LOUISIANA JUDICIAL COLLEGE AND LADC 2016 TORTS SEMINAR

Roosevelt Hotel, New Orleans, Louisiana Friday, December 9, 2016

Civil Procedure: Recent Developments, Old Problems

JUDGE TIFFANY CHASE Orleans Parish Civil District Court

JUDGE SUSAN M. CHEHARDY 5th Circuit Court of Appeal

JUDGE GUY HOLDRIDGE 1st Court of Appeal

PROFESSOR WILLIAMS CORBETT LSU Paul M. Hebert Law Center

Civil Procedure-Recent Developments, Old Problems Judge Susan Chehardy, Judge Guy Holdridge,

Judge Tiffany Chase, Professor Bill Corbett

A. DISCOVERY 1. What are the time periods to respond to discovery requests?

a. Responses to interrogatories, requests for production, requests for release of medical records, and requests for admissions shall be made within thirty (30) days after service of the request (2016 La. Acts No. 132 amending La. C.C.P. arts. 1458, 1462, 1465.1 & 1467 to change the time periods from 15 days to 30 days)

2. If a defendant fails to respond to a request for admission, is the fact

deemed admitted? a. When a party does not respond to a request for admission, the

matter is deemed admitted under La. C.C.P. arts. 1467 and 1468. Where the defendant did not respond to an admission as to the amount of monthly rent, that fact is conclusively established and the trial court committed error in holding that the plaintiff did not carry his burden of proving the amount of monthly rent. Romero v. Cola, 2015-1058 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/25/16), 193 So.3d 418, 422

B. EXECUTION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS

1. How do you make a judgment of another country executory in Louisiana?

a. The only method of making a judgment of a foreign country executory in Louisiana is to bring an ordinary proceeding against the judgment debtor in Louisiana. The ex parte procedure of La. R.S. 13:4242 is not applicable to judgments of foreign countries. (2016 La. Acts No. 132 amending La. C.C.P. art. 2541)

C. PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND TUTORSHIP

1. Who can file a suit on behalf of a minor without being designated as a tutor?

a. Either parent during the marriage or only one parent if the other parent is mentally incompetent, interdicted, or imprisoned or is an absentee

b. An ascendant, other than a parent, who is awarded custody c. The surviving parent of a minor child d. The parent who has been awarded sole custody if the parents are

divorced e. The mother of her child born outside of marriage not

acknowledged by the father (2015 La. Acts No. 260, amending La. C.C. arts. 232 & 234; La. C.C.P. art. 4061.1)

2. Who has to file tutorship proceedings or follow the same procedure as tutorship to compromise a claim of the minor?

a. Parents jointly during the marriage or only one parent if the other parent is incompetent, interdicted, imprisoned or an absentee

b. One parent during the marriage if the other parent refuses to join the petition

c. An ascendant having parental authority d. Both parents with joint custody after divorce as co-tutors e. Natural tutors f. Tutors by will g. Tutors by law (2015 La. Acts No. 260, amending La. C.C.P. arts. 4501 & 4061.1)

3. Who can alienate, encumber or compromise a minor’s claim involving

property that does not exceed $15,000.00? a. A parent having parental authority- either parent during the

marriage or a parent awarded custody or joint custody during the marriage

b. An ascendant with custody. (2015 La. Acts No. 260, amending La. R.S. 9:572 effective 1/1/2016.)

(See also La. R.S. 9:196 as to natural tutors which sets the limit at $ 10,000.00.)

D. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 1. Does the East Baton Rouge Family Court have jurisdiction to allow a

former spouse in a community property partition suit to file discovery and a garnishment proceeding against a third party non-spouse?

a. The Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit and held that the family court has jurisdiction over “all actions for settlement and enforcement of claims arising from matrimonial regimes or the establishment thereof.” The family court is vested with the power to issue orders to third parties to enforce its own judgment. Caballero v. Caballero, 2015-2039 (La. 5/3/16), 198 So.3d 1163, 1168

E. LIS PENDENS

1. If plaintiffs file individual lawsuits and claim to be putative members of Katrina damages class actions for purposes of suspending prescription, should their individual lawsuits be barred by lis pendens? Yes. The test for lis pendens is the same as the test for res judicata. Three things are required for lis pendens to apply: 1) two or more suits pending; 2) regarding the same transaction or occurrence; and 3) between the same parties in the same capacities. The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument regarding identity of parties. Aisola v. La. Citizens Property Ins. Corp., 2014-1708 (La. 10/14/15), 180 So.3d 266. 2. Should an exception of lis pendens be granted in a Louisiana state court if there is the same suit in a Texas federal court?

a. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 532 states that “[w]hen a suit is brought in a Louisiana court while another

suit is pending in a court … of the United States … the court may stay all proceedings in the second suit ….” By indicating that the court “may stay” the proceedings, the article establishes that the decision rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and cannot be overturned on review absent a clear abuse of discretion. The trial court may stay the proceedings but may not dismiss the suit with prejudice.

