· 1 module 1. module 1. getting started. conflict 102 / module 1 . getting started . conflict 102...

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MODULE 1 GETTING STARTED

Conflict 102 / Module 1 Getting Started

Conflict 102 Workshop Objectives:

1. Describe why conflict is a development issue. 2. Apply conflict diagnostic tools to design an appropriate

conflict program. 3. Explain the role that theories of change play in conflict programming. 4. Understand the differences among traditional development,

conflict- sensitive and conflict programming. 5. Learn variants to M&E for a theory of change and general

approaches to conflict sensitive M&E practices. 6. Access CMM resources to assist in conflict analysis and programming.

Activity: Introductions

(1) Name, (2) Where are you from, (3) What you do, (4) An interesting fact about yourself, (5) An expectation you have for the workshop.

Activity: Icebreaker

1. Turn to Quotes handout in your binder. 2. Read the page of quotes and select one quote that is most

meaningful to you. 3. At your table, share your favorite quote and its significance to you. 4. Select one quote to represent your table group and be prepared

to share why this quote was selected. What is its relevance to the workshop?

5. Select a spokesperson to report out to plenary.

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QUOTES

1. “The more we sweat in peace the less we bleed in war.” —Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit

2. “International foreign aid when it's provided in the context of a conflict or a context of any society becomes a part of that context.”

—Mary Anderson

3. “Peace is costly, but it is worth the expense.” —Kenyan proverb

4. “Nothing can escalate conflicts faster than the absence of communication, trust, and relationship.”

—William Ury

5. “If you want to make peace, you don't talk to your friends. You talk to your enemies.”

—Moshe Dayan

6. “Many practitioners believe that if they undertake development programs in a conflict-sensitive manner, they will contribute to peace. This is possible but not inevitable.”

—Peter Woodrow and Diana Chigas

http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/escalation/

http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/absence_communication/




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Conflict 102 / Module 2

Conflict: The Big Picture

Objectives: By the end of this session, participants will be able to:

1. Describe why conflict is a development issue.

2. Explain recent trends in conflict dynamics around the world.

3. Correctly use key conflict terms.

Activity: Quiz

1. Turn to Quiz handout in section 2 of participant binder.

2. Please answer the questions individually.

MODULE 2 LOOKING AT DEVELOPMENT THROUGH

A CONFLICT LENS

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Quiz

Select the response that best answers the following questions:

1. Which of the following adjectives is associated with the term “conflict”? a. Rational b. Creative c. Inevitable d. All of the above

2. Since 1991, the total number of violent internal conflicts1 active

worldwide in a given year has: a. Declined b. Stayed about the same c. Increased

3. Since 1960, the frequency of armed conflict recurrence has:

a. Declined b. Stayed about the same c. Increased

4. Peace agreements are percent more likely to last at least fifteen years if women are involved:

a. 10 b. 25 c. 35 d. 50

1 For this quiz, “violent internal conflicts” are those that involve the use of armed force between two or more parties, where one party is the government of a state, that results in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths over the life of the conflict and that produces at least 25 battle-related fatalities in the given year. This definition tracks the one used by Hewitt, Wilkenfeld, and Gurr in Peace and Conflict 2010, the source of most of the quiz’s data.

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5. Since the end of the Cold War, an increasing number of violent internal conflicts have terminated as the result of: a. A victory for the government side b. A victory by the rebel side c. A negotiated peace agreement between the two sides

6. Analysts estimate that the global cost of a single violent internal conflict is:

a. About $110 million b. About $1.3 billion c. About $12 billion d. About $64 billion

7. Why is it important to address conflict as part of a development program?

a. Conflict is expensive b. Conflict decreases development effectiveness c. Conflict perpetuates poverty d. Most of the countries USAID works in are fragile or conflict- affected e. All of the above

Conflict: What the Research Tells Us

Question 1

Which of the following adjectives is associated with the term “conflict”?

a. Rational

b. Creative

c. Inevitable

d. All of the above

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Question 2

Since 1991, the total number of violent internal conflicts in a given year in the world has:

a. Declined

b.

Stayed about

the

same

c.

Increased

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tw

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FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Global Trends in Violent Conflict

gure 3.1 GlobalTrends in Violent Conflict,1946-2012

Number of Active Conflicts 40 1------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I

I I I

35 Ir ·······..····..··········.........·········...·················· ·· · ····························......· I I I I I

30 :I·····---- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -------- - ----- - -- - -- - ---- - --·- -·- 1 I I I I I

25Ir ···..·······......······························.. I I I I I

20 - . - - . - - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -------- 1 I I I I

I" ... .................... . ..... 15 I

I I I I I

• Total Conflict

10 I I • Interstate Conflict I

5 t·- ---- 1

I I I

- . ----- ---·- ······- --- -- - - -----·····----- - -- - ------·····- -- - - - - -

0 I + l -- +- -1 - I + l -- I - - -1 - I - I- l - ·I - l -- I + - 1 -1- l - - I + l - -1 - l -I- - - l -1 +l --1-1- · 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

4 From: Backer, David and PaulHuth. Peace and Conflict 2014.

Question 3

Since 1960, the frequency of armed conflict recurrence has:

a. Declined

b. Stayed about the same

c. Increased

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Recurrence is increasing

Figure 2 -Trends in New and Recurring Conflicts, 1946-20 1 2

-:iol-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I I

-----:I

1 5:

------------------------------------------------------------------- I. -------- ----------------------- -101 --------------------------T -- ----------------- -------------- ..I. -- --------- ----------

1--t - I --------- ll d L.--

0 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

II New conflict onset Recurring conflict

From: Uppsala Conflict Data Program 6

Question 4

Peace agreements are percent more likely to last at least at fifteen years when women are involved:

a. 10

b.

25

c.

35

d.

50

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Question 5

Since the end of the Cold War, an increasing number of violent internal conflicts have terminated as the result of:

a. A victory for the government side

b. A victory by the rebel side

c. A negotiated agreement between the two sides

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1946-1989

1990-2005

Conflict terminations have changed

Source: Kreutz. “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Dataset,” forthcoming, 2010.

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Question 6

Analysts estimate that the global cost of a single violent internal conflict is:

a. About $ 110 million

b. About $ 1.3 billion

c. About $ 12 billion

d. About $ 64 billion

From: Collier. The Bottom Billion, 2007

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USAID War is development in reverse. FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

2s1

3.5

:2 3.0

"y1:)

= 2.5 '0 c

ii 2.0

'C

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8 1.5 "1:)

a E 8 1.0 "' 0

:! 0.5

.g '0 .5

0.0

•Fragile & conflict-affected states (FCS) Recovering from fragility •Non-FCS (including BRIC) 11

Source: The World Bank, World Development Report 2011

Question 7

Why is it important to address conflict as part of a development program?

a. Conflict is expensive

b. Conflict decreases development effectiveness

c. Conflict perpetuates poverty

d. Most of the countries USAID works in are fragile or conflict-affected.

e. All of the above.

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USAID Armed Conflict, 20 14 FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Conflict Status Conflict Recently Terminated Internal Internationalized Internal and Internationalized Multiple Internal Interstate and Multiple Internal Internal and Multiple Internationalized

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MODULE 3 CONFLICT DIAGNOSIS: THE CONFLICT EQUATION

Conflict 102 / Module 3 Conflict Diagnosis: The Conflict Equation

Objective: By the end of this session, participants will be able to conduct a basic conflict diagnosis using the conflict equation.

Activity: Conflict Diagnosis Exercise

1. Take 5 minutes to read the two-page conflict scenario on Bolivia found in your binder.

2. As a group, identify a recorder and spokesperson to report out. 3. Take 15 minutes to conduct a basic conflict diagnosis of the scenario,

attempting to apply all three elements of the conflict equation with your colleagues. Encourage everyone in your group to participate.

4. Prepare a 3 – 5 minute report on your findings. You may use a flipchart as a visual aid.

Conflict Diagnosis: The Conflict Equation

The conflict equation

+ + =

Motives + Means + Opportunity = Violent Conflict

Institutions

Motives

Legitimacy

threatens/reinforces: • Beliefs • Values • Dignity

Social Patterns

Effectiveness

threatens/reinforces: • Security • Livelihood • Aspirations

Identity

Motives

Social Patterns of Grievance

. . . That threaten identities

. . . That produce outcomes considered ineffective, illegitimate, or both

. . . May result in mobilization of identity groups

1. Elitism

2. Exclusion

3. Chronic capacity deficits Systemic stagnation Strategic resources Ungoverned space

4. Transitional moment: unmet expectations

5. Corruption


+ =

Motives + Means = Violent Conflict


Key actors

. . . Mobilize grievances, giving them structure and direction, including use of violence

. . . May be individuals or organizations

. . . Have a range of aims in mobilizing grievances

• Social justice

• Ideology

• Political aspirations

• Economic gain

. . . Have varying capacities

• Leadership

• Financial

• Organizational

• Unrestricted Operating Space

Not all actors are key actors

Means

+ + =


Case Study: Bolivia

A triggering event

. . . Moments in time that create opportunities for key actors to advance their agendas

. . . Creates a short- term window of vulnerability

Elections

Passage of legislation

Ruling in a court case

Assassinations

Targeted political violence

Holidays

Natural disaster

Opportunity

+ + =


Please read the Bolivia case study and in your groups:

1. Conduct a basic conflict diagnosis attempting to apply all 3 of the elements in the conflict equation.

2. Identify a group spokesperson who is prepared to present the group’s analysis.

Case Study: Bolivia

Elaborating the equation

Context

Mitigating Factors

Context

+ + =


Conditions that are treated as givens in the analysis:

Physical attributes

Natural resource endowments

History

Socio-economic characteristics

External influences

Context

Poverty/low quality of life

Bad neighborhood

Recent history of conflict

Low level of economic growth/recession

Heterogeneity (2 or 3 equally sized groups)

Youth bulge

Conditions are conflict risk factors, not causes

Context

+ + =

Mitigating factors


Mitigating Factors . . .Form as a result of

interactions between institutions and identity groups

. . . Are not always normatively positive

. . .Mitigate against violent conflict

RESILIENCY is the ability to withstand and recover from shocks.

During conflict analysis, we often look for societal and institutional resiliencies that mitigate the potential for violence.

Conflict equation

Motives Means Opportunity Result

Conflict Drivers

Grievances

Key Actors

+ Triggers

Violent Conflict

Mitigating Factors

Latent Grievances

Key Actors

+ Moments

Non- violent Conflict

Conflict Diagnosis: The Conflict Equation

+ + =

Motives + Means + Opportunity = Violent Conflict Notes:

New York Times December 16, 2007

Protesters in Bolivia Seek More Autonomy SANTA CRUZ, Bolivia — Tens of thousands of antigovernment demonstrators flooded the streets of this city and three other provincial capitals on Saturday as four of Bolivia’s wealthiest provinces celebrated efforts to seek greater autonomy from the central government.

The protests here in Bolivia’s most prosperous city, though they were a direct affront to President Evo Morales, had a festive spirit, as people waved green-and-white flags marked , “Now We Are Autonomous [photo above left].”

“We don’t want Bolivia to disintegrate,” said Zenon Mita, 46, who runs a construction business here. “We just want Evo to recognize that we have our own priorities.”

Although the president sent hundreds of police officers to reinforce security in Santa Cruz and other capitals as fears of violence grew, there were no signs of a major armed presence on the streets. The only violence reported was an explosion on the fifth floor of the Palace of Justice here; no one was hurt.

But in Santa Rosa, an agricultural town near Santa Cruz, local television reported that more than 50 people were hurt in rock-throwing clashes on the main plaza as supporters of Mr. Morales traveled there in buses for a counter protest.

Morales supporters, meanwhile, gathered in the capital, La Paz, to celebrate a new Constitution aimed at strengthening the rights of indigenous groups [photo above right].

The passage of the Constitution in a chaotic assembly last week that was boycotted by the president’s critics set off the moves to seek greater autonomy in eastern Bolivia. A national referendum will determine whether the Constitution will take effect.

The “autonomy statutes” of the four provinces are the biggest challenge yet to Mr. Morales, who is Bolivia’s first indigenous president. The regional charters fall short of declaring independence, but supporters seek to give provincial officials power over natural gas royalties, agricultural policies and police forces.

The regional statutes, which are also subject to public referendum, have not taken effect. But they set in motion conditions for a clash between Mr. Morales and the regions of Bolivia that are richest in petroleum and arable land.

Officials in La Paz have lashed out at the autonomy moves, describing them as racist efforts from largely mixed-race provinces to resist attempts to redistribute wealth among the country’s poor. Grievances against the relatively prosperous east are most intense in the western highlands, home to Aymara and Quechua Indians.

Vice President Álvaro García Linera accused the elite in Santa Cruz, the richest lowland province, of “separatist and racist attitudes,” in comments to the official news agency on Friday. Mr. García Linera said Santa Cruz was seeking to limit migration of Indians from the altiplano, or highlands, with its new statute, effectively restricting Mr. Morales’s land reform project.

Political leaders here make no secret of their distaste for Mr. Morales’s policies. “Evo is putting us on the road to chaos with ideas that discriminate against people who are not indigenous,” Branko Marinkovic, the president of the Pro-Santa Cruz Committee, said in an interview. “No one wants to invest or create jobs in this environment.”

In addition to sending extra police officers to Santa Cruz and other capitals, the central government put the armed forces on alert. Mr. Morales, an ally of Hugo Chávez, Venezuela’s president, has also stepped up his criticism of the United States in recent days, accusing Washington of fomenting unrest here.

Mr. Morales spoke before thousands of supporters in downtown La Paz on Saturday, some of whom were waving the wiphala, a multicolored flag representing indigenous people in Bolivia. A few others, presumably supporters of Mr. Morales from Santa Cruz, waved the province’s green-and-white flag.

“Don’t be scared!” Mr. Morales yelled into the microphone in the televised speech. “We are united and organized!” Silvia Lazarte, the Quechua Indian who presided over the constitutional assembly, stood by the president.

Attempting to show that the armed forces were aligned with Mr. Morales in a country prone to coups in the last century, members of the army, air force and navy appeared along side the president in La Paz.

“Death to the Yankees!” Mr. Morales said, finishing the address with a chant common in the Chapare, the coca-growing region where he commands a strong following, but rare in his speeches before other audiences.

Alex Contreras, Mr. Morales’s spokesman, told reporters in La Paz that one option to lessen the tensions would be to have European ambassadors step in to mediate between the government and the provinces. But neither side seemed ready for mediation on Saturday. Attention focused instead on two dramatically different visions for the country’s future.

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/c/hugo_chavez/index.html?inline=nyt-per

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MODULE 4 IDENTITIES EXERCISE

Conflict 102 / Module 4 Identities Exercise

Objectives: By the end of this session, participants will have an enhanced understanding of the role that identity plays in conflict.

Activity: Advocate Your Grievance

1. Watch the video clips of identity group perspectives. 2. Pay special attention to the “voices of identity” of your assigned group

and try to “hear” the stated grievance(s) and implied perceptions of the group.

3. In your assigned identity groups, discuss and analyze with colleagues the grievances, perceptions, and stated points of view identified in the video clips for your group. Prepare a presentation of 2 – 3 minutes to present the identity groups’ point of view.

4. Grievances must be portrayed in a realistic manner that could happen in a conflict setting. A few creative portrayals from past participants include:

a. A call to a talk show at a community radio station b. A brief article with headline for a local paper c. A street drama d. A town crier’s communication e. A song

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Identities Exercise

Excerpts from the short reading

Page 55, The Little Book of Conflict Transformation:

Bottom part of the page

“Identity is not a rigid, static phenomenon. Rather, identity is dynamic and under constant definition and redefinition, especially during times of conflict. Identity is best understood as relational.”

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Excerpts from the short reading

Page 60, The Little Book of Conflict Transformation:

Top of the page

“The key: try never to ignore or talk away someone’s perception. Instead, try to understand where it is rooted.”

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THE LITTLE BOOKS OF jUSTICE & PEACEBUILDING

Published titles include: The Little Book of Restorative Justice, by Howard Zehr

The Little Book of Conflict Transformation, by John Paul Lederach The Little Book of Family Group Conferences, New-Zealand Style,

by Allan MacRae and Howard Zehr The Little Book of Strategic Peacebuilding, by Lisa Schirch

The Little Book of Strategic Negotiation, by Jayne Seminare Docherty

The Little Book of Circle Processes, by Kay Pranis The Little Book of Contemplative Photography, by Howard Zehr

The Little Book of Restorative Discipline for Schools, by Lorraine Stutzman Amstutz and Judy H. Mullet The Little Book of Trauma Healing, by Carolyn Yoder The

Little Book of Biblical Justice, by Chris Marshall The Little Book of Restorative Justice for People in Prison,

by Barb Toews El Pequeno Libra De Justicia Restaurativa, by Howard Zehr

The Little Book of Cool Tools {or Hot Topics, by Ron Kraybill and Evelyn Wright

The Little Book of Dialogue {or Difficult Subjects, by Lisa Schirch and David Campt

The Little Book of Victim Offender Con{erencing, by Lorraine Stutzman Amstutz

The Little Book of Healthy Organizations, by David R. Brubaker and Ruth Hoover Zimmerman

THE LillLE BOO!( OF

Conflict Transformation

JOHN PAUL LEDERACH

The Little Books of Justice & Peacebuilding present, in highly accessible form, key concepts and practices from the fields of restorative justice, conflict transformation, and peacebuilding. Written by leaders in these fields, they are designed for practitioners, students, and anyone interested in justice, peace, and conflict resolution.

The Little Books of Justice & Peacebuilding series is a cooperative effort between the Center for Justice and Peacebuilding of Eastern Mennonite University (Howard Zehr, Series General Editor) and publisher Good Books (Phyllis Pellman Good, Senior Editor).

Intercourse, PA 17534 800/762-7171

www. GoodBooks. com

Acknowledgments

Writing a Little Book was much harder than it appears. I had help a long the way. First, I want to extend a warm a nd deepl y appreciative thank you to Howard Zeh r for concept ual- izi n g this Little Book Series a nd e n couraging my involvement. More impor tant l y, he had the first crack a t helping me move from a verbose text to one that got to the point. I appreciate the exce ll ent editing and sharpening t ha t this text received from Phyllis Pellman Good. It wou ld not read this well without her advice and sugges t io ns. I had a great boost on the com- puter-gene rated graphics f rom my good friends at the Consor- tium on Contlict Resolution from the University of Colorado, particularly from Heidi a nd Guy Burgess. Of particular n ote, I had the wonderfu l opportun i ty of having the Master's students from the Kroc Institute's (Notre Dame) class of 2002-2003 read my f i rst draft and spend a full day of class i mproving and clarifying the concepts. Their ideas and suggest ions are found throughout.

I would like to extend a big note of gratitude to John a nd Gina Martin-Smith for the use of their house in Nederla nd , Colorado, where I got to watch the aspens turn f rom green to yellow at 8,500 feet as I wrote this text.

Finally, I recognize that none of my wri ting would take place without the patien t support and e n courageme nt of my family, especially We n dy, w ith whom I have had many coffees while discussing the ideas found in this book and how to say them better.

Cover photograph by Howard Zehr.

Desi g n by Dawn J. Ran c k

THE LITILE BOOK OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION Copyrig ht : 2003 by Good Books, Intercourse, PA 17534 Interna ti onal Standard Book N umbe r: 978-1-56148- 390-7 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2003049110

All rights reserved . Printed in the United States of Amer ica.

No part of this book may be reproduced in any man n er, except for brief quotations in criti cal articles or rev iews, w i thout permission.

Library of Congress Ca taloging-in -Publication Data

Lederach, John Paul. The li ttl e book of conflict transformation I J oh n Paul Lederach.

p. em. Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 1-56148-390-7 1. Conflict ma n agement. 2. Soc ial confl ict. I. Title. HM1126.L43 2003 303.6' 9--dc21

Table of Contents 1. Conflict Transformation? 3

2. The Lenses of Conflict Transformation 7

3. Defining Conflict Transformation 14

4. Conflict and Change 23

5. Connecting Resolution and Transformation 28

6. Creating a Map of Conflict 34

7. Process-Structures as Platforms for Change 40

8. Developing Our Capacities 48

9. Applying the Framework 61

10. Conclusions 68

11. Endnotes 72

12. Selected Readings 72

13. Related Books by John Paul Lederach 73

14. About the Author 74

2003049110

The Little Book of Conflict Transformation

little or no control over what happens. No wonder we see complexity as a foe creating an interminable headache. No wonder we often believe that simplifying the issues or resolving the contradictions will bring remedy.

We all have a certain tolerance for complexity, but we all reach our point of saturation. When saturated , some of us cope by leaving, by getting out. Others of us stay but try to find a quick fix or solution that makes the complexity go away. Still others of us try to reduce the impact by ignoring the multiple meanings and faces. We settle on a single explanation about what is going on, then hold onto it doggedly and rigidly. Complexity becomes the enemy.

Paradoxically, as Abraham Lincoln observed , "The only way to truly get rid of an enemy is to make him your friend ." While complexity can create a sense that there is too much to consider, it also provides untold possibilities for build i ng desired and constructive change. One of the great advantages of complexity is that change is not tied exclusively to one thing, one action, one option. In fact , complexity can create the feeling of being a kid in a candy store: we are not limited by having too few options but by our own inability to experience the wide range of potentials afforded by all the available choices.

The key to this fourth practice is to trust and pursue but never to be rigid. First , we must trust the capacity of systems to generate options and avenues for change and moving forward. Second, we must pursue those that appear to hold the greatest promise for constructive change. Third , we must not lock rigidly onto one idea or avenue.

Complexity often brings a multiplicity of options to the surface. If we pay careful attention to those options, we can often create new ways to look at old patterns.

Developing Our Capacities Practice 5:

Develop a capacity to hear and engage the voices of identity

I have repeatedly suggested that we should look for and see the patterns in the context underpinning the presenting situation , in the epicenter of the conflict. But what do we look and listen for? I have consistently found that most essential is hearing and engaging the struggling, sometimes lost, voices of identity within the loud static of the conflictive environment. In my experience, issues of identity are at the root of most conflicts. Thus a capacity to understand and respect the role of identity is essential to understanding the epicenter of conflict.

Issues of identity are fundamental in protecting a sense of self and group survival , and they become particularly important during conflicts. Identity shapes and moves an expression of conflict, often in terms of deeply felt demands and preferred outcomes, to presenting issues. At the deepest level , identity is lodged in the nar- ratives of how people see themselves, who they are, where they have come from, and what they fear they will become or lose. Thus, identity is deeply rooted in a person 's or a group's sense of how that person or group is in relationship with others and what effect that relationship has on its participants' sense of self and group. Identity matters are fundamental to conflict, yet they are rarely explicitly addressed in the conflict.

Identity is not a rigid , static phenomenon. Rather, identity is dynamic and under constant definition and redefinition, especially during times of conflict. Identity is also best understood as relational. If we had no other color in the world than the color blue, then blue would be color-

54 55

The Little Book of Conflict Transformation Developing Our Capacities

less. To distinguish blue we need a matrix of colors; then "blue" in relationship has identity and makes sense.

This creates a challenge for a transformational process: how do we create spaces and processes that encourage people to address and articulate a positive sense of identity in relationship to other people and groups, but not in reaction to them? In the middle of conflict, when people are often filled with great fears and unknowns, the challenge is to lower the level of reactivity and blame, while at the same time increasing a capacity to express a clear sense of self and place.

What are the disciplines that make such a practice possible?

First, we need to develop a capacity to see and hear "identity" when it appears. Be attentive to language, metaphors, and expressions that signal the distresses of identity. Sometimes these are vague: " Five years ago, not one teacher in this school would have thought of proposing such a course. What are we coming to?" Sometimes it is named by "insider" metaphor and language: ''The Pioneer Street people no longer even have a voice in this church. " (Pioneer Street is where the church is located, but it is also the inside label for the first-generation members of the church). Sometimes it is explicit and mobilized: "The very survival of the Hmong community is under threat by the actions of this Police Chief." In all cases, pay attention to the concern behind the voice. It is an appeal to a sense of self, to identity, and to how a relationship is being experienced and defined. It is an appeal to take the discourse from the content to the core. You cannot touch the epicenter if you do not hear the voice. The first step: be attentive to the voice of identity.

Second, move toward, not away from , the appeals to identity. Acknowledge that the conflict requires us to address our understandings of identity and relationship. This does not take the place of a process which needs to be designed to address the specific issues and content that surfaced the conflict. Both processes are needed. Generating solutions to specific problems can alleviate anxiety temporarily, but it rarely addresses deeper identity and relational concerns directly.

Processes designed to explore these deeper issues will need to have a goal of creating spaces for exchange and dialogue, rather than the goal of creating an immediate negotiated solution. Also, in working with identity-based concerns it is important not to assume that the work is primarily that of direct inter-identity exchange. Often the most critical parts of the process are the cultivation of internal, self, or intra-group spaces, where safe and deep reflection about the nature of the situation , responsibility, hopes, and fears can be pursued.

Pushing inappropriately for inter-identity exchange without a framework of preparation and adequate support can be counterproductive and even destructive. When working with identity, I can suggest three guiding principles that should characterize the process: honesty, iterative learning, and appropriate exchange.

Honesty can never be forced. We can, however, work toward the creation of process and spaces where people feel safe enough to be deeply honest with themselves and with others about their fears and hopes, hurts and responsibilities. Cycles and episodes of escalated conflict create and reinforce an environment of insecurity that threatens identity. In turn , a threat to identity creates a tendency toward self-protection, which, while not the

56 57

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enemy of honesty, tends to diminish self-reflective honesty in favor of other-reflective honesty: I see clearly and honestly what is wrong with you. I cannot see so clearly and honestly my own responsibility. Deep honesty comes hand in hand with safety and trust. Give constant attention to how the processes are creating and assuring spaces with these characteristics.

The phrase "iterative learning" suggests an idea of going around. To iterate is to repeat. It requires rounds of interaction. This is especially true for issues of identity.

The questions "Who am I?" and "Who are we?" are foundational for understanding life and community. Yet

speaking deeply about self,

Developing Our Capacities think of the transaction as a one-time event that deals with identity and then is over. Instead, it is better to see process as a platform that permits ongoing learning about self and other, while at the same time pursuing decisions about particular issues that symbolize the deeper negotiations surrounding identity. This is why, for example, conflict transformation views the dispute over a parade in Belfast or Portadown , Northern Ireland, as si- multaneously an issue requiring specific decisions related to that episode and an iterative platform to explore and shape identities of people with shared childhoods and geographic horizons. You can use the episodic issue as an opportunity to explore identity, but you cannot use the limited time and scope of the decision-making

Try never to ignore

or talk away someone's

perception. Instead,

try to understand where

it is rooted.

group , and relationship is never easy or elemental. Nor is identity rigid and fixed. Under- standing and defining identity requires rounds of interaction and inner action. The development , negotiation, and definition of identity require processes of interaction with others, as well as inner reflection

process about a specific issue as an adequate mechanism for addressing identity concerns.

As we seek appropriate forms of interaction or exchange, we can easily fall into a technique-oriented approach toward dialogue and assume tha t it can only happen in direct face-to-face processes. Appropriate exchange suggests there are many ways that learning and deepening understanding about identity and relationship can happen. We need not fall prey to " process" overload that suggests "dialogue-as-talk " is the only path

about self . The whole undertaking is a learning process. And the pace of learning can be very different from one person to the next. This is important because we must recognize that identity work is not a one-time decision- making process. It is an iterative process of learning, and it is done in relationship to others.

Those who support or facilitate transformational processes therefore need to think about how to create multiple forums for addressing identity. Too often we

to understanding. In deep identity work the opposite may be true. Appropriate exchange may include dialogue through music, the arts, rituals, dialogue-as-sport, fun and laughter, and dialogue-as-shared-work to pre- serve old city centers or parks. All of these may have greater avenues for learning and understanding than talk can possibly provide. The key to this fifth capacity is an ability to recognize opportunity and to design response processes with innovation and creativity.

