licup to lim

8/8/2019 Licup to Lim

1/10

Licup v. University of San Carlos (1989)

Facts: USC increased its tuition fees tocomply with a law mandating a salaryincrease to teachers and non-academic

personnel earning below 100/day. Petitionersled a mass protest in reaction to the tuitionfee increase where they blockaded the gatesof the university. In response, theadministration issued a memo disallowing

protests inside the classrooms and made thenecessary administrative actions against the

petitioners. A formal inquiry committeecomprised solely of faculty members.Petitioners questioned the impartiality of thecommittee and its authority to charge them

because it was against the universityhandbook for they did not consult the studentgovernment. Nevertheless, they submittedthemselves to the investigations and werefound thereafter administratively liable.Consequently, the school imposed a penaltyof non-readmission for the next semester.When they appealed their case to the DECSregional office, the regional director saidthey had no authority over the case and tofile an MR with the USC president. Insteadof doing so, they filed a petition for certiorariwith injunction alleging that (1) they wereconducting peaceful demonstrations whenthe school security personnel dragged themcausing injuries; (2) they were not sufferingfrom any academic deficiencies and they

penalty for non-readmission is too harsh; and(3) the investigation was conducted withoutfairness or fair play because the studentrepresentative were not allowed to

participate. In response, the schoolcommented that (1) the protest was far frompeaceful for they chose to barricade the gatesto prevent students from attending classeswhen they were allowed to use the stadiumto voice out their concerns; (2) two of the

petitioners were in fact suffering fromacademic deficiencies; and (3) there was astudent representative in the person of thePresident of the Graduate SchoolOrganization.

Held: Protests were far from peaceful because they barricaded the gates andprevented other students from attending theirclasses. USC has a right to initiate properadministrative proceedings. SC found no

basis that the petitioners were denied due process and that the charges and penaltyagainst them were appropriate. The sanctionfor non re-admission was in fact lenient ascompared to expulsion which was prescribed

by the handbook. While it is true that thestudents are entitled to the right to pursuetheir education, the USC as an educationalinstitution is also entitled to pursue itsacademic freedom and in the process has theconcommitant right to see to it that this

freedom is not jeopardized. A student whocommits a serious breach of discipline orfails to maintain the required academicstandard forfeits his contractual right toeducation.

Guzman, et al. v. NU (1986)

Facts: NU have been continuously and persistently denying petitioners from re-

nrolling. Petitioners allege: (1) they were being denied enrollment because they participated in mass actions within thepremises of NU; and (2) they were expelledwithout being informed of such cause andwithout being afforded the opportunity todefend themselves. NU commented: (1)

petitioners academic standing were poor because they would boycott their classes;and (2) two of the petitioners were parties tocivil and criminal cases decided by the RTC

pending before the CA that held them liable;and (3) NUs academic freedom must berespected when they refuse to enroll studentswho hate the school; and (4) one of the

petitioners did not re-enroll during theenrollment period. Petitioners replied: (1)Urbiz attempted to enroll that day but was

persistently disallowed by the school; (2) themass action did obtained a permit becausethe school refused to issue them one.

Held: The fact that NU had never conductedproceedings of any sort to determine whether


2/10

or not the petitioners were liable for the massactions denies the students procedural due

process. The pendency of a civil case fordamages and a criminal case for maliciousmischief against one of the petitioners is not

sufficient to warrant for expulsion ordebarment from re-enrollment. Also, NUfailed to publish any rule that any studentmay be expelled or refused re-enrollment for

poor scholastic standing. Under theEducation Act of 1982, students have a rightto continue their studies except when theyare academically deficient or have violatedany disciplinary regulations. The SC heldthat petitioners were being denied this rightwhen NU penalized them without due

investigation, which is mandated by theManual of Regulations for Private Schools.To repeat, the imposition of disciplinarysanctions requires observance of proceduraldue process and that due process indisciplinary cases involving students do notentail proceedings and hearings similar tothose prescribed for actions and proceedingsin courts of justice. The SC laid down theminimum requirements of procedural due

process: (1) students must be informed inwriting the nature and cause of anyaccusation against them; (2) they have theright to answer the charges, with theassistance of counsel, if desired; (3) theyshall be informed of the evidence againstthem; (4) they have the right to adduceevidence in their own behalf; and (5) theevidence must be duly considered.

