maximizing return on technology investments (1)

Maximizing return on technology investments (1) Mario Micallef

0 nformation Technology (IT) is a significant part of a company’s budget. IT must be seen to be enhancing shareholders’ wealth

because companies continue to invest heavily in new computer hardware and application development.

IT is a high risk function. Because of the increasing reliance on technology in highly competitive and dynamic markets, the significant IT project costs, the associated operational ex- penses and the rapidly changing IT environment, executive management (and the Board) are determined to maximize the return on technology investment. Irrespective of whether IT costs are capitalized or charged directly to revenue in the period during which they are incurred, executive management must see a favourable relationship between the cost of IT and the corresponding economic benefits.

The strategic rationale of executive management is simple:

Limit IT investment to those pro jects which are consistent with maximising value and can clearly demonstrate that real and sustain-

able benefits can and will be delivered within the shortest possible time frame.

Investment decisions, and technology investments are no exception, must be consistent with maximising value to the organization. This is where the decision making process becomes very complex. IT costs and benefits cannot be determined with

relative precision, as was the case say twenty years ago. IT investments then were more of the transactional type, developed primarily to reduce costs - e.g. payroll and general ledger systems. Benefits were relatively tangible and easily definable - e.g. personnel cost savings. Measurement of the net worth was then relatively straightforward.

Computer Audit Update l February 1996 0 1996, Elsevier Science Ltd.

In the black art of technical mysti- cism associated with IT, a number of pertinent questions are put forward:

Are executive management really equipped to reach an informed assessment ?

Do they have adequate guidelines for determining the appropriate level of investment ?

Are they clear on the working definition of IT ?

Can they base their investment decisions on traditional financial metrics ?

Are they informed on what controls to apply and where to apply them ?

Can they really maximize the return on technology investment ?

How is Internal Audit adding value to the investment decision process ?

Executive management recognize that IT is essential to their organization, but they often lack adequate guidelines for determining the optimum level of investment. The only guidelines available are the level of IT commitment by competitors, expressed as a percentage of revenue, and last year’s IT costs and budgets.

IT investment decisions are often approached with all the visionary enthusiasm associated with technical projects. IT projects are often sponsored on blind faith that real and sustainable benefits will be delivered. Yet significant amounts are wasted each year on IT investments with many large corporations having had their fair share of (390 (major development by Westpac Banking Corp.) and/or Taurus type projects (UK Stock Exchange

“runaway project”). But do companies really learn from these expensive mis- takes ? Yes, heads will roll and whole IT project teams are dismissed. But in the face of embarrassment, does executive management react precipi- tously and deal with symptoms rather than problems? Is this the genesis of informed IT investment decisions, or simply another view in the rear vision mirror ?

The purpose of these articles, to be serialized in three parts over this and the next two issues of Computer Audit

Update, is to:

Gain an understanding of the relationship between IT investment and organizational performance;

Outline the road map necessary to manage the risks associated with technology investments; and

Recognize the contribution IT audi- tors can bring to the investment decision table.

Poor productivity returns of the 1980s After almost a decade of huge IT investment in the US, Harvard Univer- sity economist Gary Loveman came up with his convincing 1988 macroeco- nomic study of poor productivity returns. The investment decision process for all companies became extre- mely conservative. Others, recognised as authorities by the industry, sup- ported his study with analyses that business had invested too much for little return. These included:

Roach Stephen S. (principal and co- director of global economic analysis at Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc.), who demonstrated that a USJ8750 Billion investment in computer hardware had delivered negligible benefits to the service sector in the 1980’s.

Strassmann Paul (formerly CIO at Xerox Corp. and the Defence Depart- ment, and now an IT economics consultant in New Canaan, Connecti- cut, and research fellow at Earnst &


l

R

Young’s Centre for Business Innova- tion in Boston) in his 1990 publication, The Business Value of Computers, illustrated in no uncertain terms the nonexistent relationship between spending on computers and business profitability.