61 60

l


Finally, we need to be attentive to peoples' perceptions of how identity is linked to power and to the systems and structures which organize and govern their relationships. This is particularly important for people who feel their identity has historically been eroded, marginalized, or under deep threat. Here change processes must address the ways in which structural relationships symbolize and represent the perceptions. The _key: try never to ignore or talk away someone 's per- ceptiOn. Instead , try to understand where it is rooted. Never propose or tinker with structural arrangements as a _tactc to. avoid the deeper perception. When dealing w1th 1denhty- based concerns encourage participants to be onest as they look at and address systemic changes, w h1ch they need in order to assure them both respect and access to the structures.

Practices such as these are not natural skills for many of us. They take commitment and discipline, but when developed they increase our capacity to think and respond transformatively to conflict.

9. Applying the

Frameworl(

am sitting in a coffeehouse in the tow n w here I live in Colorado, next to several people who are in an animated,

sometimes heated, discussion about a rising controversy with local police. The town ' s newspaper has been filled these past tv\'o months with letters to the editor deploring recent policing actions. The police seem to have decided that speeding and rolling stops require much more attention.

At the table next to me the voices rise as one person details her recent experience of getting a ticket for speeding. She explains that she had not been stopped in 20 years, and she is convinced that the current drive is just a ploy to fill the town coffers. She concludes with a lament about the loss of citizenship in what used to be a friend- ly town. A few weeks ago a protest march was organized on Main Street , followed by a public forum to air grievances and to decide on the next steps.

This is not the first time controversy has arisen around the police. Four years ago the main complaint in the papers was that the police were too slow in responding to calls for help, especially in an area where out-of-state people were starting illegal campfires. Last year the letters to

Mod

ule

5

MODULE 5 CONFLICT DIAGNOSIS: CASE STUDY


Conflict Diagnosis: Case Study


1. Conduct a conflict diagnosis. 2. Identify factors that drive or mitigate conflict.

Activity: Case Study Exercise

1. Read the email/task from the Mission director in your binder. 2. As a group, identify a recorder for the flipchart and a

spokesperson to report out. 3. Take 40 minutes to conduct a basic conflict diagnosis of the Sri

Lanka case. Apply all five components (motives, means, opportunity, context and mitigating factors) of the conflict equation, specifically identifying social patterns of grievance and (if possible) social patterns of resilience, to identify the factors that drive and mitigate conflict.

4. Encourage everyone to participate in the discussions. 5. Prepare a brief 5-minute report on your findings. Use a flipchart as

a visual aid so other groups can see your thought process.

1


The Sri Lanka Case: Undertaking a Conflict Diagnosis

*Disclaimer - This case study is being used as a historical example to generate discussion and developmental learning, and by no means reflects the current sentiment or disposition of the Government of Sri Lanka or the U.S. Government.* The following are excerpts from an email message you just received from USAID/Sri Lanka’s Mission director, who is on a quick tour of the North and the East:

I do apologize for burdening you with such a significant assignment in your first days at post. But as you know, the Ambassador has made support for the transition from war to peace in Sri Lanka his top priority. With the Working Group meeting the day after tomorrow, we have a lot of work to do to present the development perspective effectively.

To begin with, I would like a fresh assessment of the conflict dynamics at play in Sri Lanka. I understand that you just completed a course on conflict analysis; I am sure you will be able to apply what you have learned and produce something insightful based on the materials that have been pulled together for you.

Please make sure that your analysis considers the context here in Sri Lanka; I think that is key. To the extent that you can, please also consider mitigating factors, as those may provide entry points for programming.

I’d like you to email me what you can pull together in the next few hours, when I am back from my afternoon meetings. Once I see what you have produced, we can think about next steps.

Conflict 102 Sri Lanka: A Case Study1

You have recently been posted to USAID/Sri Lanka in Colombo. One of your duties is to serve as the Mission’s conflict officer. This is an exciting time to be posted to Colombo — Sri Lanka’s decades-long civil war ended in May 2009 as the result of the Government of Sri Lanka’s military defeat of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE).

The ambassador has indicated that he feels that, despite its human and socioeconomic costs, the government victory represents a new beginning for Sri Lanka. In a recent speech, he said:

Bold actions are needed now to share power and to assure all of Sri Lanka’s communities a future of hope, respect and dignity. Through such actions, a truly united Sri Lanka can emerge. A Sri Lanka that is rooted in democracy and tolerance, where human rights are respected, where media can operate freely and independently and where all Sri Lankans can participate in an open dialogue on the way forward for your country. A successful reconciliation and healing process will help ensure a lasting end to terrorism in Sri Lanka and will open the way for a future of prosperity, opportunity and hope for all Sri Lankans. The United States will remain engaged to help your country and your government achieve this.

In support of this vision, the ambassador has formed an interagency working group to begin developing a new strategy for U.S. foreign assistance in Sri Lanka. To prepare for the working group’s first meeting, the Mission director is on a quick tour of the Northern and Eastern provinces, where the conflict has been concentrated. In his absence, he has left instructions for you to get up to speed on the situation in the country.

To help you get started, the senior foreign service national in your unit has pulled together some key documents for you to review:

1. Basic Context Data 2. Historical Summary of the Conflict 3. Development Challenges 4. Timeline of Key Events 5. Selected Background Articles:

a. Post-war Sri Lanka searches for ‘just peace,’ BBC News (May 19, 2010)

1 This is a teaching case. The views represented in the case material do not necessarily represent the views of USAID, nor does inclusion of material indicate any official endorsement of the sources.

b. Where now for post-election Sri Lanka?, BBC News (January 29, 2010) c. Sri Lanka: A Bitter Peace, International Crisis Group (January 11, 2010) d. U.S. Urges Probe of Sri Lankan War, Washington Post (October 23, 2009) e. Development Assistance and Conflict in Sri Lanka: Lessons from the Eastern Province, International Crisis Group (April 16, 2009)

1. Basic Context Data 2

Ov erv i ew : Full name: The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka Capital: Colombo (commercial), Sri Jayawardenepura (administrative) Population: 20.2 million (UN, 2009) Ethnic Groups: Sinhalese (74 percent), Tamils (18 percent), Muslims (7 percent), other (1 percent). Tamils are concentrated in the North and East, but about 10 percent of Colombo’s population is Tamil. Religions: Buddhist 69 percent, Hindu 15 percent, Christian 8 percent, Muslim 8 percent (majority practice Sunni Islam). Most Sinhalese are Buddhist; most Tamils are Hindu; some of both are Christian. Major Languages: Sinhala and Tamil (official). English is spoken by about 10 percent of the population. Literacy: 91 percent Life expectancy: 72 (male); 77 (female) Main exports: Clothing and textiles, tea, gems, rubber, coconuts Corruption Perception Index ranking: 97th (out of 180 countries, with 1st being best score) 3

GNI per capita: USD $1,780 (World Bank, 2007) G o ver nme nt Type: Republic. Independence: February 4, 1948. Constitution: August 31, 1978. Suffrage: Universal over 18. Branches: Executive — president, chief of state and head of government, elected for a six-year term. Legislative — unicameral 225-member parliament. Judicial — supreme court, court of appeal, high court, subordinate courts. Administrative subdivisions: Nine provinces and 25 administrative districts.

Ec onomy (2008) GDP: $40.7 billion.

2 Most of the overview information is from the BBC’s “Sri Lanka Profile” retrieved at . The government and economy information is from the U.S. Department of State’s “Background Note: Sri

Lanka” retrieved at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm. 3 Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) measures perceived corruption in the public sector. The CPI is compiled through surveys of business people and country analysts. Retrieved at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/ surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/%20country_profiles/1168427.stm

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm

http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/

Annual growth rate: 6 percent. Natural resources: Limestone, graphite, mineral sands, gems, and phosphate. Agriculture (12 percent of GDP): Major products — rice, tea, rubber, coconut and spices. Services (60 percent of GDP): Major types — tourism, wholesale & retail trade, transport, telecom, financial services. Industry (28% of GDP): Major types — garments and leather goods, rubber products, food processing, chemicals, refined petroleum, gems and jewelry, non- metallic mineral-based products, and construction. Trade: Exports — $8.1 billion: garments, tea, rubber products, jewelry and gems, refined petroleum and coconuts. Major markets — U.S. ($2 billion), U.K., India. Imports — $14 billion. Major suppliers — India, Singapore, Hong Kong, China, Iran, Malaysia, Japan, U.K., U.A.E., Belgium, Indonesia, South Korea, U.S. ($283 million).

2. Historical Summary of the Conflict

When it was called Ceylon, Sri Lanka fell under Portuguese and Dutch influence and finally came under British rule. During nearly 150 years of British colonial rule, English was the language of the government and Christianity was encouraged. Following standard imperialist policy, the British (and earlier the Portuguese) invested more in ethnic minority people — the Tamils. They gave the Tamils a better school system, which provided the colonial administration with the people they required in Colombo. The Tamils learned English in large numbers.

Although the British ran Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan Tamils increasingly staffed the administration and the professions. The majority Sinhalese community resented what they saw as British favoritism reflected primarily in the unequal representation of Sri Lankan Tamils in government jobs and their greater access to education and economic resources. In addition, the British introduced important new cash crops — rubber, coffee and tea — and imported about 1 million Tamil laborers from India (so-called Indian Tamils or “Hill Country” Tamils) to work the plantations, altering the ethnic balance in Sri Lanka.

In the early 20th century, a nationalist political movement emerged in Sinhalese communities with the aim of obtaining political independence, which the British granted in 1948 after peaceful negotiations. Disagreements between the Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic communities began to flare up during the drafting of the country’s first post- independence constitution. The efforts of successive Sinhalese-dominated governments to redress the perceived imbalance between Tamils and Sinhalese exacerbated the situation. In 1956, passage of the “Sinhala Only Act” made Sinhala (rather than English) the official language, limiting minorities’ access to government positions and educational opportunities. This resulted in ethnic riots. Sri Lanka’s constitution also granted Buddhism — the religion of the majority Sinhalese — a dominant status. That contributed to the sense of marginalization of not only the Tamils (most of whom are

Hindu, but a sizeable portion are Christian) but also the minority Muslim community in Sri Lanka, the majority of whom traced their ancestry to Arab traders.

Spiraling tensions and violence between the Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic communities by the end of the 1970s developed into a full-blown civil war in 1983 when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) began its armed conflict with the Sri Lankan government. Often called the Tamil Tigers, the LTTE utilized a guerilla/terrorist strategy to advance its goal of creating an independent Tamil state (named Tamil Eelam) in the North and the East of the island. The LTTE was notable for its use of female combatants. At one point, women fighters made up 30-40 percent of LTTE forces and were responsible for approximately 30 percent of its suicide attacks. Many motivations fueled women’s participation in the LTTE, including the organization’s promise to be the “supreme symbol of women’s liberation” within the new nation.

In July 1987, India and Sri Lanka signed an accord in an attempt to settle the internal Sri Lankan conflict. The accord gave greater autonomy to the Tamils and included provisions for an Indian peacekeeping force that would disarm the rebels. At first, the LTTE supported the agreement; ultimately, the accord broke down in 1989 after opposition by some Sinhalese turned violent. In 1990, India withdrew its troops and the civil war began in earnest again. As the Indian troops withdrew, the LTTE took control of significant parts of the North and established government-like functions in the areas under its control.

In October 1990, the LTTE expelled an estimated 80,000 Muslims from five districts in the North, including Jaffna, in a matter of days. Most of these Muslim internally displaced persons (IDPs) settled in Puttalam on the west coast, north of Colombo. The LTTE also forcibly took land from Muslims in the East, who remained caught between LTTE forces and the government military forces in those areas.

Although most of the civil war’s fighting took place in the North and East, the conflict also penetrated the heart of Sri Lankan society in the 1990s and early 2000s, when the LTTE’s elite Black Tiger Squad carried out devastating suicide bombings in Colombo, including at the city’s airport in 2001. Toward the end of 2001, the LTTE began to declare their willingness to explore measures for a peaceful settlement to the conflict. The LTTE are believed to have feared international pressure and even direct U.S. support of the Sri Lankan government as part of the so-called “War on Terror” that followed the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the United States. In the South, the government was facing increasing criticism over its “war for peace” strategy, with peace nowhere in sight and the economy in tatters.

In February 2002, the government and the LTTE signed a ceasefire agreement and a peace process began with Norway as the facilitator. Despite significant international support to the peace process, it never resulted in a lasting peace agreement. The peace

4 The U.S. Government designated the LTTE as a foreign terrorist organization.

process was complicated by the LTTE being banned in many countries.4 At the same time, the LTTE frequently showed no interest in even the most generous devolution proposals offered by the government. Overall, extreme nationalist parties on both sides frequently derailed any attempt to offer concessions.

In particular, Sinhalese-dominated political parties consistently failed to reach consensus on reasonable power-sharing or devolution proposals that might be acceptable to the majority of Tamils. The Sangha (Buddhist monastic order) was an influential force in opposing LTTE and other Tamils who called for autonomy or separation. The unity of the island and its historic significance to the Buddhist tradition were the main arguments used by monks to justify the government campaign against the rebels in the North and East.

While many Hindu religious leaders were supportive of Tamils’ political and national grievances, they mainly played a significant role in sustaining community networks in response to the devastation of the war. Such leaders found themselves caught between government policies and the LTTE’s direct threats against any collaboration with central government. Some Christian leaders in the North and East were outspoken during the civil war against government policies of neglect and militarization.

Following the tsunami of Dec. 26, 2004, Sri Lanka’s president and the LTTE failed to set up a joint interim body to administer tsunami relief funds and aid — basically closing any hope of restarting the formal peace process. There were also major violations of the ceasefire, including the LTTE’s assassination of Sri Lanka’s foreign minister in Colombo in 2005. The elections in November 2005 brought a new president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, to power. Although the new government did not withdraw from the peace talks, it adopted a more hardline military strategy.

The ceasefire agreement was effectively over by early 2006, and full-scale military conflict began again in July of that year, when the conflict had already claimed over 65,000 lives since its start. The escalation of the conflict resulted in an additional 150,000 IDPs, adding to the hundreds of thousands affected by the tsunami. Conditions for IDPs were highly insecure, with women especially vulnerable to sexual assault, domestic violence and trafficking. In 2007, the government of Sri Lanka formally abandoned the negotiation option and launched a military campaign to capture the LTTE territory and destroy its infrastructure. The military had significant success in the Eastern Province, recapturing the territory in mid-2007. The forced “disappearance” of tens of thousands of young men was an especially traumatic aspect of the conflict, which led to the formation of groups of “Mothers of the Disappeared” who banded together to seek justice and peace.

During early 2009, the government’s military made rapid progress. Approximately 284,000 IDPs from the North, known as the Vanni, fled the fighting. They were moved

5 “Sri Lanka: One Year On from the Conflict,” DFID, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EGUA-85LPFC?OpenDocument.

into camps just south of the conflict zone in an area called Menik Farms. Additional IDPs fled north to Jaffna and were placed in camps. In May 2009, the government declared a complete military victory over the LTTE and announced that the group’s leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, was dead. In October 2009, the U.S. Department of State’s War Crimes Office released a report detailing possible war crimes violations committed by the LTTE and government armed forces from January to May 2009, an assertion the government has continually rejected. The government has also rejected estimates that as many as 20,000 civilians died as a result of the fighting at the very end of the war. The actual numbers of dead or missing may never be known.

In June 2009, the government of Sri Lanka suggested that the majority of the 284,000 IDPs in the Menik Farm camps would likely be there for more than a year. The government continued to screen the camp population for LTTE cadres and removed an estimated 12,000 into rehabilitation centers or, in some cases, police custody. There were rumors of disappearances in the camps. Under international pressure, the government started releasing IDPs from the Menik Farm camps during the latter part of 2009. As of early May 2010, UN figures indicated that approximately 73,000 people remained in the camps.5

http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EGUA-85LPFC?OpenDocument

3. Development Challenges6

Sri Lanka is a lower-middle-income developing country with about one-quarter of its population living below the poverty line. More than two decades of civil conflict have exacerbated poverty and resulted in major inequities between regions. Large populations of civilians are displaced and living in IDP camps in Sri Lanka’s North and East. The regional imbalance of economic growth has also created major socioeconomic problems in rural areas. More than 75 percent of people still live in rural areas and depend on traditional agriculture for their livelihoods. Little focus is placed on rural industrial development within the country’s economic development programs and strategies.

The reintegration of former LTTE combatants and the return of conflict IDPs have both been challenging. The social stigmatization of former combatant women has made them especially vulnerable to poverty and continued violence, placing them at high risk for trafficking. Rates of sexual and gender-based violence are reported to be highest in conflict-affected areas, and continuing discrimination against Tamils constitutes a serious barrier to justice for ethnic minority women and men. Both women and men were reported to have been subjected to sexual violence during the conflict, and little has been done to address the legacies of this violence. Recent surveys found 90,000 war widows and 40,000 woman-headed households in the Northern region most impacted by conflict, constituting an additional challenge to socioeconomic development.

Roughly a third of the labor force is employed in agriculture-based activities; an additional 17 percent is employed in industry. The service sector, which accounts for 45 percent of all jobs, is the largest component of GDP and continues to grow. Key exports are tea and garments, but efforts are underway to diversify exports. The overall unemployment rate has declined in recent years to around 10 percent. However, the rate of unemployment for high school and college graduates is disproportionately higher than for less-educated workers. A disconnect exists between the number of students graduating from high schools and colleges and the number of jobs available for their skill levels. This results in a large population of educated and either unemployed or underemployed youth who are susceptible to recruitment to violence. Although women have high average educational achievement, their participation in the workforce lags, with only 30-35 percent of working-age women employed.

Approximately 800,000 Sri Lankans work abroad (90 percent in the Middle East) and send about $3.15 billion in remittances to Sri Lanka each year. This is second only to the textile industry, the major source of foreign exchange earnings. The economic global crisis is likely to have a significant negative impact on the country’s economy.

6 Mainly from AUSAID, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/country/country.cfm?CountryId=1; and Information from Australian Government Department of Trade, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/sri_lanka/sri_lanka_country_brief.html.

http://www.ausaid.gov.au/country/country.cfm?CountryId=1%3B

http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/sri_lanka/sri_lanka_country_brief.html

Sri Lanka's defense spending escalated in recent years to about 5 percent of GDP, nearly double that spent by India and Pakistan.7 Although Sri Lanka’s health and education systems are good compared to other countries in the region, their quality is under threat because of a lack of government investment. In higher education, a large gap exists between available training and the country’s needs. High emigration rates mean that many of the best-qualified Sri Lankans now live overseas.

Sri Lanka has a very active local civil society that has been engaged in sustained activity to help build peace across the communities on the island. An estimated 1,000 or more NGOs are in the country, with at least 10 percent of them INGOs.8 While most organizations focus on traditional sectoral development work, a number work on peacebuilding, reconciliation and conflict-related issues, and many assisted in the post- tsunami recovery of affected populations across all ethnic groups. Women’s organizations, including the Association of War-Affected Women, have been especially active in peacebuilding and reconciliation work. However, this has not always translated into women’s voices being heard in political processes; Sri Lanka ranks 140 out of 153 countries in terms of women’s representation in Parliament, with women occupying less than 6 percent of seats.

Over the past several years, human rights violations (abductions and political killings) have risen significantly and attacks on and suspicion of NGOs and INGOs that publicly supported peace or negotiations have increased. The ability of various civil society groups and activists to work for peace, security and human rights has diminished, and many NGO representatives reported difficulties organizing activities that support peace. The media have also been targeted. At least 13 journalists have been killed in the country since 2006.9

7“Q&A: Post-War Sri Lanka,” BBC NEWS, April 7, 2010. Retrieved at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/2405347.stm.

8 From http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=43509 9 Committee to Protect Journalists, http://cpj.org/killed/asia/sri-lanka/.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/2405347.stm

http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=43509

http://cpj.org/killed/asia/sri-lanka/

4. Timeline of Key Events10

EARY HISTORY/PRE-INDEPENDENCE Fifth Century BC

Indo-Aryan migrants from northern India settle on the island; the Sinhalese emerge as the most powerful of the various clans.

Third Century BC

Beginning of Tamil migration from India.

1505 Portuguese arrive in Colombo, marking beginning of European interest.

1658 Dutch force out Portuguese and establish control over the whole island except central kingdom of Kandy.

1796 Britain begins to take over island.

1815 Kingdom of Kandy conquered. Britain starts bringing in Tamil laborers from southern India to work in tea, coffee and coconut plantations.

1833 Whole island united under one British administration.

1931 British grant the right to vote and introduce power sharing with Sinhalese

SINHALA NATIONALISM AND INDEPENDENCE 1948 Ceylon gains full independence.

1949 Indian Tamil plantation workers disenfranchised and many deprived of citizenship.

1956

Solomon Bandaranaike elected on wave of Sinhalese nationalism. Sinhala made sole official language and other measures introduced to bolster Sinhalese and Buddhist feeling. More than 100 Tamils killed in widespread violence after Tamil parliamentarians protest the new laws.

1958 Anti-Tamil riots leave more than 200 people dead. Thousands of Tamils displaced.

1959 Bandaranaike assassinated by a Buddhist monk. ETHNIC TENSIONS

1972 Ceylon changes its name to Sri Lanka and Buddhism given primary place as country’s religion, further antagonizing Tamil minority.

1976 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) formed as tensions increase in Tamil.

1977 Separatist Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) Party wins all seats in Tamil areas.

1983

13 soldiers killed in LTTE ambush, sparking anti-Tamil riots in Colombo, which many believed were orchestrated by the Sinhalese-dominated government.

CIVIL WAR INTENSIFIES 1985 First attempt at peace talks between government and LTTE fails.

10 This outline is mainly from BBC’s History of the Sri Lankan Conflict at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/ south_asia/country_profiles/1166237.stm and also Alert Net’s Crisis Profile at http://www.alertnet.org/db/crisisprofiles/LK_CON.htm?v=timeline.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/%20south_asia/country_profiles/1166237.stm



http://www.alertnet.org/db/crisisprofiles/LK_CON.htm?v=timeline

1987 Government forces push LTTE back into northern city of Jaffna and agree with India on deployment of Indian peace.

1990

Indian troops leave after getting bogged down in fighting in the North. Violence between Sri Lankan army and separatists escalates. “Second Eelam War” begins. Thousands of Muslims are expelled from northern areas by the LTTE.

1991 LTTE implicated in assassination of Indian premier Rajiv Gandhi in southern India.

1993 President Premadasa killed in LTTE bomb attack.

1994 President Kumaratunga comes to power pledging to end war. Peace talks opened with LTTE.

1995 “Third Eelam War” begins when rebels sink naval craft. 1995-2001

War rages across North and East. Tigers bomb Sri Lanka’s holiest Buddhist site. President Kumaratunga wounded in a bomb attack. Suicide attack on international airport destroys half the Sri Lankan Airlines fleet. Tiger suicide bombers blow up Central Bank building. More than 100 killed and about 1,400 hurt.

PEACE EFFORTS: 2002-2005 2002

Government and Tamil Tiger rebels sign a Norwegian-mediated ceasefire. Decommissioning of weapons begins; the road linking the Jaffna peninsula with the rest of Sri Lanka reopens after 12 years; passenger flights to Jaffna resume. Government lifts ban on Tamil Tigers. Rebels drop demand for separate state.

2003 Tigers pull out of talks. Ceasefire holds.

2004 March Renegade Tamil Tiger commander, known as Karuna, leads split in rebel movement and goes underground with his supporters.

2004 December

Tsunami: More than 30,000 people are killed.

2005 June Row over deal reached with Tamil Tiger rebels to share nearly $3bn in tsunami aid among Sinhalas, Tamils and Muslims.

2005 November

Mahinda Rajapaksa elected president. Most Tamils in LTTE-controlled area do not vote. One of the president’s brothers, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, becomes minister of defense.

COLLAPSE OF NEGOTATIONS AND MILITARY VICTORY BY GOVERNMENT 2006 April Attacks begin to escalate again. A suicide bomber attacks the main

military compound in Colombo, killing at least eight people. The military launch air strikes on Tamil Tiger targets.

2006 August

Tamil Tiger rebels and government forces resume fighting in the Northeast in the worst clashes since 2002 ceasefire. Government steadily drives Tamil Tigers out of eastern strongholds over following year.

2006 October Peace talks fail in Geneva. 2006 October

Suicide bombing on convoy kills 100 sailors and civilians. Planned peace talks in Geneva come unstuck over rebel demand that government reopen a highway crossing through rebel territory to army- held Jaffna peninsula. Heavy fighting resumes.

2008 January Government pulls out of 2002 ceasefire agreement.

2008 July SL military says it has captured the important LTTE naval base of Vidattaltivu.

2008 October Suicide bombing blamed by government on Tamil Tigers kills 27 people.

2008 December

Fierce fighting in the North (both claim heavy causalities). 2009 January

President declares victory after capturing the northern town of Kilinochchi, held for 10 years by the Tamil Tigers as their administrative headquarters.

2009 February

International concern over the humanitarian situation of thousands of civilians trapped in the battle zone prompts calls for a temporary ceasefire, which the government rejects. Government says it is on the verge of destroying the Tamil Tigers, but offers an amnesty to rebels if they surrender.

2009 February Tamil Tiger planes conduct suicide raids against Colombo. 2009 March

Former rebel leader Karuna is sworn in as minister of national integration and reconciliation. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay accuses both sides of war crimes.

2009 May Sri Lanka declares military victory. State TV says Tiger leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran killed by special forces troops while trying to escape.

EARLY POST-WAR PERIOD: MID-2009 TO PRESENT 2009 August

New Tamil Tiger leader Selvarasa Pathmanathan detained by Sri Lankan authorities overseas. First post-war local elections in the North. Governing coalition wins in Jaffna, but voters in Vavuniya back candidates who supported Tamil Tigers.

2009 October

U.S. State Department’s War Crimes Office publicly issues a report detailing possible war crimes violations by the government’s armed forces and LTTE.

2009 November

Sri Lanka Armed Forces General Sarath Fonseka, who oversaw the military victory over the LTTE, resigns. President Rajapaksa calls for presidential elections (two years early), which are set for Jan. 26, 2010. General Fonseka announces his candidacy for president as the “common opposition candidate,” with support from an unlikely alliance

of the UNP and JVP political parties. The TNA, the main Tamil political party that had earlier backed the LTTE, supports Foneska.

2010 January Incumbent Mahinda Rajapaksa wins presidential election by a big margin but the outcome is rejected by General Fonseka.

2010 February

General Fonseka is arrested. Government says he will be court- martialed on conspiracy charges. President Rajapaksa dissolves Parliament, clearing way for elections in April.

2010 March General Fonseka appears before military court on charges of participating in politics while in uniform.

2010 April

President Rajapaksa’s ruling coalition secures biggest landslide victory in parliamentary elections (144 of Parliament’s 225 seats) since 1977, but with lowest voter turnout since independence. General Fonseka wins Parliament seat. President’s elder brother, Chamal Rajapaksa, is elected speaker of Parliament during the inaugural session.

2010 May Government announces it is easing emergency laws in place for most of past 27 years.

5. Selected Background Articles a. Post-war Sri Lanka searches for 'just peace' Story from BBC NEWS: Published: 2010/05/19 13:47:06 GMT

It is exactly a year since Sri Lanka declared victory in its decades-long war against Tamil Tiger separatists. It ended with the top Tiger leaders killed after being besieged with thousands of civilians they had herded into their final stronghold.

On the strength of that victory, President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his government won landslide elections. Charles Haviland reports from Colombo as Sri Lankans reflect on a remarkable anniversary.

By a grey sea, tanks rumble into motion. Massive vehicles mounted with mortars, artillery and multi-barrelled weapons parade steadily past a podium.

All the army regiments are on hand, their berets black, maroon or blue, their uniforms khaki and camouflage. "Eastern Front" reads one truck. "Vanni Theatre" reads another, recalling the last northern battleground. Marching music and drum beats fill the air.

For the anniversary, the Sri Lankan military has been rehearsing for a huge display of the hardware that helped it win.

The government is irritated because it feels that many Western countries, troubled at the scale of civilian casualties at the end of the conflict, fail to give Sri Lanka due credit for its achievement.

