lm2000avm

Landmine Monitor Report 2000 Full Text

AT mines are designed to immobilize or destroy vehicles and their occupantsDepartment of the Army (1998), MINE/COUNTERMINE OPERATIONS,

Field Manual 20-32, Washington, DC, 29 May 1998.

Antipersonnel effects of antivehicle minesINTRODUCTIONAs is generally known, the Ottawa Convention tries to impose a total ban on anti-personnel(AP) mines, yet at the same time denies that anti-tank/anti-vehicle (AT/AV) mines and anti-handling devices are, or were, ever part of the problem. Not only do AT/AV-mines causesevere civilian suffering, due to their sensitive fuzes and anti-handling devices (AHD), theyoften function just like AP mines.

Under the terms of the Ottawa treaty, antivehicle mines equipped with anti-handling devicesare not considered to be AP mines and therefore not prohibited.

But according to the Ottawa Treaty definitions antivehicle mines with antihandling devicesthat explode from an unintentional act or innocent act are considered antipersonnel mines andtherefore prohibited. The diplomatic history from Oslo clearly shows that this was the intentand understanding of the negotiators. Yet, few governments since have publicly recognizedthis fact or taken appropriate steps to ban such mines (HRW, 2000: Fact Sheet prepared forthe first meeting of the standing Committee of Experts on the general Status and operation ofthe convention, 10-11 January).

The amended CCW protocol 2 again prohibits at least the use of mines, booby-traps or otherdevices which employ a mechanism or device specifically designed to detonate the munitionby the presence of commonly available mine detectors as a result of their magnetic or othernon-contact influence during normal use in detection operations (Article 3.5.). Article 3.6.prohibits the use of a self-deactivating mine equipped with an anti-handling device that isdesigned in such a manner that the anti-handling device is capable of functioning after themine has ceased to be capable of functioning. This covers AT/AV mine types equipped with(non electric) mechanical AHD devices which can be detonated by an unintentional act.

A lot of reports indicate that AT/AV mines represent a significant burden and danger tocivilians in almost all mine affected nations and they are deliberately used against civilians,just like AP mines. AT/AV mines pose a considerable threat to the civilian population, andclaim many victims. Especially since their explosive force makes their impacts all the moredevastating, and usually fatal for several victims. Often AT/AV mines are laid together withAP mines to increase their destructive power yet further. Buildings, railway lines, roads andother infrastructures are often blocked with AT/AV mines. Due to the sensitive fuzetechnologies of AT/AV mines, which can also cause a mine explosion from an unintentionalact, individual people are basically threatened by such mines when they move (either with orwithout a vehicle!) over/past/close to such mines.

The public available data regarding AT/AV mines increases the perception, that a lot of thesemine types are suspected to violate both, the CCW 2 Protocol and Ottawa-Treaty. Therefore

2international law must address these misfittings in order to overcome the worldwide landmineproblem. In this sense all Ottawa and CCW-2 member states are urged to clarify theconsistency of their antivehicle mines with these treaties and should be asked to report allexisting AT/AV mine stockpiles to the UN General Secretary. Ottawa Member States shouldprovide this information within their article 7 reports.

Historical Background - Current Use of Antivehicle MinesModern landmines were first used in World War I responding to the threat of tanks. In WorldWar II landmines became a serious threat when pressure fuzed antitank mines and boundingantipersonnel mines were widely used.

During World War II landmines were developed to a high degree. This includes a variety ofantitank (AT mines), antivehicle (AV mines), dual-purpose, and antipersonnel mines (APmines) with a variety of fuzes. Historical reports indicate that the former Soviet Union usedapprox. 220 million AT mines ; Germany 80 million and the USA about 17 million. 18% to34% of all World War II tank kills were directly attributed to AT mines. (DIA, 1992) Thisfigure rose to 56% during the Korean War, and finally reached 70% in the Viet Nam war.However 26% of all US American soldiers for instance who died during Operation RestoreHope (Somalia) were the victims of AT/AV mines. (Wilhelm Schneck, Countermine SystemsDirectorate, Ft. Belvoir, VA 1995).

As a reaction to this trend nowadays many armies have shown increased investment activitiesby improving mine protection for their vehicles. Germany for instance is intending to spendsome 144 million DM on improved mine protection for the MARDER tank. This can only beconsidered a response to the threat posed by AT/AV mines, since AP mines are hardly likelyto pose any threat to this model of tank. The decision to procure fully-protected transportvehicles, which had been specially developed for deployment in Kosovo, also seems to havebeen similarly motivated. This because the vehicle is supposedly armored such that not evenanti-tank mines or anti-tank grenades can damage it (Handelsblatt, Sunday, 31 October 1999).

