political subjects or their representatives. Vote buy-ing was perpetrated both by the Georgian Dream57
57 Statement of NGOs about Komagi Foundation is available at http://www.isfed.ge/pdf NGO_Statem-
ent_on_the_Creation_of_the_Charity_Foundation_Komagi_May15_2012_geo.pdf Further, five young men were arrested in
Kutaisi on charges of vote buying by the coalition Georgian Dream. Information obtained by ISFED is available in the
third interim report of pre-election monitoring, p.19; http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ISFED_report_3ENG.pdf
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as well as the UNM representatives. 58 ISFEDs
report also contained alleged facts of vote buying59
by Christian-Democratic Movement as well. 60
The chart below illustrates monthly dynamics ofvote buying:
Interference in the work of NGOs
During pre-election monitoring, ISFED reported 7
cases where the organizations observers were sub-
jected to pressure. These incidents occurred in Lanch-
khuti, Khobi, Oni, Kaspi and Kharagauli districts.61
Particularly severe forms of interference in the workof NGOs were reported in Lanchkhuti and Kharagauli
municipalities. Lanchkhuti Municipality Gamgebeli
grossly interfered in the work of observers. While
communicating with ISFEDs coordinator, he tried
to interfere in and criticized her work. Head of the
department, where ISFEDs observer is employed,
tried to dismiss her.62 Similar case was reported in
Kharagauli district, where ISFEDs LTO was threat-
ened with dismissal due to the fact that her em-
ployer deemed her work as political activity.
Media Environment in Pre-Election Period
Interference in Journalistic Reporting
During the pre-election period, ISFED identified 23
cases that involved interference with journalistic
reporting and subjecting journalists to pressure/threats63,
including 10 cases that showed signs of physical
assault. In most of the cases, violence was exerted
against representatives of Maestro TV and TV9companies, Info 9 media outlet and other regional
media.
The map below illustrates geographic scope of
interference in journalistic reporting reported by
ISFED during pre-election period:
58 See third interim report of ISFED, p.20. http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ISFED_report_3ENG.pdf59 Photo material available at https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.370145629715437.87957.174947139235288&type=160 See ISFEDs fifth interim report, pp.14-15 http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/ISFED%20Fifth%20Interim%20Report%20ENG.pdf61 Detailed information about interference in activities of ISFEDs LTO is available at http://electionsportal.ge/en/incidents/
map/pre-election/?source=1.1&category=4.062 Special statement on pressure exerted against LTO in Lanchkhuti available at http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/2012-07-23.pdf63 http://electionsportal.ge/en/incidents/map/pre-election/?source=1.1&category=4.0
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The chart below illustrates monthly dynamics of
interference in journalistic reporting:
Must carry & Must offer
During the pre-election period media was rather
diverse. Television, press, radio and Internet provid-
ed access to variety of information. The problem
was that citizens of Georgia and particularly those
living in the regions lacked equal access to all
media outlets and in particular, to outlets criticizing
the government. The problem was mostly caused bythe fact that majority of cable companies refused to
carry broadcasters known for their criticism of the
government.
Transferring of satellite dish antennas and related
equipment to citizens of Georgia by Maestro TV
and Global Compact Consulting under preferential
terms for the purpose of broadening coverage zoneresulted in impounding by court of the equipment
imported and stored by both companies in Georgia,
while equipment that had already been sold was
deemed vote buying. In this light, it is safe to say
that media environment did not provide equal op-
portunities for election subjects. To address the
issue, on May 7, 2012, members of the It Affects
You Too campaign submitted legal proposals to the
parliament of Georgia enacting must carry and
must offer regulations. In particular, all cable pro-
vider systems were obligated to carry all generalbroadcasters that have corresponding license up until
the Election Day. Cable operators were also obli-
gated to carry the TV channels available to at least
20% of the Georgian population. Broadcasters in
return were prohibited from refusing cable provider
systems to carry their channel.
After the Parliament of Georgia adopted the so-
called must carry and must offer regulations for the
Election Code, access to media known for its crit-
icism was greatly improved throughout Georgia as
the official pre-election campaign commenced. En-
actment of the law was welcomed by the It Affects
You Too campaign. However, it suggested that theregulations also apply beyond the Election Day.
Monitoring of public meetings held by parties
during pre-election period
Throughout the pre-election period ISFED was closely
monitoring public meetings held by political/elec-
tion subjects and pre-election promises voiced at
these meetings.
The monitoring shows that most of the public meet-
ings in pre-election period were held by the coali-
tion Georgian Dream and the United National Move-
ment. The New Rights and the Christian Democrat-
ic Movement were also active in this respect.
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The chart below illustrates statistics of public
meetings monitored by ISFED from April 1 up
until the Election Day:
In addition to monitoring public meetings held by
political parties, ISFED was also registering elec-
tion promises made to voters during these meetings.
Key promises voiced by the coalition GeorgianDream:
Development of agriculture
Opening of agricultural extension centers in
all municipalities
Setting up a billion dollar fund for agricul-
ture and improving infrastructure
Increasing salaries for teachers
Universal insurance that will cover all types
of surgeries
Creation of jobs.
