lecture on nicomachean ethics

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Outline of Nicomachean Ethics Book I To understand what moral goodness is we must study the soul of man o Aristotle says that “happiness is an activity in accordance with perfect virtue” which means that to be happy, that is, to be in the state of happiness, then we are (a) doing something virtuous and(b) our happiness is higher or lower based upon how perfectly we do this virtue. o Because this is the case, we have to look at what virtue is and how this is related to the community. We have to look at the group, at the political whole, since this is the person we are looking to have virtue. o Aristotle says that the goodness he is looking at is not physical, but an activity of the soul and if we are to understand the happiness of a human, then we must study the soul of man in its relation to the whole. The several faculties of the soul distinguished o The human is made of a rational and irrational part of their soul Irrational: Vegetative (nutrition and growth) Appetitive (the is our desire which can be for or against reason; how this is related to reason is why we use the words of admonition, reproof, and encouragement) o Man of Virtue – both desires the good and does his desire o Continent Man – knows the good, but has appetites (pleasure, anger, other emotions, etc.) and usually can allow reason to prevail o Incontinent Man – knows the good, but has appetites that they usually cannot defeat in terms of reason and so makes decisions based upon their appetite

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These are lecture notes on Arisototle's Nicomechean Ethics

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Page 1: Lecture on Nicomachean Ethics

Outline of Nicomachean Ethics

Book I

To understand what moral goodness is we must study the soul of mano Aristotle says that “happiness is an activity in accordance with perfect virtue” which

means that to be happy, that is, to be in the state of happiness, then we are (a) doing something virtuous and(b) our happiness is higher or lower based upon how perfectly we do this virtue.

o Because this is the case, we have to look at what virtue is and how this is related to the community. We have to look at the group, at the political whole, since this is the person we are looking to have virtue.

o Aristotle says that the goodness he is looking at is not physical, but an activity of the soul and if we are to understand the happiness of a human, then we must study the soul of man in its relation to the whole.

The several faculties of the soul distinguishedo The human is made of a rational and irrational part of their soul

Irrational: Vegetative (nutrition and growth) Appetitive (the is our desire which can be for or against reason; how this

is related to reason is why we use the words of admonition, reproof, and encouragement)

o Man of Virtue – both desires the good and does his desireo Continent Man – knows the good, but has appetites (pleasure,

anger, other emotions, etc.) and usually can allow reason to prevail

o Incontinent Man – knows the good, but has appetites that they usually cannot defeat in terms of reason and so makes decisions based upon their appetite

o Man of Vice – refuses to do what an ethically virtuous person would do because they are convinced that justice, temperance, generosity, etc. are of little or no value (they are driven by desire for domination and luxury and single-minded in pursuit of these goals)

Rationalo Virtue is divided according to the difference in the soul

Intellectual Virtues – wisdom, understanding, and prudence Moral virtues – liberality and temperance

Book II

Moral Virtues, like crafts, are acquired by practice and habituationo Since virtue is of two types, then there are two ways that these are acquired:

Page 2: Lecture on Nicomachean Ethics

Intellectual virtue – acquired by instruction (so needs time and experience) Moral virtue – acquired by habit (and so are not in us by nature, but also are not

contrary to our nature since we can develop these)o All our faculties are gained from potential actual, but the virtues are gained by doing

them, by acting them out (like things we learn in the arts; it is like learning an instrument, so we are not born good or bad, but what we learn early is of ultimate importance for our disposition)

In practical science, so much depends on particular circumstances that only general rules can be given

o Ethics is a practical science, therefore we don’t aim at what the good is, but how to be good; we are applying our minds to the problem of how to act (since it is these actions which determine our dispositions)

o Each subject matter allows different levels of precision (i.e., we need to know the ruler we are using or else we might get irritated at the end and think our results are ‘vague’ when actually, we got the answer we were seeking). In ethics, we don’t in the end gain the explicitness of doing physics.

A cardinal rule: right conduct is incompatible with excess or deficiency in feelings and actionso Aristotle says that moral qualities are destroyed by the two extremes – excess and

deficiency. This means that a central virtue will be temperance. Our virtues are exercised in the same kinds of action as gave rise to them

o Aristotle means that we should ‘fake it until we make it’ and eventually we will find that we don’t have to fake it anymore because we will want to do these actions after a period of time. This does not mean we just quit then, but we exercise what we have created in us so that we then practice our skill. Virtues are on par with skill for Aristotle.

