lagod case digest on property & sales
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TOPIC: Donation inter vivos v mortis causa
Ganuelas vs CawedG. R. No. 123968 April 24, 2003
Facts:
In 1958, a deed of donation was executed by Celestina Ganuelas in favor of petitioner, UrsulinaGanuelas and is read as follows:
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE,and of the faithful services the latter has rendered in the past to the former, the said DONORdoes by these presents transfer and convey, by way of DONATION, unto the DONEE the
property above, described, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; but in the eventthat the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescindedand of no further force and effect.
The deed has an attestation clause that reads as follows:SIGNED by the above-named donor, Celestina Ganuelas, at the foot of thi s deed of donationmortis causa, consisting of two (2) pages and on the left margin of each and every page thereof
in the joint presence of all of us who at her request and in her presence and that of each otherhave in like manner subscribed our names as witnesses.
In 1967, the donor executed a document denominated as Revocation of Donation purporting to
set aside the deed of donation. More than a month later, Celestina died without issue and any surviving
ascendants and siblings.
Issue: Whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.
Held: The Deed of Donation is mortis causa.There is nothing therein which indicates that any right,
title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina.
The phrase to become effective upon the death of the DONOR admits of no other interpretation butthat Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not during
her lifetime.
More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before the donor,
the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect shows that the donation is apostmortem disposition.
Moreso, the deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation as mortis
causa.As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causadisposition, the formalities of a will
should have been complied with, failing which the donation is void and produces no effect.
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SICADvs.COURT OF APPEALSGR No. 125888 August 13, 1998
Facts: Aurora Montinola executed in 1979 a DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS to her three
grandchildren. The deed of donation expressed her wish that the donation take effect only after ten (10)years from her death and that the deed include a prohibition on the sale of the property for such period.She had the old title cancelled and was issued a new title but retained the owners duplicate copy of the
new one. She continued, as explicitly authorized in the deed itself, to possess her property, enjoy its
fruits and otherwise exercise the rights of dominion, paying the property taxes as they fell due.In 1987, she drew up a deed of revocation of the donation. She then filed in 1990, a petition to
cancel the new title and reinstate the old one. Her petition was founded on the theory that the donation toher three (3) grandchildren was one mortis causa which thus had to comply with the formalities of a
will; and since it had not, the donation was void.The donees (Montinolas grandchildren) opposed the petition. They averred that the donation in
their favor was one inter vivoswhich, having fully complied with the requirements was perfectly valid
and efficacious.
Issue: Whether the donation is mortis causa or inter vivos?
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TOPIC: Converting Legal Redemption to Conventional Redemption
Gajudo vs Traders Royal BankG.R. No. 151098 March 21, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner, Danilo Chua obtained a loan from respondent bank in the amount of P75,000.00 secured by areal estate mortgage over a parcel of land and owned in common by Erlinda, Fernando, Estelita and Baltazar
Gajudo. When the loan was not paid, respondent bank commenced extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings on theproperty. The Sheriff sold the property to the respondent bank, the highest bidder therein, for the sum
of P24,911.30. The Certificate of Sale following the extrajudicial public auction of the property was registered
on June 21, 1982.In February 17, 1984, Petitioner Chua proposed through a letter to the respondent to pay the redemption
price for the property and made an initial payment thereon in the amount of P4,000.00. But the bank in a letter
dated February 20, 1984 refused to accede to his request because the one-year redemption period had already
lapsed. The initial payment was receipted by respondent bank which the latter noted as deposit only. Thebank, though, offered to sell back the property to him at the current market value.
Petitioner Chua readily expressed in a letter his willingness to settle his account with the respondentbank, but that his present financial situation precludes him from effecting an immediate settlement. Petitioner
proposed to pay in three or four installments without a specification of dates for the payments.
Petitioners insist, though, thatthey had the right to repurchase the property through conventional
redemption, as provided under Article 1601 of the Civil Code, worded as follows:ART. 1601. Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves the right torepurchase the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with the provisions of Article 1616 andother stipulations which may have been agreed upon.
Issue: Whether the right of legal redemption of petitioners can be converted into conventional
redemption?
Held:
The Court ruled in the negative.
It is true that the one-year period of redemption provided by lawunder which the property here was sold
in a foreclosure sale -- is only directory and, as such can be extended by agreement of the parties. However, it
has also been held that for legal redemption to be converted into conventional redemption, two requisites mustbe established: 1) voluntary agreement of the parti es to extend the redemption peri od; and 2) the debtorscommitment to pay the redemption pr ice on a fixed date.Thus, assuming that an offer was made to Petitioner
Chua to buy back the property after the lapse of the period of legal redemption, petitioners needed to show that
the parties had agreed to extend the period, and that Petitioner Chua had committed to pay the redemption priceon a fixed date.
