Land Titling in Urban Slums:

The Demand Curve for Property Rights & the

Price of Female Empowerment

Daniel Ayalew,∗Matthew Collin,†, Klaus Deininger,∗

Stefan Dercon†, Justin Sandefur‡, Andrew Zeitlin†

PRELIMINARY DRAFT: NOT FOR CIRCULATION§

April 2011

Abstract

We report on a policy experiment in two urban slums in Dar esSalaam, Tanzania, that provided access to formal land titles to infor-mal settlers at randomized prices and offered additional price discountsconditional on designating a woman as owner or co-owner of the house-hold’s land. Preliminary results show the median reservation price fortitles among slum residents is roughly one-third of monthly income;this is well below the cost of property formalization by the municipal-ity, implying a need for subsidization in a viable titling program in thissetting. The gender conditionality experiment succeeded in dramati-cally raising the proportion of women listed as property owners, andthe marginal price households were willing to pay to avoid female landownership was indistinguishable from zero.

∗World Bank†Oxford University‡Center for Global Development§To date, results from the intervention described here are available for only one of two

experimental sites, accounting for just over 40% of the final sample. Results are thus

extremely preliminary and subject to change.

1

Contents

1 Introduction 3

2 Literature 4

2.1 The feasibility of titling programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42.2 The determinants of demand for title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62.3 Land titling and female inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

3 Institutional context: De jure rights under the 1999 Land

Act 9

4 Survey data: De facto land tenure arrangements in urban

slums 10

4.1 Household and parcel characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104.2 Correlates of female titling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

5 Experimental design 14

6 Modeling the demand for titles 16

7 Preliminary results 19

2

1 Introduction

This paper investigates the process of formal land registration in urbanslums and, in particular, its financial viability and potential effect on theintra-household bargaining position of women. We present early resultsfrom a randomized-controlled trial of formal land titling in two low-income,unplanned, urban settlements in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. We use thisexperiment to address three broad questions:

Question 1. Is there a market for formal property rights in urban slums?

In principle, Tanzania’s 1999 Land Act made formal land titles availableto residents of all unplanned urban settlements (conditional on the landbeing deemed inhabitable). However, to date, the Ministry of Lands hasfailed to deliver titles to any but a small fraction of residents in Dar esSalaam due to the high cost associated with titling and the lack of evidenceon general demand.

By creating experimental variation in the price of titles offered to resi-dents, we are able to identify the demand curve for formal land titles. Thereis enormous interesting among Tanzanian policymakers, given that they holda monopoly on that supply, to learn how to optimally price titles for differ-ent types of land, such as residential and commercial properties, parcels ofvarious size and with various improvements, etc. However, observed data onwillingness-to-pay also speaks indirectly to questions such as whether (i) fullcost recovery is a feasible and justifiable approach to provision of propertyrights, and (ii) whether costly requirements such as extensive town planningand cadastral surveying prior to issuing titles should be retained.

Question 2. What drives the demand for property rights?

Understanding the motives of residents buying formal land title will in-form the design of land registration policy, as well as providing some indica-tion of the anticipated longer-term benefits. We investigate the role of (a)expropriation risk, (b) credit access, and (c) sale value as factors driving thedemand for more security property rights. The analysis draws on detailed

3

subjective expectations data solicited from owners about risks and payoffsunder various titling regimes.

Question 3. Does property formalization disempower women, and can ti-tling programs be designed to overcome this tendency?

Female land ownership is commonly associated with stronger bargainingpower in household decision making, with important welfare consequencesfor dimensions such as fertility and spending on children. However, a com-mon criticism of land formalization initiatives is that they will unintention-ally strip women of their access to land. The underlying concern is thatformalization reduces the broad and variegated set of overlapping claimson land under customary systems to a simple free-hold tenure right, ofteninvested in a single, male individual.

In urban Tanzania, individual claims to ownership for formally registeredproperty are ultimately determined by the list of people – and individualphotos – included on the application for a CRO. We explore the abilityof financial incentives to overcome gender bias in the formalization processby offering residents a discount on the price of a formal land title on thecondition that a female household-member is included as owner or co-owner.Household responses to these price incentives allow us to trace out the ‘priceof female empowerment’ referred to in the title.

Section 2 discussed the relevant literature and motivations for the paper,section 3 covers the institutional context and the details of the types of landtitles offered. Section 4 discusses data from a baseline survey, 5 the designof the experiment, and 7 some preliminary results.

2 Literature

2.1 The feasibility of titling programs

The growth of unplanned settlements is a common trademark of rapid ur-banization in developing countries. Tanzania, with over many of its urbanareas dominated by fast-growing slums, is no stranger to this problem. De-spite the obvious need for an expeditious path to formality, the government

4

remained the custodian of all urban land until the 1999 Land Act was passed,legislation which took steps to recognize existing informal tenure and cre-ated a broad mandate for the government to pursue the formalization of theunplanned settlements.

