CHAPTER 05

METHOD IN INTEGRAL PHILOSOPHY

In nwst gener:ll l e n s , integrzl philosophy means a comprehensive

metaphysical synthesis. Pzii.iz,-r Advaiia or integral non-dualism of Sri Aurobindo is a

philosophical synthesis of this kind. In the prcvious chapters a detailed exploration of

Sri Aur-obindo's system of !bought was made from an ontological and epistemological

point of view. And, in tho;-. chapters one of the objectives of the present work had

been realized; the cognitional theory and the epistemological principles inherent in

integral non-dualism were brought out. However, along with the epistemological

inquir), a methodological analysis in view of discerning the distinct method employed

in integral philosophy had a1:;o been undertaken. And, accordingly, although, in all the

earlier searches in differenl directions the purpose has been methodological as well as

cognitive, it is in this chapter that the met~odological analysis is going to be taken up

in an explicit and exclusivi: manner.

It is a well-illtrstratcd fact that lhere is a meeting of Indian and Western

thought in the philosophy of Sri ~urobirtdo. ' However, such illustrations2 represent

three select aspects of Sri Aurobindo's ptlilosophy namely, the problem of evolution,

the problem of Yoga and the problem o!' the nature of reality. The focus here is an

aspect that is more basic than the previously explored ones - the problem of method

in Sri Aurobindo's philn:;ophy. In the s ~ c o n d part of the first chapter, the general

background of Sri Aurobindo's philosophy was brought out. Here, in the section that

follows a modest attempt will be made tc explain briefly the direct background of the

methodological innovatior brought by Sri Aurobindo's integral philosophy.

5.1 Ancient Indian Tratlitions and Methodological Parallelism

There are two main currents in Indian Philosophy, one having its source in the

iiinza doctrine of the I lpwii.jads and the c,ther in the anatma doctrine of Buddha. They

conct:ive rcality on two distinct and exclusive patterns.' The present study regardsall

these streams of th'ougllt as philoso-3hical t radi t i~ns ,~ and, proceeds with its

inve?,tigation along the lines of these two tradition^.^

In the structure of development of systematic philosophy in India, the discussion

on the nature of the ultinlatt reality has the central and the pivotal position. The kind

of rational treatment ofiercrl in view of s~ lv ing this question of the nature of the

ultimate reality would brand a thinker or school as belonging to one spec:ific tradition

in contradistinction with the ozher.

Thc highest conception oi'reality reached by the Vedic seers was that of the One

Reality, which realizes itself. in all existents. One can find in the Upani~ads a number

of philosophical discussion about this problem in their analyses of the nature of self,

called Dr. Radhakrishnan says; "The anlysis of the nature of selF is the legacy

of the Upanisads bequeathed to the subsequent systems of thought,"'and he notes, for

instancc, the case of the !;,?mkhya systerr which takes the self "to be a simple and

pure, rhough passive, spi-it; which in :pite of its apparent simplicity has some .,8 character and uniquene?:~. . . ~Vyaya-VuiSqika is an associate school of'this tradition.

Advaiia Vedanta, which icousiders everything other than Atman, which is identical

~vith ~ r a h m a n y as unreal. is the extreme form of utmavfida. Atman is the very pivot

of thc entire philosoph) ol'the systems fo1,owing the Upani~Sdic tradition.

?here is another tradition in lndian Philosophy, which denier; Atman. The 10 Buddhists pioneered this tradition. I t i r in~portant to note at this juncture that saying

"Buddha's revolt is no: against the r~etaphysics of the Upani~atis but against

13rahmanical ~induis-n"" is a way af simplifying the radical philosophical

differences between tllc !i?:mi~ads and Buddhism as mere religious and practical

revolts." According tn Buddha, existence is momentary, unique and unitary.

Subsiancc is an illuso!.y t1:ought-construc:lion macle under the influence of ignorance.

Buddhist metaphysic:; .irkti their doctrine of :;alvntion arc. consistent wit11 the

categbriczl denial of Su!::,tance or .4tli1i~ll. 'l'his ~z?~~?inzav~?du can be considered as a

distinct and original philcsophical traditi~n.

tloth the niajor tracitions of Indian philosophy aim to solve one and same

problem, namely, the existential pain, a d interestingly they have reached at one and

samc solution: namely, painless e~isteni:e. '~ They propose the ideal of a state beyond

the possibility of pain ar.d bondage of any kind. While the Upani$idic tradition gives

a very positive presentation ofthis ideal, the Buddhist tradition provides the negative

aspect of i t . Advaitic realiz;~tion of the a~solute is a blissfill affirmation of the

consciousness whercas Buddl~ists attain nirvana through the annihilatio~l of sorrow

with all its causes, which ill\.,>lres a negative process of a conscious correction of the

unconscious falsifications of ine real. The ultimate for both the traditions is devoid of

empirical determinations. Accordingly, it i ; unattainable through empirical means.

But, it is attainable her-e ald now. "Man's aim" in Indian philosophy, says M.

Hiriyanna; "was no long<:- represented as the attainment of perfection in a

hypothetical hereafter, but a:; a continual progress towards it within the limits of the

present life."I4 And accortling to Kena Ilpani~ad, "Blessed is he who attains

illumination in this very life: liir a man not t~ do so is his greatest calamity."" Insight

into the nature of the real is the means of attaining the real. As Byahadwyka

Llpani~ad suggests, all desires are to be satisfied and thus transcended in order to

realize the self.I6 Buddhism reaches the same goal of desirelessness by denying the

self, which is the center of Z I I desires. Atman or self; which is the primary reality for

the Upani~iidic tradition, is a primordial wrong notion for the Buddhst:;. This is the

fiindamental metaphysical $ifl'erence betvieen the two major traditions of Indian

p h i ~ o s o ~ ~ h ~ . ' ~ Although dificn:nt in metaphysical specifications, they have a common

goal.

5.1.1 Methodological Parallelism

Absolutism came t,: t ~ e established in each tradition. It was the end result of

their sustained attempt to bc self-consislent. Each tradition had to cross many a

different phases of metaph) sical theorizing, peculiar to different schools that belonged

to each of them. 'Ibcse ph,::cs include a range of metaphysical theories varying from

rnonisrn to pluralism on ti12 LJpani$%dic side and from critical realism to complete

nihilism on the Buddhistic: side. ft was hy employing a method of dialectic and a

theory of illusion that both the traditions could overcome the metaphysical huddles on

their waY.l8 Next, the de~~clopment of acma and analmu traditions niay he briefly

examined in view of idtntihing the methodological parallelism and mutual influence.

It is generally admitted that Sirnkh)~~ was the first philosophical system to arise

in India. It tried to synthc:;ize the chief tenets of the Upanaiqads on rational basis. It

bifurcated reality into two; the changing object-ParigLimi nilya and, the unchanging

subject-Kutastha nilya. SLinkl!.yr dualism was succeeded by the VaiSe~ika pluralism,

which objectified all things including the subject, atman. Idealistic Vedanta reasserted i i ) the early monism through :.I rigorous criticism of the Sdnkhya dualism. The older

Vediinta of the author of thc li'rahmasiitras cstablished monism but it also accepted

the possibility of modificalion of Brahman. Gaudapsda and ~ahkara rejected the

conception of the real transformation of the absolute into phenomena, Brhama-

puriy?ma-vLidu, introduced [he theory of appearance, Brahma-vivarthtr-vada, and,

asserted non-dualism, ud~~(li/:i.

On the other side, E,!.ilddhism is said to have three phases of development with 20 distinct metaphysical leanings, namel:?. realism, criticism and idealism.

SarvLislivada along with its associated rchools constitutes the realistic phase of

Buddhist tradition. For; tht: SarvZstiv%dair~s, all the elements of existence, dharmas

are objectively real - rarvan? &ti. Although ThZreavcida is an allied school of

SurvastivrTda, i t does not present a new sy:;tem, meriting study for its own sake2' It is

the SaulrcTntiku school which gives the ra~.ional defense of the doctrines stated by the

Sarv%?,tiviidains. The Snli?antikn puts forward three metaphysical conjectures;

everything is transient and perishing, uintyu. every thing is devoid of substantiality,

andlma, everythin$ is dist:rcte and unique, .~avalak~una.*~ The Sautr6ntih-n prepared

-t the way of the dialectic ancl subsequently ;he emergence of Yogactlra Idealism.

In brief, the earlic:r phase admitted on the one hand, the rea!ity of separate

elements and maintained them on the otl-.er hand as purely subjective fbrms (vikalpa).

The subjective forms "are apriori forms which the uncritical mind (tralaprthagjana)

supe~.imposes on wha: I.c:;:~I>, arc rnomcrttary particular elements of ex i~ tence . "~~ The

Mgdhyamika; which repicsenis the seccmd phase of criticism in the development of

the Buddhist tradition, treated the c:ategories of substance, ca~lsality, change,

existence, hha~.a, ant1 nonexistence, ahhr3va as subjective forms. At a later stage, it

denied all the categ~rie:~ 2nd doctrines. and Siin)iaia was establishetf. Tire Yogiicara

idealism is based on tile explicit acc2ptancc of the doctrine of ~ i i n ~ u t a , ~ ~ but it

contends that subjcctivit!. though the source of unreality, is real.2s

It was in thc Ruddhislic tradition that absolutism came to be established for

the first time in the history Indian ~ h i l o s o ~ h ~ . ~ ~ And; in the Buddhist tradition itself

there are two different kind:; of absolutisnis, t~atnely, Mgdhyamika Nihilism and

Yog;lc%ra-Vijfiiinavada Idcali~m. Thc Miidhyinika system is the systematized form of

the Siinycrta doctrine of the IJr,~jriapararnitcr treatises." Siinyata is established by the

dialectic. Initial stagcs 01' the dialectic arc perceivable in the direct teachings of

Buddha himself.28 The awareness of thc ar~tinomical character of reason, and the

subsequeiit effort to transct::ic the duality of reason resulted in the rnetliod of

d ia l~ct ic ."~ The principal alternative views th:it constitute the dialectic are supplied by

the &ma and the anijlma tradition^.^^ The Mi-dhyamika finds a transcendental illusion

as exemplified in the mutually opposed vieus. This illusion consists in the fact that

the empirical categories arc wrongly ascribed to the Unconditioned, giving rise to

\,arious systems of ~ ~ i c t a ~ l i ~ ~ i c : . . ~ ~ Tlierc is nothing in the phenomena, which is not

phenomenal, and, the Absolute is not a residual, precipitated when one aspect of

phenomena is sublated, bct it i:; the consciousness itself that all views about the real

are

'The other form 01' abr;olutism in the Buddhistic tradition was reached as the

culmination of YogXcZra-'Jijii;lnav%da ideali ; ~ n . ~ ~ The absolute for this sc>hool is the

non-dual consciousness. The world of external objects is unreal. An 'extemal object'

appears as extemal and ob,jective because of an i~lusion.'~ Illusion is the confusion

between the two suhjccti\,c 1:;111:tions of con:ciousness, namely knowing filnction and

willing fimction. Knowin:: irvolves the discovery of the objectively given; willing is

the subjective construction. I'lusion takes place when the willed content is mistaken

for the luio\vn content. The s:ime illusion causes the subject-object dualiv. When the

object is realized illusory, l ic subject auicrmatically dissolves. What remains is

consciou!;ness, and, this con?.tciousness freed of subject-object duality is the Absolute.

According to ~ankara , Bcing [hat is pure, universal and sclf-evident, is alone real, and

i: i:: thi: i\h:;olufi.; lir:hi--an. This is ~.ontrary to the idcalistic ],osition of

\'i,jii%nav2da;" which takis 11:- knowing act or consciousness as the only real, out of

xvhich objects are created ancl projected.

As regards the nature and status of empirical phenomena all the three

absolutisms agree to considct- the111 as appearance. Accordingly, absolute for all the

three systems, is devoid of ;ill empirical determinations. The appearances are negated

by the truc knowledge of tie absolute. Tkese systems do not establish the absolutc

through positive argunlenl: rather they reject duality and appearances through

dialectics. Thus: it is normaii\c for every kind of absolutism to fbrmulate a distinction

of reality and appearanceih and then to ,,:gate the duality. The highest knowledge

realized as non-empirical :r~ruition is called as upav6kpnnuhhiiti by Vedanta, as

loko~/a~.ujri~nn by Yogacal..~, and, as prujriupariniitu hy MZdhyamika. The highest

knowledge reached by the Vedanta and ihe YogscZra systems could generally be

described as Advaita, the knowledge of difl ercnceless entity, either Brahman, the Pure

Being or VijGanu, the Pure Consciousness On the other hand, Advuyu would be the

proper term to designatc the kfildhyamika conception of the highest

Vedanta employs dialectic to demolish difference, duality and particularity

and thereby to establish indr.ectly the sole reality of Brahman as changelsess, universal

and self-evident. Vijfibavada employs dielectic to disprove the reality of the object

and plurality and thcreby to establish indirectly the sole reality of Vijfiana. The

M;idhy;imika eniplo!~s tlia1~:ctic to deny the views of the real and not the real in

i t s ~ l f . ~ ' NOW, as regards ;hc use of a theory of illusion, we find the VedZntic

absolutism first analyzing the empirical illusions and then applying it a~alogically to

thc world-illusion. 'l'te 'Jijfianavsdins also make a similar treatment. The

h4Zdhyamika addresses thr same problem of world-illusion as presented in different

systcin:; of thought and Ileli;e lus conceln is with 'Transcendental Illusic~n,' as T.R.V.

Murti describes i t . 3 9 ~ l t h o u ~ l i there is a difference with regard to the illusions with

which these absolutisms sl;~rt to analyze a7d the standpoints from which they negate

the il lu~ory appearance. t h y could generilly be understood as a mode of negative

jutign~cnt.'~

In the three absolutisms, besides a similar spiritual orientation on the religious

side, a theov of illusion and a method of cialectic on the philosophical side have also

becn identified as a few cl;rnnIon constitutive clcments. Advaitism which developed

along the Upani~adic tradition is said to have borrowed the technique of dialectic

from thc Madhyamika sy;rc:rn of the Buddhist tradition. Similarly, although the

Advaitisrn of ~arikara ant1 the Yogacara-Vijfi%nav%da idealism vary in details and

focus, they exhibit a commonalty in the essential structure of their ccrnception and

analysis of illusion. how eve^, these parallel pathways of philosophical methodology

are riot found extended in th- modern Indian thought forms. 0 1 1 the contrary, later

Indian thinkers seem to lrG\.~: brought in a new method for philosophizing in the

Indian co:ltext. .

