ltcol tim mundy, the operation would also feature two ...tip of the spear operation spear: 17-22...

TIP OF THE SPEAR OPERATION SPEAR: 17-22 JUNE 2005

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Gearing up for Fallujah Lite

It had only been seven months since Operation Phantom Fury, otherwise known as the 2nd Battle of Fallujah, during November of 2004. Memories and stories of the deadly house-to-house fighting in Fallujah had percolated throughout the Marine Corps, and the 3/2 Battalion and RCT2 geared up accordingly.

Kilo Company would be the core of the effort, supported once more by Lima Company of 3/25. Both units had suffered tragic losses in Matador and the “regulars” of Kilo and the reservists of Lima 3/25 had forged a tight bond. Additionally, 3/2’s Weapons Company, “WarPig” would be on hand to screen and support. And 3/2 was able to pry loose another infantry platoon from units that had been providing security for Al-Asad. The 3rd Platoon of 3/2’s own Lima Company, would be a maneuver element in the operation with the callsign “Beowulf”.

Anticipating determined, even suicidal resistance, heavy firepower would be brought to bear. Charlie Company, 2nd LAR, with its eight-wheeled Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs), would use highly accurate, rapid-fire 25mm guns to interdict enemy movement from long range. And Abrams tanks from Alpha Company, 1st Tank Battalion, would move into the city right alongside advancing rifle platoons, ready to pulverize enemy strongpoints.

Overhead, the Cobra attack birds and Huey gunships of Light Attack Squadron 269, the “Gunrunners”, would be ready to pounce, flying the “rotary wing close air support” (RW-CAS) mission. Higher still, multiple flights of Marine, Air Force and coalition jets would be loaded with precision-guided bombs to provide “fixed-wing close air support” (FW-CAS) at a moment’s notice.

The operation would also feature two “force magnifiers”. The first was a company of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) troops that would be folded into the task force, assigned to Kilo Co. With the Iraqis came a supplemental name for the operation, “Rhome”, the phonetic pronunciation of “Spear” in Arabic.

The ISF company came from the Iraqi Army’s 4th Brigade, 2nd Battalion. Capt Chris Ieva decided to fold its three infantry platoons in with Kilo’s 3rd Platoon, under the leadership of 1stLt Joe Clemmey. Ieva had high confidence in Clemmey’s abilities, and directed him to integrate each of his three squads alongside one of the Iraqi platoons, forming a “combined” Marine/ISF unit.

The second measure was considerably more kinetic. Knowing that main streets had been seeded with IEDs, 3/2 brought in purpose-built trailers equipped with Mine Clearing Line Charges, or “MICLICs”. They had a long, explosive rope attached to a rocket. The rocket would be fired up and over a minefield or obstacle. Once the line was stretched out on the ground, an electrical charge would set off the C4 explosives, resulting in a massive detonation that would clear a lane 30 feet wide and 300 feet deep, the length of a football field.

Capt Chris Ieva, Commander of Kilo Company, 3/2, was a key player in the planning and execution of Operation Spear.

1st Lt Joe Clemmey, Platoon Commander of Kilo’s 3rd Platoon integrated an entire Iraqi infantry company into his platoon.

LtCol Tim Mundy, 3/2’s Battalion Commander, led a multi-unit task force during the complex operation to clear Karabilah of foreign fighters.

LEFT Marines at Camp Al Qaim stage vehicles and make final preparations for Operation Spear. Based on the “WP8” markings on the lead vehicle, these are up-armored HumVees of WarPig, 3/2’s Weapons Platoon. Also note the yellow ID panel on the hood, a recognition device for rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft.

Written by Ajax Trueblood, see more at stormquellers.wordpress.com © ATAG International, 2018 1

WORKING DRAFT v2.3This page needs some work up front, to adjust for taking out paragraphs that are now included in the Target Softening chapter.

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ASR Diamond

Karabilah

Sadah

Wad

iASR Jade (Hwy 12)

Loui

sian

a

Ohio

Min

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ta

Mis

sour

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Neb

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Objective A

Lima 3/25Kilo 3/2

Charlie 2LAR

Warpig 3/2

Objective B

Objective C

“Sharkfin”

Warpig 3/2

Charlie 2LAR

OPERATION SPEAR: SCHEME OF MANEUVERLEFT Annotated satellite imagery showing Karabilah and the basic scheme of maneuver for Operation Spear.

