letter from the executive board · may 6, 1952 - west germany joins nato. may 14, 1955 - the soviet...
TRANSCRIPT
LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD
It is an honour to moderate the NATO at SFCMUN’19. This letter shall also be considered as
the concept note to our expectations from the committee. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization is one of the world’s most important Military Alliances. It addresses the
numerous challenges concerning the member states, though the NATO may seem to just a
Military Alliance, its internal structures and functioning are multidirectional with sub-
committees ranging from the Military Agency to the Environmental council chaired under its
aegis. This often, however, the committee would sit to discuss the future prospects of NATO,
the members likely to join and the possible up-gradations that could be made into the
council. This is going to be an exceptionally vast debate, whereas the internal co-operation
among the NATO is set at a delicate twig of understanding with differentiated stands taken
by its member countries on issues as strategic as the South China Sea Dispute to as grave
and threatening as Climate Change.
We hope this background guide will help you while researching but replacing this background guide with your own research and completely relying or overlooking it is highly discouraged by us. This is to only shape your ideas to research and give a brief idea of the agenda at hand which is more complicated than it sounds. This is just a mere push to the direction of your research and will not be considered as an acceptable source of research. It is highly recommended to refer to the NATO website for in-depth research. Before the committee starts there are a few things which we would like to point out. It is highly recommended by us to research upon your country policies in depth. Throughout the days of the conference, highly diplomatic behaviour is to be maintained by the delegates. A good hold over the language with the use of over the top pronunciations and fancy vocabulary does not make you the better one by default. Of course, the importance of language usage cannot be denied but is certainly confined and it all zeroes down to the points you make and how you execute your ideas. If you are well researched that will automatically attract attention and reflect in your speeches. With this, we suggest all the delegates to research on policy background and potential solutions to maintain quality debate. We will try our best to help you as much we can if you have any questions regarding the study guide you may send them to us. Please keep in mind the fact that to make this conference a successful one you need to be well prepared and well researched because the quality of debate lies upon you. We are looking forward to the conference with the utmost excitement. Make new friends, implement new ideas, think out of the box, roam around and explore, learn to grow and leave no stone unturned but always keep in mind to not to research hard but research smart and in case of any doubt or query feel free to contact the executive board members. All the Best Everyone! Regards,
Mamas Pratim Sharma Raghav Khemka
CHAIRPERSON VICE-CHAIRPERSON
WHAT IS NATO? NATO or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created in 1949 by the United States,
Canada, and several Western European nations to provide collective security against the
Soviet Union. At present, NATO has 29 members. In 1949, there were 12 founding members
of the Alliance: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United
States. The other member countries are Greece and Turkey (1952), Germany (1955), Spain
(1982), the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (1999), Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (2004), Albania and Croatia (2009), and Montenegro
(2017).1
Fig 1: Current Member States of NATO
Each member nation is represented on the North Atlantic Council by an Ambassador or
Permanent Representative supported by a national delegation composed of advisers and
officials who represent their country on different NATO committees. The Council also meets
from time to time at the level of Heads of State and Heads of
Government or Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Defence. The NATO Secretary-
General is the Alliance’s top international civil servant. This person is responsible for
steering the process of consultation and decision-making in the Alliance and ensuring that
1 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm
decisions are implemented. The Secretary-General is also NATO’s chief spokesperson and
the head of the Organization’s International Staff. The current
NATO Secretary-General is Jens Stoltenberg2 (NATO OFFICIAL SITE, 2019)
2 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/who_is_who.htm
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NATO 1949-PRESENT
April 4, 1949 - The 12 nations of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States
sign the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, DC.3
July 25, 1950 - First meeting of NATO Council Deputies in London. US Ambassador Charles
M. Spofford is elected permanent chairman.
December 19, 1950 - General Dwight Eisenhower is appointed the first supreme allied
commander.4
April 2, 1951 - Allied Command in Europe becomes operational with Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe in Roquencourt, near Paris.
March 12, 1952 - Lord Ismay is named the first secretary-general of NATO and appointed the
vice-chairman of the North Atlantic Council.
April 10, 1952 - Allied Command Atlantic becomes operational, headquartered in Norfolk,
Virginia.
April 16, 1952 - NATO establishes its provisional headquarters in Paris at the Palais de
Chaillot.
April 28, 1952 - First meeting of the North Atlantic Council in permanent session in Paris.
May 6, 1952 - West Germany joins NATO.
May 14, 1955 - The Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries form the Warsaw Pact in
response to West Germany joining NATO.
July 26, 1956 - Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal. France and Great Britain use troops to
intervene, against the wishes of the United States, causing a rift in NATO.
August 13, 1961 - The Berlin Wall is erected.
October 22-23, 1963 - NATO and the United States demonstrate the size and speed of
emergency forces with 14,500 US troops flown into West Germany for manoeuvres.
March 10, 1966 - France formally announces intentions to withdraw from the military
structure of NATO, accusing the United States of having too much influence in the
organization.
3 4
March 31, 1967 - Opening ceremony of new NATO headquarters in Casteau, near Mons,
Belgium.
August 14, 1974 - Greece, angered at NATO's response to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus,
withdraws from the military arm of NATO.3
October 20, 1980 - Greece rejoins the NATO military structure.
May 30, 1982 - Spain joins NATO.
November 9, 1989 - The Berlin Wall comes down.
October 3, 1990 - Germany is reunified after 45 years. With German reunification, East
Germany leaves the Warsaw Pact and is incorporated into NATO.
February 11, 1991 - The Warsaw Pact is dissolved.
December 13, 1991 - For the first time, the Soviet Union takes part in meetings at NATO as
part of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.
December 21, 1991 - Eleven of the republics of the former Soviet Union create a new
Commonwealth of Independent States.
December 25, 1991 - The Soviet Union is officially disbanded with the resignation of Mikhail
Gorbachev as president and supreme commander-in-chief of Soviet Forces.
February 28, 1994 - NATO forces shoot down four Bosnian Serb planes violating the UN-
imposed no-fly zone. It is the first time NATO has used force.
November 21, 1995 - After the Dayton Peace Accords, the war in Bosnia Herzegovina ends.
December 20, 1995 - The United Nations turns over military operations command to NATO's
Implementation Force (IFOR).
January 13, 1996 - Russian troops are deployed to support IFOR in Bosnia.
May 22, 1997 - NATO and the Russian Federation sign a security and cooperation pact, the
"Founding Act" which establishes a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC).
March 24, 1999 - NATO launches air strikes against Yugoslavia to end Serbian aggression in
the Kosovo region.
April 4, 1999 - 50th anniversary of the founding of NATO.
August 22, 2001 - Operation Essential Harvest, the disarming of ethnic Albanians in
Macedonia, begins.6
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September 12, 2001 - For the first time, NATO invokes Article V, the Washington Treaty, its
mutual defence clause, in support of the United States after the September 11 terror
attacks.
May 14, 2002 - The last meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council
May 28, 2002 - NATO and Russia form the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which makes Russia
an associate member of the organization. The NRC replaces the PJC that was established in
1997 by the NATO-Russia Founding Act.7
November 21-22, 2002 - During the Prague Summit, NATO invites seven former Eastern Bloc
countries, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, to discuss
entry into the organization.
December 4, 2002 - US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz speaks before NATO in
Brussels and requests that member nations contribute forces to a potential campaign in
Iraq.
January 22, 2003 - France and Germany block discussion on war preparations submitted by
the United States. The US proposal included provisions for Turkey's defence, the use of
NATO equipment, and NATO's postwar role in Iraq.