5.2 Modern Trends and Methodological Ncwness

The modem Indiar, tilinkers develop their systems in a state of inner conflict

constituted by the anxiety io retain the elements of the original philosophical tradition

on the one hand and the need to integrate thi: scientific attitudes of the contemporary

culti~re a id the spirit of their own respective religious traditions on the other. Except

Muhammad lqbal who base:: his thoughts 01 the Islamic tradition, all other modem

thinkers, namely, M.K. Gal-iglhi, B.G. Tilal.:, R.N. Tagore, Dayanda Sarasvati, Sri

Aurobindo, Swami Vivekanda, Dr. Radhakrishnan, Bhagavsn Das, J. Krishnamurti,

etc., generally belong to the IJpani$%dic trsdition as far as the philosophical and

religious sides are concerneti. 'Thcy overcome the initial methodical predicament by

asserting the "the. value c*:' thc element: of tradition with a renewed vigour

emphasizing that these e1cmr:nts are not against the scientific temper of the present

day world."" Many of thcm gather elements from different schools and reconstruct

the ancient philosophies c?ier incorporating some doctrines from the

liowcvc~., the exact natuic .11 the East-bV(::;t synthesis will vary from tliillkcr to

thinker, for, some have facilitated an interface of key tenets while some others have

borrowed basic techniques alone. Underlying monism, reality of the world, integral

nature of' man, human dignity, human freedom, primacy of intuitive knowledge, etc.,

are a few issues on which ail ;notiern thinker:; seem to agree with each

It is a widely held observation that the original mark of Indian philosophy in

general, is its spiritual orientation. But a i regards the nature of modern Indian

philosophy, scholars havt: h ~ t i ~ e r clarified .his common impression. Basant Kumar

I,al argucs that the method of Indian Philo:;ophy is .Meditative speculation.' 44 The

method of 'meditative speculation', which has already been a method employed by

the Vedic seers and the ilparii:%dic thinkers became explicit and systematic with the

modem thinkers. And, each thinker has delieloped it in his own way in accordance

with the predomifiant trait and interest of his philosophy. Sri Aurobindo, the special

focus of the present search, has develcped a new method of philosophizing; in

contrast to the Buddhist-\'etl?intic method of dialectic, the new method employed by

him may be provisionally described as a 'method of inclusion' or Sarnanvaya. The

negation made possihle liy 1he dislecti,:al reasoning is replaced b f affirmations

prompted by synthetic \-i:;lon. and, 3 tllt:(~l~, of illusion fabricated for the systematic

exclusion of some is rc?iziced hy a new thjory of integration aimed at the inclusion of

all. l'he further inquiry hcrc is to find out the precise way how Sri Aurobindo updated

thc method of philosoplliring in and throu;:h his integral advaitism.

Indian thought ant1 Western (Greek) Philosophy are the two elements that

constitute the backgroiir~<i of Sri Aurobindo's innovatory work in philosophy.

However, he had his own reading of both.'5 And, unlike his predecessors in the Indian

tradition, "he propounds his doctrine not only from the extant of scriptural texts but

also fioni the basis of tcnlightenment gained through his own intuitive mystic

vision."46 Thc cxact nat,lre of the mutual influence and relation between Sri

Aurobindo's philosophy arid the Indian scriptures is unique. The primary source of his

philosophy is undoubtedly Ilis own spiritual experiences and mystical visions. 47

With this background knowledge -egarding the evolution of method in Indian

thought, the efforts to bring out clearly z nd distinctly the methodological principles

employed by Sri Aurobir~io in constructing his integral system of thought may be

resumed. And, as the methodological ana,ysis gets restarted, certain reaffirnlations of

the ot)jectives of the searzil arc in order. This can be done by relaunching the

investigation as orle of the numerous ways of solving the perennial problem of

'tnethod in philosophy.'

5.3 Method in I'hilosoph! . Philological :~nd Conceptual Analysis

Dariuna is thc tcrln that is comnonly used by the Indian writers to denote

what Western thinkers rnein by philosopl~y. Perhaps, the tern1 taffvajfiiina introduced

by VBtsyZyana in his 1\j~ij1~trsl7lrabha,sh~~r~~ would be a more apt Sanskrit word for

philosophy. For, tattvr-rrrz rncaus reality and, hence, taftvajfiina means knowledge of

reality as it is. L>arSana, or the other hr-nd, is a vision, which is normally the end

result of a knowing proces:;. ~ o w ~ e v e r . the: word that Sri Aurobindo uses most is

neither DarSuna nor tultvajij.?nu, but the Wcstern term, philosophy.

Philologically, the word philosophy comes from the Greekphilosophia, which

according to Martin Hcide;;ger, was coin~:d by Heraclitus. And it is by relying on

I-leraclitus' aphorisms that. Heidegger dcrives the meaning of philosophy.49 Sri

.4urobindo also attaches a pivotal position to Heraclitus in the history of the thought

c\:olution in the West. I-le says; "Nor is any Greek thinker more directly stimulating

than the aphoristic philosopher ~ e r a c l i t u : ; . " ~ ~ And coincidently, like Ileidegger, Sri

Aurobindo also has subjected some i-leraclitean terms and aphorisms for a

philological inquiry to find the meaning artd scope of intellectual pursuits.

The word philoso,c,hia comes from an adjectival term philosophos, which can

he declined as philein and sophon. Phiiein means to love, thus, philsophus means

loving sophon. According to Heidegger, in the Heraclitean sense, philein signifies

homo-legein, which mean?, to speak in the way in which the 1,ogos speaks or speak in

correspondence with the i.,ogos. And, correspondence is in accordance - harmonia -

with sophon. Therefbrc, Ileidegger cbserves that harmonia which effects the

correspondence is the distinguishing mark of the philein aspect of philosophos. I-le

says: "That one being rcciprocally unitcs itself with another, that both are originally T united to each other l>ec;iuse they are a1 each other's disposal -this harmonia is the

distinctive feature ofphii'r!in of "loving" in the Heraclitean ~ense ."~ '

Secondly, .Y~,l)/lo'i according t o Iieraclitus means Hen Panl~r. Panta denotes

thc totality of being. If<?n signifies the One that unites all. Thus, sophon means all

bciugs arc united in 13clnz. Heideyges gives a pointed expression to this rrleaning of

. ~ o ~ h o n ; ~ ~ "being is Being." The verb "is" in this expression is said to bc transitive

and thus brings in a notion of creative action that explains the essential unifiing

function of I$er? in .soi;l~~rz. And, tl~u:, i t means approximately "gathered together."

[laving thus identified the essential :~nd determining ele~ncnt of sophon, Being is

explained in terms of l.op,os: "Being is the gathering together - ~ o g o s . " ~ ~

Although, not ,n a strictly philological analysis of the word philosophy, Sri

Aurobindo has made an cnquily abou~ the meaning of Logos: "Heraclitus tell's us, all

indeed comes into being according.to strife, but also all things come into being 55 according to Reason, kal ~r-ii:.'~ but also karo ion logon. What is this ~ o ~ o s ? " * ~ ~ n d ,

he bring:; out the exact mitaning of Logos b:~ exploring the common meaning content

of its varied synonyms uscii by Heraclituj in his aphorisms. In Sri Aurobindo's

estimation, Logos, according to Heraclitus, is the original and absolute rational force

which must be conceivcd in contradistincticri with the inconscient reasoc working in

the material nature and thc coi~:;cious reason that guides humans. ''

From this brief pi~ililogical analysis along the exegetical lines followed by

Martin EIeidegger and Sri Ai.~robindo, the researcher concludes that philosophy is an

approach to i,ogos, originall:; motivated by it, mostly moved by it, thoroughly based

on it, and ultimately orientcil to it.

Rut, howcver, according to S;i Aurcbindo, Heraclitean Philosophia itself and

the subsequent Western European Philosophy in addition, have not realized all the

brighter prospects of their 1)ursuit. Sri Aurobindo has pointed out two significant

potentialities which the Greek-Western Eurepean Philosophy failed to reaiize for want

of an essential organon. A:; an 'aner philc*sophos' - man loving sophon, everyone

engaged in the philosophical cursuit has the possibility of realizing, firstly: the divine

lordship of L,ogos and sccor~dly, the divine supermanhood of hislher ve:ry self. The

Jndian equivalents for thcse liigllest philosophical realizations are Brahma Vidya and

Atmn Vidya respectively. Se 1.-awareness through identity is the means of knowledge

that leads to these realizaiions. Hut minc (with intellect), which is the ordinary

instrument of cognition: c;u-not employ t'lis means of knowledge. One needs to

develop another superior instn~ment of knwwledge to employ the method of knowing

hy identity. Sri Aurobilltio calls this hig:Iler organon Supermind. T!~ese points,

howcve~; need GCI-tain clahi~ - it (111.

11 is, firstly, by justifying Philo who deduced from the Iieraclitean idea of

1,ogos the concept of an in[.-1;i:;cnt Force. originating and governing the world, and,

secondly, by comparing philosophy with Vzdic-Vedgntic thought that S1.i Aurobindo

brings out the way ho~v (;reek-Westcrn philosophy failed to realize the divinc

lordship of the Absolute. 5s

Sri Aurobindo argues that since thc concept of Brahman is con~parable with

the idea of i.ogos,'9 tl-te r;cc,ker of L.ogc>s could have legitimately had the same

experiential realization of ' Logos as the scckers of Brahman in the Indian

philosophico-religious tradition gained. But, nowhere in Heraclitean philosophy one

finds an explicit identificztion of the Ab:;olute with the Divine and an attempt to

recover and promote the essential unity of philosophy and spirituality. Instead,

Western philosophy in the course of its development is found making a conscious and

laboriplrs attempt to redeem itself from its cwn religious sway.

Now, as regards Supcrmanhood, Sri Aurobindo observes that Stoics who were

largely influenced by the l~leraclitean philxophy have talked about the concept of

'seed I,ogos,' sperma/iko.c. This seed L.ogos, which is "the originativc and

determinant conscious forcer working as sJpreme Intelligence and ~ i1 l "~~perce ives

things not as the ordinary human reason perceives them, "in parts and pieces, in

separated and aggregated relations," but in ;i comprehensive and essential manner, "in

the original reason of thcir existence, their primal and total t r ~ t h . " ~ ' ~ n o t h e r

characteristic feature of r:eetl 1,ogos: is that it is reproduced in consciou!; beings as a ; '(2 number of 'seed J,ogo,. Basing himself on these observations, Sri Aurobindo

contends that the concept of seed 1,ogos is comparable with the Indian conception of

prajfia puruja, which according to VedFintic philosophy, says Sri Aurobindo,

represents "the supreme 1n1i:lligcnce who is thc Lord and dwells in the sleep state

holding all this in a secd of dense cons~:iousncss which works out through the

perceptions of a subtle puru:;ha, the mental ~e ing . "~ : ' I-Iowever, it is not a Vendantic

innovation, the Vedic seers themselves were aware of this aspect of the Absolute.

They called it; in Sri Aurobindo's transl;ition, "Truth-Consciousness." Also they

believed that humans as kno~\.t.rs/experiencers could become truth-conscious.64 Now,

when thi.: humans enter into the divine Reason and Will and by the Truth become

immortals, "anrhropoi u1l!arr,dt7i"~' they are not mere humans, but super humans. But

once again as in the ca;e of the realization of divine 1,ordship of Logos,

Supermanhood also remains as an unrealized possibility.66

What is more pcnel-a:ing and pronising of all these is Sri Aurobindo's

investigation for the reasons .,vhy Greek-We:,tenl European philosophy fails to realize

its inherent potenlialitjes. It is a promising investigation because it sheds light on Sri

Aurobindo's own conceptior~ nf philosophy, its nature and destiny.

Force. Reason and 1)clight are the tfree basic integral aspects of Being: "Force

is the first aspect of the world: war,'tlle c l ~ s h of energies, the second aspect, reason

emerges out of the appearance of force in uhich it . . . reveals itself as a certain justice,

. . . third aspect is a . . . univc:rsal delight: . . . . u41ich .. . can establish something higher

than justice, .. . harmony, . . . reason - . . . the ecstasy of our fulfilled e x i ~ t e n c e . " ~ ~

Hcraclitean philosophic^ ar.d subsequent Western-European philosophical tradition

failed to realize all that the), could have reelized because their epistemological project

was not integral. Their philosophical method and inquiry didnot seize and possess all

the three basic aspects of !ixistence. According to Sri Aurobindo, Heraclitus's own

knowlcdgc of the truth of things stopped with the vision of the universal force and

universal reason; "He (rieraclitus) seems to have summed up the principle of things in

these two terms. the aspect of consciousness, the aspect of power, a supreme

intelligence and a suprcrnc ~ n c r g ~ . " ~ ~ While Western Science went on moving around

one of the threc aspects of Existence namely, force and strived to take possession of

its measures and utilities though experiments in view of technological advancements,

the philosophical tradition went a little farther and seized the two lower aspects of the

third principle of delight too, namel:~ pleasure and aesthetic beauty, but it

unfortunately missed, Srl Aurobindo r~otes, "the spiritual beauty and spiritual

delight."6y

To bring out the differences in the epistemological approaches to reality and

the resultant variance i n the levels of app~ehension ofthe same, Sri Aurobindo makes

a distinction bctwecn Science, Kational Philosophy and Inspired Philosophy. He says;

"Science takes posscs:,ion of the measirc:s and utilities of Force, rational philosophy

pursues reason to its last subtleties; but inspired philosophy and religion can seize

hold of the highest s c i r f~ . rrltrrnznnl r - a l z , r . ~ ~ ~ ~ , n . " ~ Force, which is ihc sole object of

cnquiry of Science, ~vlicr~ left to itself can only produce a balance of forces, the strife

that is justice. But in that strife, there takx place a constant exchange of forces. When

the need for the exchaqc of forces become obvious, there arises the possibility of . modifling and replacing strife by reason which \vill function as the principle of

exchange. Accordins to Sri Aurobindo, Heraclitus and inevitably Western European

philosophy that followcti him did not clearly see all the possibilities inherent in the

rational intervention of man in nature. From the exchange of forces, determined by

reason, it is possible for humans. according to Sri Aurobindo, "to rise 1.0 the highest

possible idea of interchangi:, a mutual dep2ndency of self-giving as the hidden secret

of life, from that can gr(.nt the power of l . ~ v e replacing strife and exceeding the cold

balancc of. ri-nsnn, There ::; thc gate of divine ecstasy."" Thc Indian thought on the

other hand. ;lccording to S!-i Aurobindo, i:; a perfect sample of a philosophy inspired

by religion. He obscr\es; "Indian thought saw a third aspect of the Self and of

Brahman, besides thc univtxsal conscious~~ess active in divine knowledge, besides the

u~~iversal force active in d'vine will, it saw the universal delight active in divine love

and joy."'2

Thus, philosophy. in its original philological sense, must be an approach to

Being. - that manifests itself as Force, Reason and Delight - through Science, Rational

Philosophy and Inspired Philosophy. But, when considered against this synoptic

vision of reality and thi: ways of approaching them, philosophy as it is practiced

today, he it in the West 01. by the VeGZntins, seems to be unworthy of that description.

