lehman brothers went bust 10 years ago – can it happen ...the 1930s. when lehman brothers went...

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Lehman Brothers went bust 10 years ago – can ithappen again? | Larry Elliott

Larry Elliott

6-8 minutes

US subprimes set off the last crisis. We look at the possible causes of another crash

Problems with subprime mortgages in the US started emerging in 2007, eventually leading to

the biggest global financial crisis since the 1930s. Photograph: Reed Saxon/AP

In early 2007, the then chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, dismissed theidea that the slowdown in the US housing market had profound implications. It was,according to the man running the world’s most powerful central bank, just a local affair.

Everybody knows what happened next. Within 18 months the local problem in the USsubprime mortgage market had ballooned into the biggest global financial crisis sincethe 1930s. When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt 10 years ago this week, it was thecatalyst for a month of turmoil in which no financial institution was considered entirelysafe.

Inevitably, the anniversary of those tumultuous weeks in late September and earlyOctober 2008 has prompted speculation about whether it could happen again. And, ifso, what will be the cause?

Looking around the global economy, there are plenty of potential candidates, including:

Debt

The 2008 crisis was caused by excessive debt levels, with low interest rates enablinghouseholds to borrow to consume while financial institutions borrowed to speculate. Theappetite to borrow waned during the deep recession that followed the collapse ofLehman Brothers but the failure to deal with the root causes of the crisis has meant debtlevels have since risen and are now higher – as a share of global gross domesticproduct – than they have ever been.

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The financial system

There have been attempts to make the big multinational banks safer since theirvulnerabilities were exposed in 2008. Banks now have to hold more capital which canact as a buffer in the event that they suffer the sort of losses on their investments asthey did in 2008. But three problems remain: the banks have largely fended off pressurefor the sort of structural reform that followed the Wall Street crash of 1929; banking hasbecome even more concentrated; and risk has migrated from the more toughlyregulated banks to other parts of the financial system, such as hedge funds.

Emerging markets

The 1990s and early 2000s saw dress rehearsals for the global financial meltdown incountries as far part as Mexico, Russia, South Korea and Argentina, and there are onceagain signs of trouble. Low interest rates and the process of money creation known asquantitative easing has meant capital has flowed into emerging markets looking forhigher yields than have been on offer in the west. Servicing that borrowing is nowbecoming more expensive as global interest rates start to rise. The crises in Turkey andArgentina this year are unlikely to be the last.

Italy

Banks in the eurozone have made much less progress than their American counterpartsin increasing their equity capital and as a result would be much more exposed in theevent of a slowdown in activity, let alone a full-blown recession. Italy’s banks areparticularly fragile. Jens Hagendorff, professor of finance at the University of EdinburghBusiness School, says there is a “doom loop” between banks and the governmentbecause Italian banks are major buyers of Italian government bonds and even smalllosses on those bonds would cause banks to be insolvent. “What would follow will enterthe history books like the Lehman bankruptcy”, Hagendoff says.

A trade war

For now, the global economy appears to be shrugging off the impact of Donald Trump’sprotectionist measures but the real crunch point is likely to come in late 2019 and early2020 when higher US interest rates start to bite and the impact of tax cuts fades.

China

Prompt and decisive action by Beijing helped the global economy through the worst ofthe 2008-09 recession but it was achieved through a credit binge and a package ofpublic spending that dwarfed anything seen in the west. Much of the borrowinghappened outside the regular Chinese banking system through so-called shadowbanks. China’s growth remains solid and there are signs of it becoming better balanced,but in some respects it encapsulates the state of the world 10 years after Lehman: itsolved one problem but only by creating another: it is awash in debt; its banking industrylooks shaky; and it is acutely vulnerable to a full-scale trade war.

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Finance : en finir avec une culture professionnelletoxique

5-6 minutes

Les régulateurs du monde entier poussent les banques à calculer autrement les bonusou à traquer les « pommes pourries ».

LE MONDE ECONOMIE | 05.07.2017 à 10h27 • Mis à jour le 05.07.2017 à 10h41 | ParIsabelle Chaperon

Changer la mentalité court-termiste de l’industrie financière, c’est le chantier le plusrécent, mais aussi le plus difficile de l’après-crise. « Il y a eu un effondrementsystémique de la responsabilité et de l’éthique » des banquiers, soulignait, dès 2011, lerapport de la commission parlementaire du Congrès américain chargée d’enquêter surles causes de la crise financière.

