market-led policy measures for urban redevelopmetn in singapore

8/9/2019 Market-led Policy Measures for Urban Redevelopmetn in Singapore

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Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 119

Market-led policy measures for urban redevelopment in Singapore

Sau Kim Lum*, Loo Lee Sim, Lai Choo Malone-Lee

Department of Real Estate, School of Design and Environment, National University of Singapore, 4 Architecture Drive, Singapore 117566, Singapore

Received 16 January 2002; received in revised form 24 December 2002; accepted 16 January 2003

Abstract

This paper analyses the effectiveness and impacts of two market-led policy measures for stimulating private housing

redevelopment in Singapore. The first measure accorded betterment potential to sub-optimally used land through density incentives.

Subsequently, enabling legislation was enacted to facilitate site amalgamation. Using data from 1994 to 2000, the measures successfullyinduced the supply of privately owned land and site assembly through en bloc sales. However, the urban intensification strategies have

resulted in unintended and adverse consequences such as infrastructural pressure, loss of environmental character and accelerated

economic obsolescence. Moreover, policy delivery that relies on private sector capital is highly dependent on market conditions.

r 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Urban redevelopment; Market-led policy; Housing; En bloc sales

Introduction

Recent urban policy in many western cities has shown

a shift towards urban entrepreneurialism (Leitner, 1990)

and private sector participation (Jones, 1996). For HongKong as well, publicprivate partnership has become a

prevalent organizing principle in urban policy imple-

mentation (Yeh, 1990). This shift reflects the states

increasing reliance on private sector investment deci-

sions to trigger off physical redevelopment and urban

rejuvenation. Property-led urban regeneration is then

expected to induce economic growth and bring social

benefits to the community (Jones and Watkins, 1996).

In an effort to attract private capital, two strategies

have often been adopted (Tang and Tang, 1999). These

are the formulation of development control policies that

will provide more incentives to encourage property

development and the removal of private sector supply

side constraints. Both strategies were employed recently

in the city-state of Singapore to facilitate the achieve-

ment of key planning objectives in the long-term

development of the country.

As with parallel approaches elsewhere, the Singapore

government introduced a new planning incentive in the

early 1990s that relied primarily on private investment

to stimulate urban redevelopment in central-city loca-

tions. Despite institutional differences between Singapore

and other western cities, two common features of their

recent urban policy initiatives towards inner city redeve-

lopment have been an emphasis on the private sector and

an unprecedented faith in the efficiency of the market.But while deregulation and privatization have become

dominant themes of urban policy since the Thatcher and

Reagan administrations (Gaffikin and Warf, 1993), it was

only in 1994 that pro-market planning incentive measures

were introduced in Singapore through the Development

Guide Plan (DGP) to supplement government actions.

Prior to that, government intervention and state-led

development have been largely instrumental in effecting

urban development goals despite Singapore being a

laissez faire economy (Zhu, 1997).

In particular, private sector participation in the urban

renewal of Singapore has been largely passive. Under

the Government Land Sales (GLS) program that began

in 1967, sub-optimally used land parcels were acquired

and assembled by the state for comprehensive redeve-

lopment. Developers who bought these land parcels had

to adhere to a stringent set of conditions that stipulated,

among other things, the type of development allowed

and the time-frame for completion (URA, 1995).

Initially, various financial and tax incentives were

offered to attract investors to bid for the sites. As time

went on, these incentives were gradually withdrawn.

This was because the state owned some 76% of the

aggregate land mass in Singapore and it soon became

ARTICLE IN PRESS

*Corresponding author. Tel./fax: +65-6874-6900.

E-mail address: [email protected] (S.K. Lum).

0264-8377/$- see front matterr 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/S0264-8377(03)00046-2


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apparent that the GLS program was the dominant

source of vacant or soft land for development

activities. By comparison, the supply of privately owned

land parcels was small since the ownership of these sites

was often fragmented. More importantly, there were few

incentives for private agents to market and develop the

sites, given the non-trivial land assembly and othertransaction costs involved.

This changed with the release of the first of 55 DGPs

in 1994. For privately owned sites in many of the

centrally located areas, the DGPs relaxed extant devel-

opment controls on building density in terms of the

allowable plot ratio or floor area ratio (FAR as it is called

in the US;Seyfried, 1991). The land-use planning density

bonus gave rise to attractive land value enhancement

possibilities that triggered a string of what have been

called en bloc or collective sales. In such a sale, owners of

fragmented interests in land responded to the DGP

inducement of private gains by banding together to sell

their combined sites for redevelopment collectively.

Since the assembly of interests in redevelopment land

was by means of private negotiation, the process was

time consuming and became prohibitively difficult when

more land lots or interests were involved. Particularly

after the onset of the Asian financial crisis, en bloc sales

ground to a halt. Policy-makers were convinced that the

requirement of a 100% consensus level amongst all

landowners of an en bloc redevelopment scheme frustrated

the development incentives of the DGPs. To remove this

supply side constraint, the Land Titles (Strata) (Amend-

ment) Act was passed on 11 October 1999 to allow an en

bloc sale to proceed as long as a majority, rather than all,of the landowners are in agreement (The Land Titles

(Strata) (Amendment) Act, 1999).

This paper aims to critically evaluate the effectiveness

and impacts of the two strategies outlined above in the

high-density urban context of Singapore. The next

section provides a brief policy background that focuses

on the rationale for the DGP planning incentives and

for the subsequent implementation of the Land Titles

(Strata) (Amendment) Act. We then present an evalua-

tive framework and our assessment of whether the

strategies have achieved their stated policy objectives of

inducing the supply of privately owned land and

increasing private sector site amalgamation for new

urban housing redevelopment. In addition, we analyze

their unintended impacts. The paper concludes with

some implications of using market-led initiatives for

urban housing redevelopment.

The policy measures

In the early 1990s, the planning system in Singapore

underwent substantial changes. The system that had

guided the countrys development over the previous 30

years was found to be inadequate to steer future

development towards the long-term goals of the

government. In a major rationalization exercise,

the national planning and conservation authoritythe

Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA)implemented

a new two-tier planning system. The upper tier

comprised the Revised Concept Plan, a strategic planthat mapped out the vision for the long-term physical

development of the country. With the completion of the

Revised Concept Plan in 1991, the URA proceeded to

prepare detailed plans called DGPs that formed the

lower tier of the planning system.

