~lS4~ ~.l ~~. Independent Boord of Inquiry • PO 30x 32293

Broomtonlein 201 7 JOhonnesburg South Airico Phone (011) Ll03-3256/7 Fox (011) Ll03-1366

REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT BOARD OF INOUIRY FOR THE MONTH OF

MAY 1992.

CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ......•..•................................... 1

II. STATE INSTITUTIONS

1. The South African Defence Force (SADF).

1.1 The Murder of Dr David Webster .... . ................. 2 - 3

1.2 The Murder of Matthew Goniwe and others ............. 4 - 5

2. The South African PoLice (SAP).

2. 1 Covert Operations ....•..•....•.... . .•............... 5 - 7

III. THE GOLDSTONE COMMISSION .

BOARD MEMBERS: Prot Lourie Ackermonn, [J Allen Boesok, Dr Alex Boroine, Mrs Judy Cholmers, Rev Dr Fronk Chikone, Dr Mox Colemon, Mr &iCY'1 Currin, PrOf John 'Dugord, Mrs SI18eno Duncon, Mr Peler Harris, Mr Peler Kerchholl, Mrs Lydia Kampe, Mrs Emma Mashininl, Br Jude Pielerse, Archbisl,op Desmond Tutu

1. 32 Battalion .... . ............ . ..... . ...... .. . . .... . . . 8 - 9

2. Train Violence ... . ........... . .... . ... . ......... . . . . 9 - 12

IV. NATAL.

1. The Trust Feed's Massacre .. . .. . .. ... ...... . . ...... ... ... 13

V. CONCLUSION .... . .. ... ... • ...... •.. . .. ......... . . . .•. • • . . . 14

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I . INTRODUCTION.

The month of May has been marked by allegations of state

involvement in assassinations, covert operations and the

covering up of and interfering with investigations . Ev ide nce

has emerged which suggests that the South Africa n Defence

Force (SADF) could have been involved in the murd e r of

Matthew Goniwe and others in 1985. In addition the civil

Co-operation Bureau (CCB) , a clandestine unit which was

attached to the SADF's special forces, has once again been

linked to the murder of Doctor David Webster. Finally

allegations have been made regarding the involvement of

members of the South African Police (SAP) in covert

activities in the Vaal area.

As far as the various Goldstone Comissions are concerned,

evidence has been that SADF units have shown a tota l

disregard for township residents. In relation to train

attacks it seems clear that the various authorities COQcerned

have not yet developed weasures which can adequa t e ly protec t

commuters.

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II. STATE INSTITUTIONS.

1. The South African Defence Force (SADF).

1.1 The Murder of Dr David Webster.

On April 28 it was announced that an inquest would be held to

attempt to determine who was responsible for the murder of Dr

David Webster. Dr Webster was shot dead outside his

Troyeville home on May 1 1989.

At the Harms commission of inquiry the issue of Dr Webster's

killing was dealt with in some detail. Counsel appearing on

behalf of the David webster Trust argued that the civil

Co-operation Bureau (CCB), a unit attached to the Special

Forces division of the SADF, was responsible for the murder.

The factors which led to this allegation included the

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following: Christo Brits, the co-ordinator for Region 6, the

CCB's internal cell, admitted that weapons had been iss ued to (

members of the cell three days before the murder; Brits '

diary, which was se ized by the commission, had had three

pages torn out of it, one of which was May 1 1989; such · CCB

files as were se ized by the commissi on indicated that Webster

was being monitore d by the CCB and CCB operative " Slang" van

Zyl admitted that the murder carried the hallmarks of a CCB

operation.

- 3 -

In his findings Judge Harms stated that a strong suspicion

existed that theCCB had killed Webster, a suspicion that

members of the organisation had done nothing to dispel .

In The citizen of May 4, in reaction to renewed speculation

that the CCB was responsible for the killing, an unnamed

police source stated that CCB agents had been involved in

political murders and that the organisation had a "virtual

license to kill". The source added that only a small ­

p~rcentage of the CCB's activities had been made public.

In an article in the Sunday star of May 17, it was claimed

that a Louis Yssel (a CCB operative) had told Advocate Martin

Luitingh that Ferdi Barnard, a one time CCB operative, had

confessed to the murder. At the time Yssel to l d him this

Luitingh was appearing on behalf of the David \~ebster trust

at the Harms Commission. Barnard has denied the allegations.

In evidence given at the Harms commiss'ion, Barnard claimed

that in March 1989 he was informed by the CCB that he would

no longer be used for internal operations but would be

utilised externally. Nevertheless from about June 1989 ~o

october 1989 he received instructions from from Van Zyl and

fellow Region 6 operative, "calla" Botha, in connecti o n Vlith

various CCB contracts.

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1.2 The Murder of Matthew Goniwe and others.