Un constat que les scandales à répétition apparus depuis – de la manipulation deschanges au tripatouillage des taux interbancaires (Libor) en passant par les fauxcomptes créés par les salariés indélicats de Wells Fargo – n’ont fait que renforcer.

Mais comment procéder ? Autant les dettes excessives, la dépendance auxfinancements de court terme, le manque de capital se mesurent et se contrôlent. Maisl’irresponsabilité ? L’aveuglement ? La cupidité ?…

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« Il reste du chemin à parcourir »

« La culture, ce n’est pas une chose tangible que l’on peut descendre de l’étagère etinspecter. C’est une façon de faire et un ensemble d’attitudes qui déterminent lecomportement de chacun dans une organisation », professe Andrew Bailey, le directeurgénéral de la Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), le gendarme de la finance britannique,dans une tribune au Guardian, le 27 septembre 2016.

Le Conseil de stabilité financière, chargé par le G20 de rendre le système financier «plus simple, plus sûr, plus juste », a rappelé la feuille de route, lundi 3 juillet : « Ons’attaque aux causes qui sous-tendent les mauvais comportements, en renforçant laresponsabilité des individus et en alignant de façon plus efficace les incitations et lesrécompenses, mais il reste encore du chemin à parcourir. »

Les régulateurs du monde entier poussent les banques à calculer autrement les bonusou à traquer les « pommes pourries ». Mais nombre d’acteurs ont compris que c’étaitaussi leur intérêt de réaliser un travail en profondeur pour éviter fraudes et amendes.

« Système de carton jaune ou rouge »

Alors que l’affaire Kerviel avait mis en exergue l’attitude, parfois méprisante, de certainstradeurs à la Société générale à l’égard des contrôleurs internes, la banque a beaucoupœuvré pour changer cet état d’esprit. « A partir de 2012, nous avons complété notreprogramme “Culture risques” d’un système de carton jaune ou rouge, permettantd’impliquer les fonctions de contrôle, de conformité et d’analyse des risques dans lecalcul des rémunérations des opérateurs de marché. Cela a contribué à faire évoluerles comportements », relate Didier Valet, directeur général délégué de la Sociétégénérale. Et de préciser : « Ceux qui ne s’y retrouvaient pas sont partis. »

« En janvier 2015, nous avons lancé un vaste programme interne centré sur la bonneconduite dans une logique d’amélioration de nos pratiques. Ce programme a égalementcontribué à redonner de la fierté à nos collaborateurs, heurtés par l’image négativeassociée à notre métier dans l’esprit du grand public, en réaffirmant que notre activitéest utile à nos clients et participe au financement de l’économie », relate Yann Gérardin,responsable de la banque de financement et d’investissement de BNP Paribas.

« Des produits retirés des rayons »

Résultat de ce travail d’introspection : « Nous avons volontairement retiré certainsproduits de notre offre. Par ailleurs, notre niveau de marge doit toujours permettre demaintenir une proposition de valeur satisfaisante pour nos clients. J’ai aussi réduit lesobjectifs annuels fixés à certaines équipes, car je les trouvais trop ambitieux et cela lesaurait amenées à prendre trop de risques. »

En 2016, plus de 9 000 participants ont assisté aux trente conférences organisées parBNP Paribas pour sensibiliser ses équipes, de New York à Tokyo, sur les réflexes àavoir vis-à-vis des clients, des collaborateurs… « Nous formons nos vendeurs sur descas concrets de dilemmes pouvant se poser à eux. Il ne s’agit pas seulement derespecter les règles à la lettre, mais d’aller plus loin dans ce qu’il est approprié de faire», insiste M. Gérardin.

Car, de plus en plus, l’opinion publique demande aux entreprises, et à la finance enparticulier, de remplir un rôle sociétal. En témoigne la polémique qui a suivi l’acquisition,


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par l’américain Goldman Sachs, en mai, de 2,8 milliards de dollars (2,5 milliardsd’euros) d’obligations de l’Etat vénézuélien.


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nytimes.com

Opinion | Lehman Failed for Good Reasons

6-8 minutes

Too many banks still lack the checks and balances that might have saved LehmanBrothers.

By Madelyn Antoncic

Ms. Antoncic was the chief risk officer of Lehman Brothers from 2002 until 2007.