In principle minefields may contain any type, mix, or number of AT and/or AP mines and areused to:

-Produce a vulnerability on enemy maneuver that can be exploited by friendly forces.-Cause the enemy to piecemeal his forces.-Interfere with enemy command and control (C 2 ).-Inflict damage to enemy personnel and equipment.-Exploit the capabilities of other weapon systems by delaying enemy forces in an engagement area (EA).-Protect friendly forces from enemy maneuver and infiltration. (Department of the Army (1998), MINE/COUNTERMINEOPERATIONS, Field Manual 20-32, Washington, DC, 29 May 1998.)

If mines are laid to NATO SOPs then one would expect to find 3 AP mines for each AT mine(the AP are laid around the AT to protect it, forming a "cluster"). However in mostdeveloping countries the mine laying has not been as regimented as this.

However the widespread view is that AT/AV mines are not found that often in mined areas(European Security 10/99).But this seems to be an underestimation of the present situation.Even the highly incomplete UN/DHA mine database (http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/)

3identifies at least 10 million AT/AV mines laid world-wide, not including e.g. Egyptianminefields, where a good 20 million AT/AV mines are presumed to have been in place sincethe World War II. This means that at least 10% of all deployed mines are AT/AV mines, butmore realistic are about 20%. However a number which can not be ignored.

In Angola for instance every fifth of about 15 million deployed landmine is suspected to be anAT/AV mine. (http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/). Since the flare up of the civil war in 1998incidents caused by AT/AV mines had increased dramatically. Besides this the London Timesreported on the use of a new kind of landmine, designed to harm mine clearers, that iscomplicating demining efforts and hampering food delivery in Angola. The new minesexplode when they are exposed to light or when they pick up signals from mine detectors.(London Times, 4 July 99.)

From Afghanistan it is reported that still 8 million AP mines and 2 million AT/AV mines arescattered. (http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/). UN officials again reported, that convoysdelivering thousands of tons of United Nations food to cold, hungry refugees in northernAfghanistan are being delayed because of (AT/AV) mines. (according to ICBL media reports)

In Mozambique nearly every second of about 1 million deployed landmines is supposed to bean AT/AV mine and in Ethiopia 20% of all laid mines are supposed to be AT mines.(http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/). According to the Washington based Embassy of Ethiopia theEritrean military has extensively and indiscriminately planted thousands of landmines in thecourse of its nineteen-month invasion and occupation of Ethiopian territory. In fact,approximately one million anti-personnel and anti-tank mines are scattered across the borderareas from western Tigray to northern Afar by both Eritrea and Ethiopia. To add to the dangerposed by the landmines, they are unmarked, no map of the minefields exists and the mines arebeing used against civilian populations. (Embassy of Ethiopia (Washington, DC), November23, 1999)

...In Rwanda, food distributions in Ruhengeri and western Gitarama prefectures remainsuspended after anti-tank mine incident in early September in Ruhengeri... (WFP EmergencyReport No. 38 of 1998, Date: 25 September 1998). Similar events are occurring in theAngolan civil war, where AT/AV mines fitted with modern light-sensitive fuzesmanufactured in Yugoslavia are used to block paths and roads, which is currentlypreventing the population there from receiving vital food supplies. The mines also targetdemining teams, who now feel barely able to clear these extremely dangerous mines.According to expert opinion, clearing AT/AV mines is basically significantly moredangerous, time-consuming and thus more costly than is the case with AP mines. This aloneprovides a good argument for voting in favour of extending the ban. Not least, these deminingactivities indirectly tie-up resources urgently needed to aid victims.

Also In Burundi, for instance, UNO is expressing concern over the growing threat posed byAT/AV mines: Anti-tank mines are becoming a growing concern on Burundis major roads.(DHA/Humanitarian Coordination Unit P.B. 1490 Bujumbura, Burundi, 1997).

As the Namibian Society for Human Rights recently reports antipersonnel and antivehiclemine incidents are on the increase in this country, especially along the volatile northeasternborder areas. (The Printers (Mysore)Ltd., Namibian Society for Human Rights, 17.2.2000)

4There are also reports from Kenya that AT/AV mines blew up several vehicles in Moyale(Ethiopia-Kenya border area) in 1999, leaving a death toll of several people. Also this yearpolice in Nairobi confirmed several incidents caused by AT/AV mines when vehicles ran overlandmines in the same area. (March 23, 2000 Nairobi, Kenya (PANA) Africa News Online).Finally also from India, Sri Lanka and Bosnia there are reports about the increasing use ofantivehicle mines which causes a multitude of victims. (according to ICBL media reports).And even the Pope almost became the distinguished victim of an AT/AV mine during his visitto Sarajevo in September 1997, when an attempt was made to blow up his vehicle with 20AT/AV mines placed under a bridge.

All these country reports make clear that on the one hand no one seriously can deny thatAT/AV mines are also used against civilians deliberately, just like AP mines and thatgenerally also antivehicle mines pose a significant threat to civilians in mine affectedcountries.