Turner J. concluded from his 1985 analysis of 58 savings banks that “un- expectedly no relationship is found between organizational performance and the relative proportion of resources allocated to data processing”.

The IT practitioners throughout the industry were left with the fallout. IT costs had to be contained. Execu- tive management demanded more rig- orous financial analyses of each and every dollar spent on IT. External consultants were commissioned to come up with magic formulae. Return On Investment (ROI) and Net Present Value (NPV) were brought to the investment table. The number crunch- ing got serious.

Executive management were given the onerous task of sifting through a multitude of business cases, all claim- ing to make a significant contribution to the bottom line, if not corporate existence. They were too preoccupied with demonstrating clean hands in the event of disasters. Nobody wanted to be associated with IT investments which could potentially become big losers. It was easier for executive management to reject IT projects and insulate themselves from tough decisions. The business opportunities for- feited were never measured. The corporate focus within many organizations was on reducing rather than controlling IT costs. The assessment process became too academic and static. CFOs were elated with the perception that finally ROI and dis- counted cash flows had turned the tables on the IT practitioners; that IT costs were brought under control; and that they were contributing to the bottom line. Project sponsors were reduced to sacrificial lambs.

In addition, the margin squeezing recession of the early 1990s forced

executive management to insist on lowered project costs. IT budgets were slashed in swift succession. Deal- ing with IT costs was definitely easier for executive management than, say, bargaining on the industrial relations table.

New metrics were needed Traditional financial metrics alone no longer work in predicting success or failure for IT investments, as technology is becoming more and more pervasive throughout organizations. What is investment in IT equipment and what is investment in physical plant has become indistinguishable. The traditional metrics of time, cost and quality are still important, but they are no longer sufficient.

The problem with traditional cost benefit analysis and return on investment, which are a result of a manufacturing economy where labour was a significant cost component, is that they have a micro economic focus and favour low risk investments with small returns. The projects which were ultimately sponsored were those delivering marginal benefits in the short term. While the danger of over- investing or investing unwisely in information technology is a major concern to executive management, relying too heavily on ROI can leave companies irrevocably behind in the race to win competitive advantage through technology. Business decision making has always been a matter of weighing the risks against the opportunities. Yet the ongoing cost of


tactical solutions and software main- tenance was not being challenged. Too many companies leap into expensive technology for marginal returns.

New metrics were needed to un- derstand such intangibles as increased responsiveness, ease of access to information, flexibility, security and resi- lience. Executive management were faced with a number of challenging questions:

Is there any correlation between investment in IT and performance ?

Does increased investment lead to increased performance ?

Is it possible to determine the level of investment which delivers the optimum level of performance ?

Do you reach a point of diminishing returns ?

What is the minimum investment needed to survive ?

How far can you attribute IT investment to performance ?

How do you define performance ?

Attempting to answer these ques- ~_._ tions is not easy. Available research on the relationship between IT investment and performance is somewhat contradictory. Many IT investment studies concluded that companies had invested too much for little return - e.g. Loveman, Roach, Strassmann and Turner. Others came up with very different conclusions. Par example:

In 1986, Bender D concluded that in the insurance industry an optimum level of IT investment was recognized - 15% to 20% of total costs. Bender concIuded that companies that invested below this optimum level had lower performance than those which had invested above this optimum.

In 1983, Cron and Sobol found that in the warehousing industry which relied on extensive use of technology, firms were either very strong or very weak financial performers. This study supports the significance of strategic position put forward by the PIMS Program a year later.

In 1984, the PIMS Program concluded that management productivity of companies with a superior strategic position increased threefold over those with an inferior strategic position.