The main terrain features were the prominent wadi separating Karabilah from the town of Sadah just to the East, and two main east-west roads. North of the city was mostly open agricultural land extending to the Euphrates River. To the south was mostly open desert, punctuated by ravines, wadis, hills and ridges.

The two paved highways were known as Alternate Supply Routes (ASRs) by the coalition. ASR Jade was National Highway 12 running from Syria all the way to Ramadi, Fallujah and into greater Baghdad. ASR Diamond was the older highway that connected the riverside towns and cities of the Al-Qaim district. Several smaller north-south roads in the city were named for US states, such as “route Iowa” and “route Ohio”.

The two highways essentially divided it into thirds. In the plan for Operation Spear, the section south of ASR Jade was labeled “Objective A”, and would be taken early on Day 1. The section between the ASRs was divided into “Objective B” with the center part of the city, and “Objective C” further west. North of ASR Diamond was a sector called the “Sharkfin” because of its distinctive shape on the map.

Warpig 3/2

Iow

a

Lima 3/25

Kilo 3/2

51 bridge



At the leadership level, there was some hesitation about both measures. While integrating ISF into the operation helped the overarching strategic objective of building up Iraq’s Army, there was concern about their tactical proficiency and their will to fight. And the plan to use the MICLICs raised issues of collateral damage and the spectre of massive civilian casualties if something went wrong.

Locked on

At grunt-level, though, there was little concern about the finer points. As the Marines prepared to breach AQI positions in Karabilah, most figured the added forces and firepower could only help. For their part, they concentrated on loading mags, prepping demo charges, and getting ready to defeat a tough, remorseless enemy and stay alive.

In the final hours before launch, the atmosphere was electric at Camp Al-Qaim. In the platoons and squads there was palpable excitement at the chance to close with the enemy. This was the kind of mission they’d trained for. 1st Lt Nate Smith, Platoon Commander of Kilo 2nd Platoon, described the prevailing attitude:

In my experience, the guys look forward to combat. It’s not like in some WWII movies where guys are nervous and fearful. Not at all like that. With the all-volunteer Marine infantry, they’re always eager for action. Morale was always highest right before a major operation. --Interview

LCpl Ian Norris, a machine gunner with Kilo’s Weapons Platoon, confirms that sentiment:

Every time we would run a big mission, we knew we would get more action than normal. You'd get more pumped. You were more locked on than if we were running around to hamlets in the middle of nowhere. We just wanted to take the fight to the enemy and kill as many of them as we could. That's why we joined. That's why we went into the infantry. You knew that the chances of taking casualties was higher. So you have to be in the right mindset. On top of your game. --Chat with author

Launch

The operation began at 0300, as columns of vehicles rolled out in the darkness. The units then navigated across a dozen or so miles of desert to the southern outskirts of Karabilah. While the infantry units set up, the LAVs of 2nd LAR and the up-armored HumVees of Warpig took up support-by-fire positions on the flanks, using their long-range weapons and hi-tech sensors to isolate the battlefield.

Just before first light, a key combat support asset began to play its crucial role. An Army Tactical Psyops Team (TPT) fired up large banks of vehicle-mounted speakers and began broadcasting in the still morning air. The pre-recorded message repeated a warning in Arabic not to interfere with coalition forces, called for residents to leave the city and demanded that “enemies of Iraq” put down their weapons. The TPT announcements set the stage for the next phases, which would involve considerably more violent actions.

Whether as a result of the Psyops Team’s broadcasts, or because of the numerous armored vehicles massing on the city’s outskirts, most of the residents fled or found shelter. By the time the assault began, most buildings were empty and the streets deserted.

The less-built-up southern sector of Karabilah, between the railway and ASR Jade, was designated as “Objective A” in the ops plan. As the sun rose, Kilo Company from 3/2

RIGHT A specially modified HumVee of the US Army

Tactical Psyops Team (TPT) attached to 3/2 for most of its operations in 2005. Note the

bank of speakers mounted on top of the vehicle. The Psyops

Team was a key part of Operation Spear.

1st Lt Nate Smith in 2005, Commanding 2nd Platoon, Kilo Co.

LCpl Ian Norris, gunner in MG section, Weapons Plt, Kilo Co.



dismounted from their bulky Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs) and began to clear each home and building. After Kilo had established supporting positions, Lima Company from 3/25 was sequenced in to their left.