Types of antivehicle mines and technological development in the recent past

Basically Antivehicle Mines (fuses) fall into three categories:

Track-width mine. These mine types are designed to be activated by pressure and requiredirect contact with the wheels of a vehicle.Full-width mine. Designed to be activated by several methods--acoustics, magnetic-influence, tilt-rod, radio-frequency, infrared-sensored, command, or vibration. Tilt-rod ormagnetic-influence fuses are the most common fuzing systems.Off-route mine. Designed to top or side attack a target vehicle. Mostly these mines areactivated with acoustic or seismic signals. When activated, an infrared-sensored, explosive-formed penetrating or a shaped-charge rocket warhead sublet is launched; and the warheadacquires the target.

Meanwhile most so called modern AT/AV mines have reached technological standardswhich incorporate following features:

-Detonation independent of target speed-Warhead kill capability-Advanced influence fuze (magnetic)-Hand emplaced or scatterable-Full width attack capability-Anti handling/Anti disturbance device to prevent manual disruption (Janes InformationGroup,1995: Trends in Land Mine Warfare)

Like AP mines AT mines were originally produced in steel, though the Soviet Unionexperimented with wood, and the Germans used pottery, glass and Bakelite as the externalcase. This made the mines harder to locate using electronic mine detectors. The mostsignificant change in mine design came with the use of plastic. This is tough, light, and can becoloured to assist camouflage. It will not rust or deteriorate and since modern mines havepractically no metal parts, they hardly cannot be detected with electronic mine detectors.Along with plastic came the electronics revolution. Electronics have not only changed modernmine designs, they have also given new life to older weapons. The large fuse wells in many

5anti-tank mines will accommodate fuses which are triggered by either seismic signals or themagnetic field of an vehicle.A further central characteristic of modern landmine systems is their scatterability. Nearlyevery modern mine can be scattered with mine-laying systems e.g. artillery rockets, withhelicopters or with so-called dispenser weapons (stand-off weapons) by combat aircrafts (seepicture). Thus in a few seconds, a huge number of mines can be scattered indiscriminatelyfrom a great distance over a large area. These scatterable mines can be strewn in a variety ofways. Different types of mines such as anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines or so calledsubmunitions, can be scattered in a mix or separately over a target. Marking minefields toprotect civilians is generally impossible when using scatterable mines.

As the Ottawa Convention was being drawn-up, the fear was often expressed that thisConvention would bring in its wake extensive further technological development of non-prohibited mine systems. In retrospect, this fear appears to have been warranted. Some StateParties to the Convention have in many cases already completed integration of AP effects(e.g. anti-handling devices) into their AT/AV systems, which has also made it significantlyeasier for those states to support the Ottawa process. From 1990-1999 Germany for instancespent a good DM 2.5 billion on modernizing (procurement of almost only antivehicle mines)the mine equipment of its Federal Armed Forces. Yet despite that Germany, the UK, the USAand Australia will all continue to be involved in modernization and procurement activitiesover the next few years. During that period, Germany will spend at least DM 745 million onmilitarily-motivated mine technology [landmines (around DM 300 million), militarydemining equipment, mine protection of tanks]. For quite some time altogether about 20countries with credible defense budgets are involved in studies related to anti-tank minereplacements.( Janes Information Group,1995: Trends in Land Mine Warfare). Besides thissome military experts expect that it will be more difficult to obtain as both defense budgetsshrink and anti-tank warfare assumes a lower priority. Whereas the upgrade of electronicfuzes designed to prolong the life of older mines is described as the main development area oflandmine technology.

Since a few years a lot of companies, in example Bofors (Sweden), Dynamit Nobel Graz(Austria), Valsella or Tecnovar (both Italy) as well as a number of governments have offeredimproved mine systems that incorporate antidisturbance resp. antihandling mechanisms. A lotof these mines are identical in appearance (look-a-like) to their companion versions which arenot equipped with AHD devices (view Table 1). These mines are designated especiallypopular among Third World countries and increase the risk of demining operations.(DIA,1992). Besides this fuzes (e.g. tilt-rod fuzes) are also being offered for retrofit with olderAT/AV mines.

Non-signatories such as Pakistan, India, Russia and the USA are currently having alternativeAPM weapons and/or modern mine systems (self-healing minefields) developed atconsiderable expense (Defense News, 20.09.1999).

The key focus of mine modernization activities is on developing mines/mine systems that canbe remote-delivered, that can be programmed, that utilize new explosives and multiplesensors/fuzes to generate increased and certain destructive power, and that can be remote-controlled. Furthermore, almost all improved AT/AV mines are equipped with or equipable (2or more fuze wells) with anti-handling/anti-disturbance devices which mean they can beactivated by people. As such they are clearly also de facto AP mines.

6A glance at current patent statistics for landmine technology reveals uninterrupted andcomprehensive development activity in the field of modern mine technology. Here it isEuropean, and especially German, companies which are still seen to be particularly active.