'The actual practice of philosophizing in the course of history has seldom been

holistic.

Thur. accord~ilg to Sri Aurobindo, Berng, if it has to be seized in its

integrality, has to be sought in terms of its integral elements, namely, force, reason

and delight, through thi. respective methods of Science, Rational Philosophy and

Inspired Philosophy. \To.n,, a t this juncture, the present thesis contend!; that the human

approach to reality ma) be conceived as constituted of the three distinct basic

rnctliods7hf knowledge identified by Sri Aurobindo. To avoid thc ecluivocal use74 of

the term philosophy, it is also contended that, the basic methodological alliance, -

Scic:nce-Rational I'hilo>~ryhy-Inspired Philosoph:: -, brought b j Sri Aurobindo nlay be

renamed as 'Physics - :Jetaphysics - Mysticism;' Physics standing for all that Sri

Aurobindo means by Science, and similarly, Metaphysics for the 'Rational

Philosophy' and ivly?ticisrn, for 'Inspired ~ h i l o s o ~ h y . " ~ In brief> Philosophy;

according to Sri Au~.ohi~~do, develops y borrowing from physical, metaphysical and

mystical ways of knowing

5.4 Methodological Alliance in lntegral iidvaitisnl

Physical kno\vledg>, gained ordin.rrily through Science or attained through

some extraordinary p e r c ~ ~ p ~ i o n s _ ' ~ is obviotlsly an indispensable common factor in any

system of thought. Although there, is no dispute regarding the essential role of

physical knowledge in c. stem of thought. there is indeed a considerable difference

discernible in the way:: of' gaining this kind of knourlcdge. When stretched little

farther, such discussions regarding the wajVs of knowing the physical tn~ths of Nature

will eventually assume tl-c form of so called 'dialogues between Science and

Religion.' However, this arcs of the methodological alliance and the related questions

arc excluded from the presm! work. The zlnalysis here is limited to the why and how

of the methodical ernplo)ment of metlphysics and mysticism in the Integral

Advaitism. An analysis [ ; I ' this sort requires certain sharper tools and certain

introductory understanding of the problcm of method in Advaitism. And hence

follows a heuristic interlude.

5.4.1 The How and What of Human Cognition

Ken Wilber in his elaborate introduction to an anthology of the mystical

writings of the world':; r : ? a t physicists has made an analysis of human cognitive

life." Hc proposes an ontological scheme in view of elaborating the domains of 78 human knowledgelexperier~ce with its corrt:sponding scheme of disciplines.

Wilbcr makes threi: major findings; First, there are five different ways in

which humans can knowlcxpcrience realily. They are physics, biology, psychology,

theology and mysticism Stcondly, each o 'these five fields of knowledgelexperience

approaches in its o\vn \\.a> :I d'-fin!tc rcalnl of rcali:y namely. matter; lifc. mind. sot11

and spirit. Finally, the structure of reality and so also the process of

knowinglexperiencing the reality is such that every supcrior realm transcends and

includes all the inferior reairns. Thus, spirit by its very nature becomes paradoxical

because it is absolutely ~ra~:scendent and a.xolutely immanent. Basing himself on this

analysis of the human k.nc,,ving process, Wilber has also made it very clear that the

connection between physic:; and mysticism lies neither in the si~nilarity of their world-

views nor in their aims and rcsults. On the other band, it consists in a self-awareness

of the physicists that they may have always been dealing with shadow symbols or

mathematical pictures or highly abstract differential equations or symbolic

procedures. Hc quotes a mcldern scientist Eddington; "Physics most strongly insists

that its r.~ethods do not pen?trilte behind th: symbolism."79 This awarcr,ess is what

leads ant. enables the physici:,ts to embrace n~ysticism.

But, there arise a f c ~ questions. Which representative field of knowledge

would this analysis of knowlcdge belong to'? Is not the conceivable structure of reality

n distinct domain in itself? Is not the 'en: bling au~arcncss' of the physicists who

embrace mysticism something more than a psychological experience? Is it not

possiblc to make an exploration into the stru:tural depth of the 'shift' from physics to

mysticism?

Besides the physical kriowinglexperitncing there is another fundamental mode

of knowinglexperiencing. A \-. Whitehead has listed a few instances of this sort of

knowingi'experiencing: sense of withness w.th the body through which i.ve are self-

alvarc of knowing oursel\res ;I:; an organic i~nity, sense of continuous and pervasive

passage and yet of continuity with - in fact conformity to t h e immediate past, sense

of aims and intentions for the immediate future.x0 Whitehead labels this level of

cxpcricncc as an experience in the mode of casual efficacy. 'These inner experiences

of being real and in proce:is can themsel\es become an object of reflection and

articulation of imakinativc ancl speculative inquiry. The result is the possibility of

metaphysical discrimination ol'the structure of reality as it appears.

An analysis of the conditions of cne's knowinglexperiencing .would give

ccrtnin clues to the fundanlental structure of reality that one is trying to

krio\\~:'ex~~cl-icnci.. .4 1>1t or 'pi.-liended' interilcll relation of entities with one another is

the prinliq and the suflicient condition for knowinglexperiencing. This relatedness of

entities represents the funt1an;ental structure ,,fall actuality. And, this structure can be

delineated only if' one passes through and beyond without denying the objectified

world of' physical knowledgelexperiencc into a deeper level of actuality. In the

process of metaphysical knowing one is participating from inside in the same

structure of being that scientific inquiry examines from outside. And these inner

participatory elements arc rieccssary ingredients of any true knowledge, because it

includes the otherwise c:xcluded inricr aspects into the content of knowledge and

guads thc knowcr against : ,~ te~t ic ism.~ ' T h x , the world disclosed by empirical study

and described by scicnce is a world constructed by the sense organ!:, theoretical

powers and the intellecrual categories of human experience and thinking. However,

this link between the mind and the universe or self and the world can neither be

established scientifically nor could it be inferred from theories. It has to be sought in

the conditions of science.

Metaphysics provide:; the theoretical framework for science, which science by

itsclf lacks. It provide:: a clearer, less axtract, more concrete and more direct

delineation of what is real. Metaphysics can assess the cognitive value of each special

mode of knowing1experic:ncing: Physical sciences, Art, Religion, etc. 11: can give a

credible account of those factors crucial to all experience that science, by abstracting

from them tend to ignore. 'I'he following Ere a few of such factors; universality of

change, pervasiveness of ~ '~ .der ; continuity within time, appearance of novelty,

inipo~tacce of ainis and v;tlui::;: ctc. Since there is no conceivable experiecce that does

not illustrate these traits or ihctors, the melaphysical statements, i.e., the expressive

statements about these traits cannot be falsified.

'fherefore: a self-consistent science uould point beyond itself to an ontological

or metaphysical ground inclusive of knowerlexperiencer and the object of

knowledge/experiencc. Metaphysical knowledge in tum presupposes that the object of

inquiry has or can have i i still deeper and inore mysterious dimension. I-fence, it is

legitimate to expect an encounter with a realm of mysteries in the process of human

knowledgeiexperience. 5.incc. whatever concerns mysteries would be called

the cncountcr with the my~teries can be described 2,s mystical

knowledgelexperiencc. Mystt:l.ics should not be understood as the exclusive referent

of the incomprehensible rsality. Mystery includes the sign or symbol through which

the incornprehcnsible reality is made accessible to the knowers. In ol.her words,

mystery denotes not only tile synbolized but the symbol also.

Now. the heuristic cxpioration has reached a point where it must, basing itself

on the critical study and the new findings, think of enhancing the Wilber's analysis of

hurnan cognition. The ir~clu:;ion of metaphysics into the list of the fields of knowledge

alone will not answer the cjiuestions that have been raised. And, it is not an easy task to

expan? Wilber's schcm:. i:r, rnctaphysicc, which is yet to bc included in the scheme

is implicit in all the ficld:. just like Spirit (on the ontological side) is immanent and

transcendent. Therefore, 111 that a search for the How and What of human

knowledgeiexperience can derive. as it seems. is a set of broad methodological

principles and a few resul,:;int insights. And, the researcher proposes 1.he alliance of

Physics-Metaphysiis-Mysticism as a reasonable heuristic model.

5.4.1.1 Physics - Metaphysics -Mysticism

Physics as the basic mode of knowinglexperiencing has the entire ontic reality

as its object of inquiry. Thc object of metaphysics is the structural complexities of all

that is (the subject and tl-ie object are included). Mysticism, unlike in the previous

modes of physics and metaphysics, whc-e the knowerlexperiencer proceed through

deduction or induction, is heeding to the 'revealing reality.' On the part of the

knowerlexperiencer the ot~iect of inquir). is mystery. Hence, all that heishe can do is

to wait eagerly to hear the unheard anc to still the whole self to see the unseen.

Because, it is not throug.1~ grasping sorething, but by living the mystery that one

knowsJexperiences in the ~riystical mode (~i'inquiry.

All the same, if' the methodological principles are prioritized by the

knower/experiencer, the r.c:sultir~g knowle3ge.lcxperience will assume the nature of the

primary mode employed in the process. This is how there are different fields of

knowledgelexperience. Foi. instance, a physicist knowslexperiences reality primarily

through the physical mode: whereas th,: philosopher approaches reality through a

~netaphysical mode arid a theologian does it through the mystical mode. However,

irrespective of the order of priority, each one is expected to employ other modes also

in their inquiry so that thc approach may he true and integral.

I11 short, Physics-Metaphysics-Mysticism represent the three 'basic modes of

human knowing1expr:riencing ant1 three representativc fields of

knon'ledge/expericnc?. In this scnse, physics rneans the science of physical

knou ledge/experience; ~ ~ ~ d a p h y s i c s mcz ns the science of speculative or ontological

reasoning; and mysticism mc2.ns the sciencc of direct knowledgeJexperience. They are

considered to be integral ant1 basic modes of kno\vitlglexperiencing because none of 83

them in its own capacity i;nov:s/experie~lces reality exhaustively.

'The cnrx of the p~ op~~scll woutd be the following: on the one side, matter, mind

and mystely seem to bc t h i essential media of both the unfolding of Reality and

human knowledge/experie~!c.c of it, and on the other side, physics - rrletaphysics -

mysticism form the methotlological alliancc indispensable for any genuine search for

Reality in its integrality.

5.4.2 Problem of Method in Advaitism

The question of rccthod in advaitism has to be tackled at two levels,

epistemological and hemeneutical. Thc technical Sanskrit equivalent for the

epistemological aspect of method is Pramdpa and that for the hermeneutical side,

Pmkriya. Epistemologica!ly the question enquires the ways of advancing knowledge

and in the henneneuticdl level the starch is for the most effective ways of

communicating the knowlvdge gained.

5.4.2.1 &ti as the Final Ijramripa

All the advaitir<\ ;I , : profoundly committed to iruti as the infallible revelation.

Although Srufi refers to \'cdns as a w h ~ l e , it is the Vedhta - U p a ~ ~ i ~ a d s -, which

f&ms the final portion c>f the Srufi that constitutes the special object of advaitic

tradition. Thus, prcci~ely. for the advai~ins, Vcd,Znta is the valid and true means of

knowledge that can reve:11 the ultimate rc:ality to the human intellect. Ultimate Reality

is not an object of pcri;-pion becausc it is not an object of the s-nses. Note the

lJpani~2dic descriptions ;:f the Ultimate Reality: "That which one does not see with

the eye,"84 "Nobody sec:; him with the eye,"85 "It is not comprehended through the

Which can not 111, thought by the mind. through which they say the mind

thinlts."" If, thus. sensf pcrception hai nothing, to do in revealing Brahman, other

sources of knouledyt:, :;t!ch as inferenc:, comparison and postulation that depend on

the data supplied by the sense perception too will have little to do in Brahmavidya.

Sense-perception and the threr meals of knowledge that depend on it car1 impart only

the knowledge of the sen:;iblc facts and objects.

