Mod

ule

5

MODULE 5 CONFLICT DIAGNOSIS: CASE STUDY

Conflict 102 / Module 5

Conflict Diagnosis: Case Study

Objectives: By the end of this session, participants will be able to:

1. Conduct a conflict diagnosis. 2. Identify factors that drive or mitigate conflict.

Activity: Case Study Exercise

1. Read the email/task from the Mission director in your binder. 2. As a group, identify a recorder for the flipchart and a

spokesperson to report out. 3. Take 40 minutes to conduct a basic conflict diagnosis of the Sri

Lanka case. Apply all five components (motives, means, opportunity, context and mitigating factors) of the conflict equation, specifically identifying social patterns of grievance and (if possible) social patterns of resilience, to identify the factors that drive and mitigate conflict.

4. Encourage everyone to participate in the discussions. 5. Prepare a brief 5-minute report on your findings. Use a flipchart as

a visual aid so other groups can see your thought process.

1

Conflict 102 / Module 5

The Sri Lanka Case: Undertaking a Conflict Diagnosis

*Disclaimer - This case study is being used as a historical example to generate discussion and developmental learning, and by no means reflects the current sentiment or disposition of the Government of Sri Lanka or the U.S. Government.* The following are excerpts from an email message you just received from USAID/Sri Lanka’s Mission director, who is on a quick tour of the North and the East:

I do apologize for burdening you with such a significant assignment in your first days at post. But as you know, the Ambassador has made support for the transition from war to peace in Sri Lanka his top priority. With the Working Group meeting the day after tomorrow, we have a lot of work to do to present the development perspective effectively.

To begin with, I would like a fresh assessment of the conflict dynamics at play in Sri Lanka. I understand that you just completed a course on conflict analysis; I am sure you will be able to apply what you have learned and produce something insightful based on the materials that have been pulled together for you.

Please make sure that your analysis considers the context here in Sri Lanka; I think that is key. To the extent that you can, please also consider mitigating factors, as those may provide entry points for programming.

I’d like you to email me what you can pull together in the next few hours, when I am back from my afternoon meetings. Once I see what you have produced, we can think about next steps.

2

Conflict 102 Sri Lanka: A Case Study1

You have recently been posted to USAID/Sri Lanka in Colombo. One of your duties is to serve as the Mission’s conflict officer. This is an exciting time to be posted to Colombo — Sri Lanka’s decades-long civil war ended in May 2009 as the result of the Government of Sri Lanka’s military defeat of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE).

The ambassador has indicated that he feels that, despite its human and socioeconomic costs, the government victory represents a new beginning for Sri Lanka. In a recent speech, he said:

Bold actions are needed now to share power and to assure all of Sri Lanka’s communities a future of hope, respect and dignity. Through such actions, a truly united Sri Lanka can emerge. A Sri Lanka that is rooted in democracy and tolerance, where human rights are respected, where media can operate freely and independently and where all Sri Lankans can participate in an open dialogue on the way forward for your country. A successful reconciliation and healing process will help ensure a lasting end to terrorism in Sri Lanka and will open the way for a future of prosperity, opportunity and hope for all Sri Lankans. The United States will remain engaged to help your country and your government achieve this.

In support of this vision, the ambassador has formed an interagency working group to begin developing a new strategy for U.S. foreign assistance in Sri Lanka. To prepare for the working group’s first meeting, the Mission director is on a quick tour of the Northern and Eastern provinces, where the conflict has been concentrated. In his absence, he has left instructions for you to get up to speed on the situation in the country.

To help you get started, the senior foreign service national in your unit has pulled together some key documents for you to review:

1. Basic Context Data 2. Historical Summary of the Conflict 3. Development Challenges 4. Timeline of Key Events 5. Selected Background Articles:

a. Post-war Sri Lanka searches for ‘just peace,’ BBC News (May 19, 2010)

1 This is a teaching case. The views represented in the case material do not necessarily represent the views of USAID, nor does inclusion of material indicate any official endorsement of the sources.

b. Where now for post-election Sri Lanka?, BBC News (January 29, 2010) c. Sri Lanka: A Bitter Peace, International Crisis Group (January 11, 2010) d. U.S. Urges Probe of Sri Lankan War, Washington Post (October 23, 2009) e. Development Assistance and Conflict in Sri Lanka: Lessons from the Eastern Province, International Crisis Group (April 16, 2009)

1. Basic Context Data 2

Ov erv i ew : Full name: The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka Capital: Colombo (commercial), Sri Jayawardenepura (administrative) Population: 20.2 million (UN, 2009) Ethnic Groups: Sinhalese (74 percent), Tamils (18 percent), Muslims (7 percent), other (1 percent). Tamils are concentrated in the North and East, but about 10 percent of Colombo’s population is Tamil. Religions: Buddhist 69 percent, Hindu 15 percent, Christian 8 percent, Muslim 8 percent (majority practice Sunni Islam). Most Sinhalese are Buddhist; most Tamils are Hindu; some of both are Christian. Major Languages: Sinhala and Tamil (official). English is spoken by about 10 percent of the population. Literacy: 91 percent Life expectancy: 72 (male); 77 (female) Main exports: Clothing and textiles, tea, gems, rubber, coconuts Corruption Perception Index ranking: 97th (out of 180 countries, with 1st being best score) 3

GNI per capita: USD $1,780 (World Bank, 2007) G o ver nme nt Type: Republic. Independence: February 4, 1948. Constitution: August 31, 1978. Suffrage: Universal over 18. Branches: Executive — president, chief of state and head of government, elected for a six-year term. Legislative — unicameral 225-member parliament. Judicial — supreme court, court of appeal, high court, subordinate courts. Administrative subdivisions: Nine provinces and 25 administrative districts.