Yet, more than a decade following the passing of the Act, the growth ofinformal settlements in Tanzania’s cities is undeterred. Approximately 80%of parcels in Dar es Salaam are located in informal settlements (Kironde,2006). A near-permanent land title introduced in the Land Act is seen bythe Government as being a final goal in the tenure process, but to date theMinistry of Lands has failed to deliver titles to any but a small fraction ofresidents.

The sluggish progress is due in part to the Ministry’s preference to sellland titles on a case-by-case basis, with little in the way of marketing or sub-sidization. Urban land owners seeking a title are required to have arranged afull cadastral survey of their parcel, making the average cost extraordinarilyexpensive to the average resident.1 While the Government has a burgeon-ing desire to pursue large-scale titling projects to bring down the per-unitcost, concerns over financial sustainability and cost-recover have preventedit from doing so.

Land titling schemes are become more popular in the developing world(Payne et al 2007’s review of the literature found relevant examples in over 35countries), but they are rarely inexpensive. In the case of Peru’s COFOPRIland titling program, the final costs to the government were approximately$44.76 dollars per household (Angel, 2006). Aside from the direct admin-istrative costs of registering and maintaining land tenure records, the timeand resources spent adjudicating competing claims to a title may raise thecost even more (Woodruff, 2001).

Yet the actual costs of the project are less important if there is heavydemand for title in target communities. Since willingness-to-pay dictatesboth the success of cost recovery and subsequent coverage of titling, gettinga reliable estimate for residents of the unplanned settlements is key to de-

1In our sample, the average payment made by residents to hire a private surveyor wasapproximately TSH 540,000 ($350), or nearly 2x annual income.

5

termining the viability of a titling program. There is some evidence alreadythat the demand is there: In 2004, the residents of a small sub-ward in Dares Salaam working formed a community organization tasked with regular-izing the entire neighborhood, securing a private firm to survey the area atsignificantly cheaper rates than normal (Magigi, 2006). While this programalso struggled with raising the funds from the residents, it is still indicativeof a growing demand for formalization in the area.

2.2 The determinants of demand for title

While cost recovery is highly dependent on the resident’s willingness to pay,this in turn hinges on the perceived value of the title. In order to under-stand why residents might demand land tenure, it is worth Following Besley(1995), there are three immediate private benefits which might be expectedto underly demand for titling. The first is the extra tenure security conveyedby a title: when a resident’s ownership status is recorded and formalized,they should face a lower risk of expropriation from family members, otherresidents or the government itself. In Tanzania, the perceived fear of expro-priation is frequently observed in the media: Kironde (2009) discovered fivenews stories of expropriation and claims to compensation after monitoringthe local media for just one week.

While there have not been many direct studies on the impact of land ti-tling on expropriations, several studies have attempted to discern whether ornot the introduction of greater tenure security results in greater investment(although the latter does not always imply the former). Both Field (2005)and Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010) find a positive impact of urban titlingon household investment, but find little evidence of an expansion of credit,suggesting that the investment was driven by enhanced security. However,most studies of rural titling have found mixed evidence of an impact oninvestment (Jacoby and Minten 2005, Bellemare 2011).

Another benefit commonly associated with formal title is the ability toaccess credit by using land as collateral. This argument has seen resurgencefollowing de Soto (2000), despite little direct evidence that titling (Field

6

2005, Galiani et al 2005, Durand-Lasserve et al 2008) leads to an expansionin household borrowing. It is difficult for such studies to discern the differ-ence between finding no impact on an expansion of credit due to a land titlebeing ineffecive as collateral, or an owners general unwillingness to risk land.The same preferences that generate a demand for tenure security might beincompatible with the desire to put up land as collateral.2

Finally, land tenure is thought to lead to an increase of transferability,the ease at which a land owner can sell their land, given that a buyer mightbe hesitant to purchase land with uncertain legal status. To date, therehas been little empirical work on this hypothesis, although several authorsreport, observationally, that titled communities see very little buying inselling unless the area is highly desired by outside investors (some referenceshere).

It is not clear that these possible benefits do form a basis of demand fortitle in Tanzania. De Soto (2006), citing extensive research by the Institutode Libertad y Democracia (ILD) in Tanzania, found that in the absence offormal property rights, Tanzanians have created a functioning, documentedinformal sector. It is not obvious that demand for formal title will be highin a setting where residents create their own sales agreements and hoardany documents related to their tenure status, as a reasonable degree oftransferability and security may have already been attained.