Sept. 17, 2018

Image

The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on Sept. 15, 2008 was one of the catalysts of theGreat Recession.CreditCreditKeith Lew/Moment, via Getty Images

One of the big unanswered questions of the 2008 global financial crisis, which bankersand economists love to debate, is: Why was Lehman Brothers allowed to fail while AIGwas saved? Many people blame the policymakers, suggesting that they were playingfavorites to reward or punish old friends on Wall Street.

Given the anger around the bailouts, that is an appealing explanation. But the truth is,Lehman failed due to self-inflicted wounds and missteps right to the end. Lehman knewprecisely the risks it was taking. As the firm’s chief risk officer until 2007, it was my jobto know those risks and communicate them to the rest of the senior leadership team.

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But there came a time when they were not interested in hearing what I had to say, andLehman lost its way. It was clear there was a new “tone at the top,” as detailed in the2,200-page examiner’s report about Lehman’s collapse, and risk management wasrepeatedly overruled.

Should Lehman have been saved? Yes, but it should have and could have been savedby itself. Lehman was in discussions in August 2008 with the Korea Development Bank,which wanted to buy a 50 percent stake. But the potential buyers believed Lehman wasasking too high a price. While Lehman dithered, the market kept deteriorating. A weekbefore Sept. 12, 2008, Lehman’s last day in business, the Korean bank came back witha new proposal, $5.3 billion for a 25 percent stake. But Lehman would not compromiseon price to save itself.

So why did the federal government step in to save AIG, while leaving Lehman to itsfate? Not saving AIG would have been cataclysmic. Its reach was far greater thanLehman’s, and it was far more systemically important.

At its peak, AIG had a market cap of about $240 billion (over four times that of Lehmanat its peak), it had $1 trillion in assets, wrote insurance in 80 countries, and it had writtenprotection on hundreds of billions of dollars of various forms of debt — much of whichwas helping American and European banks increase the asset quality of their balancesheets. Saving AIG avoided a global macroeconomic catastrophe.

As it is, many lives were destroyed. What bothers me most is that the carnage createdby developed economies reached people in every corner of the world.

From Opinion

More on the Great Recession

To be sure, some things could have been done better, and many decisions could havebeen made faster. So what have we learned? Are we more financially secure, or are westill vulnerable?

There have been major reforms. There is more transparency and tighter controls.Banks, and in particular large international banks, have more capital and better qualitycapital. Liquidity and funding ratios have been introduced to address asset and liabilitymismatch. Regulators no longer rely only on banks’ internal models to assess risks, butinstead have introduced leverage ratios based on asset size to limit the size of a bank’sbalance sheet relative to its equity. New rules on derivatives have been introduced. Andthere has been an introduction of “living wills,” in which banks must tell regulators howthey would be unwound in the event of a failure.

But these regulatory fixes, while necessary, are not a complete solution.

The unintended consequences of some of these regulations is that risk has shifted awayfrom banks to less transparent, unregulated entities. For example, the increase incapital requirements have helped feed the so-called shadow banking system. Becausenew rules limit banks from making leveraged loans, hedge funds and private equityfirms have taken up this slack and provide direct financing. This is hardly the outcomeintended by the regulators. This peer-to-peer lending is not regulated in the same wayas banks are, and moving this lending to shadow banks reduces transparency toregulators.

Also, the 2008 crisis was the consequence not of too little regulation, but of inconsistentand inconsistently enforced regulation. Entities doing similar trades were applying


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different rules and were supervised by different regulators depending on their location,and how they were incorporated or chartered. Without functional regulation, thisproblem persists.

Third, no living will can solve the “too big to fail” problem for a highly complex globalfinancial institution. We still do not know how to address the failure of a largeinternational financial firm with hundreds of legal entities across the globe. To do sowould require harmonizing the bankruptcy legislation of all the world’s major financialcenters, something the European Union has not been able to achieve in 50 years. Thisis probably the most important lesson from the crisis and the most difficult to address.

To me, the biggest risk of all has not been adequately addressed. What I learned fromthe Lehman experience is the importance of governance. Leadership is about doing theright thing, and no one should go unchallenged when they are about to make aquestionable decision. This culture of checks and balances is still lacking in manyorganizations.

While I do not think we will have a large credit-induced financial crisis in the near term,there is always the possibility that, in the next big financial crisis, taxpayers again will beforced to pay the bill — if not directly, through a bailout, then most certainly indirectly,through lost jobs and an economic downturn.

