analysis of the 1999 parliamentary elections -...
TRANSCRIPT
Analysis of the 1999 Parliamentary Elections
Patterns, Trends and Motives
Univ.-Prof. Dr. Fritz Plasser (University of Innsbruck)Univ.-Doz. Dr. Peter A. Ulram (FESSEL-GfK Institute for Market
Research)Dr. Franz Sommer (ZAP - Center for Applied Political Research)
Vienna, October 4, 1999
This report can also be found at the ZAP homepage: http://www.zap.or.at.
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Table of Contents
Page
0. Preliminary remarks 3
1. Pre-electoral situation and election results 4
2. When the voter made his/her decision 6
3. Voting behaviour of the party changers 7
4. The voter’s key motives for making his/her choice 9
5. Voting behaviour by socio-demographic groups 11
6. Traditional determinants and new cleavages in voting behaviour 17
7. Transformation of the party system 19
8. References 21
9. The authors 22
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0. Preliminary remarks
This report provides a first sociological analysis of the voting behaviour in Austria in
the 1999 parliamentary elections. In terms of method, the analysis is based on the data
of a representative exit poll.
A nation-wide sample of N = 2,200 voters were interviewed about their voting
behaviour and the motives for choosing a particular party immediately after leaving
the polling stations. The FESSEL-GfK (Institute for Market Research) selected – by
random sampling – 160 locations throughout Austria. The task of the 110 interviewers
working for the institute was to interview the voters after they had left the polling
station within a certain time-frame (in the morning and early afternoon on election
day). Furthermore, the choice of the interviewees was based on a predetermined
gender- and age-specific quota sampling plan.
Due to time constraints, the present report deals only with the most significant
structures and patterns of the voting behaviour. A comprehensive analysis of the
changes of the voting behaviour as well as the competitive conditions of the Austrian
party system is in preparation.1
1 Fritz Plasser, Peter A. Ulram, Franz Sommer (editors). Das österreichische Wahlverhalten. Wien 2000 (inpreparation).
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1. Pre-electoral situation and election results
The 1999 parliamentary election campaign was one of the most dramatic in Austria's
Second Republic. Its initial phase was shaped by the confrontation between the two
government parties SPO and OVP, characterised to a large extent by issue-related
positioning. This allowed the FPO to seize the opportunity and tap into an undefined
wish for change and modify its public image by nominating a new leading candidate
(industrialist Thomas Prinzhorn). In the first half of September, the direction of the
campaign issues and the general mood underwent a significant change brought about
by the publication of the results of opinion polls in particular, which seemed to show
the FPO in a clear lead vis-à-vis the OVP, and by the massive coverage and
commentary of the elections by the mass media. With the exception of the issue of
foreigners, controversial political issues were increasingly pushed into the background,
whereas speculations on the outcome of the elections, coalition scenarios and the like
came to the fore. Considering this, it seems worth mentioning that after all 20 percent
of the voters (included in the exit poll) said that they were directly or partly influenced
by the publications of opinion poll results in the media as to their voting behaviour.
The election results of October 3 not only showed a strong decrease in the voter
turnout – with 76 percent, or a drop of nearly nine percent, compared to 1995 the
lowest voter turnout ever in the Second Republic – but also indicated massive losses of
votes for the SPO (approximately 326,000 votes, or a loss of 4.7 percent and 6 seats)
and even greater gains for the FPO (plus 5.3 percent and 12 seats; approx. 160,000
additional votes). On the other hand, with minus 1.4 percent, the losses of the OVP
were rather moderate (number of seats remained unchanged). At the time of this
analysis, the question whether OVP or FPO will come in second is still open, as the
two parties are only separated by about 14,000 votes, and there are about 200,000
absentee ballots (cast by people voting outside their usual districts) yet to be counted.
The Greens increased their share of votes from 4.8 to 7.1 percent (plus 4 seats). The
Liberal Forum remained clearly below the 4-percent mark with 3.4 percent, or minus
2.1 percent, and is now no longer represented in the new parliament. A total of 2
percent of the votes went to other parties.