Ec onomy (2008) GDP: $40.7 billion.

2 Most of the overview information is from the BBC’s “Sri Lanka Profile” retrieved at . The government and economy information is from the U.S. Department of State’s “Background Note: Sri

Lanka” retrieved at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm. 3 Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) measures perceived corruption in the public sector. The CPI is compiled through surveys of business people and country analysts. Retrieved at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/ surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table.

Annual growth rate: 6 percent. Natural resources: Limestone, graphite, mineral sands, gems, and phosphate. Agriculture (12 percent of GDP): Major products — rice, tea, rubber, coconut and spices. Services (60 percent of GDP): Major types — tourism, wholesale & retail trade, transport, telecom, financial services. Industry (28% of GDP): Major types — garments and leather goods, rubber products, food processing, chemicals, refined petroleum, gems and jewelry, non- metallic mineral-based products, and construction. Trade: Exports — $8.1 billion: garments, tea, rubber products, jewelry and gems, refined petroleum and coconuts. Major markets — U.S. ($2 billion), U.K., India. Imports — $14 billion. Major suppliers — India, Singapore, Hong Kong, China, Iran, Malaysia, Japan, U.K., U.A.E., Belgium, Indonesia, South Korea, U.S. ($283 million).

2. Historical Summary of the Conflict

When it was called Ceylon, Sri Lanka fell under Portuguese and Dutch influence and finally came under British rule. During nearly 150 years of British colonial rule, English was the language of the government and Christianity was encouraged. Following standard imperialist policy, the British (and earlier the Portuguese) invested more in ethnic minority people — the Tamils. They gave the Tamils a better school system, which provided the colonial administration with the people they required in Colombo. The Tamils learned English in large numbers.

Although the British ran Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan Tamils increasingly staffed the administration and the professions. The majority Sinhalese community resented what they saw as British favoritism reflected primarily in the unequal representation of Sri Lankan Tamils in government jobs and their greater access to education and economic resources. In addition, the British introduced important new cash crops — rubber, coffee and tea — and imported about 1 million Tamil laborers from India (so-called Indian Tamils or “Hill Country” Tamils) to work the plantations, altering the ethnic balance in Sri Lanka.

In the early 20th century, a nationalist political movement emerged in Sinhalese communities with the aim of obtaining political independence, which the British granted in 1948 after peaceful negotiations. Disagreements between the Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic communities began to flare up during the drafting of the country’s first post- independence constitution. The efforts of successive Sinhalese-dominated governments to redress the perceived imbalance between Tamils and Sinhalese exacerbated the situation. In 1956, passage of the “Sinhala Only Act” made Sinhala (rather than English) the official language, limiting minorities’ access to government positions and educational opportunities. This resulted in ethnic riots. Sri Lanka’s constitution also granted Buddhism — the religion of the majority Sinhalese — a dominant status. That contributed to the sense of marginalization of not only the Tamils (most of whom are

Hindu, but a sizeable portion are Christian) but also the minority Muslim community in Sri Lanka, the majority of whom traced their ancestry to Arab traders.

Spiraling tensions and violence between the Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic communities by the end of the 1970s developed into a full-blown civil war in 1983 when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) began its armed conflict with the Sri Lankan government. Often called the Tamil Tigers, the LTTE utilized a guerilla/terrorist strategy to advance its goal of creating an independent Tamil state (named Tamil Eelam) in the North and the East of the island. The LTTE was notable for its use of female combatants. At one point, women fighters made up 30-40 percent of LTTE forces and were responsible for approximately 30 percent of its suicide attacks. Many motivations fueled women’s participation in the LTTE, including the organization’s promise to be the “supreme symbol of women’s liberation” within the new nation.

In July 1987, India and Sri Lanka signed an accord in an attempt to settle the internal Sri Lankan conflict. The accord gave greater autonomy to the Tamils and included provisions for an Indian peacekeeping force that would disarm the rebels. At first, the LTTE supported the agreement; ultimately, the accord broke down in 1989 after opposition by some Sinhalese turned violent. In 1990, India withdrew its troops and the civil war began in earnest again. As the Indian troops withdrew, the LTTE took control of significant parts of the North and established government-like functions in the areas under its control.

In October 1990, the LTTE expelled an estimated 80,000 Muslims from five districts in the North, including Jaffna, in a matter of days. Most of these Muslim internally displaced persons (IDPs) settled in Puttalam on the west coast, north of Colombo. The LTTE also forcibly took land from Muslims in the East, who remained caught between LTTE forces and the government military forces in those areas.

Although most of the civil war’s fighting took place in the North and East, the conflict also penetrated the heart of Sri Lankan society in the 1990s and early 2000s, when the LTTE’s elite Black Tiger Squad carried out devastating suicide bombings in Colombo, including at the city’s airport in 2001. Toward the end of 2001, the LTTE began to declare their willingness to explore measures for a peaceful settlement to the conflict. The LTTE are believed to have feared international pressure and even direct U.S. support of the Sri Lankan government as part of the so-called “War on Terror” that followed the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the United States. In the South, the government was facing increasing criticism over its “war for peace” strategy, with peace nowhere in sight and the economy in tatters.

In February 2002, the government and the LTTE signed a ceasefire agreement and a peace process began with Norway as the facilitator. Despite significant international support to the peace process, it never resulted in a lasting peace agreement. The peace

4 The U.S. Government designated the LTTE as a foreign terrorist organization.

process was complicated by the LTTE being banned in many countries.4 At the same time, the LTTE frequently showed no interest in even the most generous devolution proposals offered by the government. Overall, extreme nationalist parties on both sides frequently derailed any attempt to offer concessions.