Patent activities in landmine technology 1/1990 - 5/2000 - Major Companies

Country Company Landmines

F42B023

LandminecomponentsF42B023-24

Landminefuzes

F42C014-08A HIRTENBERGER AG

HIRTENBERGER PATRONEN AG

3 1 -

A DYNAMIT NOBEL GRAZ GMBH 1 1 1*

CH SCHWEIZER EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT W & F BERN 2 - -

ES EXPLOSIVOS ALAVESES SA 1 1 -

F GIAT INDUSTRIESLUCHAIRE DEFENSE SA

23 12 11

F THOMSON CSFTHOMSON DASA ARMEMENTS (TDA), THOMSON BRANDT ARMEMENTS,THOMSON TRT DEFENSE SA

16 5 5

F ETAT FRANCAIS ARMEMENT 2 - 3

F LACROIX TOUS ARTIFICES 1 - -

GER RHEINMETALL AGMAK SYSTEM GMBH, MAUSER WERKE OBERNDORF GMBH, OERLIKON-CONTRAVES PYROTEC AG, RHEINMETALL GMBH, RHEINMETALLINDUSTRIE AG, RHEINMETALL WAFFE & MUNITION GMBH, STN ATLASELEKTRONIK GMBH, TZN FORSCHUNGS & ENTWICKLUNGSZENTRUM

13 3 8

GER DAIMLER-CHRYSLER AEROSPACEDAIMLER-BENZ AEROSPACE AG, DORNIER GMBH, LFKLENKFLUGKOERPERSYSTEME GMBH, MESSERSCHMITT BOELKOWBLOHM GMBH, THOMSON DASA ARMEMENTS (TDA)

28 7 9

GER DYNAMIT NOBEL AGDYNAMIT NOBEL EXPLOSIVSTOFF & SYSTEMTECHNIK GMBH

46 18 13**

GER DIEHL STIFTUNG & CODIEHL GMBH & CO, FLENSBURGER FAHRZEUGBAU GMBH

30 1 6

J BOEICHO GIJUTSU KENKYU HONBUCH 6 1 2

J NISSANNISSAN JIDOSHA KK, NISSAN MOTOR CO LTD

2 1 -

J ISHIKAWA SEISAKUSHO 5 - 1

J MITSUBISHIMITSUBISHI HEAVY IND CO LTD, MITSUBISHI JUKOGYO KK

1 - -

J TOSHIBATOSHIBA TESCO KK

2 - 2

S SAAB-CELSIUS (BOFORS AB)BOFORS AB/PA, BOFORS MISSILES AB/PA, FFV ORDNANCE, SAABMISSILES AB/PA

4 - 1

UK BRITISH AEROSPACE PLCROYAL ORDANCE PLC

2 2 -

UK UK SEC FOR DEFENCE 1 - 2

UK EMI LTD 1 1 2

7US /GER

HONEYWELL INCHONEYWELL REGELSYSTEME GMBH

5 1 2

US US SEC OF ARMY&NAVY 2 - -

Source: World Patent Index, Period: 1/1990-5/2000 (main classes and sub classes)Notes: Data given above are not complete because they represent only public available patents. All patents areholded by the named companies, their subsidiaries, predecessors or within joint ventures. Due to joint venturesmultiple entries of patents are possible. *Including Patent classification F42C007-02/mechanical contact fuzes.Patent classifications: F42B023-00 Landmines, F42B023-24 Landmine components, F42C014-08 Fuzescharacterised by the ammunition class or type - for all landmines.

Types of antivehicle mines that can be initiated by an unintentional/innocent actGenerally within the antipersonnel definition of the Ottawa treaty the word designed createsscope for interpretation, grey areas and loopholes. Besides this it is an astonishing fact thatanti-tank-mines are not defined within the Ottawa Convention or the CCW Protocol IIwhich on the other hand conceals the actual problem. The term anti-tank mine, whichshould properly be amended to antivehicle mine, is the current definition for a mine that isnot an antipersonnel mine. But even military experts confirm, that there are a number ofanti-tank mines that can be initiated by people (see also table 2), including mines fuzed withtilt rods, breakwires, or operating under moderate loads.(Janes Information Group,1995:Trends in Land Mine Warfare)

Activation of an AP mine usually requires direct contact with its fuze. An AT/AV mine canbe activated in the same way, although in many cases there is a considerably more complexrange of possible ways to detonate them. If for instance a person steps on an AP mine withouttouching its pressure-activated fuze, the mine usually does not explode. However, if thishappens with a pressure-activated AT/AV mine which is also fitted with an anti-handlingdevice or a tilt-rod, the mine will explode, resulting in the certain death of the victim. Besidesthis AT/AV mines are unable to (reliably) distinguish between military and civilian vehicles.This applies to all AT/AV mines, regardless of whether they are activated by pressure-sensitive fuzes, pull-activated fuzes, tilt-rod fuzes or by sensors, even though this is oftendisputed by the mine-producing industry and the military.