The letters sent by the bank to Petitioner Chua do not convincingly show that the parties arrived at
a firm agreement for the repurchase of the property. What can be gleaned from the letter is that Petitioner
Chua proposed to pay the redemption price for the property, but that the bank refused to accede to his request,because the one-year redemption period had already lapsed. The bank, though, had offered to sell back the
property to him at the current market value.
More important, there was no showing that petitioners had committed to pay the redemption price
on a fixed date. True, Petitioner Chua had attempted to establish a previous agreement to repurchase the
property for less than its fair market value. Petitioners were unable to establish a firm commitment on their
part to pay the redemption price on a fixed date. The February 17 letter of Petitioner Chua to the bank clearlymanifested that he was not capable of paying the account immediately. For this reason, he proposed to pay inthree or four installments without a specification of dates for the payments, but with a plea for a reduction of
the interest charges. That proposal was rejected.
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TOPIC: Equitable Mortgage vs Pactro de Retro Sale
HEIRS OF JOSE REYES, JR. vs AMANDA S. REYES, et al.
G.R. No. 158377 August 13, 2010
Facts:In 1955, Leoncia and her three sons (Teofilo, Jose Sr., and Jose Jr.) executed a Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling
Muli, whereby they sold their land and its existing improvements to the Spouses Francia for P500.00, subject to the
vendors right to repurchase for the same amountsa oras na sila'y makinabang. Leoncias sons and their respectivefamilies remained in possession of the property and paid the realty taxes thereon. They did not repay the amount
of P500.00.Alejandro, the son of Jose, Sr., paid to the heirs of Spouses Francia the amount for the obligation of Leoncia, his
uncles and his father (still alive at that time) and eventually, Alejandro was able to secure a deed entitled Pagsasa-ayos ng
Pag-aari at Pagsasalin, executed by the heirs of the Spouses Franciawhereby they transferred and conveyed to Alejandroall their rights and interests in the property for P500.00.
In 1970, Alejandro executed aKasulatan ng Pagmeme-ari, wherein he declared that he had acquired all the rightsand interests of the heirs of the Spouses Francia, including the ownership of the property, after the vendors had failed torepurchase within the given period. Nevertheless, Alejandro, his grandmother (Leoncia), and his father (Jose, Sr.)
executed aMagkakalakip na Salaysay, by which Alejandro acknowledged the right of Leoncia, Jose, Jr., and Jose, Sr.torepurchase the property at any timefor the same amount of P500.00.
In 1993, Alejandro died intestate and was survived by his wife, Amanda Reyes, and their children, (respondentsherein). In 1994, respondent Amanda Reyes asked the heirs of Teofilo and Jose, Jr., to vacate the property because sheand her children already needed it.
Issues: (a) Whether the transaction (Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli) entered into by petitionerspredecessors-in-interest was an equitable mortgage and not apacto de retro sale.
(b) Whether the petitioners now barred from claiming that the transaction under the Kasulatan ng BilingMabibiling Muli was an equitable mortgage by their failure to redeem the property for a long period of time?
Held: (a) TheKasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muliwas an equitable mortgage, not apacto de retrosale. Therewas no dispute that the purported vendors had continued in the possession of the property even after the execution of the
agreement; and that the property had remained declared for taxation purposes under Leoncias name, with the realty taxesdue being paid by Leoncia, despite the execution of the agreement.
(b) The Court ruled that the petitioners are not barred from claiming that the transaction was anequitable mortgage. It considered as meritorious the contention of the petitioners thatprescription, if it must apply tothem, should as well be applied to the respondents, who had similarly failed to enforce their right under the equitablemortgage within ten years from its execution. The Court reasoned that;
Considering thatsa oras na silay makinabang,the period of redemption stated in
the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli, signified that no definite period had been stated, theperiod to redeem should be ten years from the execution of the contract. Upon the expiration ofsaid 10-year period, mortgagees Spouses Francia or their heirs should have foreclosed themortgage, but they did not do so. Instead, they accepted Alejandros payments, until the debt was
fully satisfied in 1970.The acceptance of the payments even beyond the 10-year period of redemption estoppedthe mortgagees heirs from insisting that the period to redeem the property had already expired.
Their actions impliedly recognized the continued existence of the equitable mortgage. The conductof the original parties as well as of their successors-in-i nterest manifested that the parties tothe Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli really intended their transaction to be an equitable
mortgage, not a pacto de retro sale.Therefore, the original intention of the parties to theKasulatanng Biling Mabibiling Muli should
be upheld, without taking prescription into account, because both parties did not enforce their respective rights within theten-year prescriptive period and is more in keeping with fairness and equity.
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