.4nd, because Hr;ihn~an is self-evident by nature,88 it does not need any means

to establish itself: "You call not see the sec:r of seeing, you cannot hear the hearer of

hearing., you cannot think the thinker of thinking: you cannot know the knower of

knowing."89 However, ~r!ert:cprion n ~ d othcr means of knowledge do associate with

the ultimate reality, but or^!^. through igr.orance that establishes an appearance of

duality. YO

5.4.2.2 Adhydropa-Apa~lddo as the Basic I'rakriya

The supreme reality. which is non-'dual, which has no particular features, and,

which is beyond the rarlgr of speech and mind, is the truth realized by the classical

Vedantins. To commu~~ic:rte this experie.lce they employ a special method called

adhyGropa--apavr7du, which means "false attribution followed by retr;icti~n."~l The

first articulation of this method is found in Sankara's Bhagavad Gita BGshya; "For

there 'is the saying of th,.:se who know the true tradition, "that which cannot be

expressed (in its true f(>rni directly) is expressed (indirectly) through false attribution

and subsequent retractior-I "" According to this method, first certain features are

falsely attributed to the featureless Bratunan, and then subsequently they are all

n~gated. '~

A negative method which goes or1 falsifying and excluding all that comes in

its way must naturally lead the system, as in the case of Buddhism, to nihilism. But, in

spitc of the ncgative i~er~neneutics i t practiced, unlike the Buddhist anatamavr7du

traditian, the advaitic :.ra<jitlon in Ved2n.a has never bee11 nihilistic. ILt so happened

hecaurc Brahamn. thi:. :~,prtrimpositio~~> on whonl are rcnloved by the negaii~e

? mcthrd, is said to rel-na,~: unaffected a~id unncgatcd throughout the liermeneutical

process.9' Thus, negative method brings by implication positive kn.owledge. This

scnsemay lead scholars 10 think that th.2 method of negation cannot be understood

apart lirorn the method of indication, iuksaga." However, it must be noted here that

scholars have failed to produce sufficient illustrations of Sarikara's use of lakfapu

along with ~d~i ivo~uvi idc r . "kmo11~ a fev scholars who have worked in this direction,

Richard De Smet has tried to attach more importance to l ak~up i by projecting the

positi\/e rncthod of indicati~~n as the major hermeneutical method employed by

~alikara and keeping the melhod of nefaticn as an intermediar). step to the former.97

I-lo\ve\~ir, by doing that. It scerns; he lras confused interpretation with truth,

hcrrneneutics with epistemtrlozy.

In hrief, for advaitins, snhrlu is the most reliable source of knowledge and false

attribution followed bj- retraction is the msic method of interpretation.9R In other

words, an epistemological principle, namely; commitment to Vedu-pramtIgu and a

hermeneutical technique c:illed adjiaropu-rzpuv6da are the constituent elements of the

vedatltic method. Now, keeping this finding as the immediate background knowledge

the present study gbes on cxposing the methodological alliance in integral advaitism

with e restatement of its contention in :, more explicit and elaborate manner. By

contenting that therc i :~ a i:niquc inclusiveness of mctaphysics and mysticism in the

Advaitism of Sri Aurobindo what is intended here is to highlight three characteristic

features of his system o f tl~ought: (a) Metaphysical expressions borrowed from

rational philosophy arc thc: interpretative keys employed in Sri Aurobir.do's advaitism

\vhile adherence to mysticd knowing proper to inspired philosophy functions as the

guiding epistemo1ogic:al principle, ( b ) The metaphysical language: used by Sri

Aurobindo is plastic enoi~gll to contain znd convey the mystical knouiledge coded in

his integral philosophy. :.ril:Il; (c) The inc:lusivene:ss of metaphysics arid mysticism is

not the sign of an intcllei.i~ra1 conf'usion between episteinology and hermeneutics, hut

an e\idential support for :I r:upramental fusion of reason and religion.

5.4.3 Inclusiveness of Metaphysics and Mysticism.

.4s a system oi' philosophy, integral advaitism is constructed in view of

conversing \vith human icason, \vhich Sri Aut.obindo helie;~cs to be "proceeding by

hypothesis. assumption and theory subject to verification of some kil~d."~' And, what

it wants to communical~: is a "conscioi.~ experience of l'rulh, seen, felt, lived within

and ... a spiritual pcrcr:ption (more dilecl and concrete than intellectual) of the true

significance of things \vhich may ex?ress itself in thought and :speech, hut it is

independent of them i n itself."'00 Thu:;, Sri Aurobindo's advaitism is rational and

suprarational at the same tlmc. l'he coitent is mystical nhile the continent is

rnctaphysical.

In the methodological alliance criployed in integral advaitistn, mysticism

con~cs first. It f~~nctiol-:s :IS the surcst means for realizing thc deepest truths of

Existcnce. Metaphysics colncs second anti it formulates the niystical realizations in

intelligible terms. Sri At.lrohindo has v e y clearly brought out this distinction:

Wherever there has b2en a considerable spiritual developntent there arises

from it a philosophy ju:;tifying it to the intellect. The method was at lirst an

intuitive seeing and an intuitive expre:;sion, as in the fatl~ornless thought and

profound language cl'the Upanisads, hut afterwards there was developed a

critical method a fir171 system of dialectics, a logical organization. Tihe later

philosophies were a$- intellectual accouut (I-<&. Gita, Sri Auribindo's Foot

Note) or a logical ,justification of what had been found by inner realiza~.ion, or

they provided theni!;clves, a mental ground or a systematized method for

realization and expxience. (Eg. The Yoga philosophy of Patanjali, Sri

Aurihindo's Foot ~o tc ) ' ' '

Thus, the 'intuitive seeing' which happens in the course of spiritual

development may perhaps ~?rovisionally bc identified as the mystical way of knowing,

thc epistemological principie, and, 'inttllectual account' which gives a 'logical

justification' as the melaphysical cxpressi:jti, the hermeneutical technique. However,

up to this point Sri Aurobindo seems to share thc common path o f v e d h t i c tradition

championed by ~ a n k a r a .

His uniqueness lie:; in the fact that he went one step further from the Vedht ic

\\.a>- of employing thc t?~i:tIiods of mystical knowing and meVap11y:;ical knowing

.sc.cli~ee'tiailj~ as the epistc:-~ological print:iplc and thc hermcneutical tcchnique, to

widen their scope so as to facilitate ccrtain mutilal inclusion or stmzrrlzvayu. To

highlight the innovarivc. sic.) talcen hy Sri Airrobindo, an efforl basing on the findings

of thc prcvious scctio~lj r1:i integral cpist~:mology and human cognition to bring out

the contrast between tlic :sequential model of knowing and the snmnnlinyu model of

knowing urould be hclpful.

In the snmanvaj,n model of knowing both mysticism and metaphysics have

their operational fields cx~):inded from within and thus their boundary lines removed.

The knower is knowins tkrc object of knowledge as in the way it is found identified

with hisher consciousnes:;. And, i n every act of subsequent expression of the known

content the facts represt:ntcd are pzrceivcc in the way it is known by the perceiver. It

is so; because l;no\~letlgc!experience is a self-expression of the object of

hiowledgelexperience, anr:l any r:uhscqut:nt expression is an encapsulation of the

knowledgelexperience zailied through thr. epistemic process of identification. Thus,

here. knowing is an experience of 'knov~ing as' and the act of 'making something

known as' is also giving sm opporlunity fc~r an experience of '!mowing as'. Therefore,

in an integral approach; bc it :m epis.emological query or some herrneneutical

enterprise, the ob-ject is seized through a knowledge/experience by identity.lo2

Howcver, to bring out the exact rature of inclusiveness, the specific role and

significance that Sri Aurobindo attaches with Metaphysics and Mysticism need to be

elucidated.

5.4.3.1 Mystical Knowin,;:

Sri Aurobindo cotisiders Salikara as the greatest of all n~etaphysical thinkers.

A number of times he ti:~s registered his admiration for ~akkara's contributions to

Vedaptic metaphysics lo'' But, he does i ~ ~ t think that ~arikara, while he interpreted

Vedsntic metaphysics. rc:ied on the best possible means of knowledge to understand

the secrets of Vedas. IVotc. a sha~v observation of Sri Aurobindo in this regard; '$1 do

not think that ~akkara's i.aliona/ i~ztelle,;?, subtle indeed to the extreme, but avid of

logical clearness and ,:on~istenc)~, could penetrate far into that mystic synzholisn~."'~~

Sri Aurobindo scems t o wonder whcther Saf&arals commitmcni to ~rzcti was

complete enough, fir:;11!. in undersiancing the meaning of Vedic re\~elation in its

fullness, and secondlj-, i r l interpreting it; implications in their integrality. The Vedic

~liethod of knowing and interpreting is summarized, according to Sri Aurobindo, in

the following Sloktr:

''( 1 lrjlm ~ ~ i a S r ~ ~ l i r r . caru

Sromtln ahhi survu

uhhi grpihi ti ruva "'"' This .F'loku is comprised of two verses

from Kg Veda; 1.10.3, 4. Verse 3, "Giri'm upuirulim curu" means 'respond with

.iruti to our words' an(! vc-se 4, "Stomclr abhi snrvu abhi grnihi a ruva" means

'vibrate to our songs of praise, speak them out as they rise, cry out thy response.'

No\v, basing on this S/<:~kc: he brings out the Vedic method of knowledge and the

Vedantic method of intt:rp~ctalion: "'1.0 cr~ter passively into the thoughts of the old

Rishis, allow their worlcs 10 suit to their souls, mould them and create their own

rcvcrberation in a symp;ithc!ic and respon:,ive material - submissiveness, in short to

Sruti - was thc theory tllc ancients themselves had of the method of Vedic

knowledge" and, "To lister1 in soul to the cld voices and allow the Sruti in the soul to

rcspopd, to vibrate, first obscurely in ansuer to the Vedantic hymn of knowledge, to

give response, the echo and last to let that response gain in clarity, intensity, and ,3106 fullncs: - this is the prirlci;:le of interpremion. .. In short, as hc writes in The L+

Divine, "the true knowledge and description must be left to the language of the mystic

and the figures, at once more vivid and recondite, of a direct ;md concrete

experience."lO'

Quite in correspondsnce with the hasic method of human cognition, one can

find in Sri Aurokindo s treatment of the problem, a fine fusion or a mutual

inclusi\eness of the melhod of knowledge: and method of interpretation. And, here

this relationship between the method of knowledge and the method of interpretation -

'epistemology and hermeneutics' or 'mysticism and metaphysics' as they are

represented in the present scheme of thought - is asymmetrical. To the original

interpreter. it is a one-way movement from the source of knowledge to the method of

interpretation. liisiher rny::,fcal knowlcdg~:/experience is transmitted to the readers

through a sort of mys?ic:ll kii-ilosophy. To t . 1 ~ readcr:s too, it is a onc-waq relationship,

f io~n the intuitive languiigc 10 the source c f intuition. 'l'hus; in either case, though in

'ontranr directions, tliel-c is L. cross-section;~l movement. In the case of S1.i Aurobindo,

\vho clcims to have offered :in original interpretation of Vedas and the Lpani~ads, the

nio\re~nent of consciousncs; is from mysticism to metaphysics

5.4.3.2 Mystical Experien~ce, the Ultimate Source of Knowledge

As it was discu?se(-i in thc previous chapter, in Sri Aurobindo's exposition of

the doctrine of pran?i?p(:: the ways of knowing tlxough identity - knowing by

intimate direct contact ; a d knowing by identity - are the two methods that put reason

into its pure and sovereign use. The other two means_ which know through separative

contacts are of no use ir: tkcr attempt to knc,w the truth of Vedas, for the latter is not an

object of perception, internal ancl external. Among the two method:j of knowing

througll identity, the exdct source of knowledge used by Sri Aurobindo is the means

of knowledgc by idcnlity. The other source, namely knowing by intimate direct

contact, is also a way of knowing through identity. But to put it precisely, it is a way

of knowing of' identity, not a knowing by identity. There is in fact a world of

difference between the itno\vledge ofiden:ity and knowledge by identity. An attempt

to bring out the difference lietween these t-NO ways of knowing will also bring out the

unique features of the ultimate source of kr~owledge used by Sri Aurobindo.

I3uman reason has :I double action; dependent and sovereign.Io8 Reason

through its dcpendcnt a:ti..x~ perceives thc phenomenon, while pure reason takes the

scnsiblc as a starting pc~inl and goes beyond to see what is behind the phenomenon.

When reason is released fr8:tn its dependent actions, and functions freely and purely, it

i b raised to the lc.\lel <IS intiition or overmind consciousness where from it can see the

cssenci: of things. At this lcvcl, reason achicves two things; it becomes intimately

aware, af the essences, an,! i t manifests a higher way of knowing through, what he

calls, 'soul-seeing.' Ways of knowing through identity occur in this zone of the pure

action of reason. Firstly, i:. <employs an instrument of knowledge, which is described

by Sri Aurobindo as 'kno\\,ledge though intimate direct contact.' This is knowledge 10') . of identity. K.C. Varad11nc:iri calls it Upamanu Consciousness. The other way of

kiiowi~-&! ihrou~?li id en ti^:'. , ' r i ~ ~ i or SGk~uk3r.u as it is gtnerall>- callcd, conies w;ith a

still purer use of rcason. 111, reason that employs the instrument o f ~ a h d a ~ r a m r i ~ a , is

!:citl:cr t h i oi-di:in:-) no;- ti;(: 3xtra ordinary dimenr;ioil 01' mental I-cason, sut the higher

rcason powered by supratn~-ntal levels of being.

Knowledge by intirnate direct contact should not be confused with what is

ordinarily understood as (lrlomrina. In the realist schools of Indian thought, iJpamrlna

is employed as an analogical inference, a scnsist instrument of knowledge. But, in the

mystical traditions of thc Indian thought, a; Dr. K . C . Varadhacari obsen~es, Upumnnu

undergoes "a transfomatil~rt from the poor. analogical reasoning that it is considered

to he and just an extension ol'the infcrenti rl rea~oning""~ and becomes an instrument

of knowing the supersen:;ible. Thus, wh.>n UpamLina is redeemed from the usual

association \vith sense-depcndcnt reasoni:~~, it begins to "intuit the inner nature of

rcality as correspondential. symbolic. supra-subjective, having its own unity of all

grades and displaying n~l~iual reflection which alone makes the splendid multiple

figure of speech that adc'ln great language and ~iterature.""~~hus, there is a clear

contrast bet~veen the se;lsi::c e ~ n ~ l o ~ m c n t of iJpamiinu and the mystics' use of it as an

instrument of supersensible correspondence knowledge. Latter is the kind of

l/pan?iina employed in tht Upaniyads and their commentaries while describing reality

positively.

Although the graded process of cognition may seem to reach its summit with

the knowledge of supersen.sible realities by means of intimate direct contact, in fact, it

is not a complete cognition. For, the proper domains of Upumana and the related

lower instruments of kno..vledge are limitcd in scope and application. And, all of them

togetl-ier or any of then) independently ca:inot seize integral reality. To seize reality in

its inrler depths and tr:mscendent uni\~ers.~lity, in its essential oneness and manifested

niany-ness, ).el anothel. si81irce of itnowlec ge must be cmployeti.

