G.R. No. 162419 July 10, 2007PAUL V. SANTIAGO,petitioner,vs.CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC.,respondent.D E C I S I O NTINGA,J.:At the heart of this case involving a contract between a seafarer, on one hand, and the manning agent and the foreign principal, on the other, is this erstwhile unsettled legal quandary: whether the seafarer, who was prevented from leaving the port of Manila and refused deployment without valid reason but whose POEA-approved employment contract provides that the employer-employee relationship shall commence only upon the seafarers actual departure from the port in the point of hire, is entitled to relief?This treats of the petition for review filed by Paul V. Santiago (petitioner) assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 16 October 2003 and 19 February 2004, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 68404.1Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc. (respondent) for about five (5) years.2On 3 February 1998, petitioner signed a new contract of employment with respondent, with the duration of nine (9) months. He was assured of a monthly salary of US$515.00, overtime pay and other benefits. The following day or on 4 February 1998, the contract was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Petitioner was to be deployed on board the "MSV Seaspread" which was scheduled to leave the port of Manila for Canada on 13 February 1998.A week before the scheduled date of departure, Capt. Pacifico Fernandez, respondents Vice President, sent a facsimile message to the captain of "MSV Seaspread," which reads:I received a phone call today from the wife of Paul Santiago in Masbate asking me not to send her husband to MSV Seaspread anymore. Other callers who did not reveal their identity gave me some feedbacks that Paul Santiago this time if allowed to depart will jump ship in Canada like his brother Christopher Santiago, O/S who jumped ship from the C.S. Nexus in Kita-kyushu, Japan last December, 1997.We do not want this to happen again and have the vessel penalized like the C.S. Nexus in Japan.Forewarned is forearmed like his brother when his brother when he was applying he behaved like a Saint but in his heart he was a serpent. If you agree with me then we will send his replacement.Kindly advise.3To this message the captain of "MSV Seaspread" replied:Many thanks for your advice concerning P. Santiago, A/B. Please cancel plans for him to return to Seaspread.4On 9 February 1998, petitioner was thus told that he would not be leaving for Canada anymore, but he was reassured that he might be considered for deployment at some future date.Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages, and attorney's fees against respondent and its foreign principal, Cable and Wireless (Marine) Ltd.5The case was raffled to Labor Arbiter Teresita Castillon-Lora, who ruled that the employment contract remained valid but had not commenced since petitioner was not deployed. According to her, respondent violated the rules and regulations governing overseas employment when it did not deploy petitioner, causing petitioner to suffer actual damages representing lost salary income for nine (9) months and fixed overtime fee, all amounting to US$7, 209.00.The labor arbiter held respondent liable. The dispositive portion of her Decision dated 29 January 1999 reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby Ordered to pay complainant actual damages in the amount of US$7,209.00 plus 10% attorney's fees, payable in Philippine peso at the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment.All the other claims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.6On appeal by respondent, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled that there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent because under the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels (POEA Standard Contract), the employment contract shall commence upon actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport at the point of hire and with a POEA-approved contract. In the absence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties, the claims for illegal dismissal, actual damages, and attorneys fees should be dismissed.7On the other hand, the NLRC found respondents decision not to deploy petitioner to be a valid exercise of its management prerogative.8The NLRC disposed of the appeal in this wise:WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the assailed Decision dated January 29, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED in so far as other claims are concerned and with MODIFICATION by VACATING the award of actual damages and attorneys fees as well as excluding Pacifico Fernandez as party respondent.SO ORDERED.9Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the NLRCs Decision but his motion was denied for lack of merit.10He elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari.In its Decision11dated 16 October 2003, the Court of Appeals noted that there is an ambiguity in the NLRCs Decision when it affirmed with modification the labor arbiters Decision, because by the very modification introduced by the Commission (vacating the award of actual damages and attorneys fees), there is nothing more left in the labor arbiters Decision to affirm.12According to the appellate court, petitioner is not entitled to actual damages because damages are not recoverable by a worker who was not deployed by his agency within the period prescribed inthe POEA Rules.13It agreed with the NLRCs finding that petitioners non-deployment was a valid exercise of respondents management prerogative.14It added that since petitioner had not departed from the Port of Manila, no employer-employee relationship between the parties arose and any claim for damages against the so-called employer could have no leg to stand on.15Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied on 19 February 2004.16The present petition is anchored on two grounds, to wit:A. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a serious error of law when it ignored [S]ection 10 of Republic Act [R.A.] No. 8042 otherwise known as the Migrant Workers Act of 1995 as well as Section 29 of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels (which is deemed incorporated under the petitioners POEA approved Employment Contract) that the claims or disputes of the Overseas Filipino Worker by virtue of a contract fall within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC.B. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a serious error when it disregarded the required quantum of proof in labor cases, which is substantial evidence, thus a total departure from established jurisprudence on the matter.17Petitioner maintains that respondent violated the Migrant Workers Act and the POEA Rules when it failed to deploy him within thirty (30) calendar days without a valid reason. In doing so, it had unilaterally and arbitrarily prevented the consummation of the POEA- approved contract. Since it prevented his deployment without valid basis, said deployment being a condition to the consummation of the POEA contract, the contract is deemed consummated, and therefore he should be awarded actual damages, consisting of the stipulated salary and fixed overtime pay.18Petitioner adds that since the contract is deemed consummated, he should be considered an employee for all intents and purposes, and thus the labor arbiter and/or the NLRC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of his claims.19Petitioner additionally claims that he should be considered a regular employee, having worked for five (5) years on board the same vessel owned by the same principal and manned by the same local agent. He argues that respondents act of not deploying him was a scheme designed to prevent him from attaining the status of a regular employee.20Petitioner submits that respondent had no valid and sufficient cause to abandon the employment contract, as it merely relied upon alleged phone calls from his wife and other unnamed callers in arriving at the conclusion that he would jump ship like his brother. He points out that his wife had executed an affidavit21strongly denying having called respondent, and that the other alleged callers did not even disclose their identities to respondent.22Thus, it was error for the Court of Appeals to adopt the unfounded conclusion of the NLRC, as the same was not based on substantial evidence.23On the other hand, respondent argues that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to award petitioners monetary claims. His employment with respondent did not commence because his deployment was withheld for a valid reason. Consequently, the labor arbiter and/or the NLRC cannot entertain adjudication of petitioners case much less award damages to him. The controversy involves a breach of contractual obligations and as such is cognizable by civil courts.24On another matter, respondent claims that the second issue posed by petitioner involves a recalibration of facts which is outside the jurisdiction of this Court.25There is some merit in the petition.There is no question that the parties entered into an employment contract on 3 February 1998, whereby petitioner was contracted by respondent to render services on board "MSV Seaspread" for the consideration of US$515.00 per month for nine (9) months, plus overtime pay. However, respondent failed to deploy petitioner from the port of Manila to Canada. Considering that petitioner was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in the point of hire, the employment contract did not commence, and no employer-employee relationship was created between the parties.26However, a distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the employer-employee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.Moreover, while the POEA Standard Contract must be recognized and respected, neither the manning agent nor the employer can simply prevent a seafarer from being deployed without a valid reason.Respondents act of preventing petitioner from departing the port of Manila and boarding "MSV Seaspread" constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to petitioners cause of action. Respondent unilaterally and unreasonably reneged on its obligation to deploy petitioner and must therefore answer for the actual damages he suffered.We take exception to the Court of Appeals conclusion that damages are not recoverable by a worker who was not deployed by his agency. The fact that the POEA Rules27are silent as to the payment of damages to the affected seafarer does not mean that the seafarer is precluded from claiming the same. The sanctions provided for non-deployment do not end with the suspension or cancellation of license or fine and the return of all documents at no cost to the worker. They do not forfend a seafarer from instituting an action for damages against the employer or agency which has failed to deploy him.The POEA Rules only provide sanctions which the POEA can impose on erring agencies. It does not provide for damages and money claims recoverable by aggrieved employees because it is not the POEA, but the NLRC, which has jurisdiction over such matters.Despite the absence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent, the Court rules that the NLRC has jurisdiction over petitioners complaint. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters is not limited to claims arising from employer-employee relationships. Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act), provides that:Sec. 10.Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. x x x [Emphasis supplied]Since the present petition involves the employment contract entered into by petitioner for overseas employment, his claims are cognizable by the labor arbiters of the NLRC.Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Respondent is thus liable to pay petitioner actual damages in the form of the loss of nine (9) months worth of salary as provided in the contract. He is not, however, entitled to overtime pay. While the contract indicated a fixed overtime pay, it is not a guarantee that he would receive said amount regardless of whether or not he rendered overtime work. Even though petitioner was "prevented without valid reason from rendering regular much less overtime service,"28the fact remains that there is no certainty that petitioner will perform overtime work had he been allowed to board the vessel. The amount of US$286.00 stipulated in the contract will be paid only if and when the employee rendered overtime work. This has been the tenor of our rulings in the case ofStolt-Nielsen Marine Services (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission29where we discussed the matter in this light:The contract provision means that the fixed overtime pay of 30% would be the basis for computing the overtime pay if and when overtime work would be rendered. Simply stated, the rendition of overtime work and the submission of sufficient proof that said work was actually performed are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman could be entitled to overtime pay which should be computed on the basis of 30% of the basic monthly salary. In short, the contract provision guarantees the right to overtime pay but the entitlement to such benefit must first be established. Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very nature of his job, stays on board a ship or vessel beyond the regular eight-hour work schedule. For the employer to give him overtime pay for the extra hours when he might be sleeping or attending to his personal chores or even just lulling away his time would be extremely unfair and unreasonable.30The Court also holds that petitioner is entitled to attorneys fees in the concept of damages and expenses of litigation. Attorney's fees are recoverable when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest.31We note that respondents basis for not deploying petitioner is the belief that he will jump ship just like his brother, a mere suspicion that is based on alleged phone calls of several persons whose identities were not even confirmed. Time and again, this Court has upheld management prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employers interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements.32Respondents failure to deploy petitioner is unfounded and unreasonable, forcing petitioner to institute the suit below. The award of attorneys fees is thus warranted.However, moral damages cannot be awarded in this case. While respondents failure to deploy petitioner seems baseless and unreasonable, we cannot qualify such action as being tainted with bad faith, or done deliberately to defeat petitioners rights, as to justify the award of moral damages. At most, respondent was being overzealous in protecting its interest when it became too hasty in making its conclusion that petitioner will jump ship like his brother.We likewise do not see respondents failure to deploy petitioner as an act designed to prevent the latter from attaining the status of a regular employee. Even if petitioner was able to depart the port of Manila, he still cannot be considered a regular employee, regardless of his previous contracts of employment with respondent. InMillares v. National Labor Relations Commission,33the Court ruled that seafarers are considered contractual employees and cannot be considered as regular employees under the Labor Code. Their employment is governed by the contracts they sign every time they are rehired and their employment is terminated when the contract expires. The exigencies of their work necessitates that they be employed on a contractual basis.34WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Decision dated 16 October 2003 and the Resolution dated 19 February 2004 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of Labor Arbiter Teresita D. Castillon-Lora dated 29 January 1999 is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that respondent CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc. is ordered to pay actual or compensatory damages in the amount of US$4,635.00representing salary for nine (9) months as stated in the contract, and attorneys fees at the reasonable rate of 10% of the recoverable amount.SO ORDERED.

JEBSENS MARITIME INC.,represented by MS. ARLENEASUNCIONand/or ALLIANCE MARINE SERVICES, LTD.,Petitioners,- versus -ENRIQUE UNDAG, Respondent..

D E C I S I O NMENDOZA,J.:This petition for review assails the September 16, 2009 Decision[1]and the March 3, 2010 Resolution[2]of the Court of Appeals(CA),which set aside the October 17, 2005 and January 24, 2006 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission(NLRC),dismissing the complaint of respondent Enrique Undag(respondent)for disability benefits.Records bear out that respondent was hired as Lead Operator on board the vessel FPSO Jamestown owned by Alliance Marine Services, Ltd. and managed by its local agent, Jebsens Maritime, Inc.(petitioners).Respondents contract with petitioners was for a period of four (4) months with a basic salary of US$806.00 a month. He was deployed on March 24, 2003 and eventually repatriated to the Philippines on July 18, 2003 after his contract with the petitioners had expired.OnSeptember 24, 2003, about two months after repatriation, he went to see a physician, Dr. Efren Vicaldo(Dr. Vicaldo), for a physical check-up and was diagnosed to have Hypertensive cardiovascular disease, Atrial Fibrillation, Diabetes Mellitus II, Impediment Grade X (20.15%). According to Dr. Vicaldo, respondent had a history of hypertension and diabetes and was at risk of developing a stroke, coronary artery disease and congestive heart failure. He likewise stated that respondents ailment was aggravated by his work as a seaman and that he was no longer fit for work. For said reason, respondent requested for financial assistance from petitioners but the latter denied his request.Constrained, he filed a complaint for sickness benefits against petitioners before theNLRC,alleging that he had been suffering from chest pains and difficulty of breathing since July 2003 when he was on board petitioners vessel. Despite knowing his bad physical condition upon repatriation, the petitioners did not give him any financial assistance. Thus,he prayed that petitioners be ordered to reimburse him for his medical expenses and pay him sickness allowance amounting to US$3,224.00, including damages and attorneys fees.Petitioners countered that respondent was not entitled to disability benefits because his repatriation was not due to medical reasons but due to the expiration of his employment contract. Petitioners basically argued that, under the POEA Standard Employment Contract(POEA-SEC), a seafarer was entitled to disability benefits only if he had suffered a work-related illness during the term of his contract.On June 30, 2005, after due hearing, the Labor Arbiter(LA)rendered a decision ordering petitioners to pay, jointly and severally, respondent the Philippine peso equivalent of US$60,000.00 representing total permanent disability compensation benefits for US$3,224.00 sickness allowance, and 10% attorneys fees.On appeal, however, the NLRCreversedthe LA decisionand denied respondents claim for disability benefits. The NLRC reasoned out that respondent failed to present substantial evidence proving that he had suffered any illness while on board or after disembarking from petitioners vessel. Respondents motion for reconsideration was later denied.Not satisfied with the NLRC decision, respondent appealed before the CA. OnSeptember 16, 2009, the CA rendered a decisionsetting asidethe ruling of the NLRC. The appellate court stated that respondent was able to prove by substantial evidence that his work as a seafarer caused his hypertensive cardiovascular disease or, at least, was a relevant factor in contracting his illness. The CA explained that as Lead Operator, respondent performed multi-tasking functions which required excessive physical and mental effort.Moreover, he was also exposed to the perils of the sea and was made to endure unpredictable and extreme climate changes in the daily performance of his job. The CA also took judicial notice of the fact that overseas workers suffer a great degree of emotional strain while on duty on board vessels because of their being separated from their families for the duration of their contract. The CA was of the strong view that the inherent difficulties in respondents job definitely caused his illness. The CA added that because of the nature of his work, the illness suffered by respondent contributed to the aggravation of his injury which was pre-existing at the time of his employment. Finally, the CA ruled that respondent is entitled to claim total and permanent disability benefits because of the undisputed doctors findings that he is now unfit to resume work as a seaman in any capacity, which clearly constitutes a permanent and total disability as defined by law.Not in conformity with the CA decision, petitioners filed this petition for review praying for its reversal raising this loneISSUEWHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING FULL DISABILITY BENEFITS TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