January 23, 2003 - Secretary-General Lord Robertson announces his intention to step down
in December.
February 10, 2003 - France, Germany and Belgium block a US request that NATO provides
Patriot missiles, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, and other
equipment to Turkey. The United States had made the request anticipating that Iraq will
retaliate against Turkey in the event of war. Turkey invokes article IV of the NATO charter,
which requires the organization as a whole to discuss security threats to any member
nation.8
February 11, 2003 - A meeting to discuss the standoff over Turkey's defence preparations
ends after 20 minutes with no resolution.
February 16, 2003 - NATO comes up with three defensive plans for Turkey, in the event of a
US war with Iraq:
- Deployment of NATO AWACS aircraft;
- NATO support for the deployment of theatre missile defences for Turkey;
- NATO support for the possible deployment of Allied chemical and biological defences.
7 8 6 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1543000.stm
February 19, 2003 - NATO deploys defensive assistance to Turkey in the form of missiles,
chemical and biological defence mechanisms, and aircraft, in the event war with Iraq presses
forward.
January 5, 2004 - Jaap de Hoop Scheffer of the Netherlands becomes the new secretary-
general.
March 29, 2004 - NATO is expanded from 19 to 26 members when seven nations, Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, join in an accession ceremony in
Washington, DC. All are former communist states in Eastern Europe.
April 2, 2004 - First meeting of the NATO-Russian Council with 27 members.
August 10, 2004 - NATO AWACS begin patrolling Greek airspace prior to the Olympic and
Paralympic games. NATO's presence at the Olympics is nicknamed Distinguished
Games and includes AWACS and the Multinational Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear
Task Force.9
September 14, 2006 - Ukraine announces that it is shelving its aspirations to join NATO, due
to opposition by the Ukrainian public and Russia.
April 2-4, 2008 - NATO leaders hold a summit in Bucharest, Romania. Croatia and Albania
are invited to join the alliance.10
June 17, 2008 - French President Nicolas Sarkozy announces France will soon rejoin NATO's
military command, 40 years after it left.
April 3-4, 2009 - The 23rd NATO summit also marks NATO's 60th anniversary. Events are
held in Strasbourg, France and Kehl, Germany. During the summit, France rejoins NATO's
military command.
August 1, 2009 - Former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen takes office as the
12th secretary-general of NATO.
November 19, 2010 - NATO adopts the Strategic Concept "Active Engagement, Modern
Defence" for the next 10 years.
March 24, 2011 - NATO takes command of enforcing a no-fly zone imposed on Libya by the
United Nations.
March 29, 2011 - The Council of Europe rules NATO, among others, responsible for the 63
deaths from among 72 African immigrants left adrift for two weeks while attempting to
reach European shores from Libya in March 2011.
9 10
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May 19, 2012 - Demonstrators take to the streets of Chicago prior to the start of the NATO
summit. Anti-NATO protests near Mayor Rahm Emanuel's home focus on the cost of the
summit to the city and city budget cuts to mental healthcare.
May 20-21, 2012 - The 25th Summit is held in Chicago. During the summit, NATO accepts
President Barack Obama's timetable to end the war in Afghanistan by 2014.
March 5, 2014 - In regards to the crisis in Ukraine, Secretary-General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen announces that NATO has decided to "put the entire range of NATO-Russia
cooperation under review" to send "a clear message Russia's actions have consequences."
October 1, 2014 - Jens Stoltenberg becomes secretary-general.
December 2, 2015 - NATO extends an official invitation to Montenegro to join the alliance.
February 11, 2016 - Secretary-General Stoltenberg announces that NATO is deploying ships
to the Aegean Sea to try to deter smugglers from trafficking migrants from Turkey to
Greece.11
June 5, 2017 - Montenegro officially becomes a member of NATO.
March 14, 2019 - Despite many European countries boosting their defence budgets, only
seven of the 29 NATO allies are currently reaching the recommended spending target of 2%
of gross domestic product, according to NATO's annual report.12
11 12
PAST ENLARGEMENTS
VISEGRAD GROUP In February 1991, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia (as
Czechoslovakia) formed the Visegrád Group to push for European integration under the
European Union and NATO, as well as to conduct military reforms in line with NATO
standards. Internal NATO reaction to these former Warsaw Pact countries was initially
negative, but by the 1991 Rome summit in November, members agreed to a series of
goals that could lead to accession, such as market and democratic liberalization, and
that NATO should be a partner in these efforts. In subsequent years, wider forums for
regional cooperation between NATO and its eastern neighbours were set up, including
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) and
the Partnership for Peace.
VILNIUS GROUP
The Vilnius Group was an organization of NATO aspirant countries, created in May 2000
aimed at practical cooperation, exchange of information and lobbying for their
candidacy in the NATO capitals.
As the motto of the Vilnius group was chosen:
“While each country should be considered on its own merits, we believe that the
integration of each democracy will be a success for us all and the integration of each
democracy will be a success for Europe and NATO.”
The members were: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, North
Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia
ADRIATIC CHARTER The Adriatic Charter is an association formed by Albania, Croatia, the Republic of North
Macedonia and the United States for the purpose of aiding their attempts to join NATO.
The Charter was signed on 2 May 2003 in Tirana under the aegis of the United States.
The role of the United States has caused some confusion; in discussions in the other
member states, the Charter is often called the U.S.-Adriatic Charter. In September 2008
Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina were invited to join the Charter and joined on
December 4, 2008. Serbia accepted observer status at the same time. On 1 April 2009,
Albania and Croatia became the first of the group to join NATO. On 5 June 2017,
Montenegro joined NATO.
GERMAN REUNIFICATION NATO welcomed West Germany as a member on 6 May 1955, a day after its status as an
occupied country came to an end (the Bonn-Paris conventions came into effect on
5 May 1955). East Germany became a member of the Warsaw Pact when it was formed
a few days later on 22 May 1955. From then on, Germany became the hub of espionage
and military activity throughout the Cold War and the centre-stage of diplomatic
posturing. Soviet-occupied Berlin remained the capital of East Germany while West
Germany chose Bonn. The end of the Cold War was a massive U-turn in international
relations. It happened over a very short period of time and was the result of a series of
factors – political, economic and military - that culminated in the dissolution of the
Soviet Union in 1991. But the fall of the Berlin Wall 9-10 November 1989 marked the
radical change in international relations, epitomizing the beginning of a new era. The
reunification of Germany that followed was another step forward for Germany and all of
Europe.4
MAJOR NON- NATO ALLY This is a designation assigned by the USA government that have a strategic working
relationship with the United States but are not part of NATO. MNNA status was first
created in 1989 when section 2350a, otherwise known as the Sam Nunn Amendment, was
added to Title 10 (Armed Forces) of the United States Code by Congress.[1] It stipulated that
cooperative research and development agreements could be enacted with non-NATO allies
by the Secretary of Defence with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. The initial
MNNAs were Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, and South Korea.
In 1996, major non-NATO allies received additional military and financial benefits when
section 2321k was added to Title 22 (Foreign Relations) of the U.S. Code (also known as
section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961), which added MNNAs to many of the
same exemptions from the Arms Export Control Act that were enjoyed by NATO members.