There was little significant action in Objective A during the opening hours, as both companies searched houses on the way towards ASR Jade. Explosions from grenades and demolition charges punctuated the morning, as suspicious vehicles were blown in place. Because of the IED threat, the Marines had been briefed to destroy any vehicle they thought might contain explosives, or be used to construct a car-bomb. They interpreted that guidance liberally, and the skyline was soon marked by multiple columns of drifting black smoke.

This relatively permissive situation changed as units reached buildings adjacent to the highway. Sporadic enemy fire started coming in from across the road. The most dominant structure in that sector was a gold-domed mosque, located just south of the highway. According to the rules of engagement (ROE) at the time, Iraqi troops had to lead the way if any mosques needed to be cleared. Accordingly, 1st Lt Clemmey’s 3rd Platoon, with the ISF soldiers integrated into its squads, was given the task.

Entry was unopposed, and the interior of the mosque was quickly cleared. Weapons and ammo were found. As was so often the case in Iraq, insurgents had been using a holy place to store arms. Some of the Iraqi soldiers went to the roof where they came under effective fire from across ASR Jade. They quickly took cover beneath the parapet, not daring to peek over the edge. Nathan Pesch, a LCpl in 3rd Squad, was down at street level as gunfire started raking the mosque:

The Iraqis on the roof were hunkered down, taking fire from a building about 200 meters away. My Squad Leader, Brian Newton, grabbed me and set me up with my SAW by a rockpile, and had me lay down suppressing fire against that building. Then he went running over to the mosque, to get the Iraqis up and firing. --Chat with author

Cpl Newton was about to engage in some “battlefield diplomacy” that would have an impact on the operation and the larger effort to integrate Iraqi forces into Marine formations. And he most definitely would personally impact a group of Iraqi soldiers that day.

Emerging onto the rooftop, Newton saw about twenty ISF soldiers cowering from the incoming fire. Not one was returning fire, and no one appeared to be in charge. Nearly an entire platoon of infantry was pinned down. Newton would have none of this, and started to take rough remedial action. Completely disregarding the incoming rounds, he strode upright from man to man, yelling at the top of his lungs, cursing, grabbing, smacking helmets, and pushing the Iraqis to be men, get up, get online and engage the enemy.

From a nearby building, Capt Ieva watched as Newton went to work:

The Iraqis cleared the mosque, and then they got pinned on top. They wouldn’t move. From my position I watched a Marine NCO run from Iraqi to Iraqi, kicking them, dragging them, hitting them to fight. In a few minutes, he had the whole bunch up and shooting. It was amazing and motivating.

Gold-domed mosque

ASR Jade

The gold-domed mosque was a significant terrain feature on Day 1, situated just south of ASR Jade. This is where the Iraqi troops embedded with Kilo, 3rd Platoon took fire and were pinned down, until Cpl Newton motivated them to get back on their feet and return fire.

LCpl Nathan Pesch, SAW gunner, 3rd Plt,Kilo Co.

A Marine photogrpaher captured this image of Nathan Pesch, while he was firing at insurgents who were firing at the gold-domeed mosque. (USMC photo)

Cpl Brian Newton, Squad Leader, 3rd Plt,Kilo Co.



By refusing to let the ISF soldiers stall early in the operation, and setting a personal example by braving the incoming fire, Cpl Newton set the tone for the Iraqi platoons operating with 3rd Platoon. When fighting with Kilo Company, there would be no hunkering down.

Clearing through Objective A had taken most of the morning, and by noon all elements of 3/2 and 3/25 were online along the south side of ASR Jade. The highway and the open areas on either side constituted an exposed area 100 to 150 meters across. Getting Marines through that “linear danger area” without getting shot or blown up now became the focus.

Shockwaves

Overwhelming firepower would be the answer. Whenever insurgents fired from hidden positions on the north side of the highway, the response was swift and massive. In several instances, enemy snipers were engaged by Alpha Company tanks. Huey and Cobra gunships of HMLA 269 swooped in to engage insurgent machine-gunners, and when necessary jets would be called in to drop their pinpoint guided bombs.

From a rooftop overlooking the open ground north of the mosque, Capt Ieva judged that the time was right to push his force across ASR Jade. He expected AQI fighters would be dug into buildings on the other side, waiting to trigger hidden IEDs or open up with RPGs and heavy fire as soon as men and vehicles started across.

Again, he employed the Army Psyops Team, and their mobile loudspeakers blared warnings for civilians to clear the area. Meanwhile, the combat engineer track with the MICLIC rumbled into position. It lurched to a stop just in front of the gold-domed mosque, facing directly down the dirt street called Ohio. Behind the track, the launcher arm was hoisted into firing position. If by some chance insurgents were closely watching, they could hardly imagine the fury that was about to be unleashed.