The reason for the noted incon- sistencies and contradictory findings is that as technology is becoming more widespread throughout organizations, it is too broad to be analysed as one homogeneous technology. Research on the subject has treated IT as one entity. Different systems are developed for different management objectives. The distinction between the different types of IT is critical when attempting to establish a relationship between IT investment and performance. Incon- sistencies were also noted in the definition of IT and performance benchmarks. As a consequence, it was very difficult to isolate the impact of IT investment on corporate performance. Two critical variables need to be factored into the analysis:

l IT investment is not homogeneous.

l Conversion effectiveness of IT investments.

IT investment is not homogeneous IT investments are made for different reasons. They differ in the way they interact with the underlying corporate strategy. Corporations can choose to apply IT at any point or points of the value chain to compete (Porter and Millar 1985). Consider for example the rationale behind the following IT investments and the different benchmarks which must be used to measure success:

A new technology platform to support a specific product or service differentiation strategy;

Automating the transactions of an organization to support a cost cutting strategy by substituting capital for labour;

Computer Audit Update l February 1996 1.i“ 1996, Elsevier Science Ltd.

l Provide flexibility to handle a wider range of customer needs;

l IT investment to replace obsolete technology; and

l A new technology platform to enable the development of other business solutions.

The justification and evaluation of the above will differ, as their impact on corporate performance is bound to be assessed differently. Investments alone in IT will not guarantee returns. Ultimately the measure of success or failure is the bottom line. IT investments have to demonstrate that they are consistent with maximising value to the organization.

Segregation of IT investment is critical as no relationship can be established between the investment and performance measurement. Five classifications are recommended to assist the investment evaluation and performance measurement process - derived and extended from the cate- gories suggested by Turner and Lucas (1985) and Weill (1992):

Strategic;

Strategy Support;

Transactional;

Informational/Infrastructure; and

Tactical.

The contradictory findings outlined earlier could be explained by the different directional effects on performance (e.g. transactional is positive, strategic is negative in the short term and informational is neutral), resulting from the different management objectives for IT investment. Exactly how a company chooses to classify technology investment is highly variable hence measuring IT costs may be misleading. Comparing/benchmarking IT spending to revenue ratios across different companies may be useless, if not deceptive.

Internal Audit should ensure that these classifications are recognized. As IT investments are made for different reasons, different benchmarks have to

be used to measure success. The classifications outlined above are critical for the IT investments’ evaluation process.

Strategic IT investments Strategic IT investments are made to gain competitive advantage and increase market share via sales growth (Ives & Learmonth 1984). These type of investments may be a strategy in their own right (eg. projects launching a new product or service; projects aimed at increasing market share), or sub-components of a broader strategy (eg. improve long term customer relationships). Strategic IT investments are usually long term, with long lead times between investment and return. They may involve one or more um- brella projects, each with a number of sub-projects.

The primary metric for evaluating a business strategy is whether it yields a higher value than the current strategy. A critical feature of strategy development is the evaluation of alternatives to select the best strategy for the organization. Strategic IT investments are complex, the least understood and the most risky of all IT investment types. Strategic IT often requires significant organizational change. This type of investment has a negative impact on performance in the short term.

Strategy support IT investments These are the projects supporting a strategy’s implementation. There may


be a number of these projects in a strategy - e.g. software and hardware to support a product strategy.

These projects are an integral part of a business strategy and can only be evaluated with reference to the overall strategy. Although the viability of these projects is assessed at strategic IT investment level, their impact on the overall strategy must be assessed as these projects come on stream. The evaluation of alternatives is critical to select the best strategy support alter- native for the organization.

Transactional IT investments These are projects focusing on productivity and cost cutting, usually by substituting capital for labour. These investments are associated with im- proved corporate performance, as measured by profitability and labour productivity. Transactional IT supports operational management and usually involves significant repetition - e.g. accounts receivable, inventory control and payroll.

Transactional IT investments are well understood and the benefits are easily measurable and can be realized immediately. Osterman P (1986) demonstrated a reduction in clerical and managerial labour with this type of IT investment.