It also authorized the President to designate a nation as an MNNA thirty days after
notifying Congress.14
The benefits provided to the Major Non-NATO allies are
1. entry into cooperative research and development projects with the Department of
Defence (DoD) on a shared-cost basis
2. participation in certain counter-terrorism initiatives
3. purchase of depleted uranium anti-tank rounds
4. priority delivery of military surplus (ranging from rations to ships)
5. possession of War Reserve Stocks of DoD-owned equipment that are kept outside of
American military bases
6. loans of equipment and materials for cooperative research and development projects
and evaluations
4 https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/declassified_136311.htm
14
https://www.defence.gov
7. permission to use American financing for the purchase or lease of certain defence
equipment
8. reciprocal training
9. expedited export processing of space technology
10. permission for the country's corporations to bid on certain DoD contracts for the repair
and maintenance of military equipment outside the United States
Recently Brazil was added in the list by the current US President Donald J. Trump
NATO’S OPEN DOOR POLICY NATO’s “open-door policy” is based on Article 10 of the Alliance’s founding document, the
North Atlantic Treaty (1949). The Treaty states that NATO membership is open to any
“European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the
security of the North Atlantic area”. It states that any decision on enlargement must be
made “by unanimous agreement”. NATO enlargement has helped increase stability and
prosperity in Europe. It is aimed at promoting stability and cooperation, and at building a
Europe united in peace, democracy and common values.
Free choice NATO respects the right of every country to choose its own security arrangements. Each
sovereign country has the right to choose for itself whether it joins any treaty or alliance.
This fundamental principle is enshrined in international agreements, including the Helsinki
Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. NATO membership is not imposed on
countries. Article 13 of the Washington Treaty specifically gives Allies the right to leave
should they wish to.5
Process of Accession European countries that wish to join NATO are initially invited to begin an Intensified
Dialogue with the Alliance about their aspirations and related reforms. Aspirants may then
be invited to join the Membership Action Plan, a programme which helps nations prepare
for possible future membership. Participation does not guarantee membership but is a key
preparation mechanism. To join the Alliance, nations are expected to respect the values of
the North Atlantic Treaty, and to meet certain political, economic and military criteria, set
out in the Alliance’s 1995 Study on Enlargement. These criteria include a functioning
democratic political system based on a market economy; fair treatment of minority
populations; a commitment to resolve conflicts peacefully; an ability and willingness to
5 https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-
factsheetenlargementeng.pdf
make a military contribution to NATO operations; and a commitment to democratic civil-
military relations and institutions.
NATO’S MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN The door to NATO membership under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty remains open.
The Membership Action Plan (MAP), building on the Intensified, Individual Dialogue on
membership questions, is designed to reinforce that firm commitment to further
enlargement by putting into place a programme of activities to assist aspiring countries in
their preparations for possible future membership. It must be understood that decisions
made by aspirants on the basis of advice received will remain national decisions undertaken
and implemented at the sole responsibility of the country concerned.
1. The programme offers aspirants a list of activities from which they may select those
they consider of most value to help them in their preparations. Active participation
in PfP(Partnership for Pace) and EAPC(Euro Atlantic Partnership Council)
mechanisms remains essential for aspiring countries who wish to further deepen
their political and military involvement in the work of the Alliance.
2. Any decision to invite an aspirant to begin accession talks with the Alliance will be
made on a case-by-case basis by Allies in accordance with paragraph 8 of the Madrid
Summit Declaration, and the Washington Summit Declaration. Participation in the
Membership Action Plan, which would be on the basis of self-differentiation, does
not imply any timeframe for any such decision nor any guarantee of eventual
membership. The programme cannot be considered as a list of criteria for
membership.
Implementation
1. The Membership Action Plan, which is a practical manifestation of the Open Door, is
divided into five chapters. These chapters are:
I. Political and Economic issues
II. Defence/Military issues
III. Resource issues
IV. Security issues V. Legal issues
Within each, the MAP identifies issues that might be discussed (non-exhaustive) and
highlights mechanisms through which preparation for possible eventual membership
can best be carried forward.
The list of issues identified for discussion does not constitute criteria for membership
and is intended to encompass those issues which the aspiring countries themselves
have identified as matters which they wish to address.
2. Each aspiring country will be requested to draw up an annual national programme
on preparations for possible future membership, setting objectives and targets for
its preparations and containing specific information on steps being taken, the
responsible authorities and, where appropriate, a schedule of work on specific
aspects of those preparations. It would be open to aspirants to update the
programme when they chose. The programme would form a basis for the Alliance to
keep track of aspirants' progress and to provide feedback.
3. Meetings will take place in a 19+1 format in the Council and other bodies and in
NATO IS/NMA Team formats as appropriate.
4. Feedback and advice to aspirants on MAP issues will be provided through
mechanisms based on those currently in use for Partners, 19+1 meetings and NATO
Team workshops. These workshops will be held, when justified, to discuss particular
issues drawn from the MAP.
5. The NATO Team will normally be headed by the appropriate Assistant Secretary-
General, Assistant Director of the International Military Staff, Head of Office or his
representative. The NATO team will liaise closely with the appropriate NATO bodies
regarding advice to aspirants. Relevant procedures will be refined over time as
experience is gained. Aspirants should make requests in writing for workshops to
ASG/PA. He will be responsible for the implementation of the Membership Action
Plan and the scheduling of meetings under the overall direction and coordination of
the SPC(R).
6. Each year the Alliance will draw up for individual aspirants a report providing
feedback focused on progress made in the areas covered in their annual national
programmes. This document would form the basis of discussion at a meeting of the
North Atlantic Council with the aspirant country. The report would help identify
areas for further action, but it would remain at the aspirant's discretion to commit
itself to take further action.
I. Political and Economic Issues
1. Aspirants would be offered the opportunity to discuss and substantiate their
willingness and ability to assume the obligations and commitments under the
Washington Treaty and the relevant provisions of the Study on NATO
Enlargement. Future members must conform to basic principles embodied in the
Washington Treaty such as democracy, individual liberty and other relevant
provisions set out in its Preamble.
2. Aspirants would also be expected:
a. to settle their international disputes by peaceful means;
b. to demonstrate the commitment to the rule of law and human rights;
c. to settle ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes including irredentist
claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means in accordance
with OSCE principles and to pursue good neighbourly relations;
d. to establish appropriate democratic and civilian control of their armed forces;
e. to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the UN;
f. to contribute to the development of peaceful and friendly international
relations by strengthening their free institutions and by promoting stability
and well-being;
g. to continue fully to support and be engaged in the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace;
h. to show a commitment to promoting stability and well-being by economic
liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility.
3. Moreover, aspirants would be expected upon accession:
a. to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace
and security;
b. to maintain the effectiveness of the Alliance through the sharing of
responsibilities, costs and benefits;
c. to commit themselves to good faith efforts to build consensus on all issues;
d. to undertake to participate fully in the Alliance consultation and
decisionmaking process on political and security issues of concern to the
Alliance;
e. to commit themselves to the continued openness of the Alliance in
accordance with the Washington Treaty and the Madrid and Washington
Summit Declarations.
Implementation
4. Aspirants will be expected to describe how their policies and practice are evolving to
reflect the considerations set out above (in paragraphs 1-2 above), and to provide
their views on, and substantiate their willingness and ability to comply with other
parts of the NATO "acquis", including the NATO Strategic Concept, the development
of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance, the NATO-Russia
Founding Act and the NATO-Ukraine Charter.
5. Aspirants would be expected to provide information on an annual basis on the state
of their economy, including main macro-economic and budgetary data as well as
pertinent economic policy developments.