On command, the 5-inch rocket hissed up into the sky, leaving a squiggling, corkscrew trail of blackish smoke with the white line charge arcing behind, then falling neatly along the street. A few moments later, the combat engineers detonated the charge.

That was the biggest explosion I had heard or felt up to that point in my career. I was inside an AAV about 200 meters away, with my hatch almost all the way shut. It was open just enough to have my head popped up to see out. I felt the shockwave in my chest when it came through. --SSgt Matt Moore, email to author

The MICLIC was originally designed to enable mobile forces to quickly clear a path through a minefield and obstacles like barbed wire. When it detonates, a shockwave ripples through the ground setting off any mines or buried explosives on either side of the line. While not originally conceived of as a tool for urban combat, early in the Iraq War innovative combat engineers started using them to clear IED-infested city blocks.

The M58 line charge is essentially a 350-foot rope encased in bundles of explosives. Every foot of rope carries five pounds of C4, totalling 1,750 pounds--close to a ton.



For all the Marines and coalition troops within sight, that first MICLIC detonation down route Ohio was an unforgettable moment. The size and effects of the blast were awe-inspiring.

Certainly for the insurgents on the receiving end, it must have been a “significant emotional event”. After echoes from the explosion faded, there was surreal quiet. “It was like the city was just dead all of a sudden,” related Cpl Jeremy Ulsamer, of Kilo’s 2nd Platoon, in a later interview. “It was just done, everything was just done. It got quiet.” --History Channel, Shootout Episode

But Ieva wasn’t done with the MICLIC “play”. Immediately after the detonation on Ohio, he had the engineers reposition their AAV and a second MICLIC opposite route Louisiana, one block to the east. Within 15 minutes, the second line charge was fired. Another concussion rippled down the street, toppling walls, shredding trees and shattering glass.

At least one secondary explosion resulted, meaning a car bomb or buried IED had been set off. Others were likely disrupted without detonating. Many of the men who cleared Karabilah over the next few days credit the decision to use MICLICs with intimidating the enemy and ultimately saving Marine lives.

That sent a message of ‘we mean business’. And that is exactly why we used them. Of course it helped us gain a foothold, but it was also to send a message for all to hear. What I mean is the ‘muj’ had a choice to make. Stay and fight us after hearing and seeing those explosions, or get out of Dodge. No question that it saved lives in the long run. I am convinced that if we simply went across the ASR without those softening blows from the MCLICs, our fight would have been more fierce. --SSgt Matt Moore, email to author

As the dust cleared over route Louisiana, 1st Platoon bounded by squads across the 150 open yards of dirt, trash and asphalt that was ASR Jade. They cleared the first row of buildings adjacent to the highway, and set up support-by-fire positions on the rooftops. Now the process of clearing the main areas of Karabilah, objective B and C, could begin.

I’m a tank! I can do this!

Now the tanks of Alpha Company, commanded by Capt Lance Langfeldt, began to play a pivotal role. For Operation Spear, six M1A1 Abrams tanks were on hand to provide direct fire support. Four were from 2nd Platoon, under Lt Danny James, plus the two headquarters tanks of Capt Langfeldt and his XO, Lt Tony Davis. On the tactical net they operated under callsign “Tiger”.

As the infantry crossed ASR Jade and started clearing, the tanks accompanied them. Whenever AQI fighters tried to stand their ground, a tank opened up with its “co-axial” machine gun (coax), or fired high-explosive, anti-tank (HEAT) cannon rounds from the main gun. Directing this firepower required strict, detailed procedures to ensure the

LEFT The aftermath of a MICLIC detonation in Karabilah. Each blast cleared a zone 300ft deep and 24ft wide of any hidden IEDs or mines. The shockwave also caused exterior damage to buildings and stripped trees and plants of their leaves.

HQ section of Alpha Co, 1st Tank Battalion. (l-r seated) ___, ___ Griffith (l-r standing) ____, Capt Lance Langfeldt, 1st Lt Tony Davis, ___, ____, ____.



right targets were hit. The tanks were under “terminal control” of the infantry, meaning it was the platoon and squad leaders who were responsible for positively identifying targets and approving fires.