Transactional IT investments have a positive impact on performance.

Informational/ in~astructure IT investments IT infrastructure is the enabling foundation of shared information technology capabilities upon which business depends (McKay & Brockway 1989). This shared characteristic is what differentiates IT infrastructure from other IT investments. This type of investment is usually large and long

term. It includes projects which support the general functioning of the organization by providing the information infrastructure to deliver other functions besides increased market share and/or cutting costs.

IT infrastructure is made up of two layers (McKay & Brockway 1989) as follows:

Base layer - Commodities readily available in the market (e.g. hardware);

Top layer - Shared IT systems and services that are provided centrally for use throughout the organization (e.g. EDI; universal gateways; general ledger).

These two layers are used as building blocks for business systems. In addition there is the human IT infrastructure (e.g. knowledge, skills) which develops these two layers into the organization’s IT infrastructure.

Organizations could view the role and benefits of IT infrastructure differently. The different views would dic- tate different expectations, as follows (Venkatraman 1991):

Independent of strategies - Cost savings via economies of scale;

Reactive to strategies - Short term business benefits; and

Interdependent of strategies - Long term flexibility.

These investments do not usually evolve directly out of a specific business strategy. Most projects falling in this category are of a replacement or enhancement nature, driven by events. such as:

capacity limits on existing equipment;

technology changes;

management process changes; and

regulatory reporting requirement changes.

Replacement type projects will have to demonstrate that they can perform the required functionality at a lower cost than the existing system

Computer Audit Update l February 1996 (‘1 1996, Elsevier Science Ltd.

and other alternatives - expressed in present value terms. Business process reengineering needs to be factored when evaluating infrastructure projects.

IT infrastructure investments are di.tBcult to justify in isolation. Business units are unlikely to undertake centra- lized IT infrastructure investments, although decentralized infrastructure projects are on the increase (primarily due to emerging new technologies which have delivered more flexible and affordable platforms). However, a relationship needs to be established between the cost to develop IT infra- structures and future benefits. The commercial viability needs to be demonstrated. Otherwise, these investments will end up being approved on negative NPVs and cost will no longer be relevant as executive management are coaxed into accepting the argu- ment that the issue here is survival.

A useful analogy to appreciate the benefits and funding of IT intiastruc- ture projects is public infrastructure - eg. roads, rail, bridges. There are many studies demonstrating the relationship between public infrastructure investment and productivity gains. A survey of ‘G7’ countries indicated a strong relationship between public infrastructure investment (as a percentage of GDP) and the annual growth of labour productivity. Between 1973 and 1985, Japan had both the highest public infrastructure investment and labour productivity. Conversely the US had the lowest of the seven countries in both (Aschauer 1989). The analogy has remarkable similarities. Both IT and public infrastructure:

Require large investments and are long term;

Are delivered by a central provider;

Enable business activity which is otherwise not economically feasi- ble; and

Are difficult to cost justify in advance and/or in isolation.

Having established the distinct similarities between the two types of

investment, the funding method of public infrastructure can be applied to IT infrastructure investment projects. This may be in the form of taxation and/or user pay tariffs, similar to road tolls. This approach has the benefit of realistically measuring future benefits associated with the infrastructure investments. In addition, the process would demonstrate whether the IT infrastructure investment is commercially viable.

Another parallel would be to treat the charge-back to users of the IT infrastructure, as an insurance premium and/or infrastructure tax. These investments should be funded centrally and charged back to IT users as an insurance cover to manage business interruption risk.

One rationale behind IT infrastructure investment is to acquire flexibility. Here we could extend the analogy to the flexibility provided by options like treasury instruments - e.g. cur- rency options; bond options. For a premium one could buy the flexibility and protection against adverse market/environmental changes, which might impact on the underlying in- strument. Similarly, the central IT unit could be seen as selling flexibility to line business users for a predeter- mined amount.