6. Aspirants would be asked to provide a written contribution to the NATO Team,
which would then be passed directly on to the Allies for their comments. After
appropriate consultation in the Alliance, the NATO Team would then convene a
meeting to discuss the contribution provided and relevant political issues. Such
meetings would be held yearly; additional meetings could be convened upon mutual
agreement.
7. An annual Senior Political Committee (Reinforced) meeting will be held to provide
direct feedback from Allies to individual aspirants.
II. Defence/Military Issues
1. The ability of aspiring countries to contribute militarily to collective defence and to
the Alliance's new missions and their willingness to commit to gradual
improvements in their military capabilities will be factors to be considered in
determining their suitability for NATO membership. Full participation in operational
PfP is an essential component, as it will further deepen aspirants' political and
military ties with the Alliance, helping them prepare for participation in the full range
of new missions. New members of the Alliance
must be prepared to share the roles, risks, responsibilities, benefits and burdens of
common security and collective defence. They should be expected to subscribe to
Alliance strategy as set out in the Strategic Concept and as laid out in other
Ministerial statements.
2. Aspirants would be expected upon accession:
a. to accept the approach to security outlined in the Strategic Concept;
b. to provide forces and capabilities for collective defence and other Alliance
missions;
c. to participate, as appropriate, in the military structure;
d. to participate, as appropriate, in the Alliance's collective defence planning;
e. to participate, as appropriate, in NATO agencies;
f. to continue fully to support PfP and the development of cooperative relations
with non-NATO Partners;
g. to pursue standardization and/or interoperability.
Implementation
3. The following measures are designed to help aspirants develop the capabilities of
their armed forces, including by enhancing interoperability, to be able to contribute
to the effectiveness of the Alliance and thus demonstrate their suitability for future
membership. The measures build where possible on extant initiatives.
a. Aspirants will be able in accordance with existing PfP procedures to request
tailored Individual Partnership Programmes to better focus their participation
in PfP directly on the essential membership related issues. Within each IPP,
certain generic areas would be marked as being essential for aspirants, and
aspirants would be invited to give due priority to those areas of cooperation.
b. Annual Clearinghouse meetings for aspirants in a 19+1 format would be
developed to help coordinate bilateral and multilateral assistance and
maximise their mutual effectiveness to better assist them in their
preparations for membership.
c. Within the general framework of the expanded and adapted PARP and in
accordance with PARP procedures, planning targets specifically covering
areas most directly relevant for nations preparing their force structures and
capabilities for possible future Alliance membership will be elaborated with
aspirants. Aspirants will undergo a review process on their progress in
meeting these planning targets.
d. These planning targets will be established on the basis of consultations
between each aspiring country and NATO and may be applied to any
component of their force structures, rather than solely to their PfPdeclared
forces.
e. PARP Ministerial Guidance will include approaches and specific measures
which aspirants might adopt, in the context of the MAP, to prepare their
forces for possible future NATO membership.
f. The PARP Survey will be used for aspirants to seek more information and data
in a number of areas, for example, general defence policy, resources, and
present and planned outlays for defence.
g. As a sign of transparency, and in accordance with PARP procedures: aspirants
will be encouraged to circulate individual PARP documents to other aspirants
in addition to circulating them to NATO Allies; and aspirants will be
encouraged to invite, in particular, other aspiring countries to participate in
the review process on planning targets.
h. Aspirants will be invited to observe and participate in selected, clearly
defined phases of NATO-only exercises when the Council decides to open
these in accordance with current procedures. Priority consideration will be
given to ensuring exercise effectiveness.
i. Any future NATO facilities established for the assessment of Partner forces
for NATO-led peace support operations and of Partner performance in
NATO/PfP exercises and operations will be used to assess the degree of
interoperability and the range of capabilities of aspirants' forces. If these
assessment facilities are extended to encompass forces beyond those for
peace support operations, they will be used to assist aspirants.
j. Appropriate use may be made of simulation technology for training forces
and procedures.
III. Resource Issues
1. New Alliance members would be expected to commit sufficient budget resources to
allow themselves to meet the commitments entailed by possible membership.
National programmes of aspirants must put in place the necessary structures to plan
and implement defence budgets that meet established defence priorities and make
provision for training schemes to familiarise staff with NATO practices and
procedures in order to prepare for possible future participation in Alliance
structures.
2. Aspirants would be expected upon accession:
1. to allocate sufficient budget resources for the implementation of Alliance
commitments;
2. to have the national structures in place to deal with those budget resources;
3. to participate in the Alliance's common-funded activities at agreed cost
shares;
4. to participate in Alliance structures (permanent representation at the NATO
HQ; military representation in the NATO command structure; participation, as
appropriate, in NATO Agencies).
Implementation
3. Through existing mechanisms, including those within PfP, possible internships and
training sessions, and NATO Team workshops, aspirants upon request will be:
a. provided advice on their development of national structures, procedures and
mechanisms to deal with the above issues and to ensure the most efficient
use of their defence spending;
b. assisted in training the staff needed to man those structures and work in and
with NATO.
IV. Security Issues
1. Aspirants would be expected upon accession to have in place sufficient safeguards
and procedures to ensure the security of the most sensitive information as laid down
in NATO security policy.
Implementation
2. Appropriate courses may be made available, on request, to aspiring countries on
Personnel, Physical, Document, Industrial Security and INFOSEC. Individual
programmes for aspirants may be developed as warranted. The NATO Security and
Special Committees may wish to meet with aspirants, whenever they judge it
necessary or useful.
V. Legal issues
1. In order to be able to undertake the commitments of membership, aspirants should
examine and become acquainted with the appropriate legal arrangements and
agreements which govern cooperation within NATO. This should enable aspirants to
scrutinize domestic law for compatibility with those NATO rules and regulations. In
addition, aspirants should be properly informed about the formal legal process
leading to membership.
a. New members, upon completion of the relevant procedures, will accede to
the North Atlantic Treaty (Washington, 4th April 1949)
b. Upon invitation, new members should accede to:
i. The Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty
regarding the status of their forces (London SOFA) (London, 19th
June 1951) ii. The Protocol on the status of International Military
Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty (Paris
Protocol)
(Paris, 28th August 1952)
c. It is expected that new members accede to the following status agreements:
i. The Agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty
The organization, National Representatives and International Staff
(Ottawa Agreement) (Ottawa, 20th September 1951) ii. The
Agreement on the status of Missions and Representatives of third
States to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels
Agreement) (Brussels, 14th September 1994)
d. It is expected that new members accede to the following technical
agreements:
i. The Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for
the Security of Information (Brussels, 6th March 1997)
ii. The Agreement for the mutual safeguarding of secrecy of inventions
related to defence and for which applications for patents have been
made (Paris, 21st September 1960)
iii. The NATO Agreement on the communication of technical
information for defence purposes (Brussels, 19th October 1970)
e. For possible eventual access to ATOMIC information, new members would be
expected to accede to:
i. the "Agreement for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information"
(C-M(64)39 - Basic Agreement); ii. the "Administrative
Arrangements to Implement the Agreement" (C-M(68)41, 5th Revise);
f. Domestic legislation of aspirants should, as much as possible, be compatible
with the other arrangements and implementation practices which govern
NATO-wide cooperation.
Implementation
2. NATO Team workshops will provide for briefings on legal issues and discussions on
the steps that would have to be taken. Aspirants could provide information on
existing legal arrangements and the steps that would have to be taken to accede to
the agreements, including whether or not there are any constitutional/legal barriers
to doing so.