2.3 Land titling and female inclusion

There is evidence that female inclusion in land ownership can positively im-pact household bargaining power. Using data from a gender-focused titlingprogram in Peru, Field (cit) demonstrated a connection between title ac-quisition, lower fertility and a reduction in child labor, effects amplified inhouseholds which included a woman’s name (a requirement of the program).Similarly, Galianai and Schargrodsky found that titled households in BuenosAires had lower household sizes3 and more education for children. Benefits

2Byabato (2005) cites a survey where 80% of respondents in Dar es Salaam declaredthey would not use their houses as collateral when seeking formal bank credit

3Although it is not clear that this result is tied to changes in fertility decisions.

7

even extend to cases where the woman has not yet gained direct controlover the land: Roy (2008) used amendments in India’s inheritance law toidentify the effect of increasing the woman’s stake in landholding, showingthat it led to greater self-reported autonomy. Deininger and Goyal (2010)used the same natural experiment to suggest that the change in the law ledto increased educational attainment and later age of marriage for inheritingdaughters.

Yet these benefits are typically conditional on women attaining owner-ship status or partial control of land during the titling process, and it is farfrom clear that this is a likely outcome. Female inclusion rates in previ-ous land titling programs have rarely exceeded 40%, and in countries wheremandatory joint titling is not imposed, they can be as low as 25% (Deereand Leone 2001).

If women are not included as legal owners on a newly formed land titling,it is possible that these programs might at best maintain what might be analready unfavorable status quo, and at worst strip women of the claims toland that they might already hold under customary law. The structure ofthe titling process in Tanzania is of particular concern, as final ownershipof a property is determined by a list of names and photos included on anapplication (such as the ones displayed in Figure 8). Those that are includedin this list have full power over sale and automatic inheritance rights whichcould supersede customary law. While many countries in sub-Saharan Africahave gender equality clauses in their constitutions, most make no mentionof the right to property UN-Habitat (2005 - cit). Clauses in the 1991 LandAct provisionally acknowledge a woman’s right to land (including womenleft off of a land title by their husband), it is unknown how well these areenforced.

8

3 Institutional context: De jure rights under the

1999 Land Act

Tanzania’s Land Act of 1999 has been described as among the most sophis-ticated on the continent, granting tenure security to unplanned settlements,empowering women, and providing the basis for the use of land as collateral(?). But implementation of the Land Act has proceeded slowly or not atall. At above 80%, the level of informality in urban Tanzania is not onlyamong the highest in Africa, but continues to increase (?).

The 1999 legislation created two new forms of title in urban and peri-urban areas: residential licences (RL) and certificates of right of occupancy(CRO). By default, the legislation also created a third category, which de-scribes the majority of home owners in Dar es Salaam: residents of un-planned settlements with only informal tenure, governed by ‘purchase agree-ments’, ‘letters of inheritance’ and other documents recognized by local of-ficials in lieu of formal titles.

The three attributes of property rights enumerated in the previous sec-tion are useful in understanding the private demand for (and possible bene-fits of promoting through public funds) these alternative forms of title. As afirst approximation, CROs provide strong tenure security (in the form of aninety-nine year right of occupancy with a right to compensation in case ofexpropriation), collateralizability (in that the Land Act of 1999 fully outlinesthe law relevant to mortgages of properties under CROs), and a legal rightof transfer or disposition without any further permission or fee. In contrast,RLs provide a finite amount of security (as they are renewable after a muchshorter term, usually two years, and provide a right of compensation onlyafter three years), and no legal guarantee to collateralizability or transfer.Table ?? summarizes the relevant portions of the Land Act of 1999. How-ever, owners’ actual ability to use land as collateral or to buy and sell land ispartially an empirical matter, as urban land markets are in fact quite activeeven in the absence of CROs.

Throughout the rest of the paper we will use the term “title” to referto CROs, the highest level of formalization available to a resident or small-

9

business owner. The various elements of the field experiment describedbelow (including randomization of cadastral surveying, price discounts, andrequirements for female cosignatories) all relate to the acquisition of a CRO.

4 Survey data: De facto land tenure arrangements

in urban slums

In the summer of 2010 the University of Oxford conducted a census ofparcels in two adjacent mitaa (subwards) in the district of Kinondoni inDar es Salaam. The two settlements, Kigogo Kati and Mburahati Barafu,are unplanned, low-income communities, less than five kilometers from thecenter of the city. The survey is intended as a baseline for a future impactevaluation of the benefits of title.

4.1 Household and parcel characteristics

Households were identified using records from the Kindondoni Municipality,which created a listing of all households in the area to assist with the roll-out of residential licenses. Basic parcel characteristics from the municipaldatabase are presented in 1. Together, the subwards make up close to 4% ofthe total population of Kinondoni, but are substantially worse off in termsof property value and size, accessibility and access the public utilities andwaste removal. Less than half of all households are involved in informalemployment.

After households were identified, they were interviewed about a variety ofsubjects, including detailed data on parcel characteristics, ownership, rentaland tenure status, investment and use. Also included were basic socioeco-nomic questions, included detailed questions about credit use, expenditureon gendered goods and perceptions of the benefits and willingness-to-payfor different types of land title.