A careful analjlsiz of the logic behind the knowledge of identity, UpamrIna

consciousness, itself v~ould open the gates of the ultimate source of knowledge that

Sri Aurobindo claims lo !~nve relied on: Jfscnsible is the negation of the supersensible

there would not be any si~nilitude or correspondence. And, if there is no such

similitude or conespond~.:t~ce - if not organic and hnctional, at least structural- there

lies then no ground for a113!ogical imagination or analogical reasoning. Iiowever, this

is not the case. The idznl.ir) theories of tlie ~ ' e s t " * and the Indian systems that accept

~Ipum3nu as a valid sourc:c of knowledgc:'13are all basing themselves c,n the perceived

fact of corrcspondencc. 'fhe Fact of co~i-espondence, according to Sri Aurobindo,

points to the non-opposi-lioil between thc sensible and the supersensible, finite and the

infinite. l'hc perceived ~ ;~ i )os i t i ,~ t l is ot~ly a phenomenal dcscriptior!. Negation is a

merely methodological process. devoid of any ontological implication. Finite is veiled

infinite and rnatter the conci:aled sl>irit.'14

Therefore, awakening fully into the inner truths of the sensible is a way of

possessing the super::en:ihle condense3 in it. In the reverse movement of

consciousness, which is :he essential prercquisitc of subliminal r:ognition, the

knowledge thus gained through intimate direct contact is not the ultimate phase, but

the penultimate phase (1-rived through thc analogical imaginatiorl of reversed

consciousness. The next one is the ultimalc way of' knowledge. Sri Aurobindo calls it

knotvledge by identity, ,$r~,li, ,$ahda, Ved,c knowledge, etc. This method involves no

act of knowing, but a pa!:sive awareness secreting from within the depthslheights of

one's being. Since there \vas an e1abora.c discussion on this point in the previous

chapter, it is needless t i 1 d ~ ~ ~ e l l more on it llcrc.

5.4.3.3 Metaphysics as the Handmaid 01' Mysticism

As it was notcd crrlier, Sri Aurohindo's use of the words 'philosophy' and

'philosopher' is not in tb.e original philological sense of the words philosophia and

aner philsopho.~, respectiwly. He uses t ~ e word philosophy as a generic term that

denotes the entire acti\ritics of the humar mind."' 13e conceives it as a handmaid of

n~ystical knowledge/cxpr:rie~~ce and ks the rational foundation of physical

knowledgelexperience."" In the order of different methodical approaches to reality,

philosophical approach l>l!s in between the physical approach and the mystical

approach. In the present scheme of thouzht developed from the heuristic treatment,

'metaphysics' covers all that Sri Aurobindo means by philosophy, metaphysics,

ratiocination, rational philosophy: intellectual philosophy, etc. The ol~jective in this

section is to bring ow tha: significance oi' Sri Aurobindo's conception of philosophy,

which has often gone unrloticed, may be hecause of the lack of exclusi-ve treatment of

the topic. use of multipli tc:rminology, (:I. a fcw apparently self-defea~.ing statements

liltc "I am not a philoso;:hcr ...", ctc. Tl c nature o r metaphysics ma). bc delineated

first and then its function:i shall be brougl t out.

Through metaphy:;ical inquiries, a seeker of truth can arrive at "only some

initiai representations oi' abstract and senera1 character.""' Direct knowledge is

always an exclusive privi1eg.r: of the mysticel way of knowing. Philosophy as a search

for knowledge will fail to ii~liill it:;elf, for the last word of knowledge will remain

always unknowable to it. Allhough the unknowable is not absolutely unknowable,"'

it will bc practically unknowable to philosophy which is only a "cre:ation of the

n~ind.""~ For. the mind nec:i:ls to enter into the nature of Supem~ind in order to know

the 'fru~h: "...it is only whan we have a l redy had experience of a higher intermediate

consciousness that any tcrnis attempting to describe supramental being i:ould convey

a true meaning to our intelligence; for thzn having experienced something akin to

what is described, we cc~uli translate in an inadequate language into a figure of what

we know."lzO Therefore, Sri Aurobindo dnes not consider metaphysical reasoning as

a means to extend knowledge. He refus~s to admit the autonomy of reason. He

believes that rational intellect would be empty without some mystical intuition 121 -

generated by knowledge by identity - tha-. gives the content to the former. In short,

philosophy is not a means 0; knowledge, but a medium of expression."2

Thus. by nature thc whole edifice of metaphysics needs to bc concerned with

the relation? hetween trvo things; "the funjamental tmth of existence artd the f o m ~ s in

which existence presents itself to oul. experience."'23 Now, acwrding to Sri

Aurobindo, the all-penmding Absolute, the Divine, is the fundamental tmth of

existence. And, the form!; in which Existence presents itself to our experience is the

world. to refer to it collectively, or to p:lt i t concretely, each one's life with all the

promoting and demoting lhctors in and around. So, nothing stands beyond the scope

of metaphysics. If so, rational metaphysics stands in need of urgent enhancement. Sri

Aurol~indo says in thii; c:?nnection; "Not he the philosopher that achieves marvels in

ratiocination and winncth the applause o!'an intellectual age, but he wllose organon is

a sharply whetted instrc~nent which Crod pierces into the closed strongholds of

prejudice: pedantry, c.:rrol- and o b s c u r a r ~ t i s m . " " ~ h r o t ~ ~ h his metaphysical poetry.

aSavilri; Sri A~~robind(i is i a fact trying to give an cxample of philosophizing through a

poclic fi~rni. IIc say!: a k o ~ t his plan kehind S~,vilri; "The p11ilosol)hy (of Savitri)

expresses or tries to exp~.(:ss a total and many sided visions and experience of all the

planes of being and their action upon each other. Whatever language, whatever terms

are necessw to cc\n.icy this truth of vision and experience it uses without ,>I25 scruple.. .

Having ordaincd metaphysics as thc mediator between mystical

knowledgelexperience and physical kno\\~Iitdge/experienee, Sri Aurobindo has hrther

described its specific joh i l l tlic total movement ofconsciousness. In the capacity of a

rational search engine, 1-~liilosophy has lo f~l f i l l four functions. Howeve]., they are not

four independent services that philosophy does, but four functional sispects of the

single process of mediatio::. 'I-he first among them is to seek for truth by the intellect

dispassionately. 'Dispassionate' search means a search, in the words of Sri

Aurobindo, "without prepossession and prqjudgement; with no other first proposition

than the law of th~~ghr.""!" This would in~ply that philosophy is not bound to square

its observations and concli~sions with any current ideas of religion stnd dogma or

ethical rule or aesthetic pxr:iudice. Sri Au~obindo regards this function of philosophy

as its svadhar.ma.12' To fultill this duty eflectively and completely, a perfect freedom

of the intellect is an esscntir.1 condition. He says; "They (Philosophy, Science and Art)

must be left free even t . ~ cir-ny God and G3od and Beauty if they will, if their sincere

observation of things so points to them. E'or all these rejections must come round in

the encl of their circling and return to a larger truth of the things they refilse."'28

Secondly, philosophy has to offer an intellectual formulation of the

psychological and phy:;ical facts of' ~xistence.l~"n doing this, philosophy has to

bring out, on the one hanci. the inter-relational possibilities among the :;ubliminal and

surface aspects of Exis?.en:,.:: and on the other hand, the basic relation of these aspects

with the ultimate ontic fi~ndament. Sri Aurobindo has put it very succinctly, "The

philosopher's business is :o discriminatr Truth and put its parts and aspects into

intellectual rclation wit,$ ex!, other.'."" It is this functional aspect of metaphysics that

makes it an effective guitis.: to a dynamic solution of the problems of :.elf-experience

and world-experience.""

'The third function (~i'philosophy i i to make metaphysical distinctions. It is by

making such distinctions (hat the intellect escapes "from the confusi~~n of our first

undistinguishing mental view of things." '"~ccordin~ to Sri Aurobindo, there is only

one sense, hfanus, sense-mind, which has one inherent action and five specializations,

namely, vision: hearin!;. ~ < ! u c h ; smell anc taste. Cognitions and \,olitions are mind's

direct pure actions, wl-.erza its awareness about the objects in the external world is

the result of its mixi:d :ictions. The a~\.areness of the external wc>rld is gained

indirectly through the sensc organs. It is th: mere regularity of the dominant habit of

ego, which often separates ti:e knower fron~ the rest of thc world by dividing h idher

as subject anti everpiling clse as object. I t is possible for a knower to develop

processt:s and functions by which be/she inay again enter into communion with all

that have bcen excludcd.

Human mind ha:; iiicustorrled itscif to depend upon certain physiological

f~~~ict ioning and their rel~ctioil:; as its normrl means of entering into rela1:ion with the

objects in the world. This 1:; because the mind has consented to be d'ominated by

matter. Once the mind is tr.ained to liberate itself from the clutches of matter and

original falsehood it will be;xrne capable of taking direct cognizance of the objects of

knowledge. The mind must thus assert "iis true character as the one and the all-

sufficient sense and free :o apply to the objl-cts of the sense in its pure and sovereign

instead of its mixed and dependent a~tion." '~ ' Now, through a process of pure

ratiocination, mind reaches 2.1 certain conce 3ts which are not gained by physical way

of !alpwing. Thus, although the complete use of pure reason takes the knower from

physical knowledge to mi:tal;hysicaI knowle~ige, the demands of hishcr integral being

are not satisfied by metaphysical knowledge alone, for, as Sri Aurobindo says, "every

concept is incomplete for us ,~nd to a part of our nature almost unreal, until it becomes

an e ~ p e r i e n c e . " ' ~ ~

Finally, metaphysics ilas to make a:1 attempt to define to the mind what is

really Intinite, Ultimate, and ~ b s o l u t e . ' ~ ' In relation to this function, the other three

are preparatory s t e p . I-Iowe~.cr, the metaphysical statements made in view of defining

the Infinite can never be quite final or ultimate, for the highest truth "can t ~ e lived, can ,,I36 - be seen, but can only be patially stated. rhus, basing on this final functional

aspcct of metaphysics. ljri Aurobindo secms to admit the real pos!iibility and 13: relcvancc of cognitive p1un::isnl. And, as his choice, he follows the method of

stating nlctaphysically 111,: -.~ltimrlte truth El, making "a frec resort to image and

symbol, its intuitive forin of specch in v.hich the hard limiting definiteness of

intellectual utterance of broken down and thc: implication of words are allowed to roll

out into an illimitable wa)- trf suggestion."'38

5.4.4 l~~clusivcness Exemlllificd in Epistemic Justification

According to Sri A:!lobindo, the process of cpistemic justificatioll proposed by

the Indian tradition ha:; a <!<.finite structure. An cxumi~lation of his account of the

Indian treatment of the pr~~i)Icli? and the r1:lated question of certainty will show how

the dil'fercnt methods of knowledge, specially, metaphysics and n~ysticism are

integrated in one movt:mcnt of consciousness. jfiiinam, the certain imowledge, is

arrived at after a few operations and $elf-instrumentation of consc~iousness. Sri

Aurobindo writes: . First, the inquirer pu~ifies his intellec: by stilling of passions, emotions, and

prejudgements and o:d Samskaras or associations. Secondly, he subjects

received knowledge I O ;I rigid scrutiny by skeptical vicara, separating opinion

from ascertained u-u:Ii, mere conclusions from facts. Even the facts he takes

as only provision;~ll) 1r:ic aiid is prep:~red to find his whole knowledge to be

erroneous, misapplied or made up of half-truths. Thirdly, he experiments to

get upalabdhi or per:;::nal experience. Fourthly, he again uses vicara in order

to ascertain how far his experiment re:~lly carries him and what he is or is not

justified in concluding from it. Lastly he turns the light of the visuddha

buddhi on the subject and by inspired discrimination arrives at jnanam.Ii9

Basing on this passage thc structure of erlistemic justification can be tirought out as

f01low:j: jfiiinanz; the trse ;11;?; certain h o v ~ l e d g c is arrixred at a stage preceded by four

definite operations. Purifying, scrutinizing, experimenting, and discriminating are

those tbur operatiofis. I he first operation is meant to purify the intellect and the other

three are carried out in rclation to the knowledge contents received through the

intellect. And, becausc these operatisns arc all cognitional operations of

consciousness, each of them does emploq certain specific instruments of knowledge

such as Yogic siidhann, sl,;cptical i:iciiru? ;::~d lifc-events.'40 And theti, each operation

with h e help of its s p e c i c cogr~itive tool yields distinct results such as vi,iuddha

huddhr, provisional ccl.tali?h, personal experience, and the power of discernment.

I:inall>,, 2 new instrut;-.en1 of hno\\lcdgc: ilamcly, ~,ix,cka; clncrges and guides thc

entire cognitional opcnitioii intcgr;illy to i.i:ach j~iunai~i. Further details of the structure

of epistemic justification ;IS conceived b:. Sri Aurobindo shall be given along with

explanation of diagram in Appendix. 1 iq which the researcher tries to present Sri

Aurobindo's concept of integral epistemological process.

l'he thick horizont:il. vertical; and diagonal lines in the diagram signify thc

ultimate ontic fundamen:: c~insciounness thit itsclf functions as the varied aspects and

principles of the integral episteniic proces.. The numbers in the thick horizontal line

represent thc cognitional operations of human consciousness and that in the thick

vertical line stand for the rclatcd eognitiv': inst~uments. ' I e rcctanglcr:, with which

the numbers signifyin;: ill(: cognitive operations involvetl and the cognitive

instruments employed are diagonally at:ached, represent the end result of the

cpistcrric process at it:; each definite staic. Now, an explanation of .the cpistemic

process at each stage is i n pii~cc.

5.4.4.1 The First Stage

In the first stagc 'puritication of ]he intellect' is the main operation, yogic

sr7dhana is the instrument used, and puritied intellect, viiuddhabuddh,' is the result

gained. 'fhe seeker is adced to purify hislher intellect by stilling all passions,

emotions: prejudices, and associations. Thwe are different yogic ways of purification.

Sri Aurobindo himself tried many yogic paths, but attained the goal, as it was

mentioned in tlic first chap.,:r-. by a si~nple method of 'stilling the mind' by which he

realized that the gates lo the overmental and supramental powers are automatically

opened when the ordin21-y ~i-.cntal operatio~r:; are stilled. Purification has to be pursued

caimcstly and ccascles:;!y ~ l i i t i l t . 1 ~ intellect becolnes unaffected by the interior

~no\~en-lcnts of the ego. ;:nd thus become pt re - - vi.fuddhuhuddhi.

