MNR TYPE-D EMERGENCY

PLAN REVIEW

2012 March

What is the Type D Procedure?

The Type D Procedure is the part of the reactor emergency plan that is implemented when there is felt to be a risk of significant releases from the facility. a situation that could lead to an effective dose in excess of 1

mSv (100 mrem) or the introduction of a gamma radiation field greater than

0.25 mSv/hr (25 mrem/hr) at 25 meters from the Reactor Building.

Builds on the plan in place for > 50 years

Other procedures (Type B and C) under the emergency plan address possible incidents confined to the facility. There has never been a need to implement the Type B, C or D

procedures.

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Type DProcedure

CNSCRequirements

Ontario NuclearEmergency PlanPart VIII

McMaster Crisis ManagementPlan

National andInternationalStandards

Hamilton CrisisPlan

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What the Procedure Addresses Activate the reactor and University emergency

orgs. Notify off-campus emergency organizations Control the area surrounding the reactor

(The Controlled Area) Manage the emergency and control the reactor Assess releases and determine protective

actions Implement Protective Actions in the Controlled Area Communicate Status and actions Terminate the response when the emergency is

over 4

TYPE-D PLAN: Key Features The Emergency Planning Zone for MNR is the

central campus area – NO protective actions expected to be required outside this area. This is based on an ANSI standard for research reactor EP.

The approach is predictive – MNR will activate the plan at the earliest reasonable point if significant fuel damage appears likely. It may be that no releases actually occur.

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Emergency Planning Zone Basis: ANSI/ANS-15.16 Emergency Planning for

Research Reactors – Internationally recognized standard.

“Area for which offsite emergency planning is performed to assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect the public in the event of an accident.”

EPZ set to include areas where there is a possibility of exceeding 10 mSv (1 rem) effective dose and 50 mSv (5 rem) thyroid dose

Defaults “based on highly conservative calculations” For reactors up to 10 MW EPZ is100 meter radius

MNR licensed to 5 MW, normally operates at 2 – 3 MW MNR has a full containment shell – this is not credited

in determining the EPZ (conservative).6

Emergency Planning Zone – Per ANSI Standard

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EPZ and Initial Controlled Area

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EPZ and Initial Controlled Area

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Normal Operations Fuel Damage Release

Recovery

Initiating Event

Symptoms

Containm

ent Failure

Type D Emergency will be declared in this range

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Predictive Approach – Conservative Plan Activation

Initiating events that may lead to Type D Emergency have been identified.

Large Pool Leak Flow Blockage Other unspecified (radiation or contamination outside

facility) Indicators that Type D may occur identified

Aids staff in making early determination that Plan should be activated

The initiating events are so rare that we will start evaluating need for plan activation when they occur – expected to provide early warning, possibly a “false alarm”

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Protective Actions Early Evacuation of Controlled Area

before any release no contamination monitoring of evacuees preferred when possible

Sheltering within Controlled Area stay inside buildings – reduces exposure and contamination

potential Evacuation within Controlled Area

post-release must monitor all evacuees prior to leaving controlled area

Thyroid Blocking for Emergency Workers administer KI tablets will be available if required for emergency workers inside the

controlled area13

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What’s in a mSv? About 1/10th of a

Whole Body CT scan 12 Chest X-Rays About 40 Toronto –

Vancouver airline flights

Moving to Colorado from Boston (annual dose).

Regulatory Dose Limit for a member of the public

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

41 mSv

Average AnnualBackground Dose

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Protective Action Levels

Protective Measure

Effective Dose Thyroid Dose

Lower Level Upper Level Lower Level Upper Level

Sheltering 1 mSv(0.1 rem)

10 mSv(1 rem)

10 mSv(1 rem)

100 mSv(10 rem)

Evacuation 10 mSv(1 rem)

100 mSv(10 rem)

100 mSv(10 rem)

1000 mSv(100 rem)

Thyroid Blocking1

100 mSv(10 rem)

1 Sv(100 rem)

1 KI will be available if required for those working in the Controlled Area

From Province of Ontario Nuclear Emergency Plan Part 1

Emergency Dose Limits For Workers

OBJECTIVE EMERGENCY DOSE LIMIT COMMENT

Urgent actions to prevent capital equipment loss or

damage

50 mSv (5 rem)

Applies to any McMaster University employee and volunteers from outside

agencies.