For clearing buildings, the pre-briefed SOP was for an infantry squad to talk the tank onto the target, via the radio or just yelling up to the commander in the hatch. Then the Squad Leader would fire tracer rounds to mark the gate, door or wall they wanted breached. The tank would confirm the breach point with a burst from the coax. Once confirmed, with the breach approved, the tank would send two main gun rounds through the breach point and a third into the upper story, if present.

The effect of HEAT rounds inside a structure were devastating to both the building and anyone inside. Even to the Marines outside, the concussion was truly impressive. Multiple rounds hitting the right places would collapse a building.

Although the M1A1 is essentially impervious to almost all direct fire, in the tight confines of city streets it can be threatened if enemy fighters get close enough. An RPG hit can damage radio equipment or treads and running gear, crippling the tank. And IEDs, if large enough, can injure or even kill the crew inside. The key to tanks’ survivability in urban terrain is to operate as a combined arms team, with infantry in close proximity.

The two tanks of the HQ section were emblazoned with black, skull-like “punisher” logos on the turret. Langfeldt’s crew had dubbed their tank “Penetrator”, while Davis’ crew named their machine “Iceman”, and stencilled the names on their gun barrels. Kilo Company had already worked with Alpha’s tanks several times. “Lance was awesome. Absolutely fearless”, recalls Chris Ieva. “The guy had read about Israeli tankers, about how they wouldn’t button up. So he would stay heads up in the hatch to maximize visibility and battlefield awareness. But that left him exposed.” (chat session with author).

One particular moment illustrates how close the cooperation was between the Alpha tanks and the infantry, and how the tank crews took risks to support the forward grunts. At a certain point during the battle, Capt Langfeldt felt a narrow street was keeping him from getting to where he was needed, so had his driver take a different path. “Lance just drove through a wall, went up 200 meters and banged a left”, says Ieva, who was watching from a balcony a few blocks away.

He followed a road, along the forward trace of our lines. As he draws up by 1st Platoon, a vehicle-borne IED went off, just 30 meters from his tank. A van with multiple arty rounds, and I can hear it go off, like ‘whump!’, ‘whump!’, ‘whump!’ The tank stops in a cloud of dust. I call ‘Tiger, Tiger, are you OK?’ Lance must have got his bell rung, cause it took some time, but then we hear him, ‘I’m OK! I’m a tank! I can do this!’ His turret pivots, and he pumps like 5 rounds into the building across from 1st Platoon. Game over. --Chris Ieva, from chat with author

ABOVE One of the M1A1 tanks of Alpha Co, 1st Tank BN, in action near the center of Karabilah. The command tanks of Capt Langfeldt and his XO, 1stLt Tony Davis, had the “Punisher” logo painted on their turrets.

1st Lt Tony Davis, XO of Alpha Co, 1st Tank

Battalion


https://youtu.be/fQFv7jNPBnM?t=1760


But using tanks in such close quarters certainly came with risks. If misdirected, their inherent mass and firepower could easily result in deadly friendly-fire incidents. The 70-ton armored behemoths had to be handled with care. One squad’s close call is a vivid example:

My squad got ahead of the tanks and into a house where everything but the front door was locked or barred up. A tank came down the street and mistook our movement as bad guys. I looked down the hall and a tracer round almost hit me. Comms were messed up so they couldn't hear us. At that point, we pretty much all thought we were gonna die. The scariest thing was hearing that turret move and point the main gun right at us.

I stuck my head out and screamed at them. Other guys were trying to break through a barred window, knowing if we ran out the front door we would get lit up. Finally, someone got comm to the tank and called “friendlies!” The tank commander got out and came in the house looking like he had seen a ghost. Said he’d been a second away from pulling the trigger. --LCpl Ryan Lusby, chat with author

Another event turned tragic when civilians turned out to be on the receiving end of tank fire. On Day 1, as 3/2 pushed into the city, Marines in “Beowulf” Platoon reported contact while clearing a house. Shots were fired at close quarters. They quickly withdrew and, rather than taking the risk of re-entering and clearing room to room, the decision was made to call up one of the M1A1s to breach the house. This followed the pre-briefed SOP and was in accordance with the rules of engagement.

On a nearby rooftop, however, men in Kilo 2nd Platoon had a different vantage point and they spotted a family inside the house. Frantically, they tried to call off the tank, but it was too late. Two 120mm HEAT rounds were fired into the structure. When Marines subsequently entered the house, they found no insurgents, but instead came upon the bodies of two small children, killed by the blasts. Nearby, their mother lay grievously wounded.

