mintz 2004 how do leaders make decision

10.1177/0022002703261056ARTICLEJOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTIONMintz / HOW DO LEADERS MAKE DECISIONS?

How Do Leaders Make Decisions?

A POLIHEURISTIC PERSPECTIVE

ALEX MINTZDepartment of Political ScienceTexas A&M University

United Nations StudiesYale University

Poliheuristic theory (PH) bridges the gap between cognitive and rational theories of decision making. PHpostulates a two-stage decision process. During the first stage, the set of possible options is reduced byapplying a “noncompensatory principle” to eliminate any alternative with an unacceptable return on a criti-cal, typically political, decision dimension. Once the choice set has been reduced to alternatives that areacceptable to the decision maker, the process moves to a second stage, during which the decision maker usesmore analytic processing in an attempt to minimize risks and maximize benefits. In this article, the authorapplies poliheuristic theory to individual, sequential, and interactive decision settings. Subsequent articles inthis issue offer theoretical extensions and multiple tests of the theory using multiple methods (formal, statis-tical, experimental).

Keywords: Decision analysis; poliheuristic theory; multimethod approach

How do foreign leaders, such as Yasser Arafat and Bashir Assad, make decisions?How did American presidents, such as George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, DwightEisenhower, and Ronald Reagan, decide to use force or to refrain from using force?The leading decision paradigm in international relations is the rational actor, expectedutility theory. According to this theory, nations are led by rational, forward-lookingleaders who seek to maximize the expected gains of policy choices in a holistic andcompensatory (additive) fashion (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992).1

This special issue offers an alternative to the expected utility (EU) theory of deci-sion and other rational-analytic decision models. Poliheuristic (PH) choice theorypostulates a two-stage decision process in which the menu for choice is narrowed ini-tially by a noncompensatory analysis that eliminates options by the use of one or moreheuristics (cognitive shortcuts). Remaining alternatives are then evaluated in anattempt to minimize risks and maximize benefits (Mintz 1993). Examples of thenoncompensatory heuristic that guides the elimination of options are threats to aleader’s political survival and political constraints on the use of force.

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1. Other important decision theories are bureaucratic politics, cybernetic theory, and prospect theory.

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 48 No. 1, February 2004 3-13DOI: 10.1177/0022002703261056© 2004 Sage Publications

By focusing on a two-stage process, poliheuristic choice theory integrates elementsof the cognitive psychology school of decision making with elements of the rationalchoice school. The first stage of poliheuristic theory involves a noncompensatory,nonholistic search. It uses decision heuristics and primarily corresponds to the cogni-tive school of decision making. The second stage involves analytic processing of sur-viving alternatives. It corresponds to rational choice theory. Cognitive heuristics aremore important in the first stage of the decision, whereas rational choice calculationsare more applicable to the second stage of the poliheuristic decision process.

The poliheuristic model is applicable to single decisions, group decisions, sequen-tial decisions, and decisions in strategic settings. Poliheuristic theory focuses on boththe process of decision making and the outcome of decisions and explains why andhow decisions are made by world leaders. A key premise of poliheuristic theory is thatpolicy makers use a mixture of decision strategies when making decisions, includingstrategies that are suboptimal (Mintz et al. 1997).

Although poliheuristic theory has been in existence only since 1993, the PHresearch program has already received considerable attention in such leading journalsas the American Political Science Review, Journal of Conflict Resolution, and Interna-tional Studies Quarterly, as well as in book chapters, edited volumes, and numerousconferences, including those sponsored by the American Political Science Asso-ciation (APSA), International Studies Association (ISA), Midwest Political ScienceAssociation (MPSA), Peace Science Society International (PSSI), and the Interna-tional Society for Political Psychology (Redd 2003, 101).