Urgent actions which will prevent or mitigate a serious radiological

incident

250 mSv (25 rem)

Applies to any Nuclear Energy Worker and

volunteers who are non-NEWs.

Rescue and Lifesaving 1 000 mSv (100 rem)

Any volunteer who has been briefed on potential

consequences of exposure.

Radiation Protection Regulations: During the control of an emergency and the consequent immediate and urgent remedial work, the effective dose and the equivalent dose may exceed the applicable dose limits prescribed by sections 13 and 14, but the effective dose shall not exceed 500 mSv and the equivalent dose received by the skin shall not exceed 5 000 mSv.Does not apply in respect of pregnant NEWsMay be exceeded by a person acting voluntarily to save or protect human life 16

Key Players in Early Emergency Response

MNR Emergency Organization Management of the Controlled Area and the Reactor

McMaster Crisis Management Group Management of Campus Interface to public and organizations / regulators

City of Hamilton Emergency Control Group Coordinate provision of assistance to University Any off-campus protective actions (none expected)

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Hamilton

Campus

ControlledArea

MNR

MNR Emergency Organization

McMaster UniversityCrisis Management Group

City of HamiltonEmergency Control Group

Reactor Operations Team

Hamilton Health Sciences

Media

Emergency Management Ontario

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

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Access Control Point Team

Controlled Area Survey TeamMNR

(Controlled Area)

Plume Assessment Team

Perimeter Teams

Operations

Emergency Control Centre

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McMaster University Crisis Management

Group

Emergency Control Centre

Reactor Management Team

Access Control Point Team

Emergency Director

ScribeProtective

Action Manager

Advisor(s)CMG Advisor

Senior Reactor

Supervisor

Reactor Supervisors

Reactor Operators

Radiation Surveyor

Controlled Area Survey

Team(s)

Perimeter Survey

Team(s)

Plume Assessment

Team(s)

Access Control Point

Manager

Personnel Monitoring

Unit

Emergency Worker Unit

Counting Room Team

Ventillation Control Team

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MNR Emergency Organization

Emergency Control Centre Overall control/coordination Run by MNR Emergency Director Interface to University CMG – Information and

resources Decisions regarding actions inside Controlled Area Advise regarding actions outside of Controlled Area Provide information and status to CMG Nominal Location – NRB G101. Alternates –UCC,

JHE, IAHS

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MNR Emergency Organization – cont.

Reactor Operations Team Manage emergency in facility Provide status/information to ECC Reactor Operations Personnel + Radiation Surveyor

Perimeter Team Post Controlled Area perimeter with radiation hazard tape Patrol perimeter – prevent unauthorized entry/exit Provide continual surveys at perimeter One Security Officer and one Radiological Assessor per

team22

MNR Emergency Organization – cont.

Controlled Area Survey Team(s) Conduct surveys inside Controlled Area Implement protective actions inside Controlled Area (per ECC) Provide data to ECC Two Radiological Assessors per team

Access Control Point Team Control entry to and exit from Controlled Area Contamination monitoring and decon as required on exit Exposure control and registration of emergency workers entering Collection point for resources and personnel Nominal location – McMaster Accelerator Lab Four Radiological Assessors

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MNR Emergency Organization – cont. Plume Assessment Team

Conduct surveys outside Controlled Area – verify absence of significant effects

Collect and analyze environmental samples Provide data to ECC 1 Radiological Assessor and one Driver per Team

Counting Room Team Sample analysis and Counting, Filter collection Specially trained Radiological Assessor

Ventilation Control Team Shut down ventilation to buildings in the Controlled Area if directed by

Emergency Director Physical Plant UCC Staff

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ResourcesDesignated Emergency Directors 3

Reactor Managers/Supervisors/Operators (+trainees) 9 Health Physics Personnel 6 Iodine Production Staff 5 Neutron Activation Analysis Personnel 3 Accelerator Staff 4 Additional NFCC Members 5

Total 35

- To be trained as Radiological Assessors – able to perform field measurements

Two Security Officers with VehiclesTwo UCC Personnel for Ventilation ControlAlso require