DGPs are essentially statutory local plans that

contain details such as land-use zones, development

intensity, transportation networks, open space and

recreational areas and conservation designations that

guide land development in a demarcated area. Singapore

is currently divided into 55 planning areas. For each of

these areas, a DGP was prepared where the broad

strategies contained in the Revised Concept Plan were

translated into operational details at the local level. As

each DGP was completed, it became the reference for

development control and provided guidelines to land-

owners and developers on the type of use to which their

land could be put (URA, 1991a).

The 1991 Revised Concept Plan sets out the overall

strategy for maximising land use in Singapore (www.

ura.gov.sg). A key objective was to increase the overall

provision of housing land (URA, 1991b). Under the new

planning system, the DGPs will support the Concept

Plan through providing new channels for growth

(Malone-Lee, 1989). More land will be rezoned forresidential use (URA, 1993) and many areas, particu-

larly parcels in locations with enhanced public infra-

structure such as improved road or rail systems and

other community amenities, will enjoy enhanced devel-

opment intensity. Given these higher intensities, sites in

the affected urban areas stood to enjoy positive market

gains in terms of higher redevelopment potential.

However, most of these urban land lots were held under

private and multiple ownership. In some of the older

housing districts in the Central Area, single-family

dwelling units were built on small sites laid out in a

narrow, compact gridlock street pattern. Multi-family

units tended to be on larger sites but many of these did

not cover land areas in excess of 1000 m2.

Prior to the implementation of the new DGP planning

system, the state would identify underutilized sites for

compulsory acquisition by eminent domain rules and

then package them for sale to the private sector through

sealed-bid auctions. This mechanism attracted criticism

on two frontsthe government paid too low a price and

sold at too high a price. Private land owners who lost

their lots felt that the compensation meted out under the

Land Acquisition Act was below market levels (The

Land Acquisition Act (Cap 152), 1985). Yet, when these

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S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 1192


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sites were subsequently put out for tender, the prices

achieved often set new price benchmarks for land sales.

In addition, it was becoming increasingly difficult to

justify the expropriation of private land when the sites

would eventually be used for private development rather

than to further the public good.

In line with the governmental drive towards capitalsovereignty in the late 1980s, planners in Singapore also

adopted free market principles to achieve planning

goals. Rather than have land assembly carried out by

the state alone, the private sector was offered incentives

to amalgamate diverse interests in land under the new

planning system. In doing so, private agents were able to

realize the gains from betterment potential accorded by

the planning vision articulated in the DGPs and thereby

enable redevelopment.

This situation gave rise to the en bloc redevelopment

phenomenon whereby owners of fragmented interests in

land responded to the DGP enticement of private gains

by amalgamating their combined interests for sale and

eventual redevelopment (Lum et al., 2000). The existing

properties may be in a single strata-titled building as

would be the case of multi-family housing or adjacent to

each other as with adjoining single-family units. By

pooling multiple interests in developed land to form a

more attractive redevelopment configuration, an en bloc

sale allowed real estate owners to capitalize on the

marriage value of the en bloc site.

Such efforts however often encountered difficulties

especially in developments where numerous owners with

differing interests were involved. Particularly for the

older dwelling units in the central city that were oftensignificantly larger than the newer housing stock, many

of the existing owner-occupiers resisted en bloc sales as

comparable substitute homes in the prime areas were

scarce and very costly. Even if complete in-principle

consensus could have been secured for a joint sale,

invariably there were disagreements with regard to the

selling price, the apportionment of the sales proceeds,

the mode of disposal and the timing of events. As a

result, many en bloc sales stalled.

While there was no express statement by policy

makers when the DGPs were released, the intention of

the planning incentives was clearly to encourage private

developers to amalgamate property interests in land to

enable efficient redevelopment and urban rejuvenation.

Under similar measures undertaken by governments

elsewhere, developers had to pay for the planning gain

either by making appropriate local contributions (Bun-

nell, 1995), by providing public benefits from within

their development projects (Sagalyn, 1997) or by

building ancillary facilities (Tang and Tang, 1999).

Likewise, the private sector in Singapore was obliged to

pay for the density bonus through a development charge

that creamed off part of the enhanced value to the

government coffers. In fact, the sites that experienced

the greatest betterment potential were often in areas

where the state had made or was scheduled to contribute

heavy infrastructural investments. If en bloc schemes

were to fail on account of the problems involved in

acquiring properties held under multiple ownership, the

government stood to lose the ability to leverage on its

investments for an optimal level of urban renewal(Boyle, 1985).

On 11 October 1999, the Land Titles (Strata)

Amendment Act 1999 was enacted with the intention

of facilitating en bloc sales (Sim et al., 2002). Prior to this

measure, all the owners of an estate or building had to

agree to sell because a 100% consensus level was necessary

for the passage of a collective sale. With the passing of the

Act, there is no longer a requirement for all of the owners

to agree. A majority vote is sufficient to carry the deal

through. Majority vote is defined as follows:

(a) If the development is less than 10 years old, not less

than 90% of the owners, according to share values,must agree to the en bloc sale.

(b) If the estate is more than 10 years old, an 80%

majority will be sufficient.

Proceeds from the sale will then be apportioned

among individual owners in accordance with their

shares of the land interest or the assessable value of

their properties. Where there are disagreements, the

Strata Titles Board (STB) is the body that rules on these

disagreements or objections. The Land Titles (Strata

Titles Boards) Regulations (1999)set out the procedure

for application to the Board, the proceedings of the

Board and other matters such as appeals to the Boardand to the High Court.

By significantly altering the balance of power between

consenting and dissenting owners, the state has in-

creased the probability of success for an en bloc sale

where a minority of owners may be holding out for

financial or other reasons. Whilst this raises some

interesting questions on the issue of property rights

(Sim et al., 2002), this paper is more concerned with the

impact of the legal measure towards facilitating private

sector redevelopment efforts. The next section presents

our analysis of the effectiveness and impacts of the DGP

density bonus and the subsequent enactment of support-

ing legislation.

The effectiveness and impacts of the policy measures

The evaluative framework

We evaluate the policy initiatives in terms of their

intended and unintended impacts. First, we assess how

effective the measures have been in achieving the

governments objectives of inducing the supply of

privately owned land and increasing private sector site

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S.K. Lum et al. / Land Use Policy 21 (2004) 119 3


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amalgamation for new urban housing redevelopment.

Second, we analyze the unintended consequences of the

measures for the built environment.