When AT/AV mines are fitted with an anti-handling (anti-lift, anti-disturbance) device, thepotential risk to civilians is even higher (see below). Merely approaching such mines,standing close to them or touching them gently can cause them to explode, which meanscertain death for the victim. Anti-handling devices are, after all, designed to make the separatedeployment of AP mines superfluous, and prevent an AT/AV mine from being cleared.Without a doubt, this means that AT/AV mines possess characteristics of AP mines, by virtueof the mere fact that they are victim-activated. Many states now have considerable stockpilesof anti-tank/anti-vehicle mines fitted with such anti-handling devices. These types of minesare supplied almost exclusively complete with anti-handling devices ex factory, and oldermodels can be easily retrofitted with corresponding fuzes (e.g. tilt-rod fuzes).

People are basically threatened by AT/AV mines when they move (either with or without avehicle!) over/past/close to such a mine. In the view of experienced demining experts (RaeMcGrath, 1997: Definitions and Anti-Handling Devices, Discussion Paper), AT/AV minescan be activated by persons/civilians when:

AP mines are used to detonate AT/AV mines.

8the AT/AV mine is activated like an AP mine at a very low pressure threshold:AT/AV mines have a tilt-rod fuze.AT/AV mines are detonated like AP mines by means of a trip wireAT/AV mines are activated by a break wire.AT/AV mines are fitted with magnetic-type fuzes (electronical AHD).AT/AV mines are fitted with any other typ of (mechanical) anti-handling, anti-

disturbance or anti-lift devices.AT/AV mines are detonated or activated by means of sensors. Most common are seismic

sensors which react to vibrations in the ground, acoustic sensors which react to the noisemade by a vehicle engine or infrared sensors ehich react to radiated heat.Besides this fibre-optic cables react to being driven over, and light-sensitive sensors areused with buried mines. They explode when they are exposed to light or when they pick upsignals from mine detectors. Finally sensors that react to movement as well as opticalsensors are often part of modern landmine technology.

Modern AT/AV mines are often equipped with a mix of sensors in which the acoustic or theseismic sensor wakes up the mine, and the infrared or the optical sensor then seeks thetarget and finally detonates the mine. A patent analysis of sensor fuzed weapon systemsverifies that these sensor combinations can involve certain problems. Especially when a targetwhich should not be attacked, i.e. light vehicles or animals move in a greater distance. Inthis case the seismic sensor anyway activates the mine and causes next the infrared sensor,who detects a movement against the background, to trigger the mine (Patent DE 2262366 A1,MBB, 1978).

The German AT-2 mine and the Italian SB 81 AT mine are examples of mines that are underserious suspicion of violating against the Ottawa Convention and the CCW-2 landmineprotocol

The German AT-2 mine is a scatterable antivehicle mine in service with several Natocountries. The mine is equipped with an AHD. From the viewpoint of a German militaryofficial the AT-2 mine prevents any movement of combat vehicles and dismounted soldiers(Major Rudi Stampfer, 1981: Minen, in: Soldat und Technik, 2/1981). And also the formerUK Minister Robertson explained in an official statement that the AT-2 mine which wasprocured in co-operation with France, Germany and Italy is equipped with an anti handlingdevice which causes detonation after deliberate and sustained movement of the mine. (Houseof Commons Hansard Written Answer for 5 May 1999)Italy was the first country to prohibit the AT-2 mine by law. This law commits the Italiangovernment to destroy all 45,000 AT 2 mines in possession of the Italian Armed Forces,because the mine is sensitive enough to be detonated by a person (Italian Law N. 374: Rulesfor the Ban of Anti-Personnel Mines, October 29, 1997)According to German military authorities the AHD device of the AT-2 mine is not adjustable.Due to its self destruct feature the mine is designed as a closed system. In this connection atechnical alternation of the fuzes sensitivity should be impossible and would mean theprocurement of a new mine system. This does not make sense, especially with regard toeconomic aspects.

9The Italian made SB-81 AR anti tank mine. is another example for a mine under suspect toviolate both the CCW Protocol II and the Ottawa Convention. The scatterable mine isequipped with a self neutralization mechanism and a (mechanical) tilt rod fuze. The SB-81MV variant of this mine type provides a magnetic influence anti handling device. The SB 81is in service with the Italian and Spanish Army and was exported to Iraq.

ConclusionIn summary, it seems more than clear that civilians are under threat from mines officiallydefined as non-AP mines, i.e. that civilians can activate these mines and become theirvictims. Moreover, these mines are also so dangerous that it is extremely difficult to clearthem, thus generating high demining costs. British manufacturers of demining equipment alsobelieve that Scatterable area denial munition systems are the major threat in modernwarfare. (Aardvark Clear Mine Limited, company brochure).