In advocacy of their position, petitioners argue that the CA committed a reversible error in awarding respondent disability benefits on the principal ground that there are numerous substantial and competent evidence on record which clearly establish the fact that respondent was guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation, hence, forfeiting his right to any benefits under the POEA contract. For one, respondent intentionally lied when he declared that he was not suffering from a previous medical condition in his pre-employment medical examination(PEME). Specifically, he failed to disclose the fact that he was suffering from diabetes and heart problem, which is a clear case of concealment.Secondly, respondents illnesses were not acquired during the term of his contract with petitioners. He had no evidence showing that he acquired the heart problem and hypertension while he was on board the vessel. The fact that respondent passed his PEMEdoes not automatically mean that he suffered his illness on board the vessel or that the same was not pre-existing.Third, the Labor Code provision onpermanent disability is not applicable in a claim for disability benefits under the POEA contract.Respondents PositionRespondent counters that petitioners never raised the issue of fraudulent misrepresentation before the labor tribunals despite being given the opportunity to do so. Hence, they are estopped from raising it for the first time on appeal. At any rate, he claims that he did not commit any fraud or misrepresentation because he underwent a stringentPEME,which included a blood and urine examination, conducted by the company-designated physician. His illness, therefore, was not pre-existing.In any case, the pre-existence of an illness is not a bar for the compensability of a seafarers illness. His non-compliance with the mandatory 3-day reporting upon signoff is irrelevant because it only applies to a seafarer who has signed off from the vessel for medical reasons.Moreover, respondent argues that a repatriation due to a finished contract does not preclude a seafarer from recovery of benefits, as the only requirement is that the disease must be a consequence or a result of the work performed.He has shown by substantial evidence that his cardiovascular disease was work-related. The strenuous work conditions that he experienced while on sea duty coupled with his usual encounter with the unfriendly forces of nature increased the risk of contracting his heart ailment.Lastly, he asserts that his disability is permanent and total because he has been declared to be unfit for sea duty for which he is entitled to recover attorneys fees and litigation costs under Article 2208.THE COURTS RULINGNo substantial evidence that illness was work-relatedEntitlement of seamen on overseas work to disabilitybenefits is a matter governed, not only by medical findings, but by law and by contract. The material statutory provisions are Articles 191 to 193 under Chapter VI (Disability Benefits) of the Labor Code, in relation with Rule X of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Book IV of the Labor Code.By contract, the POEA-SEC, as provided under Department Order No. 4, series of 2000 of the Department of Labor and Employment, and the parties Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) bind the seaman and his employer to each other.[3]Deemed incorporated in every Filipino seafarerscontract of employment, denominated as POEA-SEC or the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract,is a set of standard provisions established and implemented by the POEA, called the Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, which contain the minimum requirements prescribed by the government for the employment of Filipino seafarers. Section 20(B), paragraph 6, of the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions provides:SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITSx x xB.COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESSThe liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:X x x6.In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of this Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, two elements must concur for an injury or illness to be compensable.First, that the injury or illness must be work-related; and second, that the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarers employment contract.The 2000 POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions defines "work-related injury" as "injury(ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the course of employment" and "work-related illness" as "any sickness resulting in disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied." These are:SECTION 32-A.OCCUPATIONAL DISEASESFor an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:1) The seafarers work must involve the risks described herein;2)The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarers exposure to the described risks;3)The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and4)There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.Sec. 32-A(11) of the 2000 POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions explicitly considers a cardiovasculardisease as an occupational disease if the same was contracted underworkingconditions thatinvolveany ofthefollowing risks a)If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the nature of his work.b)The strain of the work that brings about an acute attack must be sufficient severity and must be followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship.c)If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship.Consequently, for cardiovascular disease to constitute an occupational disease for which the seafarer may claim compensation, it is incumbent upon said seafarer to show that he developed the same under any of the three conditions identified above.[4]In labor cases as in other administrative proceedings, substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion is required. The oft-repeated rule is that whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence.[5]Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. The evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by law is real and not merely apparent.[6]In this case, the Court is of the considered view that respondent failed to prove that his ailment was work-related and was acquired during his 4-month sea deployment. Respondent claims that sometime in July 2003, he showed manifestations of a heart disease when he suddenly felt chest pains, shortness of breath and fatigability.[7]He, however, never substantiated such claim. He never showed any written note, request or record about any medical check-up, consultation or treatment.Similarly, he failed to substantiate his allegation that after his arrival inManilaonJuly 18, 2003, he reported to petitioners office onJuly 31, 2003to seek medical consultation for the discomfort he was experiencing but petitioners ignored him.[8]He also alleged that onAugust 4, 2003, more or less sixteen (16) days after arriving inManila, he underwent a physical and laboratory examination at the Maritime Clinic for International Service, Inc. conducted by petitioners where he was declared to be unfit for sea duty. Again, there is no record of this except his self-serving claim. What is on record is that onSeptember 24, 2003, respondent surfaced demanding payment of disability benefits.Respondent failed to comply with the mandatory 3-day ruleMore importantly, respondent failed to comply with the mandatory 3-day medical examination deadline provided in Section 20(B), paragraph (3) of the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels. As earlier stated, it was only onSeptember 24, 2003, or more than two (2) months after his arrival inManila, that he sought a medical opinion from Dr. Vicaldo who declared him unfit to work as a seaman due to hypertensive cardiovascular disease, atrial fibrillation and diabetes mellitus II.[9]Section 20(B), paragraph (3) of the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, reads:Section 20(B), paragraph (3) thereof states:X x x.3. Upon sign off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one-hundred twenty (120) days.For this purpose, the seafarershall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his returnexceptwhen he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance.Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

While the rule is not absolute, there is no credible explanation from respondent why he failed to comply with the mandatory rule considering his claim that in July, 2003, he was suffering from chest pain, shortness of breath and fatigue. An award of disability benefit to a seaman in this case, despite non-compliance with strict mandatory requirements of the law, cannot be sustained.The rationale behind the rule can easily be divined. Within three days from repatriation, it would be fairly easier for a physician to determine if the illness was work-related or not.After that period, there would be difficulty in ascertaining the real cause of the illness.To ignore the rule would set a precedent with negative repercussions because it would open the floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers claiming disability benefits.It would certainly be unfair to the employer who would have difficulty determining the cause of a claimants illness considering the passage of time. In such a case, the employers would have no protection against unrelated disability claims.Respondent claims that the 3-day mandatory rule is not applicable as it is only for those who were repatriated for medical reasons. This could only mean that he had no medical reason then.In his pleadings, he claimed that sometime in July 2003, he showed manifestations of a heart disease as he suddenly felt chest pains, shortness of breath and fatigability.[10]He, however, failed to disclose when exactly in July 2003 that he felt those manifestations whether before or after his repatriation onJuly 18, 2003. If it was before the said date, he should have submitted himself to a medical examination three days after repatriation.The Courts ruling is not novel.In the past, the Court repeatedly denied the payment of disability benefits to seamen who failed to comply with the mandatory reporting and examination requirement. Lately, in the recent case ofAlex C. Cootauco v. MMS Phil. Maritime Services, Inc.,[11]it was written:For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by acompany-designatedphysician within three working daysupon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three working days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment.