Typically, the success or failure of a land policy

experiment is determined by making comparisons either

on a spatial or cross-sectional basisbetween affected

land parcels and parcels under a no-action alternativeor on an inter-temporal basisthe same space before

and after policy intervention. In Singapore, both

methods are problematic. The first requires the existence

of a control area, a condition that cannot be satisfied

as the policy measures were implemented island-wide.

The second is complicated due to the long duration for

policy execution.

Our approach is to divide the study period from 1994

to 2000 into two separate time-frames coinciding with

the two policy-on situations:

* Situation I, 19941997: 1994 is the year in which the

first measure of a new planning density bonus was totake effect. By late 1997, all residential land dealings

including en bloc sales had stopped as a result of the

economic slowdown triggered by the Asian financial

crisis. These activities resumed only in 1999.* Situation II, 19992000: The 20-month period from

May 1999 to December 2000 is associated with the

passage of enabling legislation to facilitate land

amalgamation efforts. Although the Land Titles

(Strata) (Amendment) Bill was gazetted only on 3

September 1999, it was evident from the well-

publicized deliberations of a specially constituted

Board (Report of the Select Committee on the LandTitles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill, 19 April 1999) that

policy-makers would change the legal regime in

favour of collective sales (The Straits Times, 1999a,b).

For each situation, we identified all the transactions in

private residential development land that were reported

in the media as well as non-publicized deals that had

been brokered by property consultants. Existing plan-

ning parameters and redevelopment details for each land

parcel were examined based on the relevant DGPs and

Master Plans prepared by the URA. Information on

sales prices was extracted from statistics provided by the

Property Research Department of the URA, as well.The microdata on all the concluded en bloc sales

transactions are presented in Tables 3 and 4 of

Appendix A. We then attempted to answer the following

questions.

Did the measures induce the supply of privately owned

land?

Table 1 presents the quantum of land suppliedthrough private sector channels. Between October 1994

and November 1997, 97 en bloc deals were concluded

that yielded 90 parcels of residential redevelopment land

covering an area of 367,463 m2. During our second

policy-on period, 52 sites with 335,682m2 of land were

sold through 54 collective sales. These quanta are

compared to the amounts of land sold by private agents

through non-collective sales. The latter provides the best

available control for contextual influences over our

study period as these transactions were also originated

by private agents in response to market forces for land

parcels of comparable tenure and use, but typically notin response to the revised densities. During both policy-

on periods, collective sales induced a greater land supply

than non-en bloc deals with the difference being more

pronounced in Situation II.

We also compare the en bloc land supply against the

supply of state-owned land. GLS parcels tend to be

larger in size compared to en bloc sites and hence offered

developers greater development flexibility. Such land is

sold only on 99-year leases to private sector builders for

high intensity developments with plot ratios of 2.8 or

more. Although the GLS supply may not be an ideal

benchmark, state-owned sites are put up for sale only

when there is perceived demand from developers.Table 2presents our results. While the quantum of state

land sold in the earlier policy-on period was about 2.7

times the amount of privately held land supplied through

collective sales, the supply from the en bloc market

dominated state land provision in the second period.

Fig. 1shows the annual quantum of land from private

sector sales, both collective and non-collective, as well as

from the GLS Program over our study period. There are

two important observations. First, both private and

public land supply are positively correlated to the

strength of the market for private residential property

as proxied by the Residential Property Price Index(RPPI). Second, the composition of private land supply

has changed quite markedly since the introduction of

ARTICLE IN PRESS

Table 1

The supply of private land for private residential development from en bloc and non-en bloc sales

Land supplied (m2) Number of sites Average size of plots (m2)

En bloc Non-en bloc En bloc Non-en bloc En bloc Non-en bloc

19941997 367,462.5 213,567 90 67 4082.9 3187.6

19992000 335,682.2 77,684 52 22 6455.4 3531.1

Total 703,144.7 291,251 142 89 4951.7 3272.5



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the policy measures. Prior to 1994, virtually all theprivately owned land that entered the market was sold

by corporations and single-entity owners. After the

policy incentives were implemented, such land has been

increasingly supplied through collective sales.

Measured against the governments objective of

inducing the supply of privately owned residential

development land, particularly for parcels held

under multiple interests, the first policy measure of

providing DGP density incentives was moderately

successful. However, its impact in Situation I was

limited by three supply side barriers. First, the problems

encountered in securing unanimity amongst all the

owners capped the number of estates that could be

freed for more intensive and efficient redevelopment.

Second, the difficulties in brokering larger deals where

many homeowners were involved, meant that many of

the sites in the earlier sales were small. We present

statistics on site amalgamation later. Third, the trend of

en bloc activity was initially confined mainly to the

prime areas where the revisions in planning parameters

were generally large. Due to the high cost of land in

these areas, there were sizeable capital constraints to

entry and only developers with adequate financial

resources could acquire such sites.

When some of the supply side barriers were removedby the Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Act in

Situation II, the joint effect of the policy measures on

en bloc land supply was evident. In late 1998 and early

1999, the residential property market began to improve.

Fig. 2shows the marked increase in the demand for new

residential units as the Singapore economy began its

post-crisis recovery. Anecdotal evidence suggests that

this took many developers and even policy-makers by

surprise. As the housing inventories of many producers

were rapidly being depleted, developers who needed to

replenish their land banks began to source new sites.

The economic turn-around also saw demand for

development land from new entrants into the private

housing market. In the absence of GLS, these players

began to source land from private land owners.

En bloc activity began to emerge again in mid-1999.

However, the pace of collective sales gained momentum

only in the third quarter of 1999 when it became clear

that the enactment of enabling legislation to allow

majority rather than absolute consensus for a collective

sale to proceed was imminent. The Land Titles (Strata)

(Amendment) Bill was gazetted on 3 September 1999

and the amended Bill was brought into force on 11

October 1999. In essence, the law overcame site

ARTICLE IN PRESS

Table 2

The supply of private land for private residential development from en bloc and government land sales

Land supplied (m2) Number of sites Average size of plots (m2)

En bloc State-owned En bloc State-owned En bloc State-owned

19941997 367,462.5 1,477,241 90 92 4082.9 16,057

19992000 335,682.2 195,519 52 13 6455.4 15,040

Total 703,144.7 1,672,760 142 105 4951.7 15,931

Fig. 1. The RPPI and the supply of land for private residential development.