In a report carried in the New Nation of April 30, the

newspaper claimed to be in possesion of a signal message

form, dated June 7 1985, sent from a Lieutenant Du Plessis,

of Eastern Province (EP) Command, to a General Van Rensburg (

of the state Security Council in Pretoria. The signal, marked

"Top Secret", refers to a discussion between the General and

a Brigadier Van der Westhuisen, then Officer Commanding EP

Command, which dealt with the "permanent removal from

society" of activists Matthew Goniwe, Mbulelo Goniwe and Fort (

Calata. The signal stated that thi~ issue was now a matter of

urgency. Matthew Goniwe, Calata and two other activists,

Sparrow Mkonto and Sicelo Mhlauli were murdered approximately

two weeks after the message was sent.

It has subsequently emerged that the signal form was given to

the New Nation by the Military Leader of the 'l'ranskei, Major

General Bantu Holomisa. Holomisa claims that he has a "thick (

file" of similar documents which will be released as soon as

their veracity has been established.

Du Plessis, now a Commandant, has admitted that he sent the

message.

- 5 -

He allegedly said to the New Nation that he realised that he

"is in a lot of trouble", but refused to comment further

because he claimed that he was bound to silence by the

Official secrets Act. Van der Westhuizen now holds the rank

of Lieutenant General and the position of Chief of Staff

Intelligence at SADF Hea dquarters in Pretoria. He has

refused to comment on the allegations. Former Stat~

President, P W Botha, who chaired meetings of the state

Security council at the time, claimed that he could not

remember if Goniwe was ever discussed a t any of the meetings .

On May 8 1992 President F W de Klerk ordered that the

allegations be invest igated . They will be the subject of a

jUdicial investigation headed by !he Judge President of the

Eastern Cape, Justice J P zietsman.

2. The South African Police (SAP).

2.1 Covert Operations.

In January 1992 researchers at the Board took a n af f idavit

from Daniel Kolisang in which h e claimed that person s , whom

he believed were attached to the Transvaal Provincial

Admini s tration, had a ttempted to recruit him to carry out

certain covert operations in t h e Vaal area.

- 6 -

The operations included ·gathering of information and the

carrying out of petrol bomb attacks. The targets were members

of the African National Congress (ANC) , the South African

communist Party (SACP) and the ANC's armed wing Umkhonto we

Sizwe (MK). After some initial investigation done by Board

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researchers the affidavit was given to the Weekly Mail. This ~

was done with Kolisang's approval.

The Weekly Mail established that a house to which Kolisang

was taken, was in fact a ·police "safe house" which was used

as a base for covert operations in the area. These opera~ions

involved the use of falsely registered pager numbers,

fictitious company names and false car registration plates.

The operatives which Kolisang named in his affidavit were all

members of the SAP and many of them were former Security

Policemen. 1;'he people whom Kolisang had named as potential

"targets" were indeed senior .members of the above named

organisations in the Vaal area. Minister of Law and Order,

Hernus Kriel, stated that allegations concerning possible

illegal activities by this unit should be referred to the

Goldstone Commission.

On May 14, the commissioner of Police, General Johan Van ·der

Merwe admitted in an affidavit that a nationwide network of

covert bases was set up by the SAP in 1988.

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The house referred to b; Kolisang in his affidavit was one of

these. Bases had been established in eleven regions across

the country. Previously the bases had been utilised by the

security Police but they now fell under the Criminal

Investigation Service (CIS) into which the Security Police

were absorbed l ast year. The SAP claim that disclosures about

such bases endanger the lives of those involved in the

combating of crime. This, according to the SAP, is the reason

why the bases are still utilised.

On May 26 Judge Goldstone announced that a commission of

inquiry would be appointed to investigate the alleged illegal

activities of the Vaal unit. Board researchers will be

assisting the commission.

II. THE GOLDSTONE COMMISSION.

During the Month of May two new issu es were investigated by

the Commission; allegations that 32 Battalion were

responsible for various acts of violence in Phola Park on

April 8 and the violence on commuter trains.

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1. 32 Batrtalion.

Residents of Phola Park have alleged that on the night of

April 8 members of 32 Battalion swept through the squatter

camp killing two residents, raping three and assaulting forty

three, many of them severely.

In giving evidence, captain Mark Hermanson, the officer

commanding the Company to which the troops involved are

attached, claimed that the troops had not assaulted any

residents, they had only acted in a "heavy handed" manner.

Personally he was happy with his troops behaviour. He stated l. that he believed that the firing of indiscriminate shots at

the camp had been justified, as the soldiers had been acting

in self defence after they had been fired on .

