G.R. No. 99031 October 15, 1991

RODOLFO D. LLAMAS, petitioner, vs.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS and MARIANO UN OCAMPO III, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Llamas is the incumbent vice governor of Tarlac while private respondent Ocampo is the incumbent governor. Oscar Orbos is the Executive Secretary who is being impleaded in this case.

In 1989 Llamas filed a verified complaint against Governor Ocampo alleging the governor’s violations of BP 337 or the Local Government Code and RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Llamas maintains that in 1988 Ocampo entered into a loan agreement with a non-profit organization headed by Ocampo himself and controlled by latter’s brother-in-law. According to the petitioner such loan agreement is grossly inimical to the interest of the provincial government for it was never authorized and approved by the Provincial Board. On the other hand, respondent governor maintains the legality of the loan agreement.

After trial, the Department of Local Government rendered a decision finding respondent guilty and penalized him with suspension from office for a period of 90 days. Thereafter, petitioner Llamas took his oath as acting governor. However on May 15, 1991, without completing the 90 days of suspension respondent governor was ordered to reassume his office by virtue of a resolution issued by Executive Secretary Orbos, by authority of the President granting executive clemency to the governor.

Petitioner contends that the issuance of the said resolution constitutes grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the executive clemency could only be granted by the President ONLY in CRIMINAL CASES. According to him, the qualifying phrase “after conviction by final judgment” under Article VII Section 19 of the 1987 Constitution applies solely to criminal cases and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been “convicted” in an administrative case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President could grant executive clemency to persons convicted in administrative cases.

HELD:

AFFIRMATIVE. Applying the rule of statutory construction which is Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos the Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not distinguish between cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the exclusion of impeachment cases. If the President can grant pardons in criminal cases, with much more she can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.