In particular, Sinhalese-dominated political parties consistently failed to reach consensus on reasonable power-sharing or devolution proposals that might be acceptable to the majority of Tamils. The Sangha (Buddhist monastic order) was an influential force in opposing LTTE and other Tamils who called for autonomy or separation. The unity of the island and its historic significance to the Buddhist tradition were the main arguments used by monks to justify the government campaign against the rebels in the North and East.

While many Hindu religious leaders were supportive of Tamils’ political and national grievances, they mainly played a significant role in sustaining community networks in response to the devastation of the war. Such leaders found themselves caught between government policies and the LTTE’s direct threats against any collaboration with central government. Some Christian leaders in the North and East were outspoken during the civil war against government policies of neglect and militarization.

Following the tsunami of Dec. 26, 2004, Sri Lanka’s president and the LTTE failed to set up a joint interim body to administer tsunami relief funds and aid — basically closing any hope of restarting the formal peace process. There were also major violations of the ceasefire, including the LTTE’s assassination of Sri Lanka’s foreign minister in Colombo in 2005. The elections in November 2005 brought a new president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, to power. Although the new government did not withdraw from the peace talks, it adopted a more hardline military strategy.

The ceasefire agreement was effectively over by early 2006, and full-scale military conflict began again in July of that year, when the conflict had already claimed over 65,000 lives since its start. The escalation of the conflict resulted in an additional 150,000 IDPs, adding to the hundreds of thousands affected by the tsunami. Conditions for IDPs were highly insecure, with women especially vulnerable to sexual assault, domestic violence and trafficking. In 2007, the government of Sri Lanka formally abandoned the negotiation option and launched a military campaign to capture the LTTE territory and destroy its infrastructure. The military had significant success in the Eastern Province, recapturing the territory in mid-2007. The forced “disappearance” of tens of thousands of young men was an especially traumatic aspect of the conflict, which led to the formation of groups of “Mothers of the Disappeared” who banded together to seek justice and peace.

During early 2009, the government’s military made rapid progress. Approximately 284,000 IDPs from the North, known as the Vanni, fled the fighting. They were moved

5 “Sri Lanka: One Year On from the Conflict,” DFID, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EGUA-85LPFC?OpenDocument.

into camps just south of the conflict zone in an area called Menik Farms. Additional IDPs fled north to Jaffna and were placed in camps. In May 2009, the government declared a complete military victory over the LTTE and announced that the group’s leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, was dead. In October 2009, the U.S. Department of State’s War Crimes Office released a report detailing possible war crimes violations committed by the LTTE and government armed forces from January to May 2009, an assertion the government has continually rejected. The government has also rejected estimates that as many as 20,000 civilians died as a result of the fighting at the very end of the war. The actual numbers of dead or missing may never be known.

In June 2009, the government of Sri Lanka suggested that the majority of the 284,000 IDPs in the Menik Farm camps would likely be there for more than a year. The government continued to screen the camp population for LTTE cadres and removed an estimated 12,000 into rehabilitation centers or, in some cases, police custody. There were rumors of disappearances in the camps. Under international pressure, the government started releasing IDPs from the Menik Farm camps during the latter part of 2009. As of early May 2010, UN figures indicated that approximately 73,000 people remained in the camps.5

3. Development Challenges6

Sri Lanka is a lower-middle-income developing country with about one-quarter of its population living below the poverty line. More than two decades of civil conflict have exacerbated poverty and resulted in major inequities between regions. Large populations of civilians are displaced and living in IDP camps in Sri Lanka’s North and East. The regional imbalance of economic growth has also created major socioeconomic problems in rural areas. More than 75 percent of people still live in rural areas and depend on traditional agriculture for their livelihoods. Little focus is placed on rural industrial development within the country’s economic development programs and strategies.

The reintegration of former LTTE combatants and the return of conflict IDPs have both been challenging. The social stigmatization of former combatant women has made them especially vulnerable to poverty and continued violence, placing them at high risk for trafficking. Rates of sexual and gender-based violence are reported to be highest in conflict-affected areas, and continuing discrimination against Tamils constitutes a serious barrier to justice for ethnic minority women and men. Both women and men were reported to have been subjected to sexual violence during the conflict, and little has been done to address the legacies of this violence. Recent surveys found 90,000 war widows and 40,000 woman-headed households in the Northern region most impacted by conflict, constituting an additional challenge to socioeconomic development.

Roughly a third of the labor force is employed in agriculture-based activities; an additional 17 percent is employed in industry. The service sector, which accounts for 45 percent of all jobs, is the largest component of GDP and continues to grow. Key exports are tea and garments, but efforts are underway to diversify exports. The overall unemployment rate has declined in recent years to around 10 percent. However, the rate of unemployment for high school and college graduates is disproportionately higher than for less-educated workers. A disconnect exists between the number of students graduating from high schools and colleges and the number of jobs available for their skill levels. This results in a large population of educated and either unemployed or underemployed youth who are susceptible to recruitment to violence. Although women have high average educational achievement, their participation in the workforce lags, with only 30-35 percent of working-age women employed.

Approximately 800,000 Sri Lankans work abroad (90 percent in the Middle East) and send about $3.15 billion in remittances to Sri Lanka each year. This is second only to the textile industry, the major source of foreign exchange earnings. The economic global crisis is likely to have a significant negative impact on the country’s economy.

6 Mainly from AUSAID, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/country/country.cfm?CountryId=1; and Information from Australian Government Department of Trade, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/sri_lanka/sri_lanka_country_brief.html.