Coup plot

"Even the big countries, they are battling to defeat terrorism," Rajitha Senaratne, a cabinet minister, tells me at his home on a rainy evening. "All the entire world armies fighting in Iraq, in Afghanistan, still failed. "But the same terrorism, one of the worst terrorist organisations, has been crushed by the small country, a small army, the Sri Lankan army. And taught it a lesson. So actually it's something to celebrate."

Heavy rains have delayed the victory parade. But when it happens, there will be one man conspicuously absent - the result of a bitter post-war feud.

Gen Sarath Fonseka, who headed the army when the war was won, is locked up at naval headquarters, within easy earshot of the parade ground.

He unsuccessfully challenged President Rajapaksa in January's presidential election. Shortly afterwards the government accused him of planning a coup. It arrested him and

is trying him on various counts, including one that he dabbled in politics while still army chief. He can only leave detention to attend parliament, having been elected to it last month.

His family and colleagues deny he did anything wrong. "They have given two or three charges but all are false," his wife, Anoma Fonseka, tells the BBC. "I know that because my husband has a very clean character and he has never done anything wrong for our country. The truth will be coming out afterwards."

Transformed atmosphere

Whoever masterminded the war victory, most Sri Lankans are heartily glad it is all over. The five-star hotels are buzzing once more. Tourism has picked up from its war-time doldrums. In one top city establishment, the Cinnamon Grand, I sip a caffe latte with Dai Liyanage. He's a Sri Lankan who lives in Britain. But since the war he keeps revisiting. He says that with the Tamil Tigers no longer active, the atmosphere is transformed.

"Places like bus stations and railway stations were targets where large numbers of people could be killed in one go. So that was always a fear," he says. Now he says that things have improved so much that "there's absolutely no fear of any terrorism whatsoever".

Not everyone, though, wants to celebrate.

The main Tamil party has asked that people offer special prayers at temples and elsewhere, saying this is a time for mourning because so many died in the long war including tens of thousands of civilians.

This week the International Crisis Group called for an UN-backed investigation into possible war crimes by both sides, especially in the war's final phase.

"Can you have unity without reconciliation - can you have reconciliation without accountability?" asks Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, a human rights activist from the Centre for Policy Alternatives think tank. "There are people who still want to know what happened to members of their family. There are a number who are missing and disappeared. And people are not going to forget those things easily." He believes there should be more acknowledgement of the suffering endured by ordinary people.

'Ambiguity'

Another critic of the government is a man who was until recently a top Sri Lankan diplomat, Dayan Jayatilleka. As ambassador to the UN in Geneva last May, he helped ward off a planned motion of censure against his country from Western governments over the conduct of the war. Mr Jayatilleka tells the BBC that the war was an entirely

just one, but he feels there is not yet a "just peace". "I strongly felt and feel that we should have followed up the military victory with an outreach to the Tamil people and the Tamil politicians," he says.

"I do not see that having happened. And we have a studied silence or at best an ambiguity about the shape of the political settlement or the political reconciliation between the south and the north."

The government says its priority is not political reforms but redeveloping the north where many war-displaced Tamils still lead very restricted lives in military-run camps.

Indeed, the war still casts a heavy shadow over Sri Lanka.

The authorities say they must go on countering remnants of the Tamil Tigers based abroad. One year on, they denounce what they call "traitors" at home. A state of emergency remains in force and the defence ministry is still taking on new powers.

But the authorities reject accusations of war crimes against them or the idea of any international inquiry on the matter. They intend this week to relish the memory of their victory which, they say, quite simply liberated the island from the clutches of terror.

Retrieved at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/8690408.stm

b. Where now for post-election Sri Lanka? By Charles Haviland BBC News, Colombo

Published: 2010/01/29 13:54:28 GMT

President Mahinda Rajapaksa stands triumphant in Sri Lanka.

A number of factors helped sweep him to re-election victory on Tuesday: his fiery rhetoric and sure popular touch; his emphasis on his role in last year's war victory; and ordinary people's sense that their streets are simply safer than they have been for the past 30 years because of the defeat of the Tamil Tigers.

Monitoring groups have expressed strong concern about the abuse of state resources in the pre-election period and about some polling-day violations.

But the margin of his victory was wide and despite his defeated rival's challenge to it, Mahinda, as everyone calls him, is set to continue as president. Where will he take Sri Lanka next?


He and his government stress the economy and development. His rallies were bedecked with pictures of grand power stations (funded by China, Iran and India among others), new ports and transport infrastructure. Their priorities are now to "stabilise the situation and raise people's living standard", a senior official told the BBC.

'Minority aspirations'

But there is also the major question of Sri Lanka's ethnic divide.

The issue is made all the more stark because the places in which Mr Rajapaksa lost, and his challenger General Sarath Fonseka won, are - barring a few districts in Colombo and the hills - entirely in the north and east - the areas where Tamils and Tamil- speaking Muslims are in the majority.

The Sinhalese nationalist general was an unlikely champion for minorities but had convinced them that he was more interested in finding them a political solution.

The country now looks more ethnically split than ever and many want Mr Rajapaksa to move to address this.

As before, he has started with encouraging words, saying that although he did not win in the north he is "glad that people [there] entered the democratic process".

Political analyst S Balakrishnan says action is now needed. State institutions are supposed to have both Sinhala and Tamil as official languages, he points out, but Sri Lanka's rulers are "not at all sensitive to minority aspirations". He says that with separatist extremism conquered, it is necessary to "change the ethnic and ideological profile" of the police and military, currently almost totally Sinhalese, and make them and the judiciary more sensitive to multi-ethnic issues.

Others say constitutional moves must be made, such as devolving powers to all the provinces, as the constitution's 13th Amendment calls for - something many Tamils see as indispensable.

On these matters Mr Rajapaksa sounds lukewarm. Last week he was reported as saying that Tamil people did not seek a political solution to their grievances; rather, they simply needed to be resettled in their homes after the war.

He has also said he will find his own solution and has spoken of a possible upper house of parliament which would potentially give minorities more influence. For such a change he would need a two-thirds majority in parliament, something he will try to get in parliamentary elections expected soon.

'Intimidation'

So does he want to do it? "In Rajapaksa's heart of hearts he may not like the 13th Amendment, but it's almost impossible for him to scrap it," says Dayan Jayatilleka, former Sri Lankan ambassador to the UN in Geneva.

He says it is the only real way forward, and suggests that parties like the Tamil National Alliance, which is close to the defeated Tamil Tigers, should also embrace it, recognising that "the centre will remain Sinhalese nationalist".

Indeed, many Sinhalese people do not feel that ethnic grievances are really an issue at all.

One international source told the BBC there was concern that with his large mandate at the polls, the president will feel he does not need to take account of his critics' concerns. "It remains to be seen how much progress he will make on immediate challenges such as political reconciliation, human rights and the humanitarian situation," the source said.

Journalists' rights groups say reporters are still intimidated in the country and are concerned at the disappearance of a web journalist who vanished just before the election after apparently writing pro-Fonseka articles.

But B Raman, a retired senior Indian official and security analyst, feels outside sentiment does have a role. He writes in Sri Lanka's Daily Mirror that the president will have to deal "skillfully and diplomatically" with human rights groups' concerns that there are still unanswered questions about the methods the army used in crushing the Tamil Tigers.

Mr Rajapaksa is talking positively. His victory statement spoke of the need to be rid of the past and its "violence and division" and to set aside the differences between his government and its domestic and foreign critics.


c. Excerpt from “Sri Lanka: A Bitter Peace” International Crisis Group

Asia Briefing N°99 11 January 2010

OVERVIEW


Since the decisive military victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Sri Lanka has made little progress in reconstructing its battered democratic institutions or establishing conditions for a stable peace. Eight months later, the post-war policies of President Mahinda Rajapaksa have deepened rather than resolved the grievances that generated and sustained LTTE militancy. While the LTTE’s defeat and the end of its control over Tamil political life are historic and welcome changes, the victory over Tamil militancy will remain fragile unless Sinhalese-dominated political parties make strong moves towards a more inclusive and democratic state. The emergence of retired General Sarath Fonseka to challenge Rajapaksa in the 26 January presidential election has opened new space to challenge repressive government policies. But neither has offered credible proposals for political reforms that would address the marginalisation of Tamils and other minorities. Whoever wins, donor governments and international institutions should use their development assistance to support reforms designed to protect the democratic rights of all of Sri Lanka’s citizens and ethnic communities.

The government’s internment of more than a quarter million Tamils displaced from the Northern Province – some for more than six months – was further humiliation for a population brutalised by months of ferocious fighting. The return by the end of 2009 of most of the displaced to their home districts, and the increased freedom of movement for the nearly 100,000 still in military-run camps, are important steps forward. However, the resettlement process has failed to meet international standards for safe and dignified returns. There has been little or no consultation with the displaced and no independent monitoring; many returns have been to areas not cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance; inadequate financial resources have been provided for those returning home; and the military continues to control people’s movements. These and other concerns also apply to the estimated 80,000 Muslims forcibly expelled from the north by the LTTE in 1990, some of whom have begun to return to their homes.

The UN and donor governments should insist more strongly that all resettlement is done according to established guiding principles. Donors should end assistance to any camps where full freedom of movement is not allowed and condition additional aid on an effective monitoring role for UN agencies and NGO partners. India, Japan, Western donors, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank should tie additional development assistance to an inclusive and consultative planning process for the reconstruction of the north. Access by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to the more than 12,000 Tamils held in irregular detention centres on suspicion of ties to the LTTE is also essential.

The government’s approach to the development and reconstruction of the north and east is contributing to minority fears and alienation. Government plans remain unclear, with local communities and political leaders not consulted and even donors not informed of overall reconstruction plans. Strong military influence over policies, tight military control over the population and restrictions on local and international NGOs increase the risk of land conflicts, with the strong possibility of demographic changes

that would dilute the Tamil character of the north. No real space has been given to Tamil and Muslim political or community leaders in the north and very little in the east.

The Rajapaksa government has initiated no political reforms to address Tamil and other minorities’ concerns. The government-sponsored All Party Representative Committee (APRC) designed to craft constitutional reforms has in effect ended with no sign of an alternative process. Tamil and Muslim parties remain weak and divided, although recent encouraging initiatives to develop a common platform and build trust among Tamil- speaking parties deserve support. Inside and outside Sri Lanka, many Tamils remain angry at the lack of accounting or justice for the thousands of civilians killed in the final months of the war. Most of the million-strong diaspora is still committed to a separate state and many would be willing to support renewed violence.

The brutal nature of the conflict, especially in its closing months, has undermined Sri Lanka’s democratic institutions and governance. All ethnic communities are suffering from the collapse of the rule of law. Disappearances and political killings associated with the government’s counter-insurgency campaign have been greatly reduced since the end of the war. Impunity for abuses by state officials continues, however, and fear and self-censorship among civil society activists and political dissidents remain widespread….

…International actors need to press for accountability for abuses by both sides during the war as well as challenge the government’s post-war policies. Numerous states with insurgencies have begun to look at Sri Lanka as a model. India and Western governments may yet come to regret giving Sri Lanka the green light – and even assisting it – to fight a “war on terror” prior to the government agreeing to political reforms or showing any commitment to the rule of law, constitutional norms or respect for human rights. The precedent can and should be challenged. Donors should condition further development assistance on governance reforms designed to curb impunity and make government accountable to citizens of all communities. This could eventually help open the space for Tamil and Muslim political leaders to organise effectively now that the LTTE is no longer there to control their agenda.

d) U.S. urges probe of Sri Lanka war CRIMES ALLEGED ON BOTH SIDES

'Those responsible must be held accountable'

By Colum Lynch, Washington Post Staff Writer Friday, October 23, 2009

NEW YORK -- The State Department's top war crimes official called on Sri Lanka on Thursday to conduct a "genuine" investigation into allegations of war crimes by Sri

http://projects.washingtonpost.com/staff/articles/colum%2Blynch/

Lankan troops and Tamil rebels during the bloody final months of the country's 25-year- long civil war. The appeal by Stephen Rapp, the U.S. ambassador at large for war crimes issues, came hours after his office presented Congress with a detailed account of alleged atrocities during the conflict that suggests both sides may have violated international law and committed crimes against humanity.

The 68-page document, which relies on internal reports from the U.S. Embassy in Colombo, satellite imagery and accounts from international relief agencies and news organizations, paints a grim portrait of the conditions endured by hundreds of thousands of Tamil civilians caught between two ruthless adversaries. Between 7,000 and 20,000 civilians were allegedly killed in the country's northeast from January to May, when the Tamil Tigers were defeated, according to U.N. and independent estimates.

"We are certainly calling on the government, as part of the reconciliation process, to develop an accountability process that respects the interests of all," Rapp said in an interview. Noting that Sri Lankan authorities have insisted they can conduct a credible internal investigation, he said, "We are going to take them at their word and follow that process."

Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), chairman of the Appropriations subcommittee on the State Department and foreign operations, who authorized the report, said that it "eliminates any reasonable doubt that serious violations of the laws of war were committed by both" sides. "A full and independent investigation is needed, and those responsible must be held accountable," he said.

Rapp also expressed concern for the plight of more than 250,000 displaced ethnic Tamils who remain confined to government-controlled camps. He said the imminent seasonal monsoon could inundate the camps and cited reports from U.S. and other sources that Sri Lankan authorities had abducted male youths at government-run screening centers for the displaced.

Sri Lanka's Foreign Ministry released a statement Thursday saying that the allegations contained in the report "appear to be unsubstantiated and devoid of corroborative evidence." It said that Sri Lankan security forces had been "engaged in a humanitarian mission" aimed at freeing captive civilians from the "clutches" of the separatist group and that they had been "scrupulous in affording protection to the civilians and safeguarding their welfare."

The U.S. report documents nearly 170 incidents between Jan. 2 and May 18 in which thousands of Tamil civilians were allegedly gunned down by Tamil rebels seeking to use them as human shields or killed by indiscriminate government shelling. It portrays a

population enduring violence, starvation and severe shortages of drugs, including anesthesia for amputations.

Human rights groups and political analysts have accused the Obama administration of failing to confront Sri Lanka more forcefully over reports of indiscriminate shelling of displaced civilians as it moved in to crush the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Rapp defended the U.S. response, saying then-Ambassador to Sri Lanka Robert O. Blake had pressed for a humanitarian pause in the fighting and routinely raised concerns about the government's conduct during the war.

The report includes multiple allegations that the Tamil Tigers forcibly recruited children as young as 11 to fight, killing relatives who objected. It also alleges that the rebels used suicide bombers to kill government officials and police officers and that they regularly fired on civilians attempting to flee the war zone. It cites a Feb. 13 report to the U.S. Embassy by a foreign government alleging that rebels killed 60 civilians who were trying to escape by boat.

Also detailed in the report are numerous allegations of government shelling of civilian populations, hospitals, churches and schools in rebel-controlled territory, often in areas designated by authorities as no-fire zones. The U.S. Embassy reported several cases in which large numbers of civilians were reportedly killed in shelling, including nine in the April 29 bombardment of the Mullivaikkal Hospital.

e) Development Assistance and Conflict in Sri Lanka: Lessons from the Eastern Province11

International Crisis Group

Asia Report N°165 16 April 2009

EXECUTIVE SUMMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Violence, political instability and the government’s reluctance to devolve power or resources to the fledgling provincial council are undermining ambitious plans for developing Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province. The east continues to face obstacles to economic and political progress and offers lessons for development agencies and foreign donors considering expanding their work into newly won areas in the Northern Province. While there is still potential for progress in the east, it remains far from being the model of democratisation and post-conflict reconstruction that the government

11 The Government of Sri Lanka defeated the LTTE and regained control over the Eastern Province in 2007. The experience of development assistance in the Eastern Province since that time provides important lessons for the international community as they consider engagement in the Northern Province following the May 2009 Government victory over the LTTE in that province.

claims. Donors should adopt a more coordinated set of policies for the war-damaged areas of Sri Lanka, emphasising civilian protection, increased monitoring of the effects of aid on conflict dynamics and collective advocacy with the government at the highest levels.

International attention is currently and rightfully focused on the need to protect upwards of 100,000 civilians at risk from fighting in the northern Vanni region, but at the same time, there are still important challenges in the so-called “liberated” area of the Eastern Province. Even now, the Eastern Province is still not the “post-conflict” situation that development agencies had hoped it would be when they started work there in late 2007 and early 2008. There have been violent conflicts between different factions of the pro-government TMVP12, and impunity for killings and disappearances, many of them apparently committed by government security forces and/or their allies in the TMVP. Extortion and criminality linked to the TMVP also remain problems. Insecurity and fear are undermining the ability of agencies and contractors to implement projects.

Violence between Tamils and Muslims has been kept to a minimum since June 2008, but tensions between the communities over land and political power remain high, and there seems little prospect of reconciliation so long as current government policies remain in place. Tamils are largely alienated from the government, thanks to the heavy hand of government security forces and TMVP activities. Many Muslims feel threatened by TMVP control of the provincial council and what they see as Tamil domination of the provincial administration. Both communities continue to suspect the government has plans for large-scale “Sinhalisation” of the east. Sinhalese villagers, students, contractors and government employees have, in turn, been victims of violent attacks.

The government still has not devolved power to the Eastern Province, as required by the Thirteenth Amendment to the constitution, which established the provincial council system in 1987 in response to Tamil demands for regional autonomy in the north and east. The governor of the province, appointed by the president, is blocking the council’s initial piece of authorising legislation, and development planning and implementation continues to be run from Colombo and central government ministries. The government has yet to articulate any plans for a fair and lasting distribution of resources and political power that would satisfy all communities.

In this environment, development of the east remains affected by the conflicts and threatens to exacerbate them. Despite the need for development, there is a danger of funds being wasted or misused. Donors should not be treating the situation as a typical post-conflict environment. Instead, there is a need for additional monitoring and additional coordinated political advocacy. This is all the more important now that donors are considering assistance for the reconstruction of the Northern Province, once security conditions allow.

12 The TMVP is a Tamil party which split from the LTTE in 2004 and joined forces with the government.

Mod

ule

6

MODULE 6 THEORIES OF CHANGE

Conflict 102 / Module 6 Theories of Change


1. Describe the concept of theories of change. 2. Identify theories of change in conflict programming. 3. Develop a theory of change linked to the conflict equation.

Activity: Vignettes, Part 1

1. Receive a card from trainer and find the person who has the other

half of your note card. 2. Locate a place to sit and work with your partner.

Activity: Vignettes, Part 2

1. Turn to the programming vignettes in your binder. 2. Your assigned vignettes are listed on the bottom right hand-side of

your note card. 3. Read your assigned vignette and identify the underlying theory (or

theories) of change that shape the vignette. 4. Be prepared to share the theories of change underlying your

vignettes using a simple if/then statement.

Activity: Draw a Theory of Change

1. Working in your existing table group, draw the theory of change that you identified in your vignette.

2. Use the drawing to assess the quality of the theory of change and try to consider the following:

a. Does the if/then statement show how that change will happen? b. What type of change is being targeted (attitudes, behaviors and institutions)? c. What is the target of change (key people or more people)? d. How does the change relate to components of the conflict equation?

3. Be prepared to post your theory of change drawing and ask the group to guess the theory of change as well as what part of the conflict equation it represents.

Conflict Programming: Theories of Change

Proposals without clear theory

Activity without results

Implementation without robust evaluation

Monitoring without strong indicators

Investment without learning

State of Affairs

Theory of Change

Inputs Activities Outputs Outcomes Impact

A statement of the causal process through which change comes about.

If . . ., then . . .

Developing TOCs in the field

Mission Goal: Colombia more capable of successfully implementing a sustainable and inclusive peace.

Theory of Change: If motivations and incentives for violence and participation in armed groups are changed among disengaged child soldiers and ex-combatants to mitigate recidivism, and community members are engaged in the reintegration process, then ex- combatants are more likely to become law-abiding members of society accepted by their communities.

Contact Hypothesis (Theory of Change):

Example

If members of the different ethnic groups interact more frequently around common goals, then their distrust of the other ethnic group will decrease and peaceful relations will develop.

What would a program built around this theory of change look like?

Building a strong Theory of Change: What needs to change

Step 1:

Examine your conflict diagnosis findings

Ask WHAT needs to change in this particular context to generate more peace/less violent conflict? – Carefully examine each element in the “conflict equation”:

motives, means, opportunity, context, mitigating factors

– What drivers of conflict need to be addressed?

– What areas of resilience need to be strengthened?

Focus your theory on that needed change

Step 1: What needs to change: Conflict equation

Motives Means Opportunity Result

Conflict Drivers

Grievances

Key Actors

+ Triggers

Violent Conflict

Mitigating Factors

Latent Grievances

Key Actors

+ Moments

Non- violent Conflict

Step 2: How will that change happen

Formulate an “if…, then….” statement detailing HOW that change will happen in that particular context

Be specific about the type of change attitudes, behaviors, and institutions)

Be specific about the target of change

– Key people: key individuals, government, organizations or groups

– More people: communities, targeted populations or regional area

Exercise

Draw the theory of change to be sure the “if” and “then” parts are comprehensive and causally linked to the conflict diagnosis

Initial lessons learned

1. Targeting attitudes/perceptions may be a useful entry point, but it must be reinforced with changes in the situation if they are to last.

2. Targeting key actors may be a useful entry point, but successful peacebuilding ultimately requires changes that affect the broader population.

3. The most durable changes are those that reduce grievances.

Sources of Theories of Change

Conflict Management/Peacebuilding theories:

– USAID/CMM Conflict Equation is grounded in theories

– USAID/ CMM Theories of Change Matrix

Systematically documented “Lessons Learned” from applied practice:

– e.g., Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) Project research in 20+ countries

Conflict 102 / Module 6 Programming Vignettes

1. This program focuses on bringing together teenagers from warring parties before fear, mistrust and prejudice blind them from seeing the human face of their enemy. The program’s goal is to reverse the legacy of hatred by nurturing lasting friendships that become the basis for mutual understanding and respect. The teenagers come together in a camp-like setting and receive conflict resolution skills that will help transform them into “seeds” from which an enduring peace will grow. Each government will select teenagers for participation without regard to economic or social background, and base selection solely on academic performance and leadership ability. These young people are destined to become tomorrow's leaders.

2. Prior to the beginning of formal peace talks next month, we have received requests from both sides to support the negotiations. Specifically, we have been requested to provide coaching to the principal negotiation teams on negotiation skills. We have also proposed to establish an impartial technical secretariat that would be staffed with experts on issues the negotiations are likely to address, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), transitional justice and the return of refugees and the internally displaced to their home districts.

3. This capacity-building initiative’s objective is to help rebuild a war-torn society, overcome deep- seated ethnic hostility and spur post-war economic reconstruction. Through a series of interactive workshops, facilitators help leaders hone the skills needed to guide economic recovery and transition to democracy. An ethnically diverse cross-section of 100 leaders-from government, the army, rebel organizations and civil society will be strategically chosen for this initiative, which aims to work across traditional lines of ethnic and political division to forge a sustainable network of leaders. The core training is a six-day workshop that incorporates simulations, role-playing and other interactive exercises designed to strengthen skills in negotiations, communications, visioning and group problem-solving and strategic planning. Following their initial workshop, the participants repeatedly reconvene for further training.

4. This program will provide logistical and technical support to the newly established Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The five goals of the TRC are to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses, address impunity, respond to the needs of the victims, promote healing and reconciliation and prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered. The support provided through this project will enable the TRC to hold hearings in all five provinces of the country, ensure that proceedings are recorded in both national languages and increase public awareness of the TRC and its deliberations through outreach via radio and television skits and jingles that will promote the initiative and emphasize the healing effects of truth-telling. In doing so, the TRC will help to rebuild the nation.

5. This program will counter the dynamics of resurgent conflict and deepening divisions between ethnic communities at the local level through a range of local radio programs and outreach activities linked with local community networks. Working with journalists who live in affected communities, radio programs will explore complex problems in depth, providing all perspectives and potential solutions while telling stories that affirm person-to-person links across ethnic divides. Broadcasts will cover key conflict-affected populations. All activities will take place through established media production and resource centers, part of a sustained strategy to develop regional media targeting local needs.

6. This program will focus on building the capacity of the Electoral Commission to manage multiple aspects of the upcoming elections, including voter registration and ballot counting. Training will focus on both technical issues of registration and election management as well as on issues of ethics and dispute resolution. Support will also be provided for public relations campaigns and outreach activities to promote the image of the Electoral Commission as an effective and neutral body.

7. This project will pilot a new policing initiative to introduce modern, internationally accepted community policing methods. The aim is to reorient the police force in two ethnically diverse cities through training and new promotion opportunities to become street-level problem solvers and dispute resolvers, rather than heavy-handed enforcers. The pilot project will also provide portable radios to improve communication and bicycles to ensure an even police presence in all neighborhoods. The increased presence provided through this project is expected to reduce the number of violent altercations, while the police’s credibility with the people increases.

8. This year, major holidays of the two dominant religions coincide. Historically, each holiday alone has been an occasion for street demonstrations and clashes with adherents of the other religion. Both religions celebrating at the same time creates a risk of greater violence that may well overwhelm the abilities of the police. As a preventive measure, this project will undertake a radio-based media campaign that employs respected religious leaders and quotations from religious texts to emphasize each religion’s commitment to peace and to the peaceful foundation of both holidays.

9. The goal of the proposed activity is to contribute to the transition from war to peace by revitalizing targeted communities through capacity building that addresses issues facing youth within these communities. The program will:

• Increase awareness and knowledge about sources of conflict and vulnerability in the target areas.

• Increasing the capacity of the parastatal youth organization to enable it to become a credible and sustainable youth development organization and to serve as a significant driving force behind community revitalization and reintegration of war-affected populations.

• Encourage participatory community decision-making through local community councils.

• Increase opportunities for youth in the target areas through the development of two community centers and provision of small construction grants to provide additional physical infrastructure and jobs and skills for youth.

• Decrease tensions and frustrations among youth by providing sports facilities. 10. The unregulated mining and trade of diamonds has been a source of conflict as rival armed gangs have competed for a share of it. Revenue from this illicit trade has also provided financing to these gangs, which they have used to buy weapons and attract more recruits. Finally, the illicit trade also represents revenue lost to the government. And for a government still dependent on commodity exports, this loss seriously erodes its ability to provide basic social services. To begin addressing this problem, this multi-year program will improve the government’s ability to manage its diamond trade by streamlining diamond export regulations, increasing surveillance at the borders and in the diamond mining region and establishing the Diamond Mining Communities Foundation, which will channel a portion of government diamond revenues back into communities in the form of locally selected community projects.

11. This program builds upon three years of local-level civil administration training and community dialogues that have increased governance capacity in those districts of the country where the opposition was strongest and thus where violence associated with the recent civil unrest was most severe. The program will increase the capacity of municipal administrations and assemblies to: 1) undertake participatory budget planning, in coordination with newly established representative local public assemblies, to address local priorities; 2) generate revenues through fair and transparent procedures; and 3) effectively and transparently control finances.

12. This program will address the destructive impacts of conflict-related sexual violence, empowering survivors and their communities to build a society committed to inclusion, non- violence, and gender equity. Drawing on a comprehensive gender and conflict assessment, the program will address the needs of both female and male survivors, offering health services, psychosocial support, and skills training to expand livelihood opportunities and mitigate the economic impacts of ongoing stigmatization. Recognizing the challenging social context survivors must navigate, the program will include a radio and billboard campaign to decrease the misunderstanding and marginalization of survivors and strengthen community support for their social integration, emphasizing that sexual violence is an issue affecting both women and men. The program will also build community capacity by training cadres of local men and women as community facilitators for gender-specific local sexual violence dialogue groups, whose aim will be to raise community awareness of the problem, decrease social stigmatization, strengthen available support networks, and empower men, especially youth, to reject sexual violence as a tool of conflict.

THEORIES AND INDICATORS OF CHANGE BRIEFING PAPER CONCEPTS AND PRIMERS FOR CONFLICT

MANAGEMENT AND MITIGATION

MARCH 2013

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Eileen Babbitt, Diana Chigas and Robert Wilkinson (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University) with AMEX International.

