68 Nat ional Civ ic Review

C O M M U N I T Y B U I L D I N G

Liberal Education as Moral Education

For more than fifteen years now as a

professor, I’ve made my living as an

ethicist. In my teaching and writing,

I’ve explored through a moral lens

the practical and professional

dilemmas of everyday life. Recently,

I’ve taken on an additional adminis-

trative role. I’m the director of the

Center for Liberal Arts and Society

at Franklin and Marshall College.

The mission of the center is to

affirm and explore the value of lib-

eral learning in today’s society. As

director, my charge is to create pro-

grams that highlight the fundamen-

tal purposes and larger meanings of

a liberal arts education.

In my new administrative job, I

haven’t left the moral lens of my

larger professional life behind.

Indeed, in thinking about the larg-

er significance of a liberal educa-

tion, I often find myself asking, In

what sense is a liberal education a

moral education?

It’s a question, I’ve seen, that can

make some of my colleagues

uneasy. They tend to associate

moral education with inculcation

of certain prescribed beliefs. Seen

as a form of indoctrination, moral

education appears to be the very

antithesis of liberal education.

Central to liberal education is the

notion of liberty. A liberally edu-

cated person is a free individual,

capable of arriving at his or her

own conclusions about controver-

sial moral issues.

I believe deeply in this notion of a

liberal education. The last thing a

good liberal arts college should be

doing is telling its graduates which

side to take on such contemporary

moral issues as capital punish-

ment, affirmative action, or abor-

tion. We should be teaching them

how to think for themselves—and

expect that when they do they will

not always agree with one another.

For me, a liberal arts college would

be a dull and uninspiring place if

we did otherwise.

The root of my colleagues’

uneasiness lies not with their

notion of liberal education but

rather with their conception of

moral life. Indeed, their discom-

fort, it seems to me, stems from a

misconception of moral life, one

that sees moral life as marked by

prescribed beliefs rather than

enabling dispositions. More fun-

damental to our moral life than

the positions we hold are the dis-

positions we develop.

This is because a moral life is

most fundamentally a practice, an

activity in which we engage. As a

coherent meaningful activity, it

presupposes the dispositions that

make it possible. Beliefs are cer-

tainly important, but it is the prac-

tice that is determinative of

beliefs, not the other way around.

Indeed, the mark of an authentic

moral belief is that it is always

subject to a moral life’s own con-

stitutive set of tacit understand-

ings and expectations.

B Y J E F F R E Y N E S T E R U K

In my new administrative job, Ihaven’t left the moral lens ofmy larger professional life [asan ethicist] behind.

The last thing a good liberalarts college should be doing istelling its graduates which sideto take on such contemporarymoral issues as capital punish-ment, affirmative action, orabortion. We should be teach-ing them how to think for them-selves—and expect that whenthey do they will not alwaysagree.

69Spr ing 2004

I saw this occur recently in a law

and social issues course I taught

that included an in-depth exami-

nation of the death penalty. One

bright, politically conservative stu-

dent came to reexamine his sup-

port of the death penalty during

our class discussions. This hap-

pened because an unqualified

belief in the death penalty came

into conflict with a fundamental

understanding that had long

helped to constitute the practice

of his moral life.

This fundamental understanding

was an underlying commitment

to integrity—the moral ideal of

acting both self-consistently and

in accordance with one’s princi-

ples. As his view developed, he

came to believe there was a fun-

damental inconsistency in socie-

ty supporting the death penalty

while insisting on shielding actu-

al executions from full public

view and examination. He saw

this inability to confront directly

the human consequences of a

public policy commitment as

lacking the integrity that funda-

mentally informed his worldview.

His earlier unqualified commit-

ment to the death penalty was

evolving as it was subjected to

the underlying expectations and

understandings of his moral life.

The practice that constitutes

moral life is of a distinctive kind.