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TABLE 1

Types of Decisions Studied by Poliheuristic Theory

Type of Decision Author

Use of force Mintz (1993)Nonuse of force DeRouen (2003)Diversionary uses of force DeRouen (2001)Tests of nuclear weapons Sathasivam (2003)Initial crisis reaction DeRouen and Sprecher (2004)War termination Mintz and Geva (1998)Coalition formation Mintz (1995)Intraparty rivalry Mintz (1995)Level of force used in a crisis Redd (2002)Learning Yang (2003)Influence of advisers Redd (2002)War and peace decisions Astorino-Courtois and Trusty (2000)Framing Taylor-Robinson and Redd (2003)Military uprising Mintz and Mishal (2003)Defection and retaliation Clare (2003)Decisions by experts and novices Dacey and Carlson (2004)Negotiation Eisenband (2003)Conflict resolution Astorino-Courtois and Trusty (2000); Mintz and Mishal (2003)

Poliheuristic theory has been applied to a rich menu of decisions in internationalrelations: decisions on the use of force, nonuse of force, initial reaction to crisis, crisisescalation, crisis termination, framing, learning, negotiation, peace, rivalry termina-tion, and conflict resolution (see Table 1 and articles in this issue).

Table 2 lists cases of poliheuristic decision making by American presidents (Eisen-hower, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton) previously analyzed by DeRouen (2001, 2003),Mintz (1993), Redd (2000), and Taylor-Robinson and Redd (2003). There is evidencefor the use of the noncompensatory principle of poliheuristic theory in all of thesecases.

Goertz (2004) provides additional examples of noncompensatory, poliheuristicdecision making by American presidents:

1. The U.S. political establishment wanted to return the Panama Canal to Panama. Thetreaty “was negotiated under Henry Kissinger and Gerald Ford and supported by theCarter administration. However, public opinion polls showed little support for thismove. As a result, there was much hesitation in the Senate regarding ratification”(Goertz 2004, 20-21).

2. “Realists, such as Eisenhower, Nixon, and Kissinger, considered using nuclear weaponsin war but were constrained by public opinion” (Goertz 2004, 27).

Several scholars have applied poliheuristic theory to decisions by leaders in theMiddle East: the late President Hafez al-Assad of Syria (see Astorino-Courtois andTrusty 2000), former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan (see Sathasivam 2003),former President Saddam Hussein of Iraq (see Mintz 2000), and Chairman YasserArafat of the Palestinian Authority (see Clare 2003; Mintz and Mishal 2003). Clare(2003), Mintz (1995), and Mintz and Mishal (2003) have also applied elements of thetheory to cases involving Israeli prime ministers (Shamir, Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu,and Sharon). These case studies are listed in Table 3. Obviously, noncompensatorypolitical constraints in nondemocratic societies are different from those imposed ondemocratic leaders.

Poliheuristic theory has also been used to explain other theories of internationalrelations. For example, DeRouen (2001, 70) claimed that diversionary theory is con-sistent with the noncompensatory principle of poliheuristic choice theory “for thepresident is unlikely to select any alternative in which the political dimension is not

Mintz / HOW DO LEADERS MAKE DECISIONS? 5

TABLE 2

The Poliheuristic Decision Calculus in American Foreign Policy

President Crisis Author

Eisenhower Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam (1954) DeRouen (2003)Eisenhower Guatemala (1954) Taylor-Robinson and Redd (2003)Reagan Grenada (1983) DeRouen (2001)Bush Sr. Iraq (1991) Mintz (1993)Clinton Kosovo (1998) Redd (2000)

satisfied for fear of political repercussions.” Mintz and Geva (1993) showed that thenoncompensatory principle of poliheuristic theory helps explain the democratic peacephenomenon because leaders of democracies refrain from attacking another democ-racy because it is politically too costly. However, no such constraint is placed on demo-cratic leaders when the opponent is nondemocratic (Mintz and Geva 1993). Theauthors also showed that the noncompensatory principle played a role in PresidentBush’s 1991 war termination decision not to pursue Saddam Hussein in Baghdadwhen then-president Bush was enjoying very high levels of public approval (Mintzand Geva 1998).

Studies of poliheuristic theory have thus far only used case studies and experimen-tal analysis. The contributors to this special issue offer multiple tests of poliheuristictheory with multiple methods (formal, statistical, and experimental).

WHAT IS POLIHEURISTIC DECISION MAKING?