Hurtado v. California (1884)

Facts: Joseph Hurtado discovered that hiswife Susie was having an affair with theirfriend Jos Antonio Estuardo. Aftermeasures Hurtado took to put an end to theadulterous affair such as temporarilysending his wife away to live with her

parents, and later assaulting Estuardo in a barafter his wife returned and the liaisonsresumed proved futile, Hurtado fatally shotEstuardo. Hurtado was arrested for the

crime. He was not indicted by a grand jury.According to the California State

Constitution at the time, the followingapplied: "Offenses heretofore required to be

prosecuted by indictment, shall beprosecuted by information, after examinationand commitment by a magistrate, or by

indictment, with or without suchexamination and commitment, as may be

prescribed by law. A grand jury shall bedrawn and summoned at least once a year ineach county." The judge examined theinformation and determined that Hurtadoshould be brought to trial. Hurtado was tried,convicted of murder and sentenced to death.At issue was whether or not the 14thAmendment's Due Process Clause extendedto the states the 5th Amendment's Indictment

Clause requiring indictment by grand jury.

Does a state criminal proceeding based on aninformation rather than a grand juryindictment violate the 14th Amendment'sdue process clause? Is a grand juryindictment required by the 5th Amendmentapplicable to state criminal trials via the 14thamendment?

Held: The Supreme Court ruled 7-1 thatHurtados due process right was not violated

by denial of a grand jury hearing and that the14th Amendment was not intended to workretroactively to apply the 5th Amendment tostate criminal trials. Writing for the majority,Justice Matthews stated that the states should

be free to construct their own laws withoutinfringement and that the 14th Amendmentwas not intended to guarantee the right of agrand jury because it would have been

specifically referenced. His opinion alsoconcluded that Hurtados due process rightwas not violated because an information ismerely a preliminary proceeding and canresult in no final judgment. He furtherconcluded that Hurtado still received a fairtrial.

However, in his lone dissent, Justice Harlan presented a learned disquisition on thehistory and meaning of due process of law

that included quotes of many of the great jurists. Blackstone says: 'But to find a bill


3/10

there must be at least twelve of the juryagree; for, so tender is the law of England ofthe lives of the subjects, that no man can beconvicted at the suit of the king of anycapital offense, unless by a unanimous voice

of twenty-four of his equals and neighbors;that is, by twelve at least of the grand jury, inthe first place, assenting to the accusation,and afterwards by the whole petit jury oftwelve more finding him guilty upon histrial.' 4 Bl. Comm. 306. Further, 'But theseinformations (of every kind) are confined bythe constitutional law to mere misdemeanorsonly; for, wherever any capital offense ischarged, the same law requires that theaccusation be warranted by the oath of

twelve men before the party shall be put toanswer it.' Id. 309. He cited Edward Coke,who held that in capital cases, informationsare not allowed by that law [of the land], andwas not due process of law.

It has been on the basis of this decision thatmany states have abandoned the requirementfor grand juries, usually replacing them withinformations and a preliminary hearing

before a judge or the discretion of the prosecutor. However, as Justice Harlanwrote, ...one of the peculiar benefits of thegrand-jury system, as it exists in this country,is that it is composed, as a general rule, of

private persons who do not hold office at thewill of the government, or at the will ofvoters. Critics contend that by abandoningthe grand jury as originally conceived, therights of the accused are less well-protected,and the inevitable result is more miscarriages

of justice.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurtado_v._California

Lawton v. Steel (1894)

Facts: The facts were undisputed. The netswere the property of the plaintiffs, and weretaken away by the defendant Steele anddestroyed. At the time of the taking, most ofthe nets were in the waters of the Black

River Bay, being used for fishing purposes,and the residue were upon the shore of that

bay, having recently been used for the same purpose. The plaintiffs were fishermen, andthe defendant Steele was a state game andfish protector. The taking and destruction ofthe nets were claimed to have been

justifiable under the statutes of the staterelating to the protection of game and fish.Plaintiffs claimed there was no justificationunder the statutes, and if they constitutedsuch justification upon their face, they wereunconstitutional. Defendant Sherman was astate fish commissioner. Defendant Sargentwas president of the Jefferson County Fish &Game Association. Plaintiffs claimed thesedefendants to be liable upon the ground thatthey instigated, incited, or directed the taking

and destruction of the nets.