THEORIES AND INDICATORS OF CHANGE BRIEFING PAPER

CONCEPTS AND PRIMERS FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND MITIGATION

DISCLAIMER The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

1

I. Overview: Working with Theories of

Change The most important thing to know about theories of change is that they are intended to be helpful and practical. They are not an academic exercise to make your work more difficult, but instead, a tool to improve the design, implementation and assessment of your programs.

This guide is to help you understand and use theories of change and to provide you with resources and information that you can draw upon in that process. It distills insights from development policy and practice, as well as from the analysis of researchers, to give you the most up-to-date material to construct theories of change for development programming.

This Briefing Paper will cover the following:

1. Defining theories of change and how they are relevant (Section 1.1) 2. Constructing theories of change (Section 1.2) 3. Introducing and explaining how to use the Theories of Change Matrix and Primers in

defining your programmatic theories of change (Section 2.1) 4. Presenting the Theories of Change Matrix (Section 2.2)

1.1 DEFINING THEORIES OF CHANGE AND THEIR RELEVANCE

As a development practitioner, the programs you design are intended to improve the conditions (economic, political, social, environmental, etc.) in a given context. As such, they will hopefully change how institutions operate/are structured and the way people think or act such that these improvements take place and are sustained. As a practitioner, you draw upon your experience and others' to create ways to catalyze or facilitate such changes. In doing so, you are making explicit, or sometimes implicit, assumptions about how the change will come about, i.e., which activities will function in which ways to create the desired outcome.

“A theory of change explains why we think certain actions will produce desired change in a given context.”1 It is intended to make all of our implicit assumptions more explicit, in order to (1) clarify which drivers of violent conflict we are addressing; (2) state clearly what the intended outcome of programs will be; and (3) fully articulate how and why the program will address the drivers of conflict and achieve its intended outcomes.

In its simplest form, a theory of change is expressed in the following form:

“If we do X (action), then we will produce Y (change/shift towards peace, stability, security).”

1 CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, Search for Common Ground and CARE International (Forthcoming) Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in Conflict, Justice and Security Programmes (Draft, June 2012), London: DFID (“DFID Theories of Change”).

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or

“We believe that by doing X (action) successfully, Y will come about (movement towards a desired goal).”

Of course, not all situations call for such simple statements. A theory of change might be expressed as, “If we do X, Y and Z, it will lead to W,” or, “If we do X, it will lead to Y, which will lead to Z, which might possibly lead to W.”

It is important to extend the statement a bit further to clarify underlying assumptions by adding the rationale or logic—how and why the change will come about—in a “because” phrase. This then produces the following:

“If we do X…, then Y..., because Z….”

For instance, one theory of change for a post-war program aimed at promoting employment for ex-combatant youth might be as follows:

“If we provide employment for ex-combatant youth, then we will reduce the likelihood of inter-communal violence, because unemployed youths are the most likely to be recruited into fighting; many still hold weapons and remain connected to their command structures. If they find employment, they will disengage from their command structures and will be less recruitable because they will have more to lose.” 2

How does a theory of change relate to a conflict analysis? 3

Conflict analysis and theories of change are related but distinct concepts used to inform conflict program interventions and their evaluation. Analysis that presents no avenues for change is not useful to development practitioners, while a theory of change not rooted in analysis is also unlikely to be effective.

Experience has shown that analysis of the conflict dynamics and context is an essential first step to any and all program design, monitoring and evaluation in conflict-affected and fragile environments. At USAID, a formal conflict assessment process often serves as the starting point for programming-oriented analysis, although frequently it is necessary to conduct additional analysis specific to the project or activity in question.

Conflict analysis and assessment set the stage for design, monitoring and evaluation of programs by identifying the factors or drivers that are most salient in affecting dynamics of peace, conflict and fragility. By changing these factors or their interrelationships, it is logical to infer that conflict dynamics should change as a result. This is the juncture where theory of change and conflict analysis meet. The theory of change provides the bridge between analysis and programming, helping practitioners to make sure that the programs are relevant and appropriate to the conflict.

In short, based upon the findings of the conflict analysis, a theory of change can be identified by asking the question, “What needs to change in this particular context to generate more peace and less violent conflict?” The theory of change will be an “if…then” statement about how that

2 Modified from “DFID Theories of Change.” 3 Modified from “DFID Theories of Change.”

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change will happen. It will specify the type of change (e.g., knowledge, attitudes, skills, policies, etc.) and the target of change (e.g., key individual, group, organization, process, etc.), and the pathway to change (e.g., logic of results), ensuring that the theory of change is causally linked to the conflict diagnosis.

How can you use theories of change?

There are several ways in which theories of change are useful in conflict and development programming, some of which have already been mentioned:

1. To make assumptions explicit about what change we expect to take place and how/why we expect this to happen.

2. To weed out unrealistic program ideas and clarify and refine ideas that are worthy of further consideration.4

Embedding theory of change in context A theory of change cannot stand alone. It needs to be embedded and considered within a specific context. Efforts that contribute to a desired change in one context may have a different effect in another.

3. To uncover gaps in our programming when we find that there are steps in the logic of our theories (see (1) above) that turn out to be either incorrect or missing entirely.

4. To make sure everyone involved in designing and implementing the program has the same understanding of why a program is structured as it is and how to implement it according to that structure.

5. To help communicate and be more transparent with beneficiaries and communities about programs.

6. To provide a basis for assessing relevance, effectiveness and impact in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and, therefore, to help identify reasons for success or failure.

7. To identify where adjustments or modifications in the program may be needed to achieve the desired outcome/result.

8. Based on (6), to contribute to knowledge about violence, peace and development.5 Why is stating an explicit theory of change essential for effective monitoring and evaluation of conflict programs? 6

When analysis, theory of change and implementation come together effectively, the result should be a noticeable change in the conflict dynamics. Focusing on these outcomes— particularly in the context of evaluation—is critical for purposes of accountability and learning. If a project does not appear to affect the overall conflict dynamics, however, there are four broadly plausible explanations:

1. The underlying analysis was incorrect. Perhaps the project did affect identified conflict factors, but these factors were not related to the overall conflict dynamics in the manner previously

4 See CAF 2.0, p. 36. 5 See OECD DAC (2012) Evaluating Peacebuiding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility: Improving Learning for Results. Paris: OECD DAC. This Guidance emphasizes that “[d]eveloping better founded, more clearly stated theories about how peacebuilding and statebuilding can be achieved and supported is a key message from this guidance for decision makers, managers, and programme staff.” Id. at 9 (Executive Summary). 6 Ibid.

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understood; for example, the project addressed the symptoms of conflict instead of its sources.

2. The theory of change was unfounded or invalid. The expected changes did not take place because the project made incorrect assumptions about how change would occur in this context. Or perhaps the project did affect the targets of its change as intended, but the expected changes from this particular set of actions did not address drivers of conflict or had unintended negative consequences; for example, the project brought together leaders from opposing sides to pursue common goals unrelated to the peace process, and although relationships improved, attitudes about the other and about the peace process did not.

3. The project was not implemented properly. Perhaps the project did have a valid theory of change for affecting the conflict dynamics and the proposed actions would have yielded the desired outcomes, but the project did not go off as planned; for example, the project faced logistical challenges or malfeasance.

Identifying program gaps using theories of change: Liberia

In the wake of the 14-year civil war in Liberia, a large international Non-Government Organization (NGO) received donor funding to develop Community Peace Councils (CPCs), a community-based mechanism for resolving a range of disputes, with an explicitly inter- ethnic approach. One of the program’s theories of change was if a new community-level mechanism for handling a range of dispute types was established, then it would help maintain peace in the community and avoid incidents that have the potential for escalating into serious violence. An evaluation team found that while the CPCs successfully handled many conflicts at the local level, they were, for the most part, not handling the most serious and volatile disputes relating to land issues. The team then explored whether this was due to a failure in program implementation or, alternatively, to a theory of change that was incomplete or inaccurate. The main conclusion was that, while the CPCs were set up and trained well, the CPCs mostly were excluded from handling land issues as communities were repopulated and traditional leadership patterns re-established. The program had made incorrect assumptions about how it would contribute to stopping key drivers of the conflict in Liberia, and subsequently adjusted its strategy.

4. The theory of change was valid but insufficient. The project’s theory of change was valid and did

affect the identified conflict factors, but it was insufficient to affect overall dynamics of peace and conflict. This, for example, could be due to the influence of other conflict factors that were not considered or addressed or to the absence of linkages with other programs.

Theories of change, it should be added, may also benefit project managers in terms of maintaining accountability. In some cases, expectations for peace and security programs exceed what is plausible or realistic. By rooting projects in realistic and logical analysis and theories of change, project managers can ensure that the project’s expectations are realistic and better respond to critiques, i.e., “Perhaps the project did not bring about an end to the war, but there is credible evidence that it changed the dynamics in a positive way, based on the analysis and theory of change.” A well thought-out theory of change will help identify and assess the nature of the contribution to the broader peace, rather than make inappropriate claims to have single- handedly created that peace.

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1.2 STEPS IN CONSTRUCTING A THEORY OF CHANGE

The theory of change is best articulated at the beginning of a planning process and reviewed and checked throughout the program cycle. However, it is also possible to develop or amend a theory of change at a later stage. Conflict situations tend to be volatile and dynamic in nature. A project must sometimes shift its focus or strategy to remain relevant to the situation on the ground. Or a project team might discover that the theory of change was insufficient or inadequate as the team learns more about the situation and the program’s effects on it during implementation. In that case, it will be important to adopt a revised theory or theories of change as well. Unfortunately, this ideal is not always reflected in practice. Many efforts fail to develop theories of change at the beginning of the project cycle, if at all, and many others neglect the ongoing process of adaptation. However, it is never too late to develop a theory of change; it can be useful during all stages of the programming cycle.

Articulating the theory(ies) of change is a helpful way of generating good logical frameworks. The logical or results framework establishes a hierarchy of objectives or results statements to show how a program believes change will come about. Essentially, a good and robust logical framework should represent “a theory about how intended change will occur.”7 Once the theory of change is developed, you can use it to identify what the project goal, purposes or intermediate results (IRs) and outputs for the logical framework are, as well as what you think needs to happen to achieve them.

The theory(ies) of change, which may not be written fully into the results framework or logical framework, are important because they clarify what is behind the arrows or links between different levels of objectives. They explain how and why achieving lower level results will lead to the higher level objectives and to the Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) goal, and thus help program planners identify and test critical assumptions and expectations about how the program will work.8

Step 1: Conduct a conflict analysis

As with constructing any intervention, the first step is to conduct a conflict analysis to determine the significant drivers of violent conflict and sources of resilience in a given community, region or country. The conflict analysis should help focus attention for strategy and programming based on conflict drivers and mitigating factors, urgency, opportunity and needs. The revised USAID Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF 2.0) provides a template for conducting a conflict analysis. However, it is also possible to draw upon assessments done by other groups, such as the International Crisis Group, the United Nations, other donors or practitioners or USAID’s own partners in the country concerned.

7 USAID (2010) Performance Monitoring and Evaluation TIPS No. 13: Building a Results Framework, 2nd Draft, Washington, DC: USAID. Available at pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnadw113.pdf. 8 See Levine, C. (2007) Catholic Relief Services’ (CRS) Guidance for Developing Logical and Results Frameworks, Baltimore, MD: CRS. Available at http://dmeforpeace.org/learn/catholic-relief-services-guidance-developing-logical-and-results-frameworks.

http://dmeforpeace.org/learn/catholic-relief-services-guidance-developing-logical-and-results-frameworks

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Step 2: Identify the conflict/resilience drivers the program will address

Once the significant causes of violent conflict and the sources of resilience are identified and prioritized in terms of their relative importance, the second step is for you to decide which of the priority conflict drivers you will try to address and which sources of resilience you will incorporate and build upon. This may be a function of mandate, expertise, staffing capacity, alignment with country strategy or availability of funding.

Step 3: Identify the program’s goals (the WHAT and the WHO)

Once a priority program area has been chosen, you must again consult the conflict assessment data to determine what type of change is desirable in this context. Here is where it is important to decide: (a) what the preferred outcome will be, once the change process is completed; and (b) whether the change process needs to target political leaders, institutions, civil society leaders and/or public opinion.

Step 4: Develop the approach (the HOW)

When the outcome(s) and target audience for the change process are decided, consider various approaches that could be employed to create the desired outcome. For example, if you identify that reducing hostility among youth is your goal (e.g., because youth interactions have been a significant trigger for conflict), you will want to consider a number of different approaches to achieving that goal,

Tips on formulating robust goals

Goals are often expressed in broad and vague terms, such as “reconciliation,” “tolerance,” “empowerment” or in overly specific terms of activities. This can make it difficult to develop a good theory of change. Goals should be articulated concretely as desired changes in the key drivers of the situation—observable changes in behavior, interactions, institutional performance, intergroup relations, norms, etc. For example, goals that “women are raising issues of concern to them with local authorities, leading to changes in government policies” or that “women are consulted and included in the peace process” are more specific goals than “women are empowered to participate in the peace process.” Those goals would also be a good reformulation of activity- based goals, such as “1500 women will be trained in peacebuilding and advocacy.”

such as: cross-group sports and drama, cooperation on issues of common concern, media programming, tolerance education in schools, joint rewriting of history textbooks, youth camps, etc. Based on the conflict analysis, you then choose the most appropriate approach to use to achieve the change.

NOTE: Individual projects are usually part of a continuum or chain of intended outcomes, which starts with current conditions and extends to the overall intention/vision of “Peace Writ Large.” 9

Project or program goals are incremental or intermediate outcomes along the way to this larger vision.

9 “Peace Writ Large” is the term coined by the CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, in their study of peacebuilding activities. It refers to the ultimate goal of achieving sustainable peace in a community/ country/geographic region. The problem CDA found when it looked at most peacebuilding activities was that few of the implementers had thought about how their programs would/could eventually lead to this ultimate goal. Anderson, M., and L. Olson (2003) Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners. Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects.

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Here is where it might be especially helpful to consult the Theories and Indicators of Change (THINC) Matrix (see Section 2.2 of this document). The THINC Matrix can be a tool to help you brainstorm or focus. You may also want to review the Primers for other ideas about how to best achieve your goal. They provide an overview of various approaches, as identified in practice and through comparative and case study research, and the intended outcomes when using each one. This will give you a general idea or set of ideas that you should adapt to your context.

Figure 1: Continuum of Theories of Change

Step 4: Articulate the theory(ies) of change

Write up the completed “theory of change” to be employed, taking care to specify in detail what your assumptions are about and how your approach will result in your expected outcome in this specific context. Referring to the diagram (Figure 1), the “Project Logic” should be spelled out clearly in order to articulate how the project activities will add up to the project’s goal or IR. The “Overall Theory of Change” should also be articulated. This makes clear how achieving the goal or outcome of the program will ultimately lead to a Development Objective (DO) that is tied to an over-arching development or peacebuilding goal like the CDCS or Peace Writ Large and will address the drivers of conflict or sources of resilience you have identified in the conflict analysis.

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For example, suppose you are developing a program to treat children in schools for trauma and train them in skills for non-violent conflict resolution. The desired outcome of the program is less violence between children of differing religious groups in a local school. The overall theory of change might be articulated by considering how, if your program is successful, it will contribute to mitigating or transforming the drivers of conflict or strengthening sources of resilience you have identified in the conflict analysis. The programmatic theory of change (or program logic) might be constructed by developing a continuum of results (a hierarchy or sequence of changes sought through the program logic) by: identifying all the activities and changes resulting from them, from outputs to outcomes and impacts; organizing them in a logical sequence; and identifying the theories of change associated with each one, as illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1: Hierarchy of Results in a Theory of Change

Project Goal Overall Theory of Change (How the goal will contribute to Peace Writ Large)

Inter-religious violence at X number of schools in Y community is reduced.

If inter-religious violence at schools is reduced, then cooperation and coexistence among youth of different religions will increase, and they will be less susceptible to manipulation into inter-religious violence overall, because their new skills for resolving differences and controlling their emotions peacefully and their new relationships will make them less willing to fight.

Continuum of Results Incremental Theories of Change

Children use skills and knowledge to deal with differences at school without violence.

Children gain knowledge, awareness and skills from trainings to resolve differences non-violently.

Children will act out or act aggressively less frequently.

Children are able to manage emotions and will feel less vulnerable at school.

If children employ skills of non-violent conflict resolution to resolve differences at school, then inter-religious violence at schools will decrease.

If children are trained in non-violent methods of conflict resolution, they will resolve differences at school peacefully.

If children are able to control their emotions and feel less fearful, they will be able to master skills of non-violent conflict resolution.

If children in school X are given individual treatment for trauma recovery, they will begin to heal from the psychological wounds of war. This will allow them to control their emotions and to feel less vulnerable at school.

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Put together as a narrative, the theory of change of this program might read as follows:

This program is based upon the premise that if children in this school are given individual treatment for trauma recovery, then they will develop increased ability to control their emotions and not act out against others, especially those who are different from them. This is because the activities will have helped them begin to heal from the psychological wounds of war and reduce their overall fear and sense of vulnerability at school. Under these conditions, if we introduce inter-group skills (negotiation, mediation, problem-solving) to children of different religious groups together, then they will be able to learn them and use them to resolve disputes at school, including those that may arise between religious groups. Reduction of violence in schools will contribute to reduction of inter-religious violence overall because youth are recruited by extremist groups who are significant perpetrators of inter-religious violence and because schools are a significant place for violence in this region. The children will also be more likely to use the skills outside of school, and will be less recruitable by such extremist groups.

Step 5: Assess the theory(ies) of change

When the complete theory has been developed in a hierarchy of results and/or narrative story, the team must assess whether there are: (a) gaps in the logic of how the steps in the process follow from each other; (b) assumptions that cannot be supported; or (c) steps in the chain that cannot be carried out for any reasons. If any of these make the desired outcome no longer feasible, the team must go back to Step 3 to begin the theory of change analysis with another possible target audience or approach. For instance, in the example above, you might test how realistic the assumption is that children will be able to use the new skills outside of school and whether the ability to resolve conflicts peacefully will be enough to lead them to resist recruitment to violence (i.e., are there other factors?). Similarly, the assumption that children are “acting out” only because of the trauma they experienced might also be tested.

A number of frameworks exist for assessing the theory of change. Table 2 below describes the qualities of a good theory of change and some practical tips for developing them in the context of a specific program.

Table 2: Qualities of a Good Theory of Change

Criteria Practical Notes

Clear conceptualization of impact and pathways to it: It makes explicit the intended changes from the effort. The “road map” to change is clear and understandable. For peacebuilding interventions, it makes a clear connection to key drivers of conflict or resilience.

State the theory or theories of change in the CDCS and/or project appraisal document, as well as project Scope of Work (SOW) as feasible.

Coherence: It demonstrates logic and common sense and/or reflects research results. It shows how the effort will lead to the desired results without leaps or gaps.

Share your draft theory of change with colleagues, especially those with knowledge of or experience in the context in which the project will be implemented. Review scholarly literature or evaluations for evidence of plausibility.

Contact DCHA/CMM or PPL/LER for additional

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guidance on learning and evidence. Be sure to share your evaluation reports with DCHA/CMM and PPL/LER to ensure continued learning.

Plausibility: Beliefs and assumptions about how one change will influence another have been explored and articulated and there has been some challenge of “comfort zones” in thinking them through.

State assumptions in the results framework and in the project appraisal document.

Consider undertaking a systems analysis or generating a systems map; See Systems Thinking in Conflict Assessment: Application and Concepts (2012) from CMM.

Grounded in context: It takes context as the starting point and reflects the reality of change processes in that setting.

Review any recent conflict assessments, DRG assessments, political economy analysis, gender analysis or related CDCS background information. DCHA/CMM can provide recommendations on sources for high-quality conflict analysis.

Testable: It is specific enough to be tested for validity over time.

Ask, “What would show this theory is not right or this program is not working? What would falsify it?” Build this into the evaluation design and the project appraisal document. For guidance on evaluation design and management, contact DCHA/CMM or PPL/LER.

Include processes for monitoring validity of theories of change in M&E plan.

Dynamic: Uncertainties, risks and knock-on effects are captured, including unintended negative and positive effects and a process is in place for reviewing and revising the theory.

Document uncertainties and risks in the SOW; include scope for flexibility, such as a “crisis modifier.” Build a process for strategic theory review and revision into the SOW and/or annual work plan.

What about when a theory of change needs to be evaluated against a larger objective (contribution to the larger societal peace) or against other theories of change, such as in the context of a country strategy (i.e., CDCS)? The CAF 2.0 suggests using the Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) Matrix as a way to identify gaps in the theory of change as well as potential linkages with other programs that can enhance the effectiveness of USAID programming.10 The RPP Matrix can help in assessing and strengthening both the coherence and plausibility of a theory of change in context. The RPP Matrix emerged from research by the RPP Program of CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. It summarizes the major findings of RPP, illustrating that effective peacebuilding efforts link change at the individual/personal level (e.g., attitudes, skills, relationships) to change at the socio-political level. They also link change in “key people” or mobilizers to change in “more people” or society at large.11

In brief, if a program works primarily at the individual/personal level—on attitudes, skills and relationships—and the practitioners merely “hope” that the outcomes at that level will lead to changes in the socio-political realm, then a review or revision of Steps 3 and 4 might be needed

10 CAF 2.0, Section 4.1. 11 Anderson, M., and L. Olson (2003) Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners. Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. See also CAF 2.0, Section 4.1.

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to fill in gaps or to identify linkages with other efforts that might strengthen the program’s effectiveness. Similarly, if a program working with “more people” does not link to “key people” or mobilizers in some way (and vice versa), then a gap exists and should be addressed.

Step 6: Monitor and Evaluate Outcomes and Impacts

Context matters! Not all theories of change will be effective or even possible to use under all circumstances. Often, changes in context, new understandings of the dynamics a program is trying to influence and changes in implementation realities can affect the relevance and validity of the theory of change in the context. Therefore, MONITORING AND EVALUATING OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS IS CRUCIAL, so that assumptions are continuously examined and programs can be adjusted accordingly. You should regularly review whether the results at the lower levels are leading to the results at higher levels. The results hierarchy and underlying theories of change must be regularly revised to remain clear, coherent and relevant to the current context. It is also important to review the program’s activities and results with another evaluative method. This will help you assess the intended intervention and the results together.

Once you have articulated, tested and refined the theory of change, you can develop indicators to monitor your assumptions, outputs, outcomes and sustainability in comparison with expectations informed by the design of the program. By breaking down the statements of the “if” (input), “then” (outputs and outcomes) and “because” (assumptions, logic), the theory of change can help you identify good indicators for activities/outputs, the expected changes resulting from each of the activities and the assumptions underlying the theories.12

12 For further guidance on developing indicators, see USAID’s guidance on performance monitoring, “Selecting Performance Indicators” (2010) TIPS No. 6 (2nd edition), available at http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/evalweb/documents/TIPS- SelectingPerformanceIndicators.pdf and http://www.usaid.gov/results-and-data/information-resources/program-evaluations. USAID staff can also draw on a range of internal resources on this topic on ProgramNet at https://programnet.usaid.gov/. For further guidance on using theories of change in monitoring and evaluation, see CARE International UK (2012) Guidance for Designing, Monitoring and Evaluating Peacebuilding Projects using Theories of Change, London: CARE International UK, and Corlazzoli, V. and J. White (forthcoming 2013) “Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in Conflict, Security and Justice Programmes: Part II: Using Theories of Change in Monitoring and Evaluation.” London: DFID.

http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/evalweb/documents/TIPS-SelectingPerformanceIndicators.pdf



http://www.usaid.gov/results-and-data/information-resources/program-evaluations

https://programnet.usaid.gov/

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Using Theories of Change to Create Indicators in School Trauma Healing Program

In the trauma healing program for school children described in Step 5, an indicator that the project’s goal has been achieved could be the number of inter-religious conflict incidents at school in a month.

Indicators could also be developed to assess whether the project is having the impact the theory of change anticipates—to reduce recruitment of school-age youth into armed groups. These could include the number of school-age youth associated with armed groups outside of school or the number of youth-perpetrated incidents of inter-religious violence.

Finally, you can use the theory of change to develop indicators to monitor progress towards the goal and to monitor the assumptions underpinning the theory of change. For example, the theory of change assumes that if children are trained in conflict resolution skills, they will use the skills to resolve conflicts at school non-violently. Several assumptions about the impact of training underpin this theory: 1) that training is relevant and an effective mechanism for knowledge and skill transfer; 2) that information and skills are understood and accepted as an alternative to violence;1 Indicators for these assumptions might be:

• % of participating youth who demonstrate knowledge and skill acquisition and comprehension in pre/post-test;

• % of surveyed youth who state they are confident in their ability to employ nonviolent conflict resolution techniques.

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2. Common Theories of Change in Conflict Management and Mitigation: Matrix and Primers

2.1 INTRODUCING THE THINC MATRIX AND PRIMERS

This section provides you with resources for developing your theories of change. It describes the most commonly used theories of change in conflict management and mitigation, and it supplies you with supporting information and references to understand the state-of-the-art research backing (or raising questions about) each theory.

What is the THINC Matrix?

The Theories and Indicators of Change (THINC) Matrix summarizes and organizes the major theories of change in the practice of conflict management and mitigation, including conflict resolution. It was developed by DCHA/CMM and its partners based upon extensive literature review and consultation with experts and practitioners. The THINC Matrix is one way of organizing the many theories of change that have informed peacebuilding projects, programs and strategies.

The families and individual theories in the Matrix have been categorized based on their shared assumptions and qualities to provide a comprehensive but manageable list useful to program planners and managers. However, the list should not be considered exhaustive. Many initiatives have their own theory of change, multiple theories of change or combined aspects of different theories. And most initiatives in complex and fragile environments need and have more complex theories than simple “if…then…because” statements (for example, “if we do x, y and z, then this will lead to A, which will promote B and possibly lead to C, because…”). What is important is to be able to articulate the thinking about how change happens.

What are the THINC Primers?

The THINC Primers (published separately) give program planners and managers a detailed summary of the theories of change identified and critiqued through the THINC initiative and summarized in the THINC Matrix. They are meant to provide a brief introduction to the current practice and research underpinning each theory and its family and to point the reader to resources that can be accessed in order to learn more about the strengths and weaknesses of each theory.

The Primers are organized according to the families of Theories of Change listed in the THINC Matrix: Attitudes, Behaviors and Institutions. Each Primer includes:

1. An overview presenting the entire family and its core assumptions. 2. Summaries of each theory of change within the family describing each theory and its core

change logic.

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3. Examples of programs that are grounded in each theory of change. The examples provided in the Primers are NOT meant to be endorsements for any particular theory, but rather illustrations of how various theories have been implemented. When data is available to indicate whether, or under what circumstances, a particular theory of change has been successful, that will be indicated. However, such data is not available for all theories of change.

4. Overviews of debates and critiques concerning the validity and application of each theory, based on academic research and practitioner and policy experience.

5. Resources to offer practitioners, additional material on the theories of change, their application and their validity in different contexts.

How can you use the THINC Matrix and Primers?

The THINC Matrix and Primers are designed to be used at all stages of the program cycle: analysis, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. However, the Matrix and Primers will be most useful in the design, monitoring and evaluation phases, since these are the points when you first attempt to articulate a clear, coherent, grounded theory of change and later seek to assess progress against that theory.

In other words, although potentially of use throughout these steps and the program cycle, the THINC Matrix and Primers can be particularly useful in informing steps #4, #5 and #6 in the sequence for constructing and using a theory of change.

You can use the THINC Matrix and Primers to:

Steps in Constructing a Theory of Change

1. Conduct a conflict analysis. 2. Identify the conflict/resilience drivers the

program will address. 3. Identify the goals of the program. 4. Develop the approach. 5. Articulate the theory(ies) of change. 6. Assess the theory(ies) of change. 7. Monitor and evaluate outcomes and

impacts.

• Generate new program ideas—read through the materials to inform brainstorming about what theories and kinds of programs would be appropriate and effective in the particular context. (It should, however, only be a starting point—the ideas and the theories behind them need to be developed and thought through in context.)