Sri Lanka's defense spending escalated in recent years to about 5 percent of GDP, nearly double that spent by India and Pakistan.7 Although Sri Lanka’s health and education systems are good compared to other countries in the region, their quality is under threat because of a lack of government investment. In higher education, a large gap exists between available training and the country’s needs. High emigration rates mean that many of the best-qualified Sri Lankans now live overseas.

Sri Lanka has a very active local civil society that has been engaged in sustained activity to help build peace across the communities on the island. An estimated 1,000 or more NGOs are in the country, with at least 10 percent of them INGOs.8 While most organizations focus on traditional sectoral development work, a number work on peacebuilding, reconciliation and conflict-related issues, and many assisted in the post- tsunami recovery of affected populations across all ethnic groups. Women’s organizations, including the Association of War-Affected Women, have been especially active in peacebuilding and reconciliation work. However, this has not always translated into women’s voices being heard in political processes; Sri Lanka ranks 140 out of 153 countries in terms of women’s representation in Parliament, with women occupying less than 6 percent of seats.

Over the past several years, human rights violations (abductions and political killings) have risen significantly and attacks on and suspicion of NGOs and INGOs that publicly supported peace or negotiations have increased. The ability of various civil society groups and activists to work for peace, security and human rights has diminished, and many NGO representatives reported difficulties organizing activities that support peace. The media have also been targeted. At least 13 journalists have been killed in the country since 2006.9

7“Q&A: Post-War Sri Lanka,” BBC NEWS, April 7, 2010. Retrieved at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/2405347.stm.

8 From http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=43509 9 Committee to Protect Journalists, http://cpj.org/killed/asia/sri-lanka/.

4. Timeline of Key Events10

EARY HISTORY/PRE-INDEPENDENCE Fifth Century BC

Indo-Aryan migrants from northern India settle on the island; the Sinhalese emerge as the most powerful of the various clans.

Third Century BC

Beginning of Tamil migration from India.

1505 Portuguese arrive in Colombo, marking beginning of European interest.

1658 Dutch force out Portuguese and establish control over the whole island except central kingdom of Kandy.

1796 Britain begins to take over island.

1815 Kingdom of Kandy conquered. Britain starts bringing in Tamil laborers from southern India to work in tea, coffee and coconut plantations.

1833 Whole island united under one British administration.

1931 British grant the right to vote and introduce power sharing with Sinhalese

SINHALA NATIONALISM AND INDEPENDENCE 1948 Ceylon gains full independence.

1949 Indian Tamil plantation workers disenfranchised and many deprived of citizenship.

1956

Solomon Bandaranaike elected on wave of Sinhalese nationalism. Sinhala made sole official language and other measures introduced to bolster Sinhalese and Buddhist feeling. More than 100 Tamils killed in widespread violence after Tamil parliamentarians protest the new laws.

1958 Anti-Tamil riots leave more than 200 people dead. Thousands of Tamils displaced.

1959 Bandaranaike assassinated by a Buddhist monk. ETHNIC TENSIONS

1972 Ceylon changes its name to Sri Lanka and Buddhism given primary place as country’s religion, further antagonizing Tamil minority.

1976 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) formed as tensions increase in Tamil.

1977 Separatist Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) Party wins all seats in Tamil areas.

1983

13 soldiers killed in LTTE ambush, sparking anti-Tamil riots in Colombo, which many believed were orchestrated by the Sinhalese-dominated government.

CIVIL WAR INTENSIFIES 1985 First attempt at peace talks between government and LTTE fails.

10 This outline is mainly from BBC’s History of the Sri Lankan Conflict at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/ south_asia/country_profiles/1166237.stm and also Alert Net’s Crisis Profile at http://www.alertnet.org/db/crisisprofiles/LK_CON.htm?v=timeline.

1987 Government forces push LTTE back into northern city of Jaffna and agree with India on deployment of Indian peace.

1990

Indian troops leave after getting bogged down in fighting in the North. Violence between Sri Lankan army and separatists escalates. “Second Eelam War” begins. Thousands of Muslims are expelled from northern areas by the LTTE.

1991 LTTE implicated in assassination of Indian premier Rajiv Gandhi in southern India.

1993 President Premadasa killed in LTTE bomb attack.

1994 President Kumaratunga comes to power pledging to end war. Peace talks opened with LTTE.

1995 “Third Eelam War” begins when rebels sink naval craft. 1995-2001

War rages across North and East. Tigers bomb Sri Lanka’s holiest Buddhist site. President Kumaratunga wounded in a bomb attack. Suicide attack on international airport destroys half the Sri Lankan Airlines fleet. Tiger suicide bombers blow up Central Bank building. More than 100 killed and about 1,400 hurt.

PEACE EFFORTS: 2002-2005 2002

Government and Tamil Tiger rebels sign a Norwegian-mediated ceasefire. Decommissioning of weapons begins; the road linking the Jaffna peninsula with the rest of Sri Lanka reopens after 12 years; passenger flights to Jaffna resume. Government lifts ban on Tamil Tigers. Rebels drop demand for separate state.

2003 Tigers pull out of talks. Ceasefire holds.

2004 March Renegade Tamil Tiger commander, known as Karuna, leads split in rebel movement and goes underground with his supporters.

2004 December

Tsunami: More than 30,000 people are killed.

2005 June Row over deal reached with Tamil Tiger rebels to share nearly $3bn in tsunami aid among Sinhalas, Tamils and Muslims.

2005 November

Mahinda Rajapaksa elected president. Most Tamils in LTTE-controlled area do not vote. One of the president’s brothers, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, becomes minister of defense.

COLLAPSE OF NEGOTATIONS AND MILITARY VICTORY BY GOVERNMENT 2006 April Attacks begin to escalate again. A suicide bomber attacks the main

military compound in Colombo, killing at least eight people. The military launch air strikes on Tamil Tiger targets.