At present, the willingness of military establishments and politicians to agree to a ban onAT/AV mines appears low. Nevertheless, support for an extension of the ban is growing.Besides the German Initiative to Ban Landmines, who supports a total ban of all mine types,ICRC published an information paper (entitled Anti-vehicle mines equipped with anti-handling devices, May 1999) calling for a technical modification of AT/AV mines with anti-handling devices. According to ICRC, it would be possible to adjust the anti-handling devicesuch that it does not explode when touched inappropriately or by chance.

But a purely technical proposal seeks to falls short of the target. When scattering minesmodified in this way, there would for instance be a high risk of malfunction, quite apart fromthe issue of whether the adjustment itself would function reliably or not. At any rate, thismethod would not prevent normal activation of the mine, e.g. by a school bus filled withpassengers.

Also Human Rights Watch stated that it would appear that any use of tilt rods, tripwires,breakwires, and contact wires would be prohibited under The (Ottawa) treaty, as they couldclearly cause and antivehicle mine to explode from an unintenional act. (HRW, 2000: Antivehicle mines with antihandling devices, fact sheet prepared for the first meeting of thestanding Committee of Experts on the general Status and operation of the convention, 10-11January)

The key arguments in favour of extending the ban can be summarized as follows:AT/AV mines have been and still are being used very readily, thus cutting people off from

food supplies and, like AP mines, claiming victims among the civilian population on analmost daily basis.

Due to their enormous explosive power, AT/AV mines cause significantly more devastationthan AP mines.

AT/AV mines are often equipped with fuzes or sensors which also enable the mines to beactivated by people.

AT/AV mines fitted with an anti-handling device are by virtue of that fact also aimedagainst people. AT/AV mines kill indiscriminately. In this respect they are no different fromthe prohibited AP mines.

For the most part AT/AV mines are significantly more difficult to clear, due to the fact thattheir activation by various types of fuze and sensor makes it virtually impossible to approach

10

them without risk. The high demining costs which that entails are usually met indirectly at theexpense of the budget for mine victim assistance.

Many states are continuously engaged in the further development and production of AT/AVmines, in some cases involving enormous financial inputs. These resources too are beingmobilized at the expense of humanitarian demining and victim assistance or, conversely,would be more appropriately deployed in those areas.

Therefore the first steps towards a ban on all (antivehicle) mines which can be detonated byan unintentional act should be:

STEP 1: Following the Ottawa diplomatic history all member states should be asked toreconfirm that AT/AV mine types equipped with, or suppliable with, anti handling devicesand/or magnetic (influence) fuzes are banned by the treaty if they can be detonated by anunintentional act. All Ottawa Member States should also be asked to confirm that AT/AVmines, like antipersonnel mines, cause a significant threat to civilians in mine affectednations. An addendum with these confirmations should be attached to the existing treaty.

STEP 2: Almost every existing modern AT/AV mine type is equipped with an AHD and/ora magnetic (influence) fuze that can be detonated by an unintentional act. This would mean asignificant violation against these two CCW protocol II articles. All CCW and Ottawamember states should be asked to report all existing AT/AV mine stockpiles to the UNGeneral Secretary. Ottawa Member States should provide this information within their article7 reports.

STEP 3: All CCW protocol II and all Ottawa member states should be asked to install aunilateral export moratorium for at least AT/AV mines with anti handling devices and/ormagnetic (influence) fuzes, comparable to the export ban on AP mines already in place in asignificant number of states.

STEP 4: Effect oriented mine definition should be installed in existing landmine ban treatieslike the Ottawa Convention or CCW protocol II. Effects of munitions, in addition to thedesign of munitions, should be of primary importance when considering the legality ofweapons.

11

Table 1Improved antivehicle mine systems (Look-a-like) with antidisturbance features availableon the world market (as off 1992; not complete)Country Mine with antidisturbance

featureOriginal mine Mine function, mine type

of antidisturbance versionAustria ATM-2000E PM 85, PM 3000 Magnetic influenceFrance HPD-1A ACPM, HPD, MACIPE Magnetic influenceFrance HPD-F2 ACPM, HPD, MACIPE Magnetic influenceFrance HPD-F3 ACPM, HPD, MACIPE Magnetic influenceItaly MATS/2 MATS/2 Pressure, blastItaly SB-81/AR SB-81 Pressure, blastItaly SB-MV/AR SB-MV/T Magnetic influenceItaly TCE/3.6 TCE/3.6 Pressure, blastItaly TCE/6 TCE/6 Pressure, blastItaly VS-1.6. AR/AN VS-1.6. Pressure, blastItaly VS-HCT4 ACPM, MACIPE (France) Magnetic influenceSweden FFV 028 SN FFV 028 RU Magnetic influenceSource: Defense Intelligence Agency (1992): Landmine Warfare Trends & Projections, December 1992

Table 2Examples of antivehicle mine types which can explode from an unintentional or innocentact and which are under serious suspect to violate against the Ottawa Treaty definitionsand / or the CCW Landmine Protocol 2 / Article 3.5&3.6 (not complete)Mine type Country Anti handling