When the case was brought up to the SC, the plaintiff allege that the law exempting theperson, who destroys or takes down the fishnets in the shoreline of New York that causesa public nuisance, from any action fordamages to be unconstitutional for threereasons: (1) as depriving the citizen of his

property without due process of law; (2) asbeing a restraint of the liberty of the citizen;and (3) as being an interference with theadmiralty and maritime jurisdiction of theUnited States.

Held: To justify the state in thus interposingits authority in behalf of the public, it mustappear first that the interests of the publicgenerally, as distinguished from those of a

particular class, require such interference,and second that the means are reasonably

necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive uponindividuals.

The duty of preserving the fisheries of a statefrom extinction by prohibiting exhaustivemethods of fishing, or the use of suchdestructive instruments as are likely to resultin the extermination of the young as well asthe mature fish, is as clear as its power tosecure to its citizens, as far as possible, a

supply of any other wholesome food. Thelegislature, however, undoubtedly possessed


4/10

the power not only to prohibit fishing by netsin these waters, but to make it a criminaloffense, and to take such measures as werereasonable and necessary to prevent suchoffenses in the future. It certainly could not

do this more effectually than by destroyingthe means of the offense. If the nets were

being used in a manner detrimental to theinterests of the public, we think it was withinthe power of the legislature to declare themto be nuisances, and to authorize the officersof the state to abate them. The value of thenets in question was $15 apiece. The cost ofcondemning one (and the use of one is asillegal as the use of a dozen) by judicial

proceedings would largely exceed the value

of the net, and doubtless the state would inmany cases be deterred from executing thelaw by the expense. A person whose

property is seized under the act in questionwithout his legal remedy. If in fact his

property has been used in violation of theact, he has no just reason to complain; if not,he may replevy his nets from the officerseizing them, or, if they have been destroyed,may have his action for their value.

Villavicencio v. Lukban (1919)

Facts: Respondent mayor closed down thesegregate district of prostitutes toexterminate vice. The women were keptconfined in to their houses in the district bythe police. One night, the women werehustled into police wagons and placed themaboard a steamer destined for Mindanao. Theattorney for the relative and friends of a

considerable number of deportees files a petition for habeas corpus. The fiscal, in behalf of respondents, prayed that the writshould not be granted because (1) petitionerswere not proper parties; (2) the SC has no

jurisdiction; and (3) petition should be filedin Davao because respondents no longerhave the women in custody. The SC issuesthe writ but respondents failed to produce thewomen in court. When the court directed itsattention to the officials in Davao, they said

that the women roamed free and that they do

not have them in custody so it would beimpossible to obey the mandate.

Held: There is no law granting the right tothe Mayor of Manila to treat prostitutes as

chattles and change their domicile fromManila to another locality.

Habeas corpus is the proper remedy in thiscase to remedy the oppression of those in

power. The SC held that (1) the petitionerswere proper parties to the case being therelatives and friends of the deportees; and (2)the writ of habeas corpus may be granted bythe SC or any judge thereof enforceableanywhere in the Philippines; and (3) the

forcible taking of these women from Manilato a distant region deprived the women offreedom of locomotion just as effectively asif they had been imprisoned.

The essential purpose of the writ of habeascorpus is to inquire into all manner ofinvoluntary restraint and to relieve a persontherefrom if such restraint is illegal.

If respondents have the capacity to deportthese women to Davao, they have thenecessary means of returning them toManila.

Only the respondent mayor can be cited forcontempt because the police were onlyfollowing orders, the fiscal was only doinghis job as legal counsel and the hacienderoin Davao was only tricked.