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assembly problems and was instrumental in removing

supply side obstacles from deals that would otherwise

have stalled because of dissenting unit owners. This,

coupled with a slow response from the GLS program,

resulted in a significant supply of en bloc land in the

second policy-on period.

Did the measures induce the amalgamation of private land

sites?

Figs. 3 and 4present the distribution of the site areaof en bloc parcels corresponding to the two policy-on

situations. For both cases, the distribution is skewed

toward the smaller size range. This is particularly so for

sites assembled in the earlier period. The average size of

these parcels was 4083 m2, a figure that was inflated by

the presence of an outlier. Once this exceptionally large

site was removed, the average size fell to 3786m2

(Fig. 5). In the second policy-on period, the average size

of sites assembled with the passage of enabling legisla-

tion was 6216 m2.

Compared to non-en bloc sites, privately owned land

parcels that were assembled through collective sales

were generally larger (see Table 1). While this implies

that the policy package did induce the amalgamation of

private land interests, there is a clear difference in the

size of collective sales sites in the two policy-on periods.

Although the DGP planning bonus triggered a large

number of parcels into the market, the supply that

resulted from the first policy measure was dominated by

small-scale redevelopment sites. This has important

and unintended implications for the built environment,

an issue that we address below. In contrast, significantly

larger sites were assembled after the enactment of the

Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Act, an instrument

that offered private agents greater leverage for

amalgamating larger tracts of land for redevelopment

purposes.

What are the potential changes in net housing stock?

Since all the collective sales sites will eventually be

developed for housing, we estimated the potential net

effect of the policy measures on the private housing

stock. The last column in Tables 3 and 4 presents the

estimated number of housing units that are likely to bedeveloped on each of the assembled en bloc sites. Where

there are ongoing or completed projects or in cases

where development plans have been announced, the

actual number of units is reported. Otherwise, we have

assumed that future developments on the collective sale

sites will have an efficiency factor of 87.5% (i.e. 87.5%

of the gross floor area will be saleable unit area) and

provide units with an average size of 116 m2.

Table 3shows that the potential supply from en bloc

sites assembled in the first policy-on period is estimated

to be around 4829 private housing units. Collective sales

inTable 4which were concluded in the second policy-on

period are expected to generate another 5512 units. The

net increase in the future housing stock will be smaller

because of the demolition of existing houses. An

estimated 1398 residential units will be lost as a result

of en bloc sales in the pre-Asian crisis period whereas

about 1773 units will be replaced from the sites

amalgamated during our second policy-on period. Thus,

the net addition to supply is some 7170 private

residential units.

Based on an average annual take-up rate of 6500

private housing units over the last 3 years, collective

sales potentially add more than 1 years supply to the

ARTICLE IN PRESS

Fig. 2. The RPPI and turnover in the private residential market.



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private residential market. However, the total take-up is

a composite number for units built on privately supplied

land and state land sold on 99-year leaseholds.

Considering that the average take-up rate for units built

on privately held land is no more than 2000 units per

annum over the past 3 years, en bloc sites could

potentially contribute about 4 years worth of supply

to the private housing sector.

ARTICLE IN PRESS

0

5

10

15

20

25

0 5000

Site Area of En Bloc Parcels (in sq.m.)

Series: AREA

No. Of Observations 90

Mean 4082.917

Median 3078.900

Maximum 30472.00

Minimum 462.600

10000 15000 20000 25000 30000

Fig. 3. Size distribution of en bloc sites, 19941997.

0

5

10

15

20

25

0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000


Series: AREA

No. of Observations 52

Mean 6455.425

Median 4221.200

Maximum 26441.50

Minimum 967.4000

Fig. 4. Size distribution of en bloc sites, 19992000.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

0 2500 5000 7500 10000 12500 15000


Series: AREA

Observations 89

Mean 3786.410

Median 3053.400

Maximum 16055.50

Minimum 462.6000

Fig. 5. Size distribution of en bloc sites with outlier removed, 19941997.



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However, the timing of this supply will depend on

market viability. Unlike state land sold under the GLS

program, developers who own en bloc sites are not

obliged to complete their residential schemes accordingto a prescribed schedule. Indeed, many of the larger

players in the private housing supplier market have

bought these sites with the intention of building a

strategic prime residential land bank for future corpo-

rate expansion.

What are the unintended impacts of the policy measures?

Although the policy initiatives have had some

incipient success in achieving their targeted outcomes,

a few adverse impacts have surfaced. This section

presents an assessment of the unintended consequences

of the market-led policy measures based on our

examination of several en bloc hotspots in the Newton

and Tanglin DGPs within the Central Region of

Singapore (see Fig. 6). These areas have seen the

translation of higher FAR intensities into numerous

new developments and the impact of these developments

on the local environment is now evident.

On a positive note, many en bloc redevelopments

have brought about accelerated rejuvenation of residen-

tial areas as intended by policy makers. Older dilapi-

dated structures have given way to new and modern

developments that not only optimize land use but have

also resulted in improved amenities for local residents.

In the process of renewal, current planning standards

such as those relating to building spacing, road-

widening, landscaping and the provision of amenitieshave been imposed and incorporated. Thus, apart from

higher development intensities in many of these en bloc

areas, better quality housing and housing environments

have been achieved which is in line with the overall

planning objectives.

In certain areas however, urban renewal through

private sector efforts has had other planning impacts,

some of which are less than desirable for the local

environment particularly in the short and medium term.

We identify four such impacts below. Many of these are

common consequences of property-led regeneration

efforts where comprehensive urban renewal tends to

give way to piecemeal redevelopment of urban frag-

ments (McGrew, 1992).

Timing and co-ordination

Under the en bloc sale mechanism, market forces

responding to the prospect of enhanced gains bring

about early renewal of potential sites. Here, the private

developers primary consideration would be based on

commercial motives and market demand, unlike the case

where redevelopment is undertaken by the public

sector. The latter would have to regard overall commu-

nity needs as well as environmental concerns. Due

ARTICLE IN PRESS

Fig. 6. Newton and Tanglin DGP areas within the central region of Singapore.



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consideration would normally be given to the proper co-

ordination and phasing of redevelopment efforts to

ensure a smooth and gradual transition from old to new

and from low to high density. Thus, urban renewal

would be comprehensive and systematic rather than ad

hoc and uncoordinated (Healey et al., 1988). We have

found in en bloc sale areas many sites that weresandwiched between new and more intensive develop-

ments, when they themselves for whatever reasons were

either not ready or unable to capitalize on the en bloc

schemes. The result of such unsynchronized develop-

ment is often a less than harmonious streetscape with an

incongruous mix of new and old developments of

different intensities.