It has the nature of a conversation,

if we conceive of conversation

broadly to include all forms of

communicative social interaction.

But it is also a social interaction

with a particular character, one

that in its participation requires

we ask (either directly or indirect-

ly) what it means to live well. My

student reexamined his view of the

death penalty because he was, at a

basic level, struggling with what it

means to live well. Current death

penalty practices were inconsis-

tent with the integrity he deemed

so deeply connected with living a

good life.

Seen in this way, a moral life at its

core depends not on prescribed

beliefs but rather on enabling dis-

positions. The dispositions are

enabling because they make possi-

ble a particular kind of practice,

one that asks about the nature of

the good life.

In this conception of a moral life,

there is no inevitable tension

between moral education and lib-

eral education. Indeed, when each

is properly pursued, there is a

deep affinity here. Understood as

a capacity-enhancing practice, the

moral life is not one of diminished

liberty, as would be true if it sim-

ply involved externally prescribed

beliefs. The moral life is instead

one of enhanced freedom because

the dispositions that underlie it

enlarge rather than restrict our

possibilities. Through our moral

lives, we deepen our social inter-

actions by uncovering their values

and evaluating their worthiness.

Moral individuals can, and fre-

quently do, disagree on difficult

moral issues. But simple disagree-

ment, no matter how fundamental

in nature, tells us little about the

moral development of those

involved. This is because what is

at the core of our moral lives—our

dispositions—is intellectually and

emotionally richer than whatever

positions we currently hold.

Instead of simply affirming propo-

sitions, our dispositions reflect a

more fundamental orientation.

Beliefs are certainly impor-tant, but it is the practice thatis determinative of beliefs, notthe other way around.

A moral life at its coredepends not on prescribedbeliefs but rather on enablingdispositions.

70 Nat ional Civ ic Review

They constitute our character or

basic way of being in the world.

If the practice that constitutes our

moral lives has the nature of a

conversation, then a position we

hold is simply a pause in that con-

versation. To be sure, some

pauses, hopefully the best, will

last a lifetime. But we are gen-

uinely morally engaged only if we

remain open to the possibility of

revision, of an as-yet-unseen larger

perspective that more deeply inte-

grates or reveals the practice of a

moral life.

What we should expect of liberal

arts graduates is simply the abili-

ty to discern and participate in

this conversation. That our gradu-

ates in this conversation might

pause in different places should

not for us be a source of concern

or frustration. Liberally educated

minds will differ and in their dif-

ferences find their strengths and

possibilities.

What we do need to attend to, if

we maintain this expectation of

our graduates, is that it presup-

poses the development of certain

dispositions—virtues, in the

Aristotelian sense of that term.

We thus need to find creative

ways to commit liberal education

to the development of these dis-

positions.

Of course, determining the nature

of these dispositions is itself sub-

ject to the ongoing practice of our

moral lives. But if our larger aim is

enabling within our social interac-

tion more fruitful reflection on the

nature of the good life, I believe

four dispositions are vital.

First, there is the disposition

toward others. Central to the

nature of the good life is the qual-

ity of our relationships with each

other. The disposition toward oth-

ers entails commitment to an

awareness of others’ needs and

interests. Morality exists only

because of our social nature;

remove the relationships in our

lives and our moral life narrows, or

in the extreme disappears.

Second, there is the disposition

toward tolerance of difference. It

is fundamental to the nature of the

good life that its practice is richer

than any particular position

regarding it. The disposition

toward tolerance of difference

entails commitment to enrich each

other’s positions so that they cap-

ture more fully the practice of a

good life. The tolerance of differ-

ence accomplishes this by expos-

ing positions to their potential

inadequacies. When we genuinely

confront difference, of necessity

we ask what if anything is missing

from our own perspectives.

Third is the disposition toward the

dignity of all. The nature of the

good life must by necessity be

freely chosen, for a life is genuine-

ly moral only if it arises from our

own volition. The disposition

toward the dignity of all includes a

commitment to respecting the

self-directedness of individuals

that underlies the possibility of the

good life.