Caunca v. Salazar (1949)By Weng Santos

Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf ofhis cousin Estelita Flores who was employed

by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau,owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein.An advanced payment has already beengiven to Estelita by the employment agency,for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita

wanted to transfer to another residence,which was disallowed by the employment


5/10

agency. Further she was detained and herliberty was restrained. The employmentagency wanted that the advance payment,which was applied to her transportationexpense from the province should be paid by

Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.

Issue: Whether or not an employmentagency has the right to restrain and detain amaid without returning the advance paymentit gave?

Held: An employment agency, regardless ofthe amount it may advance to a prospectiveemployee or maid, has absolutely no powerto curtail her freedom of movement. The fact

that no physical force has been exerted tokeep her in the house of the respondent doesnot make less real the deprivation of her

personal freedom of movement, freedom totransfer from one place to another, freedomto choose ones residence. Freedom may belost due to external moral compulsion, tofounded or groundless fear, to erroneous

belief in the existence of an imaginary powerof an impostor to cause harm if not blindlyobeyed, to any other psychological elementthat may curtail the mental faculty of choiceor the unhampered exercise of the will. If theactual effect of such psychological spell is to

place a person at the mercy of another, thevictim is entitled to the protection of courtsof justice as much as the individual who isillegally deprived of liberty by duress or

physical coercion.

People v. Fajardo et al. (1958)

Facts: There was a municipal ordinancepassed during the term of Mayor Fajardo thatrequired (1) any person constructing orrepairing a building should first obtain a

permit with the mayor and non-compliancetherewith will be penalized with a fine orimprisonment or both; and (2) the removal ofthe building or house at the expense of theowner if the it destroys the view of thePublic Plaza or occupies any public property.

After the term of Mayor Fajardo, he opted toconstruct his house along the national

highway and that was separated from the public plaza by a creek. The incumbentmayor denied his application for a permit

because the house would destroy the view ofthe public plaza. Persistent, Mayor Fajardo

built his house without the permit becausethey badly needed a place of residence, theirformer house being destroyed by a typhoonand he and his family have been living on aleased property. Mayor Fajardo wasconvicted for violating the municipalordinance where eventually the brought case

before the SC questioning theconstitutionality of the ordinance.

Held: The conviction cannot stand for two

reasons. (1) The ordinance failed to state anystandard to guide or limit the mayors actionin denying building permits, and thus, itconfers upon the mayor arbitrary andunrestricted power. According to

jurisprudence, the undefined and unlimiteddelegation of power to allow or prevent alawful activity is invalid. (2) The refusal ofthe incumbent mayor based on the reasonthat the building would destroy the view isunreasonable and oppressive because itdeprives the owner of the land to use his

property, and thus, oversteps the bounds of police power and amounts to taking of property without just compensation. TheState may not, under the guise of police

power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property andpractically confiscate them solely to preserveor assure the aesthetic appearance of thecommunity. If the ordinance stands, those

owning property that disrupts the view of the place cannot constructively use their property. To legally achieve the result, themunicipality must give appellants justcompensation and an opportunity to beheard.

Homeowners Assn. of the Phil. v.

Municipal Board of Manila (1968)

Facts: Petitioners are questioning an

ordinance that prohibits lessors andsublessors primarily devoted to residential


6/10


7/10

the country at that time has already regainedits financial balance.

Agustin v. Edu (1979)

Facts: Petitioner assails (1) the letterinstruction of President Marcos requiringevery car to have a early warning device (thetriangle thing) being harsh, cruel andunconscionable to the motoring public

because it is onerous and compulsoryconfiscatory for they will only makemanufacturers and dealers instantmillionaires at the expense of the car owners;and (2) the memo circular issued by therespondent to implement immediately the

letter instruction being an undue exercise oflegislative power on their part. In support of

petitioners claim, his Volkswagen Beetlealready has with blinking lights and couldserve already as a warning device. The letterinstruction has been suspended for 6 monthsand was only implemented when the memocircular came out.

Held: The letter instruction and memocircular is a manifestation of a valid exerciseof police power because it roots from publicsafety on the roads. The law was enactedafter careful research on the part of theExecutive Department. Any motorist, whosees the early warning device installed on theroad, will conclude, without thinking, thatsomewhere along the way, there is a motorvehicle that is stationary, stalled or disabledwhich obstructs or endangers passing traffic.On the other hand, if motorists would only

rely on the blinking lights of a car, it wouldcreate an uncertainty in the mind of themotorist and such confusion increases thedanger of collision. (Wtf.)