3. Aspirants might also provide information on whether and how domestic legislation
might impede immediate and full integration into Alliance activities. Exchange of
information and experience on this issue could take place with all aspirants as
appropriate.6
6 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27444.htm?
THE UNITED STATES AND NATO
Following the end of the Second World War, the United States found itself an undeniable
superpower: a strong military, a booming economy and clear moral leadership for the post-
war period. A generation before, during the First World War, the United States had tried to
promote internationalism on the world stage, but ultimately succumbed to a policy of
isolationism. The concept of isolationism had been a thread of the American fabric since
George Washington, the revered first president of the young nation, had warned against
entangling alliances. With the Truman Doctrine of containment, which arose from a
speech President Harry S. Truman delivered on 12 March 1947, the country’s reluctance to
engage in regional conflicts not directly involving the United States started to change. The
country would aid all “free people” being subjugated, starting with financial aid to Greece
and Turkey to protect them from communist threats. The following year, the United
States launched the Marshall Plan, officially known as the European Recovery Program, a
massive initiative to help boost European economies and reconstruct the war-ravaged
continent. In June 1948, the Senate, the upper house of the country’s legislative branch,
passed a resolution that would change the course of American foreign policy: the
Vandenburg Resolution, which allowed the United States to participate constitutionally in
a mutual defence system in peacetime. Starting in 1948, secret talks began in the Pentagon among British, Canadian and American
officials. These talks would eventually include other future Allies and would form the basis
of the North Atlantic Treaty. American officials had to navigate carefully, as isolationist and
unilateralist tendencies were strong within the Senate and among the population at large.
However, 1948 saw momentous events in Europe, such as the Berlin Blockade and the
communist coup in Czechoslovakia, which reshaped American views on the continent. On 4
April 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson signed the North Atlantic Treaty on behalf of
the United States, formally wedding his country to the future of Europe. The Senate ratified
the treaty on 21 July 1949 by a vote of 83-13. On 25 July 1949, President Truman and
Secretary Acheson signed the Instrument of Accession, making the United States a founding
member of NATO. Due to its size and military capabilities, the United States played a major
role in the formation of NATO's first-ever integrated military structure. Following the
outbreak of the Korean War, NATO members feared that if the Soviet Union was willing to
extend its influence through a client state in Asia, it would do the same in Europe. Allies
agreed to rethink the existing Regional Planning Groups to make NATO's military structures
more effective. They decided to create an integrated military structure headed by a single,
unifying commander, whose role would be to prepare the Allied defences of the European
theatre. In 1950, NATO's top political decision-making body the North Atlantic Council
agreed to disband the Regional Planning Groups in favour of an integrated military
command; create the post of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and appoint an
American General as the first SACEUR. In 1952, after significant political considerations, the
Council also approved the creation of Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) in Norfolk,
Virginia, to be led by an American Navy admiral. The United States accounts for nearly 70%
of the total spending on defence by all Nato members. In terms of its GDP (gross domestic
product, the total value of goods produced and services provided) it spent roughly 3.4% on
defence in 2018, according to Nato estimates.
SOURCE: NATO SECRETARY-GENERAL ANNUAL REPORT 2018
At the height of the Cold War, there were more than 400,000 US military personnel in Europe.
Today, the US has just over 65,000 active duty personnel in Europe, including Turkey. Germany currently hosts by far the largest number of US forces in Europe, followed by Italy, the UK and Spain.
US military's global presence
But the biggest single deployment of US personnel overseas is not in Europe - it is in Japan, and there are also large numbers in South Korea. In Afghanistan, the US is currently the biggest contributor to the 17,000-strong Nato-led mission there. One key component of the US commitment to Europe is a missile defence system. It is designed to help guard against potential ballistic missile attacks from outside the continent, particularly the Middle East.
NATO DEFENCE EPENDITURE SHARE
UNITED STATES
EUROPE & CANADA
WITHDRAWL FROM NATO Withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the legal and political
process whereby a member of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation withdraws from the North Atlantic Treaty, and thus the country in question
ceases to be a member of NATO. The formal process of doing this process is stated in
article 13 of the Treaty. This says that any country that wants to leave must send the
United States (as the depositary) a “notice of denunciation,” which the U.S. would then
pass on to the other countries in the alliance. After a one-year waiting period, the country
that wants to leave would be out. As of 2019, no member state has rescinded their
membership, although it has been mentioned by a few countries.
Notwithstanding, two former dependencies of one NATO member have never applied for
membership subsequent to their becoming independent states.
PROCEDURE
Article XIII of the North Atlantic Treaty, is the article that member state use on informing
other members or parties that it wishes to leave the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. It
states the following: “After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.”
This means that after 20 years since the signing of the treaty which was in 1949, thus 1969, any member state that wishes to leave just has to inform the United States that it wants to leave, and then after a year it formally leaves.
NATO AND RUSSIA For more than two decades, NATO has worked to build a partnership with Russia,
developing dialogue and practical cooperation in areas of common interest. Cooperation
has been suspended since 2014 in response to Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine but
political and military channels of communication remain open. Concerns about Russia’s
continued destabilising pattern of military activities and aggressive rhetoric go well beyond
Ukraine.
NATO is pursuing a dual-track approach towards Russia: a meaningful dialogue on the basis
of a strong deterrence and defence posture. (NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg
meets Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, September 2017)
Relations started after the end of the Cold War when Russia joined the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council (1991). This forum for dialogue was succeeded in 1997 by the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council, which brings together all Allies and partner countries in the
Euro-Atlantic area.
Practical cooperation started after Russia joined the Partnership for Peace programme
(1994) and deployed peacekeepers in support of NATO-led peace-support operations in the
Western Balkans in the late 1990s.
The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act provided the formal basis for bilateral relations.
Dialogue and cooperation were strengthened in 2002 with the establishment of the NATO-
Russia Council (NRC) to serve as a forum for consultation on current security issues and to
direct practical cooperation in a wide range of areas.
Russia's disproportionate military action in Georgia in August 2008 led to the suspension of
formal meetings of the NRC and cooperation in some areas, until spring 2009. The Allies
continue to call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia as independent states.
All practical civilian and military cooperation under the NRC with Russia has been suspended
since April 2014, in response to Russia’s military intervention and aggressive actions in
Ukraine, and its illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea, which Allies condemn in the
strongest terms. But channels of political and military communication remain open to
exchange information on issues of concern, reduce misunderstandings and increase
predictability.
Allies’ concerns about Russia’s destabilising actions and policies go beyond Ukraine and
include provocative military activities near NATO’s borders stretching from the Baltic to the
Black Sea; irresponsible and aggressive nuclear rhetoric, military posture and underlying
posture; the risks posed by its military intervention and support for the regime in Syria; and
the nerve agent attack in the United Kingdom in March 2018, a clear breach of international
norms.
On 2 August 2019, the North Atlantic Council issued a statement supporting the United
States decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in
response to Russia’s material breach of the Treaty. The Allies regret that Russia has shown
no willingness and taken no steps to comply with its international obligations. NATO will
respond in a measured and responsible way to the significant risks posed by Russia’s SSC-8
system. At the same time, Allies are firmly committed to the preservation of effective
international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.
NATO has responded to this changed security environment by enhancing its deterrence and
defence posture while remaining open to dialogue. The Alliance does not seek
confrontation and poses no threat to Russia.