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Staffing Requirements

Minimum Nominal

Emergency Control Centre 3 6Reactor Operations Team 3 6

Perimeter Survey Team (s) 2 4

Controlled Area Survey Team (s) 2 4

Access Control Point Team 4 6

Plume Assessment Team 2 2

Counting Room Team 2 3

Ventilation Control Team 1 2

Total 19 33

McMaster University CMG Overall responsibility for emergency

management for the rest of University Provide logistical support to MNR

organization Decisions for protective actions on-campus

- outside the Controlled Area (none expected)

Interface with City of Hamilton ECG – information, advice on protective actions, support

Interface with Regulatory Agencies Interface with Hamilton Health Sciences Provide information to public/media

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City of Hamilton Emergency Control Group

Per Province of Ontario Nuclear Emergency Plan – Part VIII

Any protective actions required off-campus

Support to McMaster if requested (e.g. fire fighting, police to assist in access control)

Information to public and media Interface with Province

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Province (Emergency Measures

Ontario) Monitor progress of emergency Provide assistance as requested by City Take over management of off-site response if

requested by City (Per Part VIII of Province of Ontario Nuclear Emergency Plan)

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Type D Walkthrough There is NO credible accident scenario that leads to significant

off-site radiological doses.

Events identified in the safety analysis have frequencies well below 10-6 per year. That is, there is less than a one in a million chance of occurrence in a given year.

However the incredible events have been reviewed and the hypothetical consequences determined.

One EXAMPLE scenario from the Safety Analysis has been chosen as a basis for this walk-through. It is a highly unlikely event but is useful as a demonstration of how the plan will function.

Note – even in this event, the dose to the most exposed individual outside the Controlled Area is about 0.5 mSv (50 mrem)

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Scenario During routine operation on the evening shift, an

unspecified accident at a beam port facility causes a large rupture in the beam tube liner.

Reactor cooling water starts to leak through a 40 cm2 hole in the side of the pool

The reactor is staffed by two operators (minimum staffing)

It is 18:00 on a weekday during term – the campus is crowded with evening classes

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Characteristics of Selected Scenario Everything that can go wrong –goes

wrong – at the same time Pool drains over period of time

depending on size of leak, eventually exposing core

Crane failure prevents isolating core in second pool

Exposed fuel partially melts releasing fission products

Containment impaired over first two hours of release by unspecified compressed air in-leakage

Largest releases and doses of examined scenarios

Delay provides time to activate emergency plan and evacuate Controlled Area prior to release

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Scenario - Initiation18:00 Event – Large leak from beam tube initiated

18:00 to 18:15

Several alarms sound in control room (low flow, low pool level etc.)Assume that automatic shut-down fails

18:15 Operators diagnose problem and initiate manual shut-downTYPE B Emergency Declared

18:16 Operators call Security to carry out TYPE B call in of Reactor Supervision and Health Physics

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18:20 Operators attempt to move core and isolate in Pool 2Crane Fails for unspecified reason.

18:20 – 18:55 Unsuccessful attempts by (growing) operations team to plug hole.Reactor personnel reportingHealth Physicist reports

18:55 – 19:05 Senior Reactor Supervisor present and Senior Health Physicist discuss progress of event – Determine that there is a significant risk of fuel failure occurring.

19:05 TYPE D Emergency DeclaredSenior Reactor Supervisor present is Acting Emergency Director

19:05 Call to Security to initiate TYPE D Emergency Plan

Normal Operations Fuel Damage Release

Recovery

Initiating Event

Symptoms

Containm

ent Failure

Type D Emergency will be declared in this range

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19:10 ECC Established in NRB.Reactor Operations Team has minimal staffing

19:05 – 19:35 Security Dispatcher executing Call in Lists•Internal resource list•Crisis Management Group•External Agencies (CNSC, Hamilton Fire and Police, Medical Officer of Health (Hamilton ECG), Emergency Measures Ontario, Ontario Ministry of Labour, HHS)

19:10 – 20:00 Additional personnel report for duty and are assigned to teams – teams activated

19:20 Perimeter Survey Team completes first cordon – no detected radiation or contamination (no release yet)

19:30 Early Evacuation of Controlled Area Recommended by Protective Actions Manager and Approved by Emergency Director

Controlled Area Survey Teams

Perimeter Survey Teams

Access Control Point – Personnel Monitoring

Access Control Point – Emergency Worker Unit

Plume Assessment Team

Emergency Control Centre

Crisis Management Group

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Communications Cycle As required and at least every thirty minutes, the Emergency

Director will Receive an update from the Reactor Operations Team

• Progress of emergency, planned releases Receive an update from the Protective Action Manager

• Radiological conditions in controlled area and plume, recommended protective actions

Receive an update from the Access Control Point Manager• Status, contamination level on evacuees

Provide an Update to the Crisis Management Group advisor• Progress of emergency, radiological conditions in CA and

plume, Protective Actions implemented in Controlled Area, Protective Actions recommended outside the CA (for implementation or communication to Hamilton ECG and HHS), request for assistance.