In other instances, particularly in landed housing

areas, sites that were left out of the amalgamation

schemes became isolated or hemmed in by new and

more intensive developments with little opportunity for

redevelopment to similar intensities in future given their

relatively small plot sizes. This has been seen in many

areas where single old buildings sit as environmental

misfits amidst new developments.

The long-term planning implication is that optimal

land use will only be attained for certain development

sites in the area, but not for the entire planning area.

These isolated buildings will remain, not only as blots on

the landscape to the detriment of the overall environ-

mental quality of the entire renewed area, but also as

reminders to the community of lost opportunities and

sub-optimal development.

Developments not in tandem with infrastructureimprovements

When urban renewal is undertaken by the state on a

comprehensive basis, public infrastructure and support

services are usually planned and undertaken at the same

time to support the new developments. However, with

en bloc redevelopment undertaken on an ad hoc basis by

the private sector, the ability to tie in with public

infrastructure and services enhancement is rendered

more difficult. This is illustrated in the Balmoral Road

area in the Newton DGP.

One of the planning objectives of the Newton DGP

was to optimize the land use, particularly around the

Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) station, by increasing the

total number of housing units by about 3200 units. Most

of the new units will be of the high density category, in

recognition of the proximity of the area to the centrally

located Orchard Road area and its good accessibility.

A closer study of some of the local areas in the DGP

revealed that many of them are quiet well-established

residential enclaves with predominantly single- or

double-storey landed housing, located in attractive local

environments well-integrated with mature vegetation

and are served by narrow local roads. In the Balmoral

Road area, the 1985 Master Plan plot ratio was 1.036.

However, the Newton DGP has rezoned it medium

density with a plot ratio of 1.6 although the area is more

than 200 m from the Newton MRT Station. Building

heights are to be increased to 10 storeys.

Prior to the release of the DGP, the area on both sides

of Balmoral Crescent has around 25 land plots, most of

them accommodating low-rise landed housing develop-ments and a few small blocks of walk-up apartments.

Balmoral Crescent is a 15 m-wide dual carriageway local

access road. While the DGP envisages transportation

improvements to the area at the converging junction

between Clemenceau Avenue North and Newton Circus

as well as future local roads to serve developments on

the vacant land parcels around the Newton MRT

Station, few improvements have been proposed for the

existing local access road networks.

Fig. 7 shows the land plots in the Balmoral area as

well as extant developments on these sites. In response

to the DGP provisions, a total of five recent en bloc

deals were recorded (marked with small dots) of which

two are under construction. Over 200 new dwelling units

are envisaged from these five deals to replace the existing

40 odd dwelling units, a five-fold increase. This is in

addition to the two new developments that have already

taken place (shown with large dots). The change in the

environmental character of the area is now becoming

evident, with the existing two-storey houses sandwiched

between newly completed 10-storey buildings and those

currently under construction. The quiet local road,

which is not expected to be further widened, will carry a

substantially increased traffic load. Further, the junc-

tions with arterial roads are likely to encounter somecongestion impacts during the morning peak hours. This

will be more severe when all the sites are redeveloped.

Changing environmental character

While one of the Revised Concept Plan objectives is to

increase the proportion of private residential dwellings,

it is also intended that there should be greater variety of

housing forms. With the en bloc sales phenomenon

however, we envisage that many of the landed housing

areas will give way to medium to high-rise condominium

developments with the attendant changes in the

environmental character.

A case in point is the Walshe Road area off Stevens

Road. In the 1985 Master Plan, the Plot ratio was 1.036

with a maximum allowable height of two storeys. Prior

to the DGP changes, the area around Walshe Road had

around 20 houses, most of which were two-storey

bungalows on large sites. Walshe Road is a 15m-wide

dual carriageway local road that extends a short

distance from Stevens Road, and branches off from a

T-junction to cul-de-sacs on both sides. The area, shown

inFig. 8, had a distinctive character with its established

residences integrated amidst greenery, mature trees and

beautiful landscape.

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10/19

Under the Tanglin DGP, the plot ratio was raised to

1.6 and the height control revised to 10 storeys. Through

a series of well-conceived en bloc sales, the house plotshave been amalgamated into four large parcels for high-

rise condominium developments with over 250 new

dwelling units. With these new developments, a severe

change in the local environmental character has begun

to take place. From an informal cluster of distinctive

dwellings amidst luxuriant vegetation, a new high-rise

environment of glass and concrete monoliths has

emerged as shown in Fig. 9. The dense environment

is clearly felt at street level and rendered harsher given

the sparse vegetation and narrowness of the existing

cul-de-sac.

In other areas, particularly the River Valley belt

which saw much en bloc activity in our first policy-on

period, amalgamated sites tend to be small. Redevelop-

ment of these small sites often in the form of thin,

needle-shaped buildings with minimal communal facil-

ities is also undesirable. The resulting streetscape is often

unsightly with the densely packed buildings aggravating

traffic congestion problems.

Early obsolescence of buildings

Urban renewal is normally undertaken when build-

ings or areas are ripe for redevelopment both economic-

ally and physically. The en bloc sales phenomenon is a

market response and tends to accelerate redevelopment

for buildings or areas which are available for

redevelopment due to their higher accorded planningintensities. In effect, their economic life is shortened.

However, they may still be relatively new physically and

therefore of sound structure and could well remain

functional for many years yet. And, if built in recent

years, they would have met the relevant current

planning standards in terms of building set-backs, open

space provision, amenities and compliance with basic

planning and technical (public health, safety, utilities,

landscaping, fire prevention, etc.) requirements.

Under these circumstances, their redevelopment,

purely in response to market factors, could be regarded

as wasteful of national resources. In an otherwise

conventional and well-conceived public sector initiated

urban renewal program, these buildings would probably

be phased in for redevelopment only after being given a

substantial run of its physical life. The more deteriorated

buildings, both physically and economically, would

normally be scheduled for redevelopment at the earlier

phases of such a program. The overall impact of the en

bloc sales phenomenon in this respect is the untimely

demolition and rebuilding of newer areas ahead of older

and more deserving areas, certainly not the most

efficient manner of managing land and building

resources.