Robbins v. Delta Wire Rope, Inc., 2015-1757 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/3/16), 196 So.3d 700, 706

F. SUMMARY JUDGMENTS

1. Can the trial judge weigh the evidence/documents filed in connection with a motion or opposition to a summary judgment?

a. No, the trial court cannot make credibility determinations, evaluate testimony or weigh conflicting evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must assume that all of the affiants are credible.

Fonseca v. City Air of Louisiana, LLC, 2015-1848 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/3/16), 196 So.3d 82, 89; see also Williams v. Archer W. Constr., LLC, 2016-0158 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/5/16), 2016 WL 5804136, wherein the Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court granting of a summary judgment in which the trial court necessarily had to make credibility determinations in accepting as true the version of events described by the affiants.

2. Should the trial court grant a continuance for additional discovery

prior to the granting of a motion for summary judgment? a. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for a continuance since the case had been pending for over 15 months and the hearing was held 8 weeks after the motion was filed. Coburn v. Dixon, 2015-1095 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/27/16), 190 So.3d 816, 820, writ denied, 2016-1022 (La. 9/16/16); see also newly amended La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3) which states that a party must only be given “an opportunity for adequate discovery.”

3. Can the trial court vacate its judgment denying a motion for summary

judgment and then grant the motion? a. No, the trial court cannot vacate the judgment, nor can it grant a new trial. The denial of a motion for summary judgment is a nonappealable interlocutory judgment. The granting of a new trial applies to a final judgment. The trial court cannot certify the denial of a partial summary judgment as a final appealable judgment under La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B). The proper device for obtaining reconsideration of a denial of summary judgment is to re-urge the motion by refiling it before trial. Condon v. Logan, 2015-0797 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/30/16), 190 So.3d 778, 784; see also Kilber v. PNK (Lake Charles), LLC, 2016-173 (La. App. 3 Cir. 9/28/16), 2016 WL 5404591

(holding there is no prohibition against re-urging a motion for summary judgment.)

G. TRIAL

1. Can the trial court have a hearing on a petition for declaratory judgment before the delays for answering have expired?

a. If the defendant, who had not filed an answer, does not object to the trial and participates in the trial, he cannot object after the trial that the issue was not joined since he did not file an answer. Shepherd v. Schedler, (La. 1/27/16) 2016 WL 314932; see also New Orleans Redevelopment Authority v. Irving, 2015-1366 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/10/16), 198 So.3d 1193, 1199 (a party may waive its objection to an otherwise improper use of summary proceeding.)

2. Is a plaintiff entitled to a new trial because of misconduct by the trial judge?

a. The Supreme Court overturned the appellate court and granted the plaintiff a new trial based on misconduct by the trial judge during a jury trial. The judge left the bench on occasion, wandered around the court room, ate candy, and failed to pay attention to the proceedings. He sat in the jury box during some of the testimony and greeted the defense’s medical expert with a handshake and an embrace. The Supreme Court held that the behavior of the trial judge resulted in a miscarriage of justice and entitled the plaintiff to a new trial. Logan v. Schwab, 2015-1508 (La. 5/27/16), 193 So.3d 118, 120

H. ABANDONMENT

1. Does the filing of a witness list by the plaintiff interrupt the abandonment period?

a. Where the plaintiff did not file a “Motion to Set Trial” or a “Motion for a Scheduling Order”, the filing of a witness list was a passive and gratuitous filing only for the purpose of interrupting abandonment. It was a preparation to take a step, but was not a step since it did not hasten the matter to judgment. After the abandonment period, the scheduling of a 10.1 conference or the defendant attorney participating in a 10.1 conference to inform the plaintiff’s attorney that he is filing a Motion for Abandonment cannot revive the abandoned action. Lewis v. Jones, 2016-48 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/26/16), 193 So.3d 546, 549

2. Does abandonment apply after a judgment is rendered? a. Plaintiffs filed a timely motion and order for a devolutive appeal. The trial court did not sign the judgment for eight years. When the plaintiffs requested that the judgment be signed, the court dismissed the case as abandoned. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that La. C.C.P. art. 561 (abandonment article) only applies to civil actions that are pending trial and the article does

not apply to an action prosecuted to judgment or that has been submitted for judgment. Joseph v. Wasserman, 2015-1193 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/4/16), 194 So.3d 720, 723; see also Hibernia National Bank v. Aero-Mechanical, Inc., (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/3/16) 2016 WL 4126143 (holding that abandonment is not applicable to collection efforts by a party after a judgment.)