5.4.4.2 The Second Stage

A thorough scrr?tir~\ of all the a\~ailahle knowledge claims is the cognitional

operation undertaken by consciousness at 1 his stage. vicCva, log.ical reason, in contrast

to 'higher reason,' is thi: ~pecific instru~ncnt of knowledge employed here. The

p11qx)se of the process of scrutinizing is lo distinguish certair7 truths from uncertain

opinions, biased statements, doubts and sheer stupidity. A stupid claim has no

knowli:dge content. Dout~i; hctray the fluctuation of mind between two or more

possibilities. A biased statanent is an obvious misapprehension of the: total picture.

Opinions may have somc: supporting rcasons, hut a certain claim alone will have

sufficient reasons and evidc~~tial supports This operation is designed to discover the

sufficient reason, if any. i"i14d the end result of such rigorous and detached intellectual

e~iterpi-isc is a soit of proviio~ial ccrtaint).

5.4.3.3 Third Stage

The claims that ge.. ~hrough the rig.)rous test of vicuru are not readily accepted

as completely certain. 'l'tiz metaphysical discrimination is followed by a practical

experi~nentation. An expc:rimentation of the rationally abstracted truths against the

actual life-situations is the cognitional process at this stage. The worlcability of the

thought-solutions are examined by app1y:ng them in the real and problematic life-

situations. Concrete lifc i t d f is the instniment of knowledge here. Each experiment

leaves the inquirer with some new and specific personal experience. Such resultant

personal experience is callcd collectively as upulablihi, the end result of the process of

experimentation. The ui7aicrbdhi thus gaint:d and the knowledge claims which led the

inquircr into these lesson:i of expsrience, together constitute the data ibr the fourth

operation.

5.4.4.4 Fourth Stage

At this stage. t:or~sciousncss involvcs in an epistcmic process of

discrimination. It uses the previously enrployed organon of viciira to make again

some sharp metaphysical distinctions. Here its job is to distinguish between those

claims that work in life and ihose that are merely logical. As a result of this

cognitional operation the inquirer become; capable of making clear dir,tinctions, and

thus certain power of di:;cc~iunent is regarded as the net-result here.

5.4.4.5 The Fifth Stage

At the final sedge, c(>nsciousness integrates the methods and results of all the

four previous stages into its n~ultiple functions. Yei, it retains its distinctness and

uniqueness, by bringing, out zi new instrument of knowledge namely, viveka, which is

divine and human at thc same time. vicaru devoid of skepticism is its ardhropological

component. ~vl~ereas thc l i ~ ! i f of the ~~i . iud~ lhuh~rdd /~ i~ the result of the first operation,

perfects it by joining it as ihc divine component. Sri Aurobindo translates viveku as

‘inspired discrimination.' i,iiinun~ is the end-result of this final episteniic process of

integration.

As i t is shown in t!ie diagram, each higher stage includes the methods and

results of thc lo\ver on8::s. .'.I1 the subsequent cognitional methods and operations are

powered and guided from .!~sidc by the li&:lit of vi,f~~ddhahudd!~i which is the result of

the first operation of purification. For instmce. viveku, inspired discrimination, which

is the instrument employcd in the final cognitio~lal process of integration, includes in

its esscnce, vicaru, the mct;q)hysical discr.mination involved in the epistemic process,

and the light ofvis'uddliuh~~d~lilhi~ which is nothing other than the supramental power of

existence. In other words, r-iveku has a rational and suprarational or divine and human

components in its esscntid makeup. Now, therefore, it may be contended, as it was

done in the case of integral method of knt>wing and interpretation, that in the process

of epistemic justification approved and practiced by Sri Aurobindo, there is an

inclusiveness of the method ofmetaphysics and that of mysticism.

tlo\vc\rer, it is inip:'rtant at this ju:icturc to note the significant role of Yoga or

spirituality in the making of Sri Aurobi- do's method of inclusion. A set of Yogic

s2idhuna or a course of' spiritual discipline is what is employed in the first cognitional

operarion of the integral epistemological r~rocess.

5.4.4.6 Place of Yoga in the Process of Knowing

'The method of sarlrarzvayiz is a s~nthetic approach, but it is not a synthesis of

differznt approaches. In ::iildying a subject matter. the scientific method, for instance,

cnip1~)ys diffci-cnt iilca:is of Lnowledgc such as PC:-ception, inlercnce, postulation, ctc.

Rut. Sri Aurohindo's intc:zral approach i:. not such a combination of select sources of

kno\vledgc. 'l'lie ~netliod oi' .sc~~r~anvuj~u is riot thc cud result of an episten~ological

process of unificati~n of different pmmiir~u.~. Instead, Sri Aurobindo proceeds in the

opposite direction. He turns to each pra.wana and activates its inner dialectic. It has

always been his foundational insight that cvery basic way of knowing contains within

itself a latcnt pouer to exceed i s limits. The one, all-pervading, ever

euolvingiin\~ol\~ing cons~:iousness is the source and essence of this power. It is by

getting hold of this ~ i l - " i r k l i through Yoga that Sri Aurobindo clainis to have 141 revitali;red the inner poxvcr <IF self-transcentlcnce in each source of knowledge.

In an .automatic writing""' entitlej l'ogic ~rrdhun,'~' Sri Aurobindo gives a

f e ~ v su:;gestions for a preliminary orientatim of the consciousness of hi:s disciples. In

that honk he has stated clezi-l:, the nature ol'knowledge, instruments of knowledge and

the operations performr:d I the process of knowing. Knowledge, as explained in

Yogir Sadhun. is awarenc.:.!:. produced by an "act of consciousness operating on

something in the conscioucncss itself."'44 ~ n d , every-thing that may be known exists

in three states; srhi i l r~, .xQkyinu and kZraqa. Ktirapa denotes the existence of things in

their idcal state of con:;cic,usness. In the siik~mu state things have the possibility of

development or modificati..-n, and there tl-.ey exist in a mental state of ~:onsciousness.

In the sthiila state things l~ndergo actual change and evolution_ and there they exist in

a material state of conscio~r;ncss. Now, tl12refore tc know a thing integrally is to know

that thing in all these three states.

'The researcher finds it important at this juncture to note how Sri Aurobindo

tinderstands the specific ways of knowing at each of the above said states of

consciousness~ for it pro.,rides hirn with :l valid comparison with the ~nethodological

alliance that he propose.: little earlier: "The knowledge of Sthula is science. The

knnl%,lcdlrc of Fukstn:: i,; ~>hilosnph>; rclilion and n:c;al~h~~.vic.r. The kr,o\i-ledge of the

Karana is ~ o ~ a . " ' " 'TI-ins; tlic mzterial; tl- c mental and the ideal states of existence are

seized by the scientific: :?lctaph:isical and Yogic means of know1edl:e respectively.

And, as regards thc cngiiitive operation:; invol\~cd_ Sri Aurobindo states; "Complete

kno.n,ledgc consists ;.jf t!isee operation.;. first objective iJ2alabdhi or experience:

s:cc~:dl>. intcllcctu~.l .::<fr. 31cnt of your ili~dcrsta~~ding of the thing, thirdly subjcctivc ,,l46 TJpalabdhi or spiritual e:,:~>ctricnce. Thus. objective experience of Scicncc and tlic

subjective experience of' Yoga are the two sources of philosophy. And, because the

.sc?dhak~ are not scicn!ist.;. Sri Aurohindc suggests his disciples to sta~l. from the Yogic

source.

Howevcr, to cm,:loy the Yogic lrieans of knowledge one has to by use of the

(.'if-.'Tc~k/i keep the rz;lsrhl;3 imagination, rncmory, thought, and sensations sufficienlly

quict end pure. '1'0 actiirafr: tlic ~,'il-.<aukti in all knowerslexperiencers Sri Aurobindo

suggests Sapla (:utu~;uj LI '1':)ga.

'She pracricc of .Sa,vic CU~IAJ{UYU Yoga effects a systematic purification of all

parts and plancs of being.'.' She separati~e factors posed by the workings of the ego,

and, the seven-faccd fact ,)f ignorance, are all cleared by the Yoga. Once thus the

cntirc parts and plant:; of one's bcing are purified, the corresponding ways of

knowing, each one independently and all of them in relation to each other, begin to

evolve towards compietc possession t f their objects. In the course of this

unidirectional evolution, dii'f'erent ways o.' knowledge naturally interse8:t. And at the

outset; integral approach exhibits mutual inclusiveness of the basic: methods of

knowledge.

5.5 Retrospect and Prc.,spc:-t

Sri Aurobindo's o1>jectivc in doin: philosophy was to bring out the original

advaitic philosophy inherent in the Upanj~ads and in the Gita. And, i:n so doing hc

employed the method c:'f :;rrmonvuyu, which may be conceived, onto logic ally^ as the

method of inclusion as opposed to t ~ c method of systematic exclusion, or;

epistemologically, as a method of intcgrati'm as opposed to the method of negation.

Having thus tini~licd the expos tion of the methoci in Sri Aurobindo's

advaif sm, a concluding n8;te that ofl'ers a i.ecapi~ulation of the findings of this thesis

and a critical cvaluatior~ of its subject, namely integral advaitism is in order. And the

general conclusion that ii~llows will first off'er a sympathetic summary statement of

tlw thesis and a tcw cril.cal observations.

Notes

I P.T. MJU, The Philo.sophi~.oi :G~;dirions oflndia (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1992) 228 I , ; I ; ! ..\urubi;:.!> i>horc \\a:; ;I \,d~intin oi'lrls o ~ n hind, hut he did not iil~llow ally of the traditions wholly. As a tn;oi practicing Yoga. he comhir,ed several idms from several h-aditions that suited him. giving a new iilte~pretdtioli to cvcn the early vedic hymns and including from western r l~ i losop l i~ also. I4e criticin:(! ::I 1 1 0 ~ 1 every zncicn: ~ c h o o l hut npoundcd a philosophy that can he traccd hick to somc of lhe scl .ot~(s. particular-I) lhc Saivli and S a k a Agamas. But he used a new tenminology for traditional concepls."

See, for instance, S..K. MAII'KA, The Meeting of The Last And The West in Sri Aurobindo's Philosophy (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1')68)1-66.

T.K.V. MURTJ, The Centrol Philosophy oJBuddhism, 10. a ,'he present survey uses two heuristic tools, nimely, tradition and school. Tradition means the 'lbuntain-source from which stems a continuous st ica~n of thought and culture.' When different forms of philo:iophical thought rernair, connected with their fountain-source and retain the consciousness of the originative forces that h3ve heen moving then on, they are described as different philosophical schools. For more on such distinctions, see, T.R.V. MURTI, The Central Philosophy if Buddhism, 10, P.T. RAJU, The Philosophic~zl Poditions oflndiu, 15. 5 . rhere is yet another strelrn in Indian philoso?hy constituted by the Jaina anernpt to reconcile 8t,~ovrid0 and ancjlmnvrido. The resulting Jaina philosophy may be described as anek6ntZtmavZda, for, according to them, reality i!; ranifold. Being essi:l~tially un-Brahmanical and un-Buddhistic, Jainism stands as a distinct mid-way hctween the irtma 2nd aniitmir traditions. Yet, it is not considered as another 'tradition' in the sens: it is intended to mean the term in the present sh~dy, for, Jainism remained practically stationary down the ages. See, T.R.V. MURTI, The Centrnl Philosophy of Buddhism, 1 1- 12. 6See ,C . Up. V. iii. 3-12, V. iii. 7.1., B. Up. 1.". 4.3, viii.7.3, viii.9.1_viii.10.2.3. 7 RADEIAKRISHNAN, Jndiun I'hilosophy, 1, 162 ' RADIIAKRISHNAN, Indian I'hilosophy, 11, 163. ' 7 . Up. 1.5 1" Thc teaching ofNairutmywuda distinguishes Buddhism From all other systems. ' I RADHAKRISHNAN, Inrliarz Philosophy, I, 694. l2 T.R.V.MURT1, The Centr-a/ I'hilosophy of Budcihism, 17. 13 RADHAKRISHNAN, Indiaian Philosophy, I, 139; "The aim of the Upanisads is not so much to reach philosophical truth as t'o bring peace and freedor] to the anxious human spirit. Tenl.ative solutions of metaphysical questions are put forth in the form oFdialogues and disputation, though the Upanisads are essentially the outpourings or poetic deliverances of philosophically tempered minds in the face of the facts of life. They express the rzstlessnass and striving of the human mind to grasp the true nature of reality." And; as regards l3uddha, he was a mzn who was deeply disturbed by the transience and uncertainty of life. RADHP.KRISHNAN, Indian ."hilosoph.v. 1, 147 writes; "The story of the four signs which Goutania met on the road of Kapilavastu, the aged man . . , the sick man ..., the corpse ..., and the mendicant friar, points the rnoral that the misery of the world left a sting on h k sensitive nature" The fi:st noble truth taught by the enlightened Dnddha was the tyranny of pain and the fourth noble truth was the gospel of pairless existence. 34 M. IIIRJYANNA, 0utlir;es r,]'Jndiun Philosopiry (London: Allen & tinwin, 1932) 19. I S Kc. Lip. 11.5. 16 R. Up. IV, iv, 6. 17 RPDHAKRISI-INAN, 1i;c ' rv i Phiioso)ihj!, I , .375 mal.cs a very s~ygestive observalion; "l'hc iundalnental diflerence betwccn Buddhism and the Upanisads seems to he about the metaphysical realit) of an immutable sil'5stance; which i:. the true self of man as well", but, elsewhere RADITAKRISHNAN, Inciiufi Philosuphj', 1, 676 says that, "Buddhism is only a restatement of the thought of the Upanisads with :I new emphasis." l'.R.V.MURTl; The Central Philosophy ofBuddhlrrn, 20 sa!.~; "The Llpanisads 2nd ic~iddhism belong :o the samc spiritual genus; they differ as species; and the differentia are the acceptarce or rejection of the atman (permanent Substance)." I 3 T.R.V.MURT1, The Ceritrcl Philosoi~hy ofBuddhism, 13. 19 - The monistic theory of pg-\'eda is the referent here. Regarding this early monism Deussen says, as cited in M. HIRIYANNA, tit~tlines of fndiun I'hilosophj~, 13; "The Hindus arrkie at monism by a method essentially different f i r m that of other c~untries. .... In India they reached monism, though not monotheism on arnore pliilmophical path, sreZng through the veil of the manifold the unity which underlies it.'.