Table 2 display some basic parcel, owner and household summary statis-tics from the baseline survey. For both settlements, most parcels have beenpurchased or inherited. While CRO take-up is extremely low in both (less

10

Table 1: Summary Statistics on Parcel CharacteristicsKinondoni Kigogo Mburahati

Municipality Kati BarafuFormal employment 49.9% 44.6% 44.3%Size and Value of Property

Area in square meters 439 264 247Property value in ’000 TSh. 12,562 9,939 8,910Land rent in TSh. 3,679 2,125 1,907

Accessibility to the PropertyNo access 1.3% 1.1% 1.1%Foot path 55.2% 71.3% 82.0%Feeder road 36.4% 19.8% 16.2%Main road 5.5% 6.6% 0.6%Highway 1.6% 1.1% 0.0%

Access to Public UtilitiesPiped water (incl. public) 22.7% 22.0% 5.6%Electricity connection 46.1% 38.6% 35.1%

Waste removal servicesBurn/buried on plot 35.4% 25.4% 55.7%Gutter/river/street 20.0% 49.6% 35.4%Collected by priv. company 40.8% 24.4% 8.4%Collected by municipality 3.8% 0.7% 0.5%

Number of properties 65,535 1,474 990Source: Authors’ calculations based on the land registry maintained by Kinondoni Mu-

nicipality.

11

Tab

le2:

Par

cel,

owne

ran

dho

useh

old

char

acte

rist

ics.

Var

iable

Kig

ogo

Kat

iM

bura

hat

iB

araf

uA

llPar

celac

quis

itio

nP

arce

lw

aspu

rcha

sed

0.81

10.

760.

788

Par

cel

was

inhe

rite

d0.

140.

139

0.14

Par

cel

was

give

nas

gift

0.02

30.

034

0.02

7P

arce

lw

asaq

uire

dan

othe

rw

ay0.

016

0.03

90.

026

Am

ount

paid

for

parc

el(n

omin

al’0

00ts

h)20

79.3

3413

95.7

2917

83.7

67H

How

nsC

RO

for

parc

el0.

070.

044

0.05

8T

otal

amou

nt(’

000

tsh)

paid

toob

tain

CR

O66

.222

160.

715

94.9

07H

How

nsR

Lfo

rpa

rcel

0.55

70.

356

0.46

7T

otal

amou

nt(’

000

tsh)

paid

toob

tain

RL

12.4

299.

552

11.4

15Par

celch

arac

teri

stic

sN

o.of

build

ings

1.29

91.

315

1.30

6P

arce

lin

vest

men

t(’

000

tsh)

inth

epa

st12

mon

ths

470.

478

173.

683

338.

388

Pit

latr

ine?

0.75

40.

788

0.76

9E

lect

rici

tyco

nnec

tion

?0.

598

0.60

60.

601

Wat

erco

nnec

tion

?0.

112

0.03

50.

078

Ow

ner

char

acte

rist

ics

Ow

ner’

sag

e48

.096

50.2

7749

.048

Fem

ale

owne

r0.

254

0.24

90.

252

Rel

igio

n=

Mus

lim0.

573

0.6

0.58

5O

wne

r’s

scho

olin

g13

.071

12.5

512

.843

HH

char

acte

rist

ics

p.c.

HH

annu

alin

com

e(t

sh)

931.

853

988.

338

956.

231

Tot

alas

sets

valu

e(’

000

tsh)

3710

.759

4285

.175

3964

.83

Fem

ale-

head

edH

H0.

231

0.21

70.

225

HH

size

5.34

54.

887

5.15

2

Sourc

e:

House

hold

surv

eyof

all

land

owner

sin

catc

hm

ent

are

afo

rth

eex

per

imen

t.

12

than 6% on average), nearly 50% have obtained residential licenses (whichhave seen greater success in Kati than Barafu).

While basic demographic characteristics are similar across the two set-tlements, households in Barafu tend to be a slightly wealthier and smaller,although less educated. The advantage that Kati holds in formalization (such as greater RL take up), parcel investment and house prices may reflectboth slightly higher parcel sizes and an ongoing infrastructure investmentprogram which is current operating in the neighborhood.

When asked who are the de facto owners of the parcel, only 25% ofrespondents indicated a female household members as an owner or co-owner.However, much of this is being driven by female-headed households, in which95% consider a woman a de facto owner. In male-headed households, thefigure is closer to 5%, indicating that women may already have little claimover land in this context.

4.2 Correlates of female titling

In section 2.3 we discussed several studies which suggest that female titling isclosely associated with improved bargaining power. The low observed ratesof female titling and low CRO-take up (at 6%) combined with a lack ofcredibly exogenous variation make it very difficult to make inference aboutthe impact of female titling in the baseline.