The term poliheuristic can be broken down into “the roots poly (many) and heuris-tic (shortcuts), which alludes to the cognitive mechanisms used by decision makersto simplify complex foreign policy decisions” (Mintz et al. 1997, 554). “Poli” alsorefers to the notion that political leaders measure gains and losses in political terms.Poliheuristic theory postulates that when making decisions, policy makers employ atwo-stage decision process consisting of (a) rejecting alternatives that are unaccept-able to the policy maker on a critical dimension or dimensions and (b) selecting analternative from the subset of remaining alternatives while maximizing benefits and


TABLE 3

Poliheuristic Studies of Decisions by Leaders in the Middle East

Leader Country/Entity Decision Author

Hafez al-Assad Syria Syria’s peace and war decisions Astorino-Courtois and Trustyvis-à-vis Israel (2000)

Yasser Arafat Palestinian Patterns of conflictual and Clare (2003)Authority cooperative interactions

with Israel

Yasser Arafat Palestinian Decisions during the Palestinian Mintz and Mishal (2003)Authority Intifada of 2000-2002

Saddam Hussein Iraq Gulf War of 1991 Mintz (2000)

Netanyahu, Peres, Israel Decisions before and after the Clare (2003)Rabin Oslo Accord of 1993

Yitzchak Shamir Israel Decisions on coalition formation Mintz (1995)in 1992, 1994

Nawaz Sharif Pakistan Pakistan’s decision to test the Sathasivam (2003)bomb in 1998

Ariel Sharon Israel Decisions during the Intifada Mintz and Mishal (2003)

minimizing risks (see Mintz 1993, 2003; Mintz and Geva 1997; Mintz et al. 1997;Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993).2

Poliheuristic theory sees domestic politics as “the essence of decision.” High politi-cal audience costs are nonadditive. Avoiding major loss is noncompensatory (see alsoGoertz 2004). Domestic political audience costs are an integral part of foreign policydecision making. Policy makers are political actors whose self-interest in political sur-vival is paramount (Russett and Barzilai 1992; Sathasivam 2003). Consequently, pol-icy makers are likely to reject outright any alternative that poses potentially very highpolitical costs, even if that same alternative also yields potentially high benefits onother dimensions (although military and strategic considerations are also noncom-pensatory under certain conditions).

TWO-STAGE GAMES

Poliheuristic theory identifies a process by which leaders make decisions by firstsimplifying complex foreign policy decisions while focusing on the dimensions of thedecision. They then evaluate remaining alternatives using analytic processing. The setof alternatives is reduced to a more manageable size by employing a noncompensatorydecision analysis. Sathasivam (2003, 57) therefore argued that poliheuristic theorygoes beyond previous attempts to predict foreign policy decisions that used “rationalactor” or “bureaucratic politics” models by looking not only at why decisions weremade but also at how these decisions were made (see also Christensen and Redd 2004).Whereas several theories of political decision making originated in economics, PH is atheory of political decision making because it specifically postulates that leaders avoidmajor political loss and that such a loss is noncompensatory for political decisionmakers.

Poliheuristic theory is compatible with a host of contingency theories of decisionand judgment that attribute to the decision maker sufficient flexibility in adapting thedecision process to changing problems and conditions (Beach and Mitchell 1978;Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993; Tetlock 1992). The main characteristics of thetheory are as follows:

• Poliheuristic theory is dimension based, noncompensatory, nonholistic, satisficing, andorder sensitive (Mintz, Geva, and DeRouen 1994). This set of characteristics distin-guishes it from other theories of decision making (expected utility theory, cybernetic the-ory, prospect theory).

• In strategic settings, such as those that characterize many war and peace decisions (seeMorrow 1997), the poliheuristic decision maker eliminates, in the first stage, not only hisor her noncompensatory alternatives but also alternatives perceived to be politicallyinfeasible for an opponent (for an example, see Astorino-Courtois and Trusty 2000). Thereduced choice sets can then be subjected to a standard game-theoretic analysis in thesecond stage of the decision (Mintz and Astorino-Courtois 2001).


2. Experimental studies have shown that analytic decision models, such as expected utility, are mostlikely to be employed by decision makers when the number of alternatives available to the leader is small.

• In sequential settings, each decision in the sequence of decisions is a two-stage poli-heuristic decision. Thus, Saddam Hussein’s decisions in fall 2002 and spring 2003 can beviewed as a sequence of poliheuristic decisions on whether to cooperate (minimally) withUnited Nations inspectors.