Applying the above provision of Section 20(B), paragraph (3), petitioner is required to undergo post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days from arrival, except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period would suffice.In Maunlad Transport, Inc. v. Manigo, Jr., this Court explicitly declared that it is mandatory for a claimant to be examined by a company-designated physicianwithin three daysfrom his repatriation. The unexplained omission of this requirement will bar the filing of a claim for disability benefits.The NLRC and the Court of Appeals determined that petitioner did not observe the established procedure as there is no proof at all that he reported to the office of the respondents. We see no reason to depart from their findings. While petitioner remains firm that he reported to the office of the respondents for mandatory reporting, the records are bereft of any proof to fortify his claim. The onus probandi falls on petitioner to establish or substantiate such claim by the requisite quantum of evidence. There is absolutely no evidence on record to prove petitioners claim that he reported to respondents office for mandatory reportorial requirement. Petitioner therefore failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of relief. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]The Court reiterated the same ruling in the case ofCoastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc. vs. Elmer T. Esguerra,[12]where it was written:For this purpose, the seafarershall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician withinthree working daysupon his returnexcept when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.Theforegoing provision has been interpreted to mean that it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman's disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter's employment. Concededly, this does not mean that the assessment of said physician is final, binding or conclusive on the claimant, the labor tribunal or the courts. Should he be so minded, the seafarer has the prerogative to request a second opinion and to consult a physician of his choice regarding his ailment or injury, in which case the medical report issued by the latter shall be evaluated by the labor tribunal and the court, based on its inherent merit. For the seamans claim to prosper, however, it is mandatory that he should be examined by a company-designated physician within three days from his repatriation. Failure to comply with this mandatory reporting requirement without justifiable cause shall result in forfeiture of the right to claim the compensation and disability benefits provided under the POEA-SEC. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]WHEREFORE,the petition isGRANTED.TheSeptember 16, 2009Decision of the Court of Appeals and its March 3, 2010 Resolution are herebyREVERSEDandSET ASIDE,andtheOctober 17, 2005andJanuary 24, 2006Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission areREINSTATED.SO ORDERED.

FLOURISH MARITIME SHIPPING and LOLITA UY,Petitioners,- versus -DONATO A. ALMANZOR,Respondent.

DECISIONThis is a Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals datedFebruary 27, 2007and its Resolution[2]datedMay 18, 2007in CA-G.R. SP No. 95056.The assailed Decision affirmed with modification the Decision[3]of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) datedApril 28, 2006in NLRC NCR CA NO. 046596-05 which, in turn, affirmed the Decision[4]of Labor Arbiter Lutricia F. Quitevis-Alconcel, datedOctober 7, 2005in OFW NLRC CASE NO. (M) 05-01-0243-00.The facts of the case are as follows:Respondent Donato A. Almanzor entered into a two-year employment contract with Flourish Maritime Shipping as fisherman, with a monthly salary of NT15,840.00 with free meals every day.It was, likewise, agreed that respondent would be provided with suitable accommodations.[5]OnOctober 1, 2004, respondent was deployed toTaipei,Taiwanas part of the crew of a fishing vessel known as FV Tsang Cheng 66.Respondent was surprised to learn that there were only five (5) crew members on board and he had to buy his own food, contrary to the agreed stipulation of free food and accommodation.[6]While on board, the master of the vessel gave respondent orders which he could not understand; thus, he failed to obey him.Consequently, enraged at not being obeyed, the master struck him, hitting the right dorsal part of his body. He then requested medical assistance, but the master refused.[7]Hence, he sought the help of petitioner Lolita Uy (the manning agency owner), who then talked to the master of the vessel.While the vessel was docked at theTaipeiport, respondent was informed that he would be repatriated.Upon his arrival in thePhilippines, he reported to petitioners and sought medical assistance after which he was declared fit to work.Petitioners promised that he would be redeployed, but it turned out that it was no longer possible because of hisage, for then he was already 49 years old.Thus, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment for the unexpired portion of his employment contract, earned wages, moral and exemplary damages plus attorneys fees.Petitioners countered that respondent voluntarily resigned[8]from his employment and returned to thePhilippineson the same day.They, likewise, sought the dismissal of the complaint for failure of respondent to comply with the grievance machinery and arbitration clause embodied in the contract of employment.Lastly, they insisted that respondent failed to discharge the burden to prove that he was illegally dismissed.[9]OnOctober 7, 2005, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring respondents guilty of illegal dismissal.Respondents Flourish Maritime Shipping and Wang Yung Chin are hereby ordered to jointly and solidarily pay complainant Donato A. Almanzor the amount of NT15,840.00 times six (6) months or a total of NT Ninety-Five Thousand Forty (NT95,040.00).Respondents shall pay the total amount in its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment plus legal interest.All other claims herein sought and prayed for are hereby denied for lack of legal and factual bases.SO ORDERED.[10]On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmedin totothe Labor Arbiters findings.Unsatisfied, petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals on petition forcertiorari.[11]The appellate court agreed with the Labor Arbiters conclusion (as affirmed by the NLRC) that respondent was illegally dismissed from employment.It, however, modified the NLRC decision by increasing the monetary award due respondent in accordance with its interpretation of Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) 8042.[12]Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC Board of Commissioners awarded such amount equivalent to respondents salary for six (6) months (3 months for every year of the unexpired term) considering that respondents employment contract covered a two-year period and he was dismissed from employment after only 26 days of actual work.The CA, however, disagreed with such interpretation.According to the CA, since respondent actually worked for 26 days and was thereafter dismissed from employment, the unexpired portion of the contract is one (1) year, eleven (11) months and four (4) days.For the unexpired one (second) whole year, the court awarded three months salary.As to the 11 months and 4 days of the first year, the appellate court refused to apply the three-month rule.Instead, in addition to three months (for the unexpired second year), it awarded full compensation corresponding to the whole unexpired term of 11 months and 4 days.Thus, the CA deemed it proper to award a total amount equivalent to the respondents salary for 14 months and 4 days.[13]Petitioners now raise the following issues for resolution:1.WHETHER OR NOT THE THREE LETTERS ARE RESIGNATION LETTERS OR QUITCLAIMS.2.WHETHER OR NOT THE MODIFICATION OF THE NLRC DECISION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.[14]Simply stated, petitioners want this Court to resolve the issue of whether respondent was illegally dismissed from employment and if so, to determine the correct award of compensation due respondent.The Labor Arbiter concluded that petitioners, who had the burden of proof, failed to adduce any convincing evidence to establish and substantiate its claim that respondent voluntarily resigned from employment.[15]Likewise, the NLRC held that petitioners failed to show that respondent was not physically fit to perform work due to his old age.Moreover, the labor tribunal said that petitioners failed to prove that the employment contract indeed provided a grievance machinery.[16]Clearly, both labor tribunals correctly concluded, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that respondent was not redeployed for work, in violation of their employment contract.Perforce, the termination of respondents services is without just or valid cause.We reiterate the dictum that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases.Factual questions are for the labor tribunals to resolve.In this case, the factual issues were resolved by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.Their findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based its determination.[17]On the amount of the award due respondent, Section 10 of R.A. 8042 provides:SECTION 10.Money Claims. x x xx x x xIn case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%)per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.x x x x.The correct interpretation of this provision was settled inMarsaman Manning Agency Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission[18]where this Court held that the choice of which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker,i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract, or three (3) months salary for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or more.