/ Antidisturbance

Trip-wire orBreakwire

Tiltrod

Magnetic-fuze /sensor

ATM 2000 EAntitank Mine

Austria Yes Yes

A.V.M.Antitank Mine

Austria Breakwire

ATM-6Antitank Mine

Austria Breakwire

ATM-7Antitank Mine

Austria Breakwire

DRAGONelectronic fuzesystem

Austria Yes

PM 3000Antitank Mine

Austria Yes Yes

PM 83 AntitankMine

Austria Yes

Pz Mi 85MAntitank Mine

Austria Yes

Pz Mi 88Antitank Mine

Austria Yes Yes

SEMAGelectronic fuzesystem

Austria Yes

PRB IIIAntitank Mine

Belgium Yes

PRB IVAntitank Mine

Belgium Yes

PRB M3 A1Antitank Mine

Belgium Yes

PRB M3Antitank Mine

Belgium Yes

12

Mine type Country Anti handling/ Antidisturbance


Tiltrod


PRB M966Antitank Mine

Belgium Yes

PDM-1MAntiamphibiousMine

Bulgaria Yes

PD Mi-PKAntitank Mine

CzechRepublic

Tripwire

PT Mi-Ba IIAntitank Mine

CzechRepublic

Yes

PT Mi-Ba IIIAntitank Mine

CzechRepublic

Yes

PT-Mi-D II andIII

CzechRepublic

Yes

PT Mi-KAntitank Mine

CzechRepublic

Yes

PT Mi-PAntitank Mine

CzechRepublic

Yes

PT-Mi-DIAntitank Mine

CzechRepublic

Yes

PT-Mi-UAntitank Mine

CzechRepublic

Yes

M/88Antitank Minefuzeused i.e. withBarmine (UK)

Denmark anti-tilt

yes

ATM-L-84Antitank Mine

Finland Breakwire

KP 87 AntitankMine

Finland Yes Yes

KVKM 73Antitank Mine

Finland Breakwire

KVKM 81Antitank Mine

Finland Breakwire

MSM MK2Antitank Mine

Finland Yes

ALSETEXProgrammableIgniter )

France Tripwire

APILAS-120AAntitank Mine

France Breakwiresensor

APILAS-APAAntitank Mine

France Yes Breakwiresensor

GIAT LanceAntitank Mine

France Yes Yes

HPD 1AAntitank Mine

France Yes Yes

HPD 3 AntitankMine

France Yes Yes

HPD AntitankMine

France Yes Yes

HPD F1Antitank Mine(HPD 2 u. 2a)

France Yes Yes

HPD F2Antitank Mine

France Yes Yes

13



Tiltrod


M 51 MACI u.M52 MACIAntitank Mine)

France Yes

MACIPEAntitank Mine

France Yes

MI AC 48Antitank Mine

France Yes

MI AC CC 54Antitank Mine

France Yes

MI AC CC 56Antitank Mine

France Yes

MI AC CP 48Antitank Mine

France Yes Yes

MI AC CP48/55 Plate-Charge AntitankMine

France Yes

MI AC PlateCharge 1951

France Yes

MI AC CP 48TAntitank Mine

France Yes Yes

MI AC DISP F1Antitank Mine

France Yes Yes

MI AC ID 47Antitank Mine

France Yes

MI AC ID 51(GRILLE)Antitank

France Yes


France Yes


France Yes

MI AC ID CC51 AntitankMine

France Yes

MI AC PEDGIAT AntitankMine

France Breakwiresensor

MI AC PMAntitank Mine

France Yes

AT-Mine Type542-L

France Yes

AT I AntitankMine

Germany Yes

AT II AntitankMine

Germany Yes Possible

DM-12 AntitankMine (PARM-1)

Germany Breakwiresensor

DM-21 AntitankMine

Germany Yes

DM 31see also FFV028 SD

Germany Yes Yes

MIFF AntitankMine

Germany Yes Yes

MUSPAAntivehiclemine/Antipersonnel mine

Germany Possible

14



Tiltrod


COBRAArea defencemine

Germany Yes

TM-62P3Antitank Mine(EX-GDR)

Germany Yes

UKA-63Antitank Mine

Hungary Yes Yes Yes

NR 25 AntitankMine

Netherlands Yes

MN-111Antitank Mine

Poland Yes Yes

MN-121Antitank Mine

Poland Yes Yes

MPP-BAntitank Mine

Poland Yes

TM-62BAntitank Mine

Poland Yes Yes

TM-62DAntitank Mine

Poland Yes Yes

TM-62MAntitank Mine

Poland Yes

TMN-46Antitank Mine

Poland Yes

SB-81 AntitankMinelicenceproduction

Portugal Yes

SB-81/ARAntitank Minelicenceproduction

Portugal Yes Yes

MC-71 AntitankMine

Romania Yes

CETMEAntitank Mine

Spain Yes

M453copy of SB-81(Italy)