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Table: Parliamentary elections in Austria 1979–1999
In percent SPO OVP FPO GREENS LIF DU
1979 51.0 41.9 6.1 n. c. n. c. n. c.
1983 47.7 43.2 4.9 3.3 n. c. n. c.
1986 43.1 41.3 9.7 4.8 n. c.. n. c.
1990 42.8 32.1 16.6 4.8 n. c. n. c.
1994 34.9 27.7 22.5 7.3 6.0 n. c.
1995 38.1 28.3 21.9 4.8 5.5 n. c.
1999*) 33.4 26.9 27.2 7.1 3.4 1.0
*) Preliminary result excl. absentee ballots.
n. c. = no candidacy.
List of Austrian Parties:
German German abbr. English English abbr.SozialdemokratischePartei Österreichs
SPÖ Social DemocraticParty of Austria
SPO
ÖsterreichischeVolkspartei
ÖVP Austrian People’sParty
OVP
Freiheitliche ParteiÖsterreichs
FPÖ Freedom Party ofAustria
FPO
Die Grünen - The Greens -Liberales Forum LIF Liberal Forum LIFDie Unabhängigen DU - -
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2. When the voter made his/her decision
One fifth of the voters of the parliamentary elections did not make their final decision
as to which party to vote for until the last days and weeks before October 3. The
percentage of “late” and “last-minute deciders” roughly corresponds to that in 1995.
According to the representative exit poll carried out by FESSEL-GfK, the voters of the
smaller parties GREENS, LIF (and DU) were among the last to make up their minds.
However, when exactly the voters of the three major parties made their decision is of
particular interest and corresponds to the course of the election campaign. As far as
both the SPO and FPO are concerned, each garnered 15 percent of the late deciders.
On the other hand, 18 percent of the OVP voters decided rather late, with 12 percent of
the OVP group having made their definite decision only during the last couple of days
before the election. A fact that proves the extraordinary mobilisation of the voter
potential sympathetic to the OVP in the final phase of the election campaign.
Table: Trends regarding the time of the voting decision (1979–1999)
Percentage ofvoters who madea definitedecision...
1979 1983 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999
late deciders(shortly beforethe election)
9 8 16 14 18 21 20
early deciders(earlier on)
91 92 84 86 82 79 80
Source: FESSEL-GfK, exit polls (1979–1999).
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3. Voting behaviour of the party changers
According to their statements, 18 percent of the voters of the election on October 3,
1999 voted for a party other than the one they had voted for in the 1995 parliamentary
elections, which roughly corresponds to the average figures of the elections in the
nineties. The slight decrease in party changers from 1995 to 1999 has to be seen in the
light of the significant drop in voter turnout, which affected the SPO to a much
stronger degree than the OVP.
Table: Share of party changers in parliamentary elections (1979–1999)
Percentage of voters in theparliamentary elections
1979 1983 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999
... who voted for another partythis time
7 10 16 17 19 20 18
Source: FESSEL-GfK, exit polls (1986–1999).
The profile of the party changers clearly differs from that of the electorate as a whole
in several points. In relative terms, the strongest group is formed by the 30 to 44-year
olds making up 44 percent of all party changers. The share of secondary school
graduates/university graduates (50 percent) and white-collar workers (38 percent) is
high above average. On the other hand, the share of party changers among the older
voters and people with a lower educational level is clearly below average. Gender-
specific differences as a whole are comparatively small. In a detailed analysis,
however, they are quite telling: for instance, 63 percent of those who switched over
from the SPO to the FPO and 57 percent of those who went over from the OVP to the
FPO are men.
As with all elections since 1986, the FPO was able to garner the largest share of party
changers with 37 percent (1999), followed by the Greens with 17 percent, the OVP
with 16 percent and the SPO with 15 percent. In analytical terms, 83 percent of the
SPO and OVP voters each had already voted for the respective party in 1995. The
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OVP was able to win slightly more former Green and LIF voters than the SPO. As
regards the FPO voters of 1999, approx. 60 percent are former FPO voters. Moreover,
the FPO was able to win more former SPO voters than former OVP voters. The
Greens, too, won more votes from the SPO than from the OVP. With 8% and 9%
respectively, the share of first-time voters who voted for the FPÖ and the Greens was
significantly larger than that of voters who voted for the SPO (4%) and OVP (3%).