[19]The employment contract involved in the instant case covers a two-year period but the overseas contract worker actually worked for only 26 days prior to his illegal dismissal.Thus, the three months salary rule applies.There is a similar factual milieu between the case at bench andOlarte v. Nayona.[20]The only difference lies in the length of the subject employment contract:Olarteinvolved a one-year contract; while the employment in this case covers a two-year period.However, they both fall under the three months salary rule since the term of the contract is at least one year or more.InOlarte,as well as inJSS Indochina Corporation v. Ferrer,[21]we ordered the employer of an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker to pay an amount equivalent to three (3) months salary.We are not in accord with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent should be paid his salaries for 14 months and 4 days.Records show that his actual employment lasted only for 26 days.Applying the above provision, and considering that the employment contract covers a two-year period, we agree with the Labor Arbiters disposition, as affirmed by the NLRC, that respondent is entitled to six (6) months salary.This is obviously what the law provides.WHEREFORE,the petition isPARTIALLY GRANTED.The Decision of the Court of Appeals, datedFebruary 27, 2007, and its Resolution datedMay 18, 2007in CA-G.R. SP No. 95056, areAFFIRMEDwith the MODIFICATIONthat the monetary award to be paid the respondent shall be the amount set forth in the decision of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the NLRC.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170834 August 29, 2008PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.ANTONIO NOGRA,accused-appellant.D E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1dated August 31, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00244 affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Naga City in Criminal Case No. 98-7182, convicting Antonio Nogra (appellant) of large scale illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) in relation to Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. No. 8042),2otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995."3The inculpatory portion of the Information charging one Lorna G. Orciga and appellant with large scale illegal recruitment reads as follows:That sometime during the period of March 1997 to November, 1997 in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the General Manager and Operations Manager of LORAN INTERNATIONAL OVERSEAS RECRUITMENT CO., LTD., with office at Concepcion Grande, Naga City, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist, hire and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement to the herein complaining witnesses RENATO ALDEN, OLIVER SARMIENTO, FE ZABALLA, TEOFILA LUALHATI, PILIPINA MENDOZA and KERWIN DONACAO, but failed to actually deploy them without valid reason, as well as to reimburse their documentation, placement and processing expenses for purposes of deployment despite their repeated demands for the return of the same, to their damage and prejudice in the amounts as may be proven in court.CONTRARY TO LAW.4Only appellant was brought to the jurisdiction of the trial court since Lorna G. Orciga was then and still is at large. Arraigned with the assistance of counsel, appellant entered a plea of "NOT GUILTY" to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial of the case ensued.Of the six complainants, the prosecution was able to present five of them, namely: Renato Alden, Fe Zaballa, Teofila Lualhati, Filipina Mendoza and Kerwin Donacao. Anaielyn Sarmiento, wife of complainant Oliver Sarmiento, also testified for the prosecution.The facts, as established by the prosecution, are aptly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as follows:Appellant held office at Loran International Overseas Recruitment Co., (Loran) in Concepcion Grande, Naga City (p. 4, TSN, October 19, 1998). A nameplate on his table prominently displayed his name and position as operations manager (p. 11, TSN, November 17, 1998; p. 4, TSN, January 12, 1999; p. 21, TSN, November 19, 1998). The license of Loran also indicated appellant as the operations manager (p. 5, TSN, February 10, 1999). The POEA files also reflect his position as operations manager of Loran (Exhibit L to L-4, pp. 5-9, TSN, November 19, 1998).Sometime in December 1996, Renato Alden went to Loran to apply for a job as hotel worker for Saipan. He was interviewed by appellant, who required Alden to submit an NBI clearance and medical certificate and to pay the placement fee. Alden paid the amount ofP31,000.00. The additional amount ofP4,000.00 was to be paid prior to his departure to Saipan (pp. 5-6, TSN, November 17, 1998). Appellant promised Alden that he would leave within a period of three to four months. After one year of waiting Alden was not able to leave. Alden filed a complaint with the NBI when he was not able to recover the amount and could no longer talk with appellant (p. 6, TSN, November 17, 1998).On April 18, 1997, Teofila Lualhati applied for employment as hotel worker for Saipan with Loran (pp. 1-3, 10, TSN, November 19, 1998). Appellant required her to submit an NBI clearance and medical certificate and to pay the processing fee in the amount ofP35,000.00 so she could leave immediately. She paid the amount ofP35,000.00 to Loran's secretary in the presence of appellant. She was promised that within 120 days or 4 months she would be able to leave (pp. 11-13, TSN, November 19, 1998). Despite repeated follow-ups, Lualhati was unable to work in Saipan. She demanded the refund of the processing fee. When the amount was not returned to her, she filed a complaint with the NBI (pp. 14-15, TSN, November 19, 1998).Sometime in April 1998, Filipina Mendoza went to Loran to apply for employment as hotel worker (p. 4, TSN, July 12, 1999). She paid the amount ofP35,000.00 as placement fee. When she was not able to work abroad, she went to Loran and sought the return ofP35,000.00 from appellant (p. 7, TSN, January 21, 1999).Sometime in October 1997, Kerwin Donacao went to Loran to apply for employment as purchaser in Saipan (p. 4, TSN, February 10, 1999). He was required to submit NBI clearance, police clearance, previous employment certificate and his passport. He paid the placement fee ofP35,000.00 (pp.4-5, TSN, February 10, 1999). After paying the amount, he was told to wait for two to three months. When he was not able to leave for Saipan, he demanded the return of the placement fee, which was not refunded (pp. 6-7, TSN, February 10, 1999).During the first week of November 1997, Annelyn Sarmiento and her husband, Oliver Sarmiento, applied for overseas employment. For the application of Oliver Sarmiento, they submitted his medical certificate and certification of previous employment. They were also made to pay the amount ofP27,000.00 as processing fee. Oliver Sarmiento was promised that within 1 month, he would be able to leave. Initially, Oliver Sarmiento was told that allegedly his visa was yet to be obtained. When he was not able to leave and what he paid was not refunded, he filed a complaint with the NBI (pp. 4-6, TSN, April 23, 1999).Sometime in May 1997, Fe Zaballa applied for overseas employment in Saipan with Loran (p. 4, TSN, May 21, 1999). She was required to submit her medical certificate, original copy of her birth certificate, NBI clearance and police clearance. She was also required to pay the amount ofP35,000.00 as placement fee. When she could not be deployed, she sought to recover the amount she paid, which was not returned (pp. 7-8, TSN, May 2, 1999).5On the other hand, appellant presented the following evidence:The defense presented [appellant] Antonio Nogra and the agency's secretary and cashier, Maritess Mesina.From their testimonies it was established that LORAN INTERNATIONAL OVERSEAS RECRUITMENT CO., LTD., (LORAN, for brevity) was owned by accused Lorna Orciga and Japanese national Kataru Tanaka (TSN, September 30, 2000, p. 7). Sometime in July 1994, [appellant] Antonio Nogra read from outside the agency's main office at Libertad, Mandaluyong City that it was in need of a liaison officer. He applied for the position. The part-owner and co-accused, Lorna Orciga, hired him instead as Operations Manager as the agency was then still in the process of completing the list of personnel to be submitted to the POEA. (TSN, January 31, 2001, p. 5).[Appellant] Nogra started working with LORAN in October 1994. In 1995, he was transferred to Naga City when the agency opened a branch office thereat. Although he was designated as the Operations Manager, [appellant] Nogra was a mere employee of the agency. He was receiving a monthly salary ofP5,000.00 and additionalP2,000.00 monthly meal allowance. He was in-charge of the advertisement of the company. He also drove for the company. He fetched from the airport the agency's visitors and guests and drove them to hotels and other places. (TSN, May 3, 2000, pp. 2-9).Although part-owner Lorna Orciga was stationed in Manila, she, however, actually remained in control of the branch office in Naga City. She conducted the final interview of the applicants and transacted with the foreign employers. She also controlled the financial matters and assessment fees of the agency in Naga City (TSN, September 20, 2000, pp. 8-9). The placement and processing fees collected by the agency in Naga City were all deposited in the bank account of Lorna Orciga and not a single centavo went to the benefit of [appellant] Nogra (TSN, January 10, 2000, pp. 14-22).6On March 26, 2003, the RTC rendered Judgment7finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Thefalloof the decision reads:WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ANTONIO NOGRA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment Committed in Large Scale defined under Sections 6(m) and 7(b) of RA 8042, otherwise known as The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 and, accordingly, hereby imposes upon him the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).SO ORDERED.8On April 10, 