• In sequential and interactive (strategic) situations,3 each decision is part of a sequence ofdecisions by both players in a strategic interaction, each employing poliheuristic calcula-tions in each decision node in a strategic setting (see Eisenband 2003). According to thisthesis, Saddam Hussein and George Bush have engaged in a sequential and interactivepoliheuristic game consisting of numerous mini-decisions.

Because it uses decision shortcuts and rules of thumb, poliheuristic theory canexplain complicated foreign policy decisions. It is unique in its ability to deal withmultiple players, multiple alternatives, and multiple dimensions, such as those charac-terizing N-adic arms races, N-nation alliance decisions, and environmental decisions.It is inherently built on the assumption that policy makers simplify complicated deci-sion problems by first using simple cognitive shortcuts and then applying an analyticdecision calculus to arrive at a choice.

Poliheuristic theory can be refuted and falsified by finding the decision process tobe compensatory, alternative based, holistic, or order insensitive. As the authors ofarticles in this issue show, however, the theory is quite robust.

AN EXAMPLE OFPOLIHEURISTIC DECISION MAKING

At the core of the poliheuristic theory is the noncompensatory principle of decisionmaking. It serves to eliminate alternatives in the first stage of the decision process. Forexample, on March 1, 2003, the Turkish parliament vetoed the proposed deploymentof 62,000 U.S. troops to Turkey as a launching pad for a possible attack against Iraq.This decision was reportedly due to strong public opposition to deployment of U.S.troops on Turkish soil despite promises from the United States for a huge economic aidpackage, worth $30 billion in grants and loan guarantees, and U.S. pressure on theEuropeans to accept Turkey into the European Union. Although the economic and mil-itary benefits associated with cooperation with the United States were huge, the politi-cal costs for the Turkish parliament were apparently negative and noncompensatory.

The move by the Turkish parliament is a good example of the use of the non-compensatory principle of poliheuristic theory in decisions by state leaders and otherpoliticians. Despite a very high score on the economic aid dimension, a low score onthe political (public opinion) dimension did not compensate for the expected eco-


3. In these situations, the poliheuristic (PH) model resembles the logic of the iterated dominance-elimination procedure in game theory, yet the PH model specifically predicts that the political dimension isnoncompensatory, assumes a two-stage process rather than an iterated elimination process consisting of sev-eral steps, uses decision weights, and is also applicable to very complex decision situations with multipleplayers with multiple options. In dynamic situations, the PH model often predicts outcomes that are differentfrom those reached using games of strategic interactions that are based on rational choice because in suchsettings, PH eliminates from the outset unacceptable alternatives (such as doing nothing), and these alterna-tives do not reappear during the decision process.

nomic benefits, and the deployment of force alternative was not approved by membersof the parliament. In noncompensatory terms, there were no substitution effects ortrade-offs between the political and economic dimensions of the decision.4

Turkey has been torn between widespread public opposition to a war against afellow Muslim state and intense pressure from Washington. At the time the decisionwas made, the expectations, according to Reuters (March 1, 2003), were that Ankarawould, “almost certainly, lose an almost concluded financial aid package amounting tosome $6 billion in U.S. grants and up to $24 billion in loan guarantees.” The proposalfor deployment of U.S. forces was rejected by the Turks, even in face of a massive aidpackage from the United States and military-strategic commitment to Turkey from theUnited States and Great Britain. Opposition leader Deniz Baykal welcomed the out-come and said, “This has shown again that the whole world now has to give importanceto national [public] opinion and show understanding of parliament when approachingTurkey” (Reuters, March 1, 2003).

Once the option to deploy U.S. forces on Turkish soil had been rejected by parlia-ment, the Turkish government evaluated the remaining alternatives that advanced tothe second stage of the decision process and decided, in an attempt to minimize furthercosts and maximize benefits, to allow air passage over Turkey’s airspace to coalitionplanes.