Neither did the respondent taint the unlawfuldelegation of power because of the clearobjective of public safety. The SC, citing

Edu v. Ericita, to avoid the taint of unlawfuldelegation, there must be standard, whichimplies at the very least that the legislature

itself determines matters of principle andlays down fundamental policy. Otherwise,

the charge of complete abdication may behard to repel. A standard thus defineslegislative policy, marks its limits, maps outits boundaries and specifies the publicagency to apply it. It indicates the

circumstances under which the legislativecommand is to be effected. It is the criterion

by which the legislative purpose may becarried out. Thereafter, the executive oradministrative office designated may

pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules andregulations. The standard may be eitherexpress or implied. The standard does nothave to be spelled out specifically.

The letter instruction neither compelledmotor vehicle owners to purchase earlywarning devices from a certain source.

What the petitioner in this case is asking theSC to do is to go into the wisdom of the lawand as stated by Justice Laurel, this courtdoes not pass upon questions of wisdom,

justice or expediency of legislation.

The SC reiterated that the letter instructionwas pursuant to the Vienna Convention thatwas ratified by the Government. Under theConstitution, The Philippines adopts thegenerally accepted principles of internationallaw as part of the law of the land.

Vera v. Cuevas (1979)

Facts: Private respondents sought theinjunction from a tax provision requiring

their filled milk products to inscribe in their boxes this milk is not suitable fornourishment for infants less than one year ofage. The lower court issued a preliminaryinjunction retraining petitioner fromcompliance therewith. The case was broughtup to the SC.

Held: (1) The lower court was correct inruling that the tax provision was repealed byimplication because the other two tax

provisions that this particular tax provisionwas made related to were expressly repealed,


8/10

and thus, this tax provision becamedeclaratory, without purpose or penalsanction. Since the tax provision lost its

purpose, so did the petitioners authority toenforce it. The BIR may claim police power

only when necessary in the enforcement ofits principal powers and duties consistentwith the laws.

(2) The tax provision does not apply to filledmilk but only to skimmed milk. Thedifference between skimmed and filled milkis that the fatty part was removed from theformer while the fatty part is only replacedwith the latter. In fact, the SC and publicrespondent believe that filled milk is suitable

for infants.

(3) Since the tax provision was beingenforced only against respondentmanufacturers of filled milk products and notagainst manufacturers, distributors or sellersof condensed skimmed milk would constitutea denial of equal protection of laws.

Villegas v. Hui Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (1978)

Facts: Petitioner passed an ordinancemaking it unlawful for aliens employed or to

be engaged in business without first securinga permit from the mayor of Manila. Privaterespondent files a petition for preliminaryinjunction and retraining order to stop theenforcement of the ordinance and to declaresuch null and void. Respondent contends thatthe ordinance: (1) as a revenue measure,violated the rule of the uniformity in

taxation; (2) as a police power measure, itfails to prescribe any standard to guideand/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus,violating the fundamental principle on illegaldelegation of legislative powers; and (3)arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, beingapplied only to aliens who are thus, deprivedof their right to life, liberty and property andtherefore, violates due process and equal

protection. CFI grants respondents petition.

Held: (1) The contention of the petitionerthat the ordinance is not a revenue but a

regulatory measure bears no merit. Therequirement of payment of P 50 asemployees fee shows the obvious purposeof raising money under the guise ofregulation.

(2) The ordinance does not lay down anycriterion or standard to guide the Mayor inthe exercise of discretion and thus, theunlimited power preventing a lawful activityis void.

(3) The fee is not unreasonable not onlybecause it is excessive but it fails to considerthe valid substantial differences in situationamong individual aliens who are required to

pay it. It is imperative that the classificationshould be based on real and substantialdifferences having a reasonable relation tothe subject of the particular legislation.

The shelter and protection under the due process and equal protection clause is givento all persons, both aliens and citizens.