The best one can hope for is to minimize the severity of the shock through bettercorporate governance and more consistent regulation.

Madelyn Antoncic, an economist, is on the board of overseers of Weill Cornell Medicine.A former vice president and treasurer of the World Bank, she was the chief risk officer ofLehman Brothers from 2002 to 2007.

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nytimes.com

Learning the Right Lessons From the FinancialCrisis

6-8 minutes

Economic View

Image

A central bank can rescue lenders, like the Bailey Building and Loan in “It’s a WonderfulLife,” in times of crisis. The economist Laurence M. Ball argues in a new book that theFederal Reserve’s refusal to aid Lehman Brothers in 2008 was a policyfailure.CreditCreditRKO Radio Pictures, via Getty Images

What caused the financial crisis of 2008? Are policymakers ready to handle the nextone?

These are key questions for anyone interested in economic history and policy. In thepast decade, a conventional wisdom has developed about the answers.

Yet a new book questions that orthodoxy, offering a more disturbing perspective on thepast and a less sanguine prognosis for the future.

In a nutshell, the conventional wisdom goes like this:

In the mid-2000s, the nation experienced a housing bubble. A combination of stupidity,

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negligence and malfeasance led a bunch of Wall Street firms to make excessively riskybets that the bubble would go on forever. Through mortgage-backed securities andrelated instruments, they extended credit to home buyers of dubious credit quality.

For a while, this credit expansion fueled the bubble. But when the bubble burst, thesenew homeowners defaulted in record numbers, and the Wall Street firms headed towardinsolvency. The whole financial system teetered on the edge of collapse, leading to adeep recession.

Fortunately, policymakers came to the rescue. Henry M. Paulson Jr., the secretary ofthe Treasury, persuaded Congress to pass the Troubled Asset Relief Program, which heand his successor, Timothy F. Geithner, used to recapitalize the banks. Ben S.Bernanke, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, expanded the tools of monetary policyto support the financial system and the economy more broadly. Their bold steps savedus from another Great Depression.

In this conventional narrative, Wall Street financiers are the villains and Washingtonpolicymakers are the heroes. Certainly, the policymakers have promoted this view. Mr.Bernanke even titled his memoir “The Courage to Act.”

Yet a new book, “The Fed and Lehman Brothers,” by Laurence M. Ball, an economist atJohns Hopkins University, casts doubt on this narrative. Mr. Ball (who is a friend ofmine) does not excuse the financiers from starting the trouble. But he draws attention tothe policymakers who, in his view, failed to do their jobs at a crucial moment.

Central banks like the Fed have two tasks. The first is to adjust the money supply andinterest rates as economic conditions change. The second is to help ensure the safetyand soundness of the financial system. As part of this second task, central bankssometimes need to act as a lender of last resort.

Remember the bank-run scene in the movie “It’s a Wonderful Life”? Jimmy Stewart asGeorge Bailey, head of the local building and loan association, explains the fragility ofbanking as an enterprise. Even if a bank is solvent (meaning that its assets exceed itsliabilities), it cannot immediately satisfy all its depositors if they become fearful and try towithdraw their money all at once.

A central bank can solve this liquidity problem by lending to a financial institutionexperiencing a run. That is why the Federal Reserve Act calls for an “elastic currency.”The central bank should be there so George Bailey does not need to rely on thedespicable banker Henry F. Potter — or even his own generous friends — for thetemporary cash injection needed to keep the building and loan afloat.

Here, according to Mr. Ball, is where policymakers failed us in 2008. When mortgagedefaults started rising, many financial institutions experienced a run on their short-termliabilities. These liabilities were not traditional bank deposits but rather repurchaseagreements, called repos. But the forces at work were much the same.

In September 2008, the financial giant Lehman Brothers found itself facing a liquiditycrisis. Yet the Fed, rather than acting as a lender of last resort, pushed Lehman intobankruptcy. In the weeks and months that followed, all hell broke loose.

Why did the Fed not avert the crisis by lending to Lehman? The conventional narrative,promoted by Mr. Bernanke, is that Lehman did not have sufficient collateral, and thatthis barred the Fed from lending to it. Much of Mr. Ball’s book — which expands on hiswork in an earlier paper — is aimed at rebutting that claim.


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Mr. Ball argues that a careful look at Lehman’s finances shows that it did have enoughcollateral. In addition, he examines the historical record and finds no evidence that Fedofficials at the time were concerned about the insufficiency of collateral.