2003, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.9The RTC ordered the transmittal of the entire records of the case to this Court.Conformably to the ruling inPeople v. Mateo,10the case was referred to the CA for intermediate review.11On August 31, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision12affirming the decision of the RTC. The CA held that being an employee is not a valid defense since employees who have knowledge and active participation in the recruitment activities may be criminally liable for illegal recruitment activities, based upon this Court's ruling inPeople v. Chowdury13andPeople v. Corpuz;14that appellant had knowledge of and active participation in the recruitment activities since all the prosecution witnesses pinpointed appellant as the one whom they initially approached regarding their plans of working overseas and he was the one who told them about the fees they had to pay, as well as the papers that they had to submit; that the mere fact that appellant was not issued special authority to recruit does not exculpate him from any liability but rather strongly suggests his guilt; that appellant's invocation of non-flight cannot be weighed in his favor since there is no established rule that non-flight is, in every instance, an indication of innocence.A Notice of Appeal15having been timely filed by appellant, the CA forwarded the records of the case to this Court for further review.In his Brief, appellant assigns as errors the following:ITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS A MERE EMPLOYEE OF THE RECRUITMENT AGENCY DESPITE HIS DESIGNATION AS ITS OPERATIONS MANAGER.IITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSE-CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT UNDER THE LAW, HE WAS NOT CRIMINALY LIABLE FOR HIS AGENCY'S TRANSACTIONS.16Appellant argues that the agency was under the management and control of Orciga, and that he was a mere employee; that he could not be held personally liable for illegal recruitment in the absence of any showing that he was validly issued special authority to recruit workers, which was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA); that his non-flight is indicative of his innocence.Appellee, through the OSG, counters that appellant is not a mere clerk or secretary of Loran, but its Operations Manager who directly participated in the recruitment scheme by promising private complainants work abroad, but failed to deploy them and refused to reimburse the applicants' placement fees when demanded.The appeal fails. The CA did not commit any error in affirming the decision of the RTC.R.A. No. 8042 broadened the concept of illegal recruitment under theLabor Code17and provided stiffer penalties, especially those that constitute economic sabotage,i.e.,Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment Committed by a Syndicate.Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 defined when recruitment is illegal:SEC. 6.Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged.It shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any person,whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:x x x x(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment; and(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault.Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as offense involving economic sabotage.Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices, and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)In the present case, evidence for the prosecution showed that LoranInternational Overseas Recruitment Co., Ltd. is a duly licensed recruitment agency with authority to establish a branch office. However, under R.A. No. 8042, even a licensee or holder of authority can be held liable for illegal recruitment, should he commit or omit to do any of the acts enumerated in Section 6.Appellant was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale under Section 6 (l) and (m) of R.A. No. 8042. Section 6 (l) refers to the failure to actually deploy without valid reason, as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Section 6 (m) involves the failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases in which the deployment does not actually take place without the workers fault.A thorough scrutiny of the prosecution's evidence reveals that it failed to prove appellant's liability under Section 6 (l) of R.A. No. 8042. The law requires not only that the failure to deploy bewithout valid reason"as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment." The law envisions that there be independent evidence from the DOLE to establish the reason for non-deployment, such as the absence of a proper job order. No document from the DOLE was presented in the present case to establish the reason for the accused's failure to actually deploy private complainants. Thus, appellant cannot be held liable under Section 6 (l) of R.A. No. 8042.As to Section 6 (m) of R.A. No. 8042, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that private complainants made payments to Loran, and appellant failed to reimburse the amounts paid by private complainants when they were not deployed. The prosecution presented the receipts issued by Loran to private complainants evidencing payment of placement fees ranging fromP27,000.00 toP35,000.00.Appellant does not dispute that private complainants were not deployed for overseas work, and that the placement fees they paid were not returned to them despite demand. However, he seeks to exculpate himself on the ground that he is a mere employee of Loran.The Court is unswayed by appellant's contention.The penultimate paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 explicitly states that those criminally liable are the "principals, accomplices, and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable."Contrary to appellant's claim, the testimonies of the complaining witnesses and the documentary evidence for the prosecution clearly established that he was not a mere employee of Loran, but its Operations Manager. The license of Loran, the files of the POEA and the nameplate prominently displayed on his office desk reflected his position as Operations Manager. As such, he received private complainants' job applications; and interviewed and informed them of the agencys requirements prior to their deployment, such as NBI clearance, police clearance, medical certificate, previous employment certificate and the payment of placement fee. He was also responsible for the radio advertisements and leaflets, which enticed complaining witnesses to apply for employment with the agency. Clearly, as Operations Manager, he was in the forefront of the recruitment activities.The defense of being a mere employee is not a shield against his conviction for large scale illegal recruitment. InPeople v. Gasacao18andPeople v. Sagayaga,19the Court reiterated the ruling inPeople v. Cabais,20People v. Chowdury21andPeople v. Corpuz22that an employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal by direct participation, together with its employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in the recruitment process.In the present case, it was clearly established that appellant dealt directly with the private complainants. He interviewed and informed them of the documentary requirements and placement fee. He promised deployment within a three or four month-period upon payment of the fee, but failed to deploy them and to reimburse, upon demand, the placement fees paid.The Court is not persuaded by appellant's argument that his non-flight is indicative of his innocence. Unlike the flight of an accused, which is competent evidence against him tending to establish his guilt, non-flight is simply inaction, which may be due to several factors. It may not be construed as an indication of innocence.23Of marked relevance is the absence of any showing that the private complainants had any ill motive against appellant other than to bring him to the bar of justice to answer for the crime of illegal recruitment. Besides, for strangers to conspire and accuse another stranger of a most serious crime just to mollify their hurt feelings would certainly be against human nature and experience.24Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under the solemnity of an oath deserve full faith and credence.25It is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witnesses credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect by the Supreme Court, particularly when the CA affirmed such findings.26After all, the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of the testimonies of witnesses.27The absence of any showing that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case, or that its assessment was arbitrary, impels the Court to defer to the trial courts determination according credibility to the prosecution evidence.Under the last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042, illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in large scale,viz, committed against three or more persons individually or as a group. In the present case, five complainants testified against appellants acts of illegal recruitment, thereby rendering his acts tantamount to economic sabotage. Under Section 7 (b) of R.A. No. 8042, the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less thanP500,000.00 nor more thanP1,000.000.00 shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage.Thus, the RTC and the CA correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale illegal recruitment.WHEREFORE, the appeal isDISMISSED. The Decision dated August 31, 2995 of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of appellant Antonio Nogra for large scale illegal recruitment under Sections 6 (m) and 7 (b) of Republic Act No. 8042 isAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 178204 August 20, 2008[Formerly G.R. No. 156497]THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,appellee,vs.MARCOS GANIGAN,appellant.D E C I S I O NTINGA,J.:Before us for automatic review is the