Ynot v. IAC (1987)

Facts: Petitioner challenges theconstitutionality of an EO prohibiting thetransportation of carabaos and carabeef fromone province to another because he wastransporting carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo,where the said carabaos were confiscated bylocal officials. His contentions were that: (1)the penalty was invalid because his carabaoswere confiscated before he could haveinvoked his right to be heard; and (2) there

was an improper exercise of legislative power by the President Marcos underamendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.

Held: The challenged measure isdenominated an EO but it is really PD,

promulgating a new rule instead of merelyimplementing an existing law. Under theamendment in the 1973 Constitution,President Marcos had the authority to enactlaws.


9/10

For a law to be considered a valid exercise of police power it must past the purpose andmethod test: (1) the ordinance was enacted too prevent the indiscriminate killings ofcarabaos, which were then badly needed by

farmers; (2) The ordinance fell short of themethod requirement. The EO imposes anabsolute ban not on the slaughter of carabaos

but on the movement. Justice Cruz points outthat retaining carabaos in one province willnot prevent their slaughter there, any morethan moving to another province will make iteasier to kill them there. The reasonableconnection between the means employed andthe purpose sought to be achieved by thequestioned measure is missing.

The SC ruled that the confiscation wasarbitrary because the carabaos wereconfiscated first then was only returned tohim only after he filed a complaint forrecovery and gave a bond. The EO convictedthe petitioner and immediately imposed the

penalty without first giving him a chance tobe heard.

Note: This case was compared with US v.

Toribio, where in that case the SC upheld thevalidity of an EO prohibiting the killing ofcarabaos without first obtaining a permit.

Lim v. Pacquing (1995)

Facts: EO 392 was issued transferring the power to regulate jai-alais from localgovernments to GAB. Thereafter, RA 954was enacted prohibiting jai-alai. TheMunicipal Board of Manila later passes an

ordinance granting the franchise to operate jai-alai to respondent. Later, PresidentMarcos passed PD 771 revoking all powersof local governments to grant franchises tooperate jai-alais. Another PD was passedthereafter granting the Philippine Jai-Alaiand Amusement Corporation (PAJAC) afranchise to operate the game. WhenPresident Aquino came into power, sheexpressly repealed the PD granting thefranchise to PAJAC. Petitioner, as executive

secretary, issued a directive to GABchairman to withdraw such grant of

authority, to respondent to operate the jai-alai (watch solar sports at around 12 mn toknow what the hell this game is) in the Cityof Manila until the legal questions regardingthe sport have already been answered.

Respondent thereafter filed cases to preventthe withdrawal of their authority to operate.In the two cases respondent filed, the RTCgranted the preliminary injunction against

petitioners. The main contention of the petitioners here is the whether or notrespondents franchise to operate jai-alai,which is a gambling operation, is valid

because the grant was given by a cityordinance when RA 954 requires alegislative franchise. Respondent claims (1)

that the franchise is valid and was grantedunder the delegated power given to the Cityof Manila when its charter was enacted; and(2) that PD 771 violates the equal protectionclause and non-impairment clause based onthe motive it was passed when PD 810 was

passed later on to grant the franchise toPAJAC.

Held: The Charter of the City of Manila wasnot granted the power to franchise wagers or

betting, including the jai-alai, but retainedfor itself the power to franchise. Sincerespondent has no franchise from Congressto operate the jai-alai, it may not operateeven if it has a license or permit from theCity Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the Cityof Manila. Jai-alai as a sport is not illegalper

se, the accepting of bets and wagers on theresults of jai-alai games is undoubtedlygambling and, therefore, a criminal offense.

Jai-alai is essentially gambling and whetherit should be permitted is for the legislature todecide on. A franchise is not in the strictsense a simple contract but rather it is, moreimportantly, a mere privilege specially inmatters which are within the governments

power to regulate and even prohibit throughthe exercise of police power. Thus, agambling franchise is always subject to theexercise of police power for the publicwelfare. When PD 771 was enacted,

respondent was not singled out (even thoughthey were the only one who was affected)


10/10

but it was made to apply to all franchisesissued by local governments withoutqualification or exception.

Note: Read the dissenting opinion if you donot agree with the majority decision.

licup to lim

Documents