Fourth, there is the disposition

toward reciprocal engagement. In

the nature of the good life there is

a central dynamic, our interaction

with others who are interacting

with us. The disposition toward

reciprocal engagement involves

commitment to this distinctively

If the practice that constitutesour moral lives has the natureof a conversation, then a posi-tion we hold is simply a pausein that conversation.

Morality exists only because ofour social nature; remove therelationships in our lives andour moral life narrows, or inthe extreme disappears.

71Spr ing 2004

common character of our lives.

This distinctively common life

involves aspirations greater than

the sum of our individual needs

and interests. This is because we

develop as we interact with each

other, and as a consequence so do

our wants and desires.

Along with developing these dis-

positions in our graduates, we

need to make this deep affinity

between liberal and moral educa-

tion more visible to the general

public. In making the case for

liberal education to the wider

public, we too easily turn to

speaking of the basic knowledge

students acquire (of physics, his-

tory, and so on) and the important

skills they develop (such as criti-

cal thinking and writing) rather

than the persons they become.

But I think we’ve gotten things

backward here. As significant as

the knowledge and skills students

gain through liberal education

are, the value of such knowledge

and skills ultimately depends on

the character students develop in

the process.

We should make this argument

more forthrightly, even to audi-

ences of the most pragmatic

bent. This is because success in

today’s world depends centrally

on the development of those dis-

positions that enable the practice

of a moral life.

For a society to flourish in the

globalized environment of the

twenty-first century, it requires

more than efficient markets and a

well-functioning legal system. It

requires a vibrant civil society, one

marked by a particular kind of

civic culture.

William M. Sullivan makes clear

the nature of the civic culture

necessary for success in today’s

world. “Some societies, and cer-

tain regions within those soci-

eties,” he writes, “are proving far

more able to navigate the cur-

rents of the world economy with a

greater sense of direction and

socio-economic success than

others.” A key factor in such suc-

cess, he states, “is the presence

of a vital civic culture, in which

accepted practice demands being

alive to the concerns of others,

tolerant of difference, supportive

of others’ dignity, and willing to

talk and work together across a

wide spectrum of vital associa-

tions.”1

It is the dispositions enabling the

practice of a moral life that give

rise to the “vital civic culture”

Sullivan identifies as essential.

Underlying the “accepted prac-

tice” of which he speaks are the

capacity-enhancing dispositions

enabling the moral life we hope for

in our graduates. They include, as

I’ve mentioned, being “alive to the

concerns of others, tolerant of dif-

ference, supportive of others’ dig-

nity, and willing to talk and work

together.”

Our world today is one in which

individuals simultaneously have

more choices and more contacts

with those choosing divergently

from themselves. In such a world,

moral divergence is increasingly a

way of life.

As significant as the knowl-edge and skills students gainthrough liberal education are,the value of such knowledgeand skills ultimately dependson the character studentsdevelop in the process.

In this world, a liberal educa-tion is the most pragmaticform of education. It is sobecause the conversationmade possible by liberallearning is essential to surviv-ing—and thriving—in aworld of moral difference.

72 Nat ional Civ ic Review

In this world, a liberal education is

the most pragmatic form of educa-

tion. It is so because the conversa-

tion made possible by liberal

learning is essential to surviving—

and thriving—in a world of moral

difference. If liberal education can

develop in our students the dispo-

sitions enabling the practice of a

moral life, it can make their per-

sonal lives more satisfying, their

professional lives more accom-

plished, and their public lives

more meaningful. We should not

be shy about saying so.

N O T E

1. Sullivan, W. M. Work and Integrity:

The Crisis and Promise of Professional-ism in America. New York: Harper-Collins, 1995.

Jeffrey Nesteruk is director of theCenter for Liberal Arts and Society,Franklin & Marshall College.

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