mechanism*design*for*predic2on:* combinatorial*predic2on

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Mechanism Design for Predic2on: Combinatorial Predic2on Markets @ CS286r Fall 2012, Harvard David Pennock MicrosoD Research

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Mechanism  Design  for  Predic2on:  Combinatorial  Predic2on  Markets  

@  CS286r  Fall  2012,  Harvard  David  Pennock  

MicrosoD  Research    

An  Example  Predic2on  

•  A  random  variable,  e.g.       Will US go into recession in 2012?

(Y/N)

An  Example  Predic2on  Market  

•  A  random  variable,  e.g.      

•  Turned  into  a  financial  instrument  payoff  =  realized  value  of  variable  

$1 if $0 if I am entitled to:

Will US go into recession in 2012? (Y/N)

Recession in 2012

No Recession in 2012

2012

Sep

tem

ber 3

0 8:

02 p

.m. E

T"

2012

Sep

tem

ber 3

0 8:

02 p

.m. E

T"

Between 6.0% and 8.0% chance

http://www.predictwise.com/maps/2012president

Predic2on  Markets  Versus...  

• model it - baseline • model it - baseline++ • poll a crowd - mTurk • pay a crowd - probSports contest • pay a crowd - Vegas market • pay a crowd - TradeSports market

• guess

Design  for  Predic2on  

•  Goals  for  trade  –  Efficiency  (gains)  –  Inidiv.  ra2onality  –  Budget  balance  –  Revenue  –  Comp.  complexity  

•  Equilibrium  –  General,  Nash,  ...  

Design  for  Predic2on  

•  Goals  for  trade  –  Efficiency  (gains)  –  Inidiv.  ra2onality  –  Budget  balance  –  Revenue  –  Comp.  complexity  

•  Equilibrium  –  General,  Nash,  ...  

•  Goals  for  predic2on  –  Info  aggrega2on  –  1.  Liquidity  –  2.  Expressiveness  –  Bounded  budget  –  Indiv.  ra2onality  –  Comp.  complexity  

•  Equilibrium  –  Ra2onal  expecta2ons  

Competes with:���experts, scoring rules, opinion pools, ML/stats, polls, Delphi

Design  for  Predic2on  

•  Goals  for  trade  –  Efficiency  (gains)  –  Inidiv.  ra2onality  –  Budget  balance  –  Revenue  –  Comp.  complexity  

•  Equilibrium  –  General,  Nash,  ...  

•  Goals  for  predic2on  –  Info  aggrega2on  –  1.  Liquidity  –  2.  Expressiveness  –  Bounded  budget  –  Indiv.  ra2onality  –  Comp.  complexity  

•  Equilibrium  –  Ra2onal  expecta2ons  

Competes with:���experts, scoring rules, opinion pools, ML/stats, polls, Delphi

Why  Liquidity?  

 

Why  Liquidity?  

 Low  liquidity  takes  the  predic2on  out  of  markets  http://blog.oddhead.com/2010/07/08/why-automated-market-makers/  

Between 0.2% and 99.8% chance

Why  Expressiveness?  

Why  Expressiveness?  

Why  Expressiveness?  

Why  Expressiveness?  

•  Call  op2on  and  put  op2ons  are  redundant  •  Range  bets  require  four  trades  (“bu_erfly  spread”)  

•  Bid  to  buy  call  op2on  @strike  15  can’t  match  with  ask  to  sell  @strike  10  

•  Can’t  set  own  strike  •  Bo_om  line:  Lacks  expressiveness  

Why  Expressiveness?  

•  Dem  Pres,  Dem  Senate,  Dem  House  Dem  Pres,  Dem  Senate,  GOP  House  Dem  Pres,  GOP  Senate,  Dem  House  Dem  Pres,  GOP  Senate,  GOP  House...  

•  Dem  Pres  Dem  House  Dem  wins  >=270  electoral  votes  Dem  wins  >=280  electoral  votes...  