2006 August

Tamil Tiger rebels and government forces resume fighting in the Northeast in the worst clashes since 2002 ceasefire. Government steadily drives Tamil Tigers out of eastern strongholds over following year.

2006 October Peace talks fail in Geneva. 2006 October

Suicide bombing on convoy kills 100 sailors and civilians. Planned peace talks in Geneva come unstuck over rebel demand that government reopen a highway crossing through rebel territory to army- held Jaffna peninsula. Heavy fighting resumes.

2008 January Government pulls out of 2002 ceasefire agreement.

2008 July SL military says it has captured the important LTTE naval base of Vidattaltivu.

2008 October Suicide bombing blamed by government on Tamil Tigers kills 27 people.

2008 December

Fierce fighting in the North (both claim heavy causalities). 2009 January

President declares victory after capturing the northern town of Kilinochchi, held for 10 years by the Tamil Tigers as their administrative headquarters.

2009 February

International concern over the humanitarian situation of thousands of civilians trapped in the battle zone prompts calls for a temporary cease- fire, which the government rejects. Government says it is on the verge of destroying the Tamil Tigers, but offers an amnesty to rebels if they surrender.

2009 February Tamil Tiger planes conduct suicide raids against Colombo. 2009 March

Former rebel leader Karuna is sworn in as minister of national integration and reconciliation. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay accuses both sides of war crimes.

2009 May Sri Lanka declares military victory. State TV says Tiger leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran killed by special forces troops while trying to escape.

EARLY POST-WAR PERIOD: MID-2009 TO PRESENT 2009 August

New Tamil Tiger leader Selvarasa Pathmanathan detained by Sri Lankan authorities overseas. First post-war local elections in the North. Governing coalition wins in Jaffna, but voters in Vavuniya back candidates who supported Tamil Tigers.

2009 October

U.S. State Department’s War Crimes Office publicly issues a report detailing possible war crimes violations by the government’s armed forces and LTTE.

2009 November

Sri Lanka Armed Forces General Sarath Fonseka, who oversaw the military victory over the LTTE, resigns. President Rajapaksa calls for presidential elections (two years early), which are set for Jan. 26, 2010. General Fonseka announces his candidacy for president as the “common opposition candidate,” with support from an unlikely alliance

of the UNP and JVP political parties. The TNA, the main Tamil political party that had earlier backed the LTTE, supports Foneska.

2010 January Incumbent Mahinda Rajapaksa wins presidential election by a big margin but the outcome is rejected by General Fonseka.

2010 February

General Fonseka is arrested. Government says he will be court- martialed on conspiracy charges. President Rajapaksa dissolves Parliament, clearing way for elections in April.

2010 March General Fonseka appears before military court on charges of participating in politics while in uniform.

2010 April

President Rajapaksa’s ruling coalition secures biggest landslide victory in parliamentary elections (144 of Parliament’s 225 seats) since 1977, but with lowest voter turnout since independence. General Fonseka wins Parliament seat. President’s elder brother, Chamal Rajapaksa, is elected speaker of Parliament during the inaugural session.

2010 May Government announces it is easing emergency laws in place for most of past 27 years.

5. Selected Background Articles a. Post-war Sri Lanka searches for 'just peace' Story from BBC NEWS: Published: 2010/05/19 13:47:06 GMT

It is exactly a year since Sri Lanka declared victory in its decades-long war against Tamil Tiger separatists. It ended with the top Tiger leaders killed after being besieged with thousands of civilians they had herded into their final stronghold.

On the strength of that victory, President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his government won landslide elections. Charles Haviland reports from Colombo as Sri Lankans reflect on a remarkable anniversary.

By a grey sea, tanks rumble into motion. Massive vehicles mounted with mortars, artillery and multi-barrelled weapons parade steadily past a podium.

All the army regiments are on hand, their berets black, maroon or blue, their uniforms khaki and camouflage. "Eastern Front" reads one truck. "Vanni Theatre" reads another, recalling the last northern battleground. Marching music and drum beats fill the air.

For the anniversary, the Sri Lankan military has been rehearsing for a huge display of the hardware that helped it win.

The government is irritated because it feels that many Western countries, troubled at the scale of civilian casualties at the end of the conflict, fail to give Sri Lanka due credit for its achievement.

Coup plot

"Even the big countries, they are battling to defeat terrorism," Rajitha Senaratne, a cabinet minister, tells me at his home on a rainy evening. "All the entire world armies fighting in Iraq, in Afghanistan, still failed. "But the same terrorism, one of the worst terrorist organisations, has been crushed by the small country, a small army, the Sri Lankan army. And taught it a lesson. So actually it's something to celebrate."

Heavy rains have delayed the victory parade. But when it happens, there will be one man conspicuously absent - the result of a bitter post-war feud.

Gen Sarath Fonseka, who headed the army when the war was won, is locked up at naval headquarters, within easy earshot of the parade ground.

He unsuccessfully challenged President Rajapaksa in January's presidential election. Shortly afterwards the government accused him of planning a coup. It arrested him and

is trying him on various counts, including one that he dabbled in politics while still army chief. He can only leave detention to attend parliament, having been elected to it last month.

His family and colleagues deny he did anything wrong. "They have given two or three charges but all are false," his wife, Anoma Fonseka, tells the BBC. "I know that because my husband has a very clean character and he has never done anything wrong for our country. The truth will be coming out afterwards."

Transformed atmosphere

Whoever masterminded the war victory, most Sri Lankans are heartily glad it is all over. The five-star hotels are buzzing once more. Tourism has picked up from its war-time doldrums. In one top city establishment, the Cinnamon Grand, I sip a caffe latte with Dai Liyanage. He's a Sri Lankan who lives in Britain. But since the war he keeps revisiting. He says that with the Tamil Tigers no longer active, the atmosphere is transformed.