ARTICLE IN PRESS

Fig. 7. The Balmoral Road area within the Newton DGP area.



11/19

Conclusion

This paper evaluates the effectiveness and impacts of

two recent market-led policy initiatives in Singapore

that sought to encourage the private sector regeneration

of central city residential areas. In accordance with the

Revised Concept Plan, the first measure provided

density bonuses in terms of higher plot ratios to many

ARTICLE IN PRESS

Fig. 8. The Walshe Road area within the Tanglin DGP area pre-1994.

Fig. 9. The Walshe Road area within the Tanglin DGP area post-1994.



12/19

private urban sites through Development Guide Plans

(DGPs). Generally, sites that enjoyed betterment

potential were selected based on their proximity to

commercial areas and in line with the development

intensity of surrounding developments. This led to a

series of en bloc sales where diverse interests in land

were amalgamated and sold to private sector developersfor eventual redevelopment.

However, fragmented and multiple ownership of

many urban parcels often frustrated the realization of

the planning gain by private agents as well as the

states urban renewal objectives. The problems of

holdouts and minority objection to the assembly of

private interests were more acute in the central

area where prime land for higher-intensity residential

development was scarce. This resulted in a second

measure in the form of supporting legislation. Essen-

tially, the Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Act

facilitated en bloc sales by requiring majority rather

than unanimous consent from existing land owners for a

sale to proceed.

Our evaluation shows that the first policy measure of

DGP density incentives had limited success in achieving

desired planning outcomes. While there was an increase

in the number of private residential sites supplied, the

parcels were predominantly small. This stemmed from

the difficulty in land assembly for properties held

under multiple ownership. The second measure

where facilitating legislation was enacted aided land

amalgamation efforts. When both policy initiatives were

in operation, the en bloc parcels supplied were larger

and had generally more efficient configurations. Mea-sured in terms of high quality housing stock, the policy

measures are likely to generate about 4 years supply.

However, as with all market-led conversions, whether

the planning incentives will actually translate into new

developments and when this will take place depend on

effective demand and the state of the private residential

market.

Measured against a broader set of criteria, it is

unclear if the market-led redevelopment measures

are able to achieve the wider objectives of the

Revised Concept Plan effectively without imposing

significant costs on the supporting infrastructure

as well as on the environment. Some of their

adverse and unintended consequences that are already

evident in central-city locations include: the markets

inability to organize and schedule redevelopment

efforts; the increase in traffic and infrastructure loading;

the loss of environmental character and incompatibility

with the surrounding context; and finally the accelera-

tion of economic, but not functional or physical,

obsolescence.

Several of the negative externalities of en bloc

development can be attributed to the lack of a minimum

lot size requirement. In Hong Kong for example, a FAR

bonus is only given to developers if their redevelopment

reaches a certain threshold size of 400m2 (Tang and

Tang, 1999). This can reduce the problems associated

with small-scale redevelopment sites. The more difficult

problem is the implementation gap associated with

urban intensification efforts. In land-scarce cities,

infrastructure pressures are amplified by planningstrategies based primarily on density. Unless planners

are clear about and are able to manage the exact

consequences of piecemeal redevelopment, policy deliv-

ery will be compromised.

The larger issue is whether the private sector can be

relied upon to achieve urban renewal goals in the future.

During the building boom of the early to mid-1990s,

high values of private residential property provided

an almost ideal lever for securing private sector

participation through zoning incentives. It is unlikely

that the bubble-like conditions prevalent then will be

repeated in the future. Further, en bloc activity thus far

has been focused on much of the older stock that

comprised small low-rise structures often in dilapidated

estates where the betterment premiums have been large

(Lum et al., 1999). At the next level of replacement are

medium-rise developments but the ever more marginal

viability of redeveloping them will make it increasingly

difficult for private developers to undertake such

projects. Despite the early success of the governments

policy measures, it is questionable whether the same

prescriptions will work in the longer term on a sufficient

scale or expeditiously enough to tackle the problems of

urban regeneration.

The Singapore planning system is still in aperiod of trial and error in assessing what

strategies can work in delivering long-term develop-

ment and land use optimization objectives. While its

experiment with urban intensification through en bloc

sales is fairly unique, there are broader implications

for other market-led measures that can be learnt.

Essentially, public sector efforts to implement urban

renewal through market-led redevelopment face

a dual land-use policy challenge. On the one hand,

the state must ensure that sufficient incentives are pro-

vided to attract private sector investment. However,

such piecemeal investment by private developers

with the single perspective of profit-maximization is

largely reactionary, uncoordinated and market-deter-

mined. For market-led renewal to be sustainable,

planners must concurrently ensure that policy execution

mitigates the detrimental consequences associated with

urban intensification.

Appendix A

The microdata on all the concluded en bloc sales

transactions are presented inTables 3 and 4.

ARTICLE IN PRESS



13/19

Table 3

Concluded en bloc deals in first policy-on period

No. Date of sale Address Project Name Site area(m2)

Proceeds($ million)

Price($psf)