Crisis Management Group provides updates to Contact Organizations and Media.

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19:10 – 20:00 Controlled Area Survey Teams conduct evacuation of Controlled Area buildings

19:45 Crisis Management Group Activated19:50 Access Control Point established

20:15 Reactor Operations Team requests pumper truck for additional make-up water – Emergency Director relays to CMG to Hamilton ECG

20:30 Uncovered core appears inevitable – radiation fields increasing in containment as shielding lost over core

20:30 Communication cycle initiated by conditionsSurvey Teams directed to wear respirators and prepare for release – regular dose checks occurring

20:35 Pumper truck arrives at ACP – Directed to wait based on deteriorating conditions

20:45 MNR building evacuated due to High radiation fieldsContainment isolated

Siren Voice Message Examples NUCLEAR EMERGENCY – EVACUATION

Attention.  There is an emergency condition at the nuclear reactor.  Please evacuate all buildings in the Controlled Area immediately and proceed to a safe location outside the yellow tape.  Follow the directions of Security and Health Physics personnel.  There is an emergency condition at the nuclear reactor.

NUCLEAR EMERGENCY – SHELTER IN PLACE Attention.  There is an emergency condition at the

nuclear reactor.  Remain Inside and shelter in place until you receive further directions from Security or Health Physics Personnel.  There is an emergency condition at the nuclear reactor.  Shelter in place.

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21:00 Reactor Core uncovered – radioactivity leak to containment

21:05 Detectable radioactivity at perimeter

21:15 Controlled area survey teams report very high radiation fields near reactor building and high levels of detectable airborne activity

21:20 Perimeter teams report high levels of airborne contamination at perimeter and detectable plume shinePlume Assessment team reports measurement of detectable activity

21:30 Communication cycle focused on conditions – no protective action recommendations

21:40 Recognition that containment not holding effectively – Reactor Operations Team investigating

21:45 Initial dose projections available – higher than expected – need to address containment problem clear but public protective actions not urgently required Controlled Area teams withdrawn to safe location

22:00 Communication cycle focused on conditions and containment problem

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22:10 to22:30

Survey teams report in findings – continue to be higher than expectedDose projections show doses on campus will exceed lower Protective Action Level for sheltering in 24 hours if containment not repaired

22:30 Communication cycle based on findings – no protective actions recommended outside Controlled Area (but under consideration)

22:35 Ventilation Control Team directed to turn off ventilation for Controlled Area buildings to the extent possible

23:00 Air in leakage to containment identified and corrected

23:00 Communication Cycle focused on correction of containment problem

23:15 to 23:45

Updated surveys from all teams

00:00 Dose projection available on latest data – no need for protective actions outside Controlled Area

00:00 Communication cycle focused on updated dose projections

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Day 2 Reactor Operations Team developing plan to submerge coreReleases continue to be elevated but well less than those requiring protective actions outside the Controlled AreaSurveys and dose projections continueEnvironmental samples collected and analyzedCommunication Cycles continue (possibly at reduced frequency)

Day 3 Plan Executed to flood reactor building lower levels and re-submerge coreBrief, planned “puff” of activity released due to air displacement by waterSurveys and dose projections continueReleases greatly reduced after core submergedRadiation fields outside reactor greatly reduced

Day 3 later

Type D Emergency declared over by Emergency Director – resumption of normal line management structure for ongoing remediationCommunication cycle regarding Termination of Type D Emergency

Day 3 to Day 30

Remediation and Restoration

Day 30 Unspecified actions terminate ongoing releases from reactor

Consequences Release terminated after 30 days

Highest dose impact for a person standing at boundary of Emergency Planning Zone throughout release about 0.5 mSv

normal background doses are about 3 mSv per year

All doses outside of Controlled Area are less than lower Protective Action Levels

Probable doses to members of MNR workforce at or above occupational dose limits, but less than emergency dose limits

Many non-radiological consequences for University 45

Flow Blockage Limiting estimate – three assemblies blocked

while reactor continues to operate 48 plates severely damaged Limiting Source Term:

14% of short lived noble gases 11% of long lived noble gases 7% of radioiodines

Leakage from containment starts 1.2 hours after isolation – due to assumed pressurized air leakage.