The pleasure or pain that actions cause the agent may serve as an index of moral progress, since good conduct in a proper attitude towards pleasure and pain

o Aristotle here points out to the fact that we should pay attention to what we like and don’t like and this will show how far we have come in our moral progress. If you quit eating fast food but you think about it every second, then you are still addicted to fast food. So, the point for Aristotle is the same one as above – we are our dispositions and we need to take control of our desires through habituation.

o The reason for this is that bad action comes from bad dispositions, therefore we need training in a proper attitude to be moral.

o We need to train ourselves in three areas – the fine/base, advantageous/harmful, and pleasant/painful. As long as we have a correct disposition to these three factors we can make correct choices

Acts that are incidentally virtuous are distinguished from those that are done knowingly, of choice, and from a virtuous disposition.

o Aristotle furthers what he is saying above by stating that it is not enough that we just happen to do some action, we must do it for the right reason.

Page 3: Lecture on Nicomachean Ethics

In order to define virtue we must decide to what class or genus it belongs. It is not a feeling or a faculty, but a disposition

o Aristotle says that the soul is made of (a) feelings (b) faculties and (c) dispositions Feelings = desire, anger, fear, envy, joy, hatred, longing, pity, etc.; these are all

the conditions which are attended by pleasure and pain Faculties = that which we have in ourselves which allows us to be capable of

feelings Dispositions = that which disposes us to have one feeling rather than another

(like we might have a disposition to get angry or to be emotional)o Where then are we to place virtue?

(a) They cannot be feelings – why – since people don’t not called good or bad just based on our feelings (we aren’t blamed for being angry, but being angry in a certain way); also, we don’t have a choice usually on our feelings

(b) They cannot be faculties – we are not praised or blamed b/c we are capable of feeling; what faculties we have, we have by nature (and nature does not make us good or bad)

(c) Therefore, virtues are dispositions What is differentia? Any excellence enables its possessor to function; therefore this is true of

human excellence, i.e., virtueo What kind of disposition is virtue? It is that which makes an excellence good and allows

it to perform its function well For a human, the human excellence is the disposition that makes a man good

and causes him to perform his function well This is confirmed by the doctrine of the Mean

o The ‘mean’ in relation to the human is that which is neither excessive or deficient (and this is not one and the same for all people)

o If I am lifting weights, then the mean for me is different than the mean for you; the mean to all things in ethics is relative to us

o Aristotle is wanting us to have the right feelings at the right time toward the right people for the right motive and in the right way (this is the mark of virtue); failure is possible many ways, but for success, only one

A provisional definition of virtueo Virtue is a purposive disposition; it is a mean that is relative to us and determined by the

rational principle of the mean btw the two vices of excess and deficiency But the rule of choosing the mean cannot be applied to some actions and feelings, which are

essentially evilo Not every action or feeling has a mean – take malice, envy, adultery, theft, murder;

these are just evil in themselves The doctrine of the mean applied to particular virtues

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The mean is often nearer to one extreme than to the other, or seems nearer because of our natural tendencies

o We can have within us three types of disposition – disposition for excess, disposition for deficiency, and disposition for the mean

Summing up of the foregoing discussion, together with three practical rules for good conducto Because virtue is the mean between two vices, it is difficult to be good because it is hard

to discover the midpoint. To do things well is rare and an achievemento For this reason, if you want to reach this, then keep away from the extreme which is

more contrary to the mean that the deficiency Far from this surf and surge keep thou thy ship

o Aristotle gets practical here – he says: (1) Keep away from the extreme (2) Notice the errors which you are liable to fall based on your natural

tendencies

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(3) Guard against pleasure since we are not impartial judges of pleasure; we should do what the Trojan elders did towards Helen (agree to her beauty, but make her go back to Greece)

o To sum up: by following these rules we shall have the best chance of hitting the mean. But this is presumably difficult, especially in particular cases; because it is not easy to determine what is the right way to be angry, and with whom, and on what grounds, and for how long. Indeed we sometimes praise those who show deficiency, and call them patient, and sometimes those who display temper, calling them manly. However, the man who deviates only a little from the right degree, either in excess or in deficiency, is not censured— only the one who goes too far, because he is noticeable. Yet it is not easy to define by rule for how long, and how much, a man may go wrong before he incurs blame; no easier than it is to define any other object of perception. Such questions of degree occur in particular cases, and the decision lies with our perception.

o This much, then, is clear: in all our conduct it is the mean that is to be commended. But one should incline sometimes towards excess and sometimes towards deficiency, because in this way we shall most easily hit upon the mean, that is, the right course. . . .