• Express ideas—find language and information to help you express a difficult or new idea, i.e., articulate the theory of change underlying your program or when you are trying to infer a theory of change from a project already underway where the theory of change was not clearly expressed at the beginning.

• Clarify and seek consensus on program logic—identify, choose and develop consensus on what changes particular activities or approaches you may be pursuing will catalyze and why and how those changes may come about, especially when activities can fit into many different theories of change.

• Refine and test ideas—use the process of articulating the theory of change or the underlying research in the primers to critically examine your idea and the assumptions underlying it in light of scholarship.

• Compare ideas—understand how different theories of change relate to one another and to the underlying changes they seek to make.

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The Matrix gives a brief description of each theory, the target audience(s) for each, and the basic assumptions that underlie the theory. This should give you a good idea of which ones may fit your program needs. There will most probably be a few choices, and the Primers will then be helpful in discerning whether and how a given theory may be valid or need to be adapted for a specific circumstance.

How should you NOT use the THINC Matrix and Primers?

The THINC Matrix is:

• Not a stamp of approval—While the theories presented in the Matrix are common in practice or research, their validity has not necessarily been proven or supported by evidence, nor are they necessarily endorsed by USAID or the authors of this report. The Primers do provide examples of how the theory has been used in practice and summarize the debates about when and under what circumstances various theories may be valid. However, research is constantly evolving, and you will need to test and monitor whether the theory of change underlying your program is appropriate and valid in the context where you are working.

• Not a checklist or menu—While the theories and information in the Matrix and Primers can help you brainstorm program ideas, they should not be used as a checklist or menu to pick from. The Matrix and Primers should not be a substitute for thinking through what theory or theories of change are appropriate for your program and context.

• Not exhaustive—Just because an idea or theory is not in the list does not mean it is not credible; analysis may lead you to develop a new theory, but it should exhibit all of the qualities of a good theory of change outlined in the first section and, in particular, Table 2.

• Not static—USAID anticipates updating this Matrix as new evidence emerges on the theories or as new policy and program guidelines are developed related to theories of change and project design/evaluation. Learning emerging from experience with and evaluations of the theories of change in your programs will add to the evidence that will be incorporated in the THINC Matrix.

• Not the only aspect of effective project design—Formulating a theory of change is essential to effective conflict mitigation and development, but there are many other aspects that are important as well as related to management, logistics, contracting/grants, finances and personnel. Notably, projects and activities in conflict-affected and fragile environments need to adhere to principles of good engagement by ensuring activities do no harm, are not discriminatory, are flexible to shifting circumstances and so on.13

How can you enhance and build on the THINC Matrix?

The THINC Matrix represents an attempt to rationalize (and simplify) the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding to facilitate better knowledge management by USAID and its partners. Building upon this knowledge management architecture through additional research,

13 See OECD DAC (2007) “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations.” Paris: OECD DAC. www.oecd.org/dac/incaf.

http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf

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targeted information, and sharing of results and ideas organized in terms of this framework will lead to better outcomes for everyone.

Practitioners can

• Share information about appropriate indicators and evaluation techniques corresponding to specific theories or theory families;

• Share best practices and lessons learned by theory; • Provide guidance on legal or operational dimensions for different theories (for example,

which types of actors are most appropriate to which activities implied within the theory(ies)).

Researchers can

• Share research pertaining to theories or their underlying premises, leading over time to some theories on the Matrix being revised, supported or abandoned;

• Investigate how different theories are related to one another (such as when one theory is strongly implied within another);

• Critically examine or expose acknowledged or unspoken assumptions within each theory.

USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM) welcomes input on these or related efforts. Please send your feedback or supporting information to [email protected].

Construction of the THINC Matrix

The THINC Matrix summarizes the major theories of change commonly informing non- coercive conflict resolution practice—although it does not purport to include all possible theories. The theories have been grouped into families, according to the type of change that is being sought (i.e., the WHAT and the WHO in Section 1.2.3 above).

There are three such groupings, or families:

• theories that seek change in attitudes; • theories that seek change in behaviors; • theories that seek change in institutions.

The families are not mutually exclusive; it is often possible and desirable to combine more than one theory of change in a program; i.e., to target attitudes and behaviors, or behaviors and institutions or all three.

Family #1—Attitudes

Theories in this family are structured to change attitudes of individuals and groups. There are various attitudes that are correlated with politically violent or peaceful behaviors, and the underlying premise of the theories in this family is that by changing such attitudes, violent behavior will be prevented or mitigated because the thoughts/feelings that lead to such behavior will be changed or mitigated. A further assumption is that this creates more stable, constructive change in the society over the medium to long term because attitudes are more resilient than behaviors.

mailto:[email protected]

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This Theory of Change Family encompasses a variety of theories about attitude change, including:

• Intra-personal attitudes—change within individuals concerning their experience of the conflict and their ability to change their own attitudes about the effects of conflict. Theory 1.1 (Trauma Healing) focuses on such personal change.

• Inter-group relationships and attitudes—group-level change in attitudes about the “other” and changes in relationships between conflicting groups. Theories 1.2 (Social/Cultural Contact), 1.3 (Cooperation and Mutual Interest) and 1.4 (Problem Solving Dialogue) describe different theories for decreasing negative attitudes about the “other” and building cross-conflict relationships. They describe individual-level change that is hoped to lead to change in group attitudes, as individuals change due to their encounters with the “other,” and then, in turn, begin to change the norms of their group or of other individuals. This, in turn, creates various individual-level change within the group.

• Attitudes about the conflict—Theory 1.5 (Attitudes About Conflict) focuses on attitude changes within individuals or groups about the conflict itself: its nature, its consequences and the value of peace.

• Public opinion and social norms about the “other” and about the conflict—cultural change, or changes in mass attitudes about the “other,” about peace and about values and norms such as tolerance, diversity, etc. Theories 1.6 (Mass Attitudes About Conflict) and 1.7 (Culture of Peace) focus on changing societal attitudes about the specific conflict or about ways of dealing with difference.

Theories of change can focus on promoting change in key people (“mobilizers”),14 whether officials or not, or on broadening change to reach more people in the citizenry and communities to enhance their willingness and capacity to support peace.

Family #2—Behaviors

Theories in this family share the assumption that behaviors can be changed directly, without requiring prior attitude change. The further assumption is that this creates change more quickly because it bypasses having to allow for the longer process of a shift in attitudes. Direct behavior change is accomplished by withholding or diminishing the resources key actors or mobilizers have to perpetrate violence (Theory 2.1), addressing security fears of key actors (Theory 2.2) or changing the incentives for actors in the conflict, making the actions that lead to violence more costly and those that lead to non-violent problem-solving more appealing (Theory 2.3). Behavior change can also be facilitated through management of domestic political obstacles to peace (Theory 2.4) and through building of skills and capacities that actors lack to engage in more productive processes of peacemaking, peacebuilding and cooperation (Theory 2.5).

Programs developed based on these theories often incorporate activities and processes that are designed to change attitudes or may follow on work that is focused on attitude change and relationship building. Many programs based on these theories espouse that attitude change is also important and useful for influencing conflict-related decisions and behaviors of actors; attitude change may indeed be one step in a strategy for producing behavior change, to

14 See USAID, CAF 2.0, Section 3.1.

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reinforce or sustain changes in behavior. However, the theories in this family do not assume that attitude change will automatically produce behavior change. Rather, changing behavior and decisions requires additional effort and approaches.

Family #3—Institutions

This Theory of Change family is fundamentally about structural change, as opposed to change at a group or individual level. Political and economic theory has long recognized that societies and groups have institutions, or rules, governing who has power and how that power may be used. The institutions of society are often themselves systems for resolving conflict, such as through the rule of law or social norms, but when they do not work as planned or when different sets of institutions clash, violence can escalate. The Institutions Theory of Change Family describes ways to change the capabilities and functioning of the institutions of a society, as well as how they are perceived by the public, in order to promote sustainable peace.

The core hypothesis for institutional theories of change is, if institutions in a society are effective and legitimate, then they create options for addressing grievances peacefully rather than through violent means. As evoked in this hypothesis, there are two major underlying qualities of institutions that are believed to promote peacebuilding: effectiveness (the extent to which institutions deliver public goods and services adequately) and legitimacy (the extent to which state-society interactions produce outcomes considered to be fair, inclusive and transparent).

Using Multiple Theories of Change to Address Conflict Issues

Many theories of change are relevant and can be used in combination to address more complex issues that USAID identifies as important for transforming conflict dynamics and which fall within its manageable interests in a given context, such as: dealing with the past, support for peace processes, reconciliation or people-to-people programming. Reconciliation, for example, can be pursued through trauma healing (Theory 1.1), any of the inter-group dialogue theories (Theories 1.2-1.4) and institution-building theories (Family 3). Similarly, people-to-people programming can focus on social contact (Theory 1.2), problem-solving (Theory 1.4), psychological aspects of conflict (e.g., trauma, Theory 1.1) or skill building (Theory 2.5).

Example: Dealing with the past

Many of the theories of change that relate to attitudes can be used to address the past, often in multi-prong programs. The importance of creating mechanisms for dealing with the past is well documented, especially in situations where peace agreements do not address the key grievances of certain groups or negotiated commitments are not implemented in the post- conflict environment. In cases where one party defeats the other through force and when “groups remain intermixed after violence occurs, renewed violence is probably an even greater danger.”15 Programs for dealing with the past can be based on a number of different theories, which might be adapted for the particular context and goals of the activities, for example:

15 Staub, E. (2006) “Reconciliation after Genocide, Mass Killing, or Intractable Conflict: Understanding the Roots of Violence, Psychological Recovery and Steps Towards a General Theory,” Political Psychology, Vol. 27, No. 6, p 868.

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• Trauma Healing (Theory 1.1): If people address the trauma caused by their experience of violence, they will not have a desire for revenge, will be able to focus on the future and will have capacity to form relationships with former “enemies.” Sample activity: psychosocial counseling.

• Inter-group Relationship-Building (Theories 1.2–1.4): If people are able to engage in structured inter-group dialogue, their pain and suffering will be heard and acknowledged. As a result, they will be able to acknowledge their own group’s harmful actions.”16 This exchange will allow them to feel closure and move on, breaking cycles of violence. Sample activity: dialogue workshops with community leaders and ex-combatants.

• Public Opinion and Social Norms (Theory 1.7): If traumatic events of the past are commemorated, memorialized and acknowledged on a broad, public level within a society, then the norms governing intergroup relations will be more tolerant, and people in such societies will be encouraged and supported to coexist peacefully. Sample activities: collective rituals; community reconciliation ceremonies; reconciliation-focused radio programs.

To create a holistic and comprehensive approach to programming that effectively helps communities deal with the past, many programs have elements of all three of these theories of change. For example, one program in Rwanda worked with a range of actors in society, from members of the population who were affected in deeply personal ways by the conflict, to national leaders who shape policies, practices and institutions. The program’s interventions have included training of the staff of NGOs that work with groups in the community; seminars/workshops with community leaders, journalists and national leaders (government ministers, heads of commissions, members of the supreme court and advisors to the President); and the development of nationally broadcast radio programs that, according to surveys conducted in the summer of 2005, reached 90% of the radio listening population.17

2.2 CMM THEORIES OF CHANGE MATRIX

The Matrix is intended to be a summary of the major Theories of Change outlined in the section above. You can use this matrix as a quick reference as you are reflecting on your proposed approach, asking important questions such as, “Is the theory appropriate for the goal?”; “Is the theory consistent with my underlying analysis?”; and “Is the logic sound?”

The Matrix provides:

1. The name of the theory (Column 1). 2. A concise statement of the theory of change (“If…then” statement, Column 2). 3. An indication of the constituency engaged (Column 3). This may be key people (groups who

play a critical role in whether a conflict continues or not) or more people (groups and people in the broader population—such as communities, business people, religious leaders, women, youth, etc.) whose support and inclusion in the peacebuilding process is needed for peace to be achieved and sustained.

4. A brief description of the theory and the assumptions underlying it (Column 4).

16 Id. p.887. 17 Ibid.

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Theory of Change (THINC) Matrix

Theory of Change Statement

Constituency Most Often

Engaged

Description

Theory of Change Family 1: Shifts in Attitudes

Theories in this family seek to influence the attitudes and psychological drivers and effects of mass mobilization by key actors in an armed conflict.

Theory 1.1: Trauma Healing

If individuals who have been traumatized by violence are given opportunities and support, then their desire for revenge will be reduced.

More People Theories of change related to psychosocial trauma healing emphasize processes that assist traumatized individuals to develop effective strategies for coping with the emotional, cognitive, behavioral and spiritual effects of trauma. They assume that the psychological impact of violence on victims, perpetrators and bystanders is a significant barrier to the reestablishment of relationships with former enemies.

Theory 1.2: Social/Cultural Contact

If groups from conflicting societies participate in joint activities, then this contact will lead to increased understanding of the other and will reduce inter-group conflict.

More People This theory is based on the assumption that contact based on cultural, social and recreational activities will promote increased understanding. Programs may include peace camps for youth, cultural exchanges and inter-ethnic sports games. The theory is that hostility between groups is perpetuated by unfamiliarity and separation and that inter-group contact can challenge negative stereotypes and generate more positive inter-group attitudes and relationships.

Theory 1.3: Cooperation and Mutual Interest

If groups from similar sectors of conflicting societies work together on issues of mutual interest, then they will learn to cooperate, and through cooperation, develop increased trust and positive relations.

More People This theory is based on the assumption that if contact among people across conflict lines occurs in activities based on mutual interests, understanding will increase, prejudice will be reduced and a “safe space within the conflict for healthy relationships to develop” will be created.

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Engaged

Description

Theory 1.4: Problem Solving and Dialogue

If people from both sides of a conflict engage in unofficial dialogue at the Track 2 and 3 levels, then these efforts will ultimately strengthen official negotiation processes.

Key People and More People

Unofficial, yet structured, interactions and sustained dialogue are expected to make possible a quality and depth of communication that is not possible in more official processes, and thereby generate new understandings of the conflict and the parties that facilitates resolution of conflict issues.

Theory 1.5: Attitudes about Conflict

If perceptions of the costs of violence or benefits of peace are changed, then key decision makers or broader constituencies will withdraw support (and mobilization) for violence.


This theory presumes that if individuals change their attitudes about the consequences of continuing conflict or the benefits of alternative means of addressing conflict, then they will pursue peaceful means of resolving or transforming conflict (e.g., peace agreements), and they will influence societal attitudes or mobilize in favor of peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Theory 1.6. Mass Attitudes about Conflict

If enough people in society change their attitudes to favor peace, then they will prefer that key actors seek peaceful solutions to conflicts and will resist mobilization to violence.

More People If key actors’ attitudes change but the general population does not believe in peace, it can be difficult for key actors to create and maintain peace. In some contexts, such attitude changes can prepare the sides to accept an official peace. In others, it can be the basis for the creation of social movements at the grassroots levels of society to call for an end to violence.

Theory 1.7: “Culture of Peace”

If societies focus resources on changing people’s attitudes to support peaceful resolution of conflicts, then a culture of peace will emerge that promotes coexistence.

More People This theory focuses on fostering a cultural shift from violent (“culture of war”) to peaceful approaches (“culture of peace”) to handling conflict as a long-term process of transforming the attitudes and social norms that supported violent conflict in the past.

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Engaged

Description

Theory of Change Family 2: Changes in Behavior

Theories in this family share the assumption that behaviors can be changed directly, without requiring attitude change.

Theory 2.1: Changing Elite Means

If the means or resources that key actors have to pursue violence are reduced, then they will be less able to pursue violence and more amenable to negotiation and peaceful means of resolving conflict.

Key People This theory grows out of work by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler on the economic causes of war. They suggested that rebellions start not because of grievances, but because of the “greed” of leaders seeking greater access to financial resources. In other words, whether or not “greed” or economic motivation is a factor, government leaders and rebel groups cannot wage war without access to the means to do so.

Theory 2.2: Resolving the Security Dilemma

If a party’s fears that the "other" is not committed to peace and will exploit it in the future are allayed, then it will not resort to force.

Key People This theory builds on research concerning the “security dilemma,” which arises when one party, in an effort to increase its own security, and out of distrust of the other side, decreases the other side’s sense of security, e.g., by resorting prematurely to the use of force. Confidence-building measures, peacekeeping and verification missions, monitoring mechanisms and some problem-solving dialogues all seek to provide confidence that will alter a party’s decision to escalate conflict.

Theory 2.3: Incentives for Peace

If motivations or incentives for violence are changed so that violence seems more costly and non-violence more attractive, then people will pursue peace and reject violence.


This theory defines decision making as a matter of rational choice and focuses on changing behavior by changing the incentives facing decision makers, rather than the means at their disposal, by increasing negative incentives for violence or positive incentives for non- violence and cooperation. If people have the right incentives, motives or choices so that they believe they are gaining more from non-violence than from war, then they will decide to end war and pursue peace.

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Engaged

Description

Theory 2.4: Addressing Domestic Divisions

If domestic political struggles within a party are addressed, resolved or managed, then a party will have greater motivation and capacity to pursue peace.


Programs based on this theory seek to address domestic divisions that limit leaders’ ability to make decisions against continuing violence or to pursue peace. Intra-communal or “single community” programs that bring different factions within one side together for dialogue are an example.

Theory 2.5: Improving Skills and Processes

If parties have skills and good processes for resolving conflicts, then they will be more successful in negotiating peace and dealing effectively with underlying causes of conflict.

Key People The implicit assumption is that lack of capacity or inadequate process is a significant obstacle in negotiation, peacebuilding and consensus building. This theory suggests that if the parties have the proper skills and processes to handle the conflict differently, then agreements and cooperation are more likely.

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Engaged

Description

Theory of Change Family 3: Institutions

Theories in this family apply if you are working in a situation in which formal and informal institutions lack the capability to respond to the needs of the population and/or are considered to be unfair, abusive or corrupt.

Theory 3.1: Statebuilding Theory of Change

If formal and informal institutions can efficiently and effectively respond to the needs of society, then people will rely on these institutions rather than resorting to violence.

This theory rests on the idea that members of society look to institutions, both formal and informal, to have sufficient capacity to efficiently and effectively provide goods and services to meet the range of needs in society (e.g., police, jobs). When these needs are not met, the likelihood of violence increases. The theory contends that people will be less likely to engage in destructive conflict against the government if it acts and is seen to act efficiently and effectively.

Theory 3.2: Liberal Peace Theory of Change

If institutions are democratic, then people will more likely feel included and able to address grievances non- violently, thereby promoting peace.

Under the Liberal Peace Theory of Change, the legitimacy of a state’s institutions is determined by their democratic nature. Only democratic processes and institutions allow the people of a society to express their will and exert control over those making decisions in governing institutions. Under such a structure, people will be less likely to either revolt against the government or address their grievances violently, thereby creating a more peaceful nation.

Theory 3.3: Traditional Institutions Theory of Change

If institutions in a society are based on traditional structures (not externally- imposed structures), then people will feel more allegiance to those institutions, reducing the likelihood that they will use violence to change the institutions.

The premise of this theory is that institutions should be based on traditional norms, customs and models particular to that community or nation. Such institutions are familiar to and reflect the values of the people they govern. As such, people are more likely to feel ownership over them and to respect them as legitimate, and thus be less likely to resort to violent means to reject or replace such institutions.

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Theory 3.4: Ad-hoc or Transitional Institutions Theory of Change

If support is provided to temporary institutions that assist in the transition from a violent and/or insecure society to a peaceful society, then the likelihood of violence re-emerging in the future will be reduced.

Ad-hoc institutions provide a bridging function, which is both backwards and forwards looking. They are intended to help society deal with unresolved issues from the past, in order to move forward. The principle is that by facing the negative experiences of the past, those issues will not act as impediments to future progress.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

General resources on theories of change Anderson, M., and L. Olson (2003) Confronting War: Critical lessons for peace practitioners,

Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. Church, C., and M. Rogers (2006) Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in

Conflict Transformation Programming, Washington, DC: Search for Common Ground, Chapter 2. Available at http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/ilt/ilt_manualpage.html.

Funnell, S., and P. Rogers (2011) Purposeful Program Theory: Effective Use of Theories of Change and Logic Models, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Nan, Susan Allen and Mary Mulvihill (2010) “Theories of Change and Indicator Development in Conflict Management and Mitigation,” USAID, available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADS460.pdf.

Shapiro, I. (2005) “Theories of practice and change in ethnic conflict interventions.” In M. Fitzduff and C. Stout. (Eds.) The Psychology of Resolving Global Conflicts, New York: Praeger.

Theoryofchange.org, a collaborative project of the Aspen Institute and ActKnowledge, offers a wide array of resources, tools, tips, and examples of theories of change.

Vogel, I. (2012) Review of the Use of ‘Theory of Change’ in International Development: Review Report, London: DFID. Available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/pdf/outputs/mis_spc/DFID_ToC_Review_VogelV7.pdf.

Tools and application guidance CARE International UK (2012) Guidance for Designing, Monitoring and Evaluating Peacebuilding

Projects using Theories of Change, London: CARE International UK. Available at http://conflict.care2share.wikispaces.net/Theories+of+Change.

CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (2009) Participant Training Manual, Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, pp. 9–17 (RPP Matrix), pp. 18–27 (constructing theories of change).

Keystone Accountability (2009) Developing a theory of change: A guide to developing a theory of change as a framework for inclusive dialogue, learning and accountability for social impact

http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/ilt/ilt_manualpage.html

http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADS460.pdf

http://www.theoryofchange.org/

http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/pdf/outputs/mis_spc/DFID_ToC_Review_VogelV7.pdf

http://conflict.care2share.wikispaces.net/Theories%2Bof%2BChange

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and Interactive theory of change template, London: Keystone Accountability. Available at http://www.keystoneaccountability.org/resources/guides.

Lederach, J.P., R. Neufeldt and H. Culbertson (2007) Reflective Peacebuilding: A Planning, Monitoring and Learning Tool Kit, Mindanao: The Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame and Catholic Relief Services Southeast, East Asia Regional Office. Available at http://kroc.nd.edu/research/books/strategic-peacebuilding/391

Levine, C. (2007) Catholic Relief Services’ (CRS) Guidance for Developing Logical and Results Frameworks, Baltimore, MD: CRS.

http://www.keystoneaccountability.org/resources/guides

http://kroc.nd.edu/research/books/strategic-peacebuilding/391

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U.S. Agency for International Development 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20523 Tel: (202) 712-000

Fax: (202) 216-3524

www.usaid.gov

http://www.usaid.gov/

Conflict 102 / Module 6 / Exercise 1, part A Conflict Programming: Theories of Change

If . . . Then Card Exercise (Print Single Sided)

If I do not set my alarm clock 3

then I will be late for work. 12

If I skip lunch 4

then I will be hungry.

11

If I drop my teacup 5

then it will break 10

If I touch a hot stove 6

then I will burn my hand. 9

If I make my contracting officer angry

7

then all of my procurement actions

will take a long time. 8

If I study for my exam 8

then I will get a good grade. 7

If I flip the light switch 9

then the light will come on. 6

If I become ill from eating at a

restaurant 10

then I will not eat at that restaurant

again. 5

If I do not go to work 11

then I will lose my job. 3

If I mail a package

12

then it will arrive at its destination.

11

If I do not open my email for several

days 3

then I will miss important news.

10

If I am kind to my colleague

4

then my colleague will be nice to me.

9

If I do not receive my paycheck

5

then I will not be able to pay my bills.

8

If I am in a bad mood

6

then I am more likely to become angry.

7

Mod

ule

7

MODULE 7 HOMEWORK REVIEW

Conflict 102 / Module 7 Homework

Objectives: After completing the homework assignment, participants will be able to:

1. Understand the main differences between traditional development,

conflict-sensitive and direct conflict programming. 2. Identify some program implementation issues needing attention to

ensure conflict-sensitive programming in a conflict setting. 3. Be familiar with effectiveness standards for direct conflict

programming in a conflict setting.

1

2

Mod

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7

Differences between Programming Paradigms in Conflict Settings

1. Read the “Differences Between Programming Paradigms in Conflict

Settings” handout. 2. Read the three scenarios below about programming in a conflict setting. 3. Identify each scenario’s programming paradigm as one of the following:

(a) traditional development programming, (b) conflict-sensitive programming or (c) direct conflict programming. Document why you made each selection using the Programming Paradigms in Conflict Settings matrix.

4. Be prepared to share your answers on Day Two of the workshop, when there will be a discussion about the different programming approaches in conflict settings.

Programming Scenario #1 In a post-war African country, an international NGO is being funded by USAID and other bilateral donors to work with the national Ministry of Agriculture to restart an agricultural training program that was implemented in pre-civil war times in five provinces. This program is in line with the national government’s top priority of livelihood improvement. The international NGO conducted a context analysis that revealed agriculture as a connector of the two main ethnic groups that fought in the civil war — i.e., farming families from both ethnic groups used to participate together in agricultural cooperatives in each province. The context analysis results also showed that the program’s beneficiaries in the five provinces would be about 75 percent from one ethnic group (Group B), even though that group makes up only 45 percent of the population. The other main ethnic group (Group A) makes up 40 percent of the population in the five provinces, and the remaining 15 percent comprises several smaller ethnic groups. The program used those context findings to change the target provinces to ones that offer a better balance of beneficiaries from the different ethnic groups, and additionally, to ensure that ex-combatants from the different warring factions are reached by the program in those provinces. However, the program guarded against sending the negative ethical message of “those who take up guns get income generation opportunities” by requiring that at least 60 percent of the spots in the agricultural training program be taken by civilians (versus 40 percent ex- combatants) in all the targeted provinces. Program staff were recruited from the agricultural and livelihoods sector and given some basic conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity training. The program has a safety plan for the delivery of in- kind agricultural supplies to communities with trainees to ensure that these resources are not stolen by rebel soldiers who have not yet disarmed and demobilized in the program’s geographic areas.

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Programming Scenario #21

In the same post-war African country, an international NGO is implementing a USAID-supported program to support communities with returning internally displaced persons (IDPs) to develop and implement community rebuilding activities. The program provides training in conflict management in these communities that are composed of residents from the different ethnic groups that were fighting, and then block grants for projects to support rebuilding and conflict resolution on topics that have been the driving factors of tensions (i.e., land tenure disputes; unequal allocation of scarce resources; unequal access to local teaching jobs). These driving factors were identified in a conflict assessment carried out in collaboration with local partners. The community, through its multi-ethnic Community Development Committee (CDC) and broader community-wide meetings, establishes the priorities for allocation of the block grants, with the condition that the process must include all ethnic groups in the community, and that the priorities cannot be decided by the leadership alone or influenced by former rebel soldiers who can still intimidate civilians. In addition, the CDCs are identified in the new decentralization law as bodies that the local government must consult during the annual local government budget preparation process. The international NGO hired program staff from the different ethnic groups, with an emphasis on those with prior peacebuilding training and experience. The program has a senior conflict specialist who delivers refresher trainings and maintains an ongoing conflict analysis so the program can adjust to changes in the post-conflict situation, especially to new issues emerging as conflict drivers in the mixed-ethnic community areas. All the program signs and materials are in the languages of all the ethnic groups, and program’s name means “togetherness” in those languages.

Programming Scenario #3 In the same post-war African country, USAID has been supporting a health services delivery project for the past six years. The program has mainly been operating in a relatively homogenous area of the country. However, civil unrest has recently reoccurred with the neighboring ethnic group and displaced much of the local population, taking over access to water and other primary resources the neighboring ethnic group deemed not available to their area. USAID has decided to continue providing health care services in their targeted location/clinics, which in some cases now serve some of the neighboring ethnic population that initiated the uprising. The displaced residents are suffering from lack of health care and feel that USAID should shut down services to the perpetrators of this conflict. The project funding is not sufficient to build new clinics and/or move existing services to the IDP area. The original local management committees trained under this project are very frustrated and feel disempowered, given the overtaking of responsibility for some of the clinics and services. Resentment is building against the other ethnic group, USAID and the implementing partner. The revised project work plan proposes training for new members from the neighboring ethnic group to be added to the management committees so that both groups are represented.

1 This scenario has been adapted from Peter Woodrow and Diana Chigas, “A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding.” CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2010, p. 6.