Decision1dated 14 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of conviction2for the crime of illegal recruitment rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 21.3In an Information filed before the RTC, accused Ruth, Monchito, Eddie, Avelin Sulaiman and Marcos (appellant), all surnamed Ganigan, were charged with illegal recruitment committed as follows:That sometime between the period from July and August 1998 in Plaridel, Bulacan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport workers for employment in New Zealand, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit for a fee the following persons namely: MAURO EUSEBIO, VALENTINO CRISOSTOMO and LEONORA DOMINGO, all residents of Sto. Nio, Plaridel, Bulacan for employment in New Zealand, without first obtaining the required license and/or authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.CONTRARY TO LAW.4Only appellant was arrested. The other accused remained at large.Appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial ensued.The three private complainants, Leonora Domingo (Leonora), Mauro Reyes (Mauro), and Valentino Crisostomo (Valentino), testified for the prosecution.They narrated that they first met appellant in the house of Manolito Reyes in Plaridel, Bulacan in June 1998. Appellant allegedly made representations to private complainants, among others, that his brother, Monchito, and his sister-in-law, Ruth, had the capacity to recruit apple and grape pickers for employment in New Zealand.5On 5 July 1998, the group, composed of the three private complainants and 35 others,6went to La Union where they met with Monchito and Ruth. Ruth proceeded to explain their prospective employment with a $1,200.00 monthly salary. Ruth also required the group to attend bible study sessions every Sunday because their prospective employer is a devout Catholic. Pursuant to their desire to work in New Zealand, the group attended bible study from 5 July to December 1998.7Each member of the group was asked to payP2,000.00 as assurance fee.8Leonora paid an additionalP400.00 for her National Statistics Office-issued birth certificate,9P500.00 for physical examination andP320.00 for medical fee.10Mauro gave an additionalP320.00 for medical expenses11whereas Valentino shelled outP180.00 for pictures,P1,000.00 for bio-data andP350.00 for medical examination.12The three attested that appellant received their payment and a document was prepared by one of their companions as evidence of the receipt.13The exhibits submitted by the prosecution show that Monchito acknowledged having received a total ofP101,480.00 from various applicants.14Other documents showed that appellant and Ruth received payment from the applicants.15Ruth and appellant allegedly promised them that they would leave for New Zealand before October 1998. When they were unable to leave, however, they were told that their prospective employer would arrive in the Philippines on 22 November 1998. On the designated date, they were informed that their prospective employer fell down the stairway of the airplane. An interview was then scheduled on 29 December 1998 but on that day, they were told that their prospective employer had been held up. This prompted the complainants to go to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to check on the background of the accused.They learned that appellant, Ruth and Monchito do not have the authority to recruit workers for employment abroad.16Certifications to that effect were issued by the POEA.17Appellant denied having recruited private complainants for work abroad. He claimed that he himself was also a victim as he had also paidP3,000.00 for himself andP2,000.00 for his daughter. He likewise attended the bible study sessions as a requirement for the overseas employment.18He contended that he was merely implicated in the case because he was the only one apprehended among the accused.19The trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant of the crime of illegal recruitment. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:Wherefore, all premises considered, this Court finds and so holds that the prosecution was able to establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt the criminal culpability of the accused Marcos Ganigan on the offense charged against him. Accordingly, this Court finds him guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale resulting in economic sabotage as defined under Section 6 and penalized under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine ofP500,000.00.Accused Marcos Ganigan is also directed to pay complainants Leonora Domingo, Mauro Reyes and Valentino Crisostomo the amounts ofP2,400.00 each plus the sum ofP500.00 for Leonora Domingo for actual damages andP25,000.00 as and for moral damages.With regard to accused Ruth Ganigan, Monchito Ganigan, Eddie Ganigan and Avelin Sulaiman Ganigan, who remain at large until this time, the case against them is ordered archived. Let an alias Warrant of arrest be issued for their apprehension.SO ORDERED.20The trial court found that all elements of illegal recruitment in large scale had been established through the testimonial and documentary evidence of the prosecution.In view of the penalty imposed, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic review. However, this Court resolved to transfer the case to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review in light of our ruling in People v. Mateo.21On 14 November 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.Upon receipt of the unfavorable decision, appellant filed a notice of appeal. On 15 October 2007, this Court resolved to accept the case and to require the parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation and Motion22stating that it would no longer file any supplemental briefs and instead adopt its appellee's brief filed on 12 January 2006. Appellant likewise manifested that he would merely adopt his appellant's brief.23Appellant argues that the prosecution has failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He maintains that he did not participate in any recruitment activity and that the alleged payments made by private complainants were for membership in the Christian Catholic Mission, as shown by the fact that private complainants have regularly attended bible study sessions from 5 July to November 1998. He also points out that nothing on record would show that the necessary training or orientation seminar pertaining to the supposed employment has ever been conducted.Assumingarguendothat the Christian Catholic Mission was only a front to an illegal venture, appellant avers that he was not part of the conspiracy because he was a victim himself as he in fact also paid assurance fees for membership in the Christian Catholic Mission. He laments that aside from introducing private complainants to Ruth, he has not done any other act tantamount to recruitment.The OSG defended the decision of the trial court in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of the complaining witnesses. It contends that there is no showing that the victims were impelled by any ill motive to falsely testify against appellant. It asserts that the collective testimony of the witnesses has categorically established appellant's participation in the crime.24The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when these two elements concur: (1) the offenders have no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) the offenders undertake any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined in Article 13(b) or any prohibited practices enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code. In case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third element is added - that the accused commits the acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group.25Article 13(b) defines recruitment and placement as "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers; and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not." In the simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give the impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes.26Since appellant, along with the other accused, made misrepresentations concerning their purported power and authority to recruit for overseas employment, and in the process collected from private complainants various amounts in the guise of placement fees, the former clearly committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment. In fact, this Court held that illegal recruiters need not even expressly represent themselves to the victims as persons who have the ability to send workers abroad. It is enough that these recruiters give the impression that they have the ability to enlist workers for job placement abroad in order to induce the latter to tender payment of fees.27It is clear from the testimonies of private complainants that appellant undertook to recruit them for a purported employment in New Zealand and in the process collected various amounts from them as "assurance fees" and other fees related thereto.Private complainants testified in a clear, positive and straightforward manner. Leonora testified that appellant recruited her to work in New Zealand as a fruit picker and was promised by Ruth a monthly salary of $1,200.00. She was required to pay an assurance fee ofP2,000.00. She later learned that appellant and his cohorts had not been licensed by the POEA to recruit for overseas employment.28On cross-examination, she confirmed that she turned over the amount of fees to appellant with the understanding that such payment was for employment abroad.29Mauro similarly recounted that he was introduced to Monchito and Ruth by appellant as an applicant for farm work in New Zealand. He was told to prepareP2,000.00 as assurance fee, which he paid to appellant. When he was unable to leave, he checked with the POEA and found out that appellant had no license to recruit.30During the cross-examination, Mauro was firm in his stance that he paid the amount ofP2,000.00 as assurance of employment in New