Assumes reactor continues to operate Large Servo Error Scram Fails Short Period Scram Fails Fission Product Monitor Scram Fails

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Reference Leakage Containment tested

annually OLC – corresponds to

0.8% of free volume per hour at pressure of 0.5 psi

Safety analysis based on leak rate of 1 % per hour (86.4 m3 per hour) at 0.5 psi

It is assumed that for first 2 hours, containment is pressurized by instrument air – later by unspecified source and gas dewars (1 kg hr-1)

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Scenario 2: Flow Blockage - Initiation18:00 Event – Complete blockage of three high power

assemblies at power18:00 to 19:20

Several trips fail and unusual reactor operation not noted

19:20 Fission product release from blocked fuel

19:20 - 19:25 Multiple High Radiation Alarms in BuildingExhaust Duct Alarm – Building SealedReactor Scrammed by OperatorType C Emergency Declared – Call-ins commence

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19:50 Operators evacuate building due to high radiation

20:00 Supervisory Response – Type D Emergency Declared

20:05 – 20:35 Security Dispatcher executing Call in Lists•Internal resource list•Crisis Management Group•External Agencies (CNSC, Hamilton Fire and Police, Medical Officer of Health (Hamilton ECG), Emergency Measures Ontario, Ontario Ministry of Labour, HHS)

20:15 ECC Established in NRB.Reactor Operations Team has minimal staffing

20:45 Fission Product Leak from Containment Begins

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20:00 – 21:00 Additional personnel report for duty and are assigned to teams – teams activated

21:00 Perimeter Survey Team completes first cordon – low level radioactivity detected and reported

21:00 CMG Activates

21:15 Sheltering in Controlled Area Recommended by Protective Actions Manager and Approved by Emergency Director – voice messages over PA, signs at building exits – ventilation shutdowns

21:15 Communication Cycle

22:00 Source of building pressurization identified and isolated – significant release terminated

22:00 Communication Cycle

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22:00 – 22:30 Surveys and assessments by field teams22:30 Decision to evacuate people via Access Control Point

22:30 Communication Cycle

22:30 – 02:30 Building by building evacuation conducted through access control point – monitoring – possible decontamination.Need for reception centre for evacuees

Day 2 Continuing assessments – building reoccupation plan

~Day 3 Type D Emergency Declared over – resumption of line management organization for remediation phase.

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Flow Blockage Dose Consequences (Limiting Case)

Individual Short Term Prolonged Long TermTotal

Effective Dose (mSv)

A 8.6E-5 3.6E-5 NA 0.00012

B 7.0E-5 1.9E-5 1.4E-6 0.000091

Collective Effective Dose to public = 0.2 person mSv to 60 km

Walkthrough of Emergency Worker Assistance Reactor Management Team Lead identifies need for additional makeup

water – requests assistance from MNR Emergency Director MNR Emergency Director conveys request to McMaster CMG – alerts

Emergency Control Centre (Protective Action Manager and Access Control Point Manager – fan out)

CMG requests assistance from City of Hamilton ECG (Communications) Pumper truck arrives at site – directed by Security/Perimeter team to

Access Control Point ACP Manager consults with Protective Actions Manager – Entry Planned

HFD Personnel registered and issued with dosimetry – PPE/KI as required – dose estimates

Controlled Area Survey Team member assigned to escort HFD Pumper proceeds to reactor building exterior connections and

provides water Returns to ACP for contamination monitoring (as required) and

dosimetry Communications re clearance from Controlled Area Similar process for injured person with ambulance/paramedics No special controls required for response to campus outside of

Controlled Area

Procedures Feedback Please provide comments/corrections and

updates to us Contact information:

Krysia SteinbergNuclear Operations and FacilitiesMcMaster University, NRB G101Hamilton, ON   L8S 4K1Phone #:  905-525-9140, ext. 28615Fax#:       905-524-3994e-mail :    steinbk@mcmaster.ca

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