1 Oct-94 11A & 13 Nassim Rd 7019.2 90.25 1195

2 Oct-94 2A-2R Limau Gardens Cosy Mansions 4697 24.6888 488

3 Oct-94 3 Toh Tuck Lane Toh Tuck Gardens 3757.8 16.4 405

4 Nov-94 Upper Changi Rd North/Tampines Rd Changi Heights 30472 116 354

5 Dec-94 711 Walshe Rd 5895.7 73.6 1160

6 Jan-95 78,80,y,88 Mount Sinai Drive Gochek Apts 2950.5 31.23 983

7 Feb-95 17 Tomlinson Rd Tomlinson Mansion 3104.4 62 1855

8 Mar-95 42 & 44 Kim Yan Rd 7137.8 68.3 889

9 Mar-95 Stevens Rd/Walshe Rd 6351.3 82.38 1205

10 Mar-95 42 Surrey Rd Lincoln Mansion 1177.8 14.8 1167

11 Mar-95 7 & 9 Ewe Boon Rd 3153 27.88 821

12 May-95 38-38G Farrer Rd Farrer Grove

May-95 34 Farrer Rd

May-95 AMALGAMATED SITES 4499.6 35.75 738

13 18-May-95 2A/B, 4/4A/4B & 6-6E Ewe Boon Rd 1989.2 23 1074

14 Jun-95 17 Newton Rd Miramar Mansion 2636.7 45.89 1617

Jun-95 21 Newton Rd 740.7 8.75 1097

AMALGAMATED SITES 3377.4 54.64 1503

15 Aug-95 Stevens Rd/Walshe Rd/Anderson Rd 7667.2 93.3 1131

16 Aug-95 Newton & Keng Lee Rd Newton Mansion 2512.3 38.2 1413

17 Sep-95 Shanghai Rd Shanghai Court 1297.7 1135

Sep-95 Shanghai Rd Shanghai Residence 697.8 1135


18 Sep-95 Butterworth Lane 2143.7 19.61375 850

19 Oct-95 21 Moulmein Rise Moulmein Lodge 1207.4 14.35 1104

20 Nov-95 43 & 45 Moonstone Lane 3700.5 24.5 615

21 6-Dec-95 27 Adam Rd Adam Gdn 2937.7 20.01 633

22 6-Dec-95 6/A/B/C Balmoral Crescent 2800.7 36.1752 1200

23 18-Dec-95 Stevens Drive Robin Heights & 7202 78.9 1018

24 Jun-96 1C, 3C & 7A Stevens Drive Fontana Gdns 1637.1

AMALGAMATED SITES 8839.1

25 Jan-96 1115G Jln Mutiara 1843.4 25.85 1303

26 Jan-96 9 & 9A Balmoral Rd 1830.0 23 1168

27 9-Jan-96 15 Balmoral Rd Balmoral Court 3520.1 49.181809 1298

28 13-Jan-96 12/y/20C Brooke Rd 2454.5 20.2916668 768

29 22-Jan-96 to 5-Feb-96 8 Pulasan Rd 1434.2 8.2 531


14/19

30 25-Jan-96 10/A/B/C/12/A/B/C Moulmein Rise 1191.7 13.7 1068

31 30-Jan-96 3438C St Thomas Walk St Thomas Apts 1059.7 13.222 1159

32 Feb-96 Balmoral Crescent 8400.6 126.6 1400

33 Mar-96 8 Balmoral Road Balmoral Lodge 2025.6 27.5 1261

34 28-Feb-96 35/35A/37/37A/y/45A Robin Rd Belville Gdns 3159.2 43 1265

35 Mar-96 10/G/12/G/14/G St. Martins Drive St Martins Place 4283.2 57.6 1249 36 Oct-96 4A/4B/6/6A/6B St. Martins Drive St. Martins Court 1357.3 16.05 1099

May-97 2 St. Martins Drive 1409.4 19.35 1275

AMALGAMATED SITES 7049.9 93 1226

37 28-Mar-96 121 Keng Lee Rd The Carmina 1667.4 27.55 1535

38 28-Mar-96 8L/y/R Tanjong Rhu Rd 1799.2 18 929

39 29-Mar-96 190 Moulmein Rd Zhen Sheng Mansion 1806.3 27.1 1394

40 Apr-96 17/A/B/C, 15E/F & 15G Shelford Rd 3716.4 37.4 935

41 23-May-96 11G Shelford Rd Shelford Condo 4229.1 36.964 812

42 14-Jan-97 17E-Y Shelford Road Shelford Gdns 4129.4 37 832

43 Mar-97 11D & E Shelford Road Shelford Lodge 1765.5 15.4 810

Mar-97 406 Dunearn Rd 1373.5 12 812

AMALGAMATED SITES 3139 27.4 811 44 3-Apr-96 6 Sarkies Rd 1710.2 24.8 1347

45 4-Apr-96 20/A/B/C/y/26C Jln Raja Udang 1839.7 20.8 1050

46 16-Apr-96 104/y/H Holland Rd Holland Apt 2219.8 16.5 691

47 16-Apr-96 11/A/B/13/A/B/15A/15B Shanghai Rd 637.7 8.3 1209

48 26-Apr-96 2/A/B/C/4/A/B/C Jln Mutiara 930.1 12.96 1295

49 Development site at Jln Mutiara 921.7

AMALGAMATED SITES 1851.8

50 30-Apr-96 18/A/B/20/A/B St. Martins Drive 1114.8 15 1250

51 14-May-96 561 Upper Serangoon Rd Yardley Court 2421.5 23.6 905

52 15-May-96 145D Jalan Korma Thomson Court 10540.5 207.98 1833

53 24-Jun-96 to 3-Apr-97 205 Moulmein Rd Moulmein Apts 1829.9 40.4 2051

54 27-May-96 207 Moulmein Rd Angel Court 2040.2 39.3 1790 55 24-Jan-96 to 3-Apr-97 136/A/y150C Moulmein Rd Thomson Apts 1889.6 40.3 1981

AMALGAMATED SITES 5759.7 120 1936

56 Jun-96 Hullet Rd Hullet Court 997.3 31.9 2972

57 27-Jun-96 3 Balmoral Rd 2299.8 31 1252

58 11-Jul-96 3 Peck Hay Rd Peck Hay Court 1219.9 27.82 2119

11-Jul-96 5 Peck Hay Rd Peck Hay View 1326.9 24.88 1742

59 Feb-97 7 & 7A Peck Hay Rd 824.4 18 2028


Table 3 (continued)


Proceeds($ million)

Price($psf)