Tactical IT Investments Tactical projects deliver short-term functionality, usually for the interim period in the development life cycle of long term solutions. While this type of investment is critical because corporations could forfeit their competitive advantage should the delivery of strategic solutions be unduly delayed, the corporate focus should be on long term solutions. Otherwise, the IT platform becomes less and less integrated which in turn will impact on future strategies. If project sponsors are con- stantly putting forward tactical solutions to meet urgent business requirements, then a separate unit should be looking into long term solutions.


Conversion effectiveness of IT investments Conversion effectiveness of IT investments, that is the ability to convert IT investments into productive outputs, varies between organizations and different project teams within the same organization. Many large corporations have experienced runaway IT projects with the systems development life cycle running behind schedule, and the level of project deliverables diminishing in inverse proportion to the increasing budget overruns. The much publicised UK Stock Exchange’s Taurus project is a good example. The failure to deliver the project is not due to any technology limitation, but in the conversion effectiveness. “Progress in technology far outstrips progress in managing the technology” (Collin Nick 1995)

Organizations with an established and effective conversion effectiveness have a stronger relationship between IT investment and performance. The relationship between investment in IT and organization performance is complex. “Two firms investing the same in IT will almost certainly experience different performance effects” (Weill Peter - 1992). Conversion effectiveness is dependent on a number of variables, but the following four factors are “perceptual measures expected to moderate IT investment and firm performance relationship” (Weill Peter - 1992):

l Previous .Experience with IT;

l User Satisfaction with Implemented Systems;

l Corporate Political Turbulence; and

l Top Management Commitment.

Preuious Experience m-i% IT Previous experience with IT is impera- tive for any conversion effectiveness (Raymond 1985). Experience results in more effective utilisation of limited IT resources. Organizations with strong IT experience have realistic expectations of what IT can deliver, and are also cognisant of potential pitfalls.

Organizations should establish positive environments, encouraging line management and IT practitioners to share good as well as bad experiences. It is unfortunate that in the wake of computer disasters many organizations focus on who is to blame?, rather than why did it happen? and what safe- guards can we take to prevent further occurrences? Avoidable bad practices, if not disasters, will keep occurring.

User satisfaction with implemented systems User satisfaction with implemented systems is a universal measure of computer system success (Ives, Olson & Baroudi, 1983; Baroudi and Orli- kowski 1988). Business users’ perception of and satisfaction with implemented systems, will have a significant influence on their involvement with new systems (Ives & Olsen 1984) and their general commitment to rely on system solutions.

The issue of perception is very critical in this context, and specifically with legacy systems. For example, computer systems developed for a specific purpose may be patched up to deliver ad hoc functionality to meet urgent business requirements. This may be caused by line management’s limited strategic foresight and/or poor IT/business strategic alignment. Whether the onus is on the IT practi-

Computer Audit Update l February 1996 K’> 1996, Elsevier Science Ltd.

tioner/director, the line business unit, or both, user dissatisfaction will inevi- tably have negative ramifications on conversion effectiveness.

Internal political turbulence Organizations experiencing internal political turbulence will have a lower conversion effectiveness than more cohesive firms. Internal political turbulence has a significant intluence on IT design and implementation (Markus 1983; Markus & Ptieffer 1983). Conflict can reduce the effect of IT on performance by blocking horizontal integra- tion, waste scarce resources and misdirect innovation. Individuals or groups will push their own Machiavel- lian agendas to protect their own interests, often at the expense of the whole organization. Employees could form coalitions and influence the computerisation decision process to protect or maximize their group’s interests (Shrisvastava & Grant 1985).

Top management commitment

Having established the significance of factoring the context of the firm into the analysis (Weill Peter 1992) the subsequent parts of this article (March and April’s issues) will outline the necessary framework to maximize conversion effectiveness and ultimately the return on IT investments.