Key promises voiced by the UNM
Tackling social problems
Tackling the problem of gasification
Tackling the problem of employment
New insurance packages for citizens of
Georgia
New rural programs
Tackling unemployment.
Key promises voiced by the New Rights
300% increase of rural budget
Setting up a Rural Bank for farmers and
providing the population of rural areas with
universal access to agriculture insurance
Providing access to agricultural equipment
Reducing prices of fuel and pesticides;
Improving access to drinking water
Universal access to healthcare and educa-
tion.
Key promises voiced by the Christian Democrat-
ic Movement
Providing employment opportunities for theyouth
Tackling the gasification problem
Improving infrastructure in highland regions
Improving access to irrigation and drinking
water
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X. The Election Day
Monitoring Mission
ISFEDs monitoring mission for the October 1,
2012 Parliamentary Elections was composed of1271
accredited and trained observers distributed among
precinct, district and central election commissions.
ISFED observed total of 902 election precincts
throughout 73 election districts of Georgia. Out of
902 short-term observers, 600 were dislocated at
randomly selected election precincts. In addition to
randomly selected precincts, ISFED also monitored
302 election precincts, including special precinctsset up at penitentiary facilities and military units. In
implementing its monitoring mission, in addition to
short-term observers ISFED also utilized 73 district
observers, 78 mobile teams, two observers at the
CEC, 15 lawyers and 15 operators.
During the first stage of preparations for the Election
Day, with the help of foreign experts ISFED designed
a methodology, the system of reporting and commu-
nication, database, forms of monitoring, instructions,
guidelines and other election materials. During the
second stage of preparations, ISFED selected 22 train-
ers and conducted the following trainings:
57 trainings for short-term observers
4 trainings for 73 district observers
4 trainings for 73 mobile teams
Training for 15 lawyers
Training for 15 hot-line operators
ISFED selected members of the Election Day mon-
itoring mission based on results of testing that
training participants had undergone.
Monitoring Methodology
ISFED monitored the Election Day at 600 election
precincts by utilizing Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT),
a leading methodology of election observation. Ob-
servers had been distributed among 73 statistically
sound, representative and randomly selected elec-
tion districts.
Utilization of the PVT Methodology on the Elec-
tion Day allowed ISFED to
Collect and analyze the quantitative and
qualitative information from randomly se-
lected precincts;
Evaluate the whole process of elections in a
systemic and impartial manner, including
opening, voting, closing, vote count and
tabulation;
Receive fact-based reports to act on for
improving the process;
Uncover flaws/violations during opening of
precincts, polling and vote count;
Generalize the information received from
randomly selected precincts throughout thecountry;
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Verify official results for proportional elections;64
On September 26, ISFED conducted a complete simulation of the PVT for testing observers, operators, the
database, communication and SMS reporting system. Throughout the one-hour long simulation, 97% of
observers carried out reporting successfully.
There were two centers operating at the central office on the Election Day PVT SMS center and the
incidents center.
Notably, for the first time in Georgian for 2012 parliamentary elections ISFED carried out reporting by means
of the system of SMS reporting. Throughout the day information received from observers by text messages
was gathered in a software program and verified by operators when needed. Verified reports were processed
and analyzed by a group of experts.
Any violation monitored at election precincts or districts on the Election Day was reported to the incidents
center comprised by 15 lawyers. Observers took further actions after consulting with the lawyers. Verified
and processed information was recorded by lawyers in the incidents database, entailing not only violation
reports but also information about complaints filed with election precincts and districts.
After reports received from incidents and SMS centers were processed, five complaints were filed on the
Election Day over the course of elections, trends identified, violations observed and results, of which public
was updated by means of the website and press-conferences.
On the Election Day ISFED held the following 5 press-conferences:
I 01.10.12, at 10:00 opening/setting up a precinct
II 01.10.12, at 13:30 polling process/activities during the period of 12 hours
III 01.10.12, at 18:30 polling process/ activities during the period of 17 hours
IV 01.10.12, at 22:30 polling process/closing of precincts
V 02.10.12, at 11:00 vote count/results
Results of PVT Monitoring
Opening of Precincts
Most of the election precincts were opened on time on the Election Day. There were no large-scale violations
in this respect.
64 Randomly selected election precincts are representative for the whole country and therefore, results reflected only the
national elections
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In 77.2% cases, slight flaws were reported with respect to opening and setting up of20.3% election
precincts. Opening of 2.5% election precincts was carried out in violation of applicable legal
procedures.
91% of election precincts were ready to receive first voter at 08:00am, same as in 2008 parliamen-tary elections.
The Voting Procedures
Based on the analysis of PVT results, it is safe to conclude that the polling was conducted mostly in a
peaceful environment with only isolated incidents reported. At most of the precincts polling was carried out
in abidance with applicable legal procedures. Polling started on time throughout the country and voters were
able to freely express their will. By first half of the day, a high voter turnout was reported at most of the
precincts throughout Tbilisi, resulting in lines outside election precincts; however, no chaos or disturbances
were reported. Although there were many people at entrances of polling stations, overcrowding inside stations
was reported only at 3% of election precincts.
Based on the analysis of reports received from PVT election precincts showed that
At 6% of polling stations marking p