The noncompensatory political loss aversion variable in poliheuristic theory can beoperationalized in several ways as follows:

• Threat to a leader’s survival• Significant drop in public support for a policy• Significant drop in popularity• The prospects of an electoral defeat• Domestic opposition• Threat to regime survival• Intraparty rivalry and competition• Internal or external challenge to the regime• Potential collapse of the coalition, government, or regime• Threat to political power, dignity, honor, or legitimacy of a leader• Demonstrations, riots, and so forth• The existence of veto players (e.g., pivotal parties in parliamentary government)

NEXT STEPS IN THE POLIHEURISTICRESEARCH PROGRAM

The next steps in the PH research program are as follows:

• Apply poliheuristic theory to key issues and puzzles in international relations: decisionson alliance formation and dissolution, deterrence decisions, armament and disarmament


4. A reviewer of this article has pointed out that a much larger amount of economic aid to Turkey mighthave eventually “compensated” for domestic opposition to the deployment of U.S. troops.

decisions, diversionary uses of force, counterterrorism, enduring rivalry, and so on.Apply PH to other important domains in international relations—e.g., InternationalPolitical Economy (IPE)—while analyzing economic aid and trade decisions, environ-mental decisions, financial decisions, and so on. Apply PH decision making to the coali-tion formation process and to bargaining.

• Develop empirical criteria to identify (a) “key” decision dimensions, (b) the cutoff pointfor when the noncompensatory (avoid major loss) principle applies, and (c) the condi-tions under which decision makers switch from the first stage of decision making to thesecond stage in the PH decision calculus.

• Automate poliheuristic theory and PH decision rules. This will make it easier for scholarsto apply and test the theory using different data sets on a variety of geographical and his-torical contexts.

• Identify poliheuristic equilibria, that is, spell out the conditions under which players in astrategic setting reach an equilibrium in an interactive two-stage poliheuristic process.

• Compare PH conceptually and empirically to cybernetic and expected utility models ofthe use of force. For example, compare PH findings to Ostrom and Job’s (1986) andBueno de Mesquita and Lalman’s (1992) findings.

• Assess whether bureaucratic/organizational political constraints or domestic politicalconstraints are more salient and influential as noncompensatory domestic dimensions ofdecision making.

• Examine the impact of framing and marketing on poliheuristic choice. In contrast toexpected utility, PH is order sensitive. Is it also affected by the way alternatives, dimen-sions, and implications are framed? Examine the link between affect and PH decisionmaking.

• Extend the PH model to group decision making and sequential decision making, whichcharacterize many foreign policy situations. The simplest representation of PH is as a sin-gle individual making choices based on the noncompensatory decision principle. How-ever, political choices in bureaucratic or democratic settings are often the product ofgroup and societal processes in which an individual leader must interact with others tomake and implement choices.

MULTIMETHOD TESTS OF THE THEORY

As pointed out above, most studies of poliheuristic theory have thus far employedcase studies and experiments in studying leaders’ decisions. The contributors to thisspecial issue go beyond the case study method and process-tracing analysis in present-ing multiple tests of poliheuristic theory with multiple methods (statistical, formal,experimental).5

Stoll (forthcoming) points out that research that relies on any one methodology isusually inferior to research that makes use of several methods. It is a rare situation inwhich “one method is so superior that the others can safely be ignored.” The use of amultimethod approach in international relations is rare (but see Maoz et al., forthcom-ing, for a multimethod analysis of conflict management and conflict resolution, aswell as Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman’s 1992 work applying multiple methods todecisions to initiate wars).


5. Consistent with the policy of the Journal of Conflict Resolution, articles in this issue were reviewedby at least two anonymous referees.

A multimethod approach to foreign policy analysis can

1. cross-validate results based on different methods of inquiry,2. help generalize results beyond a specific case,3. contribute to theory development because different methods (e.g., formal, case study)

may uncover unexpected findings that may be reincorporated into a refined theory andretested,

4. enhance confidence in results and substantiate or refute theory,5. identify differences and similarities in results based on methods used,6. lead to robust and standardized results, thus contributing to scientific advancement in

international relations (Mintz 2003).

Specifically, in this special issue, Goertz (2004) uses formal theory and spatialanalysis to formalize and extend poliheuristic theory. Dacey and Carlson (2004) use aformal model to compare decision making of experts and nonexperts in foreign policy.DeRouen and Sprecher (2004) use probit analysis on a data set of N-nations’ initialreaction to international crisis. Christensen and Redd (2004) and Mintz (2004) useexperimental tests of the theory, and Stern (2004) provides a qualitative overview ofpoliheuristic theory relating it to other emerging theories of foreign policy decisionmaking: problem representation, decision units, and cognitive constructivism.

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