Top management commitment has long been recognized as critical to

successful development, implementation and use of computer systems (Lucas 1981; Markus 1981; Ginzberk 1981; Kwon & Zmud 1987). Top management backing is vital to establish and maintain:

Business and IT Strategy Alignment;

Business Process Reengineering and IT; and

An effective IT Steering Committee.

Internal audit has the responsibility to undertake an independent assessment of IT investment conversion effectiveness within their organizations and if possible benchmark that effectiveness within the industry. Win- dows of opportunity would be for- feited, unless Internal Audit invests time in reviewing the business and IT strategy alignment, business process reengineering and establish audit re- presentation on the IT Steering Com- mittee. For example, business process reengineering is recognized as the significant driver to achieve measurable and sustainable performance gains via radical and wholesale changes. It is critical that business controls are not suppressed or overlooked in the reengineering exercise.

Internal Audit would not be adding value by raising concerns on business issues/controls and/or the IT platform after the business process reengineering is finalised and the strategic platform has been selected and is either in the process of being, or has already been implemented.

The remaining two articles to be published in March and April’s Com- puter Audit Update will discuss these issues in detail, including a compre- hensive list of prerequisites which are critical to maximize IT effectiveness.

0 Mario Micallef, 1996


References Aschauer D.A., “Is Public Expenditure Productive?“, Journal of Monetary Economics, 1989. Baatz E.B., Altered Stats, CIO, October 1994. Baroudi J.J. and Orlikowski W.J., “A Short Form Measure of User Information Satisfaction: A Psycho- metric Evaluation and Notes on Use”, Journal of MIS, 1988. Bender D., “Financial Impact of Information Froces- sing”. Journal of MIS, Vol 3, No. 2, 1986. Broadbent Marianne % Samson Danny, Improving the Alignment of Business and Information Strate- gies, The Graduate School of Management, IJniversity of Melbourne, November 1990. Broadbent Marianne & Weill Peter, Developing Business and Information Strategy Alignment: A Study in the Banking Industry, The Graduate School of Management, tJniversity of Melbourne, September 1991. Butler Carey, The Role of Information Techrzology in Business Process Redisign: Observations from the Literature, The Graduate School of Management, University of Melbourne, December 1993. Butler Cox Foundation, “The Role of Information Technology in Transforming the Business”, BCF Research Report No. 79, London, 1991. Collin Nick, “Getting Value For Money From IT Investments by Rethinking the Management of In- formation and Technology”, Computer Audit Update, February 1995. Computer Science Corp., El Segundo, Califorrr-nia Software Magazine, February 1994. Computing Canada, May 1994. Cron W. and Sob01 M., “The Relationship between Computerization and Performance: A Strategy for Maximizing Benefits of Computerization”, Informa- tion And Management, Vol6, 1983. Davenport Thomas & Short James, “The New Industrial Engineering: Information Technology and Business Process Redisign”, Sloan Management Re- view, 1990. DeJarnett L.R., “What is Hot, What the Hot is Not!“, Information Strategy, 1992. Diamond Sid, “Giving Business an IT Alignment”, Software Magazine, February 1994. Ginzberk M.A., “Key Recurrent Issues in the Implementation Process”, MIS Quarterly, 1981. Gulden Gary & Reck Robert, “Combining Quality and Reengineering Efforts for Process Excellence”, 1992. Hammer Michael, “Reengineering Work: Don’t Automate, Obliterate”, Harvard Business Review - 1990. Hammer Michael % Champy James, Reengineering the Corporation. A Manifesto for Business Revolu- tion, New York, Harper Business Press, 1993. Ives & Learmonth, “The Information System as a Competitive Weapon”, Communications of the ACM, December 1984. Ives B. & Olsen M.H., “User Involvement in MIS Success: A Review of Research”, Management Science, 1984. Ives B., Olson M.H. 81 Baroudi J J., “Measuring User Information Satisfaction: A Method and Critique”, Communications of the ACM, 1983. Kerr Monta, “Tough Times for CIOs”, Computing Canada, May 1994. Kimber Jeremy, “If You Think Information is Expensive Try Ignorance”, The Treasurer, December 1994. Krass Peter, “Building a Better Mousetrap: What Role do MIS Executives Play in Business Reengineering Projects?“, Information Week, No. 313, March 1991. Kwon T.H. & Zmud R.W., “Unifying the Fragmented Models of Information Systems Implementation”,