NATO AND POST-WARSAW SUMMIT CHALLENGES During the year 2016, without any doubts, the summit in Warsaw was the most significant
event for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This is because decisions were made there, which are to establish the permanent presence of combat units of the NATO alliance at the
Eastern Flank. The individual member states are also making more and braver steps, the
goal of which would be to reinforce their own units or increase the defence expenditure.
Even though the aforesaid steps, especially in the western part of Europe, are not taken at a
rapid pace, they are a proof of awareness and willingness to counteract, in the light of the emerging threats, arising in case of the member states. In 2017, NATO will also have to face
several challenges which may have an influence on the process of implementing the provisions of the summit in Warsaw.
1. The election in the Key NATO Member States and Following Ramifications
Next year, in some of the key NATO member states, an election is planned, which
may, in a potentially negative manner, change the attitude of the authorities of those countries towards the process of reinforcing the NATO military strength. In
France, Presidential and Parliamentary election is planned, Bundestag is going to be
elected in Germany. In the former case, even if Marine Le Pen, who is openly pro-Russian, does not take over the leadership, a tendency may be reinforced to
question the NATO activities. The current government, led by Francois Hollande, was quite reserved when it came to reinforcement and, even though a careful attitude
was adopted, this was criticized, due to “too clear” stance taken, when it came to the
relations with Moscow. On the other hand, in Germany, as a result of the migrants' crisis, Alternative fur Deutschland party is becoming more and more popular, while
pro-Atlantic CDU/CSU, coalition-tied SPD (usually endorsing the reinforcement, even
in spite of pro-Russian statements made by some of the members) are gradually becoming less popular. Gaining the majority by the AfD is not very probable, but the
fact that another party, following the left-wing Die Linke which is openly pro-Russian and which questions the purpose of the NATO’s existence, emerges in the Bundestag
is very disadvantageous, just as the scenario of coalition between Die Linke, SPD and
Greens is. Regardless of the results, the election will probably weaken the stable and strong pro-Atlantic majority within the parliament. Bundestag is very important in
Germany when it comes to the defence and security policy, or even when it comes to
the operational use of the Armed Forces, should a potential threat for NATO emerge.
2. Terrorism, Migrants Crisis, and Their Impact on the Internal Situation.
Paradoxically, the immigration crisis and the acts of terror have a major impact on
NATO’s readiness to establish collective defence capacity. First, the soldiers of the frontline units from Belgium, Italy or France are delegated to patrol and provide
security in the urban areas which, in a natural manner, limits their readiness to carry
out other tasks. A threat of even higher significance is seen in the rising popularity of
populists who are against NATO or EU integration and, often, openly supporting the
Russians. This is caused by a number of errors made by the European institutions
(e.g. making it more difficult to expand the rights of the secret services, so required to act against the threat of the current scale) and by the mainstream politicians. The
best example here is seen in the Angela Merkel’s Wilkommenskultur , and limited options of taking actions by the services, should the illegal immigrants breach the
law. This applies e.g. to the citizens of the Northern African countries, who,
theoretically, have no right to asylum granted, however controlling their movement in Europe is virtually impossible, due to the reserved stance adopted towards
breaking the law exhibited both by the courts, as well as by the content of the law
(Anis Amri acts in Berlin serve the best example here). This, on the other hand, drives the European citizens towards the populists. The Eastern Flank maybe hit “by a
ricochet”, due to the connections seen between Russia and the extreme left- and right-wing parties.
3. Russian Zapad 2017 Exercise – Pressure Imposed on NATO and Belarus
Russia plans to carry out the Zapad 2017 military exercise next year, which is
expected to involve even 90 thousand soldiers. The experts at the Atlantic Council/NATO Source have noted that the said exercise may be targeted against the
expanded forward presence – NATO battalion combat teams in the Baltic States and
Poland. One cannot rule out a situation in which Moscow takes aggressive steps, e.g.
when it comes to the information policy. We also know that Russia is planning to
deploy more than 4000 train carriages of equipment to Belarus. It may also be plausible than that, justifying it with the exercise, Russia would force the Belarusian
president to accept the establishment of permanent military bases within the
territory of Belarus, of which he has been an opponent so far. We may also see Moscow making attempts of influencing Minsk in a different manner. At the
moment, the Belarusian leadership is opposing the permanent presence of large
Russian military units within the country, which is criticized by Moscow and which is partially beneficial for NATO, since it delimits the risk of escalation. Zapad 2017
exercise may change the aforesaid situation. It shall also be noted that potential pressure imposed on Belarus would be less costly for Moscow, in comparison with
any aggressive steps taken directly against NATO, even though the latter scenario
cannot be ruled out.
4. Implementation of the Provisions of the Warsaw Summit within the Armies...
NATO Armed Forces are currently in the process of implementing the provisions of the Warsaw summit. This means that certain elements form battalion groups
(relevant exercise involving those elements has been recently organized e.g. in
Germany), and they are soon going to remain active within their areas of
responsibility. At the same time, NATO is going to emphasize the reinforcement and
recovery of readiness of the main forces (forces that are not deployed to maintain
forward presence or units that are not a part of the QRF). All of the steps above
would be demanding at different levels within the armies and MoDs of the individual
NATO member states. This is especially critical, as the cuts (recently stopped, in their
majority) concerned the areas which, following the Moscow’s aggression against Ukraine, are considered to bear the highest significance. Meanwhile, the armed
forces of the individual NATO member states are also burdened, e.g. with deployments in the Middle East. Thus, the current implementation of the documents
of the summit, contrary to what one may have thought, maybe a difficult task, not
only when it comes to the units in case of which high readiness is expected, but also when one speaks of the main forces of the
NATO alliance.
5. ...and further strategic adaptation.
Following the NATO summit in Warsaw, both the NATO structures, as well as the
individual member states, all need to continue the reforms. Some of the experts suggest that a need emerges to develop a new NATO strategic concept. Moreover,
NATO relations with Turkey are also questionable. There, a summit is to be organized
in 2018. Doubts also arise when it comes to the decision making process or the commanding bodies. Furthermore, the NATO member states themselves shall
continue and intensify the process of reconstructing their own defence capabilities
or expanding their defence budgets. Long term lags, fused with an expansion of the Russian military strength, make recovering the proper level of capabilities costly and
time-consuming. This requires determination within the scope of making and
implementing tough political decisions in an unstable environment.
NATO, for several years, has been struggling and trying to carry out a strategic adaptation.
The Warsaw Summit has, in most cases, defined the directions for such adaptation, but this is just the first step. Creating a proper defensive potential requires multi-faceted steps to be
taken. Numerous circumstances suggest that political stability of the NATO member states
may be of key relevance, for the aforesaid process. The said stability is one of the founding
elements of coherence, demonstrated during the summit in Warsaw. At the same time, the
external threats are still active, including the threat posed by Russia. Thus, 2017 would be a
true test for the provisions of the Warsaw Summit. We should hope that NATO passes this test, providing a high level of security to the member states.