Lieutenant Ras, the troops' Platoon Commander, ' said that the

troops had entered Phola Park after they had been shot at and

one of their number had been injured. ~s the soldiers moved

into the camp a fire fight developed in which approximately

200 R4 and 30 AK 47 shots were fired. The troops then

conducted a search operation for approximately forty five

minutes after which they withdrew. He denied that any acts of

violence had been committed but accepted that his troops may

have acted in a "heavy handed" manner .

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He believed that their behaviour was justified in that they

had come under fire and were tense. Advocate Solly sithole,

the Commission's chairperson, said that he could not

understand why so many shots were fired at the squatter camp

before it was searched.

On May 26, lawyers representing 32 Battalion conceded that

members of the unit may have "technically committed acts of

violence" but denied that they had committed acts of murder,

rape or assault. Hearing of evidence on the incident has been

suspended whilst the various parties discuss the possibility

of a settlement.

2. Train Violence.

This commission, under the chairpersonship of Gert Steyn, a

regional court magistrate, sat from May 4 to May 21. Most of

the evidence came from police witnesses, the South African

~ Railways Commuter Corporation (SARCC) and Spoornet. An

inspection in loco was also conducted. One of the Board's

researchers attended most of the proceedings.

One of the most disturbing things to emerge from the

commission was the manner in which the authorities responded

to the issue.

- 10 -

Most of the measures that the SARCC and the SAP have taken or

plan to institute in the future, were only implemented or

discussed after Judge Goldstone announced in January that a

commission would be appointed to investigate this issue. This

was approximately eighteen months after the phenomenon of

train attacks started and after well over one hundred people

had been killed.

The inspection in loco revealed that at most stations there

is a lack of access control . This makes it extremely

difficult for members of the SAP to search commuters before

boarding trains. Many stations also have inadequate -fencing

which means that potential attackers would have easy access

to trains and stations. On evidence given at the commission,

the responsibility for addressing these problems lies with

the SARCC.

As far as the issue of policing is concerned several aspects

of the evidence give cause for concern. Firstly there has ~

been an apparent lack of co-ordination and liaison between

the various police units involved in the different aspects of

train violence, i.e. prevention, patrolling ard

investigation. There is a similar lack of co-ordination '

between the various regions which have been affected, namely

Soweto, the East Rand and Johannesburg.

- 11 -

Thus far there appears to be no uniform strategy for

addressing the issue. Secondly many of the witnesses

contradicted each other on what the major problems of

policing are. Some of the witnesses claimed that there wa s a

lack of manpower, others denied this. Some witnesses claimed

that the SAP lacked proper authority to search commuters ,

others said that they had such authority.

The third problem relates to the issue of investigation of

the attacks. As is well known, thus far there has been only

one successful prosecution . Those investigating officers wh o

gave evidence said the reason for this was that commuters

refused to come forward and identify their attackers, nor

were the SAP able to recruit informers to provide informa tion

about these attacks. The veracity of this information wa s put

into dispute by the evidence of a witness identified as ~l .

01 alleged that he had been an informer in Nancefield Hostel,

that he had given the SAP information about two train

attacks, that people had been arrested after he had given

such information, that he had not been called to court to

testify against these, people des pite his willingness to do so

and that ultimately his position a s a n informer wa s exposed

to the Hoste l dwe llers by the verypo licenie n vlhom he ha d bee n

working for.

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The evidence of 01 is still to be tested under cross

examination. 01 also testified to the fact that two of the

largest of the train attacks were planned in Nancefield

Hostel and were carried out by Hostel dwellers. These attacks

took place 'at Kliptown station on June 26 1991 and at Orlando

station on october 23. A total of fifteen people were killed

and fifty eight were injured in the two incidents. This was

the only evidence that was lead which specifically identified

train attackers. What did emerge from police evidence

however, was that, while no single group or faction can be

blamed for all the attacks, where attackers have been

identified, the overwhelming majority have been identified as

Hostel dwellers.

III. NATAL.

1. The Trust Feed's Massacre.

In the passing of eleven death sentences on former SAP

Captain Brian Mitchell, Judge Wilson called for an

independent inquiry into the alleged cover up following the

killings, the apparent interference with the investigation of

Major Dutton and the possible involvement of the SAP in

counter revolutionary strategies.

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He stressed that an internal police inquiry was not

sufficient and that the findings of the inquiry should be

made public. Major Dutton has backed the call especially the

requirement that the findings be made public.

Minister of Law and Order, Hernus Kriel, announced that

regional court Magistrate, Willem Krugel, had been appointed

to conduct the investigation . The General council of the Bar

of South Africa have expressed their dissatisfaction ~ith

this decision and have called for the appointment of a Judge

or retired Judge instead.

Collection Number: AG2543 INDEPENDENT BOARD OF INQUIRY (IBI) Records 1989-1996 PUBLISHER: Publisher:- Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand Location:- Johannesburg ©2012

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