Table: Voting behaviour of party changers (1986–1999)
Percentage of party changerswho voted*)
SPO OVP FPO GREENS LIF DU
Parl. El. 1986 10 24 39 22 n. c. n. c.
Parl. El. 1990 15 11 51 9 n. c. n. c.
Parl. El. 1994 9 10 40 15 24 n. c.
Parl. El. 1995 25 21 34 5 13 n. c.
Parl. El. 1999 15 16 37 17 8 4
Source: FESSEL-GfK, exit polls (1986–1999).
*) Remaining percentage to make up 100%: other parties and rounding errors.
n. c. = no candidacy
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4. The voter’s key motives for making his/her choice
Motives for voting SPO
The reasons for deciding in favour of the Social Democratic Party (SPO) given by
almost two thirds of the SPO voters were: maintaining political and social stability
(65%), and the representation of interests and tradition (62%). Securing jobs and social
benefits ranked third (55%). The fact that the SPO advocates the preservation of
neutrality and opposes NATO membership was a central motive for 44% of the SPO
voters, and preventing a coalition between OVP and FPO was decisive for 38%. Last
on the list of the “reasons” as indicated by opinion polls is the leading candidate of the
SPO, Viktor Klima (35%).
Motives for voting OVP
The list of the motives for voting in favour of the OVP was headed by the
representation of interests and tradition (69% of the OVP voters). Quite equally rated
were the OVP’s economic competence (44%), preventing political instability (44%)
and the desire to prevent the FPO from outperforming the OVP (40%). Next on the list
is the party’s program of promoting the family and the personality of the leading
candidate (35% and 22%, respectively). Significant differences can be observed,
however, between traditional OVP voters and those who switched to the OVP from
other parties. In the group of party changers, 59 percent stated that it was most
important to them to prevent the OVP from falling behind the FPO; 50 percent
mentioned the prevention of political instability as an additional motive. The reasons
in favour of the OVP thus reflect the effect of the mobilisation of the voter potential
sympathetic to the OVP during the final phase of the election campaign.
Motives for voting FPO
The most important reasons given for voting in favour of the FPO were the disclosure
of irregularities and scandals (65%), and the wish for a breath of fresh air (63%). The
immigrants issue, however, was of central significance for only 47% of the FPO voters
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(fourth on the list after representation of interests and tradition). From a socio-
demographic point of view, their anti-immigration views played a more important role
for female pensioners (two thirds) and blue-collar workers (50%). Both, the
personality of Jörg Haider (40%) and the desire to teach the two coalition parties a
lesson (36%) were of comparatively lower significance.
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5. Voting behaviour by socio-demographic groups
The continuing transformation of the Austrian party system is reflected in significant
changes in the voting behaviour of individual population and professional groups.
Considering the present data it is no exaggeration to speak of a “realignment”, i.e. the
reorientation of voting behaviour in Austria. In breaking down the voting behaviour,
not only must members of individual professional groups be considered, but also
includes gender- and age-specific reorientations. Traditional determinants of the
Austrian voting behaviour provide fewer and fewer explanations. Issue-related
expectations and general sentiment, on the other hand, seem more and more to explain
patterns of voting behaviour.
The reorientation mentioned above primarily affects striking gender-specific
differences in voting behaviour: among male voters; the FPO - though by a narrow
margin – has become the strongest party among men with a share of votes of 32
percent. The SPO was elected by 31 percent, the OVP by 26 percent of male voters.
Five percent of the male voters opted for the Greens, three percent for the Liberal
Forum.
The FPO scored particularly high (34%) among the group of men who are not yet
employed (mainly younger males who are still in vocational training and/or at school).