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7 Conflict 102 / Homework Reading Differences between Programming Paradigms in Conflict Settings

1. Programming Paradigms in Conflict Settings2

Programming

Paradigms

Level of Understanding of the Conflict

Programming Approach

Capacity Implications

Guiding Principles for Programming

1. Traditional Development Programming

Typically no concerted attempt to understand the conflict.

Continue with sectoral programming without addressing the potential positive or negative impact on the conflict context. Program’s key goals are sectoral.

Funding and staffing remains the same.

None for programming in a conflict setting; thus, there is a real risk of exacerbating conflict and doing harm.

2. Conflict- Sensitive Programming

Adequate understanding of the conflict to ensure that the program, at a minimum, does not exacerbate the situation and, ideally, reduces dividers and supports existing connectors.

Continue with sectoral programming but ensure, at a minimum, that it does not exacerbate the conflict context. Program’s key goals are to minimize negative and maximize positive impacts of programming on the conflict, as well as on sectoral goals.

Funding and staffing levels will remain roughly the same, though new expertise may be required, depending on the issues. Staff need to be trained in basic conflict analysis, mainstreaming and sensitivity.

Do No Harm (Mary Anderson)

Conflict Sensitivity (International Alert)

3. Direct Conflict Programming (also sometimes called Peacebuilding Programming)

Deeper understanding of the key drivers of conflict and dynamics among factors and key actors to ensure program relevance.

Conduct a stand-alone peacebuilding program. Program’s core aim is to reduce the key drivers of violent conflict and contribute to societal-level peace (Peace Writ Large). e.g., by expanding the work into new issue areas or new geographic areas.

Increased resources needed to support training for staff and key partners and for implicit/explicit peacebuilding efforts.

New expertise will be required, including conflict assessment, skills, sensitivity, program design and evaluation. Possible need for conflict specialist.

Do No Harm (Mary Anderson)

Conflict Sensitivity (International Alert)

Peace Writ Large Criteria of Effectiveness (CDA Inc.)

2 Adapted in part from Dr. Nike Carstarphen, ACT 2004, and in part from Peter Woodrow and Diana Chigas, “A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding.” CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2010, p. 10. The text in italics comes from Woodrow and Chigas.

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2. CONFLICT SENSITIVE PROGRAMMING Guiding Principles: Seven Major Lessons from Do No Harm3

1. International development assistance is not neutral; it becomes a part of the

conflict context.

2. There are two realities in any conflict situation: grievances (dividers) and mitigating factors (connectors). Dividers are those factors that people are fighting about or that cause tension. Connectors bring people together and/or tend to reduce tension.

3. Assistance has an impact on both grievances and mitigating factors. It can increase

or reduce dividers or increase or reduce connectors.

4. Resource transfers are one mechanism through which assistance produces impacts: what aid agencies bring in and how they distribute it.

5. Implicit ethical messages are the other mechanism of impact: what is

communicated by how agencies work.

6. The details of assistance programs matter: what, why, who, by whom, when, where and how.

7. There are always options for changing assistance programs to eliminate negative

impacts (increased conflict) or to improve positive contributions to peace.

3. DIRECT CONFLICT PROGRAMMING Guiding Principles: Peace Writ Large Criteria of Effectiveness4

The Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (RPP) produced five criteria of effectiveness by which to assess, across a broad range of contexts and programming approaches, whether a program is (or is not) having meaningful impact on “peace writ large.” These criteria can be used in program planning to ensure that specific program goals are linked to the large and long-term goal of “peace writ large.” They can be used during program implementation to reflect on effectiveness and guide mid-course changes, and as a basis for evaluation after the program has been completed.

1. The effort contributes to stopping a key driving factor of the war or conflict.

The program addresses people, issues, and dynamics that are key contributors to ongoing conflict.

2. The effort contributes to a momentum for peace by causing participants and

communities to develop their own peace initiatives in relation to critical elements of context analysis: what needs to be stopped, reinforcement of areas where people continue to interact in non-war ways and regional and international dimensions of the conflict. This criterion underlines the importance of “ownership” and sustainability of action and efforts to bring about peace, as well as creating momentum for peace, involving more people.

3 Adapted from Mary Anderson’s “Reflecting on Peace Practice Project,” CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2004. 4 Ibid.

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3. The effort results in the creation or reform of political institutions to handle grievances in situations where such grievances do, genuinely, drive the conflict. Peace practice is effective if it develops or supports institutions or mechanisms to address the specific inequalities, injustices and other grievances that cause and fuel a conflict. This criterion underlines the importance of moving beyond impacts at the individual or personal (attitudinal, material or emotional) level to the socio-political level. This criterion must be applied in conjunction with a context analysis identifying what the conflict is NOT about and what needs to be stopped. To reform or build institutions that are unrelated to the actual drivers of a specific conflict would be ineffective.

4. The effort prompts people increasingly to resist violence and provocations to

violence. One way of addressing and including Key People who promote and continue tensions (e.g., warlords, spoilers) is to help More People develop the ability to resist the manipulation and provocations of these negative key people.

5. The effort results in an increase in people’s security and in their sense of

security. This criterion reflects positive changes both at the sociopolitical level (in people’s public lives) and at the individual/personal level as people gain a sense of security. These criteria can best be thought of as intermediate-level benchmarks of success applicable to the broad range of peace work being done.

These Criteria are Additive The experience gathered through RPP suggests that the five effectiveness criteria are additive. Peace efforts that meet more of them are more effective than those that accomplish only one of the changes.

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A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding

Peter Woodrow and Diana Chigas Reflecting on Peace Practice Project, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects

Introduction

Are peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity the same thing? Different but related? Completely separate? Increasingly, practitioners and policy makers give different—and often opposing— answers to these simple questions. Part of the difficulty arises from the “migration” of the terms, as both have shifted their meanings over time, each coming to embrace more and more conceptual territory. Also, the various actors involved have shifted their roles. Development and humanitarian agencies have expanded from their traditional roles and increasingly attempt to address conflicts more directly. At the same time, peace practitioners recognize the need to address structural causes of conflict—which often requires development modes of programming. In the process, many people have become increasingly uncertain about what these two concepts mean and whether the distinction is even important. Why should we care about this confusion? is it causing harm?

Experience shows that conflating the two concepts or treating them as entirely distinct and unrelated, results in poorly conceived programming and reduces effectiveness. This article examines the damage done by this conceptual confusion, and proposes some ways to distinguish peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity that, evidence suggests, may lead to more effective peacebuilding and conflict sensitive practice. First, let us look at specific problems within the notions of conflict sensitivity and of peacebuilding.

Evolving Misunderstandings of and Gaps in Conflict Sensitivity

Conflict sensitivity refers to the ability of an organization to: a) understand the context in which it is operating, b) understand the interaction between the intervention and that context, and c) act upon that understanding, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts on the conflict.1 Over the years, many staff members of donor agencies, UN entities and larger development NGOs have come to use tools and frameworks that were developed to make development or humanitarian assistance programs conflict sensitive as a basis for peacebuilding policies and planning. They have also come to operate under the (false) assumption that conflict sensitive programming is the same as peacebuilding. At the headquarters level, policies and programming concepts that address conflict sensitivity have come to include what many consider

1 See International Alert et al., 2004. Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding: a resource Pack. London: International Alert (available for download at www.conflictsensitivity.org).

http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/

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to be peacebuilding approaches. Conflict analysis frameworks have proliferated, as many agencies have developed their own frameworks for conflict analysis—from UNDP to the World Bank to bilateral donors, such as USAID, DFID, SIDA or GTZ, as well as large NGOs. DFID’s Guidance Notes on conducting conflict assessments describes the aim of understanding the impact of development actors on conflict and peace as identifying “conflict related risks that need to be mitigated and opportunities for programmes/policies to better contribute to peacebuilding.”2 Conflict-sensitive practice has come to mean not only adjusting existing development, humanitarian, human rights and other activities to avoid or minimize negative impacts and promote positive impacts on the conflict context, but also the design of initiatives to address conflict causes. It is a small conceptual leap then to assume that if one is engaging in good “conflict sensitive programming,” one will accomplish peacebuilding goals.

The expansion of the concept of conflict sensitivity has led to gaps in conflict-sensitive practice. First, the focus on developing conflict analysis frameworks and methods has led to a relative neglect of practical guidance for conflict-sensitive program implementation. While donor agencies (and others) have adopted policies that enshrine the principle of conflict sensitivity, they fail to follow through to provide practical guidance regarding how to implement such policies—both in terms of priorities and the broadest articulation of program approaches and with regard to field operations. Donor policies seldom provide any consequences for neglecting to perform the necessary assessments to ensure conflict sensitive programming or penalize activities that actually caused harm. CDA’s Do No Harm project has not yet encountered any donor that has taken action (withdrawn funding, issued a rebuke, warned of impending harm…) with respect to implementing agencies that have even flagrantly violated Do No Harm principles.

Thus, at the field level of program implementation, development, humanitarian and peace agencies regularly neglect the practicalities of performing the necessary analyses and program adjustments to ensure true conflict sensitivity. As the Do No Harm project has been finding, when agencies do perform an analysis, they often use the analysis only for initial program design, but seldom monitor the subsequent impacts to identify unintended consequences or adjust programming to address these consequences. For example, an international agency in Nepal did a brilliant initial Do No Harm analysis, nicely bound and placed prominently on the shelf in the office in Katmandu. Thereafter, there was no systematic analysis of the positive or negative program effects on conflict, although local staff in the field did make minor day-to-day adjustments as they could, but did not communicate their observations to the office in the capital.

In addition, little attention has been paid to how conflict sensitivity works at the policy level. Most of the learning about conflict sensitive practice has been at the operational level in the field, with respect to program design decisions about what assistance to provide, to whom, why, by whom, using what methods, etc. A challenge remains as to what conflict sensitivity might mean at the policy level. For example, how do we assess whether donor decisions to start or stop whole areas of programming have had positive or negative effects on conflict? Similarly, as some donors have shifted to a greater reliance on budgetary support, ways of analyzing the implications and actual impacts of such approaches on conflict and ensuring that such assistance is conflict-sensitive remain to be developed.

2 DFID, 2002. Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes. London: DFID, p. 22. Available at http://94.126.106.9/Documents/publications/conflictassessmentguidance.pdf.

http://94.126.106.9/Documents/publications/conflictassessmentguidance.pdf

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Evolving Misunderstandings of and Gaps in Peacebuilding

The notion of peacebuilding has undergone expansion similar to conflict sensitivity, with similar consequences. Originally, the peacebuilding term came into popular usage as a result of a report by Boutros Boutros Ghali, then Secretary General of the United Nations. He delineated several types of work for peace: preventive diplomacy designed to prevent the outbreak of war, peacemaking aimed at ceasing war making and bringing warring parties to the negotiation table to forge a peace settlement; peacekeeping dedicated to providing security through the presence of peacekeeping forces; and peacebuilding focused on consolidating peace in the aftermath of war and violence and preventing a further round of bloodshed. Peacebuilding, referred to “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”3

Over time, the peacebuilding concept has broadened. In 2001, the UN Security Council noted that peacebuilding efforts are “aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompass a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms.”4 Peacebuilding now often refers to the entire field of peace practice, without respect to a stage of conflict or a particular set of activities or goals.5 The recent OECD DAC Guidelines on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities include socio-economic development, good governance, justice and security sector reform, reconciliation, and truth and justice activities in the domain of peacebuilding.6

Not infrequently, practitioners now consider their work during an active war to be peacebuilding. For instance, an unofficial process of dialogue aimed at supporting an official peace negotiation process or a program of peace education intended to transform social norms regarding tolerance might each call themselves peacebuilding, whether carried out during periods of violence or in its aftermath. We also see peacebuilding activities touted as conflict prevention, in periods before violence escalates. Many organizations that work on conflict transformation, conflict resolution, reconciliation (and a string of other titles) consider themselves as part of the broader “field” of peacebuilding, and use the term in their names, such as the Alliance for Peacebuilding.

While the expansion of the meaning of “peacebuilding” reflects the realities of building and consolidating peace, it also has created confusion and gaps in practice. The lack of definitional

3 Boutros Boutros Ghali. 1992 “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping.” UN Doc. A/47/277—S/24111 (17 June 1992). 4 Presidential Statement, UN Security Council. United Nations Doc. S/PRST/2001/5, 20 February 2001. 5 In a possible exception, the UN still differentiates somewhat, though inconsistently. For instance, the UN Peacebuilding Commission restricts its work to the so-called “post-conflict” period (which is really post-violence, as the actual conflict usually continues). 6 OECD-DAC. 2007. Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities. Paris: OECD DAC, p. 18. Available at www.oecd.org . See also Smith, D. 2004. Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together (Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding). Oslo: PRIO, pp. 22, 27-28 (Smith groups peacebuilding activities under four headings: security, establishing the socioeconomic foundations for peace, establishing the political framework, and generating reconciliation).

http://www.oecd.org/

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specificity and intellectual rigor about peacebuilding has allowed an attitude of “anything goes.” Thus, anything that anyone chooses to call peacebuilding is embraced as part of the field. Many policies, programmes and even conceptual frameworks for peacebuilding, for example, do not make conceptual distinctions between state building, peacebuilding, governance and development. While clearly all of these phenomena are related, and activities in all domains— socio-economic development, governance, justice and security, and reconciliation and culture— are needed, they are not all the same. State weakness is not the same as conflict, nor its only cause, even when it may be a contributor to its escalation. Similarly, conflict can be seen as a result, a symptom or a cause of fragility.7

Many peacebuilding programs are poorly conceived, demonstrating unclear goals, fuzzy theories of change about how their activities will in fact contribute to peace, vague indicators, imprecise accountability mechanisms and faulty evaluation measures—all stemming, in part, from the lack of clarity about the boundaries and aims of peacebuilding. (There are, of course, many other reasons not covered here.)

Here again, the conflation of peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity undermines the effectiveness of peacebuilding practice, as agencies in the field think that they are accomplishing peacebuilding as long as they are being conflict sensitive. On the one hand, conflict sensitivity has provided agencies a way to assuage their discomfort with the fact that peacebuilding is about change—a fundamentally political process. It is easier and less threatening to talk about “conflict-sensitive programming” in circumstances where a host government will resist any reference to peace, especially where it is a party to the conflict. The use of conflict sensitivity in place of peacebuilding is, in some cases, a tactic for avoiding awkward political interactions with host governments and other parties in conflict zones. A consequence, however, is often that the dynamics that drive the conflict are not addressed.

The Consequences: Common Myths and Misconceptions

Having discussed some of the issues with both terms, we now turn to the negative consequences of the confusion of peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity for the effectiveness of both.

Conflict-sensitive humanitarian assistance will help bring peace. Some organizations try to adhere faithfully to principles of conflict sensitivity (or Do No Harm) as they conduct their relief efforts. Some of them have assumed that doing so will also contribute to peace. It should be clear that such efforts are not sufficient for peacebuilding. A few examples illustrate the point.

Consider the case of an international agency that provides assistance to returning populations affected by conflict, both housing reconstruction and livelihood support. The assistance is provided initially mainly to returnees of one ethnic group who had been displaced by ethnic cleansing by the other, and only later to returnees from the other group who were displaced by revenge-motivated violence that followed. The agency adopts a practice of providing “balancing grants” to return communities, in recognition of the potential harmful conflict effects of targeting

7 Fabra Mata, Javier & Ziaja, S. 2009. Users’ Guide on Sources Measuring Fragility and Conflict. Oslo and Bonn: UNDP and German Development Institute, p. 7.

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the neediest. The agency also seeks to support bridge-building in these communities by sponsoring sports inter-ethnic sports events, community development projects, and cultural activities (drama, music).

All of this might constitute good conflict-sensitive humanitarian practice (one would need to do a thorough analysis of the impacts on dividers and connectors in the communities to assess this accurately), but the initiatives do not constitute a robust peacebuilding strategy, as they do not address the driving factors of conflict. For instance, the program does not address the continuing feelings of injustice and grievances expressed by members of both communities as a key obstacle to peace. Indeed, in some cases, resentment by one group regarding the amount of aid directed to returnees from the other, who had oppressed them, increases and worsens tensions between the two. Moreover, while the bridge-building activities do help bring people together, few of the resulting relationships extend beyond the level of personal or business contact. The activities provide a valuable support to existing connectors (personal relationships and friendships that had existed before the war), but without further effort and attention to internal dynamics that affect inter-ethnic relations, the activities will not “add up” to improve relations at an inter-group level.

In another example, an international agency provided assistance to displaced people in an area plagued by chronic battles among rival militias, with weak government presence and ineffective security operations. Following conflict sensitive principles, the agency ensured that local populations, as well as the displaced people, received assistance. They also negotiated with the dominant warlords to prevent expropriation of aid goods by militias—as families receiving assistance were vulnerable to attacks. As in the previous example, this program may well have been conflict sensitive, but while the negotiations with warlords may have increased local security in the short term, there is no evidence that these measures would address the key drivers of conflict in the area. Depending on the causes of conflict, it might be possible to add program components that constitute peacebuilding goals. For instance, careful analysis might reveal that the warlords represent disaffected populations that feel they have been excluded from access to decision making and development programs over many years. A strategy could be developed to address those inequalities, which could add important peacebuilding dimensions.

A caution: Relief and reconciliation assistance can make victims more vulnerable. Following conflict-sensitive principles in program design not only does not ensure positive peace effects; it does not ensure that a program will do no harm. For example, a local NGO was helping displaced people to return to their communities, in the wake of post-election violence in Kenya, during which many homes had been burned. They organized a process of dialogue between the displaced groups and their neighbors. They helped people to rebuild their homes, providing new roofing sheets and building materials and recruiting neighbors from other ethnic groups to help in rebuilding (part of the healing/reconciliation process). However, it soon became obvious that all of the rebuilt homes had shiny new roofs, essentially making them visible targets if violence were to flare up again! The new roofs also brought attention to the fact that the displaced people were receiving direct assistance, while their neighbors, many of them also poor, were not. Ongoing analysis of dividers and connectors and the program impacts on them is needed.

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Peacebuilding equals conflict-sensitive development. Many practitioners believe that if they undertake development programs in a conflict sensitive manner, they will contribute to peace. This is possible but not inevitable. Whether conflict-sensitive development programming actually contributes to Peace Writ Large will depend on the nature of the conflict, the precise program design and the resulting actual impacts. Again, three examples illustrate the point.

Example 1: In the wake of war and violence, the national government makes job creation a top priority. In cooperation with the International Labor Organization (a UN agency) and the Ministry of Agriculture, an international NGO and several local partner agencies undertake an agricultural training program for ex-combatants. To ensure it is conflict-sensitive, the program plans to recruit ex-soldiers from all of the formerly warring factions and all of the competing ethnic groups and provide them with intensive training in farming skills, emphasizing high-value cash crops and cooperative group efforts in the production process.

Even if this program were sufficiently conflict sensitive (there might be issues regarding the availability of arable land for the trainees, and others which could exacerbate conflicts at the local level), it is not at all clear that such a program would actually contribute to peace. It might be possible to add peacebuilding objectives to the program—which would then turn it into a hybrid development and peacebuilding program. For instance, during the training in farming techniques, participants might also be given skills in communication and dialogue—and provided opportunities to address ongoing inter-ethnic tensions. Such an initiative might, over time, begin to reduce mutual distrust—at least among direct participants. Whether such positive effects on participants would extend to their communities or to larger social dynamics would remain a question. The program designers might have identified continuing command structures among ex-combatants as a threat to peace and assumed that the program would contribute to the breakdown of those command structures—that is, by engaging in productive agricultural activities the ex-combatants would be less closely tied to their former military leaders and fellow soldiers. Again, that is a possible outcome, but not guaranteed, and is not likely to occur automatically.

Example 2: In another program, an NGO implements a program to support communities to develop and implement sustainable income-generating and capacity-building activities at the community level. Undertaken in a post-war context, this project is framed as a community-level peacebuilding project. The program provides training in conflict management in the communities, and then provides a block grant for projects to support income-generation. The community, through its Community Development Council and broader community-wide meetings, establishes the priorities for allocation of the grants, with the condition that the process must include all groups in the community, that is, priorities cannot be decided by the leadership alone.

In this way, the NGO hopes to maximize the potential that the grants benefit the entire community, and to promote coexistence amongst the groups by bringing them together across conflict lines to make decisions jointly. It ensures that no group is left out, and that the program integrates system to ensure that the aid is not captured by any one faction. In terms of results, it provide some livelihoods assistance, and helps improve relationships among some community members. Some disputes, such as marital disputes and land disputes, are referred to those trained

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in conflict management. However, the community dialogues and the resulting projects are a simple aggregation of individual preferences in the community, and do not analyze or address the causes of conflict or barriers to coexistence. While the project succeeds in strengthening connectors in the community, as well as mitigating potentially divisive issues such as land, without further work to address the drivers of conflict, it is not effective peacebuilding.

Example 3: An agency rebuilds destroyed homes and provides small income-generation grants to returning refugees and IDPs. As part of the program, the agency sponsors inter-ethnic dialogue between returnees and host community members and provides “balancing grants” to the host communities for priority community infrastructure or income-generation projects. Inter-ethnic community reconstruction committees are formed to guide reconstruction efforts and determine priorities. In addition, the agency sponsors a number of sports and cultural events in the community to bring together people from both groups, especially youth, for positive interaction.

This program is quite conflict-sensitive. The agency recognized that its returns program would benefit one ethnic group in the community and not the other, and created mechanisms for ensuring that all would benefit from assistance. They also tried to foster positive inter-ethnic interaction and cooperation, both at a social level and on issues of common concern (such as infrastructure). It is not clear, however, whether and to what extent the program would contribute to peace. While it avoided exacerbation of tensions that could result from the distribution of aid to refugees and IDPs, and did foster some positive inter-ethnic social interaction, it did not address the driving factors of conflict—which community members described as injustice and impunity related to oppression and violence by each group against the other, security and opposing visions of the future.

Another caution about the conflation of conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding is warranted here: there are times when promotion of connectors and reinforcement of bridges across conflict lines can reinforce the conflict status quo. A powerful—and counterintuitive—example occurred in Kosovo, where donors and NGOs supported cross-ethnic economic activities, to promote economic interdependence as well as contacts and cooperation across ethnic lines. Peacebuilding through economic cooperation tended to mirror existing, implicit “rules of the game” for inter-ethnic interaction amongst Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, which permitted interaction for economic but not for social or political purposes. The programs therefore added little to the existing quality of interaction. And, the “rules of the inter-ethnic game” limited the depth and breadth of relationships that could be developed, ensuring that any inter-ethnic engagements that did occur would not challenge the polarization of Kosovo Serb— Kosovo-Albanian relations.

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When Conflict Sensitive Practice Promotes Peace: In the experience of Do No Harm practitioners in the field, it is sometimes possible to use tools for conflict sensitivity (like Do No Harm) not only to mitigate dividers and support connectors, but also to promote positive impacts on peace. That is, in some situations, people have used conflict sensitivity tools to do peace work. Because this experience is not the norm, it is important to be clear about why and under what conditions this can occur.

First, using conflict sensitivity tools and frameworks to design and implement peacebuilding seems to occur primarily at a local level, by local actors. In part, this is because local people know their contexts well and can identify precisely, at any given time, which dividers are most likely to cause violence, and which connectors are most important. They are then able to figure out how to design development or humanitarian initiatives in such a way that they reduce dividers and reduce violence or reinforce connectors.

Moreover, as RPP has found, the very fact that local actors are taking their own initiatives to resist violence or address conflict constitutes a contribution to Peace Writ Large, as it reflects local ownership and initiative for peace. In this way, the use of Do No Harm conflict sensitivity frameworks can have greater impacts on Peace Writ Large than their use by international agencies or outsiders.

Second, experience also shows that, when conflict resolution requires efforts at a higher political level, a more thorough analysis of driving factors and a more robust strategy that addresses these factors are required. This evidence reinforces our basic caution that conflict-sensitivity models and tools are insufficient for peacebuilding at most levels.

Development will promote conflict prevention. Perhaps the most persistent myth among international aid workers is that development efforts of nearly all types will contribute to peace (and the prevention of violent conflict), particularly if they are implemented in a conflict- sensitive manner. Early and incomplete evidence shows that there is only a weak association between “normal” development programming and conflict prevention, at best.

For instance, many assume that any advance in reducing poverty will contribute to peace—but this is not supported by the experience in the field. Here again, a thorough conflict analysis might reveal that development dollars aimed at poverty reduction have been distributed in a distorted manner, causing deeper and deeper resentment among excluded groups. If poverty reduction strategies actually started to achieve greater equity, they might contribute to peace. But note that simply reducing poverty would not achieve peace; equity, fairness and inclusion are key factors that must be addressed.

Similarly, special types of programming developed for post-conflict situations—such as demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR)—also often assume that restructuring of the armed forces or changes in police operations will support peace. Of course, both DDR and SSR programs can contribute to peace—as physical security and perceptions of security are important dimensions of peace. But many SSR and DDR programs do not even ask themselves whether they have contributed to Peace Writ Large; they assume that they have. Their measures of success are often associated with the number of

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soldiers demobilized or reintegrated, the effective functioning of command structures, the ability to respond to threats, or numbers of police trained in human rights. They do not ask—either at the program design stage or during evaluation—whether any of these accomplishments actually result in improved physical or psychological security. Again, issues of equity (who is hired, who is in command, who makes decisions) and treatment of the population may have a strong association with conflict issues, and undertaking SSR with a conflict-sensitive lens may improve the likelihood that the program can reduce vulnerability to violent conflict. Pushing beyond conflict sensitivity to a more thorough understanding of conflict dynamics will increase the potential contribution of SSR programming to true prevention of violent conflict.

Peacebuilding is conflict-sensitive by definition. Many peacebuilding practitioners assume that, because they are working for peace, they are, by definition, conflict sensitive. This is not so! Peacebuilders are just as capable of acting in ways that are insensitive to conflict as other field workers. For example, they can inadvertently hire people from one ethnic group—because all of the available English-speaking (or French-speaking…) candidates happen to be from the economic/socially favored group. SSR programs can improve the delivery of justice or the performance of the policy in general, but the aggregate statistics (numbers of convictions, recorded crimes, police, perceptions of effectiveness of the courts and police, etc.) may hide deep inter-group inequalities in policing and justice. Peacebuilding activities can also increase danger to participants in peace activities, and they can disempower local people and initiatives.8

Many peacebuilding programs assess the conflict-sensitivity of their programs only at the design stage or, more often, not at all. If conflict-sensitive programming is peacebuilding, and peacebuilding is by its nature designed to address the causes of conflict, then the program is ipso facto conflict sensitive and requires no further analysis—or so the theory goes. The bottom line: peacebuilding programs must pay attention to the intended and unintended consequences on conflict dynamics from their programs, just as other program types do.

Clarifying Peacebuilding and Conflict Sensitivity: Definitions and Dimensions of Difference

The chart below shows the differences between conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding along a series of dimensions: definition, main aim, applicability to whom and what kinds of programming, analysis requirements, and standards/measures.

The establishment of hard and fast boundaries between conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding will always be elusive—and unwise. The soft boundaries between the two reflect the complexities of working both in and on conflict, and the reality that peacebuilding in practice has come to incorporate development, humanitarian, justice and human rights modes of programming. However, conceptual clarity, even in the face of blurry boundaries, can strengthen both the effectiveness of peacebuilding practice and the ability of development, humanitarian and other programming to minimize negative and maximize positive impacts on conflict. We propose the definitions and distinctions in the chart above, and further clarified below, as a basis for more robust peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive practice.

8 These and other inadvertent negative impacts of peacebuilding programs were discussed in Mary B. Anderson and Lara Olson, Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners (Cambridge: CDA, 2003).

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COMPARISON OF CONFLICT SENSITIVITY AND PEACEBUILDING

Conflict Sensitivity Peacebuilding Definition:9 Conflict sensitivity refers to the Definition:10 Peacebuilding refers to measures ability of an organization to: Understand the context in which it is

operating, particularly intergroup relations; Understand the interactions between its

interventions and the context/group relations; and

Act upon the understanding of these interactions, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts.

designed to consolidate peaceful relations and strengthen viable political, socio-economic, and cultural institutions capable of handling conflict, and to strengthen other mechanisms that will either create or support the necessary conditions for sustained peace.