Spain Yes

Mine Fuze 15(ATF 1)

Sweden Yes

FFV 016Antitank Mine

Sweden Yes

FFV 028Antitank Mine

Sweden Yes Yes

FFV 028 RUAntitank Mine

Sweden Yes

FFV 028 SDAntitank Mine

Sweden Yes Yes

FFV 028 SNAntitank Mine

Sweden Yes

M/41-47Antitank Mine

Sweden Yes

15



Tiltrod


M/47 (B-C)Antitank Mine

Sweden Yes

M/47-52BAntitank Mine

Sweden Yes

M/52 AntitankMine

Sweden Yes

M/52 BAntitank Mine

Sweden Yes Yes

MI 101Antitank Mine

Sweden Yes

MI 102Antitank Mine

Sweden Yes

MI 103Antitank Mine

Sweden Yes

ADDERAntitank Mine

UK Yes

AHMAntihelicopterMine

UK Yes

APAJAXAntitank Mine

UK Yes

BarmineAntitank Mine

UK Yes

FWAM UK YesIMP AntitankMine

UK Yes Yes

L9 AntitankMine

UK Yes

Mk-7 AntitankMine

UK Yes Yes

ATIS AntitankMine

Italy Yes Yes

BAT/7 AntitankMine

Italy Yes Yes

FD AntitankMine

Italy Yes

G50 AntitankMine

Italy Yes

Mine B Mk1Antitank

Italy Yes

SACI 54/ 5/ 7/ 9Antitank Mines

Italy Yes

SACI IMAC-5/ 7/ 10Antitank Mines

Italy Yes

SATM AntitankMine

Italy Yes Yes

SB-81 AntitankMine

Italy Yes

SB-81/ARAntitank Mine

Italy Yes Yes

SBMV / 1Antitank Mine

Italy Yes Yes

SB-MV / ARAntitank Mine

Italy Yes Yes

SH-55 AntitankMine

Italy Yes

TC / 3.6Antitank Mine

Italy Yes

16



Tiltrod


TC / 6Antitank Mine)

Italy Yes

TMP-1 AntitankMine

Italy Yes

TMP-2 AntitankMine

Italy Yes

VS-1.6 AntitankMine

Italy Yes

VS-2.2 AntitankMine

Italy Yes

VS-3.6 AntitankMine

Italy

VS-6.0 AntitankMine

Italy Yes

VS-9.0 AntitankMine

Italy Yes

VS-AT4-ELAntitank Mine

Italy Yes

VS-HCTAntitank Mine

Italy Yes Yes

VS-HCT2Antitank Mine

Italy Yes Yes

VS-HCT4Antitank Mine

Italy Yes Yes

VS-SATM1Antitank Mine

Italy Yes Yes

MPR - M85 FormerYugoslavia

Yes

TMA-1A FormerYugoslavia

Yes

TMA-2 FormerYugoslavia

Yes


Yes


Yes


Yes

TMM-1 FormerYugoslavia

Yes

TMRP-6 FormerYugoslavia

Yes Yes

BLU-91/BGATORAntitank Mine

USA Yes Yes

M6A2Antitank Mine

USA Yes

M7A2AntivehicleMine

USA Yes

M15Antitank Mine

USA Yes

M19Antitank Mine

USA Yes

Remote Anti-armour Mine(RAAM)

USA Yes

M21 AntitankMine

USA Yes

17



Tiltrod


PTM-3Antitank Mine

Russia Yes

TM-46 & TMN-46

Russia Yes

TM-57Antitank Mine

Russia Yes

TM-72 Russia YesTMK-2Antitank Mine

Russia Yes

TM-89Antitank Mine

Russia Yes

Sources: DOD Humanitarian Demining Website Databasehttp://www.demining.brtrc.com/ . DOD, 1997 Int. Deminers guide ORDATA CD-ROM, Janes Mines and Mine Clearance (1999-2000). Pionierschule undFachschule des Heeres fr Bautechnik, Minendokumentationszentrum (1993):Minenhandbuch Somalia, Mnchen, Mai 1993. Ministerrat der DeutschenDemokratischen Republik (1988): Pionierkampfmittel der NATO- undfranzsischen Landstrietkrfte. Norwegian Peoples Aid Website:www.angola.npaid.org, Jane's Mines and Mine clearance (1999):http://jmmc.janes.com/.

TermsAnti disturbance (AD)A fuze designed to operate when movedAnti-handlingAnother term for anti-disturbanceAnti-handling device (AHD)A device fitted to, added on, placed under attached to or near that acts as part of of a mine or munitionmechanism, which can be electrically or mechanically operated when the mine or munition is disturbed.Magnetic influenceA fuzing principle in which the device is initiated by the change of the magnetic field caused by the magneticsignature of its target resp. an object containing metal.

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