Twenty-five percent of this population group voted for the OVP, 14 percent for the
Greens, and only one out of ten voted for the SPO and the Liberal Forum. As regards
male voters, it is only among pensioners that the SPO is clearly in the lead (41%).
OVP and FPO have an equal share with 27 percent and 28 percent respectively among
male pensioners.
The competitive situation concerning women shows a totally different picture. Among
female voters, the SPO remains the strongest party by far with a share of 35 percent.
Twenty-seven percent of the women voted in favour of the OVP, 21 percent for the
FPO, 9 percent for the Greens and four percent for the Liberal Forum. The Social
Democratic Party scored highest with female pensioners. Forty-five percent of the
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female pensioners voted for the SPO, 32 percent for the OVP and only 19 percent for
the FPO.
In addition to the gender-specific differences regarding the voting behaviour,
significant age-specific differences became visible. Among the voters below the age of
30, the FPO was by far the strongest party with a share of 35 percent. Twenty-five
percent of those belonging to the younger generation of voters made their decision in
favour of the SPO, only 17 percent voted for the OVP. Thirteen percent of those under
30 voted for the Greens, four percent for the Liberal Forum.
Among the voters in the age group 30 to 44, SPO and FPO are neck and neck with
shares of 32 and 29 percent, respectively, 23 percent of this age group voted for the
OVP. Only among members of the older generation of voters (60 years and older), the
two governing parties both have an outstandingly high percentage of votes.
Changes, however, can also be seen in the voting behaviour of the traditional core
voters of the SPO and the OVP. Among the self-employed and those in liberal
professions, the OVP is still the strongest party with a share of 41%, 33% of this
professional group, however, turned to the FPO this time. It was only among farmers
that the traditional predominance of the OVP was preserved. 87% of Austria’s full-
time farmers voted for the OVP.
It is perfectly legitimate to speak of a spectacular development as regards the
reorientation in terms of voting among the Austrian blue-collar workers. Forty-eight
percent of foremen and skilled workers voted for the FPO. Only 31 percent of the
members of this professional group voted for the SPO, the traditional workers’ party.
Even among semi-skilled and unskilled workers, the FPO has become the strongest
party with a share of 45 percent. Only 40 percent of the members of this professional
segment voted for the Social Democrats, a mere 10 percent for the OVP.
The SPO, however, was able to stand its ground regarding its predominance in
elections among male and female pensioners: 43 percent of the pensioners voted for
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the SPO, 30 percent for the OVP and 24 percent for the FPO. The pattern among
housewives, however, is less uniform. Thirty-three percent voted for the SPO, whereas
the OVP and FPO with 26 percent and 25 percent respectively are de facto on a rather
equal footing. Among voters who are still at school or in vocational training, the
characteristic features of the changes in voting behaviour have become more obvious:
one out of every five in this group of voters opted either for the SPO, the OVP, the
FPO or the Greens.
One indication of how dramatic the final phase of the election campaign was, is
provided by the data on the behaviour of those voters who – according to their own
statements – had made their definite decision only in the last few days before the
election. Twenty-nine percent of these “last-minute deciders” voted for the OVP, 22
percent for the SPO, 17 percent for the FPO and 14 percent for the Greens. However,
among those voters who - according to their own statements - had made up their minds
as to who to vote for as late as in the last one or two weeks before the election – the
“late deciders“ – the SPO was the strongest party with a share of 30 percent. The FPO
came second with a share of 25 percent. Eighteen percent and 17 percent respectively
of the “late deciders” voted for the OVP or the Greens.
The voting behaviour of the party changers is also most telling: 37 percent of the party
changers voted for the FPO and 17 percent for the Greens. The OVP was able to
attract only 16 percent, the SPO only 15 percent of the party changers. Switching
parties, of course, only partly explains the shift in votes. Due to the strong decrease in
the voter turnout, the number of those who abstained from voting as a sign of protest
also contributed to the losses that the governing parties, in particular, had suffered.
However, as only those who voted could be interviewed within the scope of an exit
poll, the following data do not provide any indications for the quantification of the
non-voter effect.