-- -~. .-

20 S.SC~~ERDA.ISKY, Buddl:i.si I. J;~c , VOI. I ( N c ~ York: Dover Publication:;, 1962) 3-14. ASHCIK KlJMAR CHAT?'F;F:.IEE, The YogricLir<i Ideulirm, 3.

22 STCHERUATSKY, Buddhi~l i:o,qic; I, I '' T.R.V.MlJRT1, The Central I'iiilosophy of Buddhism, 57. *' T.R.V.MURTI, The Cenlrul I','zilosoph~, o,fB~iddi~ism, 5 8 . 25 ASIJOK KIJMAR CHATI'EFLJEE. 7'he Yogucirr,~ idealism, I I . 2 ~ . ~ . ~ . ~ ~ ~ l ~ ~ , The Central IJhilosophj~ qfBuddizisnz, 13. 2, Nagiirjuna is the systemati!:t:l- of these sljrru. See T.R.V.MURTI, The Centrul Philosophy of

Buddhism, 83. T.K.V.MIJRT1, The Cenrrgl iJi,;~osophv uf Buddiism, 38-54.

2' T.R.V. MUKTI, Thc (hnr,-:./ Philo.~opliy rf Buddhicm. 9 defines dialectic as the "total and intcnninahlc conflict in Kear;oii in3 the consequen. attempt to resolve the conflict by rising to a higher standpoint." 10 T.R.V.MUR1'1, Zhe C t m f ~ a i /';zilosophy ofRlrrk'hism, 60: "Nagarjuna and Alyadeva, the founders of the Madhyamika, were quite conversant with the classical Samkhya and Vaiseska and possibly Vedanta too. They invariably talx them to represert the sasvata or ahna view ..." " ASHOK KUMAK CHATrEF..IEE, The Yogijcirra Idealism. 196. j2 T.R.V.MURTI, The Central Plzilosophy ofHuddhism, 237. " ASHOK KUMAR CHATTEF.JEE, The Yog2car.a Ideali.sm, 126-140.

ASHOK KUMAR CHATTI?'EJI:E, The Yogcicdra Idealism, 182. j5 ~arikara 's absolutism will be discussed in the following section.

T.R. V. MURTI, The Central Philosophy of'Buc'dhism. 321. '' Thcre is a difference betwer~i tbe two ternis oovairavijda and advayavijdu. While the former means the ttie'ory of non-different: brlween or identit) of jiva and Brahman; the latter means the theory of non-two, neither of the two cxtrcme views. '' T.R.V.MURT1, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, 2 18. '".R.v.MuRTI, The Central iJhilosophy of Buddhism, 322. 40 T.K.V.MURTI, The Cenrral I'hilosophy of Bnddhi.sm, 322-323 says; "The Vedanta analyzes illusion from the knowledge-standpoint- the illusion consijts in w o n o characterization, in mistaking the 'given' as something else: . . Vijnanavada analyzes i l l~~sion from an opposite angle; for it, the 'given' is appearance, aiid the ideatin:; c~ir'sciousni:ss alone ir real. In both Vedanta and Vijnan:~vada, the analysis of empirical illusion is extended analogically to the world. But what will tell us thit the phenomenal world itself is illusor).? . . . Ar rnipirical illusion 'of the form 'this is snake') does not itself necessitate being oniversali7ed of all phen.!niena .... Both Vcdanta and Vijnanavada have therefare to take the cue ti-on1 s o n ~ e extra-logical modt 01' cognition: thc 'Jcdanta gets it h-om revelation (sn~ti) which declares the atman (Brahman) alon,: t11 bc real, the Yogacara depends on the deliverance of the trance-states lrhere the objects drops 0111 ir I \ i!y conr;ciou:!~cs ari t!ic roli: reality. This is mad? th: nonn for judging phenomena. .... The Madhyamika starts, not w t h an empirical illusion, but with the transcendental illusion, as exhibited in the inc:vitahle conflict of opposed standpoints and philosophies? 4 1 BASANT KUMAR LA1 ., C'r~:qiemporav India? Philosopiz~~ (Delhi: Morilal Banrsidass, '1995)lII. " P.T. RZJU, The Philosophi~ul Tradilions ofln.dia, 220. '' BASANT K'IJMAR LAI.., Cr~ntemporary Indial Philosophy, VII-VIII. 44 BASANT KUMAR LAL, i:."onfemporary indiiin Philosr?phy. IV: "Generally lndian philosophy is dcscri'oed as 'spiritual'; by thi! i5 mean1 that it lays emphasis on values that are supernatural and other- .,\~)i-ld I.. I;,l!t this dcscriptiii~; i: n.11 adccluatu, brc>:~si. il g i n s tlie i~npressio~l that Indian philosophy has !lo concern with this-worlcily \ ;~lues. At leas! cor~temporary Indian philosophy should not be described tliat \h,ay. I1 empliasircs tlzc ultirnacy of ui in~ called. sp;riti,aI value:. h ~ ~ t it dncs n o t do so in t !

. . <:!!.;I L:, i; , , , . ( ~ ! HI: . . I . .,<, , ; ; :> IC~~IC. I I~S i:!,,c;i~i, L , ' ~ r t i o i il i i t i arc crnpilical and this-

worldly. In fact the contcmp<>-:~ry lndian thinker tries his best to reconcile the two Ile cxplicitly says Ih::t s;>iriti!al a\vlrl~:enini: c::nn,:! t lkc place in \ '>id t!i;:: fir i;'i~-itual $:-ni\.lli the pl.ysica1 na!urc is no: to be rejected but perfected, l'hai sliows that i is bctter io describe thc general character of lndia!i philosophy as meditative. In this context the uord meditative is more comprehensive than the word spirit~ral, because it incoqior;rcs in it even tlie word spiritual. What is being suggested here is that the India11 philosopher come:; ti, discover certain holy powers of Nature and also a capacity of self- transcendence within man himself.. .. The proce,:s that he adopts is one oFCmeditative speculation' . .." 4 5 fli:; impression about :he;? factors is well ,:xpressed in one of his rcviews of the philosophical treatke of I'rofessor R. D Kai:ce. He says in X r r ! Supramc,ntul iWunifs~ution, SABCL, 16, 330; "The philoisophy and thought of the Greeks is perhap!, is the most intellectually stimulating, the most fi-uitful of clarities thc world has yet had. Indian philosophy was intuitive in its beginnings, stimulative rather

p~ --

to the decper vision of things, - nothing more exaltId and profound, more revelatory ot'the depths and the hei&,ts, more pou.erfu1 to oprn unending vista; hes ever been conceived than thc divine and the inspired Word, the ntnnlvir of Vrd ;~ and Vedanta. '*{'hen that philosophy became intellectual, precise, founded on thc human reasorb. it l,,:rarne a!so rigidl! logical, enamored of tixily and systcm, desirous of ;. sort of ~eon~c t l -y of thought TI)- ;:ncient mind hzi instead a fluid precision, a flexihly inquiring logic; ;:cu:cilesr ;:id TI;<: \,vidc-opci; :LC i l ' t l , ~ ii:tcIlcit v c i i its leidicg <!la:-acteri5,tics and by .ts j i i;~r',~- in it. i t determined thr whole character ;arrl lllc field of subzcquent European thinking." ""1IEOJEE PANDEY; , i n ailii I :~,iurt/ii l~hiiosophy (h'eu, [leihi: Ileep & Dcep Publications. 1987) 25. " M. P. Pandit's scholarly obs,:;v;ition cited in th': preface of BINITA PANL, The Indian Scriptures ond The Lie Divine (New Delhi: .4shish Publishinp House, 1993) is noteworthy here; '"It is an accepted tradition in India that eve? Acharya who founcs a system of philosophy cites support from the s c r i p t u ~ s , notably the ilpanisiick:. the Gita and the Rrahma Sutras. Each interprets the text in a manner that his position stands - to gain support there fron. The case with Sri Aurohindo, founder of integral philosophy of life, Puma Advaita is differcnt. His system has grown out of his life long spiritual realization. It is only aftenuardr that he has turned to scriptures to examine how far his experience and perceptions are corroborated b:i the ancient antho.-ities .... Sri Aurobindo is known t11 have had many experiences of yogic and mystic character which were later confirmed in the hymns of the Veda."

NB 4.2.35. 49 h1ARTRJ HEJDEGCER; U'hoi is Phi1ci~oph.y (Trms.) WILI.IAM KLIJHACK and :(EAN T. WI1,DE (L,ondor~: Vision Press I.imited, 1955). 50 The .Yupramentai Ma,~ifi.s/aiior~, SABCI-; 16, 135. Elsewhere in The Supramental Manijl.starion,

SABCI., 16, 370 he says: "VJc see in how many directions the deep divining eye of I-leraclitus anticipated the largest and 2rofcundest generalizztions of Science and Philosophy and how even his more superficial thoughts il;dic.;~te later powerful .endencies of the occidental mind, how too some of his ideas influenced such profoll~d and fruitful thirkers as I'lato, the Stoics, the Neo-P!atonists." '' MARTIN IIEIDEGGEK, CVh~ri is Philosophy, 47. " MARTIN HEIDCGGER. ~ V / I ~ I ? is Phiia~oohv. 4'). - ' 3 , '' MARTm HEIDEGGER. M/\ic,l is PhiI<~sophj~. 4,). 5.1 Greek word meaning 'according to strife'. 55 Greek word meaning 'according to reason'. 56 The Sirpramental Manifectation. SABCL, 16, 3f7-8. 57 The Su~~rarnerrral Manijes/a.!;on, SABCL, .I 6, ?68: "It is not an inconscient reasor! in things, for his Fire is not merely an inconscient force, it is Zeus and eternity. Fire, Zeus is Force, but is also an Intclligcncc; lel us say then th.11 i; is an intelligcl~i 1:orcc whicl~ is the origin and master of things. Nor can this Logos be identical in its nature with the human reason: for that is an individual and therefore relative and partial judgment and intelligence wtiich can only seize on relative truth, not on the true truth of things, hut the I.ognr is one and universal, an absolute reason therefore combining and managing all the relativities of the many." 5 8 Conlmentuig on Philo's acli:c\.ement he says in The Szrpramenlal Manifeslafiun, SABCL, 16, 368; "Was not then Philo justitie? i n deducing froin this idea of an intelligent Force originating and govcr~;ing the world, Zeus and Fire, his interpret:~tion of thc 1.ogos as "tire divine dynamic, the energy and th': self-rzvelation pf ($06' i' Heralitus might not so have phrased it, might not have seen all that this thought contained, but it does contain this s:nse when his different sayings are fathomed and put togethc:r in their consequences:. '4 7 % ~ Sz~,~ror~?ef?fal I f i~n(C,.~r l i , i~ i : . SPBCI., 16. 368: "U'c get vei); ncar the lnrian conceptinn of I3r;ihn~an. tllc ralise. origin :,lei sl~hstance or ;ill thinus an absolibte Existenct whose nature is consciousnes:; (Chit) manifesti?ig itsellas Force ( lapas, Sliahli) and moving the world of his own being as the Seer and Thinker, Kaviri.i;~nisi, an immanent Kno\h,leilge-Will in all, vijnanamaya purusa, who is t l ~ r Lcrd or Godhead. isa isv.1r3. dcva. and has I rdained all things accordins to thei., nature from ycan scnipcternal, - Heraclitus' -'rr.cisurcs" nhich tlii Sun in tbrccd to oh:er\.c, his -'things arc utterly detcm~ined." This Knowledge-Will is the Logos." 60 The.Supramenta1 Manq<fi.stcrion, SABCL, 16; -68.9. h ' The Supramental Man$,stoiion, SARCL, 16, : 68. 62 Plural of logos, meaning rrzison, world, will. h i The Suprun~enfal Manfislir~ion, SARCL, 16, :(IS. 64 In Sri Aurohindo's ontological scheme, tlic hnctions of Truth-Consciousnzss of the Vedas, prajii;~puru$a of the Upaniaad:;. the seed Logos of Heraclitean-Stoic thought are found associated with Supermind.

65 The Su,~ramerrtal hfan~fc.rratio!i. YAHCL, 16, 369 Greek phrase, meaning ]men are immortal. 6 6 Sri Alirobindo is not unabca?: of Frederic Nietzsche's concept of Superman. Hc has described Nietrschi: as the modem Hel-iiclit.ts. In Sri Aurobinio's estimation Nietzsche's Supem!.an is not divine hut 'cnlde and violent.' hi 7 % ~ Suprc~menral h<uni/t\torio!i. SAUCL, 16, 370 6 8 The S;,,nramenra/ A.lanifi~sra/in!j. ?sABCI., 16, 370 (39 7'hc Supramentul .Manif~srario~:. SAHCL, 16, 370 70 The Su~~rameniai Mani./bstoliolr. SABCL, 16, 370 7 , The Supramental A.lanifestutio,;-, SABCI ., 16, 371 7 2 The Supramental Manrfestirlio.;. SABCL, 16, 370 7 3 A number of borderline disciplines and a feu, cross-sectional inquires will stem from the basic methods of knowledge. 71 The equivocal use of the term philosophy ha:, greatly blurred Sri Aurobindo's contribution to philosophical traditions in India :tnd the West. Tht same has hindered his readers from accepting his system as philosophical. 7 5 One can fwd Sri Aurobinclo i:i~il~loying such a methodological alliance in the proczss of justifying spiritual evolution in The Li/i! Dibinr 11; SABCL, 19, 833-5. l6 For instance, alaukika percept:nns identified by Nvwa theory of knowledge. 77 KEN WILBER, (ed.) Qliant'dm Questions. Mi~.stical Writings of the Cl/orld'.s (;real l'hysicists (Shambhal: New Science Library 1984). 3-29. 7 8 See Wilber's chain of bein; irl Appendix. H. '9 KEN WILBER (ed.) Quantlrnr ()rrcstionc. M),stical Writings of the World's Grear P1ysicisls. 10. 80 See, A. N WI+ITEIiEAD; /'ri>:z:u and Reality, (~'Jew York: Macmillian, 1929)> 125-6. X I LANGDON GILKEY, ,Ahtzi,..?. Reality and the Sacred, The Nexus of Science and Religion (Minneapolis: Fomess Press. 1 gL)?) 73. 82 A. PLE', Mjatety am'My.\tici.in, A Synzposiurn (London: Blackfriars Publications, 1956) 9. 83 The proposal could be presznt:d in a diagram. See Appendix I . 84 Ke. Up. 1.7. " K. IJp. 2.3.9. 86 M. Up. 3.1.8. R7 Ke. U p 1.6.