Industry  Standard  

•  Ignore  rela2onships:  Treat  them  as  independent  markets  

•  Las  Vegas      sports  beeng  Kentucky      horseracing  Wall  Street      stock  op2ons  High  Street    spread  beeng  

A  Be_er  Way  (Or,...  Bringing  trading  into  digital  age)  •  Expressiveness  

– Linear  programming  – Bossaerts,  Fine,  Ledyard:  Combined  Value  Trading  –  http://bit.ly/multipm

•  Expressiveness  +  Liquidity  – Automated  market  maker  – Always  quote  a  price  on  anything  – Downside:  requires  subsidy/risk  

Example:  Liquidity  and  Expressiveness    

Geeng  Greedy  

•  Design  a  market  for  informa2on  on  exponen8ally  many  things  

•  “Combinatorial  predic2on  market”  

Combinatorial  securi2es:  More  informa2on,  more  fun  

•  Payoff  is  func2on  of  common  variables,  e.g.  50  states  elect  Dem  or  Rep  

Combinatorial  securi2es:  More  informa2on,  more  fun  

•  Dem  will  win  California  

Combinatorial  securi2es:  More  informa2on,  more  fun  

•  Dem  will  lose  FL  but  win  elec2on  •  Dem  will  win  >8  of  10  Northeastern  states  •  Same  party  will  win  OH  &  PA  

Combinatorial  securi2es:  More  informa2on,  more  fun  

•  There  will  be  a  path  of  blue  from  Canada  to  Mexico  

Some  Coun2ng  

•  57  “states”:  48  +  DC  +  Maine  (3),  Nebraska  (5)  •  257  =  144  quadrillion  possible  outcomes  •  2257  ∼  10144115188075848064  dis2nct  predic2ons  More  than  a  googol,  less  than  a  googolplex  

•  NOT  independent    

A  research  methodology  

Design Build Analyze

HSX NF TS

WSEX FX PS

Examples  

Design

•  Predic2on  markets  –  Dynamic  parimutuel  –  Combinatorial  bids  –  Combinatorial  

outcomes  –  Shared  scoring  rules  –  Linear  programming  

backbone  •  Ad  auc2ons  •  Spam  incen2ves  

Build Analyze

•  Computational complexity

•  Does money matter? •  Equilibrium analysis •  Wisdom of crowds:

Combining experts •  Practical lessons

•  Predictalot •  Yoopick •  Y!/O Buzz •  Centmail •  Pictcha •  Yootles

New  Example:  PredictWiseQ    

•  You  read  the  paper  •  Now  play  the  game!  http://PredictWiseQ.com

•  Crazy  combo  predic2on  market  for  elec2on  2012  •  Implements  constraint  gen  market  maker  •  Join  the  CS286r  group!  http://bit.ly/predictwiseq-hcs

•  Earn  the  highest  “WiseQ”  in  the  class  •  Or  browse  results  http://www.predictwise.com/WiseQResults

http://PredictWiseQ.com

http://PredictWiseQ.com

A  tractable  combinatorial  market  maker  using  constraint  genera2on  

MIROSLAV  DUDÍK,  SEBASTIEN  LAHAIE,  DAVID  M.  PENNOCK  

Thanks: David Rothschild, Dan Osherson, Arvid Wang, Jake Abernethy, Rafael Frongillo, Rob Schapire

Automated  Market  Maker  Exchange   Market  Maker  

Independent   Tractable  No  risk  No  info  propaga2on  Industry  standard  

Tractable  Exponen2al  loss  bound  No  info  propaga2on  

Combinatorial   NP-­‐hard  No  risk  Full  info  propaga2on  Major  liquidity  problem  