"Places like bus stations and railway stations were targets where large numbers of people could be killed in one go. So that was always a fear," he says. Now he says that things have improved so much that "there's absolutely no fear of any terrorism whatsoever".

Not everyone, though, wants to celebrate.

The main Tamil party has asked that people offer special prayers at temples and elsewhere, saying this is a time for mourning because so many died in the long war including tens of thousands of civilians.

This week the International Crisis Group called for an UN-backed investigation into possible war crimes by both sides, especially in the war's final phase.

"Can you have unity without reconciliation - can you have reconciliation without accountability?" asks Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, a human rights activist from the Centre for Policy Alternatives think tank. "There are people who still want to know what happened to members of their family. There are a number who are missing and disappeared. And people are not going to forget those things easily." He believes there should be more acknowledgement of the suffering endured by ordinary people.

'Ambiguity'

Another critic of the government is a man who was until recently a top Sri Lankan diplomat, Dayan Jayatilleka. As ambassador to the UN in Geneva last May, he helped ward off a planned motion of censure against his country from Western governments over the conduct of the war. Mr Jayatilleka tells the BBC that the war was an entirely

just one, but he feels there is not yet a "just peace". "I strongly felt and feel that we should have followed up the military victory with an outreach to the Tamil people and the Tamil politicians," he says.

"I do not see that having happened. And we have a studied silence or at best an ambiguity about the shape of the political settlement or the political reconciliation between the south and the north."

The government says its priority is not political reforms but redeveloping the north where many war-displaced Tamils still lead very restricted lives in military-run camps.

Indeed, the war still casts a heavy shadow over Sri Lanka.

The authorities say they must go on countering remnants of the Tamil Tigers based abroad. One year on, they denounce what they call "traitors" at home. A state of emergency remains in force and the defence ministry is still taking on new powers.

But the authorities reject accusations of war crimes against them or the idea of any international inquiry on the matter. They intend this week to relish the memory of their victory which, they say, quite simply liberated the island from the clutches of terror.

Retrieved at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/8690408.stm

b. Where now for post-election Sri Lanka? By Charles Haviland BBC News, Colombo

Published: 2010/01/29 13:54:28 GMT

President Mahinda Rajapaksa stands triumphant in Sri Lanka.

A number of factors helped sweep him to re-election victory on Tuesday: his fiery rhetoric and sure popular touch; his emphasis on his role in last year's war victory; and ordinary people's sense that their streets are simply safer than they have been for the past 30 years because of the defeat of the Tamil Tigers.

Monitoring groups have expressed strong concern about the abuse of state resources in the pre-election period and about some polling-day violations.

But the margin of his victory was wide and despite his defeated rival's challenge to it, Mahinda, as everyone calls him, is set to continue as president. Where will he take Sri Lanka next?

He and his government stress the economy and development. His rallies were bedecked with pictures of grand power stations (funded by China, Iran and India among others), new ports and transport infrastructure. Their priorities are now to "stabilise the situation and raise people's living standard", a senior official told the BBC.

'Minority aspirations'

But there is also the major question of Sri Lanka's ethnic divide.

The issue is made all the more stark because the places in which Mr Rajapaksa lost, and his challenger General Sarath Fonseka won, are - barring a few districts in Colombo and the hills - entirely in the north and east - the areas where Tamils and Tamil- speaking Muslims are in the majority.

The Sinhalese nationalist general was an unlikely champion for minorities but had convinced them that he was more interested in finding them a political solution.

The country now looks more ethnically split than ever and many want Mr Rajapaksa to move to address this.

As before, he has started with encouraging words, saying that although he did not win in the north he is "glad that people [there] entered the democratic process".

Political analyst S Balakrishnan says action is now needed. State institutions are supposed to have both Sinhala and Tamil as official languages, he points out, but Sri Lanka's rulers are "not at all sensitive to minority aspirations". He says that with separatist extremism conquered, it is necessary to "change the ethnic and ideological profile" of the police and military, currently almost totally Sinhalese, and make them and the judiciary more sensitive to multi-ethnic issues.

Others say constitutional moves must be made, such as devolving powers to all the provinces, as the constitution's 13th Amendment calls for - something many Tamils see as indispensable.

On these matters Mr Rajapaksa sounds lukewarm. Last week he was reported as saying that Tamil people did not seek a political solution to their grievances; rather, they simply needed to be resettled in their homes after the war.

He has also said he will find his own solution and has spoken of a possible upper house of parliament which would potentially give minorities more influence. For such a change he would need a two-thirds majority in parliament, something he will try to get in parliamentary elections expected soon.

'Intimidation'

So does he want to do it? "In Rajapaksa's heart of hearts he may not like the 13th Amendment, but it's almost impossible for him to scrap it," says Dayan Jayatilleka, former Sri Lankan ambassador to the UN in Geneva.

He says it is the only real way forward, and suggests that parties like the Tamil National Alliance, which is close to the defeated Tamil Tigers, should also embrace it, recognising that "the centre will remain Sinhalese nationalist".

Indeed, many Sinhalese people do not feel that ethnic grievances are really an issue at all.

One international source told the BBC there was concern that with his large mandate at the polls, the president will feel he does not need to take account of his critics' concerns. "It remains to be seen how much progress he will make on immediate challenges such as political reconciliation, human rights and the humanitarian situation," the source said.

Journalists' rights groups say reporters are still intimidated in the country and are concerned at the disappearance of a web journalist who vanished just before the election after apparently writing pro-Fonseka articles.