Although it couldn’t be determined conclusively, there was evidence that someone had fired AK rounds inside that home. No insurgents had been seen fleeing, but Capt Ieva personally found an AK in the courtyard and recently ejected AK shell casings in several locations in the house. His working theory was that either the father was an insurgent and ran before the house was hit, or that foreign fighters had taken over the family’s home. Fanatical AQI fighters would often hold Iraqi families hostage in their own homes, using them as human shields even as they fired against coalition troops.

“That incident shook several of us up”, recalls Kilo’s 1st Sgt Sean Gregory, who was also on the scene. “I’ve got daughters myself, and that event was probably the hardest thing to go through besides losing our own KIA. I remember Sgt Maj Mennig was there, and he respectfully covered the bodies.” The injured mother was medevaced out to Camp Al-Qaim, and then on to Al-Asad to get advanced care.

Author’s Note

This tragic collateral damage incident illustrates a hard truth. Close-in urban combat puts civilians in mortal danger. All the Marines involved followed the Rules of Engagement, and took precautions to avoid placing civilians in the line of fire. The infantry reported taking hostile fire, and followed procedures to mark the house. The tank crew responded to provide support to their infantry brothers. An adjacent platoon even tried to intervene. But despite the ROE, despite the precautions, innocent lives were lost.

Without a doubt, the insurgents’ cowardly, despicable practice of holding civilians hostage while using their homes as fighting positions, was the major contributor to this and other such tragedies in Iraq. While a perpetrator was never found in this instance, it was confirmed that someone fired from inside the home, most likely at the Marines. If so, it was an act which callously, and perhaps even deliberately, put the family in harm’s way. --Ajax

LCpl Ryan Lusby, 1st Platoon, 2nd SquadKilo Company

1st Sgt Sean Gregory, Kilo Co. One of his main responsibilities was to coordinate MEDEVAC of the wounded.



End of Day 1

As Day 1 of the operation came to close, LtCol Mundy and the Battalion staff were pleased with the progress. The two infantry companies were across ASR Jade and had cleared well into Objectives B and C. The Iraqis embedded with Kilo’s 3rd Platoon had performed adequately, particularly after Cpl Newton’s very hands-on leadership under fire.

The MICLIC detonations had gone off without a hitch, and the combined arms machine was firing on all cylinders. Infantry, tanks, AAVs, Psyops, and aircraft were all working well together, and weren’t giving the enemy any chance to consolidate or maneuver. Casualties had been minimal, with two Marines injured when an IED struck an AAV early in the morning. Civilian casualties had also been light, despite the family hit by tank fire.

Now the forward trace ran along an east-west line, running roughly across the mid-section of Karabilah. The reservists of Lima Company, 3/25, had acquitted themselves well on the far left flank, and stayed linked to Kilo’s 1st Platoon. On the

far right, the “Beowulf” platoon from Lima 3/2 hugged the wadi that separated Karabilah from the smaller town of Sadah to the east.

3rd Platoon, with most of the Iraqi soldiers, had been back-clearing through Objective A, searching more thoroughly for arms and munitions after the other platoons pushed up. In the center, Kilo’s 2nd Platoon set in for the night on the south edge of the city’s graveyard. They were within sight of the next day’s main objective, a complex of buildings and an underground bunker known to be utilized by AQI. The Marines were tired and grimy, but anticipation for tomorrow’s fight was high.

Night Ops

At night the operation shifted into a different sort of fight. The infantry platoons consolidated into clusters of buildings, going “firm” for the night. These buildings would normally be in close proximity, providing mutual support around an intersection or along a street. Locations were picked for the cover and protection they provided, fields of fire from the rooftops, and whether they controlled key terrain. In a city like Karabilah, that meant controlling the streets.

The squads would set up rotating shifts to man security watches, and perform communications and observation duties. Those not on watch would inspect and prep their gear, reload mags, and maybe choke down an MRE. Corpsmen would check on each Marine, making sure they were hydrated and their feet were healthy. Then the grunts could grab a couple hours of sleep. It was a strict standard, however, that for an hour at dusk and again at dawn, platoon and squad leaders would conduct “stand-to”, bringing their men to 100% readiness.