However, respondents in the survey were asked who would be includedon a CRO if the household purchased one, so it is possible to examinewhether or not hypothetical female titling is correlated with other outcomesthat suggest improved female bargaining - not for the sake of establishingcausality, but instead to demonstrate that two often go hand in hand.

Table 4.2shows the results from an OLS regression of four responses froma gender-specific questionnaire on a vector of household characteristics, in-cluding the presence of a female on the hypothetical list of CRO owners.The results show that hypothetical female titling is associated with greaterfemale borrowing interest and positive expenditure on both children’s cloth-ing and school fees, but not on alcohol. These are outcomes commonly

13

associated with increased female bargaining power. While the results arejust correlates (as increased female bargaining power would lead to bothhypothetical inclusion and these outcomes), it is possible that by creatingan instrument to entice female inclusion, one could have a positive effect onoutcomes like these. The next section discusses the overalll experimentaldesign, including our instrument for generating female inclusion.

5 Experimental design

The experiment provides access to formal property registration to residentsand business owners in Mburahati-Barafu and Kigogo-Kati. The key inter-vention is a cadastral survey, demarcating the boundaries of each residentialor commercial parcel in the treatment areas. Cadastral surveying is expen-sive, and a pre-requisite to acquire a CRO.

After the baseline survey and the the introduction of the intervention(described below) information was collected on residents’ decisions whetheror not to purchase a land title through the project. This take-up informationwas merged to the baseline survey data to form the basis of our analysis here.

The experimental design involves three elements of randomization. Thefirst dimension is a binary division between treatment and control areas.This is done at the level of ‘blocks’, or contiguous groups of approximately40 parcels. Figure 3 shows a digital map of all parcels in Mburahati-Barafu,overlaid on an aerial photograph, and Figure 4 shows the division of treat-ment and control areas. This first level of randomization, and indeed all datafrom control areas, will enable long-term impact evaluation, but is outsidethe scope of this paper.

The second dimension and third dimensions of randomization are cross-cutting: both relate to the price of a CRO, and both are randomized at theindividual parcel level. The baseline price of a CRO is TSh. 100,000 forall households, or roughly $70. We offer discounts (or ‘general vouchers’)ranging from zero to TSh. 80,000, creating net prices from TSh. 20,000 to100,000. This variation is key to estimating the price-elasticity of demandfor land titles.

14

Table 3: Hypothetical female titling and gendered outcomesWanted to take Positive exp Positive exp on Positive exp on

out a loan? on alcohol? children’s clothing? school fees?Woman would be 0.046∗∗ 0.038 0.078∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗

included on CRO (0.015) (0.029) (0.025) (0.026)

Log per capita 0.011 0.018 -0.054∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗

income (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)

Log asset stock -0.001 -0.002 0.066∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗

(0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)

Muslim HH -0.027∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.051∗ -0.022(0.012) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021)

Average 0.001 0.004 0.015∗∗∗ 0.007education in HH (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)

No. children 0.011∗ 0.002 0.101∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗

(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)

Constant -0.104 0.041 0.163 0.672∗∗∗

(0.094) (0.172) (0.153) (0.158)R2 0.017 0.024 0.199 0.082Obs 1496 1452 1618 1615Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Each column represents a separate linear probability model using parcel-level data from

all surveyed parcels in both sub-wards. ‘Wanted to take out a loan’ is a binary variable

= 1 if the female respondent has even wanted to take out a loan herself. Columns 2-4

are binary variables indicating positive hh expenditure on alcohol, children’s clothing

and school fees. The explanatory variable ‘Woman would be included on a CRO’ is = 1

if one of the people the respondent indicated would be included as an owner if the HH

purchased a CRO was female. Female-headed households are excluded from these results

as they predict hypothetical titling perfectly.

15

In addition, we also offer ‘gender-specific vouchers’, as noted above.These discounts also range from zero to TSh. 80,000. However, they canonly be redeemed if a female is listed as an owner or co-owner on the applica-tion for a CRO. Table 6 shows the distribution of parcels in each dimensionof the cross-cut. Randomization was designed so that no household receiveda price offer (net of both vouchers) less than TSh. 20,000.

6 Modeling the demand for titles

In this section we present a simple framework for thinking about the demandfor land titles, and in particular, the distribution of ownership rights con-ferred by titling within the household. We propose to empirically estimatetwo parameters: the price-elasticity of demand for titles, and the discount,if any, that households place on titles which include women as co-owners.To estimate these parameters we will use data on two observable choices:the decision to buy a title, and the choice of whether or not to include awoman as a co-owner.