#P-­‐hard  Linear/Const  loss  bound  Full  info  propaga2on  

•  Info  propaga2on Reward traders for information, not computational power  

Automated  Market  Maker  Exchange   Market  Maker  

Independent   Tractable  No  risk  No  info  propaga2on  Industry  standard  

Tractable  Exponen2al  loss  bound  No  info  propaga2on  

Our  approach   Tractable  Good  loss  bound  Some  info  propaga<on  

Combinatorial   NP-­‐hard  No  risk  Full  info  propaga2on  Major  liquidity  problem  

#P-­‐hard  Linear/Const  loss  bound  Full  info  propaga2on  

•  Info  propaga2on Reward traders for information, not computational power  

Consistent  pricing  

0

1

0 1

A&B’&C

&B&

C

Independent markets

Consistent  pricing  

0

1

0 1

A&B’&C

&B&

C

Independent markets

Prices p

Consistent  pricing  

0

1

0 1

A&B’&C

&B&

C

Independent markets

Consistent  pricing  

0

1

0 1

A&B’&C

&B&

C B = 0.6

A = 0.8 C = 0.9

Independent markets

Consistent  pricing  

0

1

0 1

0.6 B = 0.6

0.8 A = 0.8

A&B’&C

&B&

C

0.9 C = 0.9

Consistent  pricing  

0

1

0 1

0.6 B = 0.6

0.4

0.8 A = 0.8

0.8

A&B’&C

&B&

C

0.9 C = 0.9

0.9

Consistent  pricing  

0

1

0 1

0.6 B = 0.6

0.4

0.8 A = 0.8

0.8

A&B’&C

&B&

C

0.9 C = 0.9

0.9

Approximate  pricing  

0

1

0 1

0.6 B = 0.6

0.4

0.8 A = 0.8

0.8

A&B’&C

&B&

C

0.9 C = 0.9

0.9

Approximate  pricing  

0

1

0 1

0.6 B = 0.6

0.4

Prices p 0.8 A = 0.8

0.8

A&B’&C

&B&

C

0.9 C = 0.9

0.9

Approximate  pricing  

0

1

0 1

0.5 B = 0.5

0.5

Buy NotB

Prices p 0.8 A = 0.8

0.8

A&B’&C

&B&

C

0.9 C = 0.9

0.9

Approximate  pricing  

0

1

0 1

0.5 B = 0.5

0.5

Prices p 0.8 A = 0.8

0.8

A&B’&C

&B&

C

0.9 C = 0.9

0.9

Approximate  pricing  

0

1

0 1

0.8

0.5

A = 0.8

B = 0.55

0.5 0.8

Prices p

A&B’&C

&B&

C

0.9 C = 0.9

0.9

For  Elec2on  

•  Create  50  states  –  ini2alize  with  prior  •  Create  all  groups  of  2  –  init  as  indep  •  For  conjunc2ons  of  3  or  more,  group  with  it  opposite  disjunc2on:  A&B&C,    A’|B’|C’    

•  Each  group  is  indep  MM  –  fast  •  In  parallel:  Generate,  find,  and  fix  constraints  

Arbitrage  and  Constraints  

•  Possibility  of  risk-­‐free  profit:              

•  Execute  trades:  – Buy  x  shares  of  A – Buy  x  shares  of  B – Sell  x  shares  of  A ∪ B

Prob[A] + Prob[B] ≥ Prob[A ∪ B]

Price[A] + Price[B] − Price[A ∪ B] ≤ 0

September 26, 2012 Microsoft Research, New York City

Constraints  

•  Clique  lower  bound  P(L1|...|Lm)  ≥ΣC  P(Li)  –ΣC  P(Li&Lj)  

•  Spanning  tree  upper  bound  P(L1|...|Lm)  ≤Σ P(Li)  –ΣT  P(Li&Lj)  

•  Threshold  constraints  TBA  •  Choosing  constraints  is  key!  

– Depends  on  bets  (unlike  Monte  Carlo)  – An  art  

Does  it  work?  

Tested  on  over  300K  complex  predic2ons  from  Princeton  study  

Budget

10 States

Does  it  work?  