The claim of inadequate collateral arose weeks later when the full impact of the Lehmanbankruptcy became clear. It was, Mr. Ball suggests, an attempt to cover up a policyblunder.

One fascinating element of the story is the dynamic between Mr. Paulson and Mr.Bernanke. The decision whether to lend to Lehman was legally up to the Fed. But itseems that Mr. Paulson was calling the shots.

He took a hard line because, after the rescue of Bear Stearns earlier in the year, hewanted to avoid the political fallout from being labeled “Mr. Bailout.” Mr. Bernankedeferred to the Treasury secretary, partly because of the mistaken judgment that themarkets would take the Lehman bankruptcy in stride.

Looking ahead, Mr. Ball is worried about the next financial crisis. One reason is that theDodd-Frank Act has increased restrictions on Fed lending, making it harder for the Fedto act as lender of last resort.

Another is that we have not learned the right lessons from history. Mr. Ball wants tomake sure that the next time a major financial institution faces a shortfall of liquidity, theFed really will have the courage to act.

N. Gregory Mankiw is the Robert M. Beren professor of economics at HarvardUniversity.

A version of this article appears in print on July 29, 2018, on Page BU2 of the New Yorkedition with the headline: Lessons From 2008 (and George Bailey). Order Reprints |Today’s Paper | Subscribe

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abonnes.lemonde.fr

La finance a-t-elle vraiment appris du choc Lehman?

9-11 minutes

La crise a révélé la fragilité des banques, la légèreté de certains régulateurs et uneculture du risque débridée. Troisième épisode de notre série sur les dix ans de crise quiont changé l’économie mondiale.

LE MONDE ECONOMIE | 05.07.2017 à 06h39 • Mis à jour le 11.07.2017 à 12h27 | ParVéronique Chocron

Le siège social de Lehman Brothers, à New York, le 14 septembre 2008. MICHAELNAGLE / AFP

Avec la chute de Lehman Brothers, gouvernants, banquiers centraux, superviseursbancaires ont entraperçu la fin du monde. Une fois le système à terre, ils entendent lereconstruire, en fixant aux banques de nouvelles règles du jeu pour tirer les leçons de lacrise. La tâche est immense et, dix ans après, le travail n’est toujours pas terminé.

Les crédits hypothécaires risqués dits subprimes ? Aux Etats-Unis, la loi Dodd-Frank,votée en 2010, et de nouvelles règles de la Réserve fédérale américaine (Fed, banquecentrale américaine), en 2011, encadrent mieux l’octroi des prêts aux ménagesaméricains et rendent les pratiques des prêteurs et des courtiers plus transparentes.Par exemple, les courtiers des prêts résidentiels ne peuvent plus être rémunérés enfonction des taux d’intérêt pratiqués.

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Il faut dire que les subprimes, accordés à des ménages modestes ou déjà endettés, etqui n’ont donc pas le profil pour bénéficier d’emprunts à taux raisonnables, s’étaientdéveloppés à une vitesse fulgurante avant que la bulle Lehman éclate. En 2006, cesprêts risqués pèsent 600 milliards de dollars (470 milliards d’euros environ à l’époque),soit 23 % des crédits distribués aux Etats-Unis. A l’époque, le marché de l’immobilierétant orienté à la hausse, les prêteurs se rassurent, en misant sur une revente desmaisons si l’emprunteur ne parvient plus à rembourser.

Mais lorsque l’immobilier commence à se retourner à la mi-2006 et que les défauts depaiement des foyers américains augmentent, tout le système déraille. D’autant que latitrisation a permis à la crise de se propager. En quoi consiste cette technique ? Lesbanques forment des paquets de crédits, en mixant subprimes et crédits de meilleurequalité, puis les découpent en tranches, en offrant, selon le risque, des rendements plusélevés.

« Étincelle qui fait sauter la mine »

Rassurés par le label triple A accordé par des agences de notation qui raisonnent enprobabilités – le risque de défaut d’un paquet de plusieurs crédits est forcément inférieur à celui d’un crédit subprime isolé –, les établissements financiers se gavent deces obligations. Ils oublient une chose : les risques de ces crédits sont interdépendants,puisqu’ils sont tous liés au marché immobilier américain. Dès lors, loin d’atténuer lerisque, la titrisation a un effet démultiplicateur. Cette technique, qui fait d’une crise del’immobilier américain un cataclysme financier mondial, disparaît alors en Europe.