For illustrative purposes, consider a linear, additively-separable modelwith a representative household. Let y∗ represent a household’s latent de-mand or reservation price for a title (without gender restrictions), which wemodel as a function of household and parcel characteristics, X, proxying forboth household income and the value of the parcel.4 Similarly, let y∗f denotea household’s reservation price for a gender-restricted title, i.e., one whichrequires co-ownership by a woman.

y∗i = X′iβx (1)

y∗f,i = y∗i − θ (2)

Figure 1 depicts these two demand curves: the upper curve correspondingto unrestricted titles and the lower curve to gender-restricted titles.

4To avoid cumbersome notation, we use subscripts i to denote a household-parcel pair-ing. In the data there is generally a one-to-one matching between a single householdowning a single parcel. Instances of a single household owning multiple parcels are rela-tively rare and do not play any special role in the econometric identification.

16

Figure 1: Theoretical household demand for gender-restricted and unre-stricted land titles

The θ parameter represents the reduction in willingness to pay due tothe added restrictions on the title. We remain agnostic about the underly-ing model of demand; in particular, we need not specify whether a unifieddecision-maker or intra-household bargaining approach is more appropriate.In a household with a strong preference for female entitlement and/or whosefemale members possess high bargaining power, θ will be near zero. In male-dominated households with a strong preference for male property ownership,θ will be large and positive.

The observable, binary indicator of whether a household purchases atitle of any sort, whether gender-restricted or unrestricted, y, is determinedby the combination of equations (1) and (2), such that

yi = 1 if y∗i > pi or y∗f,i > pf,i. (3)

As described in Section 5, the price of an unrestricted title is TSh. 100,000

17

minus the value of the voucher, pi = 100 − vi. If the gender-restrictedvoucher is redeemed a woman must be listed on the title, such that pf,i =100− vi − vf,i. A household will purchase a title if the unrestricted price isgreater than their reservation price for a title, or their reservation price fora gender-restricted title exceeds the price of this form of title.

Aggregating over the sample of households, equation (3) provides anestimable specification. To simplify the interpretation, we write this in termsof the voucher values directly, rather than the net prices,

Pr(yi = 1|Xi) = Xi′βx + βpvi + βfvf,i + ui (4)

Identification of the βp and βf parameters follows directly from the randomassignment of the discount vouchers as described in Section 5.

Figure 1 illustrates the link from the estimated parameters in equation(4) to the underlying conceptual model in equations (1) and (2). As athought experiment, begin with the baseline price for an unrestricted CROof TSh. 100,000, where the probability of take-up (i.e. Pr(y = 1)) is givenby point A. An unrestricted voucher will reduce this price and shift thehousehold to point B. This shift is measured by the coefficient on theunrestricted discount voucher, such that β from equation (4) represents theslope of the line AB. Adding a further gender-restricted voucher takes thehousehold to point C, and the coefficient βf represents the slope of the lineBC.

The null hypothesis that sexism is low (θ = 0) is equivalent to therestriction that βp = βf . If, on the contrary, households are willing to paya premium to avoid female entitlement (θ > 0), then we should observeβp > βf , and in the extreme, βf = 0.5

5Equation (4) can be expressed in terms of pi and pf,i rather than the voucher values

Pr(yi = 1|Xi) = Xi′β̃x + β̃ppi + β̃fpf,i + ui

Expressed in this way, the null hypothesis that θ = 0 is equivalent to β̃ = 0. Sincepf,i ≤ pi∀i, if sexism is low and gender-restricted vouchers are treated just like unrestrictedvouchers, then pf,i is the only price that should affect take-up.

18

Table 4: Demand for Titlevouch price lprice(1) (2) (3)

Voucher value, unrestricted .003(.001)∗∗

Voucher value, gender restricted .003(.001)∗∗∗

Price of title, unrestricted .0003(.001)

Price of title, gender restricted -.003(.001)∗∗∗

Log price of title, unrestricted .019(.064)

Log price of title, gender restricted -.150(.046)∗∗∗

Obs. 443 443 443R2 .023 .023 .026Each column represents a separate linear probability model using parcel-level data from

all eligible, previously unsurveyed parcels in Mburahati Barafu. The dependent variable is

a binary indicator for purchase of title. Note that two vouchers are issued for each parcel:

one with no restrictions, and one which can only be redeemed if a woman is listed on the

title. In columns (2) and (3) the “Price of title, unrestricted” denotes the total cost (TSh.

100,000) minus the unrestricted voucher. The “Price of title, gender restricted” denotes

the total cost minus the value of both vouchers. Thus the gender-restricted price is always

weakly less than the unrestricted price.

7 Preliminary results

7.1 Is there a market for formal property rights in urban

slums?

Figure 7 shows the rate of take-up (i.e., percent of owners purchasing of aland title) at various price levels – the demand curve for property rights. Theblue bars show answers to hypothetical survey questions about willingness-to-pay for a CRO at each price level. The red bars show actual purchasedata from the RCT. Notably, hypothetical WTP data appears to exaggeratedemand for titles.