Within their sectors, however, the infantry were not completely stationary during the night. Every man had night vision goggles (NVGs) mounted on their helmets, so seeing and moving tactically in darkness was feasible. Squads would mount “limited objective seizures” such as clearing and occupying a building with a better view, or taking a position

1 Plt(Bullock) 2 Plt

(Smith)

3 Plt/Lima(Wingate)

3 Plt/Iraqis(Clemmey)

Lima Co 3/25

ASR Diamond

ASR Jade

BELOW Dispositions of forward-most units in 3/25 and 3/2 at the close of

Day 1. Units to right of yellow line are from 3/2 Kilo and Lima Companies

AQI bunker



in anticipation that it would be key terrain in a few hours. Such repositioning often happened during the dawn/dusk stand-to periods.

Operating in darkness with NVGs, however, still presented challenges for larger-scale infantry operations. The limited field-of-view restricted leaders’ ability to fully coordinate a unit’s actions, and house or street lighting (known as “cultural lighting”) could easily blind a soldier on NVGs at a critical moment.

In some ways, it was easier for aircraft pilots and crews to identify targets during the dark, since almost all friendly ground units were occupying known positions for the night. Any uncoordinated movement observed in or around the city would immediately attract attention. And if insurgents fired at a Marine position at night, that attention would be swift and lethal. The Gunrunners in their Hueys or Cobras would swoop in to attack, and a stream of .50 cal or 20mm tracers would lash out from a blackened sky.

In other cases, if there were positive ID on a particularly key insurgent position, and if the chances for collateral damage could be eliminated or minimized, the FACs might pass the target to an F/A-18 or other fighter/bomber aircraft orbiting high over Karabilah. A laser-guided or GPS-guided weapon would be dropped, and seconds later a large fireball would blossom over the rooflines and a concussion would shake windows and walls.

Day 2

As dawn broke over Karabilah on 18 June, the Marines were already moving from house to house again. Kilo Company moved north through the dusty streets and narrow back alleys towards the city center, expecting to encounter more determined resistance.

Kilo’s 2nd Platoon, commanded by 1stLt Nate Smith worked their way along the streets designated “Ohio” and “Louisiana”. This was the area where most of the AQI safehouses had been identified, some of which had been struck by the Reaper-directed airstrikes of June 11th. Smith and his Platoon were advancing right through the center of the enemy-held area.

They had been working hard to perfect their urban combat tactics, however, and were now exploiting every possible advantage to minimize their exposure to enemy fire or IEDs. They used the lumbering AAVs with their bulky, angled front ends to push locked metal gates open, or topple cinderblock

For the Scout/Sniper teams of Reaper, however, nighttime was hunting time. Working in close cooperation with the FACs, the snipers would use the darkness and their NVGs to carefully insert into selected hide sites. Sometimes an infantry squad might be sent with them, for security on the move and to provide a sort of ‘cover’ as the snipers inserted into a building.

Then, just as Reaper had done on the night of 11 June, they used their NVGs and even more sensitive thermal spotting scopes to search for insurgent targets and worked through the FACs to either get a better airborne view of the target, or call in a strike.

ABOVE A Marine stands watch in the ghostly green tinge of a Night Vision Device. NVGs provided US forces a huge advantage over insurgents.

ABOVE A building hit by an air-launched precision-guidedmunition (PGM), goes up in flames. Night time airstrikes could be an impressive spectacle.



walls so the infantry could enter. Where possible, squads avoided the street altogether by moving from one building or compound to another using ‘mouseholes’ blasted through walls. Whenever insurgents were detected in a building, the M1A1s punched main gun rounds into the structure, pulverizing the interior.

Throughout the morning, 2nd platoon pushed north as quickly and smoothly as possible before the onset of the withering midday heat. They were clearing north of the graveyard towards the center of town, leap-frogging from building to building towards the complex of structures designated as AQI’s main compound. Although they weren’t getting contact, 1st Squad Leader Sgt “China” Chinatomby, accompanied by scout/snipers from Reaper, found an urban “hide site” for an insurgent sniper, complete with expended brass from a 7.62mm Dragunov sniper rifle. Somebody had been watching them.

For Smith, the lack of contact was mostly good news. It meant his tactics were working, his Marines were using the urban terrain smartly and the enemy weren’t being given a chance to engage them. To their left, however, at least some insurgents chose to stand and fight.

Brassed Up*

In the area to the west of the AQI complex, 2Lt Mark Bullock’s 1st Platoon was clearing in a methodical and deliberate manner utilizing every piece of cover to minimize their exposure and showing no hesitation in the application of firepower.

