mayberry v. humphreys county

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    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

    AT NASHVILLEAssigned on Briefs October 9, 2012

    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHRISTOPHER SCOTT MAYBERRY

    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Humphreys County

    No. 12044 George C. Sexton, Judge

    No. M2012-00693-CCA-R3-CD - Filed March 11, 2013

    Appellant, Christopher Scott Mayberry, was indicted by the Humphreys County Grand Jury1

    in June of 2010 for two counts of possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell and onecount of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine. After a bench trial, Appellant was found

    guilty of two counts of the sale of methamphetamine. The trial court granted a motion for

    judgment of acquittal with respect to the sale of cocaine. After a sentencing hearing,

    Appellant was sentenced to ten years for each conviction, to be served concurrently.

    Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. After a review of the record

    and authorities, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions for the

    sale of methamphetamine. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Trial Court are Affirmed.

    JERRY L. SMITH,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in whichJOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS and

    NORMA MCGEE OGLE,JJ., joined.

    Steven S. Hooper, Waverly, Tennessee, for the appellant, Christopher S. Mayberry.

    Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Brent C. Cherry, Assistant Attorney

    General; Dan M. Alsobrooks, District Attorney General; and Craig Monsue, Assistant

    District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

    The indictment refers to Appellant as Chris Scott Mayberry. The pleadings refer to App ellant as Chris Scott1

    Mayberry, Christopher Mayberry, and Christopher Scott Mayberry. We will refer to Appellant herein as his name

    is listed on the indictment, Christopher Scott Mayberry or App ellant.

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    OPINION

    Factual Background

    Appellant was indicted in June of 2010 for three separate drug-related offenses that

    occurred in Waverly, Tennessee. Tina Hughey worked as a confidential informant for the

    Waverly Police Department. Specifically, Ms. Hughey worked with Detective Tony Ahne.

    Detective Ahne gave assignments to Ms. Hughey and monitored her activity through the use

    of an audio recording device. Ms. Hughey worked with the police department for about one

    year and participated in about fifty cases during that time.

    Ms. Hughey was involved in three separate transactions involving Appellant in

    December of 2005. The transactions that are at issue on appeal occurred on December 21

    and 23. On these two separate occasions, Ms. Hughey called Appellants cell phone to

    arrange a meeting. Ms. Hughey was given money from the police for the transactions. The

    first of the drug purchases took place in West Brookside through a friend named Shelley.2

    Ms. Tiffany gave the drugs to Ms. Hughey and Ms. Hughey gave Ms. Tiffany the money.

    The second transaction took place in the same manner. Both transactions resulted in the

    purchase of methamphetamine.

    At trial, Ms. Hughey testified that the second transaction was similar to the first, also

    taking place at Brookside. Ms. Hughey talked to Appellant on the phone and gave him

    directions to her house. Ms. Tiffany came with Appellant to the house. Appellant did not

    enter Ms. Hugheys residence on either occasion. On the audio recording of the transaction,

    Ms. Hughey is heard talking to someone on the telephone. She tells the person that she lives

    in Brookside. Ms. Hughey then talks to an unidentified person about drugs and how much

    money she has paid for drugs in the past. Ms. Hughey then takes another phone call,

    explaining specifically how to get to her house. She asks the person how long it will take to

    get to her house, like fifteen, twenty minutes? A few minutes later on the tape, knocking

    is heard. A female voice appears for a few minutes before Ms. Hughey is heard saying, Bye

    yall. Multiple voices respond to Ms. Hughey. At that point, Ms. Hughey says that

    everybody and their f___ mamas been here. Ms. Hughey asks the female if it is a gram,

    complains that it is not a gram, and asks if Chris is out in the car and whether he can talk

    to her at the moment. Ms. Hughey is later heard asking cant you talk to me? A female

    voice responds that they are in a hurry. A few moments pass before a female and male voice

    are heard conversing with Ms. Hughey. At that point, a car engine starts and fades away.

    Shelley was later identified as Rochelle Tiffany, Appellants former girlfriend.2

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    Later on the audio recording a new phone call begins with Ms. Hughey exclaiming

    that she got both of them but that Shelley gave it to me and he was in the car and in

    a hurry.

    On December 23, the audio recording begins with Ms. Hughey receiving instruction

    from Detective Ahne to buy cocaine from Ray Ray Cooksie. During the recording, Ms.

    Hughey receives a call and asks the caller if they were coming right now because she was

    fixin to leave in about ten minutes. Ms. Hughey is then heard talking to a female about

    cornmeal. Ms. Hughey asks where Chris is and the female voice responds that he is out

    in the truck. Ms. Hughey claims that she will drag him out of that truck. Next, Ms.

    Hughey is heard talking to a male voice. After some small talk, the vehicle is heard driving

    away.

    Appellant chose not to testify at trial. Rochelle Tiffany testified for Appellant. She

    dated Appellant off and on for about the last six years and had a brief relationship with him

    in 2005. Ms. Tiffany confirmed that she had recently written letters to the trial court with

    regard to the case in which she claimed Appellant had no knowledge of what was stated on

    them days. In other words, Appellant had no knowledge of the actual [drug] buys. She

    claimed that Ms. Hughey contacted her via telephone, set up the drug buys with her, and that

    Ms. Hughey never had contact with Appellant. However, on cross-examination, Ms. Tiffany

    admitted that she was riding around with Appellant when she went to Ms. Hugheys home

    to deliver the drugs and receive the payment. Ms. Tiffany claimed that she kept the money

    from these drug transactions and did not give it to Appellant. Ms. Tiffany informed the trial

    court that she was charged as a co-defendant but had accepted a diversion plea.