The comparison of a series of five representative exit polls so far offers insight into
long-term changes of selected groups of voters. Compared to the 1995 parliamentary
elections, the SPO had done slightly better among white-collar workers, the OVP
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slightly worse. Compared to the parliamentary elections of 1986, the SPO lost four
percent, the OVP lost 13 percent and the FPO won nine percent.
The reorientation in the voting behaviour of the Austrian workers is far more dramatic.
While in 1986 the SPO was still elected by 57 percent of Austria’s workers, this figure
decreased to a mere 35 percent in 1999. In other words, the Social Democratic Party
has lost 22 percent points in its core group within the last 13 years. In the same period,
the OVP’s share among workers was reduced by 50 percent. In 1999, a mere 12
percent of the workers voted for the OVP, whereas the FPO has become the strongest
party among workers. While in 1986 only ten percent who voted for the FPO, 47
percent did so in 1999. Within a period of 13 years, not only did the FPO quadruple its
share of votes among the workers but also became by far the predominant workers’
party since the 1999 parliamentary elections.
Table: Changes in the voting behaviour of selected voter groups: blue-collarworkers
In percent SPO OVP FPO GREENS LIF
Parl. El. 1986 57 26 10 4 *
Parl. El. 1990 52 21 21 2 *
Parl. El. 1994 47 15 29 4 2
Parl. El. 1995 41 13 34 3 4
Parl. El. 1999 35 12 47 2 1
Changes (1986–1999) -22 -14 +37 -2 -1
Source: FESSEL-GfK, exit polls (1986–1999).
Due to strong gains in other professional groups, the proportion of workers (blue-
collar) among the FPO voters has at the same time diminished overall. Twenty-seven
percent of the FPO voters now come from the working class, while in 1995 35 percent
were from this group. The rise of the FPO to become the predominant workers’ party
indicates deep changes in the social basis of the Austrian parties. The political
reorientation of the workers is unprecedented in the extent of the change when
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compared to the situation in Western Europe. Twenty years ago, four percent of
Austrian workers voted for the Freedom Party, while in 1999 47 percent did so. This
means that the FPO share has risen more than tenfold during this period.
By contrast, the voting behaviour of working women has only slightly changed as
compared to 1995. The SPO lost about three percent, and the OVP was able to
maintain its share of votes, while the Greens managed to win five percent among
female workers.
However, the attractiveness of the governing parties among the younger voting
generation has continued to decline. Only 25 percent of the voters under 30 voted for
the SPO, and only 17 percent cast their vote for the OVP. With a 35 percent share of
the votes, the FPO is by far the strongest party in this age group. The Greens, however,
also made an above-average showing in this age group with a share of 13 percent.
There are striking changes in the voting behaviour of the civil servants and public-
sector workers. In 1995, the SPO posted its strongest gains especially in this
professional group, appealing to 48 percent of this voter group, whereas in 1999 its
share of votes dropped to a mere 33 percent. On the other hand, the OVP posted an
increase of some 10 percent among civil servants and public-sector workers, following
close behind the Social Democrats at 30 percent.
As in the preceding parliamentary elections, the gender-specific composition of the
party constituencies partly shows significant differences. Once again, the structure of
the FPO constituency is predominantly male: 62 percent of the FPO voters are male.
On the other hand, women predominate among the voters of the Greens: 63 percent of
the constituency of the Greens is female. Thus, the Greens have a larger proportion of
women among their voters than the Liberal Forum.
The age-specific differences in the 1999 parliamentary elections remained unchanged.
Middle-aged voters and those of the elder generation make up the majority of the
voters of the two governing parties. The voters of the three opposition parties, by
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contrast, are comparably younger. Three out of four voters of the Greens, for instance,
are under 45, as are about 60 percent of the FPO voters.
As regards the level of education, the differences are similarly significant. Nearly three
quarters of Liberal Forum voters have at least completed secondary higher education,
as have two thirds of those opting for the Greens. Graduates from secondary schools or
university graduates make up 41 percent of the OVP voters. The proportion of SPO
and FPO voters with a higher educational level is 30 percent each.