Capt Lance Langfeldt’s command tank maneuvered close in to provide direct fire support to 1st Platoon. Above the city, Cobra gunships circled menacingly waiting for targets to be passed. Lt Clint Cummings, the Weapons Platoon commander, was coordinating the rotary-wing air support.

Meanwhile, Capt Chris Ieva had moved on foot to what he perceived was a critical point, along with his RTO and security section. “That was always my preference, and sometimes it got me a little too far forward”, says Ieva. “If it weren’t for those guys around me, Smith, Older, Collare, Dean, I wouldn’t have made it through that tour. They were very protective, would jump in front of me. True heroes.”

As Ieva moved through the disorienting urban maze, he found himself ahead of 1st Platoon and dangerously exposed. As he crossed from one side of a street to the other, an insurgent hidden in a house suddenly opened up on him full-auto.

“I had gone one block too far and got brassed up*”, recalls Ieva. “The guy missed, but I went down hard and was pinned against a wall. Kevin Collare, my self-designated bodyguard, and my command team were across the street and I was looking back at Bullock’s position.” To his front was a two-story house, probably fortified, with at least one insurgent inside with a commanding field of fire.

Ieva’s description of the situation as it unfolded provides a vivid picture of the intensity of the operation and the professionalism of 3/2 Marines:

From where I was pinned, I set up a ‘play’ over the radio, coordinating a time-on-target strike on the house. When I called the brevity code ‘Arrow’, Langfeldt pushed his tank up, Cummings popped up a couple of Cobras, and one of his squad leaders threw a smoke grenade. That lured an insurgent to peak out, and I heard a sniper shot.

Bullock talked the tank onto the breach, while the Cobras detected the target and I approved a Hellfire strike. As the Cobras are setting up, Langfeldt’s tank fires its coax and Bullock confirms the exact spot for the breach. Langfeldt yells “On the way!”, and fires the first 120mm round low through the breach. And from where I’m pinned, I’m looking back as it all unfolds.

Cpl Chris Deang (l) was the RTO for Kilo Company Commander, Capt Chris Ieva.

Cpl Kevin Collare (r) was the CO’s gunner and self-designated “body guard”.

ABOVE Columns of smoke rise from destroyed vehicles. For Operation

Spear, orders were given to demo any vehicles that have IEDs inside, or

could be converted into car-bombs.

* “Brassed-up” is grunt slang for taking heavy hostile fire, adopted from the British military.



The second tank round goes. I see Bullock’s assault squad stiffen. They know the third round’s coming. One Marine does the sign of the cross. The sound and pressure of a tank main gun in an urban environment is punishing, like getting punched. The third round fires, and they go.

The rest of 1st Platoon opens up with suppressive fire. I hear rounds snapping by. The first fire team starts their rush towards the house. Second team follows, then the third. Across the street from me, I see Collare pop out and start shooting. Then I hear frags in the building and shooting. I can hear an AK firing inside.

I make my rush. Chris Deang, my RTO, follows lugging the radio. As we start moving, I hear the lead Cobra call ‘shotgun’ as it pumps out a Hellfire. The missile streaks directly over my head and strikes the target to my front...

We close the distance to the house and I announce entry and step inside. It’s a bloody mess. Gore spattered everywhere, dead enemy in the courtyard. The Squad Leader reports the house cleared, no casualties. The Marines are jovial and laughing. Not because of the enemy dead. But because they rushed headlong into the abyss and dominated. They did their job. Did it well.

And because I’d gone one block too deep, I got to observe my men from the enemy’s perspective. They were tight, technically sophisticated and fearsome. Fighting block to block, integrating fires from tanks and helos. I was so proud of them.

As I’d watched their rush the thought came to me, ‘there’s no replay of this awesome sight, no ESPN, no record of their heroics. It’s just us.’ Which is why when I got brassed up, they’d actually cheered. Because I was there with them, watching them run into that abyss, defeating their fear by pushing it away.

And in the split-seconds between the suppression and their rush, I’d felt myself shift gears emotionally. From extreme empathy, a heartbreaking love, into a hard-edged apathy. We needed that house… I needed them to go. If you care too much, they don’t go. --Chat session with author

ABOVE The situation in Kilo’s sector on the morning of Day 2, as 1st and 2nd Platoons advanced north through ‘Objective B’, the center of Karabilah proper. To the left is the area of close-packed residential compounds where Capt Ieva found himself one block forward of his own troops, and became pinned down by enemy fire.

AQI armory/bunker

AQI-held house(prob location)

Chris Ieva pinned down

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