Main aim: Work IN the context of conflict to minimize negative and maximize positive impacts of programming (on conflict, but also on other factors).

Main aim: Work ON conflict, seeking to reduce key drivers of violent conflict and to contribute to Peace Writ Large (the broader societal-level peace).

Applied to Whom/What Programming: All programmes, of all types, in all sectors, at all stages of conflict (latent, hot, post-war) must be conflict sensitive, including peacebuilding efforts themselves.

Applied to Whom/What Programming: Peacebuilding programmes are those that articulate goals or objectives aimed at securing peace. Such goals/objectives can be integrated into other programming modes (development, relief) and sectors—or peacebuilding can be a standalone effort.

Required Analysis: Requires an adequate understanding of the conflict (e.g., dividers and connectors analysis) to avoid worsening dividers or weakening connectors; to reduce dividers and support existing connectors.

Required Analysis: Requires a deeper understanding of the key drivers of conflict and dynamics among factors and key actors, in order to ensure program relevance.

Standard/Measure of Effectiveness: At a minimum, the program/project does not make the conflict worse—and usually also makes a positive contribution.

Standard/Measure of Effectiveness: Programme/project reduces the power of key driving factors of conflict, contributing to Peace Writ Large.

9 Definition adapted slightly from International Alert, et al. 2003. Conflict sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding: a resource pack. 10 Definition from International Alert, 2003, as quoted in the resource pack (see op. cit. in above footnote).

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There are two significant implications of these distinctions. First, conflict sensitivity is a fundamental principle of good and responsible practice that is applicable to ALL programs. In this way, it is most useful in an adjectival form: “conflict sensitive,” rather than as a noun, which implies that it is a type of programming in its own right. As an adjective, it can (and should) be applied to humanitarian assistance, development efforts, peacebuilding, peacekeeping operations, human rights advocacy, security sector reform, demobilization of combatants, work with women and youth, and so forth.

ALL programs in ALL contexts, regardless of sector, program type, conflict phase or constituency, should be conflict-sensitive. That is, they must take account of the potential for violent conflict, and adopt measures to minimize the negative effects and maximize the positive effects of program efforts.

This continues to be the main insight from CDA’s Do No Harm Project,11 and the tools and frameworks from that project remain among the best and most widely-used approaches for ensuring that humanitarian and development programming is conflict sensitive.

Second, we can be clear about what peacebuilding is:

Peacebuilding is a type of programming with particular aims. It includes a wide range of programming modes with a common aim: they all aim explicitly to address the key drivers of conflict and, ultimately, change the conflict dynamics, with particular emphasis on reducing or preventing violence as a means of addressing political, social and economic problems and injustices.

Some argue that peacebuilding has become its own academic field and programming sector. Others assert that it is a cross-cutting set of considerations that should intersect with all sectors and work with all constituencies. This is one source of confusion with conflict sensitivity, as it is also a cross-cutting lens. Conflict-sensitive principles must be applied to various types of programming as noted above—they do not stand on their own. Peacebuilding programs can and do stand alone.

Classic peacebuilding programs include dialogue efforts (at various levels and engaging a range of different types of stakeholders), negotiations, mediation, transitional justice, peace education, and training in conflict resolution skills. These program modes can be applied in a wide range of sectors—to address key conflict drivers. For example, one might engage in public dialogue to enhance a police reform effort or organize a negotiation process to develop a new constitution. Classic development, human rights, justice reform and other programs can also be critical for peacebuilding—if they are relevant and address key driving factors of conflict. Economic development programs or education reform can be equally important peacebuilding efforts, where, for example, horizontal inequalities or unequal access to education (and jobs and political power) are underlying causes of conflict. As peacebuilding programs, however, they must be designed and implemented quite differently than they would be if their aims were purely developmental. (In practice, however, they often are not.) They must also be assessed for their capacity to address those factors, not only for their development success.

11 See CDA Collaborative Learning Projects and its Do No Harm Project at www.cdainc.com.

http://www.cdainc.com/

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Conclusion

The distinction between conflict sensitive practice and peacebuilding matters, because the lack of clarity and prevailing confusion are now weakening many programs. People are uncertain about why their peace efforts are failing. All too often, one reason is that they are working on false assumptions about conflict sensitivity or peacebuilding or both. Mixing them up leads to flawed program design.

It is time to clarify these terms and articulate the practical consequences in the field—in order to strengthen both conflict sensitive programming and peace practice.

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MODULE 8 CONFLICT PROGRAMMING: CASE STUDY

Conflict 102 / Module 8 Conflict Programming: Case Study

Objective: By the end of this session, participants will be able to use the conflict equation and the results of the conflict diagnosis (equation) to design an appropriate conflict program around a Theory of Change.

Activity: Programming Exercise

1. Read the email from the Mission Director. 2. Use what you have learned previously in Module 6 and create your

theory of change based on the conflict analysis. 3. Design a new conflict program based on your theory of change. Be

sure that your program is gender sensitive. 4. Prepare a brief report on your program design to debrief plenary.

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Conflict 102 / Module 8 / Task 1 Addressing Sri Lankan Conflict Dynamics: Program Design

*Disclaimer - This case study is being used as a historical example to generate discussion and developmental learning, and by no means reflects the current sentiment or disposition of the Government of Sri Lanka or the U.S. Government.* The following are excerpts from a second email message you have received from USAID/Sri Lanka’s Mission Director later the same day.

I cannot thank you enough for the nice piece of analysis you have produced in such a short time. It has really helped me gain deeper understanding of the issues in this conflict. We will talk about it more when I return and we are not under quite so much pressure. Now that we have a better understanding of the situation here, it is time to turn our attention to sketching out what should be the focus of USG assistance in Sri Lanka. Given the change in conflict dynamics, what should be the focus of our efforts and where can we have the most impact? Even though the Ambassador has not explicitly requested that we have programming options ready for tomorrow’s meeting, I want to be ready. Therefore, please begin work on an intervention that addresses the most significant source of the conflict identified in your diagnosis. For the moment, do not worry about costs, as I am certain that the Ambassador will go to back with Washington to obtain what we need. We do not have time to develop a full-fledged program description, but I would like to begin moving in that direction. For now, please focus on programmatic ideas for how we can help support a more peaceful, prosperous and stable future for the country. Given the sensitivities here, I’d appreciate any ideas you might have on who we can/should work with. In particular we have a strong focus in our current program on reconstruction, economic development and governance in Eastern Sri Lanka. We are considering expanding our programming to the North, given the significant needs of the IDPs resettling there after the conflict. Please keep this in mind in terms of:

• How can we leverage existing programs to work toward a more peaceful and sustainable future for all?

• What are the new areas/sectors for engagement? • What are the existing gaps in the current program? • How does the existing program fit into the new conflict dynamics that

developed in 2009 and 2010? Please also remember that the mission is committed to gender-sensitive development in conflict contexts.

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I have several meetings early tomorrow morning. I am taking an early afternoon flight and will be back in Colombo before the office closes. I will come find you as soon as I do to see how you are proceeding.

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USAID/SRI LANKA Program Overview

HISTORICAL USAID ENGAGEMENT, 2003 - 2012

USAID has been present in Sri Lanka since 1956, promoting improved development, health, education, agriculture and local governance projects, among other initiatives. Over half a century, USAID has invested more than $2 billion in Sri Lanka.1

After the tsunami, USAID and other donor programming in Sri Lanka surged to respond to the massive humanitarian needs across the country. By 2007, this funding had largely been expended, and the USAID Mission was operating on approximately $6 million per year.

Given the conflict spanning more than two decades, USAID focused much of its assistance on programs that addressed conflict issues. From 2003 to 2008, USAID programming focused in three areas:

1. More traditional democracy and governance, economic growth, humanitarian assistance and peace and security interventions.

2. The $134 million Tsunami Reconstruction Program, including reconstruction of the Arugam Bay Bridge, reconstruction or rehabilitation of nine vocational schools, upgrade of three fishing harbors damaged by the tsunami, construction of 85 play parks for children and small livelihoods and infrastructure grants.

3. The Development in Conflict strategy, focused on working “within” the conflict, rather than around it, centered on democracy and human rights, economic development, with focus on both conflict-strategic areas and conflict-affected populations. 2

In addition, during the peace process (2003–2007), the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) was active in the country, providing $29 million in two key program objectives:

1. Increase awareness and understanding on transition issues and change attitudes sustaining the conflict through information dissemination, advocacy, dialogue and debate; and

2. Mobilize and link peace constituencies through activities promoting inclusive, collaborative decision-making and resource allocation at the local level. 3

With the collapse of the peace process and changes in the USAID strategic plan, OTI closed its operations and turned over remaining activities to the Mission.

1 From 50 years of USAID work in Sri Lanka, see http://srilanka.usaid.gov/action_detail_20060713_USAID_50.php 2 From USAID Sri Lanka Webpage, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/countries/srilanka/srilanka.html 3 See http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/country/srilanka/fact0307.html

http://srilanka.usaid.gov/action_detail_20060713_USAID_50.php

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USAID/Sri Lanka STRATEGY & PROGRAMS (2008–2012)

In 2008, USAID Sri Lanka created a new two-pronged strategy to support the positive transformation in the Eastern Province and adjoining districts by developing the regional economy and local private-sector investment opportunities, as well as strengthening local government and increasing citizen participation in the governance process. Economically, the Western Province accounts for almost half the GDP in the country, yet a World Bank study shows that the greatest opportunity for growth will be in the conflict areas in the North and East, where development has lagged dramatically behind the rest of the country.

The 2008–2012 country strategy’s approach is based on the belief that economic growth can contribute to building social and economic security, which will help establish conditions conducive to a political solution. Although the strategy focuses heavily on regional needs, it also works at the national level, from which many of the most critical democracy, governance and conflict mitigation issues emanate. In 2008, Sri Lanka received 1207 funding for an interagency reconstruction and stabilization program in the East. Given the escalated war in recent months, USAID has also increased support for humanitarian relief programs.

The three current programs are outlined below.4

SUPPORTING REGIONAL GOVERNANCE (SuRG) The Supporting Regional Governance (SuRG) program, targeting the Eastern Province and adjoining districts, aims to create structures and develop capacity for increased citizen engagement in regional and local government, strengthen inter-community reconciliation and promote social equity. SuRG is building on the successful USAID Democracy and Governance Program, addressing the immediate development needs resulting from the ongoing conflict. The program will work toward supporting the positive transformation in the East that began in 2007. The program seeks to:

1. Improve social equity;

2. Strengthen regional and local government;

3. Promote citizen interaction with government institutions and engage in local reconciliation processes; and

4. Strengthen the capacity of journalists and media outlets in the Eastern Province. CONNECTING REGIONAL ECONOMIES (CORE)

Economic growth programming can enhance social and economic security and help establish conditions that will underpin a political solution to the conflict. The CORE program builds on the well-established USAID Economic Growth Program, which has successfully worked to create value chains in rural agricultural industries in Sri Lanka for several decades.

The program seeks to:

1. Support livelihood development for vulnerable populations; 4 From the USAID Mission site, http://srilanka.usaid.gov/new_strategy.php

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2. Promote competitiveness of agriculturally based regional markets;

3. Ensure that groups in conflict-affected areas participate in value chains;

4. Implement a workforce development strategy; and

5. Promote a business-enabling environment.

REINTEGRATION AND STABILIZATION IN THE EAST (RISE)

The goal of this effort is to assist the Government of Sri Lanka to create an effective, equitable partnership between regional government, the security forces and citizens in the country’s Eastern Province. The interventions funded by this project will complement political dialogue and are listed in priority order:

o Community and ex-combatant reintegration: Provide opportunities for communities to improve security and access training and job placement opportunities, particularly targeting ex-combatants and communities of ex-combatant return. Register and provide reintegration options for decommissioned ex-combatants, such as training and counseling services. Support communities to address immediate security and livelihoods concerns through small projects such as improving access to electricity or potable water, small infrastructure for markets and schools, micro-loans and grants (e.g., for fishing or farming equipment). Foster a bilingual environment to overcome language barriers to stable communities and improve second-language skills of provincial and municipal officials and police officers. Support improved media coverage and security in conflict-affected areas.

o Improved civilian policing: Strengthen the capacity of the security forces to

support the transition from military to civilian rule in the Eastern Province, and build the capacity of civilian police to act as a professional security force.

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Conflict 102 / Module 8 / Task 2 The Sri Lanka Case: Conflict Programming

Hi, how are you. I just got back from my trip to the North and East of the country and wanted to get to you as quickly as I could. The meetings I had this morning with representatives of Tamil minority, the Muslim community and the government showed me how far the groups are from each other and the long road to possible reconciliation. While not all Tamils supported the LTTE, they are very nervous about the future intentions and plans of the government especially after the military victory. While we were travelling back to Colombo, the Ambassador and I discussed the substantial needs of the returning IDPs to the rural parts of the North, known as the Vanni. While many villages have been demined, agricultural fields still are not cleared. The World Food Program has guaranteed dry rations for the resettled families through the end of 2010, but not after. The next planting season starts in October, and it will be imperative to get a good harvest from that planting to ensure food security in the North in 2011. The Ambassador and I spent the return trip discussing the implications of the food crisis. We are also concerned that due to the substantial displacement, destruction of records, and unclear government policies, there may be substantial non-violent, and possibly violent, conflict over land claims. What I heard from the population and my discussions with the Ambassador have convinced me that it is critical for USAID to invest heavily in food security, and possibly land, in the formerly rebel-held areas in the North. I would like the programming options that you are developing for tomorrow’s meeting to focus on food security and resolution of land conflicts.

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Conflict 102 / Module 8 Sri Lanka Update On January 8, 2015, the Sri Lankan people elected Maithripala Sirisena as president. Few expected this turn of events; since the introduction of presidential politics in 1978, power between Sri Lankan parties and their coalitions have changed hands only twice. This dramatic political shift completely changed the operational realities in Sri Lanka and it allows opportunities for historic advancements in human rights, economic equality, reconciliation and stability. President Sirisena laid the groundwork for a comprehensive reform agenda, starting with the announcement of his “100-Day Plan.” The government has made great strides in its first five months. The president continues to champion limiting the power of the executive presidency, strengthening the role of Parliament, re-establishing independent institutions and improving governance. The proposed 19th Amendment to the Constitution that passed in April was a resounding victory for the fledgling government. The amendment includes term reductions of president and members of Parliament from six years to five; presidential two-term limit; the power of the president to dissolve Parliament only after being in office for four and a half years; the revival of the Constitutional Council; and the establishment of independent commissions. Negotiations between the administration and Rajapaksa’s opposing freedom party on a draft 20th Amendment to the Constitution to implement electoral reforms are underway. Freedom party parliamentarians have been appointed to President Sirisena’s Cabinet of Ministers, creating a nascent national unity government. The extent of Rajapaksa’s political role will influence the composition of Sri Lanka’s next Parliament. The freedom party is demanding general elections be held after the new electoral system is introduced because they see a political advantage for the party, with a mixed system that includes a “first past the post” system for the majority of seats. There is significant turbulence within the freedom party as President Sirisena and two former presidents all vie for political influence. While Rajapaksa is being evasive about his political future, his supporters within the party remain active. Prior to the general election, the Sirisena administration will face pressure to address issues of human rights, the role of the military and reconciliation. Otherwise, it risks providing Rajapaksa an opening to further polarize the country for political gain. Postponed elections and the Human Rights Council reports will become more relevant in this context, particularly if elections are significantly delayed. Nonetheless, good governance and combating corruption are core elements of President Sirisena’s agenda. Investigations into allegations of grand corruption are in progress and the former president’s brother and two senior aides have been charged with misappropriating funds. The Bribery Commission is now seeking answers from former President Rajapaksa. Further investigations are likely as the general election approaches. Finally, during his May 2015 visit to Sri Lanka, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry celebrated a re-energized bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Sri Lankan governments. He summarized four key areas of cooperation: (1) reconciliation, (2) justice and accountability, (3) advancing human rights and (4) strengthening of democratic institutions. This project supports all four areas.

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MODULE 9 MONITORING AND

EVALUATION


Monitoring and Evaluation


1. Describe the theory of change approach to M&E. 2. Develop theory of change-driven indicators for a program. 3. Identify some M&E challenges and responses in conflict

environments.

Activity: Case Study Indicator Development

1. Focus on your program design’s core theory of change and brainstorm indicators your group could use to track whether the theory’s expected changes are happening during program implementation.

2. First, brainstorm indicators for the “if” part of the theory of change; then, brainstorm indicators for the “then” part of the theory.

3. Remember the frequent need to use proxy indicators in conflict settings and thus try to formulate at least a couple proxy indicators during your group brainstorming work.

4. Finish your indicator development work by picking your case study group’s top two indicators: one for the “if” part of the theory, and one for the “then” part.

5. Post those top two indicators on your theory of change statement. 6. You will be asked to share your work with the full group.

Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Settings

Definitions of Key M&E Terms

Monitoring

Indicator

Proxy Indicator

Evaluation

M&E Plan or PMP (Performance Management Plan)

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Core Principles for Conflict Sensitive M&E

Across all sectors…

Measure the conflict context

Measure the program/activity

Assess impact of the conflict context on the program

Assess impact of the program on the conflict context.

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Theory of Change

Inputs Activities Outputs Outcomes Impact

A statement of the causal process through which change comes about.

M&E is organized around the program’s core theory or theories of change

If . . ., then . . .

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Theory of Change M&E

M&E Plan more focused on:

Key changes that a program is trying to cause The change process; and Whether our theory of change is working

Monitoring indicators tell you if theorized changes are happening/have happened

Track changes in the theory’s “if” and “then” parts “Proxy” indicators often needed in conflict settings

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Theory of Change M&E

Evaluate the program’s theory(ies) of change as well as performance results

Why and How did this change happen or not?

How did the intervention process used attribute to mitigating conflict dynamics or not?

What new/different contextual changes have occurred? What impact does this have?

Distill lessons learned, including refined theories of change and meaningful change indicators, and disseminate them

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Full Group Practice

First, brainstorm indicators to track the “if” part of the theory:

If members of the different ethnic groups interact more frequently around common goals,…..

Some sample indicators:

No. of “bridge-building” trainings held No. of individuals reporting friendships with

people from the other group

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Full Group Practice

Next, brainstorm indicators to track the “then” part of the theory of change:

…..then their distrust of the other ethnic group will decrease and peaceful inter-group relations will develop.

Some sample indicators: Training participants report increased positive attitudes

toward the other group (before/after questionnaire) Amount of trade between merchants from the different

groups (proxy for decreased distrust or increased trust) (Perceived) Frequency of violence between the groups

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Case Study: Indicator Development Task

1. Brainstorm indicators to track the “if” and “then” parts of your program’s theory of change to measure program effectiveness.

2. Post your group’s top two indicators on the theory of change statement (one indicator for the “if” part, and one for the “then” part).

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Implications in M&E for Conflict-affected Settings

What data collection method will be used?

What is the source of the data?

Who will collect the data?

How frequently will data be collected?

How much will it cost?

Who will be involved in analyzing the indicator data and making any needed program change decisions?

What are the indicator’s baseline measure and target values over time?

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Conflict 102 / Module 9 M&E Cheat Sheet

DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS1

Monitoring: An ongoing, routine effort that requires data gathering, analysis, and reporting on results at periodic intervals during a program’s implementation. Monitoring revolves around indicators (see below) that track the program’s progress toward achieving targeted results or changes. For conflict-sensitive and direct-conflict programs, monitoring also takes place on indicators that track changes in the conflict context. See the short “How is monitoring different from evaluation?” excerpt from Designing for Results in the binder for more information on monitoring.

Indicators: Units of measure that tell us about a program’s progress toward achieving targeted results. Indicators are most often quantitative (numerical) measures but can also be qualitative (descriptive) in nature. Indicators tell us specifically what to measure, whereas a results statement tells us what we hope to accomplish and a theory of change tell us how and why the change is expected to happen. Indicators are also an indispensable management tool for making performance-based decisions about program strategies and activities. Programs designed from the theory of change perspective emphasize indicators that track the program’s core theory(ies) of change. See below for more information about USAID’s classification of indicator types (input, output, outcome, and impact) and quality standards for good indicators.

Evaluation: Evaluations help identify how and why results were achieved or not achieved and what action to take to improve performance in the future. Evaluations happen at a particular moment in time when they are needed and are often categorized by when they take place: formative evaluation (during program implementation); summative evaluation (end of the program); and impact evaluation (some years after the program finishes). Monitoring information will often trigger or flag the need for an evaluation, especially when there are unexpected gaps between actual and planned results that need explanation.

Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (or Performance Management Plan--PMP): A tool for planning and managing the collection of performance data and often the analysis, use, and reporting of the data. Most M&E Plans focus on monitoring indicators, and specify the following information for each indicator: definition of the indicator; the unit of measure (e.g., number, percentage, description); relevance of the indicator to the result or change being measured; the data collection method; who is responsible for collecting the data; frequency of data collection; and the indicator’s baseline and target values. This Plan ensures that comparable data will be collected on a regular and timely basis. It is also advised that the Plan cover how the monitoring data will be analyzed; and how the data will be reported, reviewed, and used to inform decisions. The M&E Plan may also specify in advance that formative (usually mid-term) and final evaluations of the program will take place.

MORE INFORMATION ABOUT INDICATORS2

1 Adapted from the series of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation TIPS reports, USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation, 1996-2000. See the M&E Bibliography of Resources for webpage links to the most relevant of these TIPS reports.

Indictor types: Input Indicators Measure resources/assets provided towards achieving an objective.

o $ spent for infrastructure projects, # of trainings provided Output Indicators Measure the achievement of tasks and activities. Output indicators only confirm the implementation of activities. They d o n ot measure the impact of activities.

o # of infrastructure projects completed, # of judges trained, # of signers to a peace agreement

Outcome Indicators Measure the effect of activities on achieving broader objectives – intermediate step, attributable.

o increase in employment, shorter pre-trial detention periods, increased participation in political processes by former combatants.

Impact Indicators Measure the extent to which overarching goals are achieved

o Functioning economy that provides tax revenue and facilitates licit economic activity • % of country’s economy that can be taxed by federal government • Relative personal income rates across key identity groups

o Government that ensures the rule of law and protects civilians

• Polling on “how safe citizens feel” across identity groups • Human Rights assessments

o Political processes that are seen as legitimate and credible

• Participation in political processes by major groups/factions • Civil/Political rights assessments

Characteristics of Good Indicators:

Direct: Closely track the impact it is intended to measure

Objective: Clearly define what is being measured and be comparable over time

Useful: Gathered data that is useful for the relevant level of decision-making

Practical: Available at a reasonable cost and in a timely fashion

Attributable: Measure changes that are clearly and reasonably attributable, at least in part, to USAID efforts

Timely: Should be available when data is needed to make decisions

Adequate: Monitor enough indicators to validate changes but not so many that resources are unnecessarily wasted

2 Adapted from ADS 203.3.4.2.

“ ”

Monitor ing

INTRODUCTION

Where are we going?” asks the passenger as the vehicle races across the desert. “I don’t know,” replies the driver, “but we’re getting great gas mileage.

- Excerpt from the film “Sahara.”

As illustrated in the above quote, much of the challenge in monitoring involves connecting relevant information to strategic decisions. This chapter discusses the relationship between monitoring and evaluation. It also covers the three basic types of monitoring in peacebuilding: the conflict context, program implementation, and progress toward results. Certain key or fundamental assumptions may require monitoring as well. In addition, the chapter briefly discusses reporting and explains how monitoring is integrated in the different design frameworks. An example of a monitoring plan is provided at the end.

How is monitoring different from evaluation? Monitoring and evaluation are different sides of the same coin, which is but one of the coins in the currency of learning. Other coins in the currency of learning include action research, reflection, reading, course- work, literature research, and participatory rapid appraisals to mention only a few.

Monitoring is an ongoing process that generates information to inform decisions about the program while it is being implemented. Monitoring differs from evaluation primarily in terms of when and how often it is done and the decisions it informs. Generally, monitoring starts earlier and continues more frequently than evaluation. The decisions that monitoring informs are practical and detailed, and often meet an immediate pressing need or question.

Evaluation is more a multi-part event than a continuous process, and it often focuses on a bigger picture or on more complex issues such as why something happened. For example, in a program focused on the peace process, evaluation may look at overall advances in the peace process over time. Monitoring, in contrast, may focus on specific changes in communication channels, shifts in language on specific themes under negotiation, or changes in the number of alternatives under consideration by the parties.

Monitoring is an ongoing process that generates information to inform decisions about the program while it is being implemented. Evaluation is more a multi-part event than a continuous process, and it often focuses on a bigger picture or on more complex issues such as why something happened.

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DESIGNING FOR RESULTS 82

Monitor ing

6

Both monitoring and evaluation use data to inform decision-making and contribute to improved strategies. Both are also intended to generate lessons learned, although evaluation tends to contribute to more overarching lessons while monitoring contributes to more pragmatic or technical issues. Each of these disciplines demonstrates accountability. The following table illustrates some of the differences.

Distinguishing Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring Evaluation What is it?

Ongoing collection and analysis of data on progress toward results, changes in the context, strategies, and implementation

Reviewing what has happened and why, and determining relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, etc.

Why do it?

Inform day-to-day decisionmaking

Accountability and reporting

Strengthen future programming

Provide evidence of success

Deepen our understanding of how and why things work

Who does it?

Program Staff and/or Partners and/or Participants

External consultant, staff, participants or combination of these groups

When to plan At design stage Core decisions taken at design stage and refined prior to implementation

When to implement

Throughout the program – periodically, frequently or continuously

Mid-term (formative)

Completion (summative)

After completion (impact)

Both monitoring and evaluation use data to inform decision-making and contribute to improved strategies.

Why develop a monitoring practice? Monitoring involves the use of reliable data in timely and informed decision-making. Data and information are the foundations of a monitoring practice. Too often people confuse data collection with monitoring. Pro- gram managers need to exercise the discipline to routinely collect, analyze, and reflect on information about their program at both the activity and outcome levels. Continuous, disciplined analysis of key program dynamics can result in profound improvements in relevancy, effectiveness, sustainability, and impact. In development programs, where the needs are more static, monitoring often addresses the question, “Are we doing what we said we would do?”

83 DESIGNING FOR RESULTS

M&E CHALLENGES IN CONFLICT SETTINGS (Note: Challenges 1-3 affect all program types in conflict settings. **Challenges 4 and 5 are more specific to direct conflict programs.)

M&E Challenge Best Practice Responses

1. Insecure operating environment (e.g., multiple armed groups, unpredictable flare ups of fighting, frequent population displacements, etc.) makes it dangerous to conduct M&E. M&E data collectors may be unable to physically visit a project site for security reasons, and security enhancements will draw unwanted attention to M&E teams and any local interviewees. Violence in geographic areas where certain groups live may result in under sampling of those groups in M&E studies.

1a. Use technology to gather evidence of results (e.g., phone interviews, SMS messages, photography, video, remote sensing device)

1b. Use proxy indicators to measure results, especially indicators for which data collection already happens: e.g., number of tin-roof huts in an IDP returnee village as proxy measure for returnee family units with livelihood improvement.

1c. Use some participatory monitoring in which beneficiaries develop indicators and collect data.

2. Programs identified as USG-affiliated may carry significant “baggage” in conflict settings that make local actors suspicious of project M&E. U.S. policies in the setting or actions elsewhere in the world can create perceptions of bias and even suspicion among one or more of the belligerent parties and reduce access for M&E data collection. Also, if an American M&E specialist is used (especially with repeat visits local beneficiaries may fear reprisals for “talking to the CIA”. Suspicions may arise about the purpose of the data collection and how the collected data will be used.

2a. Involve local partners who have established trust and credibility with the belligerent parties and local populations in M&E planning, data collection, and data analysis.

2b. Hire and train individuals from the conflict setting’s different tribal/ethnic/religious groups as Project staff M&E data collectors to facilitate access and trust in the project’s geographic areas with the same demographics.