Mais la crise a surtout révélé la fragilité des banques, la légèreté de certains régulateurset une culture du risque débridée, guidée par les bonus, pour répondre aux attentes derentabilité des actionnaires.

« Mon rôle, en tant que régulateur, est d’être parano, de m’inquiéter de nouveauxrisques »

Le premier chantier consiste à renforcer la solidité des établissements. « La titrisationest l’étincelle qui a fait sauter la mine, mais il y avait un problème de résistance dusystème, explique Benoît Cœuré, membre du directoire de la Banque centraleeuropéenne (BCE). Les banques ne contrôlaient pas assez leurs risques et nedisposaient pas suffisamment de capitaux propres en face des crédits distribués, et cesfonds propres durs étaient de bien moins bonne qualité qu’aujourd’hui : à l’époque, on ymettait par exemple des obligations convertibles, qui ne pouvaient pas absorber lespertes si elles se réalisaient. »

Les instances internationales fixent la feuille de route. Sous l’impulsion du Conseil destabilité financière (FSB) et du G20 (groupe des vingt pays les plus riches), les accordsde Bâle III sont adoptés fin 2010, avec l’objectif de renforcer les fonds propres desbanques et de leur imposer des coussins de liquidité. « Ce qu’on peut dire aujourd’huiconcernant la prévention des crises, c’est que nous avons augmenté considérablementla résilience des banques », estime Edouard Fernandez-Bollo, le secrétaire général del’Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR), l’organisme de supervisionfrançais des banques.

Fonds propres doublés, « stress tests », « testaments bancaires »

L’ouvrage n’est pas totalement achevé, mais le chemin parcouru est notable : les


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banques françaises rappellent qu’elles ont multiplié par plus de deux leurs montants defonds propres pour un même volume d’opérations. Face à des ratios jugés tropexigeants, les banques mettent en avant le risque de devoir limiter leur distribution decrédit, ce qui pénaliserait l’économie.

Ironie du sort, la Commission et le Parlement européens cherchent donc à relancer unetitrisation dite « simple, transparente et standardisée », pour permettre aux banques desortir une partie des crédits de leurs bilans.

« Nous avons augmenté considérablement la résilience des banques »

Aux Etats-Unis, la règle Volcker – du nom d’un ex-secrétaire général de la Fed –cherche à limiter les investissements spéculatifs des banques. De son côté, l’Europe adonné naissance à une Union bancaire dotée, à partir de novembre 2014, d’unsuperviseur unique pour les établissements bancaires. Intégré à la BCE, il est exigeantet intrusif, à mille lieues de la relation de proximité souvent indulgente entretenue entreles régulateurs nationaux et les banques du pays.

Désormais, les banques européennes sont soumises à des « stress tests » pourévaluer leur résistance en cas de choc de grande ampleur. Elles doivent soumettre àleur autorité de contrôle des « testaments bancaires », un mode d’emploi censé faciliterleur sauvetage en cas de défaillance.

« Des germes » inconnus

L’Europe a par ailleurs voulu en finir avec le concept du « too big to fail » (« trop grospour faire faillite »), accusé de décourager les grandes banques de bien surveiller leursrisques. Celles-ci sont en effet persuadées que l’Etat viendrait à leur secours en cas dedifficulté.

La « résolution » bancaire, entrée en vigueur le 31 décembre 2015, prévoit deresponsabiliser les parties prenantes privées. Comment ? En rinçant les actionnaires etles détenteurs d’obligations de la banque, avant tout recours aux fonds publics.

Mais cette règle n’est pas toujours appliquée à la lettre. Le plan de liquidation sur fondspublics de deux banques vénitiennes, Banca Popolare di Vicenza et Veneto Banca, le26 juin, montre qu’il est toujours possible de trouver des arrangements. L’Etat italien –donc les contribuables – pourrait en effet devoir injecter jusqu’à 17 milliards d’eurosdans ce sauvetage.