S. Up. vi.ii. 89 R. Up. IlI.iv.1. 90 SRI SWAMI SATCHID!'.N,lU[)EDRA, The Alethod of :he I'edanta. A Critical A c c o u , ~ of the .4d,.nith Tra(1ililini1, 6!snyi: - ' l ' - r< i.;*tion n ~ d the o t i . ~ cnipirica! 1iic;ins of howledge, along with the Vedic texts conveying injunctioii ;and prohibitions even along with the Upanisadic texts themselves

arc va!id oril? as 10112 as t i c l i b i ~ l u t e has not been known in its true nature through the Veda, for then the wrong notion of 'know-r through means of knowledge' is eliminated. After bue metaphysical knowledge has been attained. orly the non-dual Absolute remains. There cannot then k'e the notion that the self is the object of a mean: of cognition, or tbat any means of cognition exists to know it. Hence the experts in the interpretatiiw ct the Upzinisads have taught that the Upanisads are thl: 'final means of knowledge."' 91 SRI SWAMI SATCl-IIDAN/',~lI)EDKA, The M?thod of the Vedanta, 40ff MICU4EI. COMANS, The Method of Early Advaita I.:iil;mta. A Study qiGaudapadcz, Sarikara, Sr~svara und f'admapcida, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000) translates it as 'r~egation cum indication.' 92 Hh. G. S. Rh. X111.13. " SRI SWAMI SATCEIll),IN/iNDEDRA~ Thr Llethod oj tl?c Vedantcz, 43: "The essence of the method of false attribution is that the imaginary characteristics are first attributed to the Absolute, and this serves as a negatipn of wki.::cvcr is incompa.ihle with thosc characteristics; then later even the falsely attributed characteristics 21-e negated. Efforts lo abolish fdlsely attributed chara,:teristics have to be continued till all are renlo\i:,l. In this way the true nahlre of the Absolute can become known through the mere negation of al! false attributions " And, in his commentary on the Byahadaapyaka Upani~ad, as cited in SRI S\VAR11 SATCHIDANANDEDRA, The Method of the Ved~rnta, 41, ~ a h k a r a explains, how this interpret;itiv,: nicthod is aciualiy employed in Vedanta: "lie who knows the Self, thus described, as the fearless il.!x~ilute (Brahman), himself become the Absolute, beyond fear. This is a hrief statement of the mcaninj of lhc entire [Jpanisad. And in order to convey this meaning rightly, the fanciful alternatives of prod~lclion miiintenancq: and withdrawal and the false notion of action, its factors,and results are deliberate!! attributed to the Self as a first step. And then the final metaphysical lruth is inculcated by negating ttiesc characteristics through a comprehensive denial of all particular

superimpositions on the Absoluie, clprcssed in the phrase 'neither this nor thal.' Just as e. nlarl wishing to explain numbers from one ti1 a liundred thousand billion (points to figures that he has d r a w and) says, 'This tinger is one, this tingur is ten, this tinge,- is hundred, this finger is thousand,' and all the time his only purpose is to explain ~imnbers, and not to affirm that the fingers arc numbers; or just as one wisl~ini: lo explain the sounds c.fspeech as represmted hy the written letters of the alphabet resort5 lo a device in the form of a pain-l:;if on which he makes incisions which he later fills with ink to form letters. and all the while (even t h o ~ ~ g h he points to tllc letter and say 'This is the sound 'so and so") his only purpo5c is to expliin tlie r.atLr,. of the sounds referred to b:; each letter, and not to affirm that the leaf. incisi,>ns ar~d ink arc so~indi . in ,just the sam: way, the one real me:aphysical principle, the .Ahsolr~tc. is taught by resort ti1 nl:lq;, devices such ;IS anributi~ig to it productiot~ (of t'?e world) and otliel- powe ' .~ And then after~r';lr;: tllc nature of t l~c Absolute is restated, through tile concluding formula 'naithcr this nor that.' iu n i to purify it of all particular notions accruing to it from the various devices used to explain its natni-c i : ~ rhe first place." '14 ' Sankara has made this point in R.S.S.B. 3,222: "When there is the repetition ["not this, not this," what happens is that] from the dcnipl of all objects in their totality, That which is not an object, the inner ; Self, is Brahman; and the desire to know Brahman ceases. Iience the definitive conclusion is lhat [the statement "not this no1 this"] negates thi: phenomenal world, which is superimposed in Brahman, and leaves Brahman rcni~ining." 95 lakana is that which gives the secondary meaning of a word. A word, according to classical advaitism has vacyiirtha (priwar) meaning), and lak76rtha (secondary meaning or implied meaning). Vaqartha is revealed throug!~ the Sakti (explicit :;ense) of the word, while lahdrfha is revealed through the l a @ a p (implication). la!q6rlha is brought out by means of artl72parti (postt~lation). 9G MICHAEL COMANS, The rWc~ihoii of Early Adiaita l'edan~a. A Study of Gaudapada, Sarikma, ~ r ~ . ~ v a r a and Padmapdda, 29 1-3211 reviews the research works in this direction. 97 RICHARD DE SMET, Thr Th~,~-,Iogical Methcrd rd,r.$arikara (Rome: Pontifical Gregorian University, 1953). 98 Indeed there are other notattle riethods used in th,: Upani~ads to communicate the Ultimate Reality. See, for instance, the method of tsnching the Absolu:e t h r o u ~ h Doctrines of Cause and llffect (kiirana- k d ~ o prakriya) found in M. IJp. I!.ii.l2, T.Up. 11.7, the method of communicating the true Nature of the Absolute indirectly tluougl~ atfribuling to it the fslse notions of Universal and Particular found in B. Up..ll.i\,.7, the method'of commutiicating the Nature of the Absolute indirectly through recourse to the notions of Seer and Seen found i : ~ B. Up. IV.v.15, the method of communicating the Absolute through discriminating it fiom the Five :;lieaths (pancak6Sr.-prakriya) found in T.Up. 11, and the method of communicating the true nature ~ n r the Self througt a discrimination of the three apparent states of waking dream and dreamless sleer iavasthirtrqa - prakriya) found in MZndukya Upanisad. But they ::-z all v:iiian:i r h t z:. :!!l.~:idi:~~-;. :.: {!re bzcic t;litho.l orncir~.~tio? '' The Supranzental Manifesla!iof~. SAUCL., 16, 106. loo 1,ctfer.~ on Yoga I l l , SABCI,, ;!,I, 1262. I01 The,L<fe Divine 11, SABCI., 10, 879. Iu2 In this sense. thanks to the allzged employment of the basic method of knowingh:xperiencing by identity, thc Vedic mysticiim and the Upanipdic metaphysics may be said to regain their contemporaneousness in Sri Aurol,indo's integralisrr . ,<,: See, fiir instance, Thc Upanisi!,lds, SAIKL, 12, 397-8; "The great Sankarachalya nzeds no modem praisc and can bc I~urt by nc~ ~:lomi-:.n disagrbernent easily. Thc first metaphysical thinker, the greatest genius in the history of philosol~liy, his commentary has done an incalculable service to our race by bridging the intellectual gulf bel\ceen the Sages and of the Upanisads and ourselves. It has protected them fro111 thc practical obli\,ioii I I !\hicl> our igno,-imcc and inertia have aliowed the Veda to rest for so many centuries, only to be d r a ~ ~ e d out by the n d e hands of the daringly speculative Teuton. It has kepi these ancient grandeurs of Illought, lhesc h i a t repositories of spirituality under the safeguard of the temp!e of meiapliysics, tlie P.,lwaita philosophy - a little in the background, a little too much veiled c~nd shrouded but neverthcles!; sall: iiom iconoclasm." 104 The Lpanishadr. SABCL. 12. 298, Italics added. 105 Cited by Sri Aurobindo in Thc tipnni.shads. SARC:L; 12; 398. iO6 The Lbanishuds, SkBCL, 12. $98. 107 The Li/e Divine 11, 19, 921. ' O R Thc I.@ llivine I, SABCL.. I:<. 60. l n9 K. C. VARADACIIAI<I_ ' ~ A (:~iliquc of Praman:isn in Sri Aurohindo Mundir Annual 7 (1948) 102-121. 110

I(. C VAKAUACI-IARI. "A Critique of Pramanas," 114.

"' K. C:. VARADACFIARI, " P . Critique of Pramallas," 114. 1,: For instance, Plato's epi.iizmological theory of reminiscence, Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance ;and knowledge by description, or Bergson's intellectual sympathy. l 1 3 (/l~unzijna consciousness fur~ctions in three-fold manner in the Indian systems: as the Naiyayika recognilion, Mima~nraka suy~crsensiblc recollection and Alankarika dhvani. Sce, K. C. VARAIIACHARI, "A Critique c~'f'ramanas," 1 18. "I K . 13. VAIIADACHARI. ".<.ritiq~ic ~ 1 ' Prt?nian;is." 117 has summarircd in one sentence Sri Aurobindo's reasoning; "It i:; be:c:a~se the finite is. hat it can and indeed docs suggest the infinite." l15 Letltrs on Yoga 111, SABCL. 24 , 128 1 116 The Supramenlal Manife.':tali,in, SABCL. 16, 4::s. "' The /,ye Divine 11, SABC:L, 1'1, 920. 118 The Life Divine I, SABCI., 18. 570. ' l 9 Letrers on Yvgii Ill, SABCI. 24, 1281. ''"he L@ Divine II, SABCL, 19, 920. 1 2 ' The Life Divine 11, SABCL, If;, 330 12' K. I:. TRIPATHI, Probleri1.5 of Philosophy c!trd Religion (Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University, 1971) 42 has made a similal- point in his disc:ussion of the problem of method in philosophy; "Philosophy is not an objecti\.c ]node of consciousness, but a reflection on the objective mode of consciousness and as s;ch it cannot add to thc stoc of objective knowledge."

The Hour of God, SABCL, 17,400. The Harmony of Virtue, !;AIICI., 3, 440.

l'' Savirri /I, SABCL, 29, 718. 126 The Itun~an Cycle, SAUC'L, 15. 214-5, liere, th,: law of thought denotes the rules ol'logic. l'' It is the svadharma of Science and Art as well. !See, The Human Cycle, SABCL, 15, 214. 128 And be continues in The Human Cycle, SABCL, 15, 215; "... often we find atheism both in individual and society as a nece:::;ary passage to deeper religious and spiritual truth; orbe has some times to deny God in order to find kim; the finding is inevitahle in the end 01- all earnest skepticism and denial." 12' E s s ~ v s on rhe Gila, SADC:L.. I;, 241-2. Here j~sychology means the science of psyche in the sense of inner soul. Thus psychological means 5;ublimina'. 130 The Future Poetry, SABCL, '?, 3 l . "' The Life Ilivine 11, SABCL, 19, 666-7: "Our retaphysicai knowledge, our view of the fundamental truth of the universe and the 1:leanin;o of euiste-~cc. should naturally hc dctermin:mt of our whole conception of life and attitude . I , it: the aim of lift; as we corlceive it, must bc structured on that basis. Metaphysical philosophy is an attempt to fix the fundamental realities and principles of being as distinct from its processes anci thc phcnomma \;hic!i result from those processes. But it is on the fundamental realities that the pl-c~cesses depend: our own process of life, its aim and method, should be ii! :%cco:-dance with the trutli c11 tkei~lg that x1.e sec; otherwise our nletaphysical truth can be only a play of the intellect wilhout any dymi1:nic importance. It is true that the intellect must seek after tmth for its own sake without any illegitims.te interference of a preconceived idea of life-utility. But still the truth once discovered, must be rt:ali:.::~hlc in our inncr teing and our outer activities: if it is not it may have an intellectual but not an intcgrdl importance; a huth of the intellect, for our life it viould be no more than th~: solution of a thought-puzzle or an absbact unrealit). or a dead letter. Truth of being must govern truth of life; it cannot br that the two have rlo relation or inter-dependence." 132 The Life Divine I, SABC14; 18, 385. 131 The Life Divine I, SABCI,, I X, 63. 134 The L@ Divine I, SAUCId. 13,61. 135 Essays on the Gita, SABCI.. 13, 252.

E S S ~ S on the Gita, SARCI.. 13, 252. "' The, Life Divinell, SABCI.; ! 9, 700. 138 E.~s<ry~ on the Gita, SABC'I., 13, 253. In thi; sense, it may be contended that, Sri Aurobindo's ~nctaphysics proper is prcscr~tcd in poetic forms and thus Suvilri is his iMangum opus. 139 The ffarmony ofk'irtue, :;A13(:12, 3 , 439. 1411 vicira is used twice in the second and the fourth operations. l" Thi: is how Yoga or Spiri i~ality bcco~nks tt~c supreme' :science that unifies all methods. See The Iiuman Cycle, SABCL, 15. :21(1. 112 Record of Yoga, II, CWSA, i 1, l 5 10. Aulom; tic witing is not a writing dictatec! or guided by the writer's conscious mind but thwugh the interventicm of beings of another plane, or an element in the subconr;cious mind or a brilliant vein in the sublim nal.

133 Record of Yojia, 11, CWSA. I I. 1 3 - 9 9 . f!iis book vias received by Sri Aurobindo as an

automatic writing in 19 10. 114

Record of Yogir, 11, CWSA, 1 I . 1380 1.IS Hrcordqf Yogo, 11, CWSA; 11, 1380 Italics added 116

Record of Yogu, 11, CWSA, 11. : 380. '" The .Y.vnrhesis of Yoga I, SAHC' , 20, 130.