2c. Add a battery of M&E questions to a locally accepted, regularly occurring data collection (e.g., focus groups, survey, community meetings) to collect M&E data.

3. Programs in conflict zones are often launched rapidly to respond to small windows of opportunity, leaving little time for baseline data collection needed to measure program impact. Trust and access for performing baseline data collection takes time to develop in conflict zones as does data collection itself. Baseline data from secondary sources may not be seen as reputable by the disputing parties and local project partners.

3a. Implement a “rolling baseline” by building baseline data collection into the start of individual activities rather than trying to do one, large baseline data collection at the start of the project.

3b. Use backward mapping to reconstruct the baseline after the program launch has finished.

3c. When baseline data collection is not feasible, ask participants to self assess the degree of change from before the intervention to present time (e.g., ask “Compared to before, to what extent do you think this project has increased your desire to interact with the other group?”).

4. ** There is donor management demand for quick wins and early “peace dividend” results in conflict programs that often support processes which need considerable time to yield concrete outcomes. For example, programs supporting a peace process that yields a signed peace agreement; or a national truth and reconciliation process that produces a final report and reparations to victims; or a DDDR effort that results in reintegrating ex-combatants into their home villages.

4a. Break longer-term processes into multiple milestones that represent significant progress and collect data on “milestone indicators.”

4b. Establish quick results targets in the M&E Plan (e.g., At least one tangible “peace dividend” delivered in each targeted community by Day 90 of the project).

4c. Attach geographic coordinates to gathered indicator data so maps can be created showing weekly, monthly, or even “real time” progress toward results.

5. **Many conflict programs target outcomes of a more qualitative than quantitative nature such as changes in attitudes, perceptions, and feelings; tracking qualitative change in a reliable way is challenging for M&E. In particular, people act on their perceptions in conflict zones and therefore it is critically important to measure how a program has influenced what people perceive is reality.

5a. Employ triangulation, which means using three sources of data, methods, or approaches to assess the same phenomenon.

5b. Use data collection methods that capture attitudes and perceptions such as focus groups, participant diaries, beneficiary drawings, surveys.

5c. Convert the qualitative change into a rating scale (e.g., 1-5 with “5” as “excellent”) that is understood by everyone in the same way so the gathered qualitative data is quantified and made comparable.

Selected Bibliography of General and Conflict Mitigation Evaluation Resources:

Anderson, Mary B. (2002) “Can We Know What Good We Do?” In The Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation. (http:www.berghof-center.org)

Anderson, Mary B. (1999). Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Betts, Richard K. (1996). “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention.” In Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., Managing Global Chaos.Washington DC: US Institute of Peace, pp. 333-342.

Bush, Kenneth. (1998). “A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones.” Working Paper #1, IDRC, The Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Program Initiative, Ottawa.

Bush, Kenneth. (1995) “Fitting the Pieces Together: Canadian Contributions to the Challenge of Rebuilding Wartorn Societies.” IDRC, Ottawa, unpublished paper (May).

Chavez, Maria Patricia Gonzalez. (2002) “Conflict Resolution and Evaluation.” Report of an INCORE Meeting, Londonderry, Northern Ireland, (June).

Church, Cheyanne, and Julie Shouldice. (2003). The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions Part II: Emerging Theory and Practice. Londonberry, Northern Ireland: INCORE. (http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk)

CIDA. (2002) “Results Oriented Logical Framework for Peacebuilding Projects.” Collaborative for Development Action. (2002). “Effectiveness Criteria.” CDA:21 Reflecting on Peace Practice: Issue Papers, www.cdainc.com.

Duffield, Mark. (1997). Evaluating Conflict Resolution: Context. Models, and Methodology. Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute.

European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation. Towards BetterPeace Building Practice: On Lessons Learned, Evaluation Practices, Aid Conflict 2002. FEWER/International Alert/Saferworld. (2001). “Development in Conflict: A Seven Step

Tool for Planners.” David Nyheim, Manuela Leonhardt, and Cynthia Gaigals.. FEWER/International Alert. (1999). “Promoting Development in Areas of Actual or

Potential Conflict: Approaches in Conflict Impact Assessment and Early Warning.” Manuela Leonhardt and David Nyheim.

Gaigals, Cynthia, with Manuela Leonhardt. (2001). “Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development: A Review of Practice.” Saferworld, International Alert, and IDRC.

ICISS. (2001) The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background. Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa: IDRC.

International Alert. (1998). “Conflict Transformation Work: Code of Conduct.” London, International Alert.

International Alert. (2000). “Development/Humanitarian NGOs and Conflict: A Bibliography and Listing of Web Sources.” Andrew Sheriff and Eeva Vaskio, compilers.

Johannsen, Agneta. (nd) “Measuring Results of Assistance Programmes to War-Torn Societies.” Geneva: UN Research Institute for Social Development.

Leonhardt, Manuela. (2001). “The Challenge of Linking Aid and Peacebuilding.” In Peacebuilding: A Field Guide edited by Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 238-45.

Leonhardt, Manuela. (2002). “Towards a Unified Methodology: Reframing PCIA.” Berghof Center.

Lund, Michael, and Guenola Rasamoelina, eds.(2000). The Impact of Conflict Prevention Policy: Cases, Measures, Assessments. SWP-CPN. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden Germany.

Schnabel, Albrecht. (2001). “One Size Fits All? Focused Comparison and Policy-

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Relevant Research on Violently-Divided Societies.” In Researching Violently Divided Societies: Ethical and Methodological Issues. Edited by Marie Smyth and Gillian Robinson. New York: United Nations University Press, pp. 193-206.

UNDP. Evaluation Office. (2000). “Development Effectiveness: Review of Evaluative Evidence.” New York: UNDP.

USAID. (2001) “Evaluation of Recent USAID Evaluation Experience.” Cynthia Clapp- Wincek and Richard Blue. USAID, Center for Development Information and

USAID. (2000) “TIPS: Performance Monitoring and Evaluation.” Series of reports (1996-2000). Available online at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnaca927.pdf; http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/usaid_eval/pdf_docs/pnaby214.pdf; http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABY215.pdf

Wood, Bernard. (2001) “Development Dimensions of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding.” UNDP. (June ).

WSP. 1999a. Rebuilding After War: Lessons from the War-Torn Societies Project. Geneva: WSP.

Action Evaluation Bibliography Ross, Marc Howard, Action Evaluation in the Theory and Practice of Conflict

Resolution. George Mason University: Network of Peace and Conflict Studies. , 2001-05-01. Available at: http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/Ross81PCS.htm

Rothman, Jay Action Evaluation: A Response to Mark Hoffman's Comments. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Available at: http://www.berghof- handbook.net/rothman/final.pdf

Johnson, Ian (2001). Helping People to Help Themselves: Process Facilitations, Evaluation and Empowerment in an Indigenous Context, Thesis for MA. In Conflict Resolution, Antioch University McGregor program on Conflict Resolution.

Hoffman, Mark Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Methodology: Evolving Art Form or Practical Dead End?. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2001-10-01. Available at: http://www.berghof-center.org/handbook/hoffman/final.pdf

Ashton, Carolyne. “Strategic Considerations in Facilitative Evaluation Approaches.” http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/ashton.html

Darling, Ian. “Action Evaluation and Project Participants: Integrating Personal Development into Project Evaluation.” Action Evaluation Research Institute (1999). http://www.aepro.org/inprint/papers/darling.html

Bing, Debbie and Rachael Cobb. “Critertia for Success for the Action Evaluation Consultant: Lessons Learned the Hard Way.” http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/bingcobb4.html

Damme, Sue. “The ‘Outcomes’ Challenge: An Action Research Approach to Evaluation in Community Program Development.” http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/damme.html

Dick, Bob. “Action Research and Evaluation.” http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/BDick.html

Friedman, Victor. “Engaging ‘Fuzzy’ Conflict: The Role of Action Evaluation.” http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/friedman.html

Fisher, Jennifer Atieno. “Ethics and Power in Action-Evaluation.” http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/fisher.html

Johnson, Deb. “Participatory Evaluation? Yeah, That’s Fine, But We Want a Conventional Report!” http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/johnson.html

Loramy, Conradi. “Comparative Analysis of Action-Evaluation Across Multiple Cases.” http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/conradi.html

Ross, Marc. “Action Evaluation in the Theory and Practice of Conflict Resolution.” Peace and Conflict Studies (2000). http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/ross.html

Rothman, Jay. “Action Evaluation: Integrating Evaluation Into The Intervention Process.” http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/rothman.html

http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnaca927.pdf

http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/usaid_eval/pdf_docs/pnaby214.pdf

http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABY215.pdf

http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/Ross81PCS.htm

http://www.berghof-center.org/handbook/hoffman/final.pdf

http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/ashton.html

http://www.aepro.org/inprint/papers/darling.html

http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/bingcobb4.html

http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/damme.html

http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/BDick.html

http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/friedman.html

http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/fisher.html

http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/johnson.html

http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/conradi.html

http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/ross.html

http://www.aepro.org/inprint/conference/rothman.html

Mod

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MODULE 10 REVIEW AND WRAP UP

Conflict 102 / Workshop Review Closure Activity

Objectives: By the end of this session, participants will be able to identify key messages learned in the C102 workshop.

Activity: Knowledge Utilization List

1. Take 5 minutes to think about the knowledge and skills you learned over the two days, and what concepts you will bring back to your office and use in your work.

a. What concepts are particularly important to the work you do? b. How will you use your learned knowledge? c. What, if anything, do you still find challenging or need more

help with? 2. In tabletop groups take five minutes to discuss and share ideas. As a

group, highlight 2 – 3 main points. Flipchart your findings and prepare to debrief plenary.

1

OFFICE OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND MITIGATION

The Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/ CMM) was founded in 2002 to expand and improve USAID’s ability to address the sources and consequences of violent conflict.

Field Support CMM staff provide high-quality technical assistance to enable USAID field missions, regional bureaus, and other operating units to identify and respond effectively to the conflict dynamics in countries where the agency operates.

Technical Leadership CMM develops and disseminates rigorous, field-relevant research, analysis and guidance to better identify, assess, and engage conflict dynamics based on a comprehensive knowledge management system.

Training CMM trains field officers in conflict analysis and programming drawn from all employment categories and supports professional development through training, mentoring, and networking opportunities.

Policy Leadership CMM represents USAID in USG inter-agency forums that address conflict issues, bringing policy and technical expertise to bear. Furthermore, CMM sustains relationships and promotes partnerships with constituencies focusing on conflict issues within the policy-making, academic, advocacy and donor communities promoting the effective use of development resources to address fragility and violent conflict.

Programming CMM’s Reconciliation Fund provides at-risk country missions with targeted grants in reconciliation and peace building. Awardees have been funded in all regions of the globe.

Mission Services: CMM provides the following services and products to missions to better understand and respond to regional or country conflict dynamics:

• Early Warning and At-Risk Country Back- stopping: CMM staff track fragility and conflict trends in at-risk countries, providing missions and regional bureaus with nuanced conflict analyses.

• Assessments: Utilizing the Conflict Assessment

Framework 2.0 (CAF 2.0), CMM staff formulate analysis on the drivers, mitigators and actors in a country context. The CAF provides recommendations for strategic planning processes and conflict- sensitive programmatic responses.

• Program Design: CMM publications are reference

tools that missions or bureaus can use to incorporate conflict into program design, monitoring and evaluation. CMM staff may assist in designing peace building or conflict-sensitive programming for missions.

• Training: CMM offers overseas and Washington-

based basic and advanced trainings in conflict analysis and programming, and Gender and Conflict.

• Strategy Support: The office may tailor work-

shops to facilitate mission strategic planning around crisis issues in country or in Washington. CMM provides conflict-sensitive guidance through the Coun- try Development and Cooperation Strategy process.

• IQC: CMM offers its Programming Effectively

Against Conflict and Extremism (PEACE) IQC for crisis-related research and programming in prevention, peace building, peace processes and recovery.

To learn more about the services and products that DCHA/CMM provides, please contact: Technical Leadership: Joe Hewitt ([email protected]) Field Support: Lisa Chandonnet-Bedoya ([email protected]) and Cynthia Brady ([email protected]) Training: Tamara Shaya Hoffmann ([email protected]) Policy: Rachel Locke ([email protected]) PEACE IQC: Elizabeth Drabant ([email protected])

DCHA/CMM 1 Conflict 102

Key Conflict Terms This glossary covers a number of core conflict terms. Please note that that within the field of peace-building and conflict management, the definition or use of terms across institutions may differ given the evolving state of the field.

Several resources for definitions of key conflict terms include:

• http://www.certi.org/publications/related_papers/terms/cover_terms.htm (list of terms specifically for USAID)

• http://www.crinfo.org/resources/glossary.jsp • http://www.berghof-foundation.de/en/glossary/

Conflict The definition of conflict in a standard dictionary is straightforward: “An active disagreement between people with opposing opinions or principles.” Implicit in this simple definition are two important ideas that are often overlooked. First, conflict is rational. That is, when differences of opinions or principles are based on differing perceptions, understandings, interests, or values and not on some difference — or deficiency — in the underlying cognitive processes that produced those opinions or principles. Second, conflict need not necessarily result in violence. Indeed, most conflicts are not violent. Disputes between children and their parents about bedtimes, haggling between buyers and sellers over prices, or political debates are all examples of conflicts that are rational and need not be violent.

The field of conflict management uses a similar definition of conflict: “When two or more interdependent parties are pursuing mutually incompatible goals.” Conflicts can arise over objective issues such as access to limited resources like land, natural resources, money, or subjective issues, such as differing values, perceptions, etc. Most conflicts involve both subjective and objective factors.

If conflict is a result of differing perspectives and viewpoints, it is not a big intellectual leap to recognize that conflict is inevitable in all societies, and indeed may be creative if processes for problem-solving and accommodation exist. Hence, the problem is not with conflict, per se. The problem arises when conflict turns violent. Analysts of conflict, therefore, focus tremendous attention on understanding the various forces at play within a society that affect the choice of using violence to further opinions or principles.

Violence Violence is often described as either direct, cultural or structural (Johan Galtung). Direct violence is the most visible aspect of the conflict as exhibited through the direct behavior of parties in conflict. For example, violent action by the police or military against a group would be categorized as direct violence. Cultural violence is the underlying belief systems and values that legitimize the direct violence. For example, the violence may be

http://www.certi.org/publications/related_papers/terms/cover_terms.htm

http://www.crinfo.org/resources/glossary.jsp

http://www.berghof-foundation.de/en/glossary/


Inte

nsity

justified because the group being attacked is seen as backward. Finally, structural violence is how the institutions in society (such as political and economic structures) establish systems of inequality that are also reinforced by the direct and cultural forms of violence.

Conflict Curve Conflicts are commonly described as passing through a series of phases, collectively referred to as a conflict curve. These phases are frequently depicted as seen in the diagram shown below, although transitions between stages are typically not smooth or linear and conflicts may repeat stages several times.

Peak

Conflict Escalation Conflict De-escalation

Latent Conflict

Post-conflict Peacebuilding

Time

Figure 1: Conflict Curve The curve begins with latent conflict (see next term), a phase where conflict exists but lacks organized opposition, public debate, recognition, or violent behavior. Conflict escalation includes the tangible and intangible (concrete or symbolic) actions, which make the conflict manifest. These can take the form of civil society organizing around a cause (e.g., NAACP forming in 1909), protests, media campaigns, legislative action, and violence (riots, targeting of opposing parties’ offices for arson, murder of members of identity groups, assassinations, insurgency, etc.). A conflict can peak at any point, marked by a range of situations from a stalemate to a protracted civil war. A peak can also happen with activities associated with escalation, such as rioting and legislative action. Since every conflict is unique, so are the ways in which they will peak.

A conflict de-escalates when hostile activity either slows or is suppressed. Examples include when a government army quells an insurgency, an identity group convinces the government to protect them from discrimination through policy changes, and rioting forces politicians to address specific community concerns. De-escalation can be followed by peace-building.

While the model can be useful to analyze conflicts, in reality, there is less of a conflict curve than there is a conflict spiral. Few conflicts follow the clear track described above. In fact, according to the World Bank, a country that has just emerged from civil war runs


a 44 percent risk of a return to violent conflict within five years. In these cases, the conflict curve can also be thought of as a cycle.

Latent Conflict The first phase of conflict is often identified as latent conflict or “unstable peace.” This state exists whenever individuals, groups, organizations, or nations have differences that affect one or the other, but those differences are not great enough to cause one side to act to alter the situation.

Yet, the seeds of conflict may exist for long periods of time without actors being aware of them. Often one side, most likely the more powerful party, is largely unaware of the existence of tensions. While the less-powerful party may be aware of the situation, and may even consider it unjust, the conflict does not emerge until they act to change the situation.

A conflict moves out of latency and into the open when a party takes action. In many cases, this action is healthy and nonviolent. As described above in the conflict curve, an open conflict can range from an intense national discourse to legal action. Various factors can contribute to a conflicts to become violent, for example, when institutional mechanism fail to provide the space for such changes, when a party’s expectations are not met for a long period, or level of threat against one party has increased.

States with significant latent conflict can be in danger of erupting into violent conflict. USAID uses the concept of state fragility to measure the extent to which a government carries out its main functions in ways that are seen as effective and legitimate. A party excluded from government services (e.g., an identity group prevented from attending public school) is being failed by their state, and such grievances are often a rich source for conflict. States that are classified as fragile or failing states are more likely to experience significant conflict.

Sources of Conflict Sources of conflict are the grievances and situations that provide a foundation for conflict. They must not be confused with causes of conflict. For example, unions and management frequently clash, but only rarely do these conflicts become violent. Generally, such conflicts are resolved via established mechanisms like bargaining, dialogue, or strikes.

Likewise, other aspects of a society have been blamed for conflict: poverty, a youth bulge (high number of males 18-30), minority groups whose way of life differs from the majority, etc. The existence of these situations alone is not a cause of conflict or violence; if that were the case, every poor nation would always be at war. On the contrary, conflict is complicated and triggered by a combination of many factors.


A source of conflict is part of the conflict equation, which explains that no one factor can lead to a violent conflict. Three things are necessary: motives, means, and opportunities. For example, a minority group is increasingly angry at policies perceived as discriminatory. This is a motive. But the anger alone is not enough to lead to violence. The group needs a means, such as a charismatic leader. The final factor, opportunity, must then arise. Examples include an election, passage of legislation, holiday gathering, or an assassination. When violent conflict is viewed through the lens of the conflict equation, clearly there is no such thing as one single cause of a conflict, but instead a combination of certain elements.

Civil War Civil war is commonly defined by two criteria. First, the warring parties must include a government and a group from the respective country fighting for control of the political center, control over a separatist state, or to force a major change in policy. Second, the conflict must have at least 1,000 battle related deaths per year. (Uppsala University Conflict Data Project, 2001: http://www.pcr.uu.se/data.html)

Civil war is often used interchangeably with terms such as civil strife and insurgency. Broadly speaking, insurgency is a strategy to overthrow the established order. With the goal of toppling a constituted government, insurgency is an organized movement with the goal of defeating a much more powerful foe. Because they are typically the weaker power, insurgents utilize guerrilla tactics, subversion, and asymmetric violence. Governments will often refer to rebel groups as insurgents or terrorists in order to avoid admitting that its country is engaged in civil war as they do not want to legitimize the actions of the other group.

Conflict Prevention The aim of conflict prevention is to avoid the violent escalation of a dispute. It seeks to suppress violent behavior, not necessarily the actual sources of the conflict. Thus, suppressed violent conflicts will only reemerge if the root sources are not addressed.

Conflict prevention, which targets escalation on the left side of the conflict curve, can include the following:

Monitoring and/or intervening to stabilize a potentially violent conflict before its

outbreak Establishing mechanisms that detect early warning signs and record specific

indicators Coordinating to do no harm when delivering humanitarian aid and development

assistance Institutionalizing conflict sensitivity at the local, regional, and international levels

http://www.pcr.uu.se/data.html)


Promoting education for pluralism and peace The concept and practice of conflict prevention evolved from being focused almost exclusively on preventive diplomacy, to a new more comprehensive approach that can be defined as structural prevention. This new approach includes long-term initiatives targeting the sources of conflict. There are several challenges in pursuing conflict prevention. First, more resources are allocated for intervening during violent conflict and post-conflict then in the prevention phase. Second, the field is still struggling with how to effectively evaluate prevention initiatives to determine if the intervention is responsible for preventing violence. According to one study from the University of Bradford, for every $1 spent on conflict prevention will save $4 in future costs.

Mitigating, managing, and responding to violent conflict are priority areas for USAID assistance. CMM defines conflict mitigation as activities that seek to reduce the threat of violent conflict by promoting peaceful resolution of differences, reducing violence if it has already broken out, or establishing a framework for peace and reconciliation in an ongoing conflict. Conflict management refers to activities explicitly geared toward addressing the sources and consequences of likely conflict.

Early Warning Effective strategies for preventing violent conflict rest on three principles: early reaction to the transition from latent conflict to conflict escalation; a comprehensive, balanced approach to alleviate the pressures, or risk factors, that trigger violent conflict; and an extended effort to resolve the underlying root sources of violence.

Early warning attempts to head off conflict before it peaks, and entails two principle parts.

First, data collection and relative weight to determine risk in a given situation. Second, persuading political leaders to act upon a warning, which requires a high

standard of warning quality, since taking any action will have high material, diplomatic, and administrative costs.

A complicating factor affecting an early warning system is that of the various countries identified as at risk for instability, only a few may in fact experience violent conflict. Development agencies are still not able to forecast responses to these many possible situations. USAID, among other organizations, prepares a yearly analysis (The Alert Lists: Worldwide Rankings of Fragility and Risk for Instability) of those countries fitting the risk profile. While this list cannot foresee which countries may erupt into violent conflict, it can describe the conditions that lead to instability and bring policymakers’ and practitioners’ attention to possible hot spots.


Peace Processes Like the word “peace,” the term “peace process” can be defined in many different ways. Former diplomat Harold Saunders defines peace processes as “a political process in which conflicts are resolved by peaceful means.” They are a “mixture of politics, diplomacy, changing relationships, negotiation, mediation, and dialogue in both official and unofficial arenas.” Peace processes can be initiated and managed during any phase of the conflict.

Many analysts recognize that negotiation happens in many spheres with many types of actors (official and unofficial). These are categorized according to tracks:

The Official Arena: This is the arena of official Track I diplomats who establish

personal relationships with their counterparts on the other side, negotiate interim and final agreements, and work to improve relationships between governments.

The Quasi-Official Arena: o Track I.5: conflict resolution activities facilitated by “unofficials” and directly

involving official negotiators for the conflict parties. o Track II (citizens): They are not disputants, but rather people who try to work

with the disputants to resolve the conflict or transform it to make it less destructive. Sometimes these intermediaries are official or “formal” intermediaries: professional mediators, arbitrators, judges, or other official actors.

The remaining tracks involve many arenas, as described in the figure below. These are called multi-track diplomacy:

Figure 2: Multi-track Diplomacy (Developed by Ambassador John McDonald and Dr. Louise Diamond at the Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy)

Post-Conflict Reconstruction A region that experiences protracted conflict will also often suffer from economic underdevelopment, damaged assets, and a reduced capacity to function effectively. Armed conflict retards a country’s development process, and also erodes its developmental foundation.


In addition to the huge loss of lives, war leads to material losses, such as destruction of crops and roads, and extensive damage to economic and social infrastructures. Transportation and communication systems, banking, health care, education, and agriculture are often damaged or destroyed. According to Paul Collier, the average cost of a civil war in a developing country is $64 billion.

Together, institutional reform, government policy, foreign aid, resource-based development, and environmental and health care development programs can advance recovery. For genuine resolution of a conflict, these economic and government institutions must be built gradually, and in a process regarded as legitimate by all parties to the conflict.

Rebuilding physical infrastructure and economic institutions is important. However, many have noted that these activities are not sufficient because they neglect the dimension of human relationships. Often this means developing an environment that fosters reconciliation, forgiveness, transformation of relationships, and ultimately peaceful co-existence. Thus, donors should make every effort to ensure that peacebuilding activities enhance comprehensive national reconciliation.

Peace-Building Although the term peace-building was used by UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros- Ghali in 1992 in reference to post-conflict activities, today many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) understand it as an umbrella concept that encompasses not only long-term transformative efforts, but also peacemaking and peacekeeping. In this view, peace-building includes early warning and response efforts, violence prevention, advocacy work, civilian and military peacekeeping, military intervention, humanitarian assistance, ceasefire agreements, and the establishment of peace zones.

Peace-building is a process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing root sources and effects of conflict through reconciliation, institution building, and political as well as economic transformation. This consists of a set of physical, social, and structural initiatives that are often an integral part of post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation.

Peace-building measures also aim to prevent conflict from re-emerging. Through the creation of mechanisms that enhance cooperation and dialogue, these measures can help parties manage their conflict of interests through peaceful means. This might include building institutions (legal, security, economic, political, etc.) that provide procedures and mechanisms for effectively handling and resolving conflict. For example, societies can build fair courts, capacities for labor negotiation, systems of civil society reconciliation, and a stable electoral process. Such designing of new dispute resolution systems is an important part of creating a lasting peace.


Conflict transformation, an element of peace-building, is a term similar to conflict resolution, but it implies a longer-term process. While conflict resolution wishes to quickly bring an uncomfortable situation to a close, conflict transformation sees the conflict as a vehicle for change. In fact, most conflicts erupt because of a real injustice; the conflict provides a rare window of opportunity for change. But that change cannot happen immediately. Lasting change comes slowly, so conflict transformation seeks to address the root sources of the conflict in order to secure an environment that engenders peace.

Do No Harm Do no harm (DNH) is a concept that arose among humanitarians when they realized that humanitarian aid, in some circumstances, was exacerbating conflicts. The central principle is that any time resources (financial, personnel, etc.) are introduced into a conflict environment they will impact the conflict dynamics either positively or negatively (see Mary Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace and – or War” 1999).

International aid is often used and misused by people in conflicts to pursue political and military advantage. Corrupt actors may divert assistance to support government cronies and the military; other governments may divert funds that would have provided social services to the military, since aid organizations can be depended upon to step in and help; militant groups may demand kickbacks from refugees receiving aid. One famous case is the Goma refugee camp where after the Rwandan genocide Hutu militants used humanitarian aid to feed their armies and regroup.

The basis of DNH is that humanitarian and development actors must perform a conflict and context analysis before entering into any environment. They need to understand the situation so that they do not feed into existing economies of war or inadvertently ignite conflict. DNH helps assistance workers understand the patterns by which assistance can have harmful effects, and the opportunities by which it can also have additional positive effects on overcoming conflict.

While it can be intimidating to realize the harm that development and humanitarian assistance has induced, DNH should serve as a means for moving forward, not steeping in the possibilities of all that can go wrong. DNH does not mean “do nothing.” Assistance has the potential to create tremendous good as well as harm. DNH seeks to show assistance workers how to assess the local context in order to make fewer mistakes and to mitigate the effects of the mistakes they will inevitably make.

Conflict Mainstreaming Conflict mainstreaming encourages the integration of conflict management and peacebuilding processes into traditional sectoral programming. The initial focus on conflict mainstreaming has been on training development and humanitarian aid workers to


analyze the conflict and its impact on their operations. Several tools such as peace and conflict impact assessments (PCIA) have been developed to conduct such analyses.

More recently, however, the focus has shifted to infusing development programming with conflict management and peace-building processes. While conducting standalone along peace-building programming can be a valuable undertaking, integrating such processes into economic, health, education or governance programming can have a significant multiplier effect. For example, to have a successful microfinance project in a conflicted society, trust must be built between program beneficiaries from opposing sides of the conflict so that they can work together. Beneficiaries would thus need to receive training on conflict management and mitigation in addition to traditional microfinance training.

Given USAID’s strong focus on sectoral-based programming, the idea of conflict mainstreaming is particularly important. In seeking to develop increased opportunities for peace-building, staff can explore how to better integrate peace-building into their programming. Of course, in planning and executing activities, care always needs to be devoted to ensuring that projects DNH or do not exacerbate the conflict context.