15/19

60 Jul-96 176 Keng Lee Rd & 5 Lincoln Rd Xiang Court 3182.8 57 1664

61 18-Jul-96 2 Tanjong Rhu Rd Fort Apts 2138.6 24.17 1050

62 Jul-96 17/A/B Surrey Rd & 32 Lincoln Rd 1741.7 32.08 1711

63 3-Aug-96 26 Paterson Rd Paterson View 2359 46.89 1847

64 10-Aug-96 20, 22 & 24 Shelford Rd Shelford Apts 7025.7 70.556 933

65 Aug-96 18/A/B/20/A/B St. Martins Drive St Martins Mansion 1114.8 15 1250

Aug-96 23 St. Martins Drive 2259.4 30.4 1250

Nov-96 16, St. Martins Drive 1567.7 21.09 1250


66 19-Sep-96 515 & 517 Dunman Rd Dunman Court 3412.4 36.25 987

67 9-Oct-96 Palm Grove Avenue Zhen Ji Gdn 11,303.1 56 460

68 4-Nov-96 8, 10, 12, 23 & 25 Grange Garden 4462.8 94.1535 1960

69 6-Nov-96 71 & 73 Paterson Rd City Mansions 7453.7 139 1733

70 9-Nov-96 130/A/y/V Cairnhill Rd Cairnhill Apts 2247.1 60.7701998 2512

9-Nov-96 134 Cairnhill Rd Galleria Apts 2057 55.6298 2512


71 Nov-96 49 & 51 Leedon Park 9365.6 55.5 551

72 Nov-96 11/A/y/L Martia Rd Martia Court 5136.4 29.2 528

73 Jan-97 Yan Kit Rd 2274.6 26.45 1080

74 15-Jan-97 83 Cairnhill Rd Scotts Tower 3040.3 96.8 2958

75 Mar-97 1 Essex Rd Essex Towers 3053.4 48 1460 76 Mar-97 140186A Sixth Ave Avenue Park 16,055.5 165.251 956

77 Apr-97 63, 65, 67 & 69 Cairnhill Circle 1038.9 25.4 2271

78 May-97 4, 6, 8 & 10 Suffolk Rd 1624.1 23.2 1327

79 May-97 49 Devonshire Rd 1280.4 31 2249

80 May-97 114 Holland Rd Chateau de Hollande 2345.4

May-97 114A Holland Rd Spring Court 2325.5 31.8181818 1271


81 30-May-97 14,12A,14A Shelford Rd 4137.3 36.9 829

82 9-Jun-97 30 Farrer Rd 876 9.240851 980

10-Jun-97 36 Farrer Rd 714.4 7.5362 980


83 13-Jun-97 14/y

/16C Palm Grove Avenue 4220.0 20.2 445

84 Jun-97 Sunset Way Clementi Park S C 12,535.6 77.1 571

85 Jul-97 14,16,20/A/B/C Lor 6 Geylang 644.6 12.36 1781

86 Jul-97 121 except 9 Taman Warna 6358 78.26 1144

16-Sep-97 9 Taman Warna 496.8 6.11 1144


87 2-Aug-97 4/A/B/C/y/10C Kay Poh Rd 1307.9 20 1421

88 7-Aug-97 36/A/B/38/A/B Draycott Drive 1465.8 39.33 2493

89 19-Aug-97 3A/B/C/D & 5A/B/C/D Surrey Rd Surrey Ville 703.3 9.74 1287


16/19

90 Sep-97 13 Balmoral Rd Balmoral Green 3291.3 48.5 1369

91 Sep-97 23, 25, y, 37 Cairnhill Circle 3708.2 85 2130

92 16-Sep-97 56A/B/C/D/E/F/G, 58 & 60 Gilstead Rd 3013.0 28 863

93 Sep-97 Jln Mutiara 1105.2 19.2 1614

94 Jln Mutiara 2410.8AMALGAMATED SITES 3516.0

95 17-Oct-97 6 Mar Thoma Rd 1588 12.5 731

96 3-Nov-97 11/11A/11B Suffolk Rd 462.6 5.582739 1121

97 26-Nov-97 174188B Duchess Ave Casabella 9951.4 84.138 785

Total 367,462.5 4211.6404

Table 3 (continued)


Proceeds($ million)

Price($psf)


17/19


18/19

26 2-Nov-99 22,26,28,30,32,34 & 36 Shanghai Rd 2376.4 23.8 930

27 10-Nov-99 Killiney Rd Devonshire Court 5405.1 123 2114

28 10-Nov-99 Meyer Rd First Mansion 10921.0 176

10-Nov-99 Meyer Rd Meyer Tower 7293.7 117

AMALGAMATED SITES 18,214.7 293 1494 29 12-Nov-99 2, 4 & 6 Ah Hood Rd Balestier Mansion 3272.2 33.39 948

30 12-Nov-99 Grange Rd & Paterson Rd Grange Mansion 5090.9 92 1679

31 16-Nov-99 Grange Rd Kim Lin Mansion 11,660.0 251 2000

32 17-Nov-99 6 Cuscaden Walk Cuscaden Tower 3568.6 86 2239

33 Dec-99 11 Newton Rd Newton Point 4254.4 78 1703

34 Dec-99 Serangoon Ave 3 Arang Court 11,182.1 72.81 605

35 Dec-99 St. Michaels Rd & Jln Taman 5900.7 50.35 793

36 Dec-99 Carlisle Rd Norfolk Garden 2909.0 35.7 1140

37 Dec-99 Mandalay Rd Mandalay Court 4513.4 51.7 1064

Apr-99 Shelford Rd Mediterranean 1034.9 10.99 987

38 2-Dec-99 Shelford Rd Townhouses 4147.2 34.6 775

AMALGAMATED SITES Dec-99 22 St. Martins Drive 1227.8 14.2 1074

39 10-Dec-99 51 Meyer Rd Viewpoint Condo 7495.7 123.3 1528

40 Jan-00 South Buona Vista Chwee Chian Gdn 4941.7 23.4 440

41 Jan-00 Elias Rd Pasir Ris Garden 26,441.5 175 615

42 Jan-00 13, 15 & 17 Moulmein Rise 1896.5 31.4 1538

43 Jan-00 35101A Mt Sinai Lane Grenville Condo 19,544.4 157 746

44 Jan-00 121A Grange Rd Grange Garden 4227.9 80.1 1760

45 18-Jan-00 West Coast Rd Tat Lee Court 24,172.3 122 469

46 Feb-00 Cairnhill Circle Cairnhill Court 11,762.1 315 2488

Feb-00 4 Cairnhill Circle 2836.3 5560 18021965

AMALGAMATED SITES 14,598.4 370375 23552386

47 Feb-00 Jalan Loyang Besar Loyang Lodge 4055.0 15 344 48 Mar-00 Evelyn Rd Seedevi 2441.9 44.6 1697

49 Mar-00 3 Derbyshire Rd Derbyshire Court 1116.5 13 1082

50 Mar-00 9 & 11 Balmoral Park Balmoral Park Maisonettes 5656.5 67.2 1104

51 Apr-00 12,12A & 12B Nassim Rd 3998.8 53 1231

52 Jul-00 Mimosa Walk Mimosa Court 6159.8 21 317

53 Aug-00 20/y/26C Martaban Rd Martaban Court 1969.4 17.8 840

54 Sep-00 Bedok Rd Prospect Court 3104.9 11.2 335

Total 335,682.2 3748.5693753.569

Table 4 (continued)

No. Date of sale Address Project name Site area(m2)

Proceeds($ million)

Price($psf)


19/19

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