Tested  on  over  300K  complex  predic2ons  from  Princeton  study  

Budget

budget

score

−0.10

−0.08

−0.06

−0.04

10^0 10^1 10^2 10^3

●●

●●

●●

●●

●●

AggregateBrier

−0.14

−0.10

−0.06

−0.02

● ●●

●●

●●●

2−ConjunctionsBrier

−0.10

−0.08

−0.06

−0.04

10^0 10^1 10^2 10^3

●●

●●●

●●

●●

3−ConjunctionsBrier

−0.6−0.5−0.4−0.3−0.2

●●

● ●●● ●●

●●

●●

AggregateLogarithmic

10^0 10^1 10^2 10^3

−0.6−0.5−0.4−0.3−0.2−0.1

● ●●

●●

●●

●● ●●

2−ConjunctionsLogarithmic

−0.5

−0.4

−0.3

−0.2

●●

● ●●● ●●

3−ConjunctionsLogarithmic

LocalIndependentTreeTree,Clique

budget

score

−0.10

−0.08

−0.06

−0.04

10^0 10^1 10^2 10^3

●●

●●

●●

●●

●●

AggregateBrier

−0.14

−0.10

−0.06

−0.02

● ●●

●●

●●●

2−ConjunctionsBrier

−0.10

−0.08

−0.06

−0.04

10^0 10^1 10^2 10^3

●●

●●●

●●

●●

3−ConjunctionsBrier

−0.6−0.5−0.4−0.3−0.2

●●

● ●●● ●●

●●

●●

AggregateLogarithmic

10^0 10^1 10^2 10^3

−0.6−0.5−0.4−0.3−0.2−0.1

● ●●

●●

●●

●● ●●

2−ConjunctionsLogarithmic

−0.5

−0.4

−0.3

−0.2

●●

● ●●● ●●

3−ConjunctionsLogarithmic

LocalIndependentTreeTree,Clique

budget

score

−0.10

−0.08

−0.06

−0.04

10^0 10^1 10^2 10^3

●●

●●

●●

●●

●●

AggregateBrier

−0.14

−0.10

−0.06

−0.02

● ●●

●●

●●●

2−ConjunctionsBrier

−0.10

−0.08

−0.06

−0.04

10^0 10^1 10^2 10^3

●●

●●●

●●

●●

3−ConjunctionsBrier

−0.6−0.5−0.4−0.3−0.2

●●

● ●●● ●●

●●

●●

AggregateLogarithmic

10^0 10^1 10^2 10^3

−0.6−0.5−0.4−0.3−0.2−0.1

● ●●

●●

●●

●● ●●

2−ConjunctionsLogarithmic

−0.5

−0.4

−0.3

−0.2

●●

● ●●● ●●

3−ConjunctionsLogarithmic

LocalIndependentTreeTree,Clique

Log

Scor

e

50 States

Does  it  work?  

Tested  on  over  300K  complex  predic2ons  from  Princeton  study  

Revenue

No  really,  does  it  work?  

•  Built  this  thing  for  real  •  WiseQ  Game  for  Elec2on  2012  http://PredictWiseQ.com  

Predictalot alpha

Further  reading  

Gory  details  What  is  (and  what  good  is)  a  combinatorial  predic<on  market?    http://bit.ly/combopm  Guest  post  on  Freakonomics    http://bit.ly/combopmfreak Our  paper  http://research.microsoft.com/apps/pubs/default.aspx?id=167977

Play  PredictWiseQ    

•  You  read  the  paper  •  Now  play  the  game!  http://PredictWiseQ.com

•  Crazy  combo  predic2on  market  for  elec2on  2012  •  Implements  constraint  gen  market  maker  •  Join  the  CS286r  group!  http://bit.ly/predictwiseq-hcs

•  Earn  the  highest  “WiseQ”  in  the  class  •  Or  browse  results  http://www.predictwise.com/WiseQResults