PROBLEMS OF NATO EXPANSION: UKRAINIAN PROSPECTIVE
ON OPTIONS FOR GUARANTEEING OF EUROPEAN SECURITY
The decisive stimulus and, simultaneously, the main obstacle within the process of NATO
expansion has been Russia. NATO expansion, because of a number of important reasons,
does not conflict with Russian interests. Nobody, and especially Moscow, wants to see
Central Europe unbalanced by national extremism, geopolitical rivalry and increasing
political and economic instability. If Russia considers Germany’s close links with NATO
profitable for itself, the same considerations are absolutely appropriate for Poland and
other Central and East European countries. Feeling itself in security, Poland will probably be
less anti-Russia - oriented and more interested in cooperation and bridge-building than the
Poland which is not confident in its own future and which finds itself in a new geopolitical
pitfall between Russia and Germany. Though some Russian scientists agree with this logic,
the major part of the Russian elite, including both Democrats and nationalists opposes
NATO expansion. This viewpoint is caused by four factors. First, Moscow is concerned with
a prospect of possible isolation at the periphery of global politics. Second, Russian
democrats are afraid that such expansion can undermine the reform process, and
nationalists will benefit from this. Third, Russian military circles are concerned with the
appearance of a new NATO threat near the very Russian borders. And finally, fourth,
many Russian strategists and politicians still have an instinctive feeling that NATO
expansion will definitely result in the creation of such European security system where
there will be neither place for, nor recognition of Russia’s status and influence as a
superpower. These researchers have not seen the difference in Russia’s considerations as to
Germany and Poland, though any Russian politician or analyst will define this difference
with utmost clarity: “After Yalta, Germany belonged to the West and Poland belonged to
us“. The mistake made by the authors of the research in respect of the reasons has led to
the mistake in conclusions, when the authors did not see the main reason of both
inconsistency of NATO expansion with Russian interests and, as a result, a tight lasting
confrontation of Moscow with Brussels: expansion is held at the expense of narrowing the
Russian sphere of influence and makes it forever impossible for Russia to return to the
territories where it had been ruling during the last decades. It is not correct to speak about
the things which the abstract Moscow may want or not want abroad. Its foreign political
wishes will depend on the country’s nature -imperial or democratic. Democratic Russia will
indeed be interested in the stable development of its neighbours. Imperial Russia will be
characterized with polar interests: the more unstable is the neighbour’s position, the easier
it will be to interfere into its internal affairs through the mediation of this or that political
force. The examples in the territory of the former Soviet Union are more than sufficient -
Georgia, Tadzhikistan, Belarus. An excessively simplified approach to Russia from the part of
the
West has led to two great mistakes made by the latter in 1991-1994. The first is that in
1991-1992 the West lost a real possibility to quickly and relatively smoothly expand NATO to
the East when the entrance of new members to the Alliance could look merely as a stage of
their democratization. The second mistake included a wrong strategy of expansion and it
must be discussed more deeply. The analysis of the US National Security Strategy Regarding
Europe and NATO and Study on NATO Enlargement proves that there is some controversy
between the goal and the ways of its achievement. The expansions of NATO was aimed at
existing of peaceful, democratic, prospering and integrate Europe through cooperation
„with our trans-Atlantic partners to expand the stability zone throughout the region. The
main element of such cooperation and, probably, the only way to ensure stability in Europe
is, in the opinion of the authors of both documents, NATO expansion. This strategy had a
great disadvantage - simplified and purely mechanical approach to the expansion concept
development. It was a priori stated that accession of new countries to NATO will promote
the strengthening of stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region. However, the
question was not discussed how, against Moscow’s will, the transformation of its recent
satellites into strategic opponents would strengthen the general European security. There
were no forecasts of the possible events after expansion, especially in relations between
NATO and Russia, Russia and its former allies. Meanwhile, in 1995-1996 the developments
went in the direction, contrary to stability and security. At the beginning of 1997 the analysis
of the situation and optimum variants of solving the existing problems, related to NATO
expansion, were as follows.
The policy aimed at prompt admission of former Warsaw Pact members to NATO has
significantly deteriorated the relations of Russia with its neighbours and the West. Ignoring
(because of the quite understandable reasons) the statements of US and NATO top officials
asserting that „expansion is not directed against Russia“, Moscow made its counterblow - it
announced the beginning of a tight course as to the ex-USSR republics. In his Decree of
September 1995, Boris Eltsin entrusted the executive structures to seek from the CIS
members: - to allow the presence of the Russian army in their territory; - to declare the
rouble the joint currency; - to hold a coordinated foreign policy; - to unite into a military
alliance. In addition, „NATO expansion“ has negatively influenced the internal political
situation in Russia. As it had been predicted by many analysts, anti-Western rhetoric
dominated in the course of both pre-election campaign to the State Duma and the
„Presidential race“. It is enough to mention that, among several dozens election blocs and
parties, none stands for NATO expansion. The idea of „dishonesty of the West which, in
response to the Warsaw Pact disbandment, is surrounding Russia by enrolling our former
allies“, finds more and more understanding and support even in the liberal circles of the
Russian public, and it can become a real foundation for creation of a broad, force-based,
chauvinistic bloc. Staff transformations in the Russian Government after elections held in
December 1995 prove that such a bloc is being created „from the top“, in particular by
Eltsin´s team. Few analysts are surprised by the fact that during the whole post-Soviet
period, in spite of obvious controversies, Zhirinovsky and Eltsin have never allowed direct
mutual criticism. But quite often it looks like the policy of both President Eltsin and Russia as
a whole is formed in the head-quarters of Liberal-Democratic and Communist Parties.
Massive bombing of Pervomayske village from all kinds of heavy artillery occurred on the
third day after emotional TV appeal made by the leader of Russian nationalists to Boris Eltsin
„to destroy this Chechenian den with napalm“. The Russian President nominated to the post
of the Minister of Foreign Relations Evgeny Primakov who can compete with Zhirinovsky in
anti-Western feelings and sympathy for Saddam Hussein. V. Chernomyrdin had
„surrendered“ the democratically elected Belorussian Parliament to Oleksandr Lukashenko
the day before it was suspended from the power. Elected to the post of the
Speaker of the State Duma, G. Seleznyov, a member of the Communist Party of the Russian
Federation, declared that the Communists would not raise the question about the vote of
nonconfidence to the Government as far as „we noticed that the President and the
Government started to accomplish our goals. As a result, a paradoxical situation originates
when the West and the Central European countries actively stimulate Russia to further fall
away into the dictatorship and restoration of the empire, rather than to continue
democratic processes. Was it possible to not only prevent such transformation of Russia, but
also to effectively stimulate this country to deepen democratic reforms and to voluntarily
recognize the good style rules during communication with other members of the world
community and, first of all, with its neighbours? The answer to this question could be
positive, unless the authors of the expansion concept would have not only ascertained the
necessity „to develop cooperation between NATO and Russia with the purpose to
strengthen mutual trust and openness“, but would have proposed concrete ways of such
strengthening. Instead, NATO bluntly ignored Russia’s opposition towards expansion and it
was rather clearly framed by, for instance, Aleksey Arbatov, famous political scientist,
presently, the State Duma Deputy: „Independently of all talks about NATO’s defensive
nature, Russia will inevitably understand its expansion as something oriented against it. If it
is not invited to join the bloc on equal terms, Russia will undertake measures to develop its
defensive perimeter to the East and the South. It will result in a new division of Europe into
the influence spheres, and at their borders, as history proves, there always are some
tensions and confrontation. Ukraine may become the principal apple of discord - with
regard to its role in Europe, CIS, Black Sea region, and because of its own problems“. The
last phrase also explains why forced NATO expansion has just recently been inconsistent
with Ukraine’s interests: the edge between the two inevitably hostile blocs - independently
of Ukraine’s membership in any of them - will pass along one of its boundaries. Moreover, in
my opinion, a graduate and prolonged accession of postSocialist countries to Washington
Treaty hardly meets their own long-term interests, since, when joining NATO, they initiate a
strong rise of nationalist moods in Russia, which certainly and very quickly will bring purely
imperial forces to power, or will in this way transform the existing Government. As a result,
the pressure from the part of the Kremlin on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
will essentially increase and a real threat to their independence will appear. Thus, instead of
the ephemeral guarantees of their security, they will be given absolutely real „insecurity
guarantees“ (I am using the word „ephemeral“ with regard to the inter-war experience of
Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as to West’s current hesitations in cases involving its
participation in military actions). In order to avoid the outbreak of a new „Cold War“, NATO
should find the compromise between the interests of Central and East European countries
(to join NATO as soon as possible which will be a guarantee of security against potential
pressure of Russia), the West (not to disturb Russia, but simultaneously not to allow it to
renew the old influence sphere) and Russia (not to allow NATO to come to Russia’s
boundaries). Such a compromise may include, provisional no expansion of NATO“ according
to either of the following two variants.