Critical Issues in Information Systems Research, Wiley, 1987. Lamont Warren Gorham, How IS Steering Commit- tees Contribute to a Proper Control Environment, Auerbach Publishers Inc., 1994. Lucas H.C. Jr., Implementation: The Key to .Success- fuI Information Systems, Columbia I:niversity Press: New York, 1981. Markus M.L., Power, Politics and MIS Implementa- tion, Communications of the ACM> 1983. Markus M.L., Implementation Politics. Top Manage- ment Support and User Involvement, 1981. Markus M.L. & Pfieffer J., “Power and the Design and Implementation of Accounting and Control Systems”, Accounting Organizations and Society. 1983. McKay D.T. 8t Brockway D.W., Building IT Infra- structure for the 19905, Nolan Norton & Company. 1989. Osterman P., “The impact of Computers on the Environment of Clerks and Managers”, Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 1986. PLMS Program, Management Productivity and In- formation Technology, The Strategic Planning Insti- tute, Cambridge, Mass, 1984. Porter and Millar, “How Information Gives You Competitive Advantage”, Harvard Business Review. July August 1985. Raymond L., “Organization Characteristics and MIS Success in the Context of Small Business”, MIS Quarterly, March 1985. Roach Stephen S., “Technology and the Service Sector: The Hidden Competitive Challenge”. Technof- 0~ Forecasting and Social Change, December 1988. Roach Stephen S., “Pitfalls on the ‘New’ Assembly Line: Can Services Learn from Manufacturing’“, Economic Perspectives, Morgan Stanley and Co, New, York, December 1989. Shrisvastava P., & Grant J.H., “Empirically Derived Models of Strategic Decision-making Process”, Strate- gic Management Journal, 1985. Strassmann Paul, The Business Value of Computers, New Canaan, CT: The Information Economics Press. 1990. Teng J.T.C., Kettinger WJ, Guha S., “Business Process Redesign and Information Architecture: Estah- lishing the Missing Links”, Proceedings of the Tbir- teenth International Conference on Information Systems, DalIas, Texas, December 1992. Thompson D., Reorganizing MIS: The Evolution of Business Computing in the 1990s, Carmrl, LA: SAMS Publishing, 1992. Turner J., Organizational Perfformance, Size and The Use of Data Processing Resources, New York University, Centre for Research in Information Sys-

terns, Working Paper #58, 1985. Turner J. and Lucas H.C. Jr., “Developing Strategic Information Systems”, Handbook of Business Strat- ee, Chapter 21, Warren. Gorham and Lamont. Boston 1985. Venkatraman N., “IT-Induced Business Keconhgura- tion Infrasrtuctures: The Corporation of the 19905”. Information Technology and Organizational li-ans- formation, Oxford University Press. 199 I. Well1 Peter, The Role and Value of Information Technology Infrastructure, Some Empirical Observa- tions, The Graduate School of Management, llniversity of Melbourne, July 1992. Weill Peter, “The Relationship Between Investment in Information Technology and Firm Performance”: A Study of the Valve Manufacturing Sector, The Graduate School of Management, University of Mcl- bourne, July 1992. Weill Peter & Olson Margrethe, Managing Invest- ing in Information Technology: Mini Case Examples and Implications, The Graduate School of Manage- ment, 1 ‘niversity of Melbourne, March 1989.

Computer Audit Update l February 1996 (. 1996, Elsevier Science Ltd.

maximizing return on technology investments (1)

Documents