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6. Traditional determinants and new cleavages in voting behaviour
The voting behaviour of persons who are strongly affiliated with a religious
denomination has remained steady in the course of time, although their share in the
electorate has continuously declined. In these elections, 59 percent of the voters who
were strongly affiliated with a particular religion – defined as regular attendance of the
church service – have voted for the OVP, 20 percent for the SPO and only 13 percent
for the FPO. On the other hand, the formative influence of union affiliation, which is
the second traditional determinant of voting behaviour in Austria, has become slightly
weaker. Forty-nine percent of the union members voted for the SPO, whereas nine
years ago this figure had been 62 percent. In 1999, 21 percent of the union members
voted for the FPO. Thus, the share of FPO voters among union members has doubled
within nine years. The proportion of the OVP, however, is comparably stable: 19
percent of the union-member employees again voted for the Austrian People’s Party in
these elections.
In the late 90s, however, these traditional determinants are no longer sufficient to
describe the complexity of the Austrian voting behaviour. New conflicts and shifts are
meanwhile shaping the voting behaviour of the Austrians to a greater extent than the
affiliation with a particular church or union membership. Due to time constraints, the
authors can only deal with the fundamental changes in the conflicting structure of the
Austrian party system.
• Class voting, which shaped the Austrian voting behaviour until the 70s is a thing of
the past. Only 35 percent of the blue-collar voters opted for the Social Democratic
Party, while 60 percent voted for centre-right parties, of which the FPO managed to
attract 47 percent. The behaviour of the white-collar voters also shows only relics
of traditional class voting. In this group, too, the Social Democratic Party is in
fierce competition with the OVP and FPO, but also with the new post-materialistic
and libertarian parties such as the Greens or the Liberal Forum.
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• The most striking gender-specific differences in voting behaviour can be found
with the FPO, which is number one among men, but continues to rank third in the
group of female voters. It is a gender gap which has only been seen in the voting
behaviour in the US, where the Republican Party, similar to the FPO, has caused a
gender-specific polarisation in voting behaviour.
• Age is another significant dividing factor in the Austrian voting behaviour. Only 42
percent of the voters under 30 opted for the SPO or OVP. The FPO has become the
strongest party by far among the members of younger generations of voters with a
share of 35 percent. But even in the 60 plus age group, pensioners no longer
concentrate their votes on the two traditional parties. The SPO and OVP continue
to have an above-average share of voters among senior citizens, and, consequently,
the governing parties have an obviously overly aged voter structure. However, with
a share of 23 percent, this time the FPO has become a competitive factor in this
voting sector.
• Since the 1994 parliamentary elections the Austrian election researchers have also
pointed to a new shift in the voting behaviour between the sheltered and
unsheltered production sector, for which there is empirical evidence in the 1999
parliamentary elections. Only 21 percent of the public-sector employees voted for
the FPO as compared to 31 percent of the employees in the private sector. This is
also reflected in the voting behaviour of non-union member employees. The OVP
and FPO have an equal share of 30 percent each among non-union members, while
the SPO is only the third-largest party in this voter segment with a 24 percent
share.
• The voting behaviour of persons living in a worker household shows how
permeable the “Lager”, which are so characteristic for Austria, have become. This
is the line along which the conflict and competition runs between the SPO (41
percent share) and FPO (38 percent share), which are steering an increasingly
fiercer confrontational course within this social class.