But B Raman, a retired senior Indian official and security analyst, feels outside sentiment does have a role. He writes in Sri Lanka's Daily Mirror that the president will have to deal "skillfully and diplomatically" with human rights groups' concerns that there are still unanswered questions about the methods the army used in crushing the Tamil Tigers.

Mr Rajapaksa is talking positively. His victory statement spoke of the need to be rid of the past and its "violence and division" and to set aside the differences between his government and its domestic and foreign critics.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/8487405.stm

c. Excerpt from “Sri Lanka: A Bitter Peace” International Crisis Group

Asia Briefing N°99 11 January 2010

OVERVIEW

Since the decisive military victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Sri Lanka has made little progress in reconstructing its battered democratic institutions or establishing conditions for a stable peace. Eight months later, the post-war policies of President Mahinda Rajapaksa have deepened rather than resolved the grievances that generated and sustained LTTE militancy. While the LTTE’s defeat and the end of its control over Tamil political life are historic and welcome changes, the victory over Tamil militancy will remain fragile unless Sinhalese-dominated political parties make strong moves towards a more inclusive and democratic state. The emergence of retired General Sarath Fonseka to challenge Rajapaksa in the 26 January presidential election has opened new space to challenge repressive government policies. But neither has offered credible proposals for political reforms that would address the marginalisation of Tamils and other minorities. Whoever wins, donor governments and international institutions should use their development assistance to support reforms designed to protect the democratic rights of all of Sri Lanka’s citizens and ethnic communities.

The government’s internment of more than a quarter million Tamils displaced from the Northern Province – some for more than six months – was further humiliation for a population brutalised by months of ferocious fighting. The return by the end of 2009 of most of the displaced to their home districts, and the increased freedom of movement for the nearly 100,000 still in military-run camps, are important steps forward. However, the resettlement process has failed to meet international standards for safe and dignified returns. There has been little or no consultation with the displaced and no independent monitoring; many returns have been to areas not cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance; inadequate financial resources have been provided for those returning home; and the military continues to control people’s movements. These and other concerns also apply to the estimated 80,000 Muslims forcibly expelled from the north by the LTTE in 1990, some of whom have begun to return to their homes.

The UN and donor governments should insist more strongly that all resettlement is done according to established guiding principles. Donors should end assistance to any camps where full freedom of movement is not allowed and condition additional aid on an effective monitoring role for UN agencies and NGO partners. India, Japan, Western donors, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank should tie additional development assistance to an inclusive and consultative planning process for the reconstruction of the north. Access by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to the more than 12,000 Tamils held in irregular detention centres on suspicion of ties to the LTTE is also essential.

The government’s approach to the development and reconstruction of the north and east is contributing to minority fears and alienation. Government plans remain unclear, with local communities and political leaders not consulted and even donors not informed of overall reconstruction plans. Strong military influence over policies, tight military control over the population and restrictions on local and international NGOs increase the risk of land conflicts, with the strong possibility of demographic changes

that would dilute the Tamil character of the north. No real space has been given to Tamil and Muslim political or community leaders in the north and very little in the east.

The Rajapaksa government has initiated no political reforms to address Tamil and other minorities’ concerns. The government-sponsored All Party Representative Committee (APRC) designed to craft constitutional reforms has in effect ended with no sign of an alternative process. Tamil and Muslim parties remain weak and divided, although recent encouraging initiatives to develop a common platform and build trust among Tamil- speaking parties deserve support. Inside and outside Sri Lanka, many Tamils remain angry at the lack of accounting or justice for the thousands of civilians killed in the final months of the war. Most of the million-strong diaspora is still committed to a separate state and many would be willing to support renewed violence.

The brutal nature of the conflict, especially in its closing months, has undermined Sri Lanka’s democratic institutions and governance. All ethnic communities are suffering from the collapse of the rule of law. Disappearances and political killings associated with the government’s counter-insurgency campaign have been greatly reduced since the end of the war. Impunity for abuses by state officials continues, however, and fear and self-censorship among civil society activists and political dissidents remain widespread….

…International actors need to press for accountability for abuses by both sides during the war as well as challenge the government’s post-war policies. Numerous states with insurgencies have begun to look at Sri Lanka as a model. India and Western governments may yet come to regret giving Sri Lanka the green light – and even assisting it – to fight a “war on terror” prior to the government agreeing to political reforms or showing any commitment to the rule of law, constitutional norms or respect for human rights. The precedent can and should be challenged. Donors should condition further development assistance on governance reforms designed to curb impunity and make government accountable to citizens of all communities. This could eventually help open the space for Tamil and Muslim political leaders to organise effectively now that the LTTE is no longer there to control their agenda.

d) U.S. urges probe of Sri Lanka war CRIMES ALLEGED ON BOTH SIDES

'Those responsible must be held accountable'

By Colum Lynch, Washington Post Staff Writer Friday, October 23, 2009

NEW YORK -- The State Department's top war crimes official called on Sri Lanka on Thursday to conduct a "genuine" investigation into allegations of war crimes by Sri

Lankan troops and Tamil rebels during the bloody final months of the country's 25-year- long civil war. The appeal by Stephen Rapp, the U.S. ambassador at large for war crimes issues, came hours after his office presented Congress with a detailed account of alleged atrocities during the conflict that suggests both sides may have violated international law and committed crimes against humanity.

The 68-page document, which relies on internal reports from the U.S. Embassy in Colombo, satellite imagery and accounts from international relief agencies and news organizations, paints a grim portrait of the conditions endured by hundreds of thousands of Tamil civilians caught between two ruthless adversaries. Between 7,000 and 20,000 civilians were allegedly killed in the country's northeast from January to May, when the Tamil Tigers were defeated, according to U.N. and independent estimates.