3. If a suit is dismissed on the basis of abandonment, is a subsequent suit

barred by a plea of res judicata? a. Even though the first suit was inadvertently dismissed with prejudice on the basis of abandonment, it would have no practical effect because an abandoned suit cannot form the basis of a plea of res judicata. Entrada Co., LLC v. Pressley, (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/16), 200 So.3d 848

I. INJUNCTIONS 1. What is the purpose of a preliminary injunction?

a. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the trial on the merits. The burden of proof at the preliminary injunction hearing is that the mover will suffer irreparable injury, loss or damage if the injunction is not issued and that the mover will likely prevail on the merits of the case. Dynamic Constructors, L.L.C. v. Plaquemines Parish Government, 2015-0271 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/26/15), 173 So.3d 1239, 1242

2. Can a preliminary injunction be issued without showing of irreparable

injury? a. Yes, a preliminary injunction can be issued without a showing of irreparable injury if the conduct sought to be restrained constitutes a direct violation of a prohibitory law or violation of a constitutional right. Yokum v. Pat O'Brien's Bar, Inc., 2012-0217 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/15/12), 99 So.3d 74, 77

b. If the preliminary injunction seeks to protect rights in real

property. Cason v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 47,084 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/11/12), 92 So.3d 436, 444, writ denied, 2012-1290 (La. 9/28/12), 98 So.3d 840

c. If the preliminary injunction is sought to enforce an agreement not to compete. W. Carroll Health System, L.L.C. v. Tilmon, 47,152 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/16/12), 92 So.3d 1131, 1136, writ denied, 2012-1387 (La. 11/2/12), 99 So.3d 665

3. What is the difference between a mandatory injunction and a prohibitory injunction?

a. A mandatory injunction commands the doing of an action while a prohibitory injunction restrains conduct usually when such conduct would cause irreparable injury, harm or damage to the plaintiff. A temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction are available to maintain the status quo with a prohibitory injunction. A mandatory injunction may only be issued after the plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence at a full evidentiary hearing that he is entitled to the injunction. A TRO and a preliminary injunction are not available in an action for a mandatory injunction. Denta-Max v. Maxicare Louisiana, Inc., 95-2128 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/14/96), 671 So.2d 995, 997; Concerned Citizens for Proper Planning, LLC v. Par. of Tangipahoa, 2004-0270 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/24/05), 906 So.2d 660, 664

4. Can a permanent injunction issue without a showing of irreparable

injury or harm? a. A permanent injunction can only be issued under La.

C.C.P. art. 3601 after a trial on the merits in which the burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. Since the plaintiffs did not prove they suffered irreparable harm by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the permanent injunction. While a preliminary injunction may be issued without proving irreparable harm, there is no case law that holds that irreparable harm does not have to be proven for the issuance of a permanent injunction. Yokum v. 544 Funky, LLC, 2015-1353 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/28/16) 2016 WL 5416349

5. Can you consolidate the preliminary injunction hearing with the trial

on the merits for the permanent injunction? a. By stipulation of the parties, a preliminary injunction hearing can be converted into a permanent injunction trial. At the trial, the burden of proof will be a preponderance of the evidence not a prima facie showing that the party will prevail on the merits. Desselle v. Acadian Ambulance Service, Inc., 2011-1017 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/1/12), 83 So.3d 1253, 1257, writ denied, 2012-0518 (La. 4/13/12), 85 So.3d 1253

6. When can you appeal a judgment granting or denying a preliminary

injunction? a. An appeal from an order or judgment relating to a preliminary injunction must be taken and bond furnished within fifteen (15) days from the date of the order or judgment. La. C.C.P. art. 3612(C). A party may not extend this time by seeking review by applying for supervisory writs instead of taking an appeal. First Bank & Trust v. Duwell, 2011-0104 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/18/11), 70 So.3d 15, 18