Variant I.
At its session, NATO declares that, taking into account the importance of preserving a
general peace in Euro and around the world, with a due regard to the interests of NATO as
well as separate countries - both NATO members and partners, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization: a)shall not expand in the Eastern direction under current conditions; b) shall
deepen and develop cooperation in the field of defence among the partner countries within
the Partnership for Peace Program; c) shall grant to the partner countries all the rights
enjoyed by NATO members, except the rights which result from Article 5 of the Treaty
(where aggression against one member of the bloc is qualified as an aggression against the
entire bloc); d)will consider the coming to power in Russia (through constitutional or any
other ways) of forces that bear a direct or indirect threat to independence or territorial
integrity of partner countries as a necessary and sufficient reason for immediate admission
of the latter to NATO as members to enjoy full rights.
Variant II
a)at its session, NATO declares and makes it clear to the nonaligned European countries
that, taking into account the importance of preserving the atmosphere of partnership and
cooperation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall not expand in the Eastern
direction;
b) Central and East European countries which belong to neither NATO nor Tashkent Treaty,
conclude an agreement on the creation of a new, independent from both blocs structure
named, for example, Budapest Treaty, European Nuclear-Free Zone, Neutral European
States Organization or something similar;
c) the new structure concludes two absolutely identical agreements with NATO and
Tashkent Treaty, each necessarily including an article analogous to Article 5 of the North
Atlantic Treaty. Therefore, each member country of this structure is given security
guarantees simultaneously from the two sides. As a result, these agreements: a)without
depriving the countries of Eastern and Central Europe of their non-bloc status, would
provide them with the same security guarantees which they would get in case they joined
either of the two blocs existing on the continent; b)would make it impossible to accuse the
new structure of its one-sided orientation; c) would significantly increase the chances to
reach a lasting peace in Europe, since the potential aggressor will be aware that it is
attacking even the smallest country belonging to the „middle organization“ will
automatically result in its confrontation with the whole opposing bloc. The „provisional no
expansion of NATO“ would allow combining the interests of the West, the Center and the
East, would make any one-sided advantages impossible, and would enable to create a new
flexible security system in Europe, within which: a)there will be much less reasons (at least
at the European arena) for confrontation between Moscow and Washington; b)the interests
and ambitions of both the West and Russia will not suffer; c) Central European countries will
remain free from the pressure of superpowers, foreign troops and nuclear weapons. As it
was mentioned above, these propositions were developed by the author with regard to the
situation which existed at the beginning of 1997, i.e. by the moment when there was no
confidence whether the Alliance would resist Moscow’s pressure and would keep its word
concerning the admission of new members. However, in spring these doubts disappeared
when NATO dotted its I’s and crossed its T’s in the question of enlargement: in spite of
Russia’s resistance, the expansion will take place and will on the first stage involve 3-5
countries to be announced at Madrid Summit in July. A new situation caused the necessity
to review the prospects of the European security system transformation, search of new
variants based on a new reality.
QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED IN A DRAFT POLICY PAPER: 1. HOW TO MAKE NATO LESS DEPENDENT ON USA
2. HOW TO MAKE UNIFORM POLICIES PERTAINING TO THE INVESTMENTS IN THE DEFENCE
3. HOW TO DEAL WITH RUSSIA WHICH SERVING AS A POTENTIAL THREAT TO NATO
EXPANSION CURRENTLY
4. HOW TO MAKE FAIR POLICY AND CRITERION FOR EACH AND EVERY COUNTRY WHICH
WANTS TO JOIN THE NATO AND LIMITING THE UNANIMOUS POWER SHARING
BETWEEN THE MEMBERS
5. MAINTAINING A UNITED STANCE ON THE INF
6. MANAGING NATO’S ROLE IN WESTERN BALKAN
7. NAVIGATING POLITICAL TENSION IN NATO OPERATIONS
8. BALANCING EUROPEAN AMBITIONS FOR STRATEGIC AUTONOMY
9. HOW TO DEAL WITH CHINA WHICH IS EMERGING AS A POTENTIAL THREAT TO NATO IN
TERMS OF MILITARY, TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC EXPANSION
10. NATO UNITED STANCE ON NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
CRISIS:
A Crisis Update is a real-time global update that disrupts the usual proceedings of any
committee. It could range from a war declared to a country bombed and submerged.
Whenever a Crisis update is introduced in a committee, the provisional Rules of Procedures
are put at a halt and the Special Rules of Procedures are established, in order to solve the
crisis at hand.
CONSTITUENTS OF THE SPECIAL ROPs:
1. UPLIFTMENT COMMUNICATION LINES
2. SPECIAL SPEAKERS LIST (SSL)
3. PAPERWORK POST THE UPDATES
UPLIFTMENT OF COMMUNICATION LINES:
During the introduction of a Crisis Update, the communication lines for the delegates to the
parliamentary head of their countries are uplifted leaving them to a closed room and only
the update at hand and solving it out using their own diplomatic skills. To make the session
more interesting and replicating a closer model of the same the delegates aren’t allowed
access to their research until and unless the Crisis at hand is solved.
SPECIAL SPEAKERS’ LIST (SSL):
The special speakers' list is a randomly prepared list by the executive board in order of
countries affected the most and the least by the update. To give an example, if a war is
raged on the USA by China and Russia collectively, these three becomes the most effective
countries in the Crisis. Hence, including them three in the SSL is the most logical thing to do,
other than these three the ally countries of USA, essentially the NATO must have a say in
this so does the absolute Neutral Countries like Switzerland to state an example. Hence, the
SSL is always prepared as a justifiable mix of views coming from all blocks standing to have a
multilateral debate of the crisis at hand and solve it. There are ample chances of a Crisis
Update being introduced in the current setting of the NATO since the aspects of
enlargements being talked about can bring essential structural changes to the NATO, which
could be beneficial as well, may be repercussions.
PAPERWORK:
The final declaration of the Crisis as solved comes in the form of paperwork that could be a
declaration, directive or even a loosely knit working paper. The idea is to jot down all the
solutions discussed in the SSL and release them as a concrete document of the committee.
When this happens, no matter how vague the ideas are or how satisfying they are on the
contrary, a committee can be declared successful since it just solved a Global Crisis.
LINKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Check Footnotes
https://www.nato.int
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/68147.htm#threats
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120
822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/cold-war/the-warsaw-pact
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timdaiss/2016/06/03/south-china-seadisputes-off-
limits-says-general/#64a37915ddaf
http://natoassociation.ca/natos-future-in-sub-saharan-african-and-the-southchina-
sea/