19

More importantly, it is clear from the graph that a majority of residentseven in low-income areas are willing to pay up to TSh. 20,000 for a title.This value is within reach of unit cost of the most efficient titling programsin the region. However, the graph clearly shows that full cost recovery –which the Ministry of Lands estimates at over TSh. 150,000 per parcel –will not enable formalization of a sizeable share of slum properties.

Setting aside concerns about universal coverage and access, land titlesmay currently be too expensive even judged by the more conservative crite-rion of government revenue maximization. Focusing on revenue maximiza-tion is motivated by two considerations. First, as just noted, cost recovery isa primary consideration in pricing titles by the Ministry of Lands. Second,a large share of the costs of land titling are fixed costs, stemming from townplanning and systematic demarcation of a large number of parcels at once.For both these reasons, revenue maximization appears to be a reasonableapproximation of the incentives faced by Ministry officials. However, con-versations with Ministry officials suggest that actual pricing policy is basedon average costs per parcel, assuming 100% take-up by residents – raisingthe possibility that prices may be too high, even without considering socialbenefits from titling not captured by residents’ willingness to pay.

The estimated demand functions allow us to calculate the revenue max-imizing price for titles. Figure 2 shows the average revenue per plot thatwould be generated by pricing titles at each increment from 20,000 to 100,000shillings. Average revenue is calculated as the predicted proportion of plotsthat would be titled at each price level, multiplied by the per-plot price. Thepredicted take-up underlying these calculations is somewhat sensitive to thefunctional form used to estimate the demand function. To illustrate thissensitivity, the figure presents four alternatives: demand as a linear func-tion of price; as a quadratic function; a cubic; or a simple, non-parametricmean take-up rate for each discrete price level.

The linear and quadratic demand functions suggest that revenue is strictlyincreasing with price over the range of prices considered in the experiment.However, allowing for a more flexible form – either with a cubic term or anon-parametric approach – indicates that revenue may reach its peak at a

20

10

20

30

40

Ave

rag

e r

eve

nu

e in

th

ou

sa

nd

s o

f S

hill

ing

s

20 40 60 80 100Price of title in thousands of Shillings

Linear

Quadratic

Cubic

Non-parametric

Revenue as a Function of Price

Figure 2: Estimated government revenue function from sale of land titles

price level of around Sh. 80,000 per parcel. This suggests that prices levelsof Sh. 100,000 and above (as actually charged under currently policy) maybe counterproductive.

7.2 Does property formalization disempower women, and

can titling programs be designed to overcome this ten-

dency?

Before turning to the results, it is useful to consider the expected effectsof the gender-specific price discounts on (a) demand for a title, and (b) thepresence of women on title applications. First, in an extreme case, one couldimagine that men have sole decision-making power within the household, andplace infinite value on not having women listed as co-owners of the household

21

property. In this case, gender-specific vouchers should have no impact ontake-up and no impact on the probability a woman is listed as owner (therate of women on titles in this case will be zero). At the opposite extreme, ifno sexism exists, gender-specific vouchers should be treated interchangeablywith unrestricted vouchers, and once again they will have no impact on theprobability a woman is on a a title (the rate of women on titles in this casewill be high).

Results in Figure 9 show that general and gender-specific vouchers havean almost identical impact on take-up (the standard errors in the figureare misleadingly large; more precise estimates are feasible in a multivariateregression). Furthermore Figure 10 shows that gender-specific vouchers havealmost zero relationship with the probability of listing a woman as an owneron the title application. Notably, the overall rate at which women are listedas owners is greater than 80%. This is confirmed in Table 7, which testsformally the null hypothesis that gender-restricted vouchers have no impacton female titling. This null is comfortably accepted. Taken together, theseresults are consistent with the hypothesis that sexism is irrelevant to landownership in Tanzania.

We find this conclusion implausible, and favor an alternative interpreta-tion of the data. Our results are also consistent with the hypothesis that thecollaborating NGO responsible for marketing land titles exerted an stronginfluence on all residents, at all levels of gender-specific vouchers, extollingthem to list women as co-owners on title applications. This hypothesis is nottestable using experimental variation, but is consistent with the high levelof female co-ownership within the study contrasted with the very low levelof hypothetical female inclusion (which was approximately 30% in Barafu).

In short, the experiment has shown that it appears relatively cheap toensure that women are listed as co-owners during land formalization. It willremain to be seen over a longer horizon whether this co-ownership carriesthe same benefits associated with female land-ownership in studies usingobservational data.

22

Table 5: Tanzania’s Land Act of 1999Tenure SecurityResidential License Certificate of Right of Occupancy

Part IV, Section 23, paragraph 1 states: “...aresidential licence, confers upon the licenseethe right to occupy land in... urban or peri-urban area[s] for the period of time for whichthe residential licence has been granted.”Paragraph 6 continues: “Where a person orfamily has occupied the land in the same lo-cation under a residential licence for not lessthan three years, he or they shall be entitledto compensation under the Land AcquisitionAct, 1967 where that land is to be acquiredfor a public purpose or where that person orfamily is to be removed from the land...”