7. May the trial court stay the preliminary injunction or grant a suspensive appeal?

a. The court in its discretion may stay further proceedings and the preliminary injunction until the appeal has been decided. However, if the court stays the preliminary injunction, the appeal and any action for a permanent injunction may be moot. Parker v. Senate of State, 2015-0048 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/21/15) (unpublished)

J. JURY INSTRUCTIONS

1. Can a trial judge give a one-page jury instruction in a complicated contract case over the objection of the attorneys for all parties?

a. In the case of Georgia-Pacific, LLC v. Dresser-Rand Company, after a five-day jury trial, the trial court’s entire instruction to the jury was as follows:

This is a contract case between plaintiff, Georgia-Pacific, and the defendant, Dresser-Rand Company. A contract is the law between the parties. This contract contains an exclusive warranty provision. An exclusive warranty provision applies unless the warrantor, which would be Dresser-Rand Company, has been unable or unwilling to repair or replace any defective part within a reasonable period of time. That’s up to you to decide whether there’s been a reasonable period of time. That is your entire jury instruction.

The attorneys for both Dresser-Rand Company and Georgia-Pacific timely objected to the brevity and inadequacy of both the jury instruction and the jury verdict form. La. C.C.P. art. 1793. The First Circuit held that because “the trial court’s jury instructions omitted essential, applicable legal principles and its jury verdict form failed to adequately set forth the issues to be decided by the jury, no weight should be afforded to the jury’s verdict …” and the court vacated a $2,061.903.62 jury verdict in favor of Georgia-Pacific. The court further held that because “the weight of the evidence was so nearly equal that a first-hand view of the witnesses [was] essential to a fair resolution of the issues[,]” the matter should be remanded to the trial court for a new trial. Georgia-Pacific, LLC v. Dresser-Rand Company, 2015 CA 2002 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/31/16) (unpublished)

K. PARTIAL JUDGMENTS

1. When are partial summary judgments appealable? a. “When a court renders a … partial summary judgment … the judgment shall not constitute a final judgment unless it is designated as a final judgment by the court after an express determination there is no just reason for delay.” La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(1).

2. Does the appellate court have to accept the trial court’s designation of the judgment as a final judgment?

a. The court’s jurisdiction depends upon whether the judgment was properly designated as a final judgment pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(1). Neither an agreement by the parties nor the trial court’s designation are determinative of the appellate court’s jurisdiction. Spanish Lake Restoration, L.L.C. v. Shell Oil Co., 2015-0837 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/18/16), 2016 WL 1572425

3. What factors may the court use to determine whether a partial

judgment should be certified as appealable? a. The relationship between the adjudicated and

unadjudicated claims; b. the possibility that the need for review might or might

not be mooted by future developments in the trial court; c. the possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged

to consider the same issue a second time; and d. Miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and

solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, and expense.

Dupuy Storage & Forwarding, LLC v. Max Specialty Insurance Co., 2016-0050 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/5/16), 2016 WL 5806996

4. Does the appellate court have the discretion to convert an appeal from an improperly designated final judgment into a supervisory writ application?

a. “Because the proper procedural vehicle for seeking review of an interlocutory judgment is ordinarily by application for supervisory review, we can, when appropriate, convert the improper appeal to such an application.”

In re Succession of Scheuermann, 2015-0040 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/22/15), 171 So.3d 975, 983 b. However, the primary consideration is whether the

review and decision by the appellate court would result in a final judgment of all issues in the case.

L. FINAL JUDGMENTS

1. What is a final judgment? a. A final judgment shall be identified as such by

appropriate language. La. C.C.P. art. 1918.

b. A final appealable judgment must contain decretal language and it must name the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied. See Carter v. Williamson Eye Center, 2001-2016 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/27/02), 837 So.2d 43, 44

c. “[E]very final judgment shall contain the typewritten or

printed name of the judge and be signed by the judge … [j]udgments may be signed by the judge by use of electronic signature.” La. C.C.P. art. 1911(A).

d. “The page of the judgment, order, or ruling containing the judge's signature line shall reflect the docket number and title(s) of the pleading(s) at issue.” District Court Rule 9.5.

e. The reasons for judgment and the final judgment should

not be included in the same document. See Eugene v. Davenport, 2014-0953 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/9/14), 150 So.3d 56, 59. See also La. C.C.P. art. 1918 (stating that when written reasons for the judgment are assigned, they shall be set out in an opinion separate from the judgment.)