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7. Transformation of the party system
The 1999 parliamentary elections were a turning point and point to far-reaching
consequences for the Austrian party system. The historic arrangement of a party
system which is held in a state of equilibrium by two dominating parties embedded in
firmly established social milieus has definitely become history. What took shape at the
1996 election of the European Parliament for the first time – the competition between
three parties of roughly the same size – has turned into reality for Austrian
parliamentary elections on October 3. Long-term changes in the underlying structures
of party competition, which only seemingly came to a halt in the 1995 parliamentary
elections, have continued to progress under the surface and contributed to a
transformation which is unprecedented in Austria. The particular cornerstones of this
transformation are as follows:
• the dramatic losses of the Social Democratic Party, which hit an all-time low in the
1999 parliamentary elections;
• the stalemate situation between the FPO and OVP regarding the election outcome,
as only after the counting of the absentee ballots it will be clear which of the two
parties will actually rank second or third by a very narrow margin;
• the spectacular reorientation in the voting behaviour of the Austrian workers,
which made the FPO the dominant workers’ party;
• the fundamental reorientation of the voting behaviour in the younger generation of
voters, to the detriment of the two traditional parties SPO and OVP;
• the far-reaching changes in the conflicting structures of the Austrian party system,
which threatens to force the two traditional parties SPO and OVP in particular into
the opposition;
• the clear decline of voter turnout compared to former Austrian elections including
the rise in voting abstention as a sign of protest;
• the volatile moods of a public opinion which is to an increasing degree controlled
by the press concentrating on editorial news value and on circulation;
• finally, the problems of governing and in finding a functioning government
majority.
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The 1999 parliamentary elections were obviously a vote for change as well as an
expression of fundamental changes in society. In the next weeks it will be equally
important to give a responsible answer as well as to reasonably interpret the voters’
undefined desire for political changes in the country.
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8. References
Bürklin, Wilhelm/Klein, Markus: Wahlen und Wählerverhalten. Eine Einführung, 2. Auflage,Opladen 1998.
Müller, Wolfgang C./Plasser, Fritz/Ulram, Peter A. (Hg.): Wählerverhalten undParteienwettbewerb. Analysen zur Nationalratswahl 1994, Wien 1995.
Müller, Wolfgang C./Plasser, Fritz/Ulram, Peter A.: Schwäche als Vorteil, Stärke alsNachteil. Die Reaktionen der Parteien auf den Rückgang der Wählerbindungen in Österreich,in: Peter Mair/Wolfgang C. Müller/Fritz Plasser (Hg.): Parteien auf komplexenWählermärkten, Wien 1999.
Plasser, Fritz/Ulram, Peter A.: Konstanz und Wandel im österreichischen Wählerverhalten, in:Wolfgang C. Müller/Fritz Plasser/Peter A. Ulram (Hg.): Wählerverhalten undParteienwettbewerb, Wien 1995.
Plasser, Fritz/Sommer, Franz/Ulram, Peter A.: Ende des traditionellen Parteiensystems?Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1994, in: Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik 1994, Wien1995.
Plasser, Fritz/Ulram, Peter A./Ogris, Günther (Hg.): Wahlkampf und Wählerentscheidung.Analysen zur Nationalratswahl 1995, Wien 1996.
Plasser, Fritz/Ulram, Peter A./Seeber, Gilg: (Dis-)Kontinuitäten und neue Spannungslinien imWahlverhalten: Trendanalysen 1986–1995, in: Fritz Plasser/Peter A. Ulram/Günther Ogris(Hg.): Wahlkampf und Wählerentscheidung, Wien 1996.
Plasser, Fritz/Ulram, Peter A./Sommer, Franz (Hg.): Das österreichische Wahlverhalten.Analysen zum „Superwahljahr“ 1999, Wien 2000 (in preparation).
Roth, Dieter: Empirische Wahlforschung. Ursprung, Theorien, Instrumente und Methoden,Opladen 1998.
Roth, Dieter/Wüst, Andreas M.: Parteien und Wähler. Erklärungsmodelle des Wahlverhaltens,in: Heinrich Oberreuter (Hg.): Ungewißheiten der Macht. Parteien, Wähler,Wahlentscheidung, München 1998.
Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger: Mediennutzung und Wahlentscheidung: Fünf westliche Demokratienim Vergleich, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 4/1998.
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9. The Authors
Fritz Plasser is Professor of Political Science at the University of Innsbruck and
Director of the Center for Applied Political Research in Vienna.
Franz Sommer is Research Consultant at the Center for Applied Political Research in
Vienna.
Peter A. Ulram is Head of the Political Research Department at the Fessel-GfK
Institut, Vienna, and Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of
Vienna.