Zealand. Furthermore, he regularly attended the bible study as a requirement for said employment.31Valentino's testimony corroborated that of Leonora and Mauro.32The trial court found these testimonies credible and convincing.Well-settled is the doctrine that great weight is accorded to the factual findings of the trial court particularly on the ascertainment of the credibility of witnesses; this can only be discarded or disturbed when it appears in the record that the trial court overlooked, ignored or disregarded some fact or circumstance of weight or significance which if considered would have altered the result.33In the present case, we find no reason to depart from the rule.Verily, we agree with the OSG that the testimonies of private complainants have adequately established the elements of the crime, as well as appellant's indispensable participation therein. Appellant recruited at least three persons, the private complainants in this case, giving them the impression that he and his relatives had the capability of sending them to New Zealand for employment as fruit pickers. The OSG adds that appellant went to Bulacan to invite the victims and accompanied them to a fellowship and briefing in La Union; that appellant misrepresented that joining the religious group would ensure their overseas employment; and that appellant without any license or authority to recruit, collected various amounts from private complainants.Appellant miserably failed to convince this Court that the payments made by the complainants were actually for their membership in the religious organization. He did not present any document to prove this allegation.For their part, private complainants were adamant that the payments made to appellant were for purposes of employment to New Zealand. They further explained that their participation in the bible study sessions was but a requirement imposed by appellant because their prospective employer was also a member of the same religious group.Moreover, appellant has failed to rebut the evidence presented by the prosecution consisting of a receipt of payment signed by him.34His flimsy denial that the signature on the receipt was not his own does not merit consideration in light of the trial court's contrary finding.As between the positive and categorical testimonies of private complainants and the unsubstantiated denial proffered by appellant, this Court is inclined to give more weight to the former.In sum, appellant is correctly found guilty of large scale illegal recruitment tantamount to economic sabotage.Under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042, the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less thanP500,000.00 nor more thanP1,000.000.00 shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00867 isAFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169076 January 23, 2007PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Appellee,vs.JOSEPH JAMILOSA,Appellant.D E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR.,J.:This is an appeal from the Decision1of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-97-72769 convicting appellant Joseph Jamilosa of large scale illegal recruitment under Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, and sentencing him to life imprisonment and to pay aP500,000.00 fine.The Information charging appellant with large scale illegal recruitment was filed by the Senior State Prosecutor on August 29, 1997. The inculpatory portion of the Information reads:That sometime in the months of January to February, 1996, or thereabout in the City of Quezon, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, representing to have the capacity, authority or license to contract, enlist and deploy or transport workers for overseas employment, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally recruit, contract and promise to deploy, for a fee the herein complainants, namely, Haide R. Ruallo, Imelda D. Bamba, Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E. Singh, for work or employment in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in Nursing Home and Care Center without first obtaining the required license and/or authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).Contrary to law.2On arraignment, the appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.The case for the prosecution, as synthesized by the Court of Appeals (CA), is as follows:The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: private complainants Imelda D. Bamba, Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E. Singh.Witness Imelda D. Bamba testified that on January 17, 1996, she met the appellant in Cubao, Quezon City on board an aircon bus. She was on her way to Shoemart (SM), North EDSA, Quezon City where she was working as a company nurse. The appellant was seated beside her and introduced himself as a recruiter of workers for employment abroad. The appellant told her that his sister is a head nurse in a nursing home in Los Angeles, California, USA and he could help her get employed as a nurse at a monthly salary of Two Thousand US Dollars ($2,000.00) and that she could leave in two (2) weeks time. He further averred that he has connections with the US Embassy, being a US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent on official mission in the Philippines for one month. According to the appellant, she has to pay the amount of US$300.00 intended for the US consul. The appellant gave his pager number and instructed her to contact him if she is interested to apply for a nursing job abroad.On January 21, 1996, the appellant fetched her at her office. They then went to her house where she gave him the photocopies of her transcript of records, diploma, Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) license and other credentials. On January 28 or 29, 1996, she handed to the appellant the amount of US$300.00 at the McDonalds outlet in North EDSA, Quezon City, and the latter showed to her a photocopy of her supposed US visa. The appellant likewise got several pieces of jewelry which she was then selling and assured her that he would sell the same at the US embassy. However, the appellant did not issue a receipt for the said money and jewelry. Thereafter, the appellant told her to resign from her work at SM because she was booked with Northwest Airlines and to leave for Los Angeles, California, USA on February 25, 1996.The appellant promised to see her and some of his other recruits before their scheduled departure to hand to them their visas and passports; however, the appellant who was supposed to be with them in the flight failed to show up. Instead, the appellant called and informed her that he failed to give the passport and US visa because he had to go to the province because his wife died. She and her companions were not able to leave for the United States. They went to the supposed residence of the appellant to verify, but nobody knew him or his whereabouts. They tried to contact him at the hotel where he temporarily resided, but to no avail. They also inquired from the US embassy and found out that there was no such person connected with the said office. Thus, she decided to file a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).Prosecution witness Geraldine Lagman, for her part, testified that she is a registered nurse by profession. In the morning of January 22, 1996, she went to SM North EDSA, Quezon City to visit her cousin Imelda Bamba. At that time, Bamba informed her that she was going to meet the appellant who is an FBI agent and was willing to help nurses find a job abroad. Bamba invited Lagman to go with her. On the same date at about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, she and Bamba met the appellant at the SM Fast-Food Center, Basement, North EDSA, Quezon City. The appellant convinced them of his ability to send them abroad and told them that he has a sister in the United States. Lagman told the appellant that she had no working experience in any hospital but the appellant assured her that it is not necessary to have one. The appellant asked for US$300.00 as payment to secure an American visa and an additional amount of Three Thousand Four Hundred Pesos (P3,400.00) as processing fee for other documents.On January 24, 1996, she and the appellant met again at SM North EDSA, Quezon City wherein she handed to the latter her passport and transcript of records. The appellant promised to file the said documents with the US embassy. After one (1) week, they met again at the same place and the appellant showed to her a photocopy of her US visa. This prompted her to give the amount of US$300.00 and two (2) bottles of Black Label to the appellant. She gave the said money and liquor to the appellant without any receipt out of trust and after the appellant promised her that he would issue the necessary receipt later. The appellant even went to her house, met her mother and uncle and showed to them a computer printout from Northwest Airlines showing that she was booked to leave for Los Angeles, California, USA on February 25, 1996.Four days after their last meeting, Extelcom, a telephone company, called her because her number was appearing in the appellants cellphone documents. The caller asked if she knew him because they were trying to locate him, as he was a swindler who failed to pay his telephone bills in the amount ofP100,000.00. She became suspicious and told Bamba about the matter. One (1) week before her scheduled flight on February 25, 1996, they called up the appellant but he said he could not meet them because his mother passed away. The appellant never showed up, prompting her to file a complaint with the NBI for illegal recruitment.Lastly, witness Alma Singh who is also a registered nurse, declared that she first met the appellant on February 13, 1996 at SM North EDSA, Quezon City when Imelda Bamba introduced the latter to her. The appellant told her that he is an undercover agent of the FBI and he could fix her US visa as he has a contact in the US embassy. The appellant told her