2. What are not judgments?

a. “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Judgment be entered in favor of Defendants.”

1. The judgment at issue does not precisely and definitively state the relief granted or denied. The judgment does not dismiss the plaintiffs' petition, nor does it specifically find in favor of all defendants. Since the trial court has not issued a valid, final judgment in this case, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal. Morraz-Blandon v. Voiron, 2016-112 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/25/16), 199 So.3d 1220, 1222; Oregan v. Cashio, 2015-612 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/27/16), 185 So.3d 885, 887

b. “The exceptions filed in the above captioned matter

are granted.” 1. The judgment is not a final appealable judgment. A final

appealable judgment must contain decretal language, and it must name the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied. The result decreed must be spelled out in lucid, unmistakable language. The specific relief should be determinable from the judgment without reference to an extrinsic source such as pleadings or reasons for judgment. Moon v. City of New Orleans, 2015-1092 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/16/16), 190 So.3d 422, 425

c. “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED that the Exception filed by KATHRYN ELIZABETH HOLLAND and PAUL SCOTT HOLLAND is granted. This action is a revocatory action[,] and either prescription or preemption apply as per LA C.C. Art. 2041.”

1. We dismiss the appeal as having been taken from a judgment lacking the proper decretal language. While the judgment at issue states that it grants the exception, it is indefinite in that it states that either prescription or peremption applies and does not indicate what relief is granted.

Holland v. Holland, 2016-117 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/6/16), 188 So.3d 484, 485

d. “It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that

Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.”

1. The judgment does not contain sufficient decretal language. In the absence of such decretal language, the judgment is defective and cannot be considered as a final judgment. Gaten v. Tangipahoa Parish School System, 2011-1133 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/23/12), 91 So.3d 1073, 1074

3. What happens if the appellate court sends a judgment lacking proper

decretal language back to the trial court? a. Under La. C.C.P. art. 1951, as amended in 2013 “a final

judgment may be amended to alter the phraseology of the judgment … only after a hearing with notice to all parties or if the court or the party certifies that it was provided to all parties at least 5 days before the amendment and that no opposition has been received.”

b. A substantive amendment to a final judgment can only be

made by consent of the parties, after a timely filed application for new trial, an action for nullity or a timely appeal. Otherwise, a trial court lacks authority to make any modification of substance to a final judgment.

Sanderford v. Mason, 2012-1881 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/1/13), 135 So.3d 745, 749

c. If a final judgment is amended to make a substantive

change without the consent of all parties, a motion for new trial, or an appeal, the amended judgment is an absolute nullity.

Bourgeois v. Kost, 2002-2785 (La. 5/20/03), 846 So.2d 692, 696

M. APPELLATE COURT

1. What does an order from the appellate court setting briefing and oral argument deadlines mean when a motion for summary judgment has been denied?

a. On review, an appellate court shall not reverse a trial court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment and grant a summary judgment dismissing a case or a party without assigning the case for briefing and permitting the parties an opportunity to request oral argument. La. C.C.P. art. 966(H)

b. If the appellate court issues an order for briefing or oral argument of a denial of a summary judgment, at least two judges are considering reversing the trial court and granting the judgment.

JUDGE TIFFANY GAUTIER CHASE BIOGRAPHY

HON. TIFFANY GAUTIER CHASE has served as judge of Division A of Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans since May 2007. She has presented at numerous continuing legal education seminars on a variety of civil litigation topics including recent developments in the law, medical malpractice, domestic violence, professionalism and ethics. Judge Chase is committed to providing access to justice to all litigants and works with various groups to do so. In 2010, she worked closely with the Louisiana Bar Association-Access to Justice Committee to create Civil District Court's Self-Represented Litigant Help Desk, the first self-contained legal help-desk in a Louisiana court. Judge Chase serves as Chairperson of Civil District Court's Technology and Jury Policies and Procedures Committees. She was appointed in 2013, by the Louisiana Supreme Court as Chairperson of the Louisiana Court Security Committee. Judge Chase is the Louisiana Delegate to the American Bar Association-State Court Trial Judges Committee, serves on the District Court Rules Committee, Executive Committee of the District Judges' Association, Louisiana Judicial Council and previously served as co-chair, for two years, of Louisiana Judicial College-Louisiana State Bar Association Summer School.