    Unfortunately, Ms. Tiffany violated probation and, after her probation was reinstated, failed

    a drug screen. Ms. Tiffany ultimately ended up serving her three-year sentence.

    At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found sufficient evidence to convict

    Appellant of two counts of the sale of methamphetamine. The trial court granted a motion

    for judgment of acquittal with respect to the third count of the indictment.3

    The trial court held a sentencing hearing to determine the length and manner of

    service of Appellants sentences. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced

    Appellant to ten years for each conviction, to be served concurrently.

    On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.

    It is for this reason that we have not included the factual basis for the third count of the indictment in the factual3

    backg round portio n o f the opin ion on appeal.

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    Analysis

    On appeal, Appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying his motion for

    judgment of acquittal and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for

    selling methamphetamine. Specifically, Appellant contends that the proof did not show that

    he manufactured, delivered, sold, or possessed a controlled substance. The proof merely

    shows that Appellant was at the residence of the confidential informant and the drug

    purchase was between Ms. Hughey and Ms. Tiffany. Further, Appellant argues that the proof

    submitted on his behalf at trial indicates that he had no knowledge of the actual drug

    purchase and, therefore, the evidence is insufficient. The State, on the other hand, argues

    that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions.

    When assessing the sufficiency of the evidence following a conviction from a bench

    trial, the verdict of the trial judge is entitled to the same weight on appeal as a jury verdict.

    State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (citing State v. Hatchett, 560

    S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tenn. 1978)). To begin our analysis, we note that when a defendant

    challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court is obliged to review that claim

    according to certain well-settled principles. A verdict of guilty, rendered by a jury and

    approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the States witnesses and resolves

    all conflicts in the testimony in favor of the State. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 259

    (Tenn. 1994); State v. Harris, 839 S .W.2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). Thus, although the accused

    is originally deemed with a presumption of innocence, the verdict of guilty removes this

    presumption and replaces it with one of guilt. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn.

    1997); State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). Hence, on appeal, the burden of

    proof rests with the defendant to demonstrate the insufficiency of the convicting evidence.

    Id.

    The relevant question the reviewing court must answer is whether any rational trier

    of fact could have found the accused guilty of every element of the offense beyond a

    reasonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e);Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979).

    In making this decision, we are to accord the State the strongest legitimate view of the

    evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom.

    See Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d at 914. As such, this Court is precluded from re-weighing or

    reconsidering the evidence when evaluating the convicting proof. State v. Morgan, 929

    S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn.

    Crim. App. 1990). Moreover, we may not substitute our own inferences for those drawn

    by the trier of fact from circumstantial evidence. Matthews , 805 S.W.2d at 779. Further,

    questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to be given

    to evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by such evidence, are resolved by the trier of

    fact and not the appellate courts. State v. Pruett, 788 S.W.2d 599, 561 (Tenn. 1990).

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    The guilt of a defendant, including any fact required to be proved, may be predicated

    upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both direct and

    circumstantial evidence. See State v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 392-93 (Tenn. Crim.

    App. 1999). Even though convictions may be established by different forms of evidence, the

    standard of review for the sufficiency of that evidence is the same whether the conviction is

    based upon direct or circumstantial evidence. See State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379

    (Tenn. 2011). As such, all reasonable inferences from evidence are to be drawn in favor of

    the State. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978); See Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d at

    914.

    Appellant herein was convicted of two counts of the sale of .5 grams or more of

    methamphetamine. Our statutes provide that it is an offense to knowingly sell a controlled

    substance. T.C.A. 39-17-417(a)(3). It is a Class B felony to sell .5 grams or more of

    methamphetamine. Id. at (c)(1).

    The transcript reveals that the trial judge, as the trier of fact and law in this case,

    considered Appellants argument and concluded that, based on the evidence, Ms. Hughey,

    the confidential informant, called Appellant and set up a meeting to purchase

    methamphetamine. Ms. Tiffany arrived at Ms. Hugheys home and sold her the

    methamphetamine while Appellant waited in the car. While Ms. Tiffany testified that

    Appellant had no knowledge of the drug transaction, the trial court accredited the testimony

    of Ms. Hughey, a finding which we will not reweigh or reevaluate on appeal. Morgan , 929

    S.W.2d at 383;Matthews, 805 S.W.2d at 779. Additionally, Investigator Ahne testified that

    he searched Ms. Hughey for contraband prior to the arrangement of the transaction, supplied

    her with money for the transaction, and placed an audio recording device on her person.

    While the officers involved did not obtain a visual on Appellant during the transaction, the

    audio recording is consistent with Ms. Hugheys testimony. Based upon this evidence, it is

    clear that the defendant has failed to establish that insufficient evidence was presented;

    rather, it is clear that any reasonable trier of rational trier of fact could have found the

    essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, the evidence was

    sufficient to support the convictions. Appellant is not entitled to relief.

    Conclusion

    For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

    ___________________________________

    JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE

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