« On a fait en sorte qu’en cas d’épidémie celle-cise transmette plus difficilement et quechaque organisme soit plus résistant à la maladie, mais il y aura toujours des germesque l’on ne connaît pas, résume Benoît Cœuré. La prochaine crise, on ne l’aura pasprévue. Mon rôle en tant que régulateur est donc d’être parano, de m’inquiéter denouveaux risques, et le “shadow banking” est un candidat. »

« Finance de l’ombre »

Cette « finance de l’ombre », que le Conseil de stabilité financière dénomme plusvolontiers, sans connotation négative, « market-based finance » (« financement del’économie par les marchés »), a largement prospéré depuis la crise de 2007. Tandisque les banques sont devenues un îlot de régulation, les fonds d’investissement, leshedge funds et les sociétés de capital-investissement se sont développés beaucoupplus librement, agrégeant au passage nombre d’actifs cédés par des établissements


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bancaires, contraints par leurs ratios de fonds propres.

Selon le dernier rapport du FSB, elle pesait 92 000 milliards de dollars à la fin 2015, soit150 % du produit intérieur brut des Etats concernés, un niveau supérieur à celui atteintà la veille de la crise financière. Cette finance parallèle sera d’ailleurs le prochainchantier des grands argentiers de la planète et des superviseurs.

« Il ne faut pas créer de différence de pression trop forte entre la finance régulée et lesactivités financières non régulées. On y voit désormais des opérations, qui, il y a dixans, relevaient des banques d’affaires. Ainsi, il faut, pour les gérants d’actifs, plusd’exigence de capital, de liquidité et l’organisation de stress tests à intervallesréguliers », prévient Xavier Musca, directeur du Trésor pendant la crise, et qui occupeaujourd’hui le poste de numéro deux du Crédit agricole. Avant de conclure, fataliste : « Ilest illusoire de croire que le système peut être parfait. »

Prochain épisode : Comment l’affaires des subprimes a déclenché la crise des detteseuropéennes


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theguardian.com

'If it was Lehman Sisters, it would be a differentworld' – Christine Lagarde

Richard Partington

5-7 minutes

IMF head says the male domination of banking could lead to another financial crisis

Christine Lagarde said more work to fix the financial system was still required, particularly on

gender diversity. Photograph: Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

Christine Lagarde has said male domination of the banking industry made the collapseof Lehman Brothers more likely, as she urged further reforms to prevent a repeat of thefinancial crisis triggered by its failure a decade ago.

Writing on the IMF blog ahead of the 10th anniversary of the US investment bank’scollapse next week, the head of the International Monetary Fund said significantmeasures had been taken to fix the financial system, although she warned more workwas still required, particularly on gender diversity.

“As I have said many times, if it had been Lehman Sisters rather than Lehman Brothers,the world might well look a lot different today,” she said.

The chief executives and chairs of Britain’s four biggest banks are all male, while theproportion of female board directors at companies across the wider FTSE-100 rankingof major British firms is in decline. There are, however, exceptions, such as atSantander UK, where Shriti Vadera is chair, and Virgin Money, where both the chair andchief executive are female.

Research from the IMF shows a higher proportion of women on the boards of banks andfinancial supervision agencies is associated with greater stability. Lagarde called thecollapse of Lehman Brothers a “sobering lesson in groupthink” that many economistshad failed to spot coming. In this context, she said a key ingredient of reform would bemore female leadership in finance.

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“Greater diversity always sharpens thinking, reducing the potential for groupthink,” shesaid, adding: “This very diversity also leads to more prudence, and less of recklessdecision-making that provoked the crisis.”

The failure of Lehman Brothers, which was one of the oldest and biggest investmentbanks in the world before its humiliating demise, triggered a ripple effect in the globalfinancial system as banks around the world stopped lending to one another for fear theymight not get their money back.

“In the immediate aftermath of Lehman, we were really staring into the abyss,” Lagardesaid, calling the collapse a “holy cow” moment for the world economy.

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Governments in the US and Europe stepped in with taxpayers’ money to bailoutstruggling lenders, including RBS and Lloyds in the UK, to protect their economies fromlosing valuable access to finance. There have, however, been lasting effects, as thecrisis triggered damaging recessions across the developed world, with severeconsequences for living standards still being felt.

Lagarde said the heavy economic costs borne by ordinary people, combined with angerat the bank bailouts and bankers enjoying impunity, was among key factors behind therise of populism and backlash against globalisation. Economists believe the recession inthe UK, government austerity and weak wage growth, coupled with this anger, areamong key reasons for the Brexit vote two years ago.

“We have come a long way, but not far enough. The system is safer, but not safeenough. Growth has rebounded but is not shared enough,” she added.

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