Honorable Susan M. Chehardy Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal State of Louisiana

THE HONORABLE SUSAN M. CHEHARDY currently serves as Chief Judge of the Louisiana 5th Circuit Court of Appeal. She received her Juris Doctorate from Loyola University of the South Law School in 1985. Upon graduation she held the position as law clerk for the late Hon. Veronica Wicker for the 85'- 86' term. In August of 1986 she was employed as an associate with the firm of Gauthier, Murphy, Chehardy, Sherman & Breslin, engaged in the practice of personal injury litigation. In 1989 she became a partner in the firm of Chehardy, Sherman, Ellis & Breslin. In 1991, she opened her own general litigation practice, Chehardy & Nielsen. In January of 1992 she was appointed by the Louisiana Supreme Court as judge pro tempore to Division C of the 24th JDC. In September of 1992 she was elected judge of Division N of the 24th JDC. She served as judge of Division N, winning re-election without opposition to her district court seat in 1996. In October of 1998 she was elected to Division D of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, the first woman to be elected to that Court. She was re-elected without opposition in 2002 and 2012. In January of 2013, she was sworn in to her new term as the first female Chief Judge of the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal. Judge Chehardy is a member of the American Bar Association, the Louisiana State Bar Association, the Jefferson Bar Association, as well as a retired member of the Federal Bar Associations of the Eastern and Middle Districts. She is also a member of the American Judges Association, the Council of Chief Judges of the State Courts of Appeal, the Louisiana Association of Appellate Judges; the Fifth Circuit Judges Association, the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Judges Association, the Association of Women Judges and the American Judicature Society.

JUDGE GUY HOLDRIDGE BIOGRAPHY JUDGE GUY HOLDRIDGE serves on the First Circuit Court of Appeal. Judge Holdridge previously served as a District Judge of the 23rd Judicial District Court. He served as a district court judge since 1991 and was the chief judge in 1991, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2006, and 2014. Judge Holdridge earned a B.A. Degree from Louisiana State University in 1974 and a J.D. in 1978 from the LSU Law Center where he was a member of the Order of the Coif and the Louisiana Law Review. He is a member of the LSU Law Center Hall of Fame. Judge Holdridge serves on the adjunct faculty of LSU Law Center where he teaches LA Civil Procedure I and II. He is a member of the council of the Louisiana Law Institute. He is also a member of the Child Custody, Expropriation, Prescription, and Adult Guardianship Committees of the Law Institute. He was the reporter of the Bail Bonds Committee and Expedited Jury Trial Committee. He is also currently serving as acting reporter for the Criminal Law and Procedure committee. He was the past chairman of the law institute committee that revised the law on Summary Judgments. He also served as past chairman of the Louisiana Certified Shorthand Reporter’s Board. He is a past president of the Louisiana District Judges’ Association and a member of the Executive Committee”. He is also a past president of the Board of Directors of the Louisiana Judicial College, and continues to serve on the board. He is also a member of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s Strategic Planning committee and Jury Instructions Committee.

WILLIAM R. CORBETT BIOGRAPHY WILLIAM R. CORBETT holds the Frank L. Maraist Professorship and the Wex S. Malone Professorship at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center of Louisiana State University. He has been a faculty member at LSU since 1991. In 25 years on the faculty, Corbett has taught Labor Law, Employment Law, Employment Discrimination, Comparative Labor Law, Torts, Relational Torts, Federal Civil Procedure, and Louisiana Civil Procedure. Professor Corbett served as Interim Co-Dean during the 2015-16 academic year and as Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs of the Law Center from 1997 through 1999. He was a visiting associate professor at William and Mary in 1996 and a visiting professor at the University of Georgia School of Law in 2004, 2011, and 2015. He has served as the executive director of the Louisiana Association of Defense Counsel since 2001, with responsibility for arranging and administering the continuing legal education programs of the LADC. From 1998 to 2001, he had similar responsibilities while serving as the executive director of the Louisiana Judicial College. In October 2016, Professor Corbett returned to the Judicial College when he was appointed as the College’s Faculty Advisor. Professor Corbett has contributed to several books and written numerous articles on labor, employment, and torts topics. He is a frequent speak on continuing legal education programs. Corbett received his B.A. from Auburn University and his law degree from the University of Alabama, where he was Editor-in-Chief of the Alabama Law Review and a member of the Order of the Coif. Before coming to the LSU Law Center in 1991, he practiced labor and employment law in Birmingham, Alabama with Burr & Forman.