"We are certainly calling on the government, as part of the reconciliation process, to develop an accountability process that respects the interests of all," Rapp said in an interview. Noting that Sri Lankan authorities have insisted they can conduct a credible internal investigation, he said, "We are going to take them at their word and follow that process."

Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), chairman of the Appropriations subcommittee on the State Department and foreign operations, who authorized the report, said that it "eliminates any reasonable doubt that serious violations of the laws of war were committed by both" sides. "A full and independent investigation is needed, and those responsible must be held accountable," he said.

Rapp also expressed concern for the plight of more than 250,000 displaced ethnic Tamils who remain confined to government-controlled camps. He said the imminent seasonal monsoon could inundate the camps and cited reports from U.S. and other sources that Sri Lankan authorities had abducted male youths at government-run screening centers for the displaced.

Sri Lanka's Foreign Ministry released a statement Thursday saying that the allegations contained in the report "appear to be unsubstantiated and devoid of corroborative evidence." It said that Sri Lankan security forces had been "engaged in a humanitarian mission" aimed at freeing captive civilians from the "clutches" of the separatist group and that they had been "scrupulous in affording protection to the civilians and safeguarding their welfare."

The U.S. report documents nearly 170 incidents between Jan. 2 and May 18 in which thousands of Tamil civilians were allegedly gunned down by Tamil rebels seeking to use them as human shields or killed by indiscriminate government shelling. It portrays a

population enduring violence, starvation and severe shortages of drugs, including anesthesia for amputations.

Human rights groups and political analysts have accused the Obama administration of failing to confront Sri Lanka more forcefully over reports of indiscriminate shelling of displaced civilians as it moved in to crush the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Rapp defended the U.S. response, saying then-Ambassador to Sri Lanka Robert O. Blake had pressed for a humanitarian pause in the fighting and routinely raised concerns about the government's conduct during the war.

The report includes multiple allegations that the Tamil Tigers forcibly recruited children as young as 11 to fight, killing relatives who objected. It also alleges that the rebels used suicide bombers to kill government officials and police officers and that they regularly fired on civilians attempting to flee the war zone. It cites a Feb. 13 report to the U.S. Embassy by a foreign government alleging that rebels killed 60 civilians who were trying to escape by boat.

Also detailed in the report are numerous allegations of government shelling of civilian populations, hospitals, churches and schools in rebel-controlled territory, often in areas designated by authorities as no-fire zones. The U.S. Embassy reported several cases in which large numbers of civilians were reportedly killed in shelling, including nine in the April 29 bombardment of the Mullivaikkal Hospital.

e) Development Assistance and Conflict in Sri Lanka: Lessons from the Eastern Province11

International Crisis Group

Asia Report N°165 16 April 2009

EXECUTIVE SUMMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Violence, political instability and the government’s reluctance to devolve power or resources to the fledgling provincial council are undermining ambitious plans for developing Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province. The east continues to face obstacles to economic and political progress and offers lessons for development agencies and foreign donors considering expanding their work into newly won areas in the Northern Province. While there is still potential for progress in the east, it remains far from being the model of democratisation and post-conflict reconstruction that the government

11 The Government of Sri Lanka defeated the LTTE and regained control over the Eastern Province in 2007. The experience of development assistance in the Eastern Province since that time provides important lessons for the international community as they consider engagement in the Northern Province following the May 2009 Government victory over the LTTE in that province.

claims. Donors should adopt a more coordinated set of policies for the war-damaged areas of Sri Lanka, emphasising civilian protection, increased monitoring of the effects of aid on conflict dynamics and collective advocacy with the government at the highest levels.

International attention is currently and rightfully focused on the need to protect upwards of 100,000 civilians at risk from fighting in the northern Vanni region, but at the same time, there are still important challenges in the so-called “liberated” area of the Eastern Province. Even now, the Eastern Province is still not the “post-conflict” situation that development agencies had hoped it would be when they started work there in late 2007 and early 2008. There have been violent conflicts between different factions of the pro-government TMVP12, and impunity for killings and disappearances, many of them apparently committed by government security forces and/or their allies in the TMVP. Extortion and criminality linked to the TMVP also remain problems. Insecurity and fear are undermining the ability of agencies and contractors to implement projects.

Violence between Tamils and Muslims has been kept to a minimum since June 2008, but tensions between the communities over land and political power remain high, and there seems little prospect of reconciliation so long as current government policies remain in place. Tamils are largely alienated from the government, thanks to the heavy hand of government security forces and TMVP activities. Many Muslims feel threatened by TMVP control of the provincial council and what they see as Tamil domination of the provincial administration. Both communities continue to suspect the government has plans for large-scale “Sinhalisation” of the east. Sinhalese villagers, students, contractors and government employees have, in turn, been victims of violent attacks.

The government still has not devolved power to the Eastern Province, as required by the Thirteenth Amendment to the constitution, which established the provincial council system in 1987 in response to Tamil demands for regional autonomy in the north and east. The governor of the province, appointed by the president, is blocking the council’s initial piece of authorising legislation, and development planning and implementation continues to be run from Colombo and central government ministries. The government has yet to articulate any plans for a fair and lasting distribution of resources and political power that would satisfy all communities.

In this environment, development of the east remains affected by the conflicts and threatens to exacerbate them. Despite the need for development, there is a danger of funds being wasted or misused. Donors should not be treating the situation as a typical post-conflict environment. Instead, there is a need for additional monitoring and additional coordinated political advocacy. This is all the more important now that donors are considering assistance for the reconstruction of the Northern Province, once security conditions allow.

12 The TMVP is a Tamil party which split from the LTTE in 2004 and joined forces with the government.