Part IV, Section 22 states: “A granted rightof occupancy shall be – . . . for a period up tobut not exceeding 99 years.” Note howeverthat the right is “liable, subject to the promptpayment of compensation, to compulsory ac-quisition by the state for public purposes.”

Collateral & mortgageResidential License Certificate of Right of Occupancy

The law provides no specific guidance here. Itis an open empirical question – which we needto resolve soon – whether local microfinanceinstitutions (SACCOS, etc.) use RLs in con-sidering credit applications. They should notbe able to serve as collateral per se as theyare not subject to confiscation in the case ofdefault.

The law clearly intends for CROs to serveas the basis for mortgages, and Part IX ofthe act is devoted to this topic. Note thatPart IX, Sub-Part I, Section 111, Paragraph 3states: “References in this part to ‘the mort-gaged land’ shall be taken to mean and includea mortgaged right of occupancy, mortgagedlease and sublease and a second or subsequentmortgage.” No mention is made of mortgagingresidential licenses.In an interview with the mtaa executive officerfor Kigogo Kati, she indicated that NationalMicrofinance Bank will accept CROs from res-idents of Kigogo as collateral for a loan. Fur-ther details to be sought from NMB.

Transfer & dispositionResidential License Certificate of Right of Occupancy

Residential licences are non-transferable. PartIV, Section 23: “(4) A residential licence shallnot be assignable by the licensee. (5) A resi-dential licence shall bind the successor in titleto the licensor who obtains the land with ac-tual or constructive notice of the licence.”

The right of disposition for CROs is guaran-teed by the act. Section 22 states that thegranted right of occupancy “capable of be-ing the subject to the subject of dispositions.”Part III, Article 36, paragraph 2 states: “Un-less otherwise provided for by this Act or reg-ulations made under this Act, a dispositionof a right of occupancy shall not require theconsent of the Commissioner or an authorizedofficer.”

23

Figure 3: The study area: Mburahati, Barafu

Figure 4: Randomly assigned treatment & control blocks. Red and pinkblocks are eligible for titling.

24

Figure 5: Randomly assigned prices for Certificates of Right of Occupancy(CRO) within treatment blocks.

25

Figure 6: Take-up: Yellow parcels denote owners who have made an initialpayment to purchase a CRO at their reandomly-assigned price.

26

0.2

.4.6

.8P

roport

ion o

f R

esid

ents

Buyin

g T

itle

20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000Price, net of all discounts

Hypothetical

Actual

95% C.I.

Hypothetical & Actual Demand

Figure 7: Demand curves using hypothetical and actual prices

27

Figure 8: Land title application showing proposed owners

28

Table 6: Cross-Cutting Design: General and Gender-Specifc DiscountsConditional Discount

General Discount 0 20k 40k 60k 80k Total0 6.7% 6.7% 6.7% 6.7% 6.7% 33.3%

20k 6.7% 6.7% 6.7% 6.7% . 26.7%40k 6.7% 6.7% 6.7% . . 20.0%60k 6.7% 6.7% . . . 13.3%80k 6.7% . . . . 6.7%

Total 33.3% 26.7% 20.0% 13.3% 6.7% 100%The baseline price was TSh. 100,000 for a CRO, per parcel, regardless of size or other

characteristics. Each cell shows the proportion of the sample assigned to each combination

of general and gender-specific discounts. Blank cells were not used to avoid offering a

negative net price.

29

.3.4

.5.6

.7P

rop

ort

ion

of R

esid

en

ts B

uyin

g T

itle

20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000Price, net of general discounts

General Discounts

.3.4

.5.6

.7P

rop

ort

ion

of R

esid

en

ts B

uyin

g T

itle

20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000Price, net of conditional discounts

Conditional Discounts

Does Conditionality Matter?

Figure 9: Are gender-specific vouchers valued differently?

Table 7: (Non)impact of gender-conditionality on female inclusion on title

(1) (2)

Voucher value, unrestricted -.0007(.001)

Voucher value, gender restricted -.00004(.001)

Const. .890 .908(.021)∗∗∗ (.057)∗∗∗

Obs. 218 218R2 0 .003

The sample is comprised of households who purchased a title through the experiment. The

dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether or not a woman was listed on the title.

Each column represents a linear probability model, i.e., an OLS regression. In column one,

the female titling dummy is regressed on a constant, yielding the unconditional mean.

30

.7.8

.91

Pro

port

ion o

f T

itle

s L

isting W

om

en

0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000Conditional discount

Presence of Female on Title Application

Figure 10: Are women included as (co)owners during formalization?

31